<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<feed xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom">
<title>Law - Journal Articles</title>
<link href="http://hdl.handle.net/10468/231" rel="alternate"/>
<subtitle/>
<id>http://hdl.handle.net/10468/231</id>
<updated>2013-05-03T00:07:36Z</updated>
<dc:date>2013-05-03T00:07:36Z</dc:date>
<entry>
<title>Diversion of offenders with mental disorders: Mental health courts</title>
<link href="http://hdl.handle.net/10468/618" rel="alternate"/>
<author>
<name>Ryan, Sarah</name>
</author>
<author>
<name>Whelan, Darius</name>
</author>
<id>http://hdl.handle.net/10468/618</id>
<updated>2012-07-11T02:00:40Z</updated>
<published>2012-02-24T00:00:00Z</published>
<summary type="text">Diversion of offenders with mental disorders: Mental health courts
Ryan, Sarah; Whelan, Darius
At present, if people with mental disorders appear before the criminal courts in Ireland, unless they are unfit for trial or not guilty by reason of insanity, the system governing their case will be the general one which applies to all criminal cases. In recent decades, a number of other common law jurisdictions have begun to set up mental health courts as a means of diverting some people with mental disorders from the criminal justice system and into more appropriate treatment. This article begins with a review of the background to mental health courts, focusing on the concept of diversion from the criminal justice system and the role of Therapeutic Jurisprudence theory as an inspiration for the establishment of mental health courts. The main features of mental health courts are identified and the features of those in existence in the United States are contrasted with those in Canada and England and Wales. Some of the main arguments against the use of these courts will be discussed, including the contentions that defendants  participation may not be truly voluntary and that their due process rights are not adequately protected. The question of whether a mental health court should be established in Ireland is considered.
</summary>
<dc:date>2012-02-24T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Legislative policy, law and competitiveness: a mysterious and difficult relationship in the EU</title>
<link href="http://hdl.handle.net/10468/1003" rel="alternate"/>
<author>
<name>Lynch-Fannon, Irene</name>
</author>
<id>http://hdl.handle.net/10468/1003</id>
<updated>2013-03-01T03:00:12Z</updated>
<published>2009-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
<summary type="text">Legislative policy, law and competitiveness: a mysterious and difficult relationship in the EU
Lynch-Fannon, Irene
The Lisbon Agenda places Europe in a uniquely difficult position globally, most particularly as an example of a social and regulatory experiment which many consider to be doomed to failure. The drive towards economic competitiveness has led to a focus on regulation and its effect on entrepreneurship, productivity and business growth but assessing this relationship is complex for a number of reasons. First, not all regulatory effects can be predicted precisely in relation to behavioural outcomes. Path-dependency scholars have also demonstrated that the regulation will have varying effects depending on context. Second, theoretically it is clear that many non-regulatory factors may contribute to economic and competitive success. Third, there is evidence of internal conflict within the Commission as to the relative importance of the Lisbon goals. Finally, the experience of distinct Member States presents challenges both for assessment and prescriptive remedies. The Commission has estimated that the cost of regulatory compliance obligations on businesses in the EU is between 4% and 6% of gross domestic product and that 15% of this figure is avoidable 'red tape' (the term used specifically to signify unnecessary compliance burdens). This article proposes to assess the likely outcomes of de-regulation as we rapidly approach 2010, the year for attainment of the Lisbon goals.
</summary>
<dc:date>2009-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Fitness for trial in the District Court: the legal perspective</title>
<link href="http://hdl.handle.net/10468/232" rel="alternate"/>
<author>
<name>Whelan, Darius</name>
</author>
<id>http://hdl.handle.net/10468/232</id>
<updated>2011-03-01T03:00:04Z</updated>
<published>2007-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
<summary type="text">Fitness for trial in the District Court: the legal perspective
Whelan, Darius
</summary>
<dc:date>2007-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>The corporate social responsibility movement and law's empire: Is there a conflict?</title>
<link href="http://hdl.handle.net/10468/1007" rel="alternate"/>
<author>
<name>Lynch-Fannon, Irene</name>
</author>
<id>http://hdl.handle.net/10468/1007</id>
<updated>2013-03-26T03:09:14Z</updated>
<published>2007-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
<summary type="text">The corporate social responsibility movement and law's empire: Is there a conflict?
Lynch-Fannon, Irene
At the heart of corporate governance and social responsibility discourse is recognition of the fact that the modern corporation is primarily governed by the profit maximisation imperative coupled with moral and ethical concerns that such a limited imperative drives the actions of large and wealthy corporations which have the ability to act in influential and significant ways, shaping how our social world is experienced. The actions of the corporation and its management will have a wide sphere of impact over all of its stakeholders whether these are employees, shareholders, consumers or the community in which the corporation is located. As globalisation has become central to the way we think it is also clear that ‘community’ has an ever expanding meaning which may include workers and communities living very far away from Corporate HQ. In recent years academic commentators have become increasingly concerned about the emphasis on what can be called short-term profit maximisation and the perception that this extremist interpretation of the profit imperative results in morally and ethically unacceptable outcomes.1 Hence demands for more corporate social responsibility. Following Cadbury’s2 classification of corporate social responsibility into three distinct areas, this paper will argue that once the legally regulated tier is left aside corporate responsibility can become so nebulous as to be relatively meaningless. The argument is not that corporations should not be required to act in socially responsible ways but that unless supported by regulation, which either demands high standards, or at the very least incentivises the attainment of such standards such initiatives are doomed to failure. The paper will illustrate by reference to various chosen cases that law’s discourse has already signposted ways to consider and resolve corporate governance problems in the broader social responsibility context.3 It will also illustrate how corporate responsibility can and must be supported by legal measures. Secondly, this paper will consider the potential conflict between an emphasis on corporate social responsibility and the regulatory approach.4 Finally, this paper will place the current interest in corporate social responsibility within the broader debate on the relationship between law and non-legally enforceable norms and will present some reflections on the norm debate arising from this consideration of the CSR movement.
</summary>
<dc:date>2007-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</entry>
</feed>
