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JCOERE
Judicial Co-operation
Supporting Economic Recovery in Europe

Report 2
Report on Judicial Co-operation in Preventive Restructuring and Insolvency in the EU
Substantive and procedural harmonisation, judicial practice and guidelines.

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Report 2: Report on Judicial Co-operation in Preventive Restructuring and Insolvency in the EU

Substantive and procedural harmonisation, judicial practice and guidelines
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Professor Irene Lynch Fannon, Principal Investigator, Dr Jennifer L. L. Gant, Post-Doctoral Researcher, Aoife Finnerty, Research Assistant and Molly O’Connor, Project Manager

1.1 Introduction

The JCOERE Project is focused on the concept of co-operation between courts and practitioners across Member States of the European Union. The specific subject matter of the JCOERE Project concerns the obligations imposed by the European Insolvency Regulation (Recast) on courts in European Member States to co-operate in cross-border insolvency matters. Additional obligations are placed on insolvency practitioners to co-operate. Furthermore, in light of new initiatives in the area of corporate restructuring, the JCOERE Project focused on this important policy initiative and hypothesised that the nature of the rules typically involved in preventive restructuring frameworks might present further obstacles to co-operation between courts. These rules were both substantive and procedural in nature. Because the JCOERE Project focused on co-operation and communication obligations contained in the European Insolvency Regulation (Recast) it was appropriate to choose a type of insolvency process covered by this Regulation. However, many of the issues raised in this part of the Project and described in this second Report are equally applicable to a broader range of initiatives concerning judicial and court-to-court co-operation in the European Union. This broader issue is fundamental to continued European integration. Where

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1 Throughout this report, it should be noted that the spelling of co-operate (cooperate) and co-operation (cooperation) will alternate. This is because they are used interchangeably within the documentation and literature that we have used and referred to throughout the Report. For example, Chapter 2 utilises ‘cooperate’, as that is the spelling found in the EIR Recast. The JCOERE Project itself, by contrast and as articulated above, has ‘co-operation’ in its title. This is also the case for words such as co-ordinate (coordinate) and co-ordination (coordination).


4 As we examined how Member States approached preventive restructuring in their domestic frameworks both prior to and in anticipation of implementation of the Preventive Restructuring Directive 1023/2019 it became apparent that some domestic legislative processes aimed at corporate rescue were already covered by the European Insolvency Regulation (Annex A) whilst others were not. This in effect means that some preventive restructuring frameworks in Member States will benefit from co-operation obligations in the Regulation, others will not. It is also important to note that the Preventive Restructuring Directive itself allows Member States the choice of whether or not to include the implementing process in Annex A of the Regulation. See Recital 13 and 14 of the PRD. See further Lorenzo Stanghellini and Andrea Zorzi, ‘Coordinating the Prevent Restructuring Directive and the Recast European Insolvency Regulation’ Eurofenix (Autumn 2019) 22.
an obligation is imposed on courts to co-operate, the obvious question is whether there is a specific obligation imposed on members of the judiciary specifically to co-operate. This question is answered affirmatively by some commentators but this report takes the view in Chapters 3 and 5 that this is an open-ended issue.

1.2 The European Project and Judicial Co-operation

At the time of writing, the issue of corporate and business insolvency and rescue has unfortunately become acute due to the COVID 19 pandemic. The broader public health and economic threats have yet again raised high level issues concerning the nature of the European project. As President Emmanuelle Macron has observed, the debate focusses on whether the European Union is simply a market project or a political project and has stated *inter alia* that: ‘If the European Union is to succeed as a political project sustained and continued attention must be paid to issues of co-operation and co-ordination in legal spheres.’

1.3 A European Judiciary

While Chapter 4 of this Report considers matters relating to legal and judicial culture in detail, this section will briefly consider the question of whether there is a distinctive European legal tradition or culture. Whether this exists or not or has more potential for development, this is nevertheless the context in which co-operation obligations will operate. Effective court-to-court co-operation is dependent upon aligned legal principles and values, such as the rule of law and judicial independence. The importance of these factors is evident in the emphasis placed upon them in the EU’s criteria for accession.

As is commonly known, the European Union sets out membership criteria for each accession state, which are contained in the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht (Article 49). A subsequent declaration was made in June 1993 by the European Council in Copenhagen which led to the denomination of these more detailed criteria as the ‘Copenhagen criteria.’ The criteria address three areas that form the basis of negotiations with a particular candidate state, namely the political, economic and legislative areas. These areas are used to guide accession states towards EU membership. The legislative criteria focus on what are called ‘rule of law’ issues that are in turn governed by the Rule of Law Framework. The Framework was introduced by the European Commission in March 2014 and has three stages, namely a Commission Rule of Law Assessment, a Commission Rule of Law Opinion and a Commission

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Rule of Law Amendment. The official view is that the entire process is based on a continuous dialogue between the Commission and the Member State concerned, with the Commission keeping the European Parliament and Council informed.

1.3.1 Enforcing the Copenhagen criteria

When agreed in 1993, there was no mechanism for ensuring that any country that was already an EU Member State was compliant with these criteria. However, arrangements have now been put in place to police compliance, following the ‘sanctions’ imposed against the Austrian government of Wolfgang Schüssel in early 2000 by the other 14 Member States' governments. This process can end with the invocation of Article 7(1) of the TEU, which was threatened in relation to Poland some years later.

More recently the Commission took action in 2016 and 2017 against Poland in relation to the treatment of members of the judiciary. In its statement on the 26th July 2017, it stated that the reform of the judiciary in Poland ‘amplifies the systemic threat to the rule of law in Poland already identified in the rule of law procedure started by the Commission in January 2016’. The Commission went on to request that the Polish authorities address the identified problems within a month of this decision and particularly requested the Polish authorities ‘not to take any measure to dismiss or force the retirement of Supreme Court judges’. The Commission stated that it was ready to implement ‘the Article 7(1) procedure’ – a formal warning by the EU that can be issued by four fifths of the Member States in the Council of Ministers.

At the time, a specific connection was made between this issue, the rule of law generally, and the importance of an independent judiciary as an essential precondition for EU membership. The statement of the Commission President Jean Claude Juncker at the time emphasised that a system that included the ability of a state to dismiss judges at will could not operate in the EU, noting that: ‘Independent courts are the basis of mutual trust between our Member States and our judicial systems.’ In other words, a commonly created judiciary is essential to mutual trust between Member States and obviously to detailed court-to-court co-operation. Vice President Franz Timmermans set out the issue even more explicitly, describing that the courts of each Member State, in this case the courts of Poland, are expected to provide an effective remedy in case of violations of EU law, in which case they act as the ‘judges of the Union.’ This statement sets up an interesting situation whereby Member States have their

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9 This is explained in a graphic attached to the European Commission Press Release regarding the position of Poland below.


11 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union [2012] OJ C326/13, Article 7(1). (Hereinafter TEU). Article 7.1 of the Treaty on European Union provides for the Council, acting by a majority of four fifths of its members, to determine that there is a clear risk of a serious breach by a Member State of the common values referred to in Article 2 of the Treaty (see Annex II). The Commission can trigger this process by a reasoned proposal.

12 Press Release (n 12).

13 Ibid.
own independent system for appointing judges, but once appointed judges and courts become in some way judges of the European Union.

1.3.2 The Tampere Council

The vision for further integration of the European Union was underpinned by the holding of the Special Council meeting in 1999 in Tampere, Finland, which addressed the need to create a ‘European Area of Justice’. Amongst the milestones articulated by the Council, the following statement was made regarding the mutual recognition of judicial decisions at Article 33:

Enhanced mutual recognition of judicial decisions and judgements and the necessary approximation of legislation would facilitate co-operation between authorities and the judicial protection of individual rights. The European Council therefore endorses the principle of mutual recognition which, in its view, should become the cornerstone of judicial co-operation in both civil and criminal matters within the Union. The principle should apply both to judgements and to other decisions of judicial authorities.14

The Tampere Council provided a platform for the development of mutual recognition of judgements and consequent co-operation between judicial and administrative authorities in Europe. Many areas of law ranging from criminal to family to commercial law are now subject to specific rules regarding co-operation between Member State courts.15

1.4 Co-operation, Trust, Recognition, and Harmonisation

The idea of co-operation is recognised as being underpinned by concepts such as trust in, and recognition of, Member State legal systems, in addition to the more complex and ambitious pursuit of a harmonisation agenda.16 Because of the complexity of doctrinal issues, harmonisation is not as easily achieved as other elements to co-operation. This is highlighted by the work with Member State country reports gathered during the first stage of the doctrinal research of this Project. Combining all four elements co-operation, trust, recognition, and harmonisation will lead to integration of the European Union, but no assumptions are made in this Project as to the optimal levels of integration. When the JCOERE Project focussed on preventive restructuring frameworks in Report 1 it became apparent that there were strong underlying differences regarding policy and implementation of rescue processes for corporations and businesses in Europe. Report 1 the of the JCOERE Project demonstrated that there were significant differences between policy makers and thought influencers (academics) across the European Union on the theory of preventive restructuring. In surveying 11 jurisdictions within the EU, benchmarked against the newly passed Preventive

16 This is also addressed in the context of the text of the European Insolvency Regulation in Chapter 2.
Restructuring Directive,\textsuperscript{17} it was clear that there was also significant variation in existing processes. Furthermore, the PRD itself allows for continued variation within Member States; these range from what this Project has termed ‘robust restructuring processes’, exemplified by the use in practice of the English Scheme of Arrangement processes and the Irish Examinership process (based on the US Chapter 11 process), to much less aggressive restructuring.\textsuperscript{18} The EIR Recast recognises the reality of ‘widely differing substantive laws’ in the insolvency laws of Member States.\textsuperscript{19} At the same time however, the EIR Recast also expresses the aspiration that harmonisation projects will successively bring domestic frameworks together, thereby underpinning the elements necessary for further co-operation. Nevertheless, as we have seen in Report 1, the PRD expressly supports widely differing variations in Member State legislative frameworks with the provision of a range of choices allowing for significant variations in types of restructuring processes.

\textbf{1.4.1 Co-operation and the EIR Recast 2015}

Whilst Chapter 2 of this Report will outline the terms of the EIR Recast in relation to co-operation obligations, Chapter 5 will explore some case law on how these may operate. However, in the context of this Chapter it is worth emphasising how the obligations imposed by the EIR Recast are based on Article 81 TFEU regarding judicial co-operation in civil matters with cross-border implications.\textsuperscript{20} Furthermore, this specific obligation is based on the even broader principle of sincere co-operation outlined in Article 4(3) TEU.\textsuperscript{21}

Despite these observations and indeed European aspirations, our empirical observation is that court-to-court co-operation is a matter with which members of the European judiciary are not very familiar. Even though we certainly found that there was a general understanding of recognition provisions incorporated in the Regulation and in the EIR Recast, there was much less experience, if any, of co-operation during the hearing of a case, or indeed expectation that such an issue would arise.\textsuperscript{22} However, the specific co-operation obligations are relatively new, having been introduced in the EIR Recast, which although passed in 2015 only began to

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{19} See Chapter 3 below for further categorisation of the Member States surveyed.
\item \textsuperscript{20} EIR Recast, Recital 21.
\item \textsuperscript{22} See the discussion by Dominik Skauradszun and Andreas Spahlinger, ‘Chapter III Secondary Insolvency Proceedings, Articles 40 – 44’, in Moritz Brinkmann (ed), \textit{European Insolvency Regulation: Article by Article Commentary} (Beck, Hart, Nomos, 2019).
\item \textsuperscript{22} Discussion at the INSOL Judicial Wing, INSOL European Annual Congress, held in Copenhagen, September 26th, 2019. See further Chapter 8 of this Report.
\end{itemize}
apply on 26 June 2017 (in accordance with Article 92) and so it is possible that discussion and consideration of these issues will become more common over time.  

1.5 JCOERE Project Summary to Date

Before considering the nature and development of judicial and court co-operation in the European Union, this section will summarise the research of the JCOERE Project to date. As noted above, this concerns the development of the theory and law with respect to preventive restructuring and rescue within the European Union. In our first Report, we described the debate within the Member States regarding the concepts, which are fundamental to restructuring. These concepts were explained in an academic context in Chapter 4 of our first Report, relying heavily on commentary from US academics familiar with Chapter 11 type restructuring processes. Our first Report demonstrated the heated nature of the debate, which is taking place in European academic circles triggered by the passing of the PRD.

Second, we concluded that the academic debate has clearly influenced the development of the PRD itself, given that the Commission-DG Justice established and consulted with a range of academic commentators in the Commission Group of Experts on restructuring and insolvency law (E03362). In addition, the first JCOERE Report reflected on pre-existing preventive restructuring frameworks in various Member States, including for example Ireland’s Examinership, the Italian debt restructuring processes, and the French sauvegarde. The various iterations of the PRD as described in Chapter 5 of the first JCOERE Report underline this. The contribution of various academic projects including the CODIRE project to the development of the PRD is also important.

Third, in picking some controversial provisions in preventive restructuring we pursued the hypothesis that court-to-court co-operation would be challenged by the very nature of restructuring. We saw that the intellectual liveliness of the academic debate was both an influence in terms of continued divergence but also reflective of quite divergent approaches to restructuring leading up to, and following, the passing of the PRD. Some of this divergence also arises from the challenge of matching quite diverse legal systems with a harmonising piece of legislation. It was clear that even where terminology is concerned there are misunderstandings, which we highlighted in Chapter 2 of the first Report.

In addition, as we surveyed different state responses to restructuring, it became clear that disagreement and lack of clarity was not only limited to terminology but also existed in

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23 Interestingly some commentators assumed that there was an implied obligation to co-operate under the general schema of recognition and enforcement in the original 2000 Insolvency Regulation. See Gabriel Moss, Ian Fletcher and Stuart Isaacs, The EU Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings (3rd edn, OUP 2016), at para 8.402. See also the cases that are discussed in Chapter 5 of this report.


relation to key concepts. Key concepts included what is termed ‘the threshold question’, namely the question of which companies (those which were tending towards insolvency and/or those which were insolvent but not formally declared to be) could avail of a restructuring process; the application of a stay or moratorium to other creditors; the treatment of creditors throughout the process in relation to pre-existing priority, and approval processes. We concluded that following the implementation of the PRD, divergence would persist even in relation to these most basic concepts, aggravated in this context by the extensive scope within the PRD for differential implementation of its provisions.

Fourth, the peculiar interplay between the EIR Recast and the PRD and other restructuring processes raises a range of questions for the potential for mutual recognition under the EIR Recast, let alone co-operation, upon which we will expand in this Report.

1.6 Framework of the Second Report

Chapter 2 considers the evolution of the EIR Recast with particular emphasis on co-operation and co-ordination obligations imposed on both courts and insolvency practitioners. Our focus is on corporate rescue. The EIR Recast addresses obligations to co-operate in relation to insolvency processes affecting a single debtor, in our case a single corporate entity, but goes on to describe similar obligations in relation to corporate groups. In Chapter 3 the Report will return to our survey of the Member States; first, to place substantive differences in the broader context of judicial and court co-operation and second, to describe what we broadly define as procedural rules that present obstacles to court-to-court co-operation. This Chapter will be supported by information gathered in the second half of Part III of the JCOERE Questionnaire, which was distributed during the first phase of our research. Accordingly, in Chapter 3 we will combine our assessment of the level of disagreement regarding key concepts and substantive rules with our discussion of procedural rules to indicate the potential challenges to co-operation.

1.6.1 Engaging with the European Judiciary

During the JCOERE Project we have been fortunate enough to have access to the Judicial Wing of INSOL Europe. We first met the Judicial Wing at the INSOL Europe Annual Conference in Athens, Greece in 2018 where an initial presentation of the Project was made and greeted with considerable interest from members of the judiciary who were present. The presentation
covered both the expected enactment of the PRD (which was passed the following June in 2019) and the idea of court-to-court cooperation and the consequent obligations to co-operate imposed by the EIR Recast 848/2015. At that time, the members of the Judicial Wing were extremely interested in engaging with the Project. In fact, the concept of judicial cooperation in insolvency processes was also the subject of a presentation by members of the judiciary at the main INSOL Europe Congress held in the following days in Athens. At that point, the judicial members on the panel expressed some reservations about the burden of being obliged to co-operate in cross-border insolvency cases. Practical difficulties were also discussed, including language barriers and knowledge of Member State processes. In addition, in terms of protocols facilitating co-operation, a matter which is the subject of Chapter 6 of this Report, the participating members of the judiciary expressed a preference for developing co-operation protocols on a case by case basis, views which are also reflected in the responses to the Judicial Survey discussed in Chapter 8 of this Report.

At the second meeting in which JCOERE presented its findings to the INSOL Europe Judicial Wing, this time at the INSOL Europe Annual Congress in Copenhagen, the JCOERE Project was well advanced. At a special meeting the progress of the JCOERE Project presented a case study based on an Irish Examinership case. At this meeting the views of the members present were that once the process was covered in Annex A of the EIR Recast there would indeed be co-operation. However, practical barriers to co-operation were raised, in particular, the difficulty of accessing information on other Member State’s domestic processes. In some jurisdictions, for example, judges were directed to specific, approved sources of information, whereas in other jurisdictions this process was considerably more open-ended. As it happens, one of the final tasks of this Project is to create a database of cases for members of the judiciary to access. In addition, language and equivalence of legal terms and concepts was also considered an issue.

In the latter part of the Project a judicial survey was distributed, which sought information regarding knowledge of processes and responses to obligations to co-operate and calls for co-operation. In particular, the survey queried the information on awareness of existing protocols on co-operation. All of this is discussed in both Chapters 6 and 8 of this Report.

The JCOERE project has been invited to present its findings at a virtual meeting of the INSOL Judicial Wing in September and presented an open panel to the Society of Legal Scholars (held virtually this year) on differences in judicial reasoning in European courts. Finally, all going well the JCOERE project will conduct its final event live in Dublin in November 2020.

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31 This seems to reflect experience of actual cases as described in Chapters 3, 5 and 7 of this Report.

32 These documents are available on the JCOERE website <www.ucc.ie/en/jcoere> and in Annex I of this Report.
1.6.2 Common and Civil Law cultures

During the Project we also became aware of continuing differences between jurisdictions regarding the judicial function, broadly described. Lawyers from a common law tradition place great emphasis on the role of the judicial branch in interpreting legislation. It has always been part of the accepted tension within the European Union that there was some difference between common law countries within the EU and civil law countries (which represent the majority of Member States) on the scope of judicial discretion, although this difference was not considered to be generally significant. To our surprise, however, this difference emerged in discussions surrounding the PRD, pre-existing domestic restructuring processes and the role of the courts. Civil lawyers expressed distrust of the role of courts as described by their common law colleagues as arbiters of technical evidence regarding the viability of an enterprise, described the development of tests and application of fairness in domestic restructuring frameworks as being ‘random’ where common lawyers described a case by case development of these tests. In one conference a commentator described the role of the US courts as ‘capricious’ in interpreting the terms of Chapter 11. We consider these ongoing differences arising from legal culture in Chapter 4 of this Report.

1.6.3 Differences in qualifications and training

In addition, the creation of a European judiciary, a phrase that has emerged in European policy documents, is quite a challenging project given differences in training, practical backgrounds, and cultures. We return to these ideas in Chapter 4. In the meantime, it is worth noting that the EU continues to monitor judicial functions generally within the EU as a whole, issuing documents such as the EU Justice Scoreboard for public consideration. In preliminary remarks in the 2019 edition of this document, Věra Jourová, European Commissioner for Justice, Consumers and Gender Equality states that:

We all should share the same objective of improving our European judiciary, as without independent and efficient justice systems, there can be no rule of law, no trust from citizens, and no business and investment-friendly environment.

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33 England and Wales, Northern Ireland within the UK (excluding Scotland) are traditionally described as common law countries. England and Wales being a particularly dominant jurisdiction insofar as corporate rescue was concerned during the recession from 2007-2012/13. Similarly, the Republic of Ireland is a common law jurisdiction with a written Constitution. Cyprus is a third common law jurisdiction within the EU and Malta a final jurisdiction whose laws have roots in common law and civil law combined.

34 Tomáš Richter, ‘Negotiating a restructuring plan: confirmation, cross-class cram-down and valuation’ (Paper presented at ERA Conference, Trier, 7 November 2019).


37 See for example European Commission, ‘The 2019 EU Justice Scoreboard’ (Communication) COM (2019) 198/2 final. This is the 7th edition of this document.
1.6.4 Independence

The independence of the judiciary is one of the key concepts addressed in the Justice Scoreboard. Interestingly, scores in relation to the perceived independence of the judiciary amongst companies illustrate that Ireland and the Netherlands (both with proactive rescue processes) score highly,\(^\text{38}\) the UK a little less so. Cyprus as a common law country scored well below these figures.\(^\text{39}\)

1.7 The Judiciary and Cross-border Insolvency Co-operation

As the Project continued, and our engagement with members of the judiciary and the practising communities increased, more interesting questions arose. For the main part, these focussed on the presence of any formal types of co-operation, the frequency of these issues arising in reality, and how the issue of co-operation or otherwise was pre-empted in a number of different ways. These developments will lead to a consideration of the obligations themselves in the body of this Report and whether there is actually any need for the imposition of formal obligations, such as those present in the EIR Recast. Chapter 5 of this Report highlights some of these issues through a discussion of case law which, in turn, describes real commercial situations where these issues have arisen. As we progressed in our research, we realised the nature of co-operation in EU insolvency matters remains unclear. It seems that a lot of assumptions have been made regarding this matter, which will be explored further as case law develops into the future. That said we are conscious of the fact that the EIR Recast (with its enhanced co-operation obligations) is a relatively new piece of legislation, dating back only 3 years from the time of the beginning of the project in 2018 and so perhaps it is too early to say what its real effects are, or indeed how these enhanced obligations to co-operate will be interpreted over time, particularly in the even newer context of a pan European preventive restructuring framework.

1.8 Co-Operation Guidelines, Examples, and Experience

In keeping with our original research agenda (as indicated to the EU Commission DG Justice) we will also consider awareness of, and the application of, existing best practice guidelines for co-operation in cross-border insolvency cases. Chapter 6 will provide an account of these current existing guidelines on co-operation in cross-border insolvency cases, particularly those applicable in the European sphere. Chapter 6 will also explore how co-operation is

\(^{38}\) Ibid at p. 45. In Ireland 30% rated judicial independence as very good with 70% as fairly good. In the UK these figures were 20% and 60% approximately. The Netherlands the figures were 25% and 73% approximately. Other common law countries such as Cyprus scored lower with 12% and just over 50% scoring very good and fairly good perception of judicial independence.

\(^{39}\) This is also interesting as Cyprus introduced a rescue procedure which is similar to Ireland’s examinership process which has been judged a failure. See further Kayode Akinola and Sofia Ellina, ‘The Use and Abuse of Corporate Insolvency Rescue Procedures: A Contextual Evaluation of the United Kingdom and Cyprus’ in Jennifer L. L. Gant (ed), Party Autonomy and Third Party Protection in Insolvency Law (INSOL Europe 2019) 137-154. See generally Michael Peel, ‘Moscow on the Med: Cyprus and its Russians’ Financial Times (Limassol and Nicosia, May 15th, 2020), and see further Council of Europe, Anti-money Laundering and Counter-terrorist Financing Measures in Cyprus, Fifth Round Mutual Evaluation Report December 2019 Moneyval (2019) 27.
envisaged under the UNCITRAL Model Law, which includes provisions on co-operation that are similar to the EIR Recast. Chapters 5 and 8 of this Report will include information on judicial awareness and use of these guidelines gleaned from our engagement with members of the European judiciary through the Judicial Wing of INSOL Europe.40

Chapter 7 will then give an insight into how the United States, as a federalised jurisdiction similar in some respects to the structure of the EU, deals with interstate insolvencies, particularly with regard to forum determination and cross-border case coordination. The latter of these two aspects will mainly explore how coordination occurs often through bespoke protocols created on a case-by-case basis.

The final substantive chapter of this Report, Chapter 8, will present our findings of a survey distributed among three judicial focus groups in English, Italian, and Romanian. The purpose of this survey was to determine the experience of members of the European judiciary with both court-to-court co-operation in cross-border cases and their awareness and utilisation of the guidelines discussed in Chapter 6.41 The final Chapter will then offer our conclusions and reflections on the content of this Report.

1.9 Chapter 2: Transition

The next Chapter will give an exposition of the European Insolvency Regulation (Recast) 848/2015 applicable from 26 June 201742 developing from the original European Insolvency Regulation 1346/2000.43 It provides an explanation of the policy and regulatory framework within which the obligation placed on courts to co-operate arises. In particular, it will focus on the evolution of the co-operation obligations under both versions of the EIR, including how the EU views the meaning of judicial co-operation and what kinds of actions are expected or recommended in this area. These obligations will be examined in terms of both the recitals and the articles within which they are seated and how they developed between the two Regulations, along with a close analysis of the same provisions for corporate groups.

40 Materials of relevance, which were presented at these meetings, are attached in an Annex to this Report.
41 A copy of this survey distributed through domestic networks of our partner researchers UNIFI, who accessed an Italian network of insolvency judges, UTM who accessed those in the Romanian Magistracy having experience in hearing insolvency cases, and Ireland and through the Judicial Wing of INSOL Europe is attached in an Annex II to this Report.
42 EIR Recast, art 92.
II. Chapter 2: Court-to-court and Judicial Co-Operation\(^1\) in the European Union

2.1 Introduction to Chapter 2

In Chapter 3 of Report 1, we considered the evolution of the European Insolvency Regulation\(^2\) and the subsequent EIR Recast (848/2015)\(^3\) from various conventions and negotiations taking place since the 1960s, which exemplify the movement toward further integration of the European Union. During those early decades, but particularly during the period immediately preceding the adoption of the EIR Recast, the discussion between universalism and territorialism, which had taken place in the United States academy, sparked the interests of some academics on this side of the Atlantic.\(^4\) However, no EU policy documents proactively engage with this theoretical debate\(^5\) and it is clear that the incrementalist approach\(^6\) was adopted in the European Union, thereby avoiding a binary classification of approaches to issues of recognition and cooperation.

This Chapter will trace the evolution of the EIR Recast and, in particular, the evolution of the cooperation obligations. In doing so, it will consider how the EU addresses what is meant by judicial cooperation and what kinds of action are envisaged. Section 2.2 is broken into three parts. First, it begins with a discussion of the EIR and considers its historical background and some of the factors that prompted its introduction. The next section progresses to considering the specific cooperation obligations for individual debtors found in the EIR and discusses the changes to these requirements introduced by the Recast. The third part of section 2.2

\(^{1}\) The remainder of this chapter will adopt the spelling cooperation, so that is the spelling in the EIR and the EIR Recast.


\(^{5}\) See for example Emilie Ghio, ‘Cross-border Insolvency and Rescue Law Theory: Moving Away from the Traditional Debate on Universalism and Territorialism’ (2018) 29(12) ICCLR 713.

considers the changes made to the EIR Recast during the inter-institutional negotiations and highlights some of key differences between what the Commission proposed and what was eventually passed. Section 2.3 considers the relationship between the EIR, the EIR Recast and the regulation of groups of companies. It is split into three parts: the first considers cooperation obligations for groups of companies; the second discusses the regulation of proceedings for groups of companies; and the third looks at the differences between the Commission Proposal for the EIR Recast and what was finally agreed, giving some context to the divergent views of the institutions.7

2.2 The European Insolvency Regulation and the Obligation to Cooperate

2.2.1 Introduction to the EIR and its Recast

Amongst others, Reinhard Bork, Paul Omar and Kristin van Zwieten trace the history of the EIR back to the 1970 draft Convention on Bankruptcy, Winding-up, Arrangements, Compositions, and Similar Proceedings,8 wherein those drafting the Convention recognised that insolvency proceedings in one State had to produce effects in other States in order to be in any way effective.9 As appears to be common in relation to insolvency matters – and indeed other matters subject to regulation – within the EU, it was concluded that the unification of domestic laws would be too time-consuming and laborious. Instead, the drafters chose to adopt a procedural framework based upon the concept that one proceeding opened in one Member State would have effect across the EU (or EEC, as it was then). Despite a long negotiation period, a subsequent draft convention and an EC Council Working Party review in the 1980s, consensus on the matter could not be reached, resulting in the endeavour being shelved.10 The idea was revived in the 1990s and resulted in the 1995 Convention on Insolvency Proceedings, which envisaged inter alia the operation of main and secondary proceedings and the interaction and coordination of the two. The 1995 Convention was not ratified by the United Kingdom; thus, it was not ratified by all Member States as was required. Interestingly, Denmark, which opted out of the EIR and by extension the Recast in accordance

8 European Economic Community ‘Preliminary Draft Convention on Bankruptcy, Winding-up, Arrangements, Compositions, and Similar Proceedings’ COM (1970) 3.327/1/XIV/70-E, art 2: ‘The proceedings specified in this Convention, when instituted in one of the Contracting States, shall have full legal effect in the other Contracting States and shall be a bar to the institution of any other such proceedings in those States.’
10 Miguel Virgós and Etienne Schmit, ‘Report on the Convention of Insolvency Proceedings of 3 May 1996’, EC Council Document 6500/96, 7. In the early 1990s, the ‘Istanbul Convention’ was presented by the Council of Europe, as distinct from the Council of the European Union or the European Council. It differed from the previous attempts at a convention in that it would permit multiple insolvency proceedings related to a single debtor to be opened across states, instead, regulating aspects of such proceedings. It too, was unsuccessful, however, Paul Omar argues that it may have provided a ‘fresh impetus’ to the EU to pursue a convention; Paul J Omar, European Insolvency Law (Ashgate 2004) 73. See also Kristin van Zwieten ‘Introduction’ in R Bork and K van Zwieten (eds), Commentary on the European Insolvency Regulation (Oxford University Press, 2016).
with Articles 1 and 2 of the Protocol on the position of Denmark annexed to the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, signed the 1995 Convention.  

In 1999, the Convention text of the Convention returned in the form of a Council Regulation, namely the Council Regulation on insolvency proceedings (1346/2000) or the ‘EIR’. Its purpose, as far as preceding conventions and bilateral agreements were concerned, was clear: it was to replace such agreements from the point at which it entered into force. Generally, it has been viewed as not only achieving its central aim of coordinating insolvency proceedings in Europe but also as constituting an important step toward judicial cooperation within the European Union. 

The review of the EIR and its subsequent overhaul, which took place in 2015, was mandated by the Regulation itself. Article 46 mandated the Commission to report on the application of the EIR to the Parliament, Council and the EESC within a specified timeline. If necessary, the Commission report was to be accompanied by a proposal for the modification of the EIR. Generally, the aim of this review and modification of the EIR was considered to be an exercise in filling ‘perceived gaps in the original instrument’ rather than a tearing down and rebuilding of the EIR, perhaps reflecting the idea that the EIR was generally viewed to be fit for purpose. 

As was the case with the introduction of the Preventive Restructuring Directive, the overall stated objective of the revision of the EIR was ‘to improve the efficiency of the European framework for resolving cross-border insolvency cases in view of ensuring a smooth functioning of the internal market and its resilience in economic crises’. The Commission itself noted in the Proposal for the Recast that the EIR was ‘functioning well in general’ but that it was desirable to improve upon the application of certain provisions ‘in order to enhance the effective administration of cross-border insolvency proceedings’. 

### 2.2.2 EIR & EIR Recast: Cooperation obligations

The principle of cooperation is not exclusive to the EIR or its Recast; rather as Reinhard Bork has pointed out, it has ‘its foundations in the European law principle of EU Member States assisting one another’, for example in Article 4(3) of the TEU. A considerable difference

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12 EIR, art 44. Examples of the agreements that were replaced were the Convention between France and Austria on Jurisdiction, Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments on Bankruptcy, signed at Vienna on 27 February 1979 and the Convention between Italy and Austria on Bankruptcy, Winding-up, Arrangements and Compositions, signed at Rome on 12 July 1977 (EIR, art 44 (e)(g)).
17 ibid 12.
18 Reinhard Bork ‘The European Insolvency Regulation and the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency’ (2017) 26 Int. Insolv. Rev. 246, 259. See also the judgment in the Case C-116/11 Bank Handlowy w Warszawie SA and PPHU «ADAX»/Ryszard Adamiok v Christianapol sp. z o.o. ECLI:EU:C:2012:739, where the relationship between Article 4(3) of the TEU and cooperation in insolvency matters was
between the EIR and the EIR Recast was the addition of new and stronger cooperation obligations, which Renato Mangano contends is consistent with both ‘a commonly shared idea that private international law is based on cooperation’ and ‘an established tradition of common law courts and practitioners dealing with cross-border cases’. This theme of the relationship between cooperation and the rules of private international law will be considered in more detail in Chapter 5. In the EIR, there was a duty to cooperate, but this was confined to cooperation between liquidators. Article 31(1) of the EIR stated:

Subject to the rules restricting the communication of information, the liquidator in the main proceedings and the liquidators in the secondary proceedings shall be duty bound to communicate information to each other. They shall immediately communicate any information which may be relevant to the other proceedings, in particular the progress made in lodging and verifying claims and all measures aimed at terminating the proceedings.

Article 31(2) stated:

Subject to the rules applicable to each of the proceedings, the liquidator in the main proceedings and the liquidators in the secondary proceedings shall be duty bound to cooperate.

Furthermore, Article 31(3) of the EIR required that the liquidator in the main proceedings be given an early opportunity by the liquidator in the secondary proceedings to submit proposals on the liquidation or use of the assets in the secondary proceedings. The intention behind these articles was clear: to require communication and cooperation in order to coordinate multiple proceedings, thereby increasing efficiency and clarity and decreasing cost. The cooperation requirements in the EIR were not without their issues, however. First, the cooperation requirements only specified liquidators. Although the cooperation requirements in the EIR were interpreted more broadly by some courts and despite many Member States having domestic legislation requiring cooperation between national courts and the foreign insolvency court presiding over the main proceedings, it still remained that only liquidators were explicitly bound to cooperate. Accordingly, the co-operation provisions in the EIR Recast were drafted, in part, to solve this issue.

Second, it could be suggested that there are issues of clarity, particularly with the applicable recital, Recital 20. Bernard Santen, for example, argues that ‘neither the recitals nor the

acknowledged. See also chapter 3 of this Report for a discussion of article 81 of the TEFU (judicial cooperation in civil matters with cross-border implications) as a potential basis for the (increased) cooperation requirements in the regulation.


20 Case C-116/11 Bank Handlowy w Warszawie SA and PPHU «ADAX»/Ryszard Adamiak v Christianapol sp. z o.o ECLI:EU:C:2012:739: ‘[T]he principle of sincere cooperation laid down in Art 4(3) TEU requires the court having jurisdiction to open secondary proceedings, in applying those provisions, to have regard to the objectives of the main proceedings and to take account of the scheme of the Regulation, which, as observed in paragraphs 45 and 60 of this judgment, aims to ensure efficient and effective cross-border insolvency proceedings through mandatory coordination of the main and secondary proceedings guaranteeing the priority of the main proceedings.’

articles provide[d] insight into the application of ‘cooperation’ or ‘coordination’. He goes on to query if there was actually any difference between the two or if they are ‘(largely) identical concepts’. While his argument that ‘no insight’ is provided could be considered a little harsh – Recital 20 of the EIR does give explanations of how coordination and cooperation can be achieved – it is perhaps fair to say that the language employed lacked precision. For example, the explanation of cooperation provided by Recital 20 could be construed as meaning ‘communication’, as it refers to ‘exchanging a sufficient amount of information’. ‘Coordination’ is primarily explained as being achieved through cooperation, which is in turn explained as above, as potentially meaning communication (‘exchanging a sufficient amount of information’). Furthermore, Renato Mangano contends that the lack of specific provisions expressly allowing liquidators to conclude agreements and protocols meant that in civil law jurisdictions, at least, there was evidence of liquidators being hesitant to enter into such arrangements and no evidence of cooperation between courts. In other words, the absence of certainty resulted in a reluctance towards cooperating. The Recast, as will be demonstrated below, goes some way to ameliorating perceived issues of clarity.

The EIR Recast specified two types of cooperation and coordination. First, it added a requirement for cooperation and coordination between courts, something that was viewed as preferable to leaving such cooperation ‘to the realm of implication and inference’. Plainly, as Gerard McCormack asserts, this is because courts may interpret the existence and extent of such a requirement differently were it not specifically provided for in the Regulation. Arguably, this potential for difference in inference would be particularly acute within the common and civil law divide; it might be remembered that Renato Mangano contends that a major difference between common law and civil law courts was the ‘established tradition’ of the former dealing with cross-border cases and cooperating therein. This importance of the difference in legal cultures and traditions will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4 of this Report.

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23 ibid.
24 ‘In order to ensure the dominant role of the main insolvency proceedings, the liquidator in such proceedings should be given several possibilities for intervening in secondary insolvency proceedings which are pending at the same time.’ Coordination is also explained as being achieved by cooperating.
25 ‘In particular by exchanging a sufficient amount of information’.
26 EIR, Recital 20.
27 ‘Main insolvency proceedings and secondary proceedings can, however, contribute to the effective realisation of the total assets only if all the concurrent proceedings pending are coordinated. The main condition here is that the various liquidators must cooperate closely …’ EIR, recital 20.
29 ibid.
30 As will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3, in view of article 2(6)(ii) of the EIR Recast, ‘court’ can also be interpreted to refer to ‘administrative authority’ or more broadly, a body legally empowered to open insolvency proceedings.
If an insolvency or restructuring proceeding is included in Annex A of the EIR Recast:

(...) a court before which a request to open insolvency proceedings is pending, or which has opened such proceedings, shall cooperate with any other court before which a request to open insolvency proceedings is pending, or which has opened such proceedings, to the extent that such cooperation is not incompatible with the rules applicable to each of the proceedings.\(^{33}\)

The only exception to this requirement is where cooperation would be incompatible with the rules applicable to the proceedings in question, an exception which one could argue defers appropriately to the domestic courts and national rules. While it may be unlikely that there would be provisions contained within a domestic framework that would explicitly prohibit cooperation, arguably a jurisdiction with such a framework would do as the Dutch have and create it with the intention that it to be outside the EIR. Examples of national rules comprised of rules of both a substantive and procedural nature that may have the result of impeding cooperation will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3 of this Report. The remainder of Article 42 expands on and further explains how this duty to cooperate may be fulfilled.\(^{34}\)

Second, the EIR Recast added a requirement for cooperation between insolvency practitioners and courts. Article 43(1) requires that an insolvency practitioner in main insolvency proceedings cooperate and communicate with any court that has opened secondary proceedings, or which has a request to do so. The same requirement applies to an insolvency practitioner in territorial or secondary insolvency proceedings vis-à-vis the court of main jurisdiction. Finally, it also mandates that an insolvency practitioner in territorial or secondary insolvency proceedings cooperates and communicates with a court that has also opened territorial or secondary insolvency proceedings, or one which has a request to do so. Article 43(2) then refers to the means of cooperation laid out in Article 42(2) and (3).

In addition, the EIR Recast amended the original Article 31 duty to cooperate – now Article 41 – which was outlined above. The primary change from the EIR was the inclusion of an additional means of how the cooperation should occur via article 41(2)(b), namely that the insolvency practitioners shall ‘explore the possibility of restructuring the debtor and, where such a possibility exists, coordinate the elaboration and implementation of a restructuring plan’.\(^{35}\) Naturally, in light of the PRD being passed in 2019, an interface between these two

\(^{33}\) EIR Recast, art 41(1).

\(^{34}\) EIR Recast, art 42(2): ‘In implementing the cooperation set out in paragraph 1, the courts ... may communicate directly with, or request information or assistance directly from, each other provided that such communication respects the procedural rights of the parties to the proceedings and the confidentiality of information.’

EIR Recast, art 42(3): ‘The cooperation referred to in paragraph 1 may be implemented by any means that the court considers appropriate. It may, in particular, concern: (a) coordination in the appointment of the insolvency practitioners; (b) communication of information by any means considered appropriate by the court; (c) coordination of the administration and supervision of the debtor’s assets and affairs; (d) coordination of the conduct of hearings; (e) coordination in the approval of protocols, where necessary.’

\(^{35}\) EIR Recast, art 41(2)(b).
legal instruments exists, which will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5. Other aspects of the article were refined, or reworded without substantial change; for example, the second sentence of the original Article 31 became:

[A]s soon as possible communicate to each other any information which may be relevant to the other proceedings, in particular any progress made in lodging and verifying claims and all measures aimed at rescuing or restructuring the debtor, or at terminating the proceedings, provided appropriate arrangements are made to protect confidential information.

The requirement in Article 31(3) that the liquidator in the main proceedings be given an early opportunity by the liquidator in the secondary proceedings to propose the liquidation or use of the assets (secondary proceedings) saw minor changes. It became a requirement to ‘coordinate the administration of the realisation or use of the debtor’s assets and affairs’, which when explained, in practical terms, broadly meant the same as the old article 31(3).

The recitals applicable to cooperation also saw significant changes between the EIR and the Recast. Two new recitals were added, Recitals 49 and 50, presumably with the intention of expanding on the ideas of cooperation, communication and coordination within insolvency proceedings. Recital 49 applies to cooperation between insolvency practitioners and the court, emphasising the view that their entry into agreements and protocols with a view to facilitating ‘cross-border cooperation’ of multiple cross-border proceedings concerning the same debtor (or members of the same group of companies) should be permitted. The Commission explained the inclusion of explicit reference to agreements and protocols in the Recast as a means of acknowledging their practical importance and promoting their use.

It explains that such arrangements may (i) take a variety of forms, in other words be written or oral; (ii) may vary in scope, ranging from generic to specific; and interestingly may (iii) cover parties taking or refraining from taking certain steps or actions. Recital 50 pertains to court-to-court cooperation, providing that cooperation and coordination in that instance may be achieved by the appointment of a single insolvency practitioner for multiple insolvency proceedings concerning the same debtor or for different members of a group of companies.

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36 Aspects of this interface were also touched upon in Chapter 4 of Report 1 of the JCOERE Project. See also Stephan Madaus, ‘Leaving the Shadows of US Insolvency Law: A Proposal to Divide the Realms of Insolvency and Restructuring Law’ (2018) 19 Eur Bus Org L Rev 615.
37 ‘They shall immediately communicate any information which may be relevant to the other proceedings, in particular the progress made in lodging and verifying claims and all measures aimed at terminating the proceedings.’
38 EIR Recast, art 41(2)(a).
39 EIR Recast, art 41(2)(c): ‘coordinate the administration of the realisation or use of the debtor’s assets and affairs; the insolvency practitioner in the secondary insolvency proceedings shall give the insolvency practitioner in the main insolvency proceedings an early opportunity to submit proposals on the realisation or use of the assets in the secondary insolvency proceedings.’
40 Proposal, 9; Just for clarity, it is worth noting that the Proposal did not originally contain a recital referring to agreements and protocols. The reference was only included in article 31 (now article 48).
41 The caveat is that such an appointment must be compatible ‘with the rules applicable to each of the proceedings, in particular with any requirements concerning the qualification and licensing of the insolvency practitioner’. See EIR Recast, recital 50.
2.2.3 The evolution of the EIR Recast: European Union institutions\textsuperscript{42}

It is worth noting that the Proposal for the EIR Recast did not sail through the various EU institutions; rather, it went through considerable EU negotiations before being passed, a process which took two and a half years, two European Parliament readings, four Council debates and inter-institutional negotiations (trilogue), amongst other input. With that said, much of the debate centred elsewhere and not around the issues, articles, and recitals directly relevant to cooperation; however, there were some changes of note. As discussed in the previous section, the review of the EIR and resulting changes were mandated by the Regulation itself.

Before examining the specific amendments made to proposed recitals and articles, it is worth bearing one overarching change in mind: across the Regulation, there was a change in terminology from ‘liquidator’ to ‘insolvency practitioner’, reflecting the fact that perhaps an update in terminology was needed from the EIR and indeed, from the proposal for its reform. Arguably, this change in terminology was desirable in order to reflect the shift in scope that took place between the EIR and the Recast; a focus on insolvency procedures in the former to encompassing restructuring and pre-insolvency procedures in the latter. A related possibility is that it was not envisaged that rescue processes would be included in the EIR when it was originally drafted, particularly given the wording of Article 1, which states: ‘This Regulation shall apply to collective insolvency proceedings which entail the partial or total divestment of a debtor and the appointment of a liquidator.’ Yet, across the procedures contained in Annex A are frameworks that do not require a ‘liquidator’ and instead utilise a different professional; thus, ‘insolvency practitioner’ is certainly a more appropriate term for these professionals. For example, the Irish Examinership procedures uses an ‘examiner’, who is an insolvency practitioner; liquidation, which requires a liquidator, is a separate procedure entirely. While a liquidator is an insolvency practitioner in Ireland, the corollary is not always the case, as a liquidator is just one of the roles that can be held by an insolvency practitioner. There are a number of other procedures in Annex A, both in the EIR and the Recast, that do not necessarily have ‘liquidators’, such as the Italian concordato preventivo, the French Sauvegarde,\textsuperscript{43} and the Dutch surséance van betaling.\textsuperscript{44} Thus, Article 2 of the Commission Proposal was amended and rather than defining ‘liquidator’,\textsuperscript{45} as had been the case in the Proposal, the EIR Recast defines an ‘insolvency practitioner’.\textsuperscript{46} Practically, the change may have been minimal, as ‘liquidators’

\textsuperscript{42} This section discusses the changes to the cooperation obligations in the EIR Recast.
\textsuperscript{43} And its variations; Sauvegarde accélérée, and Sauvegarde financière accélérée,
\textsuperscript{44} The public procedure under the WHOA, which is intended to be included in Annex A, is another example. For further information on the procedures in France, Ireland, Italy and the Netherlands, amongst others, see JCOERE Report 1, Chapters 6-8.
\textsuperscript{45} Defined by the Proposal as: ‘(i) any person or body whose function is to administer or liquidate assets of which the debtor has been divested or to supervise the administration of his affairs. Those persons and bodies are listed in Annex C; (ii) in a case which does not involve the appointment of, or the transfer of the debtor’s powers to, a liquidator, the debtor in possession.’ Commission Proposal (COM) 744 final for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council COM744 final of 12 December 2012 amending Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 on insolvency proceedings [2012] 2012/0360 (COD) [Hereinafter ‘Commission Proposal for the EIR Recast’] art 2(b).
\textsuperscript{46} An “insolvency practitioner” means any person or body whose function, including on an interim basis, is to: (i) verify and admit claims submitted in insolvency proceedings; (ii) represent the collective interest of the creditors; (iii) administer, either in full or in part, assets of...
in the EIR were understood in line with a prescribed list of professionals (Annex C) that clearly included a range of insolvency practitioners other than liquidators. For example, it included the Irish examiner and *commissario* (Italy) and when recast, included the *administrateur judiciaire* and *mandataire judiciaire* (France), amongst others. The question does, however, legitimately arise as to why certain procedures were included in the EIR, which did not appear to fit comfortably, or at all, in the scope of the regulation as outlined in Article 1.

Aside from the change in terminology proposed by both the Council and the Parliament, the changes to recitals and articles relevant to this research emanated principally from the Council. Arguably, the amendments to the recitals were relatively minor, appearing to be more for the sake of clarity rather than substantive change. For example, the Commission Proposal for Recital 48, which stated that main and secondary insolvency proceedings could *only* contribute to ‘the effective realisation of the total assets’ if proceedings were ‘coordinated’, was expanded and softened a little:

Main insolvency proceedings and secondary insolvency proceedings can contribute to the efficient administration of the debtor's insolvency estate or to the effective realisation of the total assets if there is proper cooperation between the actors involved in all the concurrent proceedings.

Recital 48 then goes on to define ‘proper cooperation’ in a similar manner to how ‘coordinated’ was defined in the Proposal, namely as the insolvency practitioners and courts ‘cooperating closely’ by exchanging ‘sufficient … information’. Finally, as was articulated above, the references to 'liquidator' were removed and replaced with 'insolvency practitioner'.

Interestingly, neither recital 49 nor 50 were included in the Commission Proposal and thus, were added during the inter-institutional negotiation process. Even though the Commission referred to agreements and protocols in the relevant article, perhaps the addition of recital 49 was to further emphasise an important status for such arrangements in order to eliminate the reluctance of practitioners in civil law countries to their use, which was identified as an issue by Renato Mangano.
As articulated previously, the primary articles pertaining to cooperation in the EIR Recast are articles 41 – 43. Before discussing the amendments to those articles, it is interesting to note that article 44, which prohibits courts from charging costs to each other for cooperation and communication, was neither a standalone article in the Commission Proposal nor was the requirement written with the same specificity. The Commission had required that cooperation be ‘free of charge’ as part of article 31a (now article 42).  

Arguably, this amendment goes a long way towards eliminating any confusion as to the intention of the article, which one could describe as a prohibition on one court from charging another in a different Member State for the privilege of cooperation.

As explained above, the function of article 41 is to lay out the provisions that govern cooperation between insolvency practitioners. The only amendment to article 41 was the insertion of subsection 3, which extends the cooperation requirements contained in the first two paragraphs to ‘situations where ... the debtor remains in possession of its assets’. Perhaps it could be argued that this change is another reflection of the regulation moving scope from predominantly insolvency and liquidation to also encompassing pre-insolvency and rescue.

The change made to article 42(1) appears to be relatively minor; it was amended to add the requirement that the appointment of the independent person or body acting on its instructions must not be incompatible with the rules applicable to them. Across articles 42 and 43, ‘territorial proceedings’ were added to the list of proceedings concerning the same debtor that should be coordinated where possible. Finally, article 42(3) was amended to include ‘coordination in the appointment of the insolvency practitioners’ as a means of implementing the court-to-court cooperation requirement; the others being communication of information by any means considered appropriate by the court; coordination of the administration and supervision of the debtor's assets and affairs; coordination of the conduct of hearings and coordination in the approval of protocols. Arguably, this addition demonstrates consistency with the new recital 50.

The primary amendment to article 43(1) was an extension of the obligation of insolvency practitioners in territorial or secondary insolvency proceedings to cooperate and communicate with courts, which had opened or had a request to open other territorial or secondary insolvency proceedings. In the Commission Proposal the obligation only explicitly applied to the insolvency practitioner in the main proceeding vis-à-vis the court with a secondary proceeding (request) or the insolvency practitioner in the secondary proceeding vis-à-vis the court with main proceedings. Naturally, the omission may have resulted in the

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54 Article 31a(2) originally read: 2. The courts referred to in paragraph 1 may communicate directly with, or to request information or assistance directly from each other provided that such communication is free of charge and respects the procedural rights of the parties to the proceedings and the confidentiality of information.

55 EIR Recast, art 42(3)(a).

56 EIR Recast, art 42(3)(b)–(e); ‘where necessary’ was added to art 42(3)(e).

57 ‘Similarly, the courts of different Member States may cooperate by coordinating the appointment of insolvency practitioners. In that context, they may appoint a single insolvency practitioner for several insolvency proceedings concerning the same debtor or for different members of a group of companies, provided that this is compatible with the rules applicable to each of the proceedings, in particular with any requirements concerning the qualification and licensing of the insolvency practitioner.’
insolvency practitioner involved in secondary or territorial proceedings having no obligation to cooperate with a court in another Member State also involved in a secondary or territorial proceeding.

2.3 EIR & EIR Recast: Cooperation Obligations and the Regulation of Groups of Companies

2.3.1 EIR & EIR Recast: Cooperation obligations for groups of companies

As described in the introduction, a significant issue with the EIR appeared to be connected to its effectiveness where groups of companies were concerned; the primary issue being that ‘coordination’ in the EIR was not explicitly and effectively regulated for groups of companies. Thus, where the previous section (2.2) outlined and discussed the changes to cooperation and coordination requirements for single debtors, this section will discuss the EIR and the Recast, its articles and recitals, with groups of companies as the focus. In its Proposal for the EIR Recast, the Commission acknowledged that almost half of respondents that took part in the public consultation process viewed the EIR as failing to work efficiently for insolvencies consisting of members of a multinational group of companies. Furthermore, it was noted that the lack of regulation was diminishing ‘the prospects of successful restructuring of group[s] [of companies] as a whole’ resulting instead in their break-up. In spite of this clear sentiment expressed by the Commission, its Proposal for amending the EIR did not contain express provisions on coordinated group proceedings, arguably a notable omission. As will be discussed in section 2.3.3, the framework for group coordinated proceedings was added during the inter-institutional negotiation of the Recast.

Perhaps it goes without saying that the types of insolvency proceedings that most need effective coordination, efficiency and organisation are those concerning large groups of companies with potentially intricate structures, as evidenced by complex and challenging cases such as Eurofood. Eurofood concerned the resolution of a dispute over the COMI of Eurofood IFSC, a subsidiary of the Italian parent company, Parmalat SpA. This case will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5, however, cases such as this illustrate, albeit it briefly in this Chapter, the challenges that arose from the lack of regulation of groups of companies in the EIR and highlight ‘bitter clashes between courts and insolvency practitioners belonging to different jurisdictions’. In spite of the legislative void where groups were concerned, there was some evidence that certain domestic courts overcame the lack of regulation by adopting an ‘integrated economic unit’ approach. This refers to the practice of considering the affairs

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58 Commission Proposal for the EIR Recast, 5.
59 Commission Proposal for the EIR Recast, 3.
60 C-341/04 [2006] ECR I-3813.
of the group of companies as a whole, which in turn can lead to a finding that related companies have their COMI in the same state despite being incorporated elsewhere. With that said, however, differences in inferences still posed a problem as this use of the integrated economic unit approach was not universal, thereby leading to potential discrepancies in how different group proceedings could be treated. Furthermore, on foot of Eurofood, the CJEU seemed not to interpret the issue the way some of the domestic courts had. Accordingly, and in line with the stated intention of the Commission to create a ‘specific legal framework to deal with the insolvency of members of a group of companies while maintaining the entity-by-entity approach’; the Regulation was amended to expressly apply to groups of companies to attempt to avoid disputes concerning them from arising.

The first step in achieving the aim of express regulation of groups of companies, the opening gambit as it were, was to create new recitals to make a clear statement as to the intention of the Recast over and above merely referring to ‘groups of companies’ in other recitals. Recital 51 made an unequivocal statement about the purpose of the Recast regarding groups of companies, wherein it was stated that the EIR Recast should ensure efficient administration of the insolvency proceedings of those companies forming part of a group. Recital 52 provides that there should be ‘proper cooperation’ between participants – courts and insolvency practitioners – involved in group insolvency proceedings in the same way as is required in the case of a single debtor. Recital 54 introduced the concept of the coordinated group proceedings, for which procedural rules were to be introduced by the Recast, with recitals 55-59 providing more detail on their operation. Interestingly, despite the noted advantages of coordinated group proceedings, recital 56 provides an ‘out’ in the interest of preserving their ‘voluntary nature’; it states that insolvency practitioners involved in coordinated proceedings ‘should be able to object to their participation’. Thus, whilst the Recast certainly encourages coordination, it does not make it obligatory, perhaps, once again, leaving the door open to the potential for inconsistencies across the EU for the sake of compromise.

To reinforce the intentions expressed by the recitals, the EIR was amended to add articles regulating groups of companies. Chapter V of the EIR Recast, which is entitled ‘Insolvency Proceedings of Members of a Group of Companies’ is divided into two sections. Section 1, entitled ‘Cooperation and Communication’, regulates cooperation between courts, insolvency practitioners and courts and insolvency practitioners for groups of companies in a manner similar to the way articles 41-43 did for single debtors. The insolvency practitioners are obliged to cooperate; such cooperation can be achieved inter alia by communicating relevant information as soon as possible and where possible in the circumstances, coordinating the creation and implementation of a restructuring plan. Additionally for practitioners in

63 ibid. See also Re MPOTEC Gmbh [2006] BCC 681.
64 Case C-341/04 Re Eurofood IFSC Ltd [2006] ECR I-03813.
65 Commission Proposal for the EIR Recast, 59.
66 For example, the revised recital 6, recitals 49-50.
67 This is supported by article 64 of the EIR Recast, which will be discussed in more detail in the coming paragraphs.
68 EIR Recast, articles 41 and 56.
proceedings concerning a group, additional powers may be granted to insolvency practitioners appointed in one of the proceedings by (some of) the others in order to coordinate the administration and supervision of the affairs of the group members and to coordinate restructuring efforts, both of which are desirable if feasible per articles 56(2)(b)(c). The courts are obliged to cooperate in proceedings concerning groups of companies ‘to the extent that such cooperation is appropriate to facilitate the effective administration of the proceedings’. Aside from the addition of ‘appropriateness’ as a test or standard, the articles concerning court-to-court cooperation for single debtors and groups are virtually identical. Finally, insolvency practitioners and courts are obliged to cooperate, again to the extent that such cooperation is appropriate to achieving the aims of effective management of the proceedings. Interestingly, in proceedings concerning groups, the insolvency practitioner is empowered to request information concerning the proceedings of other member of the group from the relevant court, again provided that the request is appropriate to achieving its aims. One could question the necessity of such a provision if the cooperation mandated under article 56 was being achieved.

2.3.2: EIR & EIR Recast: The regulation of proceedings for groups of companies

Section 2 of Chapter V of the EIR Recast regulates the concept of ‘coordinated group proceedings’ referred to in recitals 54-59. Article 61 states that coordination proceedings may – as distinct from ‘must’ or ‘shall’ – be requested before any applicable court by any insolvency practitioner appointed to a member of the group. Therefore, such articles create a framework for opening coordinated proceedings, rather than making such proceedings mandatory. Article 61 goes on to regulate the contents and form of the request to open coordinated group proceedings; first, it must comply with the applicable national law. Second, it must be accompanied by details of the proposed ‘group coordinator’, an estimate of and proposed division of costs and a list of the appointed insolvency practitioners and where relevant, the courts and competent authorities. Third, an outline of the proposed group coordination must also be included with specific reference to how the coordination fulfils the article 63(1) criteria.

Article 63(1), in turn, details the conditions that should be satisfied by the request for the opening of coordinated proceedings, namely its appropriateness to facilitate the effective administration of the group insolvency proceedings; the absence of a likelihood that any

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69 EIR Recast, art 58(b).
70 ‘Applicable court’ refers to ‘any court having jurisdiction over the insolvency proceedings of a member of the group’ (EIR Recast, art 61(1)).
71 EIR Recast, art 61(2): ‘The request referred to in paragraph 1 shall be made in accordance with the conditions provided for by the law applicable to the proceedings in which the insolvency practitioner has been appointed.’
72 EIR Recast, art 61(3)(a): ‘a proposal as to the person to be nominated as the group coordinator (‘the coordinator’), details of his or her eligibility pursuant to Article 71, details of his or her qualifications and his or her written agreement to act as coordinator’.
73 EIR Recast, art 61(3)(d).
74 EIR Recast, art 61(3)(c).
75 EIR Recast, art 61(3)(b).
76 EIR Recast, art 63(1)(a).
creditor expected to participate in the proceedings will be financially disadvantaged by such participation\textsuperscript{77} and that the group coordinator meets the eligibility criteria to be appointed per article 71.\textsuperscript{78} Once the required time of 30 days, as specified by article 64(2), has elapsed and the court is satisfied that the conditions laid out in article 63(1) are met, then the court may grant the request.\textsuperscript{79} This results in the court appointing a coordinator, deciding an outline of the coordination and deciding on the estimation and division of costs.\textsuperscript{80}

Article 64 allows for any appointed insolvency practitioner to object to the inclusion of its part of the group in the coordinated proceedings or to object to the proposed coordinator within a 30-day period.\textsuperscript{81} Critically, this objection is determinative and results in the relevant part of the group being excluded from coordinated proceedings.\textsuperscript{82} Furthermore, there appears to be no guidance or limitations on the reasoning behind such an objection. Thus, it may be possible for insolvency practitioners to object on the basis that they do not wish to relinquish any of the value of the proceeding to their business – ‘to keep the business’ so to speak – perhaps providing scope for an objection to be lodged on grounds that directly concern neither the debtor nor its creditors.\textsuperscript{83} This concern is not exclusive to the EU. A similar point will be made in Chapter 7 (section 7.3) in relation to participation in centralised coordination for insolvency practitioners in the United States. Perhaps, more honourably, the reticence to be involved in coordinated proceedings may be as a result of the view that local interests – creditors and the debtor – can be better served by an uncoordinated approach. Even still, however, the lack of a requirement for the insolvency practitioner to provide a justification for requesting exclusion from the group coordinated proceedings arguably undermines its effectiveness and exposes it to the potential for abuse.

There is also a specific cooperation requirement pertaining to group coordinated proceedings. Similar to the previously discussed cooperation obligations within insolvency proceedings, article 74 requires the appointed insolvency practitioners and the coordinator to cooperate with each other provided that such cooperation is not incompatible with the rules governing the proceeding.\textsuperscript{84} This requirement specifically obliges the appointed insolvency practitioners

\textsuperscript{77} EIR Recast, art 63(1)(b).

\textsuperscript{78} EIR Recast, art 63(1)(c). These eligibility criteria are: 1. ‘The coordinator shall be a person eligible under the law of a Member State to act as an insolvency practitioner.’ 2. ‘The coordinator shall not be one of the insolvency practitioners appointed to act in respect of any of the group members, and shall have no conflict of interest in respect of the group members, their creditors and the insolvency practitioners appointed in respect of any of the group members.’ (EIR Recast, art 71).

\textsuperscript{79} EIR Recast, art 68(1).

\textsuperscript{80} EIR Recast, art 68(1)(a)-(c).

\textsuperscript{81} EIR Recast, art 64(1) & (2).

\textsuperscript{82} EIR Recast, art 65(1).

\textsuperscript{83} Renato Mangano argues something similar in relation to choice of jurisdiction in insolvency matters: ‘In fact, if each court and insolvency practitioner can individually establish which law should apply to and which court should be competent in each cross-border legal relationship and which judgments of which other Member States are to be recognised, each court and each insolvency practitioner have an incentive to act opportunistically and to pursue the interest of those parties that are located in their own jurisdiction, that is, to overprotect local debtors, local creditors, local employees, local company directors, etc.’ Renato Mangano ‘From Prisoner’s Dilemma to Reluctance to Use Judicial Discretion: The Enemies of Cooperation in European Cross-Border Cases’ (2017) 26 IIR 314, 319.

\textsuperscript{84} EIR Recast, art 74(1).
to communicate information that may be needed by the coordinator to perform his or her role.\textsuperscript{85}

The changes to the EIR brought about by its Recast, though generally viewed as positive, are not without criticism. Horst Eidenmüller, for example, comments that the EIR Recast – or Proposal for the EIR Recast as it was at the time – ‘falls short’ when it comes to managing group insolvencies, i.e. the coordinated group proceedings approach.\textsuperscript{86} A much better administration of group insolvencies, he argues, would be achieved by consolidating the procedures, as opposed to the entity-by-entity approach used by the EIR and its Recast.\textsuperscript{87} Whether Eidenmüller is correct is perhaps irrelevant to an extent. Perhaps consolidated proceedings would work better, however, without both the flexibility of implementation and the retention of some control by Member States offered by the Regulation and other similar instruments, agreement on their introduction and subsequent amendment would be extremely challenging, if not impossible, to reach within the EU. Thus, while he may have a point, perhaps it is fair to say that his argument is more about the compromises and concessions almost endemic in intra-institutional negotiations and less about a failure to choose the best available option. Or perhaps, as Gerard McCormack argues succinctly, such policy choices ‘reflect an approach that, in this particular area, progress is best achieved by a series of small steps rather than by a great leap forward’.\textsuperscript{88}

### 2.3.3 The evolution of Chapter V: European Union institutions

As was articulated in the opening of section 2.3, a notable omission from the Proposal was a clear framework on coordinated group proceedings. Although the Commission noted the lack of effectiveness of the EIR where groups of companies were concerned, it did not propose a model of coordinated proceedings; instead, the Commission additions to the EIR were predominantly the articles that eventually made up Chapter V, Section 1 – articles 56-60 – which saw some minor changes during the negotiation process. For example, the primary change to article 57, which pertains to cooperation between courts in proceedings concerning groups of companies, was the addition of ‘coordination in the appointment of insolvency practitioners’ to the means by which the courts could communicate. Arguably, this amendment was somewhat unsurprising given that a similar change was made to article 42, as discussed previously. While other parts of article 57 were revised, the amendments were

\textsuperscript{85} EIR Recast, art 74(2).


\textsuperscript{87} \textit{Ibid.} He explains ‘procedural consolidation’ as one insolvency court being ‘designated in charge of the multiple (main) insolvency proceedings over the assets of multiple debtors within the group setting’ and one insolvency practitioner being appointed with respect to the multiple proceedings. The powers of insolvency practitioners in group proceedings are laid out in article 60.

of little significance as they neither altered its overall meaning or intention. The same can be said to the changes made to articles 56 and 58.

The addition of the articles pertaining to group coordinated proceedings was the most considerable change during the intra-institutional negotiations. The addition was advanced by the Parliament in the first instance; the report by the Committee on Legal Affairs proposed six new articles that, when reformulated during the negotiation process, became Section 2 of Chapter V. Interestingly, the Parliament and Commission appeared to be at odds regarding the approach that should be taken to remedy the issues with the EIR where groups of companies were concerned. In the explanatory statement accompanying its report, the Parliament stated that the Commission ‘[was] not following the recommendations of Parliament but [focusing] on enhancing the coordination and communication of different insolvency proceedings’. This was a contrast to what the Parliament had requested from the Commission, namely a ‘flexible proposal for the regulation on the insolvency of groups’. Through the additions it proposed, the Parliament viewed itself as ‘formulating a more ambitious solution on insolvency of groups of companies’, something which it viewed as a compromised between its position and that of the Commission. It appears that this compromise was desirable all round, as the final text from the Council also contained the provisions pertaining to group coordinated proceedings.

2.4 Conclusion and Transition

This Chapter has traced the evolution of the EIR between its 2000 version and its Recast with a particular focus on the emergence of the cooperation obligations contained in the Recast. While the EIR Recast is sometimes viewed as lacking in the provision of specific instructions on how cooperation should occur, it also acknowledges that courts and practitioners may create protocols to assist in this task, examples of which are discussed in greater detail in Chapters 6 and 7 (section 7.3). That said, there remains criticism that the EIR Recast has not gone far enough, as discussed in section 2.3.2 of this Chapter. Given the value-laden characteristics of insolvency and restructuring, it remains a difficult area of law to harmonise due to the jurisdiction specific policy arguments that often conflict in where the greatest

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89 For example, the provision allowing the appointment of an independent person or body to act on the instructions of a court in order to facilitate cooperation, which is in both the final text of the EIR and the Commission Proposal had the caveat ‘provided that this is not incompatible with the rules applicable to them’ added by the Parliament; European Parliament Committee on Legal Affairs ‘Report on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 on insolvency proceedings’ (2013) A7-0481/2013 COM(2012)0744 – C7-0413/2012 – 2012/0360(COD).
91 Ibid.
92 Ibid.
emphasis should lie in the rationale underpinning the mechanisms to resolve financial distress.

The next Chapter 3 will summarise the JCOERE Project’s findings from Report 1 on substantive principles in restructuring (preventive or otherwise) mechanisms within the framework of the Preventive Restructuring Directive that it was determined may present obstacles to cooperation when they are implemented by the Member States. It adopts a taxonomic categorisation of Member States in terms of their observed approach to preventive restructuring in terms of underlying policy and implementation of the PRD. It will also provide pertinent observations on the relationship between harmonisation and cooperation within the paradigm of cross-border insolvency. Finally, Chapter 3 will provide a summary of the JCOERE Project’s findings in relation to procedural obstacles to court-to-court cooperation, including those revealed in the responses to the JCOERE Questionnaire noting that most of the responses to the JCOERE Questionnaire have been discussed in detail in Chapters 6-8 of Report 1.
III. Chapter 3: Potential Obstacles to Court-to-court Co-operation in Preventive Restructuring Cases

3.1 Introduction

The JCOERE Project began with the hypothesis that differences between Member States on policy and legal principles, including both substantive and procedural rules, might be particularly acute in the context of preventive restructuring. Such differences can present obstacles to court-to-court co-operation, practitioner-to-practitioner co-operation and practitioner-to-court co-operation. The next subsection (3.1.1) will describe the policy objectives behind preventive restructuring. In section 3.2, we provide a summary of our findings from Report 1 on variations in substantive law principles arising from pre-existing restructuring frameworks in member states and which are generated by the range of options contained in the Preventive Restructuring Directive (1023/2019). As we continued with our research, including a survey of chosen Member States and participation in various colloquia and conferences, our hypothesis was proven to hold true. We found significant differences in approaches to preventive restructuring in Member States. We have categorised these differing approaches in an original taxonomy which is described in this chapter. The categorisation of Member States adopted in this Chapter and described in section 3.3 relied on the identification of fundamental differences in policies and approach to preventive restructuring generally, which will affect the implementation of the PRD. This Chapter will continue in section 3.4 with observations on the relationship between harmonisation and co-operation. The EIR Recast acknowledges the tension between harmonisation, or lack thereof, and co-operation or indeed disruptions to the potential for co-operation. For example, it countenances the opening of competing or secondary proceedings where:

[T]he differences in the legal systems concerned are so great that difficulties may arise from the extension of effects deriving from the law of the State of the opening of proceedings to the other Member States where the assets are located. For that reason, the insolvency practitioner in the main insolvency proceedings may request the

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opening of secondary insolvency proceedings where the efficient administration of the insolvency estate so requires.³

The findings in relation to procedural obstacles to court-to-court co-operation revealed in the responses to the JCOERE Questionnaire will then be discussed and analysed in section 3.5, along with other observations relating to the institutions (administrative or judicial) that hear cross-border cases and the difficulties that differences here may cause to co-operation and mutual trust (3.6). A number of additional potential obstacles will then be discussed in the last few sections, including a summary of the views of members of the judiciary expressed to researchers during the JCOERE Project. This last section complements the findings of the Judicial Survey in Chapter 8.

3.1.1 A summary of policy objectives relating to preventive restructuring

Chapter 5 of Report 1 describes the evolution of the Preventive Restructuring Directive 1023/2019 passed in June 2019. In reflection of this work, this section summarises key substantive concepts as they evolved. The principle policy document underlying the Preventive Restructuring Directive is the European Commission Recommendation: A New Approach to Business Failure (2014).⁴ Of importance was the idea of improving the efficiency of insolvency laws to support economic recovery across the EU.⁵ We have discussed this at length in Report 1, but it is worth reminding ourselves of the specific policy objectives outlined in the 2014 Recommendation, which ultimately led to the PRD. These included:

a. Maximising value to the economy as a whole through the protection or benefit of those (these could be individuals or other businesses) connected with businesses at risk of insolvency. Individuals could include other businesses as creditors, employees of these businesses and owners of businesses.

b. Saving jobs.

c. The provision of a ‘second chance’ to ordinary individual sole traders…or entrepreneurs. At the time bankruptcy laws in many Member States including Ireland and Germany were really restrictive as compared with the frameworks in other jurisdictions, for example, England and Wales.⁶

d. The recovery of non-performing financial loans. Although not at the forefront of policy concerns in 2014, by the time the Preventive Restructuring Directive was passed in June 2019, another key concern was that restructuring process would allow specifically for the restructuring of corporate debt to the benefit of the banking sector and the

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³ idem, Recital 40.
⁴ For a discussion of the other policy documents relevant to the PRD, see JCOERE Report 1, Chapter 5, which gives an account of the history of the PRD chronologically.
⁵ The policy objective was to ‘ensure that viable enterprises in financial difficulties…have access to national insolvency frameworks, which enable them to restructure at an early stage with a view to preventing their insolvency…’. European Commission, Recommendation COM (2014) 1500 of 12 March 2014 on a new approach to business failure and insolvency [2014] OJ L 74/65.
support of the capital markets union. This was a policy issue that was more clearly articulated later in the day, very near to the adoption of the Directive and particularly afterwards. It was reiterated by Commission officials at various meetings following the passing of the Directive. For example, in June 2019 the importance of addressing the restructuring of non-performing loans was described by Salla Saastomonien. A key related issue articulated by the Commission representatives was what they perceived to be ‘the significant variance’ between Member States regarding attitudes to corporate restructuring and the actual legal frameworks involved. This is borne out by our research in Report 1. The view of the Commission was that these variances in turn led to a reluctance on the part of businesses to expand across the European Union, either by virtue of the increased costs or uncertainty as to their level of exposure in other Member States, and very different recovery rates for creditors.

e. A particular focus on SMEs reflecting sectoral concerns with providing a ‘second chance’ for entrepreneurs as described above. Discussion of costs of existing restructuring processes was of particular importance and reflected the experience of practitioners in many countries. The idea that a rescue process should be available to the SME sector was and is of concern to many but whether this is in reality a true reflection of the possibilities of such processes is a key and seemingly irresolvable question.

In its Recommendation, the Commission highlighted the following substantive elements which were considered to be desirable for a harmonised approach and which were eventually reflected in the PRD:

- **Flexibility of procedures**, namely limiting the need for **court formalities** to where they are necessary and proportionate; 
- **Provision for a stay** of individual enforcement actions;
- **Protection of the interests of dissenting creditors**, namely that the court should reject any restructuring plan that would likely reduce the rights of dissenting creditors below what they could reasonably expect to receive, were the debtor’s business not restructured. This is indeed where the genesis of the priority debate began.

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7 This point was made by Director Saastamonien at the European Insolvency & Restructuring Conference, held in Brussels, 27th and 28th June 2019. The key message was the concern to prevent the build-up of non-performing loans, thereby freeing up capital reserved to address non-performing loans - which amounted to between 167-520 billion euro - across the European Union. Salla Saastamoinen, Director for Civil and Commercial Justice, DG Justice. EIRC Meeting June 27th.

8 It was felt that this particular aim would help to combat the ‘social stigma’ and legal consequences of an on-going inability to pay off debts.

9 PRD, art 4(6).

10 PRD, art 6.

• Provision for ‘second chance’ that will allow for a full discharge of debt after a specified period of time – these are more applicable to entrepreneurs (bankrupts);
• That the preventive restructuring process should depend on a debtor in possession model;\textsuperscript{12}
• That even though there was a recognition of the need to protect dissenting creditors, the preventive restructuring framework would also include the possibility for cram-down provisions. Thus, a tension was established from the outset between the idea of protecting dissenting creditors and the characteristics of a robust restructuring framework. In turn this led to the divergence amongst Member States, which is categorised in the following section;\textsuperscript{13} and
• Protection for new and interim financing.\textsuperscript{14}

This summary informed the areas where we felt it was necessary to interrogate the approach of individual Member States, which we have done in our JCOERE Questionnaire.\textsuperscript{15} Even at this time, Commission policy documents emphasised the goal of harmonisation of these complex principles across Member States, stating:

\begin{quote}
[T]he creation of a level playing field in these areas would lead to greater confidence in the systems of other Member States for companies, entrepreneurs and private individuals, and improve access to credit and encourage investment.\textsuperscript{16}
\end{quote}

The development of the Preventive Restructuring Directive from these policy beginnings through various iterations and debates in the European legislative process demonstrates how the substantive rules that are considered to be core to restructuring emerged and became part of the PRD. The following section of this Chapter summarises our findings regarding differences on substantive legal principles, which we consider will prevent co-operation. As the Commission has acknowledged, harmonisation is important and without it, the chances for co-operation diminish.

\section*{3.2 Obstacles Arising from Substantive Law: Findings from JCOERE Project Report 1}

The following is a brief summary of the findings of JCOERE Report 1. The JCOERE Questionnaire focussed on key rules central to preventive restructuring to assess both current rules and planned implementation. These key rules included the following principles:

• The imposition of a stay, which in the PRD is envisaged as being up to 4 months normally with a possible extension to 12 months.

\begin{footnotes}
\item[12] PRD, art 5.
\item[13] PRD, art 11.
\item[14] PRD, art 17.
\item[15] See JCOERE Report 1, Chapters 6, 7 & 8: \url{https://www.ucc.ie/en/jcoere/research/report1/report1chapter/}.
\end{footnotes}
• The creation of a majority rule principle, which is often described as an intra-class cram-down.
• The optional creation of legal structures allowing for a cross-class cram-down, where dissenting creditors may be brought into the restructuring plan (with court approval).
• The best interests of creditors test which allows the creditors to expect a dividend from the restructuring, which is at least as good as what they can expect in alternative scenarios. This would mean that in the money creditors would be treated at least as well as in alternative scenarios.

As we proceeded in the analysis of the contributing Member States responses to our JCOERE Questionnaire and participated in debates at various multi-national conferences and fora, we realised the depth of differences between legal cultures, policy approaches and preferred outcomes across the Member States.

3.2.1 The Member States contributing to the JCOERE Questionnaire and why

The Project began with Member States which we knew to have ‘robust restructuring processes’. These included Ireland and the UK (but in reality, England and Wales). In the former, the Examinership process17, modelled on Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code had operated for 30 years and in the UK, the English Scheme of Arrangement18 had achieved some notoriety as a rescue device for large distressed companies during the recent Great Recession. What is interesting is that the Irish model was not well known in Europe, but the UK framework was extremely well known. A key difference, which we think might explain this discrepancy, is that the former was covered by the EIR Recast19 and therefore subject to COMI20 requirements, whereas the latter was not. As discussed in Chapter 3 of JCOERE Report 1, this allowed companies to avail of the English court system once English legal tests regarding jurisdiction were satisfied.21 In addition, the English courts exercise fairly flexible rules regarding jurisdiction, which are not replicated elsewhere.22

As outlined in Report 1, our partner countries included one major European country with a civil law code, namely Italy to which we added France and Spain, and a former Eastern bloc country, Romania to which we added Poland. Following on from that, we added Germany and Austria, where we suspected approaches to preventive restructuring differed from the countries we had included in our survey to that point. We added the Netherlands because of innovations introduced there in anticipation of the PRD and finally, we added Denmark in light

17 See Companies Act 2014, Chapter 2 to Chapter 5.
19 Annex A, EIR Recast.
20 EIR Recast, Recitals 23, 25, 27, 28, 30, 31, 33 and Articles 2(9)(viii), 2(11), 3(1), 3(2) and 3(4)(a).
21 Please see JCOERE Report 1 Chapter 3 Section 3.5 for a detailed discussion on the flexibility of the English Scheme jurisdiction: <https://www.ucc.ie/en/jcoere/research/report1/report1chapter/report1chapter3/> See also this Report, Chapter 7 section 7.4.
22 ibid.
of its continuing engagement with the EU despite treaty protocols described below in section 3.3.7.

3.2.2 The contributors and their roles

In terms of garnering information on these countries, we relied on a range of contributors and additional sources where any doubts arose. Of course, the danger is that a particular representative or commentator, whether practitioner or academic, is not entirely representative of the ‘official’ position and so we engaged in specific questions regarding substantive legal rules. These were separated out from observations regarding projections of legal initiatives or assessments of the policy debate. However, we found that the differences in legal approaches were often reflected in differences in policy and opinion. Even within jurisdictions we found differences in the characteristics of the commentary. To that end academics, for example, were often less pragmatic regarding the role of courts in adjudicating matters relevant to insolvency. These differences also arose regarding the willingness of judges to cede jurisdiction where the EIR Recast might apply, even in the face of dramatic rules such as a stay, whereas practitioners were less content with the loss of jurisdictional reach, for reasons that are discussed below.

3.3 The Classification of States – Our Perspective

As indicated, it is not proposed to go through the various different approaches to the elements of a preventive restructuring framework displayed by Member States and the various legal players within those states. Instead we have adopted a classification of Member States that is reflective of the JCOERE Project findings from Report 1. This classification is original and is presented as part of our research. It is not intended to be the final arbiter of the approach of Member States to corporate restructuring, but is simply designed to provide a comparative perspective on Member States in the context of corporate restructuring.

23 These points were made by Nicolaes W A Tollenaar and Tomáš Richter, at the ERA Conference, held in Trier, 7th and 8th November, 2019.
24 Discussed in more detail in para 3.10 of this Chapter.
26 Many commentators have presented the view that the Member States which are most likely to attract corporate restructuring business are the Netherlands and possibly Ireland. The UK is also regarded as continuing to attract restructuring business in Europe despite Brexit. From a practitioners’ perspective this is often presented as a competition for legal business whereas not all of the judiciary are as keen to add to the burden of their court work. For example, a note issued by Dentons Solicitors, ‘English Creditors and the new Dutch Scheme of Arrangement - A Two Horse Race?’ (June 16 2020) <https://www.dentons.com/en/insights/articles/2020/june/16/whoa-english-creditors-and-the-new-dutch-scheme-of-arrangement-a-two-horse-race>; from Ireland: Deloitte, ‘Business Restructuring Solutions: Solutions to help get your business back to growth’ <https://www3.deloitte.comie/en/pages/finance/solutions/restructuring-services.html>; An international perspective provided from London: Global Restructuring Review, ‘International Debt Restructuring: Can other Jurisdictions compete with London and New York?’ <https://www.shlegal.com/docs/default-source/news-insights-documents/11_16-grr-roundtable.pdf?sfvrsn=b58b165b_0> [All accessed June 17, 2020].
3.3.1 Member States with robust restructuring processes: The Common Law countries

It was clear from the beginning of our research that the common law countries within the EU have adopted what is described in this Chapter as ‘a robust’ approach to corporate rescue. It is difficult to know why this is the case; there is no reason inherent in the nature of the common law as a generator of legal rules compared with the civil law, which would suggest that one system is more favourable to the creation of rules which impose a stay, or protection for dissenting creditors and other characteristics typical of a robust restructuring process. There is the possibility of more influence from the US and the perceived importance of Chapter 11 of Title XI of the US Bankruptcy Code because of the commonality of systems. However, we have arrived at the interim conclusion that the explanation rests with a ‘commonality of legal culture’, specifically a culture that places the role of the judiciary at the centre of legal development; this, we believe, is different from civil law countries. A further part of this hypothesis is that restructuring is somewhat dependent on judicial responsiveness and that there is more potential for this in common law countries.27 These ideas are discussed further in Chapters 4 and 7.

That said we are a bit wary of the common law - civil law divide as providing the only explanation, as we suspect this might be too simplistic. As described below, there are also variations among civil law countries, which makes the mostly dualistic approach under the legal origins theory too simplistic to explain the variety of differences among the EU Member States.28

Within the common law countries of the EU, there are also problems associated with the differences between Schemes of Arrangement and Examinerships. The latter is included in the EIR Recast while the former is not, as it is a process derived from Company Law and is therefore excluded.29 This has not been detrimental to its use by a variety of foreign companies seeking to restructure in the UK. Rather, the flexibility of the ‘sufficient connection test’ as opposed to COMI has made it possible to extend availability of the process far more broadly than might have been possible had the procedure been subject to COMI. It is still

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27 The importance of the English Scheme of Arrangement post the recent financial crisis cannot be denied. The development of Schemes of Arrangement is discussed fully in Jennifer Payne, Scheme of Arrangement: Theory Structure and Operation (CUP, 2014). Many European companies were restructured under this process. The following cases are examples: Re Drax Holdings Ltd [2003] EWHC 2743 (Ch) and Re Rodenstock GmbH, [2011] EWHC 1104 (Ch). In addition, English courts are flexible regarding jurisdictional issues. In the first instance English law provides that a scheme can be between ‘a company’ and its creditors. This includes any company which is liable to be wound up under the Insolvency Act 1986. This can include solvent or insolvent ‘foreign’ companies. The test of whether an English court accepts jurisdiction rests on the following questions where a positive answer to any question is sufficient. First the presence of assets in the jurisdiction but this is not absolutely necessary. Second whether there are parties who might benefit from a process and finally whether there are one or more persons will receive assets are subject to court’s jurisdiction. In Primacom Holding GmbH & Anor v A Group of the Senior Lenders & Credit Agricole [2012] EWHC 164 (Ch) and Re Rodenstock GmbH, [2011] EWHC 1104 (Ch), the English court found that the fact that English law governed all creditor arrangements was sufficient. See further, Jennifer Payne, ‘Cross-border Schemes of Arrangement and Forum Shopping’ (2013) 14 European Business Organization Law Review 563, 571: ‘There is much to be said for the view that where the creditors have chosen English law, allowing a scheme of arrangement to compromise or transfer the creditors’ debt is entirely appropriate.’

28 Chapter 4, Section 4.3.1 refers to a number of commentators who have criticised this simple dualistic approach.

unclear how Brexit will affect the use of the process by European companies as it will not be affected by the disapplication of the EIR Recast. However, the recognition of judgements under the EU Judgements Regulation (Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001)\(^\text{30}\) had supported the general effectiveness of English Schemes of Arrangement and whilst some doubt has been cast over this approach in recent decisions of both the English courts and the CJEU, this has been relied upon by English practitioners. Of interest is the fact that whilst both Schemes of Arrangement with very similar characteristics to the English model are available in Ireland, the Examinership process has been the preferred approach over many years.

3.3.2 Civil Law countries with pre-existing rescue processes

The French *sauvegarde* procedures include a number of different variations, which have been described in Report 1.\(^\text{31}\) These have been in place for some time since the 1980s. They are included in the EIR Recast and plans are afoot to amend the existing legal framework to take account of the PRD. The question remains, however, whether any of the existing frameworks in France are fully compliant with the implementation of the PRD. It is interesting that France resists the cross-class cram-down which, although important in terms of a robust restructuring framework, is not a necessary part of implementation.

3.3.3 Civil Law countries responding to the financial crisis

*Italy*

There are three types of restructuring processes available in Italy and of these, the *concordato preventivo* is covered by the EIR Recast. The *concordato preventivo*\(^\text{32}\) includes an optional stay and a cross-class cram-down and is subject to court confirmation. The other two procedures as described by our contributors, seem to be more administrative in nature. These are different types of *accordi di ristrutturazione dei debiti* (purely consensual or binding on a minority of dissenting creditors) that envisage an out-of-court phase consisting of negotiation and reaching an agreement with creditors with a view to rescuing the company. These are subject to court confirmation. To an outsider, the range of options is confusing and therefore problematic. The issue of the formal co-operation obligations which arise is determined by two questions; the first is whether the process is covered by the EIR Recast. As two out of three of the procedures are not covered by the EIR Recast, therefore the issue of whether a formal obligation to co-operate does not arise. A second issue is that two out of the three procedures are out-of-court procedures. If these processes involve administrative authorities, it should not be assumed that co-operation obligations do not apply; in fact, such obligations could apply, as they have equal relevance to courts and administrative authorities, a point that will be discussed in more detail in section 3.3.6. In any event, it is possible that some sort

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32 Codice della crisi d’impresa e dell’insolvenza (CCI), art 84, para 3.
of co-operation would occur. That said, as we discuss in Chapter 4 section 4.3.2, legal certainty and foreseeability are fundamental to judicial co-operation and where individual Member States present a variety of preventive restructuring procedures, some of which are included in the EIR Recast and some of which are not, further uncertainty will arise in relation to both issues of recognition and co-operation. In fact, the variety that we now see emerging raises the question as to whether there should have been more harmonisation in the PRD once it was near finalisation, with less scope of implementation for individual Member States.\(^{33}\)

**Spain**

Spain is somewhat similar to Italy with a range of options for restructuring. These provisions include a stay and the possibility of including dissenting creditors where a majority approves the compromise plan in a particular class. However, at present Spain has no procedure that includes a cross-class cram-down as such. Again, as with France, it is not necessary to introduce cross-class cram-down as part of the implementation of the PRD and so we can see that there is a growing lack of harmonisation between the Member States.

### 3.3.4 Innovator countries

The Netherlands has introduced the WHOA legislation in anticipation of the passing of the PRD.\(^ {34}\) Interestingly, as the first version of the WHOA was progressing through the Dutch parliament, existing Dutch legislation under which a pre-pack restructuring process is possible was challenged on behalf of employees of Estro. Its business was restructured and sold to a new company, Smallsteps, with all employees being made redundant and some offered new contracts. The Dutch pre-pack is available under what was considered a liquidation procedure (faillissement), which is why it was believed that the rules requiring the transfer of employment contracts\(^ {35}\) would not apply in their case, as such rules apply only in procedures that are not with a view to the liquidation of the company. The CJEU found that despite the identifying features of the procedure under which the pre-pack was created being liquidation, because the business would continue to operate, the requirements to transfer employment contracts would also apply. This took away an important characteristic upon which the perceived competitiveness of the Dutch pre-pack relied: avoiding the highly protective Dutch employment regulations by being able to dismiss employees prior to the purchase of the employing company under a pre-pack. As a result, the WHOA went back to the proverbial


\(^{34}\) Wet homologatie onderhands akkoord (Act on the Confirmation of Extrajudicial Restructuring Plans) (WHOA).

drawing board, ostensibly to deal with what was viewed as a disadvantage to its competitiveness as a result of the CJEU’s finding in Estro/Smallsteps, among other things.\textsuperscript{36}

### 3.3.5 Newer accession states

Both Poland and Romania have taken the commitment to corporate rescue on board. There are elements of the Italian experience in the Romanian legislation. Polish legislation is advanced and developed and at present, includes four different possibilities. However, there are plans to further develop the processes in keeping with the option for robust restructuring processes.

### 3.3.6 The Resisters

#### Germany

Effectively, there is no \textit{preventive} restructuring framework available in Germany but the description of German insolvency procedures to this effect seems to rely on the dividing line of declared insolvency. In effect, there is no rescue process available before a declared insolvent but following a declaration of insolvent, the legislative framework does provide for a restructuring process. Once the debtor files for insolvent under the \textit{Insolvenzverfahren},\textsuperscript{37} the restructuring or rescue process is available \textit{(Insolvenzplan)}. The \textit{Insolvenzverfahren} is included in the EIR Recast. German law allows for a restructuring plan to be approved despite the objections of an entire class, so this would indicate that cross-class cram-down is permitted weighed against criteria applied by the court.\textsuperscript{38}

The apparent preference for relying on the insolvency threshold as a gateway to a restructuring process is also influenced by a continued theoretical resistance to pre-insolvency restructuring, which is described in Chapter 4 of JCOERE Report 1.\textsuperscript{39}

#### Austria

The Austrian \textit{Unternehmensreorganisationsgesetz} (URG) seems to be a very ‘light touch’ restructuring process that appears quite similar to the English (and Irish) Scheme of Arrangement insofar as it is essentially a restructuring process, which can be used for a solvent restructuring or a restructuring where the company is likely to become insolvent. Despite some similarities between this system and the English Scheme of Arrangement, there is also

\textsuperscript{36}Case C-126/16 First Steps Federatie Nederlandse Vakvereniging and Others v Smallsteps BV [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:489. The CJEU response supported the envisaged possibilities for rescue in the PRD but also stated that employees must be protected. There is now a specific provision in Article 13 designed to protect workers. The different political response is interesting in contrast to the differing approach to worker welfare in the common law countries.

\textsuperscript{37}Insolvenzverfahren, the unitary insolvency procedure under \textit{Die Insolvenzordnung} (The Insolvency Statute or InsO).

\textsuperscript{38}See further the description of the German process in Section 3.2 of the report by Stefania Bariatti and Robert Van Galen, \textit{Study on a new approach to business failure and insolvency – Comparative legal analysis of the Member States' relevant provisions and practices} TENDER NO. JUST/2012/JCV/CT/0194/A4, (INSOL Europe 2014). In this document the German process is described as potentially occurring once the notice of insolvent is published.

\textsuperscript{39}JCOERE Report 1, Chapter 4, section 4.4 discusses the theoretical debate around pre-insolvency and preventive restructuring, available here: <https://www.ucc.ie/en/jcoere/research/report1/report1chapter/report1chapter4/>.
no requirement for court confirmation of the scheme under the URG, which is a clear difference. Furthermore, there is no cross-class cram-down. In effect, this would represent a bare minimum in terms of the requirements of the PRD.

In Germany and Austria there seems to be little appetite for a robust restructuring process at policy level. Germany had a more robust restructuring process on the books previously (the Vergleichsordnung), which we are told was not often used. There is resistance to the wholesale rewriting of existing contracts, which tends to characterise restructuring agreements. Austria has the same response, which is interesting as we have been informed that, as a centre for cross-border insolvency, Austria might experience more of these kinds of cases than others. Our Austrian contributor pointed out that the Austrian process, the URG is hardly every used. It is unclear why this is the case.

### 3.3.7 Outliers

**Denmark**

Of key importance in considering the position of Denmark are Articles 1 and 2 of Protocol No 22 on the position of Denmark annexed to the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Denmark is not obliged to comply with further provisions regarding Title 5 of Part 3 of the TFEU. Therefore, the Danish legislative framework, as it currently stands, is not covered by the EIR Recast per Recital 88. Nevertheless, Denmark intends to implement the provisions of the PRD. Reflecting the German approach, the Danish legislative framework provides for a restructuring plan but only after a formal declaration of insolvency has been made. Thus, a new process will be introduced following the terms of the PRD.

### 3.4 Harmonisation and Co-operation

As described above, there is general acknowledgement that co-operation is reliant on significant degrees of harmonisation. This is acknowledged by the European Commission and is also evidenced in practice, with the most obvious example emanating from our comparison with the United States in Chapter 7 where a federal arrangement of states operates under a federal bankruptcy code. In this latter context, as we show in Chapter 7, issues relating to the choice of forum become muted and less complex. It should be noted that despite this marked difference between the EU and the US in the context of insolvency law, it is not the case that all significant areas of law are harmonised across the US, the most obvious examples being tax law and employment laws. Corporate law is also an area that is not harmonised across the United States. Nevertheless, in this particular arena, the states of Delaware, New York and

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40 As regards the latter there is very little harmonised law in relation to individual employment law standards unlike the EU where levels of harmonisation are significant. In contrast laws regulating trade unions and collective bargaining are federalised. See generally Irene Lynch Fannon, *Working Within Two Kinds of Capitalism* (Hart 2003). Similarly, although there is a federal tax base states in the United States vary considerably as regards income tax levels and indeed sales tax.
California represent the majority of cases where choice of forum in corporate law is necessary. Thus, it is not accidental that the choice of forum in corporate bankruptcy follows this line. In the EU, in contrast, all Member States pursue their own corporate law frameworks, with some elements of harmonisation across Europe.\textsuperscript{41} In addition, tensions between the real seat doctrine and the place of incorporation make it difficult to replicate the US experience, although corporate mobility is becoming increasingly common in Europe.\textsuperscript{42} On the whole however, it is clear that harmonisation of EU corporate insolvency law has a long way to go and this is clearly the case as regards our specific focus on preventive restructuring. Our first Report described in detail different approaches of EU Member States and these differences become more exaggerated the more one engages in discourse on the subject. The differences were adumbrated as early as 2014\textsuperscript{43} in the period leading up to the publication of the Commission’s policy document, \textit{A New Approach to Business Failure}, discussed here and elsewhere in our Reports.

3.5 \textbf{Procedural Obstacles: Findings from JCOERE Project Report 1}

In our JCOERE Questionnaire, which we circulated to eleven Member State jurisdictions, we identified in advance some issues that we characterised as procedural obstacles and which we hypothesised would cause obstacles to co-operation. The EIR Recast itself includes some specific provisions regarding choice of forum and/or choice of law issues and in some senses therefore, the EIR Recast acknowledges that co-operation has its limits. What is interesting is the extent to which the EIR Recast itself embeds obstacles to co-operation in this way; these are discussed in the following section. For the moment however, we are focussing on issues, which arise in a typical preventive restructuring framework or issues that are specifically addressed in the PRD, which may prove to be problematic.

These include but are not exhaustive of the following issues:

- Rights in rem as provided for in article 8 of the EIR Recast. This issue was included in our JCOERE Questionnaire in anticipation of difficulties arising from it (Qn 11).
- Constitutional Parameters Delimiting Freedom of Judicial Communication (Qn 12).
- Training and Competency for Insolvency Judges (Qn 14), which is addressed in Chapter 4 of this Report (section 4.6).

3.5.1 \textit{Rights in Rem}

Article 8 of the EIR Recast provides particular protection for creditors with rights \textit{in rem} over assets ‘which are situated within the territory of another Member State’.\textsuperscript{44} Effectively this


\textsuperscript{43} Stefania Bariatti and Robert Van Galen, Study on a new approach to business failure and insolvency – Comparative legal analysis of the Member States’ relevant provisions and practices TENDER NO. JUST/2012/JCIV/CT/0194/A4, (INSOL Europe 2014).

\textsuperscript{44} EIR Recast, Art. 8(1): ‘The opening of insolvency proceedings shall not affect the rights \textit{in rem} of creditors or third parties in respect of tangible or intangible, moveable or immovable assets, both specific assets and collections of indefinite assets as a whole which change from...
means that there is a limitation to the jurisdictional reach of any insolvency proceeding opened in one Member State in relation to assets situated in another Member State. In the context of the PRD, this imposes a limitation on the reach of any restructuring insofar as it affects the rights of a creditor secured with an in rem right. Dahl and Kortleben observe that article 8 relates to the right in an asset but not to the asset itself. Thus, where the creditor obtains proceeds from the realisation of the asset, the underlying principle is that the asset belongs to the insolvency estate so that where there is a surplus generated the surplus reverts to the insolvency estate. Where the asset is realised for equivalent value, no further issues arise, but where the asset is realised for less than the value of the debt, the creditor will become an unsecured creditor of the company for the remainder. This seems a legitimate approach in the context of traditional insolvency proceedings. In a restructuring however, the question is whether the creditor’s right in a particular asset is protected in this way under the European framework. In other words, is the protection in the EIR Recast absolute? It would seem to be so. Therefore, the creditor’s right or claim cannot be part of the restructuring proceedings as such, unless the creditor specifically agrees to this. This would therefore seem to be an ex ante limit on the operation of cram-down or cross-class cram-down provisions.

Furthermore, in the scenario where proceeds of the realised asset are insufficient to meet the debt, the question persists as to whether the creditor remains in a different, protected position compared with other creditors that must submit to the restructuring process.

As observed by Snowden, the opening of a main insolvency proceeding, which will include a restructuring process if it is included in Annex A, essentially ‘has no effects upon the right in rem’. This means that ‘security rights in other Member States can be asserted and enforced in spite of the opening of insolvency proceedings as if no such proceedings existed’.

3.5.2 Constitutional issues – public hearings

As argued by Moss, Fletcher and Isaacs, it would seem to be incompatible with procedural rights and principles if courts were to communicate with each other without the presence of legal parties or their advisors. It seems to us that this might be the view of members of the judiciary (and commentators and practitioners) in a number of Member States, including Ireland, for example, which has a constitutional guarantee that justice would be administered...
in public insofar as possible. However, other commentators take a different view. In our view, the nature of the co-ordination would be determinative of whether a procedural or indeed constitutional principle is breached. It could be that limited co-ordination such as setting a date might be finally decided upon without the parties present, but on the other hand, we would not agree that courts co-ordinating actions regarding the appointment of an insolvency practitioner could be done without informing the parties and ensuring their presence. In addition, the requirement that a court hearing should be heard in public is not, in terms of constitutional jurisprudence, limited to the requirement that only the parties are heard. There is an understanding that the constitutional requirement extends to the interests of the public in general including journalists, reporters, other interested stakeholders, who may not be party to the action, per se. In the case of Ireland, this understanding can be said to stem from two articles of the Irish Constitution; first, Article 34.1 and second, Article 40.6.1.

Article 34.1 states that justice shall be administered in public and was considered in detail in *The Irish Times v Ireland*, wherein it was held by the Supreme Court that it was both ‘a fundamental right in a democratic state and a fundamental principle of the administration of justice (...) for people to have access to the courts to hear and see justice being done’ save in limited exceptions. The exceptions to this are few and far between as demonstrated by *Doe v Revenue Commissioners*, wherein a potential exception to the requirement was considered. At a preliminary hearing, the plaintiffs sought permission to bring the main proceedings anonymously and an in camera hearing for (part of) those proceedings. The case concerned the identification of the plaintiffs in Iris Oifigiúil (Government Official Gazette), effectively as ‘tax defaulters’. The plaintiffs argued for anonymity on two grounds: first, an entitlement to privacy in taxation matters and second, an entitlement of access to the courts, which would be lost in their case if anonymity was not permitted. The Court rejected both arguments and held that the constitutional rights to privacy or to a good name are insufficient to displace the constitutional imperative to administer justice in public and are distinguishable from the right to a fair trial, which may necessitate some proportionate restriction of that imperative. Article 40.6.1 protects the right of citizens to express freely their convictions and

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51 Dominik Skauradszun and Andreas Spahlinger, ‘Chapter III Secondary Insolvency Proceedings: Article 42. Co-operation and communication between courts in Moritz Brinkmann (ed), *European Insolvency Regulation: Article by Article Commentary* (Beck, Hart, Nomos, 2019), p. 352 where it is argued that because co-operation is between two representatives of the courts and that the focus is on co-ordination this cannot be ‘compared to a hearing or the court’s examination of the evidence.’ However, the following sentence contemplates courts coordinating about the ‘appointment of the same insolvency practitioner’ without informing the parties or inviting them to take part in the deliberations.

52 This appears to be borne out in many of the guidelines considered in Chapter 6.

53 [1998] 1 IR 359, 361. The court also expressed that the trial judge in this case, who prohibited contemporaneous reporting, could have dealt with the matter under contempt of court rules and by giving adequate directions to the jury, arguably further emphasising that any prohibition on the media from reporting on court cases should be exceptional. This case also considered the right of the media to report in the context of Article 40.6.1. See also *Cullen v Toibín* [1984] I.L.R.M 577 and *In re R* [1989] I.R. 196, in which Walsh J stated: ‘The actual presence of the public is never necessary but the administration of justice in public does require that the doors of the courts must be open so that members of the general public may come and see for themselves that justice is done’ [p.134].

54 [2008] 3 IR 328

55 The publication in Iris Oifigiúil would be of the settlement reached between the plaintiffs and the Revenue Commissioners under the ‘Disclosure of Undeclared Liabilities by Holders of Off-Shore Assets’ scheme. There was a disagreement between the parties as to the legal requirement for such a publication.

56 The right to a fair trial was not relevant in *Doe*, as the plaintiffs had ‘admitted’ wrongdoing by virtue of reaching a settlement with the Revenue Commissioners.
opinions subject to certain limitations; it acknowledges *inter alia* the ‘grave import to the common good’ of the education of public opinion. Naturally this right is not absolute and must cede to other constitutionally protected rights, such as the right to a fair trial or ‘trial in due course of law’. In *Kelly v O’Neill* the constitutionally guaranteed right to freedom of expression of the press was expressly acknowledged by the Supreme Court; while it viewed this right as ‘a value of critical importance in a democratic society’, the Court held that it was not an absolute right and could be superseded by other concerns, such as the administration of justice and the right to a fair trial.

Rules of this kind and their interaction with obligations to co-operate depend on the domestic legal framework. The nature of the constitutional guarantee that justice will be administered in public and how it is understood will no doubt affect the willingness of members of the judiciary to communicate with members of the judiciary in other Member States and it will certainly affect the manner in which that communication takes place.

It is noted, however, that not all jurisdictions will take the same approach as the Irish example. In contrast to the assumptions made in Ireland, contributors to the JCOERE Questionnaire from other countries with written constitutions (all apart from the UK) such as Denmark expressed the view that it is not generally considered that the process of communication raised significant challenges.

3.5.3 Co-operation: Statute, judge-made protocol or guideline?

From country to country, different approaches are taken to the issue of co-operation. In France, for example, the law that implements or adds to the EIR Recast and the co-operation provisions emphasise the need for security and privacy. The law states that communication may take place by any suitable means that enable security, confidentiality and the privacy of the information exchange to be guaranteed. The court may also appoint a judge or authorise the supervising judge and / or the office-holder to carry out any necessary co-operation and communication. The office-holder is also required to submit for the approval of the supervising judge, any proposed agreement or protocol agreed by virtue of the same provisions of the Recast EIR in respect of the same debtor or another entity that is a member of the same group as the debtor. In some countries, such as the French example cited here,

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57 Article 40.6.1 identifies these limitations as ‘public order and morality’ and ‘the authority of the State’, however it does not extend to ‘criticism of Government policy’, which is expressly protected.
58 Articles 38.1 and 40.3.
60 [2000] 1 ILRM 507, 509. Although this was a criminal matter, critically the Supreme Court drew a distinction between “an article published after the jury have returned a verdict of guilty, but before sentence is imposed, which simply summarises the facts of the case … and includes innocuous background material” and the media having “an unrestricted licence, subject only to the law of defamation, to comment freely and publish material, however untrue and damaging, concerning a trial at a stage when it was still in progress”.
63 *ibid*, introducing new Article L695-2-II of the Commercial Code.
the manner in which judges might co-operate with other courts is regulated by statute. In other countries, there is no expectation of such regulation and so the matter may be addressed through the operation of protocols, such as those considered in Chapter 6.\textsuperscript{64} When questioned, judges often expressed the view that they themselves would adopt and devise a protocol if necessary and often expressed scepticism about the need for a common standard protocol. Certainly, it became apparent that there was little awareness of developed principles and guidelines amongst some judges, which is discussed further in Chapter 8 of this Report, with the principles and guidelines themselves being explored in Chapter 6.

According to the Polish Constitution, everyone shall have the right to a fair and public hearing of his case, without undue delay, before a competent, impartial and independent court. Similar to Ireland, exceptions to the public nature of hearings may be made for reasons of morality, State security, public order or protection of the private life of a party, or other important private interest. Judgments shall be announced publicly (article 45 of the Polish Constitution).\textsuperscript{65}

The Italian Constitution does not include any express parameter delimiting the freedom of judges to communicate, in general; however, pursuant to art 111 of the Italian Constitution, all proceedings must be conducted on an equal footing in a fair and impartial third-party hearing between the parties. This provision introduces the so-called adversarial principle in the Italian jurisdiction.

In light of the above, direct communications between Courts, although permitted, needs to occur in a way that is compliant with domestic constitutional principles provided here simply as examples of issues that might occur in all Member States. In particular, compliance with constitutional provisions prohibits that judicial decisions be taken without protecting the interested parties right to be heard (orally or in writing) on an equal footing.

While there is a focus on the rights of parties to the proceedings in the answers to our questions about constitutional issues, it is important to note that in some jurisdictions the constitutional issues regarding the hearing of judicial proceedings in public (as with Ireland) will extend well beyond the interests of particular parties to the proceedings.

\textsuperscript{64} See further Chapter 6.

3.5.4 Court or administrative authority?

Other difficulties that may arise have been illustrated by a consideration of case law in Chapter 5 of this Report. One of these includes the equation of a court with what is described as an ‘administrative authority’ in the PRD. In this case, even though the recitals to the PRD and the definition in article 2 refer to ‘a court’, in subsequent articles, reference is repeatedly made to ‘a judicial or administrative authority’ as is the case in article 5(2), article 6 relating to the imposition of a stay and so on.66 A similar approach is taken in the EIR Recast where the definition in article 2(6)(i) states that court means ‘the judicial body of a Member State’ in relation to specific provisions67 but goes on to provide in article 2(6)(ii) that, in all other articles, ‘court’ means ‘the judicial body or any other competent body of a Member State empowered to open insolvency proceedings, to confirm such opening or to take decisions in the course of such proceedings’. This means that, for the purposes of articles 42-44 and articles 57 and 58, an equivalence is drawn between a judicial body and an administrative authority. Recital 20 of the EIR Recast states:

Insolvency proceedings do not necessarily involve the intervention of a judicial authority. Therefore, the term ‘court’ in this Regulation should, in certain provisions, be given a broad meaning and include a person or body empowered by national law to open insolvency proceedings. In order for this Regulation to apply, proceedings (comprising acts and formalities set down in law) should not only have to comply with the provisions of this Regulation, but they should also be officially recognised and legally effective in the Member State in which the insolvency proceedings are opened.

Many of the articles in the PRD refer to judicial or administrative authorities exercising power or authority in various ways. However, there can be a significant difference in the characteristics of judicial and administrative authorities, whether within a single jurisdiction or in a cross-border situation.

3.5.5. Court or administrative authority: Case law

From the very beginning the equivalence drawn between a court and an administrative authority was bound to present problems between the common law and civil law systems, where the perception of the latter type of arbiter is much more mixed than in civil law countries. However, the difficulties caused by this asserted equivalence between a court and an administrative authority will not be limited to simply a civil-common law divide, as is evidenced by some of our responses to the JCOERE Questionnaire. As expected, this issue presented problems in the Eurofood case.68 Under article 2(d) of the 2000 EIR it is stated that ‘court’ shall mean the judicial body or any other competent body of a Member State

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66 The same phraseology is used in Article 10 in relation to confirmation of a restructuring plan and in Article 11 regarding the operation of cram-down provisions.

67 These specific provisions are listed in PRD, Article 2(6)(i). None are of particular relevance to restructuring other than points (b) and (c) of Article 1(1) which refer to a stay.

68 Case C-341/04 Eurofood IFSC Ltd [2006] ECR I-03813, and Re Eurofood IFSC Ltd, (C-341/04) [2006] Ch. 508; [2006] 3 WLR 309 [Hereinafter Eurofood].
empowered to open insolvency proceedings or to take decisions in the course of such proceedings’ and went on in art 2(e) to state that ‘“judgment” in relation to the opening of insolvency proceedings or the appointment of a liquidator shall include the decisions of any court empowered to open such proceedings or to appoint a liquidator’. Article 2(f) provided that the time of opening of proceedings shall mean ‘the date of the judgment which renders the commencement effective’. However, Recital 10 of the EIR explicitly stated as follows:

Insolvency proceedings do not necessarily involve the intervention of a judicial authority; the expression ‘court’ in this Regulation should be given a broad meaning and include a person or body empowered by national law to open insolvency proceedings.

In his opinion in Eurofood, Advocate General Jacobs explained that ‘in various jurisdictions there are different ways in which insolvency proceedings may be commenced’, usually a decision of a court, on the one hand, and the appointment of a liquidator, on the other hand. The EIR ‘confers automatic recognition on insolvency proceedings opened in both ways’.69

The Parmalat/Eurofood case illustrates the potential for enormous difficulty in the application of these principles. Here, the first decision in Italy to commence the insolvency process was made by the Italian Minister for Production Activities on 9 February 2004. It is worth bearing in mind, however, that Parmalat SpA had been admitted to extraordinary administration proceedings and an extraordinary administrator appointed on 24 December 2003. In Ireland, the petition for the winding-up of the company had been presented to the High Court and a provisional liquidator appointed to Eurofood on 27 January 2004. Subsequently, the winding-up order was made, and an official liquidator appointed on 23 March 2004. The most important question, namely which proceedings would prevail in relation to Eurofood IFSC, turned on which step constituted the ‘opening of proceedings’. The ECJ held that it was the appointment of the provisional liquidator by the Irish High Court on 27 January 2004, which constituted the opening of main insolvency proceedings. This issue was vigorously contested on behalf of the Italian authorities, which characterised a provisional liquidator as a ‘temporary administrator’ with ‘limited powers’ and therefore not a ‘liquidator’ for the purpose of the EIR. In contrast, it was contended that, as an administrative act, the Italian commencement did not amount to the commencement of proceedings as such. The ECJ concluded that under Irish law a provisional liquidator has ‘extensive powers’, including to take possession of the assets of a company, and his role is therefore much wider than a ‘temporary administrator’.

On the continuing question of court-to-court co-operation and staying with the Italian situation, as suggested earlier in this Chapter, various restructuring processes in Italy involve an administrative authority rather than a court. The procedimento di composizione assistita della crisi involves an administrative authority. In other processes, the board (collegio, art 17 CCI) is composed of three members chosen among those included in a public register of

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69 Case C-341/04 Eurofood IFSC Ltd [2006] ECR I-03813, para 64.
experts. One of them is designated by the court and the other two by the Chamber of Commerce and by the trade association of the debtors’ industry. While it is important to note that in Italy the court, not the board, has the power to grant a stay on enforcement actions, nevertheless, it is clear that in some cases courts could potentially be asked to co-operate with administrative authorities. As with *Parmalat*, this may cause difficulties in and of itself.

### 3.6 Workers

In introducing a restructuring framework under the Preventive Restructuring Directive, article 13 provides:

> Members States shall ensure that individual and collective workers’ rights, under Union and national labour law, such as the following, are not affected by the preventive restructuring framework.

As indicated in the text, the article then goes on to list some provisions but also notes that all rights of workers available in domestic legislation are protected under the article. The question then arises as to whether a restructuring, which includes a cram-down of workers’ claims within a class or includes a cross-class cram-down of an entire class of creditors’ claims of which workers form a part, can be achieved under these provisions?

The answer would seem to lie in the practical terms of a restructuring process, in other words the actual restructuring agreement. Usually workers will be kept in employment during a restructuring as preservation of jobs is indeed one of the aims of restructuring. However, some workers may be made redundant or there may be a reorganisation of working roles. In these cases, workers will have a claim against state insurance funds or will benefit from the provisions of Directives 98/59/EC,70 2001/23/EC,71 and 2008/94/EC72 and the PRD seeks to preserve this situation.

However, the PRD goes on to state in article 13(2):

> Where the restructuring plan includes measures leading to changes in the work organisation or in contractual relations with workers, those measures shall be approved by those workers, if national law or collective agreements provide for such approval in such cases.73

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73 PRD, art 13(2).
This seems to imply that where a domestic restructuring framework allows for workers to be part of a restructuring claim, where workers could in fact waive rights to claims for payment or other rights that might arise, this is permissible under the PRD.

The EIR Recast also includes the proviso that in all cases, ‘[t]he effects of insolvency proceedings on employment contracts and relationships shall be governed solely by the law of the Member State applicable to the contract of employment.’ Effectively, as with the provisions of the EIR Recast in relation to rights *in rem* discussed above, the EIR Recast itself places a limitation on universal recognition of any particular insolvency process, including any rescue framework implementing the PRD, which is covered by the EIR Recast. Where the process is not covered by the EIR Recast, article 13 of the PRD provides that workers are protected by domestic law. However, article 13.2 implies or envisages that Member States may introduce particular restructuring frameworks under the PRD, which may not insist that workers rights are absolute.

### 3.7 Further Obstacles

#### 3.7.1 Liability for non-co-operation

In the commentary on the EIR Recast edited by Brinkmann and specifically the commentary on article 42, which obliges courts to co-operate, Skauradszun and Spahlinger observe that this obligation was not present in the EIR 2000. The authors note that this obligation stems from article 81 of the TEFU regarding judicial co-operation in civil matters with cross-border implications but note that despite this European aspiration, co-operation with foreign courts ‘will be an entirely new experience for many judges’ though some jurisdictions already have an obligation embedded in legislation.

The authors continue to address the very important issue that this provision does in fact impose an obligation on the court and raise the issue of what happens when there is non-compliance. The first point is that article 2(6)(ii) of the EIR states that ‘court’ includes in its definition ‘the judicial body or another competent body of a Member State empower to open insolvency proceedings, to confirm such opening or to take decisions in the course of such proceedings’. Most importantly the authors go on to assert that, under German law, this definition comprises judges as well as officers of justice as individuals. This is further considered in Chapter 5 of this Report.

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74 EIR Recast, art 13.
75 Mortiz Brinkmann (ed), European Insolvency Regulation: Article by Article Commentary (Beck, Hart, Nomos 2019).
76 See also, Chapter 2 of this Report.
77 The authors quote Renato Mangano, Bob Wessels, Reinhard Dammann, ‘Secondary Insolvency Proceedings (Art 34-52), in Reinhard Bork and Kristin van Zwieten (eds), *Commentary on the European Insolvency Regulation* (Oxford University Press, 2016) and also refer to the experience of English courts under the UK Cross-border Insolvency Regulation 2006 which implements the UNCITRAL Model Law in the UK.
3.7.2 Effect of non-co-operation

Perhaps of more significance is the consequence of non-compliance with co-operation obligations for the validity of a procedure and its outcome. So, for example where an insolvency practitioner operating a preventive restructuring process recognised under the EIR Recast (for example the Irish Examinership) notifies a second court that an examiner has been appointed and that a stay is in place, is the second court obliged to recognise this stay? The answer seems to be an unequivocal yes. A further question then arises; if the court decided to ignore the stay to give a creditor a remedy in the second court, would this decision and any consequent orders be invalid? The issues concerning recognition and ongoing assistance or co-operation are considered in detail in light of existing case law in Chapter 5 of this Report.

3.7.3 Practitioner resistance

An additional obstacle to real co-operation in restructuring processes lies in the dynamics of legal practice. In large restructuring cases involving a range of corporate entities, in groups of companies for example, practitioners will be anxious to protect their own role, or practice interest.\textsuperscript{79} This will have two effects:

- First, it may be the case that a particular restructuring processes will not be included within the remit of the EIR Recast thus avoiding the COMI issue and allowing the Member State to attract restructuring business from across Europe, much as the English Scheme of Arrangement has done in recent years. Alternatively, some states, but not all, will adopt ‘robust restructuring processes’ such as those adopted in Ireland and the Netherlands and perhaps attract business from Europe through operation of a COMI shift.
- Second, arguments may be made that particular actions are not centrally part of the insolvency process. In our case, reference to ‘an insolvency process’ includes a restructuring process created to implement the PRD and included in the EIR Recast, which will be subject to jurisdictional rules generated by the determination of COMI. If actions which impact on a particular creditor’s position such as \textit{an actio pauliana} are not a part of the restructuring process included in the EIR Recast, then they will also not be subject to any terms of the EIR Recast. It is possible that practitioners will identify particular types of action which allow for a removal of their client’s action from the insolvency process, thus removing the action from the shadow of the EIR Recast and the obligation to co-operate. We have already seen this phenomenon in a number of cases that are considered in Chapter 5 of this Report.\textsuperscript{80} In other words the strategies of practitioners may serve to dilute the effect of the co-operation obligations in the EIR Recast.

\textsuperscript{79} See Chapter 2 where a similar point is made in relation opt out of co-ordinated proceedings contained in the EIR Recast.

During our discussions and attendance at conferences with practitioners and other insolvency specialists, we have definitely seen this effect, where practitioners are actively promoting their jurisdiction as supporting rescue or where practitioners are concerned regarding loss of business. This is discussed further in Chapter 7 of this Report in the US context.

### 3.8 Observations from the European Judiciary

Interestingly, further obstacles to co-operation have been identified by members of the European Judiciary themselves at events attended by the JCOERE Project. This section describes observations made by members at the Judicial Wing meeting of INSOL Europe, which took place at the annual conferences held in Athens in 2018 and in Copenhagen in 2019. In Athens Greece, the JCOERE Project gave a simple introduction to the Project. Even at that point, there was a great deal of interest and a number of significant points arose, even in those initial stages. First, there was a concern amongst the judiciary regarding a lack of knowledge of legal systems of different Member States. This was considered to be an obstacle to effective co-operation. Methods for ascertaining knowledge of Member States’ legal systems varied from availing of informal networks to a formal request for information from a home ministry of justice or similar government entity.\(^{81}\) It is clear that the EU can contribute further to judicial training in this regard. Some consistency of approach in terms of the provision of information is important. A second key point that emerged even at that point was the varied methods of appointment of members of the judiciary, who may have to deal with cross-border cases. These differing standards regarding training and experience requirements were identified as a possible obstacle to co-operation; this discussion is furthered in Chapter 4 of this Report, where it is analysed in the context of mutual trust. Chapter 4 also explores the judicial education and training requirements of our eleven contributing jurisdictions in the JCOERE Questionnaire, which is set out in section 4.6 of this Report.

In Copenhagen, the members of the Judicial Wing were presented with a case study concerning the application of the co-operation provisions in the context of the opening of restructuring proceedings in Ireland (the Examinership process) and the enforcement of a compromise in those proceedings against a debtor of the group located in a second Member State.\(^{82}\) The outcome of this discussion is described in the following section. The purpose of this case study was to identify potential obstacles to court-to-court co-operation and to discern any differences in understanding held by the judges.

#### 3.8.1 The nature of insolvency

A generally acknowledged view from members of the judiciary at the INSOL Europe Judicial Wing Meeting in Copenhagen was the desirability of one forum, particularly as regards

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81 As is described in Chapter 2 in instances of cross-border judicial co-operation in other trading blocs, ‘information that courts will want…will often revolve around the governing law of another court.’ See further, Jay Lawrence Westbrook ‘International Judicial Negotiation’ (2003) 38 Tex Int’s L J 567, 579.

82 This survey is attached in Annex I of this Report.
bankruptcy or insolvency proceedings. This is derived from the particular nature of insolvency proceedings, which is based on the fundamental concept of the collective distribution of the insolvent estate to all creditors.

3.8.2 Procedures and protocol

Many judges expressed concern regarding the nature of the obligations and their own role in facilitating co-operation. Several senior judges were uncomfortable with the idea that they or their court would engage in a high level of communication. Instead, it was considered preferable that this communication, as part of a formal process, would take place via a court clerk or other individual. As discussed previously, the EIR Recast does envisage the appointment of an independent person or body. The insolvency practitioner was also seen as a possible support in terms of co-operation. There would be considerable resistance to any perception that a judge would or would be perceived as communicating behind the scenes. The following key principles were proposed by the Judicial Panel held at the main INSOL Europe conference in Athens:

i. Open Court is a key idea.

ii. Transnational transparency is also important. There must be directions given to notify all parties.

iii. Protection of confidential information of course also important.

iv. Fair Procedures.

These procedural rules are relevant to all processes but are relevant to preventive restructuring when such a process is court-based. However, the differences in approach in legal systems was noteworthy. Whereas in common law countries, the judges were in a position to exercise discretion as to the type and method of co-operation, other jurisdictions, including Italy as a sample civil law country, were subject to more specific rules or guidance. For example, the following rules applied in Italy according to Judge Panzani:

i. Italian laws state that the rules of the Regulation must be applied by the court regarding proceedings opened in the EU, but also elsewhere.

ii. There should be a general approach in all cases of cross-border insolvency.

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83 Again, these observations from members of the judiciary at INSOL Europe Judicial Wing in Copenhagen, reflect observations described in Chapter 2 of this Report. ‘There are also gaps in knowledge of foreign insolvency frameworks that could lead to distrust, inhibiting cooperation as trust requires knowledge of how such a framework functions.’ Again this is reflective of observations made by Jay Lawrence Westbrook: ‘Theory and Pragmatism in Global Insolvencies: Choice of Law and Choice of Forum (1991) 65 Am Bankr L J 457.

84 See further EIR Recast, Article 42(1) and 57(1).

85 This was discussed by the Judicial Wing Panel: ‘Cooperation and Communication between Judges in Cross-Border Insolvencies under the EIR Recast’ (INSOL Europe Annual Congress, Athens, 5th October 2018). The Judicial Wing Panel was composed of Judge Caroline Costello, Judge Luciano Panzani, and Emil Sczepanik, Ministry of Justice, Poland.

86 Although the judges did acknowledge that there would be limited possibilities for private hearings in the context of insolvency proceedings, for example the hearing of an ex parte application for an injunction or stay. In Ireland the initial appointment of an examiner can be based on an ex parte application of private hearings. For example, Mareva or ex parte hearings.
iii. The language of co-operation will be Italian and if this is not possible, it should be English. The Court is allowed to use English, but provision should be made for translation.

iv. The costs of co-operation will be considered an expense of the courts system and would not be considered to be part of the professional costs of the insolvency practitioner.

v. Co-operation would ideally be facilitated by IP for the same sorts of reasons regarding procedural safeguards as applied in Ireland.

vi. Italian judges / courts are not permitted to engage in side bar phone calls. At the very least such calls should be recorded.

vii. The IP appointed in Italy cannot be the same as the IP in second jurisdiction. This also indicates that the IP cannot be from the same firm or practise.

In contrast, in former Eastern bloc countries, the idea of co-operation between courts seemed more ‘normal’ and acceptable.

In France, the procedure for the recognition of a foreign judgment follows the ordinary rules of civil procedure and involves an application to the court by any interested party, including the foreign office-holder and the debtor, even if the foreign judgment was obtained ex parte. The court hearing the application must content itself with an examination of the regularity of the foreign judgment and that the public interest and legal system in France would not be offended by the recognition of the judgment. The elements a court would look at in its examination include whether the foreign court had proper jurisdiction; whether the proper law was applied; compliance with due process and public policy rules, including whether the procedure was adversarial; and the absence of fraud. This examination of compliance conditioned the ability of French judges to extend assistance to foreign proceedings.

It is suggested by the JCOERE Project that the markedly different attitudes and existing legal frameworks may constitute barriers to court-to-court co-operation. A judge or administrator operating in a jurisdiction where it is commonplace to have a telephone conversation as a means of communicating and co-operating, may be met with clear resistance to such a suggestion in another jurisdiction. As articulated, certain jurisdictions have clear rules on co-operation and information sharing, however, it appears that others do not. If there is an unawareness of the extent to which the obligation to co-operate is permissible within a jurisdiction or procedure, then it may act as a barrier to it. In this context, the importance of the applicability of the obligation to co-operate to administrative authorities cannot be overlooked.

87 Meaning the relevant person in an administrative authority.
3.9 Conclusion and Transition

The JCOERE Project research revealed certain categories of Member State approaches to preventive restructuring, which we applied to our contributors in the analysis of their approach to preventive restructuring. Also discussed was the likely divergence that will arise in implementation of the PRD due to certain policy differences, which may well present obstacles to co-operation. We also presented an analysis of our findings in relation to questions relating to procedure queried in the JCOERE Questionnaire, along with additional observations around how procedural differences may also inhibit effective co-operation in cross-border preventive restructuring cases. This Chapter has connected this issue with the broader issue related to EU integration and harmonisation and how this affects mutual trust and, by extension, effective co-operation.

The next chapter will examine additional issues that may challenge mutual trust and co-operation, namely different aspects of legal and judicial culture. As the characteristics of a jurisdiction’s legal culture are deeply imbedded features that underpin the development and application of commonly held legal principles, these are particularly difficult to dislodge or otherwise harmonise. They influence the approach of a jurisdiction to fundamental legal principles, such as the rule of law, which underpin many other important characteristics of a legal system, including the role of the courts and judicial independence. The EU has taken a proactive approach to harmonising or Europeanising Member State judiciaries with a view to increasing mutual trust and effective co-operation. The next Chapter will explore issues of harmonisation as they relate to legal and judicial culture and how differences in this area may impact court-to-court co-operation.
IV. Chapter 4: Influences of Judicial and Legal Culture in Europe

4.1 Introduction

Chapters 1 and 3 of this Report described the connections that have been made by the EU between the harmonisation of laws and judicial co-operation, in turn leading to ever closer integration of the European Union. The obstacles to harmonisation of substantive laws on preventive restructuring measures, which have been described in the JCOERE Report 1 and summarised in Chapter 3 of this Report, are connected to similar, if not identical, issues that also present obstacles to jurisdictional co-operation between courts and practitioners generally. These include differences in legal culture, and for the purpose of this Chapter, judicial culture. While differences in legal and judicial culture are not the sole reasons why harmonisation and co-operation continue to be challenging within the EU, the differences underpin many of the conflicts that do arise.

Effective cross-border court-to-court co-operation is predicated on the principle of sincere co-operation and mutual trust, as set out in the EIR Recast:

This Regulation should provide for the immediate recognition of judgments concerning the opening, conduct and closure of insolvency proceedings which fall within its scope, and of judgments handed down in direct connection with such insolvency proceedings. Automatic recognition should therefore mean that the effects attributed to the proceedings by the law of the Member State in which the proceedings were opened extend to all other Member States. The recognition of judgments delivered by the courts of the Member States should be based on the principle of mutual trust. To that end, grounds for non-recognition should be reduced to the minimum necessary. This is also the basis on which any dispute should be resolved where the courts of two Member States both claim competence to open the main insolvency proceedings. The decision of the first court to open proceedings should be recognised in the other Member States without those Member States having the power to scrutinise that court's decision.1

As discussed in Chapter 2 of this Report, while the EIR Recast increased the duties of co-operation and communication between practitioners and between courts, this is not always easy to achieve in practice, particularly between courts. The objective of this Chapter is to

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explore aspects of legal and judicial culture and how these can impact on harmonisation of substantive laws. Lack of close harmonisation can cause difficulties in achieving mutual trust between jurisdictions and courts, which by extension presents obstacles to effective co-operation and co-ordination of cross-border matters generally and in particular, cross-border insolvency and restructuring cases. Challenges to harmonisation, mutual trust and co-operation connect closely with the issues surrounding European integration and an ever-closer union, which were outlined in Chapters 1 to 3 of this Report.

It must be emphasised that within the European Union there is an agreed backdrop to these differences including a strong European commitment to and acknowledgement of what can be broadly described as rule of law issues. The ever-closer integration of the European Union underpins the issues that are the focus of the JCOERE Project. Of particular relevance are the foundational principles concerning adherence or respect for the rule of law discussed in section 4.2 of this Chapter, under which falls liberal democratic ideals such as judicial independence and impartiality, certainty and predictability, as well as aspects of justice and fairness. One of the issues that seems to be central to preventive restructuring particularly is the role of the courts in ‘robust restructuring frameworks’, as explained in Chapter 3. In our discussions at conferences and other forums, the recognition of the importance of the role of the court is perceived as problematic amongst some academics and policymakers. A difference has also been detected between common law and civil law systems in this context. This is considered in Section 4.3.

In addition to setting ‘ground rules,’ on rule of law issues, as it were, the EU has also taken a proactive role in trying to harmonise the functioning of the European judiciary in all Member States, which is described in section 4.4 of this Chapter. Nevertheless, differences persist that continue to challenge mutual trust, such as issues, albeit in a small number of Member States, concerning judicial independence, discussed in section 4.5, and differing approaches to training, experience, competence, and specialism or expertise, described in section 4.6 and in Chapter 8 of this Report. Section 4.7 will conclude with the challenge of harmonising legal and judicial cultures in light of the discussion of the preceding sections, with some thoughts as to how this may impact co-operation when it comes to coordinating preventive restructuring procedures under the PRD.

4.2 Mutual Trust and the Rule of Law in the EU

The EU has actively adopted and promoted the rule of law principle through the legal orders of its Member States, requiring as it does that any acceding Member State has stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities.2 The Treaty on European Union states unequivocally that ‘[t]he

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2 The EU’s minimum standards regarding the principle of the ‘rule of law’ is derived from the Copenhagen criteria on the accession of new Member States: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/accession_criteria_copenhagen.html> [Last accessed 10 April 2020].
Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights, and fundamental freedoms, the rule of law, principles that are common to the Member States.3 Along with a number of Communications that have presented frameworks and policy initiatives for protecting and promoting the rule of law among the Member States, which will be discussed below, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union provides specific protection for human rights and fundamental freedoms, the infringement of which on an institutional level could also lead to sanctions by the EU.4

As described in Chapter 1 of this Report, Article 7 of the TEU provides a formal mechanism to address such matters in relation to Member States. In addition, it has been noted by the Commission that the rule of law ‘makes sure that all public powers act within the constraints set out by law, in accordance with the values of democracy and fundamental rights, and under the control of independent and impartial courts’.5 A coherent and consistent approach to rule of law principles is a key factor in ensuring the independence and impartiality of all Member State courts, which is why there has been a focus placed on a common approach to the rule of law among the Member States in the last decade in particular.

In 2014, the European Commission issued a Communication on a new framework to strengthen the rule of law in the EU. This Framework also acknowledged that the way in which the rule of law is implemented among the Member States plays a key role in the foundation of mutual trust upon which the functioning of the EU is built.6 However, it also acknowledged that the content and even standards associated with the rule of law may vary at a national level, depending on each Member State’s constitutional framework, offering some reason, if not justification, for the differences in approach to rule of law issues. The Commission listed a number of key principles defining the core common meaning and perhaps expectation that Member States should strive to protect:

Those principles include legality, which implies a transparent, accountable, democratic and pluralistic process for enacting laws; legal certainty; prohibition of arbitrariness of the executive powers; independent and impartial courts; effective judicial review including respect for fundamental rights; and equality before the law.7

The 2014 Communication introduced a mechanism that could be utilised if a legal system at a national level were unable to cope with a threat to the rule of law, which in turn could present a potential systemic threat to the rule of law and the stability of the EU.8 The

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6 Framework 2.
7 Framework 4.
8 Framework 5-6.
Framework suggested a fairly strong assessment and action protocol\(^9\) that aimed at preventing the need to issue proceedings under article 7(1) TEU.\(^10\) The original strong mechanism recommended in the Framework was watered down by the Council, who claimed that such a strong approach would be unlawful.\(^11\) It was decided instead to have a ‘dialogue’ on an annual basis to discuss rule of law issues, but these dialogues did little to confront Member States with their rule of law shortcomings. The Framework was used twice between 2014 and 2019: once by the Commission in respect of Poland in December 2017\(^12\) and by the European Parliament in September 2018 in respect of Hungary.\(^13\) It was observed in the first rule of law related Communication in 2019\(^14\) that ‘progress by the Council in these two cases could have been more meaningful.’\(^15\)

Another Communication focused on the rule of law was issued on 3\(^{rd}\) April 2019. It repeats much of the positioning of the 2014 Framework with the added aim of enriching the debate on further strengthening the rule of law in the EU and inviting reflection and comment by stakeholders.\(^16\) In July 2019, another Communication was issued by the Commission that offered a ‘blueprint for action’ in relation to strengthening the rule of law in the EU.\(^17\) The two 2019 Communications were based on certain core principles, including Member State accountability to ensure adherence to the rule of law; treating Member States equally; and finding solutions rather than imposing sanctions ‘with co-operation and mutual support at the core.’\(^18\) The Commission identified three pillars to reinforce its approach: ‘promoting the rule of law culture, preventing rule of law problems from emerging and deepening, and how best to mount an effective common response when a significant problem has been identified’.\(^19\) In addition, a consultation on the rule of law and the creation of a mechanism to protect it was issued in March 2020, which resulted in the first annual Rule of Law Report published 30 September 2020.\(^20\)

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\(^9\) A three-stage process based on four principles were suggested that began with a dialogue and ended with ‘swift and concrete actions to address the systemic threat’ followed by recommendations by the Commission. See Framework 7.

\(^10\) TEU - Protocols - Declarations annexed to the Final Act of the Intergovernmental Conference which adopted the Treaty of Lisbon, signed on 13 December 2007 OJ C326/1 (‘TEU’) art 7(1), which can be invoked if there is ‘a clear risk of a serious breach by a Member State of the values referred to in Article 2.’

\(^11\) Peter Oliver and Justine Stefanelli, ‘Strengthening the Rule of Law in the EU: The Council’s Inaction’ (2016) 54(5) JCMS 1075, 1076.

\(^12\) European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Council Decision on the determination of a clear risk of a serious breach by the Republic of Poland of the rule of law’ (Communication) COM (2017) 835 final.

\(^13\) European Parliament, ‘resolution of 12 September 2018 calling on the Council to determine, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the existence of a clear risk of a serious breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded(2017/2131 (INL))’ [2019] OJ C 433/66.


\(^15\) 2019 Communication 163, 3.

\(^16\) 2019 Communication 163, 2.


\(^18\) 2019 Communication 163, 7.

\(^19\) 2019 Communication 343, 5.

There is little doubt that the rule of law is an elementary principle forming the foundation of the European Union, as well as the process of integration that can cause difficulties in mutual trust and effective co-operation where differences in adherence to it persist among the Member States. The differences in approach to the rule of law can often be influenced by differences in legal or judicial culture. The next section will look at the unique aspects of legal culture from a theoretical perspective to lend context to a discussion surrounding the difficulties of co-operating across borders when individual jurisdictions may differ on key legal principles, such as those associated with the rule of law.

4.3 The Influence of Legal Culture on Rule of Law Principles: Common Law and Civil Law Traditions

As noted above, co-operation between courts relies on mutual trust and confidence as set out in recital 65 of the EIR Recast. Where there are variances in legal principles underpinning mutual trust, then courts/judges may be less likely to respect decisions of other jurisdictions and to co-operate effectively. For judges, it is important to have at least some kind of consensual idea of the legal culture within which their decision-making takes place so that they are operating within the same regulative ideal, particularly if they are co-operating within a cross-border context.22

A legal culture can be characterised by a number of factors, such as the nature of institutions, the way that judges are appointed, the role of lawyers, and even public attitudes as they relate to litigation and incarceration. The legal culture of a jurisdiction also extends to more nebulous concepts, such as ideas, values, aspirations, and mentalities that underpin the respect for legal principles, such as the rule of law.23 The differences in legal culture are also connected to the influence of a jurisdiction’s historical evolution,24 which go beyond simple design aspects of government and institutions.25

The key characteristics of legal culture in individual Member States tend to be deeply rooted and path dependent in nature.26 Much of the groundwork for modern legal culture was laid at earlier stages in history prior to the creation of the European Union, with small jurisdiction-specific differences that have been retained and that are sometimes at odds with other

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26 Path dependence describes the theory that a social or legal system is limited by the decisions made in the past or by the events experienced, even though past circumstances may no longer be relevant. For in-depth discussions of path dependency and the law, see, for example, Oona A Hathaway, ‘Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal Change in a Common Law System’ (2000-2001) 86 Iowa L Rev 601; John Bell, ‘Path Dependence and Legal Development’ (2012-2013) 87 Tul L Rev 787; and Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Mark J Roe, ‘A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance’ (1999) 52 Stan L Rev 127, who provide an application of legal path dependency to corporate law.
jurisdictions. It is these deeply rooted, path dependent characteristics and norms that are particularly difficult to dislodge or change in order to harmonise the nature and function of EU Member State judiciaries. The complexities of even understanding the nature of a jurisdiction’s legal culture is one of the reasons why it continues to be so difficult to ensure an equal understanding and approach to legal principles generally among the Member States, which the Commission admits it needs in order to implement its Blueprint for enhancing the rule of law.

4.3.1 Judicial culture and legal origins

The legal origins of a jurisdiction can sometimes explain why differences in approach to legal regulation and court co-operation persist, despite the influence of globalisation and the relative benefit that more homogenous legal systems could provide in terms of efficient cross-border solutions. The legal origins hypothesis claims that national judicial and regulatory styles are influenced by the origins of that legal system from specific legal families. However, this often appears to focus on the common law / civil law divide, which has been criticised as being too limited and dualistic. Although the EU is comprised of legal systems derived from several different legal families, a discussion of general differences between the common and civil law judiciaries is a good place to begin for the purpose of this Report, as the comparison does reveal key differences upon which other cultural differences are layered.

The clearest example of the difference between common law and civil law legal systems is the codification of law in civil law countries, as opposed to the heavier reliance on judicial interpretation and jurisprudence in common law systems. Under civil law systems, legal codes describe which specific actions are prohibited, restricting the actions of participants in a legal system, making it possible to apply the law strictly, and to at least some extent, circumscribing judicial discretion by the content of legal codes. In contrast, codes in common law countries often serve to summarise previous judicial decisions. In addition, a common law judge has the discretion to disregard the provisions of a code when it conflicts with the basic principles of common law, though this discretion is not used capriciously in any sense. In relation to civil law systems, Glaeser and Shleifer note:

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In civil law countries, in contrast, judges are not even supposed to interpret the codes very much, and in principle must seek not to differentiate a specific situation, but to fit it into the existing provisions of a code. As a restraint on the judge, codes are much more powerful in civil than in common law countries.\footnote{Edward L Glaeser and Andrei Shleifer, ‘Legal Origins’ (2002) 117(4) The Quarterly Journal of Economics 1193, 1212.}

The differences associated with legal origins have made harmonisation in the EU difficult due to the diverse characteristics of legal systems among the Member States. In the context of restructuring, particularly where court decisions seem to be central to robust restructuring processes, it is difficult to reconcile the common law perspective of law-making and judging with the perspective of a civil lawyer.\footnote{Pierre Legrand, \textit{Fragments of Law as Culture} (WEJ Tjeenk Willink, 1999) 11.} A civil law practitioner may consider the common law as being overly traditional, uncertain, and peculiar in the interconnected quality of law and equity, while the same characteristics seem to a common lawyer as practical, flexible, rooted in national culture, and natural and productive.\footnote{R Zimmerman, ‘Savigny’s Legacy: Legal History, Comparative Law, and the Emergence of a European Legal Science’ (1996) 112(Oct) LQR 576, 587.}

As will be shown in Chapter 5 of this Report, the civil law perspective makes it difficult sometimes to grasp fully how common law procedures such as the Irish Examinership, English Scheme of Arrangement, and American Chapter 11 operate, given the need for judicial application of the various tests of fairness throughout the operation of the process and in final approval of the restructuring plan. In civil law jurisdictions, the function of a code or statute is to seen as giving a judge clear instructions on how to come to a clear decision, whereas the ambiguities and vagaries of the common law allow a judge to make a decision that can take into account a wider set of circumstances than might be available to a civil lawyer, although this also opens the door for legal uncertainty. These differences do go some way to explaining why common law and civil law judges often approach co-operation in cross-border cases differently.

\textbf{4.3.2 Legal culture and the judicial role}

Clearly, judiciaries in common law and civil law jurisdictions have sometimes starkly different roles. While this can often be traced to the fundamental difference between institutional structures, there are enough differences between civil law jurisdictions alone to indicate that the underlying conflicts go beyond a simple binary comparison. The EU Member States are influenced by a number of legal systemic characteristics due to the variety of civil law systems present, whether they are based on French or Austro-Germanic civil law, the cooperative Scandinavian/Nordic system, the transitioning Eastern European economies that have been influenced by the Soviet era, and those systems that have adopted a hybrid or mixed approach. Therefore, there are many factors that might challenge the ease of mutual trust between courts and practitioners among the variety of legal systems present within the EU.
Mangano describes two particular issues that may affect the willingness of practitioners in particular to co-operate: lack of certainty and foreseeability of legal frameworks leading to a reluctance to defer to another jurisdiction, despite the practical benefit that such co-operation would create. This may have an impact on court co-operation as it is generally through practitioners that such co-operation takes place, usually in a negotiation phase, according to practitioners engaged by the Project at various events. When faced with a lack of certainty or familiarity due to the differences in law and language, Mangano notes that if given the choice, a court or an IP would tend to choose the law with which they are comfortable and familiar rather than accede to another jurisdiction’s procedural primacy, despite appearing that it would be in the interests of all parties to co-operate.

These potential choices demonstrate an impulse to protect local interests over the benefit of the collective of cross-border creditors as well as a certain understandable discomfort with the unknown, whether due to language differences or lack of available and easily accessible information about legal systems and process in other jurisdictions. Fundamentally, this means that if legal frameworks lack certainty and foreseeability (or are perceived in such a way), then courts and practitioners dealing with the same case in different jurisdictions may not opt to co-operate because, regardless of what the other courts and practitioners do, in the short term not co-operating is viewed as being in the best interests of their local creditors as outcomes appear more predictable.

The difference between civil law and common law approaches as well as the more nuanced differences between legal families among the civil law systems of Europe (which it must be acknowledged is replicated in the wider common law world) may be a key issue in the willingness and ability to co-operate in cross-border insolvency and restructuring cases. Common law jurisdictions tend to be more at ease with interpreting their obligation to co-operate and making private arrangements to do so, such as bespoke co-operation protocols, which will be described in Chapter 7 section 7.3. Mangano observes, however, that civil law jurisdictions sometimes remain attached to a more public interest approach to insolvency law, which is often incompatible with an effective conclusion to such private arrangements or protocols. Although the EIR Recast has set an enhanced obligation to co-operate and communicate in cross-border insolvency cases, it is still not entirely clear how this is intended to occur. There is still scope to interpret the enhanced obligations to co-operate because they leave mode and method up to the cooperating parties themselves. In other

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36 The Eurofood case is an example of this dilemma occurring in reality. See Chapter 2 section 2.3.1, Chapter 3 section 3.6.1, and Chapter 5 section 5.2.
words, there is no specified framework or protocol judges can refer to that unequivocally explains how co-operation should materialise. While there are a number of guidelines available for judges to rely upon as will be discussed in Chapter 6 of this Report, it seems that these are rarely used in practice, which became apparent in the analysis of the Judicial Survey in Chapter 8 of this Report.

The challenge of ambiguous, open-textured obligations under the EIR Recast combined with different approaches to the judicial role mean that approaches to co-operation can differ with some significance. Combine that with the weight and importance of judicial interpretation in decision-making and deeply ingrained differences between European legal systems creates a web of potential conceptual conflicts to co-operation in cross-border insolvency cases. Considering the scope of implementation possibilities and the controversial provisions in the PRD, for example, these issues may indeed create conflicts that could be more difficult to surmount in negotiation to achieve co-operation in a cross-border restructuring. Despite the efforts by the EU to Europeanise the judiciaries of the Member States, which will be discussed in the next section, differences in practical judicial independence and aspects of the judicial profession persist, making mutual trust an elusive pursuit at times.

4.4 Creating a European Judicial Culture – Networks and Training

4.4.1 Harmonising judiciaries through training and the European Judicial Training Network

Within the last two decades, there has been a lot of focus and discussion on the need to harmonise the judiciaries of EU Member States through training as a means of ensuring that the rule of law and its associated principles are equally applied throughout the EU, thereby ensuring mutual trust and effective co-operation. Training and networking organisations have been key promoters of harmonisation and the development of a European judicial culture, such as the European Judicial Training Network, the European Law Academy, the INSOL Europe Judicial Forum, and various other organisations created by the EU institutions. This

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41 EJTN Website: [http://www.ejtn.eu/] (Last accessed 26 June 2020).

42 ERA Website: [http://www.era.int/] (Last accessed 26 June 2020).


44 Other networks include the Association of the Council of State and Supreme Administrative Jurisdictions (ACA-Europe), The Association of European Administrative Judges (AEA), The Network of Presidents of the Supreme Courts of the European Union (NSPC), and the EU Forum of Judges for the Environment (EUFJE) (non-exhaustive list).
move commenced as an aim of the EU institutions with the Hague Programme in 2005, which emphasised that:

Judicial co-operation...could be further enhanced by strengthening mutual trust and by progressive development of a European judicial culture based on diversity of the legal systems of the Member States and unity through European law.  

Since that time, a number of other Communications and Resolutions on this matter have been released, which have further promoted the ideals of networking and training to promote mutual trust and respect for the rule of law. Fundamentally, the aim has been to take a practical approach to judicial training, making it relevant to every day work, encompassing both initial and continuous training, and enabling Member States to view it as an investment in the quality of justice. These goals were set as objectives to be achieved by 2020 in a Communication in 2011 and would be achieved by relying upon existing training structures in Member States while maintaining respect to their subsidiarity and judicial independence.

The European Judicial Training Network has been instrumental as a hub for the implementation of EU policy with regard to the judicial profession as it connects national and European institutions to help define training policies and standards, as well as coordinate judicial academies. The EJTN, funded by the EU, adopts a decentralised approach, relying on a strong commitment from Member States and their individual training institutions. The EU has absorbed these networks in the framework of EU governance under the EJTN and exerts some influence over their activities and objectives. These networks generally engage in four main areas of activity: co-operation in the field of training; cultural exchange and socialisation for a better knowledge of other legal systems or for the sharing of practical experiences; standard setting and exchange of best practices; and lobbying and representation of the interests of network members. The various networks relied upon or set up by the EU institutions help to facilitate and enhance judicial co-operation, improve the functioning of the EU judicial system, and increase mutual trust. It is likely that these networks also play an

47 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on Building Trust in Eu-Wide Justice – A New Dimension to European Judicial Training’ COM(2011) 551 final, 6.
important role in encouraging convergence in national judicial practices, gathering European judiciaries into a closer judicial culture.\textsuperscript{51}

4.4.2 Judicial training and mutual trust

In June 2014, the European Commission issued a press release, the cornerstone of which was judicial training and the aim of fostering mutual trust among the Member States’ judiciaries.\textsuperscript{52} Viviane Reding, the EU’s Justice Commissioner at the time, stated that:

Mutual trust is the bedrock upon which EU justice policy is built, and high-quality training of legal practitioners is paramount in fostering this trust. As heads of state and government are meeting today and tomorrow to define the future strategic priorities for Europe’s justice area, my call to leaders is to put mutual trust high on the future justice agenda. Trust is not made by decree. It grows with knowledge.

Reding emphasised the importance of training in EU law as the most effective way of ensuring that the single market area can deliver the most for citizens and businesses. Training ensures that legal practitioners are equipped to implement EU law and to foster a sense of a common European judicial culture based on mutual trust. Training does not necessarily fix all of the problems that are associated with mutual trust when considering the obligation to cooperate. Rather, the respect a system and its judiciary have for legal principles and norms is also an important aspect that engenders respect as well as trust between judiciaries of different jurisdictions. Without mutual respect, there can be no mutual trust.

The 2019 Communication 343 also acknowledged the importance of judicial networks as playing an important role in exchanging ideas and best practices and suggested that the existing networks should be supported to further promote the rule of law.\textsuperscript{53} It was noted that national judiciaries themselves have an important role to play in promoting the rule of law standards and that participation in councils and national debates on judicial reforms are an important part of national checks and balances.\textsuperscript{54}

4.4.3 Protecting the rule of law through shared knowledge and values

The Commission’s Communications on the rule of law in 2019 identified that some of the political developments in several Member States that have led to the undermining of the rule


\textsuperscript{53} 2019 Communication 343, 6.

\textsuperscript{54} 2019 Communication 343, 7.
of law could be attributed to a lack of information and limited public knowledge about the it.\textsuperscript{55} This came through clearly in a special Eurobarometer Survey in 2019.\textsuperscript{56} In order to rectify this, the Commission has proposed taking action to embed the rule of law in national and European political discourse by:

...disseminating knowledge about EU law requirements and standards and the importance of the rule of law for citizens and business, and by empowering stakeholders with an interest in in promoting rule of law themes. For citizens and businesses to appreciate the role and importance of justice systems, these need to be modern and accessible. Of key importance is the mutual trust in each other’s judicial systems, which is a pre-condition for a truly functioning Single Market.\textsuperscript{57}

The activities of the European Commission in this area and the multitude of judicial, social and training networks have helped to create a greater understanding of differences in legal and judicial cultures, while also drawing judiciaries closer together. This accompanied by checks such as the Judicial Scorecard, along with the Rule of Law framework and inter-institutional and related Member State dialogues, have continued to help on the march towards judicial Europeanisation. In addition to these supranational and EU level activities, Member State professional guidelines and efforts to harmonise these have also helped to draw judiciaries closer together, at least in terms of understanding each other, although this is also dependent on the engagement of Member State judiciaries in these activities, which can be inhibited by heavy case loads and limited time for additional training.

While on paper there is a set of shared values regarding independence, impartiality, integrity and professionalism, current guidelines and ethical codes developed on the basis of these values are still diverse among the Member States.\textsuperscript{58} For example and as summarised by Mak, Graaf, and Jackson, judges in ‘old’ Member States tend to be critical towards centralised judicial management and approach the value of individual judicial autonomy differently than do those in ‘new’ Member States, who, depending on their individual history, are still adjusting to a greater degree of self-governance in many cases.\textsuperscript{59} The next section will explore aspects of the challenges in this area, specifically focusing on problems of judicial independence.

\textsuperscript{55} 2019 Communication 343, 5.
\textsuperscript{57} 2019 Communication 343, 5.
\textsuperscript{58} See Elaine Mak, ‘Researching Judicial Ethical Codes, or: How to Eat a Mille-Feuille?’ (2018) 9(2) Int’l J for Court Administration 55 for a discussion on judicial ethical codes and guidelines.
4.5 Challenges to Judicial Independence in the EU

The Judiciary sits at the heart of the rule of law and judicial independence is a key element to ensuring its protection. Without independence, courts may be influenced by politics and special interest lobbies, potentially leading to systematic bias and arbitrary decision making.\(^6^0\) While judicial independence is clearly an important value ascribed to by all EU Member States, the relative independence of Member State judiciaries can still differ along a fairly broad spectrum in reality, ranging from fully independent, to judicial systems less protected by constitutional checks on political and governmental influence. These differences can be attributed, at least in part, to legal culture and tradition as it influences the judicial function and profession in individual Member States.

Countries wishing to join the EU are required to satisfy the Copenhagen Criteria, as noted in section 1.3 of Chapter 1. Of particular importance to this discussion around legal culture and its influence on mutual trust and co-operation is the requirement that institutions are stable enough to guarantee democracy and the rule of law.\(^6^1\) These two aspects are also some of the most deeply embedded in terms of the way in which a country has developed over time and sometimes difficult to change without deep structural adjustments. Coman notes that while the Western European judiciaries are perceived as having good systems in place to protect judicial independence and impartiality (apart from a few notable exceptions), many newer Member States are still developing in line with EU expected criteria.\(^6^2\) The challenges faced by newer Member States have been particularly acute, though that is not to say that there are not challenges to judicial independence and the rule of law elsewhere in the EU. Where there has been a long history of a politicised or an otherwise non-independent judiciary, it is difficult to create new habits and protocols to assure judicial independence if constitutional mechanisms are not also in place to protect it.

Judicial reforms were required of most of the newer Member States prior to joining the EU as many of them had to adjust to a post-communism approach to justice and administration in order to meet the EU’s requirements on judicial and administrative capacity. Coman observes that these attributes are difficult to change in the short term.\(^6^3\) In some Member States, existing law still tends to be insufficient to ensure real judicial independence. Batory attributes this in part to the layers of legislation and controls introduced that have often been added to existing rules, indicating a ‘knee-jerk’ reaction to compliance, which can lead to policy design


being out of step with effective implementation. As observed by Fleck, the quick reformative reactions appeared at times to have merely moved power and undue influence from one bureaucratic institution to another with some radical reforms having an opposite effect to increasing mutual trust, introducing lack of efficiency, decline in trust in the judiciary, corruption and ideological bias.

The EU has tried to help in the area of judicial reform in issues of judicial independence, in particular for new Member States. For example, a Co-operation and Verification Mechanism was created as a transitional measure for Romania and Bulgaria to assist them in addressing several judicial reform shortcomings, corruption, and organised crime. The Mechanism established a set of criteria for the Commission to assess on an annual basis, although it has been viewed as efficient, recent reports show some setbacks, which has raised the question as to whether the demand for progress is stringent enough and whether changes should be more concrete in the system before the Mechanism is terminated. While Romania and Bulgaria continued to follow these benchmarks, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic saw increased tensions as political parties tested their autonomy against EU judicial governance to empower elected branches of government over the judiciary. It is interesting to note that if some of these governments were exhibiting the same characteristics at the time that they joined the EU, they would not have been permitted to do so.

In conclusion, it is not the intention of this Chapter or this Report to detail the problems that have been encountered since the accession of some of the newer Member States, which risk the rule of law and judicial independence. It is sufficient to note that the issues confronting newer Member States are closely connected to cultural trends that have informed their legal systems for decades, as are the difficulties that continue to be encountered by older Member States in this area. These paths are hard to break and require more than just legislative changes, rather entire paradigm shifts in the values and principles that underpin a jurisdiction’s existential foundation. If judicial harmonisation is to be achieved, these paradigm shifts will continue to require a close working relationship between EU institutions and Member States to ensure developing principles are aligned. A commonly held view and approach to the rule of law and judicial independence are essential to establishing and maintaining mutual trust in order to ensure effective co-operation between the courts of

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66 EESC Opinion para 4.6.1.
67 EESC Opinion para 4.6.2.
Member States. Differences in education and training, for example, may colour perspectives on the relative respect to such principles, making mutual trust more difficult to achieve in practice.

4.6 European Judicial Education and Qualification

As noted in section 4.3 of this Chapter, there are fairly significant differences between the common law and civil law judicial roles, with the former including an interpretative duty that tends to be avoided in the latter. There are also a number of differences between the education, experience, and training requirements to be appointed as a judge among the Member States generally, with some fairly substantial differences between common and civil law countries due to the difference in the judicial role. Question 14 of the JCOERE Questionnaire targeted this area of interest, as has the Judicial Survey, which will be discussed in Chapter 8 of this Report. This section will draw primarily from the responses to the JCOERE Questionnaire to the following question: ‘In your jurisdiction, what are the training and competency requirements for insolvency judges?’

**Italy**

In Italy, judges may qualify through a number of avenues. Either a candidate must already have a PhD or other post graduate law degree, have attended a stage or training course in Court, worked as an honorary judge for at least six years, attained a lawyers licence, worked as a regular university law professor, occupied certain managerial roles in Public Administration, or been appointed as a judge of the administrative and accounting courts. There is also a compulsory initial induction and training period over 18 months including internships.70 Training sessions are also required every four years.71 Judges are selected through a public competitive exam published by the Minister of Justice, with some exceptions. For example, university law professors of at least 15 years’ standing enrolled in a specific register can also be appointed Counsellors of the Supreme Court of Cassation by the Superior Council of the Judiciary.72

**France**

Commercial court judges, who hear insolvency cases in France, are a special category of unpaid judge, elected by their peers from a constituency formed of persons registered as running a business for at least five years.73 They are generally elected for a period of generally two years in the first instance, but can be re-elected for an additional four years.74

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74 Greffe du Tribunal de Commerce, ‘Presentation du Tribunal de Commerce’ (Greffe du Tribunal de Commerce CAEN)
elective judges are required to undertake training composed of six modules of one or two days each within the first 20 months of their election to the bench. There is now a specific obligation to acquire relevant professional skills and education with a continuing requirement for further professional development. Failure to complete the requisite courses following election will deem the judge to have resigned from office. This differs from judges in the ordinary and civil courts, which require that an individual has completed a bachelor’s degree in law, requiring three years of legal studies; and a master’s degree in law for two years; and the completion of a competitive examination generally preceded by preparatory classes. Successful candidates can then be appointed as judges’ assistants, at which time they receive the same training given by the École Nationale de la Magistrature, which lasts for 31 months and is comprised of 27 months general training followed by a phase to prepare the judicial candidates for the positions they will undertake.

**Spain**

Admission to careers in the Spanish judiciary is based on the principles of merit and ability. The selection process is objective and transparent, guaranteeing equal opportunity for everyone who meets the criteria and who has the necessary skills, professional competence and qualifications to serve as a judge. There are three ways to become a judge in Spain. First and probably most traditional, upon completion of a law degree, the candidate can pass a free public competitive examination followed by a theoretical and practical selection course at a judiciary school. The average preparation time for the examination tends to be around 3 to 5 years. Then the candidate is required to spend a year at the Spanish Judicial School in Barcelona followed by a one-year internship in the jurisdiction in which they wish to practice. One can also come to judgesship if they are a legal professional with ‘renowned competence’ and 10 years of practice experience. The candidate would still have to complete a training course at the judicial school, after which they can apply for a merit-based appointment. Finally, a candidate can be a renowned legal professional with more than 15 years of legal practice experience and the ask the general counsel of the judiciary for a discretionary appointment.
**Austria**

Austrian judges are required to complete a degree programme of at least 4 years in Austrian law, which is followed by practical experience as an intern in the courts. Internships last for four years and in principle can take place in a variety of legal environments, including of course district and regional courts. The practical experience concludes with a judicial office examination. After passing the exam, candidate judges can then apply for vacant permanent positions as judges. Appointments are made by the Federal President who delegates this task to the Federal Minister for Justice for most positions. Only Austrian nationals can be appointed judges. There are only 35-40 insolvency judges in Austria and these are usually drawn from experienced judges of the higher courts, such as Landesgerichte and Handelsgericht Wien. Once appointed, an insolvency judge usually stays in this position until retirement. There is no specific training for insolvency judges, but there is an annual seminar organised by the informal association of insolvency judges.

**Germany**

Judges are required to undertake the same general legal education as all other regulated legal professions. The legal qualification, uniform for all legal professions, is acquired by passing two examinations with the first examination taking place after undergraduate university studies and the second exam after a state-organised practical training. The general criteria for judicial appointment are set out in the German Constitution (Grundgesetz). Professional competence is assessed with an emphasis on the examination results, while personal and social competences are assessed in interviews with appointment commissions or staff managers of the ministries of justice. New judges begin their career on probation, then after three to five years they become judicial officials for life. Insolvency judges are required to have special competences in insolvency, company and trade law and sufficient basic knowledge in labour, social and tax law, as well as in accounting. In practice, however, the huge number of about 185 insolvency courts in Germany results in many judges lacking such
competences. There are no specific continuing training rules for insolvency judges and in general, judges are not obliged to prove training.\textsuperscript{86}

\textit{The Netherlands}

To qualify as a judge in the Netherlands, a candidate must have both an undergraduate and master’s degree in Dutch law and at least two years of working experience outside of the judiciary. In addition, a candidate must be of irreproachable standing, have met the selection criteria of the National Selection Committee for Judges (\textit{Landelijke Selectiecommissie Rechters}, LSR),\textsuperscript{87} and complete the initial training programme for trainee judges.\textsuperscript{88} The duration of the initial training program depends on the duration of the experience that the trainee judge has.\textsuperscript{89} For those with at least two and up to five years working experience, the training will take four years. For trainee judges with more experience, there is a shortened training period from 15 months to three years. In addition to the initial training program,\textsuperscript{90} optional training is also available.\textsuperscript{91} This is particularly relevant since within the Dutch judiciary judges will usually switch to a different section of the court system about every 3-6 years. As such, there are no specialised insolvency judges in the Netherlands.\textsuperscript{92} However, with respect to the WHOA (the new Dutch restructuring process),\textsuperscript{93} a so-called ‘WHOA pool’ will be formed with eleven judges and eleven legal supporters (one for each district court) for building up ‘knowhow’ and expertise on the operation and application of the WHOA within the Dutch judiciary. To this end, these judges and legal supporters will receive specific training. Furthermore, whereas professional standards provide a quality check for several areas of law, there is no such standard yet available for insolvency judges in the Netherlands.\textsuperscript{94}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Thanks to Professor Stephan Madaus of the University of Halle-Wittenburg for his contribution of the content of the country report on German, available here: JCOERE Consortium and Madaus S, ‘Country Report: Germany’ (JCOERE Website 2020), https://www.ucc.ie/en/jcoere/research/report1/report1jurisdiction/report1jurisdictiongermany/.
\item See further: De Rechtspraak, ‘LSR’ (De Rechtspraak Website) www.werkenbijderechtspraak.nl/de-organisatie/lsc/ (Last accessed 26 June 2020).
\item See De Rechtspraak, ‘Recht Voor Jou’ (De Rechtspraak Website) www.rechtvoorjou.nl/home/werken-bij-de-rechtbank/hoe-word-je-rechter/ (Last accessed 26 June 2020). Judicial training is, in particular, provided for by the SSR. See also SSR, ‘Initial Training Programmes’ (SSR Website) https://ssr.nl/ssr-excellent-training-for-a-just-society/initial-training-programmes/ (Last accessed 26 June 2020).
\item Much training for judges is provided by the SSR. See also SSR, ‘Initial Training Programmes’ (SSR Website) https://ssr.nl/ssr-excellent-training-for-a-just-society/initial-training-programmes/ (Last accessed 26 June 2020).
\item At the start of the legislative program providing for a recalibration of the DBA, it was considered that specialised insolvency judges could be facilitated to better enable knowledge building. This was not included in later updates from the Ministry. See Kamerstukken II 2012/13, 29911, 74, at 2.1.
\item Wet homologatie onderhands akkoord ter voorkoming van faillissement (Act on the confirmation of a private restructuring plan in order to prevent bankruptcy) [hereinafter WHOA]; see also Chapter 7 of JCOERE Report 1 https://www.ucc.ie/en/jcoere/research/report1/report1chapter/report1chapter7/ accessed 8 October 2020.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
**Denmark**

In order to qualify to become a judge in Denmark, an LLM in law is a prerequisite, preceded by an undergraduate degree in law. In addition, a three-year internship as an attorney or within the courts is required. Judges must undertake an initial training programme of 11 courses. Continuous training following appointment is available, but is not required.95 There are no specific training requirements for insolvency judges but all judges, including insolvency judges, are required to do a training programme,96 which includes a module on procedural insolvency law.97

**Romania**

In Romania, a judicial candidate must first hold an undergraduate and masters degree in law. They must then undertake a two-year National Institute of Magistracy Course and pass a final examination. It is also possible to apply directly for a judicial position, which is open to lawyers with five years of experience and who have passed the required exam. It has been observed that the experience qualification tends to be exceptional, with most appointments undertaking the 2-year magistracy course. This means that a majority of newly appointed judges in Romania do not have practical experience. The 2-year course is also comprised of a 2-week internship in first instance courts, the prosecutor’s office, and the probation office. At the end of the first year, candidates must then undertake a 1-month internship at a lawyer’s office with additional hands-on experience during the second year.98

**Poland**

Judges in Poland must first have been admitted to a legal profession, which can be done in a number of ways. A candidate to the bar must have a master’s degree followed by bar training and a bar exam; have a master’s degree in law followed by five years professional experience and a bar exam; have a PhD in law followed by either the bar exam or three years of professional experience; or they must possess a high academic qualification in the legal sciences.99 Judicial training is managed by the National School of Judiciary and Prosecution in Krakow.100 A three year training course is required to become a judge, which includes attendance at lectures and working within the courts. After undergoing one year of training, the candidates then proceed to specialised training as a judge or public prosecutor for an additional 30 months. Finally, trainee judges serve internships as law clerks for 12 months.

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96 According to The Administration of Justice Act section 19 the content of the mandatory training program is decided by Domstolstyrelsen.


100 Act of 23 January 2009 on The National School of Judiciary and Public Prosecution.
There is also the possibility of switching from another legal profession; at present, however, this is strongly limited.\textsuperscript{101} There is no additional competency requirements for insolvency judges.\textsuperscript{102}

\textbf{Ireland}

In Ireland, which along with Cyprus will be the only common law jurisdiction remaining in the EU post Brexit,\textsuperscript{103} judges are appointed to the High Court, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court by the President of Ireland on the advice of the Government.\textsuperscript{104} A Judicial Appointments Advisory Board,\textsuperscript{105} established pursuant to the Courts and Court Officers Act 1995 (as amended) and comprised of senior judges, the Attorney General, legal professionals and nominees from the Minister for Justice has the function of identifying ‘persons and informing the Government of the suitability of those persons for appointment to judicial office.’ To be appointed to the Circuit and District court benches, a candidate must be a practising barrister or solicitor with at least ten years’ experience whereas to be appointed to the High Court, the Court of Appeal, or the Supreme Court, a candidate must have at least 12 years’ standing and have been practising continuously 2 years before the appointment.\textsuperscript{106} The reality is that judges in the Commercial Courts tend to have considerably more experience than that. The individual must be a qualified legal practitioner in order to obtain the practice experience necessary, which usually requires an undergraduate law degree and a professional qualification as either a solicitor qualified with the Incorporated Law Society of Ireland or a barrister qualified with the Honourable Society of the Kings Inns. In addition, the candidate must possess a sufficient ‘degree of competence and probity’ and must be ‘suitable on grounds of character and temperament.’\textsuperscript{107}

\textbf{England and Wales}

Judges in the normal courts of England and Wales must be qualified legal practitioners, which requires an undergraduate law degree and qualification with the Law Society of England and Wales or qualification as a barrister. Following training, a candidate must have had at least 5 or 7 years of post-qualification experience to be a judge.\textsuperscript{108} In terms of continuing training,


\textsuperscript{102} Polish Restructuring Law, s 150.

\textsuperscript{103} Malta demonstrates a hybrid civil law / common law jurisdiction.

\textsuperscript{104} Irish Constitution, article 35.1 and 13.9. Article 35.1 of the Constitution provides that ‘[t]he judges of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal, the High Court and all other Courts established in pursuance of Article 34 hereof shall be appointed by President.” While the formal appointment of judges is made by the President through the presentation of warrants of appointment to those appointed, this power is, pursuant to Article 13.9, exercised “only on the advice of the Government.”

\textsuperscript{105} www.jaab.ie [Last accessed July 07, 2020]

\textsuperscript{106} Section 5 of the Courts (Supplemental Provisions) Act 1961, s5(2)(a) as amended by section 4 of the Courts and Court Officers Act 2002, and section 11 of the Court of Appeal Act 2014, provides that: ‘a person shall be qualified for appointment as a judge of the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeal or the High Court if the person is for the time being a practising barrister or practising solicitor of not less than 12 years standing who has practised as a barrister or a solicitor for a continuous period of not less than two years immediately before such appointment.’

\textsuperscript{107} Court of Appeal Act 2014 s12(d)(ii).

\textsuperscript{108} https://www.judicialappointments.gov.uk. See also for further information https://www.judiciary.uk/ [Last accessed July 07, 2020]
the Judicial College is directly responsible for training full (salaried) and part-time (fee-paid) judges in the courts in England and Wales, and for training judges and members of tribunals within the scope of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007. An essential element of the philosophy of the Judicial College is that the training of judges, tribunals members, and magistrates is under judicial control and direction.\textsuperscript{109}

\textbf{Conclusion}

Out of the examples from our contributing jurisdictions, there appears to be a wide range of requirements for post education training and apprenticeships to qualify as a judge. There is no specific training requirement to gain a judgeship in the Irish or English jurisdictions, however, given the interpretative role of the judiciary and the need for barristers and solicitors to understand, interpret and apply case law in their advisory and advocacy roles, the experience requirements mitigate this. With minimum ten-years-experience Irish practitioners will have been steeped in judicial interpretation and decision-making to a much higher degree than their civil law counterparts, though it is perhaps less satisfying that the English experience requirement is less than the Irish. Interpretation and experience is an important legal cultural aspect of the common law system that does not align with the judicial role in civil law systems.

The differences among the civil law systems also seem significant, though there are a number of parallels. Most of the judgeships require education in law of either undergraduate or master’s level, though this depends on the legal education requirements generally in each jurisdiction. The length of training in terms of courses and internships vary from 8 days in France to 4 years court internship in Austria with a variety of course requirements and on the job training in between. French commercial judges are a particular anomaly, drawn from the business community and elected for fairly short periods of time. Though there is some logic in asking businesspeople to hear commercial cases, by comparison the training seems relatively limited. It is also interesting to note that it is among the newer Member States that some of the most stringent training and education requirements arise.

Apart from France, all of the other civil jurisdictions interrogated provide a much higher level of training on the surface than either Ireland or the UK. While the difference in training is clearly connected to the differences in civil and common law and the fact that the interpretation and understanding of judicial decision-making is a part of the job of a common lawyer, without an understanding of that key legal culture difference, it would be easy to view the Irish and English judicial training as inadequate. In the JCOERE team’s experience, there is certainly some dissonance between many civil lawyers’ understanding of the common law system that has given them pause, particularly with regard to the interpretative obligation

\textsuperscript{109} United Kingdom Courts and Tribunals Judiciary, ‘The Judicial College’ (Judiciary UK) \texttt{<https://www.judiciary.uk/about-the-judiciary/training-support/judicial-college/>}

that clarifies ambiguities in legislation and creates precedents that can be used habitually to determine things like fairness; this can be seen in the unfair prejudice test in Ireland, for example.

4.7 Towards Resolving Challenges to Judicial Co-operation

Political powers shift and, as has been evident over the last several years, this shift can be in a direction away from balancing political power and toward more authoritarian impulses. Where internal structures of a Member State are not developed or strong enough to resist such movements, the EU has tried to provide early warning systems and mechanisms to assist and recalibrate legal structures as noted in section 4.2 of this Chapter. The Commission needs a deep knowledge of Member State legal culture and systemic characteristics to be able to provide oversight on rule of law problems among the Member States and to identify warning signs that a problem is coming. Country-specific knowledge is essential to respond effectively to rule of law risks as these may arise in different guises in different countries due to the inherent differences among the 27 Member State legal cultures. Thus, a dialogue with Member State authorities and stakeholders is also essential.110

A number of mechanisms have been developed to assist the EU in monitoring issues arising from rule of law and judicial independence problems. The Council of Europe has also developed The Rule of Law Checklist, intended to be a tool for assessing the Rule of Law from the viewpoint of its constitutional and legal structure, legislation in force, and existing case law. It aims at enabling objective, thorough, equal, and transparent assessment of the legal safeguards in place to protect the rule of law in a given jurisdiction.111 In addition, the European Judicial Training Network produced a publication in 2019 about perspectives on the rule of law from both practitioners and academics in the EU. Its objective is to increase knowledge and awareness of professional standards within the rule of law framework and strengthen the rule of law culture in the EU.112

The European Semester and the Judicial Scoreboard have also been created to help develop country-specific knowledge relating to the rule of law, highlighting positive and negative trends in the judiciaries of the Member States.113 The Judicial Scoreboard offers Member States the opportunity to reflect on their own strengths and weaknesses with indicators on efficiency, quality, and independence of judiciaries.114 It also feeds into the Semester by

110 2019 Communication 163, 9.
providing elements for assessing the quality independence and efficiency of national justice systems. The aim of the European Semester is to provide a framework within which economic policies can be coordinated across the EU, also covering the fight against corruption, effective justice systems, and reform of public administration. It provides country specific assessments carried out through a bilateral dialogue with national authorities and the stakeholders involved. However, it has been criticised for not being inclusive enough of social partners and that recommendations are not being implemented in a satisfactory manner in the Member States tasked with them. These tools could be further developed in order to explore how the challenges to harmonisation in this area can be further resolved.

In 2019, the Judicial Scoreboard assessed a number of qualities of Member State justice systems, including efficiency, quality standards, independence and training. Given the focus on independence and training in the foregoing sections, it is interesting to consider what the 2019 Scoreboard showed. In terms of training, the 2019 Scoreboard demonstrated that most Member States provide continuous training in EU Law, the law of other Member States, and judgecraft, though most Member States continue to devote less time to judicial ethics overall. Notably and in contrast, Romania provides continuous training in judicial ethics to 80% of its judges, by far the highest proportion in that area among all of the other Member States.

While judgecraft is clearly important, as indicated by the high proportion of judges who receive continuous training in this area, for newer Member States that may have suffered from systemic corruption in the past, judicial ethics should likely form a reasonably high proportion of judicial training practices. Other newer Member States dealing with the challenges of governmental corruption do not devote near as much time to judicial ethics, as Romania in this context.

A whole section of the Scoreboard is devoted to judicial independence. The findings in 2019 show that judicial independence perceived among the general public is skewed in the negative toward newer Member States, with two notable exceptions in the bottom five (Spain and Italy). Most of the negative perceptions are based on interference or pressure from governments and politicians. Where perceptions were positive, this was usually noted as being due to the guarantees provided by the status and position of judges. There has been little change in the perception of either businesses or individuals in the independence of the

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115 EESC Opinion para 4.4.1.
117 EESC Opinion para 4.4.2.
judiciary among the Member States in terms of the ranking; however, there is a trend in a perception that independence has improved among the Member States that had been experiencing challenges over a four year period. Compared with the 2018 Scoreboard, however, the perception of judicial independence has decreased overall.121

While the Scoreboard presents only the perceptions of individuals and businesses in relation to the relative success of their own Member States, it does give some indication as to how the main recipients of a justice systems’ services feel about the services they are receiving: the public. The perceived improvement among the Member States, which were facing challenges in the last four years, may show that the EU’s efforts to enhance the rule of law principles throughout all of the Member States, the mechanisms it has created, and the frameworks it has put in place have begun to make some impact on improving mutual trust, thereby creating an environment in which co-operation can occur more effectively. However, and as noted previously, legal and judicial culture will be difficult to change without serious structural adjustments where the differences are far from expectations within the EU legal framework. ‘Knee-jerk’ legislative reactions often just transfer responsibility and power to a different institution. That said, the goal of judicial Europeanisation as part of the integration project of the EU is essential for its success if true mutual trust is to be established within the framework of the rule of law, allowing for effective co-operation between the courts of different Member States.

4.8 Conclusion and Transition

The EU, its institutions and associated organisations have clearly been busy implementing the 2019 Communications’ frameworks and recommendations in the latter half of 2019. The efforts to gather knowledge and increase understanding are a step in the right direction in trying to create a true European judicial culture by challenging the deeply rooted presumptions within Member State legal cultures from which differences stem, making mutual trust more difficult to achieve, and thereby pushing effective co-operation in cross-border matters further out of reach.

This chapter has explored the rule of law within the framework of the EU and how it has been a focus of policy discussion and initiatives towards change, particularly in the last decade. These policies have promoted support for existing judicial training networks and for the introduction of training at national levels through organisations such as the European Judicial Training Network. While there has certainly been a move towards a closer relationship between EU judiciaries and a rise in the level of awareness of foundational principles, such as the rule of law, and associated principles such as judicial independence, this has not prevented

actions that have risked the integrity of the rule of law in the EU by some Member State governments. Legal culture, coupled with political forces, influence diverse approaches to similar problems. This is one important reason why enhancing harmonisation and co-operation is vital to ensure the strength of the EU. The JCOERE Project is focussed on the integration of a particular aspect of market behaviour, namely the rescue of failing businesses and economic recovery in Europe, but nevertheless our findings and observations can be applied in other spheres.

The next Chapter will discuss and analyse cases arising in the context of co-operation in cross-border insolvency and rescue. The cases discussed in Chapter 5 will demonstrate the different approaches taken by practitioners and courts and how these will influence developments within the EU over time as well as some situations in which difficulties in co-operation have arisen.

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122 As noted in section 4.2 of this Chapter, both Poland and Hungary have been subject to notifications under the Rule of Law Framework. In addition, while Romania and Bulgaria have been seen to follow the benchmarks set out in the Cooperation and Verification Mechanisms, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have seen increased political tensions as political parties tested their autonomy against EU judicial governance to empower elected branches of government over the judiciary. See Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the Communication COM(2019) 163 final from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, and the Council on Further Strengthening the Rule of Law within the Union – State of play and next possible steps (Brussels 3.4.2019) para 4.6.1.
V. Chapter 5: Judicial Co-Operation in Restructuring Processes

5.1 Judicial Co-Operation in Cross-Border Restructuring

This Chapter follows on from the discussion in Chapter 3 summarising differences in approach to preventive restructuring in European Member States and on procedural obstacles to co-operation, in addition to the discussion in Chapter 4 on different legal and judicial cultures in Europe. It will focus specifically on case law arising, either domestically in an EU Member State or in the CJEU, on co-operation in the context of insolvency, and on the emerging context of European corporate restructuring, in particular. The starting point, therefore, will be the EIR Recast Regulation,¹ which imposes specific obligations on insolvency practitioners and courts to co-operate as described in section 2 of this Chapter, building on the detailed discussion conducted in Chapter 2. The Chapter will then move on to a consideration of recognition and co-operation in the context of restructuring in section 3. Section 4 considers what co-operation might look like as application of these obligations increases together following the implementation of the PRD.² Examples are derived from cross-border cases in other contexts, where instances of judicial co-operation and communication occurred, or where such an approach was proposed and where it did not occur. Case law will demonstrate different approaches by practitioners and courts, which will influence developments in the European Union over time. Finally, section 5 will consider some exceptional cases, which may cause difficulties for co-operation.

5.2 Foundation of the European Approach: Recognition of Proceedings under the European Insolvency Regulation 2000 and the EIR Recast 2015

The EIR Recast Regulation on Insolvency and its predecessor, the Insolvency Regulation,³ set out important rules regarding recognition of insolvency proceedings across the EU Member States and the enforcement of consequent judgements.

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For many years following the enactment of the original Insolvency Regulation, the case law focussed on the important question of centre of main interest or COMI. COMI is determinative of the jurisdiction in which the main insolvency proceedings will begin and the litigation surrounding the issue has been well documented. The important point in the context of cooperation, however, is that once COMI and seizure of proceedings is established, the opening of secondary or territorial proceedings (as local proceedings are described under the Regulation) is constrained. Despite somewhat rocky beginnings in cases such as Eurofood, which will be discussed below, the principles on which COMI is determined are fairly well settled in subsequent decisions of the CJEU such as Interedil and followed in other cases such as Daisytek. For our purposes, the smooth operation of the recognition process is a cornerstone of further enhanced court and judicial co-operation as anticipated following the passing of the EIR Recast. As described below, there is, however, more to co-operation than simple recognition and the extent of the new co-operation obligations has yet to be explored.

The Eurofood case, which was discussed in a different context in Chapter 3 of this Report, is relevant once again, albeit for a different reason. A further question had been referred to the ECJ by the Supreme Court of Ireland, namely whether there could be recognition for the principle of Irish law that the liquidation commences from the date of presentation of a petition to wind up a company where that petition is successful, as provided for in section 220 of the Companies Act 1963. This question was considered by Advocate General Jacobs in his opinion, where he expressed the view that under the Regulation it is national law, which determines when a ‘judgment’ becomes effective. This matter was not considered by the ECJ in this case. However, subsequent cases have considered the issue. The lodgement of a request for the opening of insolvency proceedings, such as the presentation of a petition in the Central Office of the High Court, should have some consequence, even if this does not constitute the ‘opening of proceedings’. The ECJ has held that the lodging of a request for the opening of proceedings in a Member State has, at least, the effect of restricting the debtor’s freedom to move its centre of main interests; thus, the Member State where the request is lodged retains jurisdiction to determine the issue of COMI and whether to open main insolvency proceedings. Applying to a preventive restructuring process such as the Irish

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4 Regulation 1346/2000, Recitals 12, 17 and articles 3 and 27. EIR Recast, Recitals 23, 33, 38 and articles 3 and 34 – 40.
5 Case C-341/04 Eurofood IFSC Ltd [2006] ECR I-03813.
10 Companies Act 1963, s 220 provides that once a winding-up order is made the liquidation shall be deemed to commence from the date the petition was presented. This concept of ‘relation back’ was later referred to as ‘heresy’ by the Italian authorities in the Supreme Court (Re Eurofood IFSC Ltd [No 2] [2006] IESC 41, [2006] 4 IR 307).
11 See also the decision of the Court of Justice in Case C-1/04 Susanne Staubitz-Schreiber [2006] ECR I-00701, where it was held that under art 3(1) the court of the Member State in which the centre of the debtor’s main interests was situated at the time when the debtor lodged the request to open insolvency proceedings retained jurisdiction to open those proceedings when the debtor moved the centre of his main interests to another Member State after lodging the request but before the proceedings were opened. See also, in the context of the presentation of a bankruptcy petition, Stojevic v Komercni Banka AS [2006] EWHC 3447 (Ch) [2007] BPIR 141 and Official Receiver v Eichler [2007] BPIR 1636. See also Case C-396/09 Interedil Srl, in liquidation v Fallimento Interedil Srl and Intesa Gestione Crediti SpA [2011] ECR I-09915, where the court stated that ‘it is the location of the debtor’s main centre of interests at the date on which the request to open
Examinership, this would mean that the commencement of the stay, which is linked to the presentation of the petition, would receive pan-European recognition under the terms of the Regulation and that co-operation obligations would apply.

In fact, the *Eurofood*\(^{12}\) case is a classic example of non-co-operation. Similarly, in recent times Irish courts have been inclined to support the repatriation of individual insolvent debtors, rather than allow the administration of the bankruptcy to take place in a neighbouring jurisdiction. In an academic context, this is described as a desire on the part of creditors to maintain ‘jurisdictional reach’ with the debtor.\(^{13}\) There is anecdotal evidence of informal co-operation between practitioners in the UK and Republic of Ireland and there are provisions in the Irish Companies Act 2014, which allow a government Minister to make an order allowing for particular co-operation between Ireland and another state. There are similar provisions in the UK Insolvency Act 1986. These provisions were activated between Ireland and the UK until both countries’ accession to the EU. It is expected that post Brexit these provisions will be re-activated.\(^{14}\)

### 5.2.1 Foundations of the European approach: The co-operation obligations

The co-operation obligations contained in the EIR Recast were dealt with in detail in Chapter 2, however, a brief restatement is useful for this Chapter. In short, the more recent iteration of the EU Insolvency Regulation in the EIR Recast introduces an enhanced co-operation regime.\(^{15}\) Articles 41-44 address co-operation obligations imposed on insolvency practitioners and courts respectively regarding a single insolvency proceeding concerning one company and articles 56-59 address similar co-operation obligations in the context of groups of companies. It is worth pointing out that the emphasis in the JCOERE Project is on the role of courts and the co-operation obligations imposed on them, rather than the obligations imposed on insolvency practitioners. For clarity though, it must be emphasised that article 41 imposes the obligation on insolvency practitioners to co-operate with each other in a single company situation and article 57 imposes a similar obligation in the context of corporate group proceedings.\(^{16}\)

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\(^{12}\) Case C-341/04 *Eurofood IFSC Ltd* [2006] ECR I-03813.


\(^{15}\) See generally, Moritz Brinkmann (ed), *European Insolvency Regulation: Article by Article Commentary* (Beck, Hart, Nomos, 2019).

\(^{16}\) For a general commentary on these obligations see Dominik Skauradzsun and Andreas Spahlinger in Moritz Brinkmann (ed), *European Insolvency Regulation: Article by Article Commentary* (Beck, Hart, Nomos, 2019), at Chapter III and Chapter V.
The language of the relevant articles is important to note from the outset. The obligation to co-operate is addressed to the court and not to the judiciary, as such.\textsuperscript{17} The JCOERE Project, which reflects the policy of the EU Commission Justice Directorate General,\textsuperscript{18} focuses on the question of judicial co-operation. It remains to be seen whether the different language employed is significant. In other words, is the fact that the obligation is addressed to the court rather than to the judiciary potentially important? It would seem to be of considerable importance in relation to the legal consequences for non-compliance. As described in Chapter 3 of this Report, questions of liability, for example, will pivot on the precise nature of the obligation.

Article 42 makes it clear that the explicit co-operation provisions are linked to the question of recognition of proceedings as it states that the co-operation obligation is imposed ‘[i]n order to facilitate the co-ordination of main, territorial and secondary insolvency proceedings concerning the same debtor (...).’ The article goes on to provide that any court dealing with a request to open proceedings or that has opened such proceedings, ‘shall co-operate with any other court’, which is similarly dealing with a request to open proceedings or which has opened proceedings. The article envisages that the co-operation obligation is subject to the compatibility with the ‘rules applicable to each of the proceedings.’\textsuperscript{19}

As we have stated, we expect that in the new European era of restructuring, some rules may be problematic for different courts as discussed in Chapter 3 of this Report. In some commentary, a wider view is taken of what is meant by ‘rules applicable to each of the proceedings’. The proposition is that ‘applicable rules’ will include a range of laws, including for example, the General Data Protection Regulation (EU) 2016/679 or the Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC.\textsuperscript{20} It seems surprising that these two specific legal frameworks would be singled out, as naturally, there will be other relevant legal rules that are applicable. It is our view, of course, that the general legal framework will be applicable, but nevertheless our interpretation of the specific provision is that it is intended to apply to rules applicable to each of the insolvency proceedings covered by the EIR Recast. On the face of it, the obligation to co-operate is most likely to be interpreted with reference to specific rules applying to particular proceedings covered by the EIR Recast.\textsuperscript{21}

Article 42 goes on to provide some guidance as to how such co-operation might take place, including a provision that ‘an independent person or body’ acting on the court’s instructions

\textsuperscript{17} PRD, art 42(1): ‘In order to facilitate the co-ordination of main, territorial and secondary insolvency proceedings concerning the same debtor, a court before which a request to open insolvency proceedings is pending, or which has opened such proceedings, shall cooperate with any other court before which a request to open insolvency proceedings is pending, or which has opened such proceedings, to the extent that such cooperation is not incompatible with the rules applicable to each of the proceedings’

\textsuperscript{18} The JCOERE Project is funded under a call from DG Justice for projects concerning Judicial Co-Operation. It is not envisaged that the use of the term court as distinct from judge is significant but nevertheless the difference should be noted.

\textsuperscript{19} See below for a discussion of what this might mean.

\textsuperscript{20} Both of these provisions are specifically mentioned by Dominik Skaudzdus and Andreas Spahlinger in Moritz Brinkmann (ed), European Insolvency Regulation: Article by Article Commentary (Beck, Hart, Nomos 2019) 342.

\textsuperscript{21} These specific proceedings are listed for each jurisdiction in Annex A of the EIR Recast.
may be appointed, who may ‘communicate directly with, or request information or assistance directly’ from their counterpart in the second Member State. As outlined in Chapter 2 of this Report, article 42(3) instances particular examples of co-operation that might occur. Article 43 then goes on to impose an obligation on insolvency practitioners to co-operate with courts. Interestingly, however, the language of article 43 focuses on the practitioners’ obligation in this regard and does not impose a correlated obligation on the court.

Article 57 imposes a similarly worded obligation on courts to co-operate with each other in situations where ‘insolvency proceedings relate to two or more members of a group of companies’. Article 58 imposes an obligation, which is similarly worded to that in article 43, on insolvency practitioners to co-operate with courts in the same group context. In both contexts, articles 44 and 59 address costs but interestingly, somewhat different statements are made. Article 44 states that costs will not be charged by courts against each other for such co-operation whereas in the group context, article 59 states that costs of co-operation will apply to the respective proceedings. In short, the co-operation obligations are imposed on courts and practitioners insofar as such obligations to co-operate are not incompatible with substantive or procedural rules. The key questions posed by the JCOERE Project are how such co-operation obligations will operate in practice, particularly in the context of restructuring, and to what extent the substantive rules considered in Report 1 and the procedural rules considered in Chapter 3 of this Report will prevent co-operation.

5.2.2 Foundations of the European approach: Some issues surrounding co-operation

Our enquiry does not end there, rather there are additional questions of interest. We already know that there is more to co-operation than simple recognition of judgements. As the JCOERE Project progressed, a question has been raised in relation to the borderline between simple recognition issues, which have been played out in many cases, and the broader obligation now imposed under the EIR Recast regarding co-operation, both in relation to single debtor cases and group cases. This question is returned to in Section 5.4 of this Chapter.

As the co-operation obligations are actually addressed to courts in the Member States, the question arises as to whether judges are personally obliged under the terms of the articles. According to Skauradszun, Spahinger and other commentators, under German law ‘a prompt rejection or non-response to a request of another court for cooperation...is now a breach of

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22 EIR Recast, Article 42(2). This communication must respect the procedural rights of the parties to the proceedings and the confidentiality of information. The reference to ‘an independent body or person’ reflects the UNCITRAL Model Law provisions described in Chapter 6.

23 These are: (a) co-ordination in the appointment of the insolvency practitioners; (b) communication of information by any means considered appropriate by the court; (c) co-ordination of the administration and supervision of the debtor’s assets and affairs; (d) co-ordination of the conduct of hearings; (e) co-ordination in the approval of protocols.

24 EIR Recast, Article 44: ‘The requirements laid down in Articles 42 and 43 shall not result in courts charging costs to each other for cooperation and communication.’

25 EIR Recast, Article 59: ‘The costs of the cooperation and communication provided for in Articles 56 to 60 incurred by an insolvency practitioner or a court shall be regarded as costs and expenses incurred in the respective proceedings.’

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duty. These authors conclude that the imposition of liability for breach of this obligation will rely on the terms of national law. However, the idea that an obligation imposed on a court could result in personal liability for a judge or other officer of the court would certainly raise some complex issues in some domestic legal frameworks. It is clear that one cannot presume that the reference to a court explicitly refers to a particular judge, or other officer of the court. Furthermore, it cannot be presumed that an obligation imposed on a body, such as a court, imposes a specific obligation, which gives rise to liability on a judge or officer.

A second interesting question in terms of legal consequences, as identified in Chapter 3 of this Report, is whether an alleged failure to co-operate can affect the validity of any claim, proceeding or other outcome in relation to insolvency proceedings generally. In other words what are the consequences if a party to an insolvency proceeding claims that either a court or an insolvency practitioner failed to comply with the co-operation obligations imposed in the EIR Recast? Is it even possible for a party to allege a failure to co-operate?

Finally, as described, it is contemplated in the EIR Recast that a court may decide that particular rules, substantive or procedural, render the co-operation required or requested ‘incompatible with the rules applicable to them’. In addition, the court may find that co-operation may lead to a ‘conflict of interest.’ The question here is whether this decision by a court can be contested by a party to the proceedings. In other words, are the co-operation articles justiciable and if so, what is the proposed outcome?

5.3 The European Approach: Developing an Obligation to Co-operate in Restructuring

As described here and in Chapter 2 of this Report, the specific obligations imposed on courts to co-operate are newly introduced in articles 42 and article 57 (in a group context) and only applicable since 2017. Therefore, the fact that there are few cases arising in relation to these obligations may not be as significant as was thought at the outset. Instead, it may be simply a matter of time before issues come to the fore. Furthermore, restructuring is an even more recent concept in many European Member States following the passing of the PRD in June 2019. That said, we have some examples of a broader duty to co-operate being considered by courts in a European context prior to the enactment of the EIR Recast. The idea of an obligation imposed on courts to co-operate, as being inherent in the obligations already imposed on practitioners to co-operate in the original EIR 2000, was mooted by some commentators and certainly raised in case law.27

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26 Dominik Skauradszun and Andreas Spahlinger in Moritz Brinkmann (ed), European Insolvency Regulation: Article by Article Commentary (Beck, Hart, Nomos 2019) 353. Reference is also made to Zipperer in Festschrift fur Vallendar to support this view. However, it is not entirely clear to whom this duty is owed and by whom. It is clear that one cannot presume that the reference to a court explicitly implies reference to a particular judge, or other officer of the court. Even more so one cannot presume that an obligation imposed on a body such as a court imposes a specific obligation giving rise to liability on a judge or officer.

In Nortel Networks SA, for example, the court had been asked to send letters to courts in other EU jurisdictions seeking assistance for the Joint Administrators of various companies in the Nortel group. Patten J observed that even though the obligation in the EIR 2000 was addressed to practitioners only, ‘the duty has been treated by the courts of Member States as incorporating or reflecting a wider obligation which extends to the courts which exercise control of insolvency procedures in their respective jurisdictions’. In so finding, he referred to Re Stojevic and cited the following passage from that decision, which states:

Although the wording of Art 31 of the EU Insolvency Regulation only obliges the trustees in bankruptcy to cooperate, this also applies to the court according to the prevailing opinion and under the UNCITRAL model law.

Nevertheless, the obligation to co-operate was not as clearly described as it is now.

5.3.1 Combining the EIR Recast and the new focus on restructuring

In June 2019, the Preventive Restructuring Directive was passed. The terms of the PRD, insofar as it describes rules that are potentially problematic to co-operation, are described in detail in the first JCOERE Report. Chapters 6-8 of JCOERE Report 1 also describe plans for its implementation by a number of Member States. The responses by various Member States to the issues we have raised in relation to the PRD and restructuring generally is summarised in Chapter 3 of this Report. Zorzi and Stanghellini have made some observations regarding the interface, or indeed lack of complementarity, between the PRD and the EIR Recast.

A key question that arises is whether the new restructuring processes adopted by Member States will be included in Annex A of the EIR Recast. The PRD provides Member States with the option of registering the processes under Annex A or not. This possibility is mentioned in Recital 13 and in Article 6 of the PRD, which concerns the imposition of a stay of enforcement proceedings. For example, statements in the final paragraph of article 6 are designed to limit the available stay under the PRD to 4 months where the rescue process is not notifiable under Annex A and where there has been a COMI shift in the preceding 3 months. If a Member State...

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28 Re Nortel Networks SA & Ors [2009] EWHC 206 (Ch).
29 Ibid para 11.
30 Stojevic v Komercni Banka AS [2006] EWHC 3447 (Ch) [2007] BPIR 141, quoting a decision of the Vienna Higher Regional Court (9 November 2004, 28 R 225/04w).
31 Patten J. also referred in Para 13 of his judgement to a similar observation made in the decision of the court in Graz in Re Collins & Aikman, Higher Regional Court of Graz, 20 October 2005, 3 R 149/05, reported in NZI 2006 vol 11 p.660.
33 PRD, Recital 13: ‘This Directive should be without prejudice to the scope of Regulation (EU) 2015/848. It aims to be fully compatible with, and complementary to, that Regulation, by requiring Member States to put in place preventive restructuring procedures which comply with certain minimum principles of effectiveness. It does not change the approach taken in that Regulation of allowing Member States to maintain or introduce procedures which do not fulfil the condition of publicity for notification under Annex A to that Regulation. Although this Directive does not require that procedures within its scope fulfil all the conditions for notification under that Annex, it aims to facilitate the cross-border recognition of those procedures and the recognition and enforceability of judgments.
34 PRD, Article 6: ‘Where Member States choose to implement this Directive by means of one or more procedures or measures which do not fulfil the conditions for notification under Annex A to Regulation (EU) 2015/848, the total duration of the stay under such procedures shall be limited to no more than four months if the centre of main interests of the debtor has been transferred from another Member State within a three-month period prior to the filing of a request for the opening of preventive restructuring proceedings.’
chooses to implement the PRD by introducing a rescue or restructuring process that is not registered under Annex A of the EIR Recast, the obligations to co-operate quite simply do not arise. If, on the other hand the process is listed in Annex A, the obligations apply and then, and only then, do the questions around compatibility raised by the JCOERE Project arise.

The significance of the fact that the PRD gives the choice of Annex A inclusion to Member States can be illustrated by comparing two existing restructuring processes. The first process, which has been already implemented by Ireland as a Member State is the Examinership procedure and the second restructuring process, which was used effectively in the UK both before and after the financial crisis and which was particularly popular during the Great Recession, is the Scheme of Arrangement. The former is listed in Annex A\(^{35}\) and therefore once an Examinership proceeding is opened in an Irish court, the recognition obligations, and the co-operation obligations under the EIR Recast will arise. In the gathering of the Judicial Wing at Copenhagen in September 2019, some members of the group regarded these facts as leading to an open and shut case of recognition.\(^{36}\) This would unquestionably guide the court in the second Member State when considering a request from another party to open secondary proceedings in that Member State. Such a party could be a local creditor wishing to commence an enforcement proceeding in a local court, which would be contrary to the stay that accompanies the opening of an Examinership in all cases under Irish law. These rules effectively give the Irish stay a pan-European effect. In addition, requests for co-operation will be similarly governed by the EIR Recast.

A precursor to this situation is exemplified in the decision of the CJEU in *MG Probud Gdynia*\(^{37}\) in which main insolvency proceedings had been opened in Poland. The company had a branch in Germany, carried on construction activities there and had assets situated there. On the application of the German customs office, a German court ordered the attachment of the company’s assets. Even though the attachment had been ordered under German law, under Polish law it was not possible to order attachment of assets in this way. The CJEU confirmed that the main proceedings opened in Poland had universal effect and encompassed all of the company’s assets including those situated in Germany. As a result, Polish law governed the treatment of assets, even though they were situated in another Member State. Thus, the German courts were precluded from ordering enforcement measures against the company’s assets situated in Germany, subject to the exceptions to Article 4 provided for in the EIR Recast, which did not apply in this case. On the other hand, if secondary proceedings had been

\(^{35}\) As is the French sauvegarde procedure, the Italian procedure and the Spanish procedure which feature in our Reports. See JCOERE Consortium, Report 1: Identifying substantive and procedural rules in preventive restructuring frameworks including the Preventive Restructuring Directive which may be incompatible with judicial co-operation obligations (JCOERE Project, 2019) [https://www.ucc.ie/en/jcoere/research/report1/].

\(^{36}\) Discussion at the INSOL Judicial Wing, INSOL European Annual Congress, held in Copenhagen, September 26th, 2019.

\(^{37}\) Case C-444/07 MG Probud Gdynia sp. z o.o. [2010] ECR I-00417.
opened in Germany, then German law would have applied and there would have been no difficulty in ordering attachment in respect of the assets situated in Germany.  

In contrast, if the same situation arose under a UK Scheme of Arrangement, the EIR Recast would not apply, so debtors in a second Member State could proceed to open a second set of proceedings to counteract or disrupt the rescue being proposed under the Scheme of Arrangement. It is also worth noting that rescue processes like the UK Scheme of Arrangement, which are based in company law, are specifically excluded from the application of the EIR Recast under Recital 16, which states:

This Regulation should apply to proceedings which are based on laws relating to insolvency. However, proceedings that are based on general company law not designed exclusively for insolvency situations should not be considered to be based on laws relating to insolvency. [emphasis added]

This statement raises an interesting question as to whether restructuring processes designed by Member States, which comply with the terms of the PRD, may in fact be excluded from being registered in Annex A, regardless of the views of the Member State. The lack of clarity or complementarity between the EIR Recast and the PRD presents difficulties of classification of restructuring processes with consequent advantages and disadvantages, which will take some time to work out once the PRD has been implemented. For our purposes, the most important consequence would be that the court (or judicial) co-operation obligations found in the EIR Recast would not apply to these restructuring processes at all.

Strangely, the EIR Recast itself addresses the question of restructuring in the provisions that are addressed to insolvency practitioners. Thus, Article 41(2)(b) states that in implementing the co-operation described in the first paragraph of the article insolvency practitioners should ‘explore the possibility of restructuring of the debtor and, where such a probability exists, coordinate the elaboration and implementation of a restructuring plan’. A similar obligation is repeated in relation to the obligation imposed on insolvency practitioners in article 56 in the context of groups.

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38 Note that article 46 of the EIR Recast provides that the court which opens secondary proceedings may itself order a stay on the process of realisation of assets in whole or in part ‘on receipt of a request from the insolvency practitioner in the main insolvency proceedings’ but the Regulation goes on to provide that the court may require the insolvency practitioner in the main proceedings to take ‘suitable measures to guarantee the interests of the creditors in the secondary insolvency proceedings’. This does not smoothly interface with existing domestic law implementing the Directive such as the Irish Examinership process which allows for a general stay of realisation of all claims, without any guarantee or other protective obligations. This contradiction is part of the Regulation because it recognises the Examinership as a procedure in Annex A.

39 EIR Recast, recital 16: ‘This Regulation should apply to proceedings which are based on laws relating to insolvency. However, proceedings that are based on general company law not designed exclusively for insolvency situations should not be considered to be based on laws relating to insolvency. Similarly, the purpose of adjustment of debt should not include specific proceedings in which debts of a natural person of very low income and very low asset value are written off, provided that this type of proceedings never makes provision for payment to creditors.’

40 EIR Recast, art 56(2)(c).
In contrast, restructuring is not mentioned in relation to the obligation to co-operate imposed on courts in either Article 42 or 57.

5.3.2 The classification of rescue as an insolvency proceeding

The EIR Recast applies specifically to insolvency proceedings. However, the PRD, which refers to preventive restructuring processes, implies that the procedures must be processes where there has been no adjudication of insolvency. Nevertheless, the PRD does envisage that a company may be technically insolvent, simply not adjudicated to be insolvent. As discussed in the previous section, we are aware of preventive restructuring mechanisms, such as the Irish Examinership process and the French sauvegarde processes, which are already covered by the EIR Recast.41 We also know that certain kinds of restructuring proceedings, such as Schemes of Arrangement, are not included in Annex A of the EIR Recast. As discussed, such proceedings cannot, in fact, be included under the EIR Recast because they are derived from company law and therefore excluded per Recital 16.42 It is also possible that that some Member States may decide not to include restructuring processes implementing the PRD in Annex A. This means that the recognition and co-operation obligations included in the EIR Recast may or may not apply to restructuring processes introduced by Member States to implement the PRD. What is interesting and somewhat surprising is that this issue is left to the discretion of the Member States.43

5.3.3 Rescue proceedings that are not included in the EIR Recast

In the same vein, similar considerations apply to particular kinds of actions that may be utilised in domestic insolvency practise, but that do not fit neatly into the categorisation provided by the EIR Recast or the PRD. As described above, schemes of arrangement, which are found in English and Irish law, are examples of rescue processes based in company law, that cannot be included under the EIR Recast. Common law receiverships and similar enforcement actions arising from the enforcement of rights in rem are another. In some jurisdictions – but not in all – that possess receivership-type arrangements, whether these are limited to rights derived from securities on real property or otherwise,44 are viewed by practitioners as being part of the insolvency turnaround tool kit. This is the case in Ireland.45 However, a common law receivership occurs without a formal adjudication of bankruptcy. All that happens is that the debtor decides a security or loan is in jeopardy and the receiver is

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41 EIR Recast, Annex A, France.
42 EIR Recast, Recital 1 states: ‘This Regulation should apply to proceedings which are based on laws relating to insolvency. However, proceedings that are based on general company law not designed exclusively for insolvency situations should not be considered to be based on laws relating to insolvency.’
43 At some point during the last financial crisis the issue of whether UK Schemes of Arrangement ought to be included in the EIR Recast was considered as a debatable point by some academics in the UK See ILA Conference, London, 2015. However, the provisions of the EIR Recast 2015 renders this debate a moot point as Schemes of Arrangement are considered to be derived from Company Law provisions.
44 English Insolvency Act 1986 Part III (though the use of this procedure has been significantly limited since the passage of the Enterprise Act 2002). See also, Irish Companies Act 2014, Part 8.
appointed to protect the security or loan. The question as to the nature of a receivership arose in *Re Stanford International Bank Ltd* 46 in the context of the UNCITRAL Model Law in a similar set of circumstances that may occur under the EIR Recast.

In *Stanford International* it was held that ‘the powers and duties conferred or imposed on the Receiver’ did not amount to a ‘foreign proceeding’ for the purposes of the Cross-Border Insolvency Regulations (implementing the UNCITRAL Model Law). 47 Receiverships are not covered in these Regulation and will not be. In that sense there will be types of turnaround mechanisms that will not come within the remit of the EIR Recast or indeed be mechanisms implementing the PRD as such and will thus, be outside the European framework entirely.

Again, these provisions underline the lack of complementarity between the PRD and the EIR Recast and indeed some inherent lack of coherence in the provisions of the Recast itself.

**5.4 Beyond Recognition to a Broader Understanding of Co-operation** 48

As described in the introduction to this Chapter, one of the distinctions at which the JCOERE Project has already arrived, is between recognition *simpliciter* of a decision to open proceedings or recognition of a judgement at the close of proceedings, on the one hand, and co-operation, which is ongoing throughout a process, in our case a restructuring process. Bearing in mind the difficult caveat generated by the lack of complementarity between the PRD and the EIR Recast, we will assume for these purposes that a number of restructuring processes will be included in the scope of the EIR Recast so that questions not only of recognition, but of ongoing further co-operation will arise. Omar have referred to examples of cases involving non-EU cross-border matters as exemplars of court-to-court co-operation relevant to the new provisions in the EIR Recast. However, on closer consideration of these cases, not all deal with questions of co-operation as distinct from questions regarding recognition. Our focus on co-operation in the EIR Recast goes further than mere recognition in reflection of the intended goals of the EIR Recast.

To illustrate this distinction, the Irish Supreme Court decision in *Re Flightlease* 49 concerns the question of whether a proceeding in a Swiss court will be *recognised in the sense of enforcement of the decision* in an Irish court. In answering this question, the court focussed on the nature of the proceedings and the question of whether this concerned the enforcement of a right *in rem* or a right *in personam.* This followed arguments made based on

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46 [2016] EWCA Civ 137.
47 The Cross-Border Insolvency Regulations 2006 no 1030 (UK) [hereinafter the ‘CBIR’].
49 *Re Flightlease (Ireland) Ltd* (in Voluntary Liquidation) [2012] IESC 12. [Hereinafter *Flightlease*].
a decision of the Privy Council in in *Cambridge Gas*,\(^{50}\) which raised similar facts and where the court held that the particular enforcement action was an action *in personam*.

In addition, the common law conflict of law principles recognising such judgements were also considered, as were the statements of the Privy Council in *Cambridge Gas*, which concerned further and additional observations regarding co-operation. In *Flightlease*, a resolution of this final discussion regarding the development of common law principles was not necessary for the court to decide, rather it confined itself to the more limited question of recognition, which it was decided was not required in relation to the Swiss decision.\(^{51}\)

The *Cambridge Gas* covered similar but broader territory with the decision addressing questions of recognition, but also questions of assistance, which for our purposes can be equated to the new European obligations to co-operate. As Lord Hoffman observed in his judgement, the entire circumstances in which Cambridge Gas sought to dispute the implementation of certain aspects of the Chapter 11 restructuring plan of the principle company Navigator Holdings plc (‘Navigator’) were peculiar in that no particular financial consequences arose for Cambridge Gas. Nevertheless, the Privy Council took the opportunity to deliver an important judgement regarding the common law and the principles that might be relevant to the courts of England and Wales in deciding whether to provide assistance to foreign bankruptcy proceedings. The focus is, therefore, on the provision of assistance to the ongoing conduct of an overseas insolvency proceeding (again similar to an obligation to co-operate in the European framework). Lord Hoffman, citing Professor Fletcher, agreed that the common law on cross-border insolvency has for some time been ‘in a state of arrested development’,\(^{52}\) referring to both Regulation 1346/2000 and the fact that the UK gave effect to the UNCITRAL Model Law through a statutory instrument.\(^{53}\) Consequently, the principles at common law could be further developed.

The court recognised that there was and is a distinction between questions of recognition by courts and the decisions of those courts, on the one hand, and on the other hand, the exercise by the Court of its ‘discretion to assist the foreign trustee by enabling him to obtain title to or otherwise deal with the property’. The latter question of assistance seems to be a more fluid concept.

In describing these distinctions, the Privy Council then went on to discuss the effect of existing common law principles in the following terms:

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\(^{50}\) *Cambridge Gas Transportation Corp v. Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Navigator Holdings plc* [2006] UKPC 26 [Hereinafter ‘Cambridge Gas’].


\(^{53}\) Cross-Border Insolvency Regulations 2006 (SI 2006 No 1030).
the underlying principle of universality is of equal application and this is given effect by recognising the person who is empowered under the foreign bankruptcy law to act on behalf of the insolvent company as entitled to do so in England. In addition, as Innes CJ said in the Transvaal case of *Re African Farms* 1906 TS 373, 377, in which an English company with assets in the Transvaal had been voluntarily wound up in England, ‘recognition carries with it the active assistance of the court’. 54

Following further consideration of the current principles at common law, the Privy Council concluded in *Cambridge Gas* that the relevant court in the Isle of Man, which had originally been asked for assistance in implementing some aspects of a previously agreed restructuring plan under a Chapter 11 proceedings, had the discretion to assist the trustee in the Chapter 11 proceedings in New York. This obligation was separate from the issue of recognition *per se*.

In the decision of the Privy Council in the *Singularis* litigation, the common law powers to assist the operation of a foreign court were further considered in the context of a liquidation, which occurred in the Cayman Islands. The appointed liquidators had made a request to the court in the Cayman Islands ordering the auditors of the company (PwC) to disclose information and in the course of this litigation sought similar orders from the court in Bermuda, again with a view to assisting the liquidators in tracing assets that they felt at the time existed. The order was eventually denied by the Bermuda Supreme Court and this was appealed to the Privy Council, which summarised the questions to be considered as follows:

The first is whether the Bermuda court has a common law power to assist a foreign liquidation by ordering the production of information (in oral or documentary form), in circumstances where (i) the Bermuda court has no power to wind up an overseas company such as Singularis and (ii) its statutory power to order the production of information is limited to cases where the company has been wound up in Bermuda.

The second issue is whether, if such a power exists, it is exercisable in circumstances where an equivalent order could not have been made by the court in which the foreign liquidation is proceeding. 56

The Privy Council had this to say in relation to the earlier decision in *Cambridge Gas*:

It has proved to be a controversial decision. So far as it held that the domestic court had jurisdiction over the parties simply by virtue of its power to assist, [emphasis added] it was subjected to fierce academic criticism and held by a majority of the Supreme Court to be wrong in *Rubin v Eurofinance SA* [2013] 1 AC 236. So far as it held that the domestic court had a common law power to assist the foreign court by doing whatever it could have done in a domestic insolvency, its authority is weakened by the absence of any explanation of whence this common law power came and by the direct rejection of that proposition by the Judicial Committee in *Al Sabah v Grupo Torras SA*

55 *Singularis Holdings Ltd v PricewaterhouseCoopers (Bermuda)* [2015] AC 1675, [2014] UKPC 36 (Hereinafter *Singularis*).
56 *idem*, para [8].
In making these distinctions, which lead to the conclusion that the question of assistance in a particular proceeding is separate from the question of recognition and enforcement of an actual judgement, the question then becomes one of whether recognition is a precondition to assistance. In European terms, can the co-operation obligations (analogous to assistance) be treated separately from recognition issues? Is it possible that assistance may be given to a particular process without involving the question of recognition of a final judgement?

If this is the case, it might lead us to suppose that in relation to restructuring in particular, assistance in the ongoing process of preventive restructuring might allow for a court to assist in the imposition of a stay imposed at the outset of a process, without the question of recognition of the process in the fullest sense of the word being assumed, particularly if the second Member State has implemented the PRD in an entirely different manner from that in the first Member State. If this second Member State implements the PRD through the adoption of a process that varies considerably from the process in the first Member State, would the enforcement of a pan-European stay simply amount to co-operation (assistance at common law), without obliging the second Member State to enforce a court order or judgement arising from the restructuring, which may include a cram-down on the interests of creditors in the second Member State?

5.4.1 The nature of the action: Enforcing rights or a collective bankruptcy proceeding?

In Cambridge Gas, as with Flightlease, the significance of whether the creditors’ claim was a right in rem or a right in personam were also at issue. In the former decision, the distinction was considered important in terms of recognition of the creditors’ claim against the insolvent estate. Key points regarding this development are that both corporate and personal insolvency proceedings involve a set of legal principles, which are not encompassed by the question of whether a particular action involves the enforcement of rights in rem or rights in personam. The distinction rests on the fact that:

Judgments in rem and in personam are judicial determinations of the existence of rights: in the one case, rights over property and in the other, rights against a person. When a judgment in rem or in personam is recognised by a foreign court, it is accepted as establishing the right which it purports to have determined, without further inquiry into the grounds upon which it did so. The judgment itself is treated as the source of the right.

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The purpose of bankruptcy proceedings, on the other hand, is not to determine or establish the existence of rights, but to provide a mechanism of collective execution against the property of the debtor by creditors whose rights are admitted or established. That mechanism may vary in its details.58

This distinction is important; recognition of a court order in a bankruptcy proceeding relates to the proceeding itself. In contrast, recognition of other claims, whether these are claims in rem or in personam, involves a recognition of a right. The court in Cambridge Gas emphasises that there is a difference in the effect of recognition from the second court. This distinction is expressed further in case law such as Feniks and BNP Paribas referred to below, which also distinguishes particular causes of action arising in national laws from an insolvency proceeding, even where these causes of action were pursued in the context of insolvency proceedings.

Finally, the Privy Council refers constantly to the provision of information as a form of assistance, which can be correlated to the statements in Article 42(3) described above. Noting that the obligation to assist may be more fluid in some ways, but stops short of recognition of a court order, the question remains as to whether this power of assistance is actually limited to the provision of information? It is also noteworthy that the Privy Council did not think the court was under a common law duty to assist in this particular case.

In this vein of distinguishing a particular cause of action from the recognition of and assistance with an insolvency proceeding as such, in another decision made at around the same time, the court in Re Phoenix59 considered issues surrounding the enforcement of applications in the UK by office holders in a second jurisdiction. In this case a German administrator was recognised in the UK as having the capacity to act with the powers of an insolvency office holder under the Insolvency Act 198660 in the UK. The German administrator then applied under the Insolvency Act 1986 to have certain transactions set aside as being fraudulent against creditors and to claw back sums invested and fictitious profits under what had been deemed a Ponzi scheme. The facts rested upon the common law principles used to determine whether the court had an inherent jurisdiction to permit the statutory power under section 423 of the Insolvency Act 1986 to allow a foreign administrator to use those powers.61 This decision rests upon the issue of assistance rather than the recognition of a particular process.

The elements of what might be involved are nicely summarised in the judgement of the Privy Council in Singularis by Lord Collins with reference to previous case law in this area. The elements are as follows:62

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60 Insolvency Act 1986, s 423.
61 Re Phoenix.
62 Singularis Holdings Limited (Appellant) v PricewaterhouseCoopers [2014] UKPC 36 para 38 per Collins LJ.
First, there is a principle of the common law that the court has the power to recognize and grant assistance to foreign insolvency proceedings.

Second, that power is primarily exercised through the existing powers of the court.

Third, those powers can be extended or developed from existing powers through the traditional judicial law-making techniques of the common law.

Fourth, the very limited application of legislation by analogy does not allow the judiciary to extend the scope of insolvency legislation to cases where it does not apply.  

Fifth, in consequence, those powers do not extend to the application, by analogy ‘as if’ the foreign insolvency were a domestic insolvency, of statutory powers which do not actually apply in the instant case.

5.4.2 Specific actions, rules and exceptions to co-operation in an insolvency and restructuring context

In the case law of the European Union and decisions of the CJEU, the issue of what amounts to a proceeding for the purposes of recognition and the purposes of the co-operation obligations has been litigated recently. In the following two cases, the CJEU held that the relevant proceedings, although connected to the main insolvency proceedings in terms of settlement of certain issues, were separate from the insolvency as such and therefore could proceed without incurring the recognition obligations under the regulation. A fortiori these sorts of proceedings would also not therefore attract the obligations to co-operate under the Regulation.

In NK (liquidator) v BNP Paribas Fortis NV, money had been transferred to Fortis bank prior to insolvency proceedings concerning Gerechtsdeurwaarderskantoor BV. This was a company governed by Dutch law, of which PI (‘PI.BV’) was the sole shareholder who had subsequently been declared bankrupt. It was found that this particular transfer amounted to an act of embezzlement, which had resulted in the imprisonment of the individual involved. During the insolvency proceedings conducted in the Netherlands, proceedings were brought against the bank. Under Dutch law, the liquidator can bring an action in tort against a bank to repay money where the money has been paid at a disadvantage to other creditors: - ‘Peeters-Gatzen-vordering (PGV). In Dutch law, this is an action in tort, which can be brought by an individual creditor, liquidator, and/or anyone affected. The defendant bank, Paribas Fortis,

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63 This is a particularly important observation for common law countries in terms of how the EIR Recast is applied. Similar principles may apply in civil law systems. It is important to note that in France and Italy as examples, the implementation of the EIR Recast also includes rules regarding the conduct of recognition and co-operation obligations.

64 This would mean that where there are differences in domestic legislation between the common law jurisdiction in which the application for assistance is made and the primary jurisdiction, the existence of an ongoing process in the primary jurisdiction would not in and of itself allow for the application of principles existing in that legal framework in the secondary common law court. In this case the transactional avoidance provisions are a case in point.


66 This is similar to a claim arising out of mistaken payments.
said it was a tort claim and therefore should be brought in Belgium against the defendant. In contrast, the Dutch liquidator argued that this was a claim normally brought by a liquidator and therefore the Dutch court had jurisdiction over all of the insolvency related matters. CJEU found to the contrary. It decided that just because the liquidator brings the particular claim, it does not mean it is an insolvency procedure. It is still a tort and because individual creditors can bring the claim, the Belgian court could have jurisdiction. The PGV is covered by the concept of ‘civil and commercial matters’ within the meaning of article 1(1) Judgement Regulation:67

The Court has held that only actions which derive directly from insolvency proceedings or which are closely connected with them are excluded from the scope of the Brussels Convention and, subsequently, Regulation No 44/2001... 68

The court went on to state that:

the same criterion, as stated in the Court’s case-law on the interpretation of the Brussels Convention, was set out in recital 6 of Regulation No 1346/2000 in order to delimit the subject matter of that regulation, and was confirmed by Regulation (EU) 2015/848 on insolvency proceedings... 69

An important statement in the judgement is that:

[the decisive criterion adopted by the Court to identify the area within which an action falls is not the procedural context [author’s emphasis] of which that action is part, but the legal basis of the action. According to that approach, it must be determined whether the right or obligation which forms...the action has its source in the ordinary rules of civil and commercial law or in derogating rules specific to insolvency proceedings.70

More significantly, the decision in Feniks sp. z o.o. v Azteca Products & Services SL71 also addresses this issue in relation to an important transactional avoidance action. In this case, Feniks was a creditor of Coliseum, which was a general contractor with whom Feniks had an investment agreement regarding a construction project in Poland. Coliseum was technically insolvent, in that it was unable to pay subcontractors, but proceedings had not yet been

71 Case C-337/17 Feniks Sp. z o.o. v Azteca Products & Services SL [2018] ECLI:EU:C:2018:805. I wish to acknowledge the lecture provided by Lucas Kortmann RESOR at the EIRC Conference, hosted by German Arbeitsgemeinschaft Insolvenzrecht und Sanierung with INSOL Europe and the Law Society, Brussels 29 June 2017 which provided references and explanations for these cases amongst others. Kortmann L, ‘Update on ECJ and other landmark decisions on European Insolvency Law’ (EIRC Conference, hosted by German Arbeitsgemeinschaft Insolvenzrecht und Sanierung with INSOL Europe and the Law Society, Brussels 29 June 2017.)
opened. Coliseum sold property in Poland to Azteca (Spain) in partial fulfilment of prior claims by Azteca. This transaction would normally be subject to some sort of clawback action. Under Polish law any creditor – not just an insolvency practitioner or appointed liquidator – can bring a claw back action. Feniks, as a creditor of Coliseum, brought a claw back action against Azteca before the Polish court to clawback the value of the transaction on the basis of article 7(1)(a) of the Judgments Regulation. Azteca argued that the correct forum was the Spanish court.

The question for the CJEU was whether an *actio pauliana* is covered by the rule of international jurisdiction provided for in article 7(1)(a) Judgments Regulation. The response from the CJEU was that an *actio pauliana*, which is based on the creditor’s rights created upon the conclusion of a contract, falls within ‘matters relating to a contract’ of article 7(1)(a) Judgments Regulation. Therefore, the action is separate from the insolvency *per se* and is not subject to the recognition or co-operation obligations in the EIR Recast. In terms of the interface between the EIR Recast and these provisions of the Judgements Regulation, there is a lack of certainty and clarity as to the borderline between insolvency matters and other causes of actions. It is also important to recognise that these cases were argued under the original European Insolvency Regulation 1346/2000 and so the addition of the provisions of Article 6 to the EIR Recast may have an effect on possible outcomes of similar arguments made in cases after 2015. This provision states in Article 6(1) that “The courts of the Member State within the territory of which insolvency proceedings have been opened in accordance with Article 3 shall have jurisdiction for any action which derives directly from the insolvency proceedings and is closely linked with them, such as avoidance actions.” and goes on to amplify this issue in further sub sections. There has been no case law to date on this issue under the EIR Recast. However, commentary on a later decision of the CJEU in *Wiemer & Trachte GmbH v Zhan Oved Tadzher* asserts a liquidator’s right to choose between different jurisdictions ‘when it comes to bringing actions to protect the interests of the creditors’ and it is further argued that this situation should be maintained despite the provisions of Article 6 of the EIR Recast. The argument is made the view that Article 6 of the EIR Recast leads to a ‘conclusion of exclusive jurisdiction’ should be rejected as limiting the ‘options of the insolvency practitioner unduly’.

5.4.3 The invocation of exceptional rules

Some interesting cases have illustrated that it might be possible for particular rules to be invoked to prevent full co-operation. The rule in *Gibbs* seems to be one such example; this states that a debt governed by English law cannot be discharged or compromised by a ‘foreign’

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72 Such an action is where a person entitled to a debt repayment (ie a creditor) requests that an act, whereby his debtor has transferred an asset to a third party, which is detrimental to his rights, be declared ineffective, also described as an avoidance action.


74 See Case C-296/17 Wiemer &Trachte GmbH v Zhan Oved Tadzher and the commentary on this case from Ganeve et al in Eurofenix Spring 2020 p. 24
insolvency proceeding. The rule has been heavily criticised, with commentators arguing that it is not relevant in modern day cross-border insolvency proceedings following the continuing trend towards recognition of foreign insolvency proceedings (and their effects). However, in a recent English decision the court considered an application by a foreign representative to the English court on behalf of a debtor, International Bank of Azerbaijan, for a permanent stay on a creditors' enforcement of claims in England under a contract governed by English law, contrary to the terms of the foreign insolvency proceeding. The foreign proceedings were conducted in Azerbaijan and had been recognised in England under the CBIR. The English High Court found that the rule in Gibbs did apply to prevent the court granting a permanent (or indefinite) stay on the enforcement of creditors' English law governed contractual claims. Any stay granted by the court would be more than simply procedural and would go to the substance of creditors' claims. The court would, in effect, be ordering the discharge of the creditor's claim and was prohibited from doing this, following the rule in Gibbs.

In a European context, by analogy, leaving aside the issue of the UK specifically, the question would quite simply be whether the rule in Gibbs, or a rule of this kind, would be a rule incompatible with the recognition of, and co-operation with, a restructuring process introduced in another Member State, where this process is registered in Annex A. Following the decision in Bakshiyeva, there was a view that the recognition and co-operation obligations under the EIR Recast would supersede the invocation of a rule such as the rule in Gibbs. In fact, in Bank of Baroda v Maniar it has been held by the English courts (in a case concerning an Irish Examinership) that the EIR effectively bypasses the Gibbs rule in cases where there is recognition of insolvency proceedings under the EIR. However, it is not entirely clear how different treatment of different proceedings in different jurisdictions could justifiably lead to different outcomes. The relatively recently created Model Law on Insolvency Related Judgments (2018), not as yet implemented in the UK, would similarly supersede the Gibbs rule.

5.4.4 The public policy exception in the EIR Recast

The EIR Recast does provide for the court to decide that an insolvency process in another jurisdiction may not be recognised for public policy reasons, specifically if recognition of such proceedings are contrary to public policy. In the European context, a decision of this kind was made by the Irish High Court in ACC Bank plc v McCann in which a set of proceedings were brought by the ACC Bank against Sean McCann. Mr McCann had also been involved in property development in Ireland. The case in hand concerned his application for a personal

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75 Antony Gibbs and sons v La Société Industrielle et Commerciale des Métaux (1890) 25 QBD 399. [Hereinafter Gibbs].
77 Bakshiyeva v Sberbank of Russia [2018] EWHC 59 (Ch) [Hereinafter Bakshiyeva].
bankruptcy order in Northern Ireland and the efforts of his main creditor to have that order annulled. In a decision in the Irish High Court, Dunne J upheld the creditor’s argument based on article 26 of the EIR Recast, which provides for the annulment of proceedings on public policy grounds. In upholding the creditor’s challenge, which focussed on the fact that the nature and timing of the application to Northern Ireland had negated the creditor’s right to be heard and could potentially prejudice the particular creditor’s rights in significant ways regarding priority of payment, the proposed recognition of the bankruptcy adjudication in Northern Ireland was declined as being contrary to public policy within the terms of article 26. In the circumstances of the case and in granting the order not to recognise the personal bankruptcy proceedings in Northern Ireland, Dunne J stated:

Suffice it to say I think that this is one of the exceptional and rare cases in which the court should, for the reason I have already outlined, namely the fact that ACC did not have an opportunity to be heard in Northern Ireland on the question of COMI bearing in mind that they will be significantly prejudiced by that fact it is my view appropriate in this case to make an adjudication. 79

This case was on appeal to the Supreme Court, but the appeal has been withdrawn. 80

5.5 Conclusion and Transition

The foregoing Chapter has focused on cases that have centred on an issue of cross-border cooperation within the EU in the area of cross-border restructuring and insolvency. Although the EIR Recast has only been applicable for the last three years at the time of writing, the cases discussed in this Chapter have shown what could occur in the EU when restructuring procedures falling under the EIR Recast begin to come before Member State courts and the CJEU and how these issues may develop in the EU over time, including where difficulties may arise. The discussion in this Chapter also provides an insight into the eventuality that there may be competing procedures under the PRD and what this could mean for court-to-court cooperation generally or under the EIR Recast.

The next Chapter will present a thematic discussion of the various guidelines and recommendations that provide direction in relation to co-operation and co-ordination of cross-border insolvency and restructuring cases. Chapter 6 will discuss a number of different sets of guidelines and recommendations, focusing on their approaches to the sharing or obtaining of information and disclosure requirements; asset co-ordination; the mechanism of co-operation and communication methodology; and the notification and service of official documents. Chapter 6 will therefore extract issues that are relevant to court-to-court co-

79 Please note these statements are from the transcript of the proceedings in the High Court. There is no approved judgement to date. See further reports at RTE Business, ‘Judge puts stay on Sean McCann bankruptcy case’ RTE News (Dublin, 21 August 2012) <https://www.rte.ie/news/business/2012/0821/334442-judge-puts-stay-on-sean-mccann-bankruptcy-case/> [Accessed July 11, 2013].

80 See also Re Zetta Jet Pte Ltd [2018] SGHC 16. Under article 6 of the Singapore Model Law, to which article 17 is subject, a Singapore court may refuse recognition if such recognition would be ‘contrary’ to the public policy of Singapore. Article 6 of the Model Law on the other hand requires recognition to be ‘manifestly contrary’ to public policy for it to be refused.
operation, focusing on how these issues may arise in the context of restructuring (preventive or otherwise), and explain what tools are already available to assist judges in the fulfilment of their co-operation obligations.
VI. Chapter 6: Survey of Frameworks and Best-Practice Guidelines for Judicial Cooperation

6.1 Introduction

Over the past 20 years, there have been a number of initiatives aimed at enhancing cross border insolvency law with the aim of enhancing the performance of economic and financial systems. These include formal frameworks such as the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-border Insolvency and less formal guidelines and principles covering both substantive and procedural matters, including aspects of cooperation between courts and insolvency professionals. Some of these initiatives have been led by international organisations such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the American Law Institute (2000 and subsequent publication in 2012).

Against the backdrop of the relatively newly imposed obligations created by the EIR Recast, described in Chapter 2 of this Report, this Chapter explores some of these reports and guidelines, which have either focused solely on judicial cooperation in matters of cross-border insolvency or, which have included this matter in a broader context.\(^1\) The purpose of this Chapter is to extract the issues identified in these principles, guidelines, and recommendations that are relevant to court-to-court cooperation in cases of cross-border preventive restructuring. It will be divided into four areas addressing the following aspects of judicial cooperation in the cross-border insolvency context: a) the sharing or obtaining of information and disclosure requirements (section 6.2); b) asset coordination (section 6.3); c) cooperation and communication methodology (section 6.4) and, finally, d) the mechanism of notification or service of official documents (section 6.5).

The ‘principles’, ‘standards of good practice’ and ‘recommendations’ that will be analysed in this Chapter will be abbreviated as follows:

- The UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-border Insolvency (‘Model Law’);\(^2\)
- The ALI-III Global Principles for Cooperation in International Insolvency Cases (‘ALI-III

\(^1\) Thanks to Paul Omar, Technical Research Officer of INSOL Europe for preliminary work on collating these documents.

\(^2\) ‘UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency with Guide to Enactment and Interpretation’ (United Nations 2014) (hereinafter referred to as the ‘UNCITRAL Model Law’).
Global Principles’);³
- The World Bank Principles for Effective Insolvency and Creditor/Debtor Regimes (‘World Bank Principles’);⁴
- The EU Cross-Border Insolvency Court-to-Court Cooperation Principles and Guidelines (‘JudgeCo Principles and Guidelines’);⁵
- The European Communication and Cooperation Guidelines for Cross-Border Insolvency (‘CoCo Guidelines’);⁶
- The European Law Institute Project on the Rescue of Business in Insolvency Law (‘ELI Report’).⁷

While projects such as CODIRE⁸ and ACURIA⁹ undoubtedly have recommendations or aspects that are relevant to cross-border cooperation, that relevance is perhaps less direct than the other guidelines or mechanisms, which are clearly aimed at encouraging, improving or facilitating cooperation in cross-border insolvency and restructuring cases. In a similar vein, although the Asian Development Bank Good Practice Standards for Insolvency Law may affect an EU Member State involved in a cross-border matter, those standards are not applicable if the states involved in the matter are within the EU. Consequently, it was felt that such guidelines and projects should be dealt with in an annex, rather than as a part of this Chapter.¹⁰

6.2 The Sharing or Obtaining of Information and Disclosure Requirements

As highlighted in JCOERE Report 1 and in this Report, the availability of complete information is vital in the context of cross-border insolvency coordination and cooperation – both between courts and between courts and insolvency practitioners. Information relevant to such cases includes the status of the procedure opened in a foreign country, the number and quality of the debtor’s assets, its liabilities and, in general, data that may help foreign creditors and their representatives to interact effectively with each other and with the courts of the main and secondary proceedings.¹¹ To this end, various international institutions have developed principles and best practices that offer guidance to legislators, judges, insolvency

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⁴‘Principles for Effective Insolvency and Creditor/Debtor Regimes’ (World Bank 2011) (hereinafter referred to as the ‘World Bank Principles’).
⁵‘EU Cross-Border Insolvency Court-to-Court Cooperation Principles’ (Tri Leiden, University of Leiden, and Nottingham Law School 2014) (hereinafter referred to as the ‘JudgeCo Principles and Guidelines’).
⁶Bob Wessels and Miguel Virgos, ‘European Communication and Cooperation Guidelines for Cross-Border Insolvency’ (INSOL Europe Academic Wing 2007) (hereinafter referred to as the ‘CoCo Guidelines’).
⁷Bob Wessels, Stephan Madaus, and Gert-Jan Boon, Rescue of Business in Insolvency Law (European Law Institute 2017) (hereinafter referred to as the ‘ELI Report’).
⁸Contractualised distress resolution in the shadow of the law: Effective judicial review and oversight of insolvency and pre-insolvency proceedings.
⁹‘Assessing Courts’ Undertaking of Restructuring and Insolvency Actions: best practices, blockages and ways of improvement’.
¹⁰See ‘Annex III: Chapter 6 - Additional Guidelines’.
practitioners, and parties involved in cross-border cases, in order to create a common ground - primarily stemming from shared information - on which they can build effective cooperation.

6.2.1 The Model Law: The sharing of information between courts and cooperation

Internationally, perhaps the most important instrument in the context of cross-border insolvency regulation is the UNCITRAL Model Law of 1997. It is distinct from other documents discussed in this Chapter in the sense that it is not a series of guidelines, but instead a ‘soft law’ legal instrument, the purpose of which is to supply a model of ‘effective mechanisms for dealing with cases of cross-border insolvency’ designed with a view to implementation into domestic law by signatory states. The Preamble describes the purposes of the Model law as ensuring:

(a) cooperation between the courts and other authorities involved in cases of cross-border insolvency;
(b) greater legal certainty both for trade and investment;
(c) efficient and fair management of cross-border insolvencies, which should protect the interests of all creditors and other interested persons, including the debtor;
(d) protection and value maximization of the debtor’s assets; and finally,
(e) support to the rescue of financially troubled businesses.

In this sense, the UNCITRAL Model Law can be understood as an instrument of harmonisation of national insolvency legislation. In the European context, each individual Member State may be a signatory to the Model law. At present, however, there are only a handful of Member State signatories, including Poland, Slovenia, Greece, and Romania. Although the United Kingdom signed a number of years before Brexit, it may have done so with a move towards ‘a global Britain’ in mind given that other signatories include the United States, Australia, and Japan. There are questions over the relevance of the Model Law if both or all states involved in the cross-border insolvency are members of the EU, as in such circumstances, the EIR Recast would be the applicable instrument. In reality, the main relevance of the Model Law is to a situation where one of the parties is based outside the EU and both are signatories. Nevertheless, the Model Law has informed European developments as many of the concepts are similar.

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13 See UNCITRAL Model Law, Preamble 3.
Amongst other aims, the UNCITRAL Model Law addresses the ability of courts to grant foreign stakeholders access to documents and information on the same basis of domestic stakeholders, as well as to permit another jurisdiction to take principal charge in the administration of an insolvency process, including reorganisation.16

The main features of UNCITRAL Model Law on cross-border insolvency relevant to the provision of information are:

a) Article 9 which provides for a right of direct access to the courts of an enacting State, to be granted to foreign representatives. This feature reduces, by a considerable amount, the time and costs necessary to communicate between foreign jurisdictions.

b) Article 15 providing for simplified procedures to recognise foreign proceedings, complementing the presumption that the documents submitted for recognition are authentic (see Article 16):

c) Article 25 which includes a requirement of cooperation and direct communication between courts and insolvency practitioners. This feature - above all - aims to reduce the obstacles to court-to-court cooperation (see below section 6.4.1), providing that the court ‘shall cooperate to the maximum extent possible with foreign courts or foreign representatives’, either directly or through a delegate. It must be noted that cooperation is not linked to recognition of the foreign proceeding, and can occur at an early stage and before the recognition takes place.17 This mirrors the discussion regarding distinctions between assistance and recognition in Chapter 3 of this Report.

Another fundamental document related to the provision of information under the UNCITRAL Model Law is the UNCITRAL Practice Guide on Cross-Border Insolvency Cooperation, which was adopted by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on 1 July 2009.18 Its purpose is to ‘provide information for practitioners and judges on practical aspects of cooperation and communication in cross-border insolvency cases’ with a focus on cases that involve insolvency proceedings in multiple countries.19

The main obstacles to cooperation and coordination between courts is identified by the UNCITRAL Practice Guide as twofold:

- the absence of a relevant legislative framework, and

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- uncertainty with regard to the scope of the legislative authorisation to pursue cooperation with foreign judges.\textsuperscript{20}

While the Practice Guide acknowledges that the UNCITRAL Model Law provides for such a framework, it also points out that the Model Law does not specify how cooperation and communication can be achieved.

However, the second part of Article 25 provides that ‘the court is entitled to communicate directly with, or to request information or assistance directly from, foreign courts or foreign representatives’. The wording of this provision, which imposes a broad duty on the cross-border insolvency actors to cooperate (and that will be examined in more detail below), shows how a consistent and complete stream of information between courts (and their representatives) is fundamental in order to ensure an effective coordination and cooperation and maximise efficiency in cross-border insolvency cases.\textsuperscript{21}

The JCOERE Report has questioned the willingness of courts to communicate directly with each other without intermediary intervention.

An interesting example is provided in Article 18 of the Model Law which regulates ‘subsequent’ information that must be provided after the filing of the application for recognition of the foreign proceeding. Article 18 provides that the foreign representative must inform the court without any delay of:

\(...\) any substantial change with regard to the status of the recognised foreign proceeding, the status of the foreign representative’s appointment and (\(...\) any other foreign proceeding regarding the same debtor that becomes known to the foreign representative.

6.2.2 The ALI-III Global Principles: Disclosure duties and sharing of information

The ALI-III Global Principles for Cooperation in International Insolvency Cases of 2012 (hereinafter, also, ‘Global Principles’) is the result of a study commissioned by the American Law Institute (ALI) and the International Insolvency Institute (III). It includes some relevant principles that aim to drive the cooperation and the sharing of information between insolvency practitioners and between courts and insolvency practitioners.

- Principle 9, Point 1, of the Global Principles requires full disclosure in cross-border insolvency matters, by providing that the cooperation between the courts and insolvency practitioners ‘should include prompt and full disclosure regarding all

\textsuperscript{20} UNCITRAL Practice Guide on Cross-Border Insolvency Co-operation, p. 15.
relevant information, including assets and claims (…)’. Such disclosure should also help, pursuant to Principle 9, to promote transparency and reduce fraud.

• Principle 9 also specifically refers to cooperation amongst insolvency practitioners, by providing that they should give all the other insolvency practitioners involved in the case ‘prompt and full disclosure about the existence and status of the insolvency proceedings in which they have been appointed’. The required disclosure covers all the relevant aspects of the proceeding.

• Finally, the last point of Principle 9 provides that the insolvency practitioners should also share and communicate non-public information, in other words information that is not freely available on public fora, to the other insolvency practitioners, while also respecting the applicable law and potential confidentiality arrangements.

• Principle 33 of the Global Principles further explores the duty of insolvency practitioners with respect to information exchange; it provides that insolvency practitioners in parallel proceedings ‘should make prompt and full disclosure to each other on a continuing basis of all relevant information they have’ and that, such information, should include - as a minimum - a list of all claims and claimants, with detail of their ranking and status.

6.2.3 The World Bank Principles: Access to information about the Debtor

In 2011, the World Bank drafted its own Principles for Effective Insolvency and Creditor/Debtor Regimes. This document, which does not directly address cooperation duties in a cross-border insolvency, stresses the importance of the access of all the relevant parties to information concerning insolvency proceedings. For this reason, Point D4 provides that an insolvency framework should be based on both transparency and accountability.

To this end, the World Banks provides that the rules of the relevant framework ‘should ensure ready access to relevant court records, court hearings, debtor and financial data, and other public information’. Interestingly, in contrast to the ALI-III Global Principles, the World Bank Principles do not include non-public information in the list of suggested data to be shared. In terms of communication, Principle C17.2 provides that the law should allow domestic courts to communicate directly with foreign courts and their representatives and, in particular, to request information from them. Such a provision should contribute to reducing the delays and costs associated with the acquisition of information from proceedings opened in different countries.

22 This understanding of non-public information has been derived from Guideline 7.5 of the CoCo Guidelines, 51.
23 It is worth noting that the same approach was adopted by the Principles of European Insolvency Law of 2003 that requires, pursuant to Point 1.4, to attribute appropriate publicity to the insolvency proceeding.
6.2.4 The JudgeCo Principles and Guidelines: Disclosure and harmonisation of the proceedings

The communication of information, as described by the EU JudgeCo Principles and Guidelines (2014), produced by the Leiden Law School and the Nottingham Law School, refers to the exchange of information, mainly by electronic means, between actors in different jurisdictions as the basis for coordination and cooperation in parallel proceedings. With regard to court-to-court communication, Guideline n. 3 of the EU JudgeCo Principles and Guidelines provides that a court may communicate with another court about matters related to the proceedings ‘for the purposes of coordinating and harmonising proceedings before it with those in the other jurisdiction’. This Guideline also specifies that, before disclosing the information, the court should obtain the consent of all the affected parties. Additionally, JudgeCo Guideline n. 4 allows the courts involved to communicate with the insolvency practitioners of another jurisdiction for the same purpose, provided that the court obtained the consent of the parties involved in advance, as specified in Guideline n. 3.

As can be seen from these provisions, the guidelines regulating the sharing of information pay particular attention to the rights of the parties involved in the proceeding. The acknowledged need for protective measures when courts and insolvency practitioners communicate will be explained in more detail below. This need led to the development, within the guidelines and best practices analysed in this Chapter, of precautions that aim to reduce the procedural steps – and therefore association costs – required to disclose information and, more generally, to communicate, while protecting the rights of those participating to the insolvency proceeding.25

6.2.5 The CoCo Guidelines: The right to obtain information in a cross-border insolvency scenario

Another fundamental source of guidance with regards to court-to-court co-operation are the European Communication and Cooperation Guidelines for Cross-Border Insolvency (CoCo Guidelines) of 2007. In the words of one of its authors, its aim was:

[T]o provide some substantial and procedural guidance to those practitioners, struggling to communicate and coordinate main and secondary insolvency proceedings in the context of the EU Insolvency Regulation.26

As a result, strictly speaking, it is not overtly addressed to courts.

Guideline n. 7 refers to the information that the insolvency practitioners (liquidators) are required to disclose to all the other insolvency practitioners involved, ‘including all relevant

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25 See below, section 6.4.3.
information about the existence and status of the insolvency proceedings in which they have been appointed’. This requirement, which imposes a duty on insolvency practitioners to also inform the courts involved, is periodical. The same Guideline provides that a foreign insolvency practitioner should be allowed ‘to use all legal methods to obtain information that would be available to a creditor or to a liquidator in any national insolvency proceedings’ to enhance, as far as possible, the right to obtain information in a cross-border insolvency scenario. Finally, similar to the AL-III Global Principles, non-public information is included; Guideline n. 7 provides that such information should be shared by the other insolvency practitioners ‘subject to appropriate confidentiality arrangements to the extent that this is commercially and practically sensible’. The key concept seems to be that commercially sensitive information is not shared unnecessarily.

6.3 Asset Coordination

In order to ensure effective coordination in a cross-border insolvency case, it is necessary to regulate the treatment of the debtor’s assets in all jurisdictions, so that the actions of one creditor or group of creditors against the debtor’s estate do not frustrate the efforts to restructure the debtor’s business or maximise its value in a liquidation. In this respect, coordination is also required to allow the courts and insolvency practitioners of the parallel proceedings to act in concert and, therefore, to avoid adopting measures or plans that are incompatible with the main or other proceedings. For this reason, the relevant international institutions address this issue and provide guidelines and best practices that deal with the rules concerning the treatment of debtor’s assets in situations that involve foreign, parallel proceedings.

Given that the focus of the JCOERE project is on the operation of a stay amongst the crucial elements of a restructuring process, how the obligations regarding asset coordination compliment the operation of what would in fact be a pan-European stay, if co-operation occurred, is of interest.

6.3.1 The Model Law: Stay on individual actions and relief

Article 29 of the Model Law provides that in cases where one or more foreign proceedings concerning the same debtor are taking place concurrently, the court must seek cooperation and coordination. This express duty to coordinate imposed on courts by the UNCITRAL Model Law is primarily aimed at protecting the debtor’s assets during the proceeding. In fact, pursuant to Article 20 – which regulates the effects of the recognition of the foreign main proceeding – after the recognition of the main proceeding, ‘the commencement or

27 See the European Communication and Cooperation Guidelines for Cross-border Insolvency (CoCo Guidelines), Section 1, 9.
continuation of individual actions or individual proceedings concerning the debtor’s assets, rights, obligations or liabilities is stayed’. In addition, pursuant to Article 20(a)(b), the enforcement against the debtor’s assets must be stayed while the right to dispose of the assets of the debtor must be suspended. As stated above, this is of particular relevance to restructuring proceedings in view of the importance of the stay to their success.

Article 21 of the Model Law provides that the court can grant relief, upon recognition of a foreign proceeding (whether main or secondary), if it is ‘necessary to protect the assets of the debtor or the interests of the creditors’. This last provision responds to the need for flexibility of the rules regarding the treatment of debtor’s assets; it requires that the courts and their representatives coordinate their actions, in order to avoid granting relief on assets that are necessary for the ‘global’ reorganisation or liquidation of the debtor’s business.

6.3.2 The ALI-III Global Principles: Coordination and value maximisation

Principle 8 Global Principles of 2012, which regulates the stay of individual enforcement actions in cross-border insolvency cases, provides that effective cooperation in this field might require ‘a stay or moratorium at the earliest possible time in each state where the debtor has assets or where litigation is pending’. Tempering this, Principle 8 also requires that the moratorium imposes ‘reasonable restraints’ both on the debtor and creditors and the other parties involved.

In line with the UNCITRAL Model Law, the second paragraph of Principle 8 provides the following rule on relief: ‘if the local law does not provide an effective procedure for obtaining relief from the stay or moratorium, then a court should exercise its discretion to provide such relief where appropriate.’ The Global Principles recognise the problem of too wide a discretion in this regard that, as articulated above, might frustrate the reorganisation/liquidation efforts. Therefore, this requires that the exceptions to the stay must be limited and clearly defined.

Principle 17 pertains to the stay and moratorium in a subsequent stage of the cross-border insolvency scenario and provides that, when a court recognises a foreign insolvency proceeding as main proceeding, it should ‘promptly grant a stay or moratorium prohibiting the unauthorised disposition of the debtor’s assets and restraining actions by creditors’. With respect to reorganisation cases, Principle 17 provides that the stay should allow the continuation of the debtor’s business. To this end, a protective approach towards the activity of the business is incorporated in one of the crucial points of the insolvency law: the stay on creditors’ actions. Principle 18 regulates the harmonisation of the stays and moratorium in parallel proceedings by providing that ‘each court should minimise conflicts between the applicable stays or moratoriums’ and, therefore, such courts should actively coordinate their actions.

It must be emphasised, however, that as described in Chapter 5 of this Report, where a process such as the Irish Examinership or the Dutch WHOA is registered under Annex A of the EIR, the recognition obligations will effectively yield a pan-European stay; so, as observed, the
relevance of soft law guidance is limited. The remaining questions will concern the cooperation on administration of assets against the backdrop of a stay on enforcement actions.

The Global Principles also consider coordination between insolvency practitioners; Principle 27 provides that when there are parallel proceedings – if that were to occur under the EIR as secondary or territorial proceedings – ‘each insolvency administrator should obtain court approval of an action affecting assets or operations in that forum if required by local law’. The second paragraph of Principle 27 expands such coordination duties, by requiring the insolvency practitioners involved to pursue ‘prior agreement from any other insolvency administrator as to matters that concern proceedings or assets in that administrator’s jurisdiction’, with the sole exception of emergency circumstances that would make it unreasonable to do so.

Finally, Principle 29 of the Global Principles provides, in relation to cross-border sales, that when assets are to be sold in a situation where there are parallel proceedings ‘courts, insolvency administrators, the debtor and other parties should cooperate in order to obtain the maximum aggregate value for the assets of the debtor as a whole, across national borders’. Principle 29 also provides that the courts involved should approve sales that will maximise the value obtainable from the debtor’s assets.

6.3.3 The World Bank Principles: Stay of actions to ensure higher recovery

Arguably, the World Bank Principles also broadly align with the international standards and best practices in this area; Point C5.1 provides that during the period that goes from the filing of the application to the rendering of the court’s decision, ‘provisional relief or measures should be granted when necessary to protect the debtor’s assets and the interests of stakeholders’ and that the relevant parties must be notified. Point C5.2 pertains to the unauthorised disposition of the debtor’s assets; this should be prohibited after the commencement of insolvency proceedings, while actions by creditors to enforce their rights against the debtor’s assets should be suspended. On the scope of the stay, the World Bank Principles provide that it should be ‘as wide and all-encompassing as possible extending to an interest in assets used, occupied, or in the possession of the debtor’. This provision is in line with the Good Practice Standard 5.4 of the Asian Development Bank. Finally, point C5.3 pertains to secured creditors and their actions; it provides that ‘a stay of actions by secured creditors also should be imposed in liquidation proceedings to enable higher recovery of assets by sale of the entire business or its productive units, and in reorganisation proceedings where the collateral is needed for the reorganisation.’

In doing so, the World Bank requires ‘a proper balance’ be reached between the creditor’s protection and the objective of maximising the value of the insolvency proceeding, both

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30 See Annex III to this Report.
restructuring and non-restructuring. It is worth noting, as articulated above, that the World Bank Principles also expressly recognise the importance of coordination with respect to secured creditors in order to ensure the success of a future reorganisation. The EIR Recast, by contrast, does not; it provides that the opening of insolvency proceedings must not affect the rights in rem of creditors (and third parties) in relation to assets situated within the territory of another Member State. This lack of coordination with regard to secured creditors, as already noted in Report 1 of the JCOERE Project, may cause serious problems, particularly in preventive restructuring, and endanger any effort to restructure a viable business given the potential for differential treatment of secured creditors in the Member State of primary proceedings and those in other Member States.\textsuperscript{31}

6.3.4 The JudgeCo Principles and Guidelines: Moratorium and agreement from other insolvency practitioners

The JudgeCo Principles deal with the treatment of the debtor’s assets in cross-border insolvency cases under Principle 8. This Principle provides that ‘insolvency cooperation may require a stay or moratorium at the earliest possible time in each State where the debtor has assets’ or if there is a litigation related to the debtor’s assets. That said, Principle 8 also provides that the constraints on the parties must be reasonable and that the exception to the stay and the moratorium should be limited and, above all else, well defined. In this regard, Principle 19 of the JudgeCo Principles considers the duties of the insolvency practitioners involved. It provides that, in case of parallel proceedings, the insolvency practitioners involved ‘should obtain court approval for any action affecting assets or operations in that forum if required by local law’, with the sole exception of a different provision contained in the protocol (if present).

The second paragraph of Principle 19 requires, in any case, that the above-mentioned insolvency practitioners ‘seek prior agreement from any other insolvency practitioner in relation to matters concerning proceedings or assets in that practitioner’s jurisdiction’. That said, seeking a prior agreement is not required in case of emergency circumstances, which would render such requirement unreasonable. Accordingly, it can be suggested that the combination these of Principles points to the need for a balance between the required coordination and keeping intact the ability of insolvency actors to act rapidly, if necessary.\textsuperscript{32}

\textsuperscript{31} See JCOERE Report 1, Identifying substantive rules in preventive restructuring frameworks including the Preventive Restructuring Directive which may be incompatible with judicial co-operation obligations, p. 15. <https://www.ucc.ie/en/jcoere/research/report1/>

6.3.5 The CoCo Guidelines: Asset coordination and cooperation between insolvency practitioners

The CoCo Guidelines consider the need for coordination when dealing with the debtor’s assets and regulating cooperation between insolvency practitioners (liquidators). In fact, Guideline 12, paragraph 2, requires the insolvency practitioners involved to minimise the conflicts between the different procedures and in particular, to maximise ‘the prospects for the rehabilitation and reorganisation of the debtor’s business or the value of the debtor’s assets subject to realisation’ if reorganisation is not feasible. This provision is of considerable interest due to the fact that it directly links the assets’ value maximisation to an effective coordination and cooperation between the professionals involved in the different procedures.

Guideline 13 governs the treatment of the debtor’s assets in cross-border insolvency situations where a cross-border sale of debtor’s assets is concerned. Guideline 13 provides that every insolvency practitioner should seek to sell these assets ‘in cooperation with the other liquidators so as to realise the maximum value for the assets of the debtor as a whole’. In connection to this cooperation duty, Guideline 13 provides that if required to act, the courts involved approve such value maximising sales.

6.3.6. The ELI Report: The need for a coordinated strategy

The European Law Institute Business Rescue Report (2017), which is the result of the collaboration between the University of Leiden and the Martin Luther University of Halle-Wittenberg, also addresses the need for coordination between parallel proceedings in a cross-border insolvency case. With specific regard to the insolvency of a group of companies, Recommendation 9.02 of the ELI Report provides that courts, when deciding on the opening of insolvency proceedings concerning a member of a corporate group, ‘should verify whether a coordinated strategy is being considered for some or all of the members of the group’. This provision highlights the widely recognised importance of a coordination strategy where different proceedings are concerned and requires the court to verify such a requirement when deciding on a request to open insolvency proceedings.33

6.4 The Mechanism of Cooperation and Communication

Most of the best practices and guidelines considered thus far stress the importance of cooperation between courts, between insolvency practitioners and between courts and insolvency practitioners. Cooperation between the main actors of the insolvency proceedings is recognised as the fundamental means to achieve a value maximising reorganisation or

liquidation.\textsuperscript{34} It is also key to ensuring efficiency. For this reason, some interesting provisions pertain to the mechanism by which courts and insolvency practitioners can engage in dialogue and coordinate their actions.

As can be seen from the provisions that follow and as evident from the coverage of the EIR and the EIR Recast in the previous chapters of this Report, cooperation and communication are intrinsically connected.\textsuperscript{35} Consequently, when regulating the mechanism of cooperation, the various guidelines and principles also deal with methods of communication that courts and insolvency practitioners should adopt. Therefore, in order to provide a full picture, cooperation and communication provisions will be addressed together.

\textbf{6.4.1. The Model Law: Cooperation and agreements concerning the coordination of proceedings}

As anticipated at the beginning of this Chapter, one of the key elements of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-border Insolvency is its focus on cooperation between courts and insolvency practitioners. Article 25 requires that courts cooperate to the maximum extent possible, both with foreign courts and with foreign representatives. The cooperation required by Article 25 can occur either directly or through an intermediary. That said, in order to simplify this duty, Article 25 provides that the courts are ‘entitled to communicate directly with, or to request information or assistance directly from, foreign courts or foreign representative’. A similar requirement is placed on insolvency practitioners involved in a cross-border insolvency proceeding in that they must cooperate to the maximum extent possible, both with foreign courts and foreign representatives (Article 26).

Article 27 of the UNCITRAL Model Law lists some possible means that can be used by courts and insolvency practitioners to implement these cooperation requirements. Under Article 27, cooperation can predominantly be achieved by means of the appointment of ‘a person or body to act at the direction of the court’ and the ‘implementation by courts of agreements concerning the coordination of proceedings’. In the same article, the following additional means of achieving cooperation are listed: the use of communication considered ‘appropriate’ by the court; the enhancement of coordination when administering the debtor’s assets; and ‘coordination of concurrent proceedings regarding the same debtor’. This idea of ‘an independent person’ is reflected in the EIR and also discussed in Chapter 5 of this Report. In fact, this was a method which seemed attractive to members of the judiciary at the second meeting held with the INSOL Judicial Wing in September 2020.

\textsuperscript{34} Leah Barteld, ‘Cross- Border Bankruptcy and the Cooperative solution’ (2012-2013) 9(1) Int’l L & Mgmt Rev 27, 30.
\textsuperscript{35} Stefano Dominelli and Ilaria Queirolo, ‘Gli obblighi di cooperazione e comunicazione tra autorità e parti del procedimento fallimentare nel nuovo regolamento europeo sull’insolvenza transfrontaliera n. 2015/848: aspettative e possibili realtà applicative’ (2018) 3 Dir comm internaz 719.
It is worth noting that these points are rather general and do not clarify how, specifically, the actors in the insolvency proceeding should implement the required cooperation. Though also mentioned in the EIR Recast, it is not entirely clear what office or function the independent person would occupy. Would this be a clerk of the court? Or perhaps a third insolvency practitioner? The added value of these provisions is perhaps a harmonisation of the approach taken by the insolvency actors, when required to cooperate.\footnote{Felicity Deane and Rosalind Mason, ‘The UNCITRAL model law on cross-border insolvency and the rule of law’ (2016) 25(2) International Insolvency Review 138, 138.} At least the added cost is addressed in the EIR Recast.\footnote{See Chapters 2 and 5 of this Report.} Most importantly it is not at all clear that these proposals would be acceptable in reality or as a matter of procedural law by either professionals working on any particular reorganisation or any of the courts involved in a cross-border insolvency. As discussed in Chapter 8 and 9, it would seem that courts, meaning judges, are resistant to imposed rules or guidelines in relation to the procedures or protocols which they adopt. This is also illustrated by the cases discussed in Chapter 4.

\textit{6.4.2 The JudgeCo Principles and Guidelines: Communication and precautions}

The JudgeCo Principles and Guidelines address the issues of ensuring cooperation between courts and of avoiding potential conflicts with the procedural rights of parties within the countries in which the insolvency proceedings are opened. In this last regard, the major issues seem to involve the fundamental right of the parties to ‘equality of arms’ set forth by Principle 6 and the requirement, found in many European jurisdictions, to publicly administer insolvency procedures and, more generally, justice. When communicating and exchanging information, courts and insolvency practitioners may be viewed as violating the above-mentioned right, as the requirement of publicity might not be respected. This could happen especially in those situations where the insolvency’s actors might discuss urgent matters informally.\footnote{See also Chapter 3 of this report.}

Guidelines 7 and 8 of the JudgeCo Principles and Guidelines provide an effective solution to the potential obstacles identified above. Guideline 7 – entitled ‘method of communication’ – revolves around the need for the courts involved to ‘provide advance notice to counsel for affected parties’ when communicating with each other,\footnote{By sending, for example, ‘formal orders, judgments, opinions, reasons for decision, endorsements, transcripts of proceedings’ see Guideline 7.} thereby allowing them to have complete knowledge of the documentary situation and to act on an informed basis. Guideline 8 – entitled ‘court-to-court e-communication’ – gives guidance ‘in the event of a communication between the courts (…) by means of a telephone or video conference call or other electronic means’, mainly by requiring that counsel for the parties be allowed to participate; that the communications be recorded or transcribed; and that a time and place for communication be set that satisfies both courts.
There is a view that these measures, as a whole, should overcome any domestic, procedural requirement put in place to protect the effective participation of the parties of an insolvency procedure, which may represent the major obstacle to full and integrated cooperation between courts of different Member States.\textsuperscript{40} However, as we note in Chapter 3 of this Report, some constitutional provisions require a broader concept of publicity than one confined just to the parties. It is acknowledged that generally the public have a right to know of legal proceedings. Moreover, the nature of insolvency proceedings are such that other stakeholders, not necessarily parties \textit{per se}, have an interest in the outcome.

\textbf{6.4.3 ALI-III Global Principles: The need for informal ways to communicate and cooperate}

The Global Principles address cooperation by highlighting the potential and increasing role of protocols and agreements in enhancing effective cooperation between courts and insolvency practitioners.\textsuperscript{41} Indeed, having provided that the insolvency practitioners involved in cross-border cases should cooperate in every respect of the case, Principle 26 specifies that ‘the use of an agreement or “protocol” should be considered to promote the orderly, effective, efficient and timely administration of the cases’. Principle 26, paragraph 2, then clarifies fundamental issues that should be addressed in the aforementioned protocols, such as the coordination of requests for court approvals of decisions and actions and of communication with the creditors and the other parties involved.

It is worth noting that the Global Principles also recognise the need for faster and less formal ways to communicate and accordingly provide that the protocols should envisage ‘timesaving procedures’ in order to avoid ‘unnecessary and costly court hearings and other proceedings’. If we combine this provision with the ‘protective measures’ of the JudgeCo Guidelines 7 and 8 mentioned above, it is possible to outline a framework where courts and insolvency practitioners can effectively and legitimately use a less formal tool or process to communicate, exchange information and cooperate. This hypothetical framework can become relevant especially if we consider the fact that, pursuant to the ELI guidelines discussed in section 6.4.5, the insolvency protocols should incorporate the JudgeCo and CoCo guidelines and principles in order to enhance the cooperation in a cross-border insolvency scenario.

Guideline 7(a) of the Global Principles pertains to the methods of communication from one court to another. Pursuant to it, courts can communicate by ‘sending or transmitting copies of formal orders, judgments, opinions, reasons for decision (…)’ directly to the other court, as long as advance notice to counsel for the affected parties is provided. Point b) of Guideline 7

\textsuperscript{40} Bernard Santen ‘Communication and co-operation in international insolvency: on best practices for insolvency office holders and cross-border communication between courts’ (2015) 16 ERA Forum 229, 230.

provides an alternative method, which consists of directing counsel or one of the insolvency practitioners involved ‘to transmit or deliver to the other Court copies of documents, pleadings, affidavits and other documents that are filed or to be filed with the Court (…)’, provided that counsel for the affected parties is given notice. Finally, Guideline 7, point c), suggests additional methods of communication with the other court by means of a telephone call, video conference call, or another electronic means.

In this last regard, Guideline 8 of the Global Principles requires that, unless otherwise directed by either of the two (or more) courts, counsel for all affected parties should be entitled to participate in person at such ‘e-meetings’ and that the communication between the courts should be recorded. Guideline 9 provides the same protective measures in cases of e-communications between the courts and foreign insolvency practitioners, whereas Guideline 10 pertains to the use of joint hearings with the other courts involved.

6.4.4 The CoCo Guidelines: Direct communications and cooperation between insolvency practitioners

As previously stated in section 6.3.6, Guideline 12 of the CoCo Guidelines categorises the cooperation duties borne by the insolvency practitioners involved in a cross-border case as applicable to the coordination of the debtor’s assets. Guideline 16 applies the duty to cooperate to the courts involved and requires that they ‘operate in a cooperative manner’. In this regard, Guideline 16 advises that the courts consider whether the appointment of an insolvency practitioner in the main proceedings or a co-insolvency practitioner in the secondary proceedings ‘would better ensure coordination’.

Guideline 6 applies to the duty to communicate, which is imposed on insolvency practitioners: first, it requires insolvency practitioners ‘to communicate with each other directly and as soon as they are appointed’ and, secondly, it provides that the insolvency practitioner in the main proceeding ‘should always take the initiative to start or to continue communications’, thereby clarifying a potential aspect of confusion. By providing a simple and clear criterion, this last provision can help solve potential impasses between different procedures and may also be useful if applied in situations of court-to-court cooperation. Finally, the last paragraph of Guideline 6 requires the insolvency practitioners to respond to the other insolvency practitioners without any delay.

6.4.5. The ELI Report: The inclusions of guidelines and best practices in the protocols

In line with the provisions mentioned in the previous points, the ELI Report stresses the importance of protocols, in order to ensure cooperation in cross-border insolvency cases. In this regard, Recommendation 9.03 specifies that communications and cooperation can take

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42 In addition, Guideline 8 of the Global Principles, point c), provides that the copies of the recording should be ‘made available to counsel for all parties in both Courts’ and be subject to confidentiality.
‘any form, including the conclusion of protocols’, after requesting that domestic legislators ensure that insolvency practitioners and courts follow the CoCo and JudgeCo Guidelines and Principles.

Pursuant to Recommendation 9.03, the protocol should, at least, include clauses regarding the right of the parties involved in the cross-border insolvency case (insolvency practitioners included) to appear and to access data and information, as well as provisions regulating the communications and coordination between the actors in the different proceedings. It is worth noting, as anticipated above, that Recommendation 9.03 of the ELI Report also considers the possibility of including the provisions of the guidelines and principles mentioned above (CoCo and JudgeCo) in the protocol, by means of a specific clause. This last provision reflects, in general, the approach of the ELI Report, which identifies cooperation at all stages of the proceedings as the key element to a successful and value maximising procedure.43

Before concluding this section, it must be emphasised that guidelines are exactly that, guidelines and that none of these statements are specific instructions to domestic courts or indeed to practitioners. Other than in the situation where the Model Law has been implemented in legislation, which is rarely the case in member states of the EU, none of the guidelines discussed have legal effect. That is not to say that they will not prove useful to members of the judiciary or indeed practitioners, but it must be remembered that even where the language is couched in somewhat mandatory terms, there is no legal authority behind the statements. Their usefulness would be improved by providing quick summaries and ensuring the language is clear.

6.5 The Mechanism of Notification or Service of Official Documents

Another fundamental aspect of cooperation addressed by the international best practices and guidelines is the mechanism by which the relevant parties are notified of content or served documents. Arguably, the development of a simple and effective set of rules governing notification, where two or more proceedings are opened in different countries, is essential to reduce costs and delays. The relevant best practice and rules are also developed with a view to ensuring and incentivising the prompt exchange of information and participation of the actors in the insolvency proceedings, starting with the insolvency practitioners and creditors.

In this regard, an important advantage comes from the use of new technologies, which can now have a primary role during all the stages of the proceedings.44

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6.5.1. The Model Law: Notification to foreign creditors

The UNCITRAL Model Law considers the regulation of notification to foreign creditors. Article 14 provides that whenever notification is to be given to creditors within that State according to the domestic insolvency laws, notification must also be given to the known creditors that do not have an address in that country. Thus, pursuant to art 14, ‘the court may order that appropriate steps be taken with a view to notifying any creditor whose address is not yet known’. Art 14 also requires that such notification is made individually, with the exception of circumstances where another form of notification might be more appropriate. In order to reduce costs and save time, the Model Law does not require ‘letters rogatory or other, similar formality’. This provision is in line with the general trend toward a deformalisation of communication in the context of cross-border insolvency. Finally, article 14 pertains to the content of the notification of the commencement of proceedings to foreign creditors; it provides that such a notification must indicate a reasonable time for the filing of claims by creditors – including the place for the filing – and whether secured creditors need to file their claims. The notification must also include any other information required by domestic legislation or court order.

6.5.2. ALI-III Global Principles: Electronic notices and service list

With a view to minimising costs and ensuring an effective and rapid notification of the parties involved in cross-border insolvency case, the Global Principles envisage the introduction of a ‘Service List’. Guideline 13 provides that the courts can coordinate the different proceedings ‘by establishing a Service List that may include parties that are entitled to receive notice of proceedings before the Court in the other jurisdiction’.

The Global Principles also have the availability of new technologies in mind: Guideline 13 provides that all the notices and materials to be served should be made available ‘electronically in a publicly accessible system or by facsimile transmission, certified or registered mail or delivery by courier’ to foreign parties. This provision should help in reducing the delays in favour of foreign insolvency actors and add transparency to the proceedings.

Regarding the language to be used in communication, Principle 21 of the Global Principles requires that the insolvency practitioners determine the language in which communications should take place ‘with due regard to convenience and the reduction of costs’. In any case, pursuant to Principle 21, the notices should specify their nature and significance using the language that the recipients are expected to understand. Principle 28 pertains to the notice to be provided to the insolvency practitioners involved in a cross-border insolvency case, stating that they ‘should receive prompt and prior notice of a court hearing or the issuance of...”

46 Bernard Santen ‘Communication and co-operation in international insolvency: on best practices for insolvency office holders and cross-border communication between courts’ (2015) 16 ERA Forum 229, cit., p. 230
a court order’. Clearly, such provisions aim to ensure the availability of information in relation to, and the participation of all the relevant parties involved in, a cross-border insolvency case.

6.5.3. The JudgeCo Principles and Guidelines: The ‘sufficient’ notice and the online registry

In line with the UNCITRAL Model Law, the JudgeCo Principles apply to the requirements associated with notifying creditors. Principle 18 provides that, if there are foreign creditors in a country wherein an insolvency case is not pending, then the court ‘should assure that sufficient notice is given to permit those creditors to have a full and fair opportunity to file claims and participate in the case’. In order to ensure that the creditors are given a fair opportunity, the court should – pursuant to Principle 18 – ask for the publication of the aforementioned notices in the Official Gazette or an applicable online registry of the relevant jurisdiction. Principle 18 also proposes a criterion for the recognition of foreign creditors for the purposes of the notification; ‘known foreign creditors’ are those expressly listed as creditors in the debtor’s business records or those entities or persons whose address is established in such records.

Finally, Principle 20 addresses the issue of notice to an insolvency practitioner involved in a cross-border insolvency case, providing that the court must ensure that the insolvency practitioner ‘receives prompt and prior notice of a court hearing or the issuance of a court order, decision or judgment that is relevant to or potentially affects the conduct of the proceeding’. This provision aims to ensure that the insolvency practitioners are given timely notice of all the relevant decisions adopted during the proceeding and, therefore, act in coordinated manner.

6.5.4. The CoCo Guidelines: Notices of court hearings and court orders

The CoCo Guidelines address a fundamental aspect of the exchange of information and the service of documents. Guideline 9 deals with situations where authentication of documents is required and provides that ‘methods should be established so as to permit rapid authentication and secure transmission of faxes and other electronic communications relating to cross-border insolvencies’. Pursuant to Guideline 9, this method should develop a common basis for authentication thereby allowing the acceptance of the relevant documents by all the parties involved.

Guideline 17 provides that the notice of court hearings and court orders should be given to each insolvency practitioner ‘at the earliest possible point in time where the hearing or order is relevant’ to the specific insolvency practitioner. If the insolvency practitioner is unable to attend the hearing, Guideline 17 also provides that the court should invite the insolvency practitioner to communicate her/his observations before the court makes its decision. Finally, pursuant to the final paragraph of Guideline 17, the insolvency practitioners should make their record of the notices received by the court available and update it on a regular basis.
6.6 Conclusion

The description of the guidelines, principles and best practices developed by various international institutions in this Chapter has shown some interesting and important shared trends in the evolution of the core principles that govern the cross-border insolvency context. In this regard, it is worth noting three different common aspects that seem to have a central role. First, the recognition of the importance of removing obstacles to direct cooperation and communication between the main actors of the insolvency proceedings, namely judges and insolvency practitioners. For this reason, less formal and direct communications between judges and insolvency practitioners are preferred over cumbersome procedures that cause delays and increase the costs of the insolvency process.

The second aspect, which is connected to the first, is the acknowledged need for participation among the actors involved and the need for appropriate safeguards. Following our engagement with members of the European judiciary, it is not at all clear to us first, that there is much in the way of formal cross border activity in terms of litigation, second that there is much knowledge of these guidelines and finally and most importantly, that even following engagement with the guidelines, the increasingly informal nature of the exchange of information – between the representative and judges of the different proceedings envisaged by some of these guidelines would be acceptable.

Before concluding it is worth noting that the potential for new technologies is highlighted in almost every collection of guidelines and best practices, with a view to enhance the exchange of information and the communication between the insolvency practitioners and the courts.

Finally, on a more general note, it is also worth mentioning the strong focus on the need for preservation of the going concern of insolvent debtors – or those just facing financial difficulties – that is set out in almost every international report collecting guidelines and best practices in the last decade. This fundamental point, highlighted by the PRD and domestic legislation across member states, and in addition by the analysis of many scholars, is addressed in the above-mentioned guidelines, mainly with respect to the central role played by coordination and cooperation, in order to achieve a value maximising restructuring process. This is doubly important when considering the incoming preventive restructuring processes under the PRD, given their potential complexity, inclusion of sometimes controversial provisions, and the scope for key differences between the procedures implemented in different jurisdictions. Despite the attempts to provide guides to how cooperation might take place, JCOERE would take the view that the obstacles described in Chapters 3 and 5 are significant. This analysis is returned to in our concluding chapter.

The next Chapter will examine how another key federalised jurisdiction has managed issues of court-to-court cooperation. The United States has been a key player in examples of interstate and international cross-border insolvency for decades. Chapter 7 will therefore examine its nature as a federalised jurisdiction in the context of insolvency and restructuring,
drawing examples from both state-to-state cases requiring co-ordination as well as how similar problems are handled in an international cross-border insolvency context. The latter circumstances often rely on the rules of the UNCITRAL Model Law (implemented in Chapter 15 of the United States Bankruptcy Code) as has been discussed in this Chapter. Finally, Chapter 7 will discuss the United States’ courts effective use of bespoke protocols and the advantages and disadvantages that have arisen to observe lessons that could be leaned in the context of the incoming PRD frameworks and their potential use of protocols over pre-existing guidelines and rules, or indeed, the obligation to co-operate under the EIR Recast given the choice of Annex A inclusion as discussed in Chapter 3 of this Report.
VII. Chapter 7: Comparative Analysis of Co-operation in Other Federalised Systems: The United States

7.1 Introduction

The purpose of this Chapter is to compare the approach of the EU in matters of cross-border insolvency with the approach in the United States as a comparator federal jurisdiction. Given the uncertainty as to how individual Member States will implement of the PRD, coupled with issues surrounding co-operation and coordination under the EIR Recast, considering how another federalised jurisdiction deals with multi-state cases is a useful exercise to benchmark actions related to the JCOERE Project going forward. Accordingly, this enquiry extends to both forum determination and the coordination of multiple proceedings.

While there are arguments that will challenge the validity of comparing the EU with the United States – for example, whether the EU is truly federal in nature – we would hypothesise that there are enough practical parallels and connections to the problems of forum shopping and the coordination of cross-border cases to draw helpful comparisons as to how the same issues are handled in the United States. Although other federal jurisdictions were considered as additional possible comparators, such as Australia and Canada, the case law and literature are far more developed in the United States, which will therefore be the focus of the following discussion.

The following discussion will also refer to how the US courts have developed protocols and addressed instances of co-ordination of cross-border insolvency proceedings to draw examples of how this might occur within the EU in relation to cross-border restructuring procedures.

This Chapter will proceed as follows: Section 7.2 addresses forum determination and forum shopping. Section 7.3 addresses coordination, which includes not only recognition and enforcement mechanisms, but also for cross-border restructuring and insolvency, the coordination of assets, parties, and the implementation of plans. Section 7.4 will explore the
concept of forum competition as compared to interstate competition in the USA and the potential for similar competition among EU Member States. Section 7.5 will then offer a comparative reflection upon the EU’s co-operation mechanisms and the other cooperative frameworks or mechanisms discussed below.

7.2 Forum Shopping and Court Cooperation in the United States

7.2.1 The idiosyncrasies of the United States bankruptcy regime

Bankruptcy is set within the competence of the federal government by the US Constitution under the Bankruptcy Clause,² which confers the federal government with the power to enact ‘uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States.’³ Interestingly, prior to the introduction of a federal bankruptcy procedure, the American states mirrored, to some extent, the current picture of EU Member States, with each state having its own perspective on how to deal with financially distressed companies, sometimes with different objectives and outcomes. This caused a number of constitutional challenges with little clarification from the Supreme Court⁴ until a Bankruptcy Act was passed in 1898.⁵ In that sense the period before 1898 represents a movement from states operating their own bankruptcy/insolvency codes to a more federalised structure. Even after the 1898 Bankruptcy Act further steps were taken towards a fully federalised bankruptcy code including the enactment of the Chandler Act during the New Deal in 1938.⁶ In terms of timing, the much shorter period of European integration from the 1950s to the present allows us to perhaps view the current European situation in an historical frame.

The connection between bankruptcy cases and other areas of law, where many of these areas of law are matters for regulation by state rather than federal law, presents interesting questions. This includes laws relating to tort, contract, property, and trusts and estates.⁷ It also includes company law or the law relating to corporations as matters of state law. Contract law was originally particularly problematic in multi-state (cross-border) bankruptcies and bankruptcy discharges as such procedures by their nature impair the obligations arising under

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⁵ Act of July 1, 1898, Ch 541 30 Stat 544 (repealed 1978); see also SJ Lubben, ‘A New Understanding of the Bankruptcy Clause’ (2013) 64(2) Case Western Reserve Law Review 319, 388-389.

⁶ The full development of a federal bankruptcy framework is described in SJ Lubben, ‘A New Understanding of the Bankruptcy Clause’ (2013) 64(2) Case Western Reserve Law Review 319, 341-342.

contract. \(^8\) State bankruptcy laws were therefore challenged as being unconstitutional in interstate bankruptcies because of their potential impairment of contracts in another state. To some extent, this mirrors the difficulties in aligning insolvency procedures among the Member States of the EU due to different legal principles on how to deal with issues such as secured debt, the order of priorities, and rights \textit{in rem}.

Today, bankruptcy and restructuring laws are contained in the US Federal Civil Code \(^9\) within the Bankruptcy Statute under Title 11. It is a hybrid system that relies on both federal and state law. \(^10\) The Federal Bankruptcy Code establishes the substantive entitlements of debtors and creditors that then intersects with state competences in areas of corporate law, tort, contract, property, and trusts and estates. \(^11\) Arguments begin in state District courts and it must be shown that the jurisdiction of bankruptcy has been earned before a case will be transferred into the bankruptcy court system, and then only if some bankruptcy policy is being furthered. \(^12\)

The dividing line between bankruptcy and other related areas of law is also reflected in how the judiciary bankruptcy judges are appointed in the US. US bankruptcy judges derive their authority under Article I section 8 of the US Constitution, which details the powers of Congress including the power to enact a bankruptcy statute. \(^13\) By contrast, other judges derive their authority under article III, which creates the judicial branch of the United States Government. The individual rights and effective administration of justice protecting judicial independence and competence is embedded within article III; whereas, it has been argued that article I judges lack the same level of constitutional protections. \(^14\) Bankruptcy judges also differ from article III judges because they are not appointed by the President, but by the United State Court of Appeal for the Circuit in which they sit and for a term of only fourteen years. \(^15\) For this reason, their position is not as secure as article III judges, and there is the perceived danger of being subject to external influence. \(^16\) Because Article III judges benefit from express constitutional protections over their independence due to the nature of their role and method


\(^9\) The US Civil Code codifies general and permanent statutory law at the federal level of the United States legal system. Federal law pre-empts state and territorial law if there is a conflict so long as the federal law is also in accordance with the United States Constitution.

\(^10\) See for example, 11 USC §362(a) which enjoins all entities from taking almost any action outside of the bankruptcy process that would affect a debtor’s property; §541, which designates all legal and equitable interests as property of the estate; and §544 which creates rights in the bankruptcy trustee based on the powers allowed to certain lien creditors under relevant state law.


\(^13\) Article 1 details the powers of Congress, while clause 8 lists those powers, including the power to establish ‘uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States.’ US Constitution art 1 §8 of 4.


\(^15\) 28 USC §152(a)(1) (2006); for a discussion about judicial appointment see David A Skeel, ‘\textit{Bankruptcy Judges and Bankruptcy Venue}’ (1998) 1(1) Delaware L Rev 1, 32-33.

of appointment, they are better protected from being influenced by external factors that could influence their decision-making. In order to ensure that judicial independence is maintained, a norm was adopted in the *Marathon*\(^{17}\) case and later incorporated into the Bankruptcy Code requiring that all bankruptcy cases be filed in an article III District Court,\(^ {18}\) which could then choose to refer the matter to a bankruptcy judge ‘operating as a type of special master to the District Court.’\(^ {19}\)

The key difference between article I and article III judges in relation to bankruptcy revolve around whether a matter is considered ‘core’ or ‘non-core’. Core proceedings are essentially those actions that arise from public rights created by the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code.\(^ {20}\) Whereas, non-core proceedings are predicated on rights that are usually decided outside of bankruptcy, whether under state or federal law, such as contractual or tortious matters.\(^ {21}\) Bankruptcy judges can hear both types of proceedings, but are only empowered to exercise their full competence over core proceedings, with only limited competence over the non-core matters\(^ {22}\) in which they can only submit ‘proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district court, subject to de novo review.’\(^ {23}\) There have been arguments justifying this approach\(^ {24}\) but what is interesting is the overall recognition of the difference between insolvency or bankruptcy law and proceedings and other actions in contract or tort or other related areas. These distinctions are also reflected in the EU approach to enforcement of insolvency processes and determinations under the specialised European Insolvency Regulation (original and Recast) as distinct from the more generally applied Brussels Judgement Regulation.

These distinctions have further implications regarding co-operation in insolvency matters as adumbrated in the discussion of cases on assistance of foreign courts in insolvency at common law in Chapter 5.

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\(^{17}\) *N Pipeline Construction Co v Marathon Pipe Line Co* 458 US 50, 87 (1982).


\(^{21}\) See Broyles v US Gypsum Co 266 BR 788, 783 (ED Tex 2001).


\(^{23}\) *Wood v Wood (In re Wood)* 825 F2d 90, 95 (5th Cir 1987).

7.2.2 Forum determination in the USA

Forum shopping between states in the United States is common for a variety of matters and most importantly, in the current context for corporate law matters. While it is allowed and facilitated by the legal system, Congress and the courts have often disparaged the practice. In corporate law cases, forum shopping also implies choice of law issues whereas because the substantive law of bankruptcy in the United States is federal in nature, it would seem to follow that this should exclude forum shopping driven by choice of law. However, there remain a number of ‘jurisdictional hooks’ to shop among the bankruptcy courts.

Chapter 11 proceedings are the most similar type of proceeding to that envisaged by the new EU PRD so the discussion in this Chapter will focus on this issue. Forum shopping occurs frequently in Chapter 11 reorganisation cases by filing a petition in a court other than in the location of the company’s head office. In the Chapter 11 petition, the debtor or its representative simply states its preferred venue and if it satisfies the requirements for forum determination as set out in the Bankruptcy Venue Statute, it tends to be accepted without question. The Statute ostensibly provides two methods of determining venue: domicile or residence and affiliation. These two criteria have been interpreted as giving rise to 5 different options to establish forum:

1. place of incorporation;
2. location of the debtors’ principle assets;
3. the debtor’s principle place of business;
4. a case concerning an affiliate of the debtor is pending in the jurisdiction; or
5. objections to the venue have been waived expressly or through conduct.

The Bankruptcy Venue Statute therefore provides for a virtually unlimited choice for large debtors with extensive operations. The presumption that favours the debtor’s first choice of venue that must be rebutted should another party wish to transfer the venue elsewhere. To rebut the presumption of the debtor’s choice, it must be demonstrated by a preponderance of evidence that a different venue is better. This allows debtors to file, with

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29 28 U.S. Code § 1408 - Venue of cases under title 11.
30 28 USC §1408 (1).
31 28 USC §1408 (2).
little or no interference, in a jurisdiction where they believe they will receive the most favourable judgement.34

This has led to a focus on two main courts for bankruptcy filing: the District of Delaware and the Southern District of New York (SDNY). The ‘jurisdictional hooks’ mentioned above do not derive from differences in state laws but derive from a number of less obvious factors. Both jurisdictions are considered debtor friendly and have judges with extensive expertise and experience. Both states provide rules that make it fairly easy to file, including Delaware’s rule on incorporation; this allows any of the many companies incorporated in Delaware with little or no business activities in the state to file for insolvency in Delaware. In the case of New York, its affiliate rule, which allows companies to file if they have some affiliate in the state already filing for bankruptcy there, offers a jurisdiction with flexible rules for parties to claim a connection with that jurisdiction.35

As Delaware grew in popularity, the bankruptcy industry grew up around it. Delaware’s popularity in the bankruptcy arena is of course linked to the underlying popularity of Delaware as a state of incorporation and as a forum of choice for corporate litigation generally. Because of the experience and significant body of specialised jurisprudence in the state system, Delaware judges are viewed as more predictable with certainty of outcomes. While certainty may be beneficial, John Coffee notes that it can sometimes be ‘manipulated by management in those areas where its interests conflict with those of the shareholders.’ 36 While there are arguments that challenge the morality and appropriateness of shopping for what is sometimes perceived as judicial favour, few real efforts have been made to change this status quo.37 In addition, it has been suggested by Coffee and others that the role of markets will actually provide an incentive for states to ensure efficient legal systems, which will be of benefit to any party involved in a corporate law or bankruptcy case. The argument goes that if a company were to choose a jurisdiction with inefficient laws, it would suffer in the product and capital markets and its stock price would also fall, making the firm an attractive takeover target. Thus, the availability of forum shopping may actually facilitate a race to the top for states providing efficient laws.38 Nevertheless and despite arguments regarding the merits or

demerits of forum shopping and a lack of consensus about the correct interpretation of the Bankruptcy Venue Statute on forum determination, most Chapter 11 cases are heard in one of these two jurisdictions.\textsuperscript{39}

Objecting to a venue selection in the United States after it has already been filed is also difficult. In fact, most cases proceed with little discussion over the choice of venue at all, as the alternative is costly, timely, and challenging. Courts view debtors as being in the best position to better know their operations and the extent of their problems than any other party, so tend to defer to the better information that the debtor is perceived to have to make this choice. There is also a concentration of professionals and experts in New York and Delaware, so there is a strong ‘club atmosphere’ that tends to influence the maintenance of the status quo.\textsuperscript{40} As noted by LoPucki and Whitford:

Although the benefits of venue transfer may well exceed the costs for all claimants as a group, the benefits to any one claimant are likely to be far less than the costs of a successful challenge to the initial venue choice. These costs are high, in part because much of the information needed to assess what venues are possible...tend to be under the exclusive control of the debtor during the crucial period from the filing of the case until momentum renders the case unmoveable.\textsuperscript{41}

Finally, judges, while empowered to transfer venue themselves, will rarely do so.\textsuperscript{42}

Despite the fact that bankruptcy law is a federal competence in the US, there still exist significant variances on case-defining issues from circuit to circuit, such as the treatment of key non-assignable contracts\textsuperscript{43} and third party releases under reorganisation plans.\textsuperscript{44} Thus, while the bankruptcy law remains the same, decisions that relate to a plan and which have an element of judicial interpretation may find different results under different circuits.\textsuperscript{45} The exercise of discretion makes debtors and decision-makers quite sensitive to the perceived experience, knowledge, and personality of judges in a given district.\textsuperscript{46} It is not surprising then that debtors and decision-makers in a Chapter 11 case will take time to examine the characteristics of available potential venues and judges for a bankruptcy case to determine the greatest chance of success.\textsuperscript{47


\textsuperscript{43} 11 USC §365(c); See In re Catapult Entm’t 165 F3d 747, 754-755 (9th Cir 1999) and In re W Elecs Inc 852 F2d 79 (3d Cir 1988).

\textsuperscript{44} See In re Lowenschuss 67 F3d 1394, 1401-02 (9th Cir 1995); In re Zale Corp 62 F3d 746, 760-01 (5th Cir 1995); and In re W Real Estate Fund Inc 922 F2d 592, 601-02 (10th Cir 1990); Samir d Parikh, ‘Modern Forum Shopping in Bankruptcy’ (2013) 46(1) Connecticut Law Review 159, 193.


7.2.3 European parallels

The first point to make is that the development of an integrated market is of much more recent vintage in the EU; consequently, the development of a European insolvency legal framework is in a comparatively early phase. At this point in its development, the application of the COMI test in cross-border insolvencies and restructurings in the European Union under the original Insolvency Regulation 1346/2000 and the EIR Recast 848/2015 renders the idea of forum shopping less possible. However, over time, the idea of orchestrating a ‘COMI shift’ prior to a proceeding has gained more familiarity and become more common. The emergence of case law and litigation on COMI is related to the operation of more traditional insolvency processes, rather than more recent developments in restructuring law. The development of a newer European approach to business failure represented in the PRD raises a number of possibilities that have been considered in Chapters 2, 3 and 5 of this Report. Essentially, where some restructuring processes do not come within the EIR Recast, the impediment to forum shopping created by decades of COMI case law quite simply does not exist.

The second point then comes into play, which is that unlike the US, restructuring laws are quite different across the EU and given our analysis in both the first JCOERE Report and the summary of different approaches in Chapter 3 of this Report, forum shopping driven by choice of law is a real possibility. We have already seen this in relation to English Schemes of Arrangement. However, given the range of choices built into the PRD, it will now be possible to have a process that both implements the PRD but that is more dynamic and ‘robust’ than other processes that may be implemented elsewhere in the EU.

7.2.4 American cases on forum determination or transfer

The following sample of cases demonstrate a habitual tendency for states such as Delaware or New York to accept jurisdiction or refuse to transfer it, despite the thin association a venue has to the actual operations of the company and evidence that participation by the more vulnerable stakeholders would be stymied due to the costs of attendance. There are further interesting points raised in the discussion below.

Polaroid 2001

The Polaroid case is demonstrative of some of the issues around objecting to the filing of a case in a venue distant from a company’s main activities.

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49 See generally Chapters 2 and 5 of this Report.
51 In re Polaroid Corp, No 01-10864 (Bankr D Del July 3, 2002).
In 2001, after years of financial difficulty, Polaroid filed for protection under Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy code. A sale of substantially all of its assets under section 363(b) of the US Bankruptcy Code was approved by the Bankruptcy Court of Delaware, although the company’s nerve-centre was in Massachusetts where it had thousands of employees. There was considerable controversy around the section 363 sale, which the financial press criticised for being undervalued by around a third of the actual value. Judge Walsh of the Bankruptcy Court of the District of Delaware declined to take into account the creditor committee’s evidence that the company would be worth more in a reorganisation, relying instead on a market approach in which a transaction appropriately conducted is viewed as the best test of value.

During a hearing on the Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Venue Reform Act of 2011, the Chief Bankruptcy Judge of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts, the Honourable Frank J Bailey, noted in his testimony that filing in certain magnet courts, such as Delaware, has an adverse effect on ‘the rights of small creditors, vendors, employees and pensioners’ because ‘efforts to overrule the filer’s choice have proven to be much too expensive for all but the most well-heeled creditors.’ Polaroid’s filing of Chapter 11 in Delaware far from its assets and investments, meant that anyone interested in pursuing their rights would have to either travel to Delaware or hire a lawyer to appear in court on their behalf. As noted by Judge Bailey in his testimony to Congress on reforming the Bankruptcy Venue Statute:

[...]the stakeholders, large and small, would have had an opportunity to participate in the proceeding. At a minimum, stakeholders would have received notices that told them that they could participate in the proceeding at courthouses near where they live and work before a judge that lives in the same community as they do. This is to say there would have been the perception that their opportunity was real and accessible. And perception is often paramount.

It is suggested by Coordes that the Polaroid case ‘demonstrates the difficulties that can arise when a company files far from its primary operating region’. While there are ways to challenge the venue filing under section 1412 of the Bankruptcy Venue Statute, Judge Bailey

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52 In re Polaroid Corp, No 01-10864 (Bankr D Del July 3, 2002).
notes that litigating a motion to change venue is very expensive and often out of the reach of small vendors and former employees. The strong presumption in favour of the debtor’s chosen forum also makes it difficult to persuade a Court to change the venue of the case.\(^6\) In a European context these issues are aggravated by legal and cultural differences.

*Enron (2002)*\(^6\)

The *Enron* case is well-known for many reasons. According to C William Thomas, it is an example of failure due to ‘individual and collective greed born in an atmosphere of market euphoria and corporate arrogance’.\(^6\) Unusually, there was actually a request to transfer its venue to the Southern District of Texas instead of being heard in the Southern District of New York. There were multiple litigant companies and groups involved in the *Enron* case, along with a class-action lawsuit on behalf of pension beneficiaries. In short it was a complex, multifaceted case that garnered much media attention at the time due to the scandals associated with it.

Enron’s business activities took place mainly in Portland, Oregon and Houston, Texas, with no real property owned in New York. The debtor companies were organised under the laws of Oregon, California, and Delaware with only one organised under the law of Texas and one under Pennsylvania law. None of the debtor companies were organised under the law of New York and the principal place of business was almost unanimously identified as Houston.\(^6\)

Around 25,000 employees worked for Enron worldwide, with 7500 employees in Houston Texas and only 63 employees in New York, where it decided to file for bankruptcy. At the time of filing the motion to change venue, almost all of the dismissed employees in the United States were employed in Houston.\(^6\) In addition, much of the debtor’s real property was also located in Houston.\(^6\) The only connection Enron had to New York was Enron Metals & Commodity Corp, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in New York with assets consisting of furniture and fixtures at a rental office; deposit accounts at Citibank; contracts, accounts receivable, prepaid transactions, and trades in progress, comprising less than 0.5% of the assets of the debtor as a whole.\(^6\)

A group of creditors and state officials moved to transfer the venue to the Southern District of Texas to make it easier for small stakeholders to participate. Because the venue was found to be properly filed, it was the burden of the movant to ‘show by a preponderance of the


\(^6\) In re Enron Corp 274 BR 327 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002).


\(^6\) In re Enron Corp 274 BR 327 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002) [334].

\(^6\) In re Enron Corp 274 BR 327 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002) [337].

\(^6\) In re Enron Corp 274 BR 327 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002) [338].

\(^6\) In re Enron Corp 274 BR 327 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002) [338].
evidence that the transfer of venue is warranted.\textsuperscript{67} The judgment in the motion to transfer also noted accessibility of both potential venues, observing that while New York is one of the most accessible locations in the world, it is 1,600 miles from Enron’s headquarters, which is blocks from the Texas District Bankruptcy Courts. It also noted the challenges of plane ticket costs and the limitations of arrival times in terms of travel from Texas to New York,\textsuperscript{68} which indicates that the Court was considering the convenience of the most affected stakeholders in their decision-making.

Judge Arthur Gonzalez of the Bankruptcy Court of the Southern District of New York refused to move the venue, despite the overwhelming amount of business operations conducted in Texas. Key considerations included the number of creditors and the relative amount of their claims, placing an importance on the value of the debt owed, which placed the banks and financing creditors in a high position of preference. It was also noted that given the worldwide nature of the Enron bankruptcy, New York was more accessible overall than Texas.\textsuperscript{69} Further, both the creditors’ committee and the banks, Enron’s largest creditor, opposed the transfer. Primarily, support of the venue transfer came mainly from Texas state and local authorities with an economic interest in the case. While clearly employees may not have been able to attend in person, the Judge considered that the issues most pertinent to employees would not likely be heard by the bankruptcy court in the first place.\textsuperscript{70} That said, the issue of greatest concern to those employees in Texas was the fate of their 401k pension plans, which were heavily affected by the failure of the company due to the high percentage of Enron stocks in which the plan had invested.\textsuperscript{71}

Fundamentally, Judge Gonzalez deemed that there was not really a necessity for those arguing for the venue change to attend court, and that court management protocols would make it possible for interested parties to follow the case from a distance.\textsuperscript{72}

The court found that:

> New York is the more economic and convenient forum for those whose participation will be required to administer the cases. Accordingly, New York is the location which would best serve the Debtors’ reorganization efforts – the creation and preservation of value.\textsuperscript{73}

Jurisdiction was retained in the Southern District of New York, which was arguably exactly the correct decision based on wealth maximisation principles. That said, little consideration was given to what Judge Bailey considered important in relation to Polaroid in his testimony to

\textsuperscript{67} In re Enron Corp 274 BR 327 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002) [342].
\textsuperscript{68} In re Enron Corp 274 BR 327 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002) [339].
\textsuperscript{69} In re Enron Corp 274 BR 327 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002) [345].
\textsuperscript{70} In re Enron Corp 274 BR 327 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002) [346].
\textsuperscript{72} In re Enron Corp 274 BR 327 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002) [347].
\textsuperscript{73} In re Enron Corp 274 BR 327 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002) [349].
Congress: the perception of an opportunity to participate, which employees and smaller local stakeholders will not have had due to the costs of travel and their lack of income due to layoffs. Again, in a European context the issue of what has been termed ‘jurisdictional reach’ will be even more pertinent and it is one to which European judges may be more sensitive.

General Motors (GM) Case (2009)\textsuperscript{74}

The General Motors’ bankruptcy is another example of a company filing in a place that is clearly not its headquarters and highlights the relative ease with which this can be done in the United States. A Chevrolet-Saturn dealership in Harlem filed under Chapter 11, making it possible for GM to utilise the affiliate rule under the Bankruptcy Venue Statute, which allows a filing to be made in a place ‘in which there is pending a case under Title 11 concerning such person’s affiliate, general partner, or partnership.’\textsuperscript{75} GM was headquartered in Detroit, Michigan and incorporated in Delaware with its only affiliation in New York a single subsidiary dealership in Harlem. GM lawyers centred on the Harlem affiliate so that it could find a way to bring the whole case to the Southern District of New York, which as noted by Reuters, is ‘known for its expertise and speed in handling huge bankruptcies such as Enron and WorldCom.’\textsuperscript{76}

Out of the 26 representative groups appearing in the case, 18 were at least partially based in New York, including GM’s representatives, the representatives of the creditors’ committee, and the various Unions representing the workers. These are clearly some of the largest groups of stakeholders in the case, while those based elsewhere comprise individual tort victims, other US States, single creditors, a retirees’ association, and a public citizen litigation group,\textsuperscript{77} in other words, groups that on the face of it have relatively minor financial interests when compared with those represented by New York legal professionals. In 2011, after the GM Bankruptcy, reforms were being mooted for the Bankruptcy Venue Statute to reduce forum shopping. It was noted by a congressman of the House Judiciary Committee sponsoring the Bill that venue shopping for sympathetic courts ‘...significantly disadvantages displaced employees, creditors and shareholders who should be able to participate in the reorganisation negotiations.’\textsuperscript{78}

In line with this statement by Congressman Lamar Smith (Republican-Texas), it has been observed by Coordes that ‘running the bankruptcy from New York could make it more difficult

\textsuperscript{74} In Re General Motors Corp 407 BR 463 (Bankr SDNY 2009).

\textsuperscript{75} 28 US Code § 1408(2).


\textsuperscript{77} In Re General Motors Corp 407 BR 463 (Bankr SDNY 2009) [471] list of Appearances.

for GM’s Detroit-based employees, trade creditors, and other stakeholders to interfere in the case’ noting further that ‘filing close to home might have fuelled local tensions, invited more voices into the courtroom, and slowed down the case – all risks GM probably preferred to avoid’. While no written evidence of this intention has been unearthed, filing in New York will certainly have been easier for the many party representatives and professionals in the case based there. There was no objection or request for change of venue filed in the GM bankruptcy, which proceeded on the basis of a s363 sale to the US Treasury and the governments of Canada and Ontario through Export Development Canada (EDC), as a Chapter 11 reorganisation would have been too lengthy to ensure that the company would not end up in liquidation. The only objections listed in the case relate to the fairness of the sale to the various parties and it was approved by SDNY Bankruptcy Judge Robert E Gerber.

While the filing in New York was legal, the media, interest groups, and even Congress questioned the appropriateness of choosing New York over Delaware (incorporation) or Michigan (headquarters), not only in relation to GM, but generally in similar cases. As noted by the Honourable John Conyers Jr:

By choosing to file for Chapter 11 in a distant venue such as New York, a business— with its principal assets and most of its creditors and employees located in Michigan or California for example—makes it much more difficult for these creditors, particularly smaller creditors and workers, to participate in the case and defend their claims.

These creditors are forced to retain counsel in the distant venue and, if they want to physically appear, incur travel costs. In effect, they have to pay more to collect on their claims.

As a result, the ability of these small creditors and workers to influence the bankruptcy proceedings is greatly diminished. And, by choosing a distant forum, a company can reduce local press coverage of the case.

While the reform of the Bankruptcy Venue Statute failed to change the venue determination rules around Chapter 11 filings, in part due to resistance from a powerful Delaware Congressman at the time, Joe Biden, the discussions within Congress, the media, and interest

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80 11 US Code § 363 Use, sale, or lease of property.
81 In Re General Motors Corp 407 BR 463 (Bankr SDNY 2009) [479-480] & [484].
groups illuminated how easy it is to file in a state with little connection to the business of the company and how difficult it is to challenge that filing once made in practical and financial terms. Those who benefit from filing in New York, for example, often tend to have the greatest financial strength while those who are most adversely affected by a distant filing tend to have far less financial stake in the case, in terms of the proportion of debt owed to them.

Conclusion

The forgoing cases show a range of forum issues. The common thread between all of these cases is that a forum, which might not have been the most appropriate under the Bankruptcy Venue Statute or convenient to a large number of creditors (even if those creditors did not command a commensurate value of the debt owed), has been confirmed or accepted by the courts. The tendency of courts, as well as the strong presence of insolvency professionals in New York and Delaware and the powerful lobby they also control, make changing venue that much more difficult. This is particularly true as the larger creditors usually command more of the value of the debt and there is a for bankruptcy judges to look at convenience of creditors from a proportion of value perspective. Finally, the presumption that appears to follow forum selection by the debtor that it will know best where it should file, adds a further burden onto stakeholders who may be left out-of-court. As surmised by Coordes, these ‘judicial considerations suggest that small creditors must fight an uphill battle when they object to venue in large cases’. Other commentators have described the ‘harm’ of forum shopping but there are yet others who do not regard the fact that specialist courts and jurisdictions have emerged in the US to be a problem. This debate is expected to resonate in the EU.

In an emerging European context, the key difference is the strength of the jurisdictional tie created by COMI jurisprudence in the EIR Recast, coupled with normative resistance to forum shopping (possibly derived from elements of legal culture described in Chapter 4). However, the phenomenon of emerging patterns in recent significant European corporate insolvency cases, particularly relating to corporate restructuring that are run out of the courts in London under the Scheme of Arrangement framework, raises questions regarding the alleged difference between Europe and the US. It is possible that as the European Union becomes more integrated that patterns of forum shopping may begin to reflect patterns that have emerged in the United States over a long period of more than 100 years. More integration implies a greater knowledge of the characteristics of a particular jurisdiction, reflected in the taxonomic characterisation presented in Chapter 3 of this Report. Thus, certain jurisdictions appear more attractive as forums.

However, there is another consideration. It has always been assumed that one of the key differences between the US and the EU is that unlike the US, there is very little by way of harmonisation of insolvency law as between state frameworks in the EU compared with the

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federalised approach of the US. As we progress incrementally towards harmonisation in Europe and as we discover through our work in preventive restructuring and cross-border practise generally, there is in fact there is a commonality of concepts (eg. *actio pauliana* and variants thereof) across European jurisdictions. It is therefore likely that greater convergence will occur. Against that background, deliberate forum shopping driven by a search for issues like efficient and expert courts; a concentration of legal and financial expertise in a particular jurisdiction; and a willingness or openness to accept jurisdiction over cases may be a feature of future European practice.

### 7.3 Coordinating Proceedings in other Cooperative Paradigms

This Chapter has illustrated that the issue of interstate court-to-court recognition and co-ordination is not a hotly contested legal issue in bankruptcy proceedings in the United States, although it is controversial in other respects. Comparisons with the EU system are therefore not entirely fluid because even though harmonisation is acknowledged as a goal and an important element in court co-operation (see Chapters 3, 4, 6 and 8 of this Report), this is not near the EU reality.

There is the separate but related issue of co-ordination in the US cases that typically involve jurisdictions outside the US. And indeed, in terms of the EU there are Member States such as the UK that have been identified as possessing similarly attractive forums for international restructuring particularly, as distinct from more traditional insolvency processes. In this context US courts are considered exemplars of the conduct of co-ordination proceedings in an international context. New York in particular is considered to be a centre point for restructuring and therefore this Report would not be complete without a consideration of how the co-ordination of proceedings is actually achieved. This Report has considered what the EIR Recast itself describes as co-ordination in Chapters 2 and 3, and in Chapter 5 has considered some case law within European jurisdictions, mostly from England and Wales, on co-ordination in international insolvency and restructuring proceedings. Hence a consideration of how US courts co-ordinate proceedings is pertinent to the extent that it might provide some useful examples for cross-border insolvency co-ordination either within the EU or in cases involving one European jurisdiction operating externally to the EU. Comparisons are therefore not entirely straightforward; nevertheless, European insolvency practitioners, lawyers and policy-makers may assess the likelihood of successful co-ordination within Europe against this comparative context. Alternatively, with the new interest in preventive restructuring, the real focus might be on external cases even in a European construct where Ireland, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg already look to attract legal and

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89 Post-Brexit the interesting question is whether one of the remaining states will take up this role and it is generally acknowledged that Ireland and the Netherlands are the main contenders.
financial services business into their jurisdictions and the EU.\(^90\) This discussion is continued in 7.4 below.

There are a number of examples of how the US has coordinated complex multinational bankruptcies in the US courts under Chapter 15, which demonstrate that co-ordination is often achieved through the use of bespoke protocols,\(^91\) in addition to or instead of following guidelines such as those discussed in Chapter 6 of this Report, though some of those also refer to the use of protocols in aid of co-ordination. The following examples of protocols used in international cases may indicate what could be expected in future cross-border restructuring cases within and external to the EU.

7.3.1 Maxwell\(^92\)

The Maxwell case is one of the first recorded uses of a coordinating protocol in a cross-border insolvency case. The parties created a bespoke protocol to coordinate what were effectively two primary insolvency proceedings in the UK and the USA. An examiner was appointed under the Chapter 11 proceedings to work towards harmonising the two proceedings. The protocol’s two primary goals were to maximise the value of the estate and to harmonise the proceedings to minimize expense, waste, and jurisdictional conflict.\(^93\) Under the protocol framework, UK administrators were tasked with the corporate governance of the Maxwell estate, while major decisions concerning the estate would require the approval of the US examiner or approval by the US Court. While much of the decision making in the case was left open, the protocol provided direction regarding the conduct of certain matters to be determined in the case, in particular that the parties should develop a coordinated plan of reorganisation and scheme of arrangement. The UK administrators and US examiner were able to consensually accomplish all matters of coordination and co-operation, with only one material conflict regarding US preference law.\(^94\)

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\(^92\) In re Maxwell Communications Corp Case No 91-B-15741 (TLB) (Bankr SDNY Jan 15 1992).


7.3.2 Nortel

Nortel was a multinational group of high-tech companies with the parent company in Canada and much of its business occurring in the United States. Insolvency proceedings were filed in Canada, the USA and the UK. The results of this case indicate both the best of co-operation, through bespoke protocols, and the worst. Although reorganisation failed, the parties were able to co-operate to sell the debtor’s global assets in large pieces spanning many different countries. Co-operating with the disposition of the assets produced more value than would have happened if individual jurisdictions had dealt only with their domestic assets. However, the parties could not then agree on how to allocate the proceeds of sale without resolution through the courts, which heavily dissipated the benefits gained from the initial co-operative efforts.

7.3.3 Blackwell

The Blackwell case concerned Inverworld, which collapsed in a scandal after defrauding investors in the United States and several Latin American countries. Insolvency proceedings were brought in the United States, Cayman Islands, and England. A protocol was agreed that led to the dismissal of the English insolvency proceedings if certain conditions to protect claimants were met between the other two courts. The US Court was tasked with resolving the outstanding legal and factual issues, while the Cayman court oversaw the creation and operation of the mechanism formulated to distribute the claimants’ proceeds, with full recognition and enforceability agreed between the courts. It is generally considered that this led to a successful worldwide settlement at a much lower cost that would have occurred if the three courts struggled for power over the case. The key factor that is attributable to the success of this case and its protocol is the substantial amount of communication aimed at resolving the global case. The judges involved:

actively encouraged the professionals to engage in cross-border negotiations with an emphasis on non-litigious solutions despite plausible conflicting claims for several groups of claimants under each of the seven arguably applicable laws (…) Judicial activism combined with a first-rate performance by the professionals produced spectacularly fast, fair, and efficient results.

95 In re Nortel Networks Inc 669 F3d 128 (3d Cir 2011).
97 San Antonio Express News v Blackwell (In re Blackwell) 263 BR 505.
7.3.4 Nakash

The Nakash protocol is an example of a protocol agreed between the United States and a civil law country, Israel. The fact that it was agreed with a civil law country is significant because of the strict adherence to statutory law required of a civil law judiciary, which often inhibits effective co-operation in such cases due to a lack of legislative standing to do so. This potential obstacle arising from legal origin differences was noted in this Report in Chapter 4 section 4.3.2 and is discussed in some detail by Mangano. Express statutory permission to enter into the protocol was required, which was perhaps surprisingly found by the Israeli court. It also focused on enhanced coordination of court proceedings between the civilian judiciary of Israel and the American court along with coordinating the actions of the parties. This enhanced coordination was needed because of the increased level of involvement in the civilian court setting required to harmonise the international proceedings. Flaschen and Silverman’s view is that the success of this protocol can largely be attributed to the willingness of the two courts to work together along with the extraordinary agreements made to harmonise and respect the actions of each other. In this context, the particulars of the case are less important than the nature of the two systems and the fact that they were able to conduct proceedings in a coordinated fashion despite the fundamental differences between the legal systems, which might otherwise have inhibited effective co-operation to the extent reached between the parties and the court.
7.3.5 Lehman

Finally, the Lehman bankruptcy is a particularly complicated example of an international cross-border insolvency case. The Lehman Brothers insolvency resulted in 75 separate insolvency proceedings subject to the laws of nine different countries all of which had competing and sometimes conflicting policy and social influences. The Protocol itself was agreed as a response to a lack of applicable law that would bind all of the parties in the Lehman bankruptcy and was broadly similar to the UNCITRAL Model Law containing references to the Guidelines Applicable to Court-to-Court Communication in Cross-Border Cases by the American Law Institute, which was discussed in Chapter 6 of this Report. We would consider it exceptional in this discussion.

7.3.5 Limitations of the United States’ approach to cross-border co-ordination

Protocols have been powerful tools in cross-border insolvency cases heard in the United States but they are also flawed. In a protocol, it is still possible for a party to ‘hold-out’ for a better deal to the detriment of the collective and they do not resolve territorial disputes about substantive law. There have been a variety of cross-border cases resolved through the use of protocols, but with a broad range of success and efficiency. That said, as will be shown in Chapter 8 in the responses to the Judicial Survey, many judges would still prefer to draft their own bespoke protocols on a case by case basis.

As with provisions in the Article 26 of the EIR Recast, the US courts have the discretion to refuse to recognise a plan that contains some action that would be manifestly contrary to public policy under the rules of Chapter 15 in cross-border insolvency cases. This exception provides flexibility to avoid recognising foreign insolvency proceedings, as public policy is a decision based in national law, which was discussed in some detail in relation to the EIR Recast in this Report’s Chapter 5 section 5.5.3.

Protocols also often contain a similar public policy exception. The exception can have a broad range of interpretations from differences in substantive law, to conflicts with fundamental

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104 For a detailed account of the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, see Stephen J Lubben and Sarah Pei Woo, ‘Reconceptualising Lehman’ (2014) 49 Texas Int’l L Rev 297 and more recently, for a detailed discussion and analysis of the Lehman insolvency, see Paula Moffat, ‘In a Digital Age and Where Significant Assets May Consist of Dematerialised Instruments, are our Existing Rules Sufficient to Provide a Fair and Effective Regime Governing the Location of Assets?’ (PhD Thesis, Nottingham Trent University 2016).

105 Sheryl Jackson and Rosalind Mason, ‘Developments in Court-to-Court Communications in International Insolvency Cases’ (2014) 37(2) UNSW L J 507, 507.


107 Lehman Bros Holdings Inc, Cross-border Insolvency Protocol for the Lehman Brothers Group of Companies (May 12, 2009).

108 ‘Guidelines Applicable to Court-to-Court Communications in Cross-Border Cases’ (The American Law Institute and the International Insolvency Institute 2001).


constitutional principles.\textsuperscript{111} This is particularly acute when a protocol attempts to bring together both civil and common law jurisdictions.\textsuperscript{112} As observed by Sexton:

Courts in civil law jurisdictions meticulously scour their civil codes for authorisation to engage in any practice, but because protocols frequently interact with rules limiting ex parte communications and communications between courts, civil law courts have found their authority to endorse protocols lacking.\textsuperscript{113}

It is not entirely clear to us in our research on the JCOERE Project that, despite the fact that some civil law jurisdictions such as France and Italy have standardised rules relation to co-ordination and co-operation as discussed in Chapters 2, 3 and 5 of this Report, all civil law countries have the same approach. Nor is it clear that all common law jurisdictions would approach the adoption of co-ordination protocols without significant and careful consideration of the constitutional and administrative law principles mentioned in Chapters 3 and 5 of this Report. Otherwise, the information on what co-ordination looks like or indeed might look like in the EU in reality is sparse, and this would be equally applicable both within the EU and in relation to any one jurisdiction within the EU co-operating externally. Although some of the guidelines referred to in the foregoing Chapter 6 (section 6.4.3 and 6.4.5), notably the European JudgeCo Principles and Guidelines\textsuperscript{114} along with the ELI Report\textsuperscript{115} as well as the well-known ALI-III Principles,\textsuperscript{116} do refer to the usefulness of creating protocols to co-ordinate cross-border proceedings, evidence of their use by courts in EU countries in strictly EU cross-border cases is not prevalent. Nor is there significant evidence of use in external cases by courts in EU of such protocols, other than in relation to cases deliberated upon in England and Ireland, a sample of which are mentioned in Chapter 5 of this Report.

\textbf{7.4 Competition in the International Restructuring Forum Context}

The United States provides an interesting example of how competing for forum in international cross-border corporate insolvency cases may (or may not) arise. As the restructuring frameworks implemented as a result of the PRD may not be covered by either the EIR Recast or the Judgments Regulation, it has already been noted that there may be opportunities for competition between European jurisdictions for restructuring business. The Netherlands has already been clear that they would like to become the next restructuring destination post-Brexit, as was discussed in Chapter 3 section 3.5.4, and also currently have

\textsuperscript{114} EU Cross-Border Insolvency Court-to-Court Cooperation Principles’ (Tri Leiden, University of Leiden, and Nottingham Law School 2014) (hereinafter referred to as the ‘JudgeCo Principles and Guidelines’).
\textsuperscript{115} Bob Wessels, Stephan Madaus, and Gert-Jan Boon, Rescue of Business in Insolvency Law (European Law Institute 2017) (hereinafter referred to as the ‘ELI Report’).
\textsuperscript{116} ‘ALI-III Global Principles for Cooperation in International Insolvency Cases’ (International Insolvency Institute 2017) (hereinafter referred to as the ALI-III Global Principles)
plans to create a non-EIR Recast procedure similar to the English Scheme of Arrangement. Ireland already has a Scheme of Arrangement process in place that was used effectively recently in Re Ballantyne plc.\textsuperscript{117} 

Competition for international (or European) forum also brings to mind the ‘race to the bottom’ debate.\textsuperscript{118} McCormack has refuted the ‘race to the bottom’ argument in the realm of European cross-border insolvency, suggesting that in a European context, involuntary or poorly adjusting creditors can also be protected by secondary proceedings, ‘which truncates the possibility for a ‘race to the bottom’ leaving only opportunities for a “race to the top.”’\textsuperscript{119} This protection is not available from state to state in the USA as all creditors who are party to a bankruptcy will be governed by the same federal bankruptcy regime. Co-ordination procedures and co-operation obligations contained in the EIR Recast add further assurance in this vein.\textsuperscript{120}

7.5 Comparing Co-operation in the US with the EIR Recast

7.5.1 Comparing procedural co-ordination

Without a recognised procedural framework such as the EIR Recast, coordination tends to be either subject to soft law or at the discretion of the parties. This can lead to a delay in acting quickly to seek recognition and coordination, as happened in the Nortel case, which resulted in two or more independent insolvency proceedings with little or no co-operation and a subsequent loss of value. The Lehman case is also an example where a delay caused serious problems as recognition and coordination were not sought for months. Whereas early co-operation facilitated perhaps by a regulation such as the EIR Recast promotes earlier contact. As noted by Westbrook:

Early co-operation permits the establishment of protocols and lines of authority in a cooperative direction from the start. It also has the benefit of being put in place before tactical considerations have become so apparent as to make it difficult for the parties to agree.\textsuperscript{121}

The presence of an overarching regulation applicable to all jurisdictions helps to create certainty in the procedural aspects of a cross-border insolvency cases. Our engagement with the European judiciary gave a clear indication that judges bound by the EIR Recast would not

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{117} Ruairi Rynne, ‘Landmark Scheme of Arrangement in Ireland’ (2019) Autumn Eurofenix 30. See also Irene Lynch Fannon and Gerard Murphy, \textit{Corporate Insolvency and Rescue} (Bloomsbury, 2012). \textit{Ballantyne RE Plc & Companies Act 2014 [2019] IEHC 407. From the William Fry Solicitor’s note: ‘This case demonstrates the effectiveness of an Irish law scheme of arrangement (which has been on the statute books for over 50 years) as a tool to implement complex international debt restructurings. Together with the extensive use of the examinership process to restructure insolvent Irish businesses it highlights the effectiveness and robustness of Ireland as a jurisdiction in which to pursue such restructurings.’}
  \item \textsuperscript{118} The ‘race to the bottom’ is a socio-economic phrase that describes circumstances in which governments deregulate the corporate environment in the interests of economic efficiency to attract external investment that may effectively remove protections and limit regulatory interference that might otherwise ensure a higher level of corporate responsibility.
  \item \textsuperscript{120} See further, Chapter 3 of JCOERE Report 1
\end{itemize}
argue with a request for recognition of foreign main proceedings because the wording of the provisions is obligatory. While co-operation and recognition between courts in the USA in relation to inter-state insolvency and restructuring proceedings is not a problem due to the federal nature of bankruptcy, it does arise in cross-border cases occurring within the US Bankruptcy Court when there are multiple international proceedings occurring within the same case. That said, the use of ‘sufficient connection’ rather than the COMI test seems to continue to be the rule, even when a case falls under Chapter 15, which provides for a COMI test. This flexibility of interpretation is in part due to the ability of common law courts such as the US, Ireland, and the UK to interpret the test of COMI in a way that is more likely to make jurisdiction possible in more spurious situations.

The examples of coordination of international cross-border procedures in the USA may also serve as useful instruments of reference for coordination efforts between EU Member States when having to deal with potentially competing restructuring procedures.\textsuperscript{122} However, bespoke protocols can also be problematic for civil law jurisdictions due to the nature of the judicial role as the applier of statutory law, rather than the interpreter. As aforementioned, most of the time a judge would need some kind of legislative permission to involve him or herself in a protocol that dictated its role in a case. The \textit{Nakash} protocol was a significant exception to this characteristic conflict but is likely due to the relationship between the two relevant jurisdictions (the USA and Israel). Protocols can be created to suit the particulars of a case and provide a flexible and party-specific resolution to cross-border conflicts. However, protocols are also potentially subject to holdouts and will also differ on a case by case basis, though there is also an argument that case specific protocols may be more beneficial than a one-size-fits-all approach.

\textbf{7.6 Conclusion and Transition}

This Chapter has focused on the methods and means used by the United States in both its cross-border interstate bankruptcies as well as in the international restructuring arena. Co-operation in this context has focused on how certain conflict of laws issues are resolved in a place not covered by the EIR Recast, namely forum determination and the coordination of procedures. These comparisons are useful as the EU is itself both a species of federal organisation somewhat similar to the United States but is also a confederation of states that exhibit international relationships, similar to the United States’ relationships with other countries. Thus, looking at the US from an interstate and international bankruptcy perspective offers some insight into the mechanisms that exist for co-operation both within and outside of the EU that may be instructive in both insolvency generally and restructuring particularly. Drawing parallels to the current paradigm of co-operation under the EIR Recast, the inevitable conclusion is that the EIR Recast provides certainty and a harmonised approach that will be

lacking should there be a proliferation of restructuring procedures that Member States choose to keep out of the EIR Recast.

The next Chapter will present the results of the JCOERE Judicial Survey. It is organised along several key themes: experience with cross-border co-operation; awareness of co-operation guidelines; demand for resources among the judiciaries of the EU; and interpretative observations in relation to judicial training.
VIII. Chapter 8: JCOERE Focus Group Survey on Judicial Cooperation Guidelines Awareness, Use, and Recommendations

8.1 JCOERE Survey of Judicial Practice: Introduction and Methodology

One of the aims of the JCOERE Project has been to explore awareness of the guidelines described in Chapter 6, their use, and their potential to support co-operation amongst members of the European judiciary. This Chapter describes a survey that was disseminated to three separate focus groups of judges within the EU to determine their experience with cross-border co-operation, as well as their awareness of the guidelines applicable court-to-court cooperation, along with other aspects that could bear some relevance to the ease of judicial co-operation generally. The latter aspect of the survey reflects some of the themes and observations outlined in Chapter 4 of this Report which described how the EU has adopted policies and initiatives addressing challenges to the rule of law within the EU and supporting increased mutual trust between jurisdictions.

At the planning stage, it was intended to disseminate an English language survey among networks of judges throughout the EU. On the recommendations of our partners at Università degli Studi di Firenze and Universitatea Titu Maiorescu in Bucharest, the team undertook to create the survey in both Italian and Romanian to avoid any reticence to take the survey based on a language preference. The survey was therefore produced in three different languages (English, Italian, and Romanian) and disseminated to three different focus groups: INSOL Europe Judicial Forum and an additional group of Irish judges;¹ networks of Italian Judges;² and the Romanian Magistracy networks.³ There was a window of approximately one month within which the surveys could be completed, resulting in 17 responses to the English Language Survey, 14 responses from the Romanian Language Survey, and 19 responses to the Italian Language Survey.

The survey was divided into three main sections. The first section contained preliminary questions pertaining to the judicial role, specialism, jurisdiction, and finally, the requirements

¹ The JCOERE Project Team would like to express its gratitude in particular to the Honourable Judge Michael Quinn of the Irish High Courts and Lorna Reid for facilitating the contact with both the INSOL Europe Judicial Forum and the group of Irish judges hearing commercial cases in Ireland. This group of judges will be referred to throughout the rest of this Report as the English Language Focus Group or “ELFG”.

² The JCOERE Project Team would like to express its gratitude in particular to Professor Lorenzo Stanghellini of Universita degli Studi di Firenze for facilitating the contact with the network of Italian Judges.

³ The JCOERE Project Team would like to express its gratitude in particular to Judge Nicoleta Mirela Nastasie of the Bucharest Tribunal for facilitating the contact with the network of judges among the Romanian Magistracy.
for training, both to become a judge and in relation to hearing insolvency cases. This section was designed to highlight commonalities and differences between the participants and to assist in the categorisation of responses to questions asked later in the survey. The second section focused on the participants’ experience with co-operation and communication in cross-border insolvency cases. The final section then assessed the awareness and use of a list of 14 guidelines, both European and international, that provide advice on co-operation and communication in cross-border cases, as described in Chapter 6 of this Report. Some of these guidelines focus on cross-border insolvency, whereas others are less specialised in nature. The questions in this survey were intended to satisfy one of the tasks under Workpackage 3 of the JCOERE Project, specifically to gauge awareness of co-operation guidelines amongst members of the judiciary and to enhance such awareness.

8.2 Observations from the Judicial Survey

The Judicial Survey was answered by a total of 50 judges from 11 different jurisdictions. Of these judges, 13 indicated that they only hear insolvency related cases, while 25 hear cases of a commercial or corporate nature, with the last 12 hearing a variety of civil cases.

8.2.1 Judicial experience with co-operation

A key theme explored by the survey was the experience that members of each focus group had with cross-border co-operation. It is interesting to note initially that out of the 50 responding judges, 16 had specific training on how to deal with co-operation in cross-border cases (6 in the English Language Focus Group (ELFG); 4 in Italy; and 6 in Romania). In terms of the experience indicated in relation to co-operation, there were some interesting results, as set out in the table below:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>ELFG</th>
<th>Italian Judges</th>
<th>Romanian Judges</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Insolvency co-operation experience in the EU</td>
<td>4/17</td>
<td>2/19</td>
<td>6/14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of those, also trained in co-operation</td>
<td>2/4</td>
<td>1/2</td>
<td>4/6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-operating on EU insolvency cases only</td>
<td>3/4</td>
<td>1/2</td>
<td>2/6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-operating in international insolvency cases</td>
<td>1/4</td>
<td>1/2</td>
<td>4/6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-insolvency co-operation experience in the EU</td>
<td>5/17</td>
<td>4/19</td>
<td>8/14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of those, also trained in co-operation</td>
<td>4/5</td>
<td>2/4</td>
<td>3/8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-operation in international non-insolvency cases</td>
<td>3/17</td>
<td>2/19</td>
<td>4/14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of those, also trained in co-operation</td>
<td>2/3</td>
<td>0/2</td>
<td>3/4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The focus group responses indicate a diverse experience with both co-operation itself and with training in co-operation. Interestingly, a strong correlation between the two is not actually indicated. Some judges appear to have co-operated without any training in the area, while others have had training that they have not yet had the opportunity to use. In the responses to the English Language Survey, there does seem to be a correlation between the length of service and experience co-operating in cross-border matters; however, no such correlation exists in the Italian or Romanian responses.

It can be observed from the responses that the reach of current co-operation training could be improved. It is recommended that the EU Commission could address this matter in coordination with national training initiatives, which will be discussed below in section 8.3.

The responses also indicate that co-operation may not be as widespread as initially surmised within the JCOERE hypothesis. While some of the judges have co-operated both inside and outside of the EU and in both insolvency and other matters, the numbers who have engaged in cross-border co-operation are still less than half of the total number of responding judges.\(^4\) Interestingly, it seems the Romanian magistracy has experienced requests for co-operation more frequently than the judges who responded to the English Language or Italian surveys. Our survey did not collect information that could be specifically useful in identifying why this may be the case, however, it is certainly an area worth exploring. The general response reflected the experience of practitioners as reported at INSOL events, namely that cross border insolvency litigation issues, as distinct from transactions, were not that common within

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\(^4\) Also less than half of those who responded to the survey in each focus group.
the EU, nor were issues requiring the formal need to raise or address court-to-court co-operation. In contrast, the relative frequency in Romania could indicate an interesting characteristic of Romania and the Romanian judiciary, or may perhaps be reflective of patterns of trading in newer EU Member States, or of those states, which are located centrally within Europe, or which are close to a number of non-EU countries.

It should be noted that because the EIR Recast has only been in effect since 26th June 2017 and therefore a relatively short period of time, little case law has been generated under it. This could be a factor in the low numbers of judges with co-operation experience, as it may be that the issue of cross-border co-operation as it pertains to the enhanced obligation to co-operate in the EIR Recast has not yet arisen for the judges within these groups. That said, as the obligation becomes more known and companies become even more global, training in this area should certainly be more targeted to ensure that those who may be asked to co-operate have had the training to do so effectively. Given the COVID-19 crisis, current at the time of writing, and the likely impact to the economy that it will have, there will certainly be an increase in insolvencies internationally over the next several years. Cross-border co-operation may become even more important in that context.

8.2.2 Awareness and use of co-operation and communication guidelines

The second key theme of the survey is the awareness and utilisation of various co-operation guidelines that have been developed either internationally or at a European level, in connection with the original EIR. Given the relative newness of the EIR Recast, it is perhaps unsurprising that a new specific co-operation and communication guideline has not yet been fully developed to reflect the enhanced obligation to co-operate within the EU, though a project to update the CoCo guidelines is ongoing with an expectation that a revised set of guidelines will be released in late 2020. This project is discussed further in section 8.2.3.

The JCOERE Judicial Survey noted 14 different co-operation and cross-border insolvency guidelines and recommendations, 6 of which were discussed in detail in Chapter 6 in terms of shared themes that arise in cross-border insolvency cases requiring co-operation. The resources were chosen on the basis that they had some connection with both cross-border insolvency law and advice or guidelines on dealing with such cases from a co-operative perspective, or because they touched on the benefits of co-operation in some way. Such guidelines range from bespoke communication and coordination guidelines, to recommendations on how to deal with certain issues arising in cross-border insolvency and restructuring. The level of awareness of each of these guidelines in each focus group is set out

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7 Chapter 6 focuses on the Model Law, the ALI-III Global Principles, the World Bank Principles, JudgeCo Principles and Guidelines, CoCo Guidelines, and the ELI Report. The CODIRE and ACURIA projects and the ADB Standards are considered in the annex to Chapter 6.
in the table below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Guideline/Principle</th>
<th>ELFG Out of 17</th>
<th>Italian Judges Out of 19</th>
<th>Romanian Judges Out of 14</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coco Guidelines</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JudgeCo Principles and Guidelines</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The UNCITRAL Model Law</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EBRD Core Principles</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INSOL Europe Judicial Wing Book</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The ELI Report</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CERIL Statement</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CODIRE*</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACURIA*</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALI/UNIDROIT Principles</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank Principles</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALI-III Global Principles</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALI General Principles</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The ALI-III Guidelines</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8 ‘EU Cross-Border Insolvency Court-to-Court Co-operation Principles’ (Tri Leiden, University of Leiden, and Nottingham Law School 2014) (hereinafter referred to as the “JudgeCo Principles and Guidelines”).
9 ‘UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency with Guide to Enactment and Interpretation’ (United Nations 2014) (hereinafter referred to as the “Model Law”).
10 ‘Core Principles for an Insolvency Law Regime’ (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 2004) (hereinafter referred to as the “EBRD Principles”).
11 The Role of the Judge in the Restructuring of Companies within Insolvency (Judicial Wing of INSOL Europe 2013) (hereinafter referred to as the “INSOL Europe Judicial Wing Book”).
13 Conference on European Restructuring and Insolvency Law (CERIL) Statement 2018/01 in Insolvency Regulation (Recast) and National Procedural Rules
16 ‘ALI-III Global Principles for Co-operation in International Insolvency Cases’ (International Insolvency Institute 2017) (hereinafter referred to as the “ALI-III Global Principles”).
17 ‘Guidelines Applicable to Court-to-Court Communications in Cross-Border Cases’ (The American Law Institute and the International Insolvency Institute 2001).
While the CODIRE Project\(^\text{18}\) was completed following the period in which the EIR Recast came into force, its reference to co-operation and communication are not as direct as some of the more targeted guidelines discussed in Chapter 6. The same applies to the ACURIA Best Practices.\(^\text{19}\) As a result, any aspects relevant to cooperation contained in these projects are discussed in Annex III (annex to Chapter 6), which is available at the end of this report.

It is interesting to note that the vast majority of those responding to the English Language Survey were aware of at least one of these guidelines (15/17). This is perhaps unsurprising for two reasons. First, the majority of the judges within this group were derived from the INSOL Judicial Forum. Second, the majority of the respondents (16/17) indicated that they attended international judicial events, predominantly INSOL Europe Judicial Forum meetings, wherein it is common to discuss European guidelines and reports. Among the Italian and the Romanian groups, there was comparatively less awareness of the guidelines, with 8 of the 19 respondents for Italy and 4 of the 14 respondents for Romania indicating awareness of one or more of the 14 resources listed in the survey.

There appears to also be an interesting connection between the attendance at international events and knowledge of at least one of the guidelines. Of the 7 Italian respondents who had attended international events, 4 were aware of at least one of the guidelines. 1 of the 4 Romanian respondents who was involved in international events was also aware of at least one of the guidelines. The same filter when applied to the English Language Survey Group revealed that 14 of the 16 who attended international events also had awareness of at least one guideline. It is perhaps an obvious connection, but it does support the Commission’s training policy, as described in Chapter 4 of this Report, to involve judges in networks and events to encourage the Europeanisation of Member State judiciaries. Extending this analogy here, it is recommended to encourage a greater proportion of judges (and practitioners) in the Member States, who may be involved in cross-border cases, to attend networking and training events hosted by organisations such as the EJTN or the INSOL Europe Judicial Forum. It is argued that this will help increase awareness of the resources available to aid them in meeting the enhanced obligation to co-operate under the EIR Recast.

Regarding the use of co-operation guidelines, only 4 of the 50 of judges surveyed have referred to such guidelines to aid them in communication and co-operation in cross-border insolvency cases. These 4 judges were split between the English and Italian Language Surveys. On a related point, almost half of the judges surveyed had a preference for creating their own protocol on a case-by-case basis. This may be indicative of a number of things, for example, a desire amongst judges to consider things flexibly and perhaps a preference not to be constrained in advance by a specific set of guidelines, which may be perceived as not being appropriate in every cross-border circumstance. The importance of the jurisdiction of the


court itself, and its control over proceedings seems to be a second important consideration. The need to respond particularly to the parties to the actual proceedings would also drive flexibility and court control over any co-operation process. The view that protocols created on a case-by-case basis may be preferable was also expressed by some members of the judiciary at INSOL Europe events. This could indicate that members of the judiciary are aware of the possibility raised by the JCOERE project that substantive and procedural issues may arise that will need to be addressed on a case-by-case basis rather than with set guidelines, which may not accommodate them.

It is interesting to note, however, that while only 4 judges in total said that they had actually referred to the guidelines when dealing with a cross-border case requiring co-operation, it seems that those who did refer to guidelines referred to several of them, with different guidelines being referred to in the different cohorts. The English and Italian language groups both referred to the CoCo Guidelines, the Model Law, and the ALI/UNIDROIT Principles, with the English Language respondents also referring to the JudgeCo Principles, the EBRD Guidelines, the Judicial Wing, the ELI Project, and the ALI Transnational Insolvency Principles. Again, it is possible that membership in the INSOL Europe Judicial Wing among the English Language Focus Group has led to a wider awareness of resource among its members. Given the broad awareness of the Model Law, it is unsurprising that all three groups referred to it. The Romanian group was more familiar with international principles, such as the EBRD and the World Bank principles and did not refer to any of the European guidelines, such as JudgeCo and CoCo. As suggested in relation to other aspects of the survey, perhaps this is a reflection of its proximity to and trade with non-EU countries.

8.2.3 Desired access to information

Amongst the respondent judges, there seemed to be a real interest in having access to information either in relation to substantive rules on preventive restructuring processes in other member states (43/50), or case studies demonstrating instances of co-operation (44/50), or both. That said, even access to information is not a clear-cut issue for members of the judiciary. Approximately half of the respondents across the three groups indicated that there were rules applicable to the way in which judges could access information external to a case, while the remaining respondents indicated that there were not. One possible explanation for the contradicting responses, particularly within the same jurisdiction, was that some respondents answered the question as though a proceeding had already commenced before their court, whereas others were answering more generally. In certain jurisdictions, a judge can only formally rely on sources that are opened to them by the parties during the proceedings. In some countries, it appears there are specific rules regarding permitted sources of information. Thus, what may have seemed like quite a simple question at the outset

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20 This was discussed by the Judicial Wing Panel: ‘Co-operation and Communication between Judges in Cross-Border Insolvencies under the EIR Recast’ (INSOL Europe Annual Congress, Athens, 5th October 2018). The Judicial Wing Panel was composed of Judge Caroline Costello, Judge Luciano Panzani, and Emil Szczepanik, Ministry of Justice, Poland.
turned out to be more multifaceted than initially imagined. Questions still remain as to what kind of information judges would be able to access from outside sources. There are also challenges regarding providing content to such sources, which clearly illustrates the need for further action research projects. In general, the guidelines described in Chapter 6 of this Report defer to national rules on the issue of how judges access information about other Member States or other state processes.

As noted at the beginning of this section, a set of guidelines specific to communication and coordination of cross-border insolvency and restructuring cases that includes the enhanced obligations set out in the EIR Recast is not yet available. However, a project to revise the CoCo Guidelines in line with the EIR Recast has been ongoing since the end of 2017 and a working group comprised of academics, judges, and practitioners belonging to both INSOL Europe and the Conference of European Restructuring and Insolvency Law (CERIL) are expected to complete this task.  

It is hoped that the specific dataset on case studies provided by the JCOERE project on its website will provide much needed examples to members of the judiciary of methods of cooperation. Additionally, information pertaining to the preventive restructuring processes in other jurisdictions is provided on our website.

8.2.4 Judicial training requirements

Within each focus group, discrepancies were observed in the responses to the questions posed on training requirements. Respondents were asked: ‘Before you qualified as a judge or administrative decision-maker, were you required to take specific training?’ This was an open question in which respondents were invited to write what the relevant training requirements were in their jurisdiction to become a judge in a comment box. The question did not specify “formal” training or educational prerequisites, so it is unsurprising that there was a range of interpretations, sometimes leading to conflicting responses. The variety of answers to this survey question, particularly from participants in the same jurisdiction, points more towards a non-uniform interpretation of the survey question itself rather than to actual differences in training.

The preliminary questions in the survey also queried whether judges in the three focus groups were required to undertake training to hear insolvency related cases. The overwhelming response was that such specialist training is generally not required. Of the 13 total respondents across the three focus groups who hear insolvency cases only, 1 from the Italian group indicated that they were also required to undertake specialist training. Our impression of responses, which varied within jurisdictions, is that the open-ended nature of the preliminary question regarding training also led to different responses. For example, 1 of the Italian respondents indicated the need for specialist training, but other Italian respondents

21 Under the stewardship of Tomáš Richter Of Counsel at Clifford Chance and Charles University Prague and Paul Omar, INSOL Europe.
replied that no such training was required. As these respondents also indicated that they hear only insolvency cases, it must be queried whether the training indicated by that one respondent is actually a requirement, or if it is optional but perhaps undertaken as a matter of practice. For example, the training requirement could also be determined by the particular court level or region. It is also possible that respondents who answered in the affirmative were doing so in light of insolvency-related training undertaken in the past as part of their role.

A further question asked whether there were requirements for Continuing Professional Development (CPD) if a judge specialised in insolvency law, which could be answered by providing some commentary on what was required. While over half of the respondents indicated some requirement for CPD, in many cases the answers did not correlate within the same jurisdictions. In addition, this question received responses that do not align with those who had to take training to decide insolvency cases in the first place or with the numbers who hear only insolvency cases. As was the case with the responses discussed above, it is possible that respondents interpreted requirement along the same lines as custom and practice; thus, while it may not be a requirement that CPD is undertaken, it may be that it is generally accepted practice that a judge would do so. It could also be that the respondents felt that this kind of training was required in the sense of its absence being problematic in some way.

Although it is difficult to draw reliable trends from the survey questions pertaining to training, the JCOERE Project has identified a number of key, and what may be perceived as significant differences between Member States in relation to the training and education required to become a judge. The JCOERE Questionnaire distributed and answered in connection with Report 1 of the JCOERE Project investigated training requirements for judges, to which 11 answers were received. These responses were discussed in detail in section 4.6 of Chapter 4 of this Report, which gives a clear picture of the training and education characteristics for the judiciaries in the relevant jurisdictions. While a number of similarities can be found in domestic requirements, for example a university (law) degree; experience of practice as a lawyer or a period of formal judge training; internships with courts or firms; exams; and certain character requirements, there are also a number of key differences that could impede judicial co-operation or interaction between the courts of Member States.

In common law countries, for example, it is not uncommon for the minimum period of legal practice prior to judicial appointment to be 7 years, particularly for the courts that deal with preventive restructuring matters. In Ireland, the requirement is 12 years’ practice before an individual is eligible to be nominated as a judge of the High Court, which handles the vast majority of restructuring matters.22 With that said, the majority of High Court and Supreme Court judges in Ireland have considerably more experience than the minimum requirement.

22 The Circuit Court has jurisdiction in relation to the examinership of small and medium enterprises, however the majority of examinership hearings are conducted in the High Court.
By contrast, other EU countries require a judicial internship after graduation lasting for 3\textsuperscript{23} or 4\textsuperscript{24} years or a judicial training course lasting 2 years\textsuperscript{25}. Furthermore, in France judges of the local Commercial Courts are businesspeople elected to the role; this is an entirely different construct to the Irish or English Commercial Court or indeed most of the rest of the EU, wherein the usual – and clearly varied – practice requirements apply to judicial appointment. Therefore, even in these examples there are some substantial differences in types of experience required for judges, thus a legitimate question arises as to what effect these imbalances and may have on court-to-court co-operation.

8.3 Analysis of and Reflection on the Results

The main purpose of the survey of the three judicial focus groups was to assess the awareness of current existing guidelines pertaining to communication and co-operation and to gauge experience with co-operation among the respondents. The promotion by the EU of judicial involvement in networks and training to encourage the development of a European judicial culture coincides with the importance of such networks for the dissemination of knowledge about resources to assist with the EU derived obligations to co-operate between the courts of different Member States. While the correlations are not necessarily present across the three focus groups, there is certainly a correlation between attendance at events, such as the INSOL Europe Judicial Forum, and awareness of such guidelines among the English Language survey participants. While knowledge of the guidelines will not impact judicial experience with co-operation on a case-by-case basis, it does point to the effectiveness of networks and training in raising awareness of the resources in co-operation and communication available to judges. In addition, it also seems clear that there is not a broad experience of co-operation in cross-border insolvency cases, which could potentially be attributed to the newness of the enhanced obligation to co-operate under the EIR Recast. That said, given the crisis looming for national economies at the time of writing due to the COVID-19 pandemic and associated limitations on business and industry, the potential for a growth in cross-border cases is significant over the next few years.

At the time of writing, the judiciary has also been forced to make a lot of serious changes in the way that they deal with hearings and cases as a result of the inability to hold such hearings in person due to limitations and lockdowns associated with the COVID-19 crisis of 2020. INSOL International conducted a webinar hosted by Judge Nicoleta Mirela Nastasie of the Bucharest Tribunal with Judge Martin Glenn of the Southern District of New York Bankruptcy Court and Judge Aedit Abdullah of the Singapore Bankruptcy Courts, during which the impact on the judiciary of the COVID-19 crisis, as well as the changes made to accommodate the need for social distancing, were discussed. While these reactions are not directly pertinent to co-operation, the experience itself has been eye-opening, in particular for some judges who may

\textsuperscript{23} Denmark.
\textsuperscript{24} Austria.
\textsuperscript{25} Romania.
be resistant to virtual options for a variety of reasons prior to these being necessitated by the crisis. Virtual tools not only make it easier for parties to access courts and each other, but may well enhance the possibility of co-operating in cross-border cases. Judge Aedit Abdullah acknowledged that the Singapore judiciary may have had to order equipment and even laptops to accommodate the needs of virtual courtrooms, but the fact is that judges have been able to do so despite some understandable reticence towards moving hearings on-line. As noted by Judge Martin Glenn: “Financial distress does not know geographical boundaries”. As companies continue to expand into global enterprises, the administration of justice must find a way to keep up, including the facilitation of co-operation between courts.

While it was also recognised that there are differences in the level of discretion that judges have in common law jurisdictions like the United States and Singapore to adopt new methods of administering justice, Judge Nastasie was absolutely clear that she did not believe that the civil law jurisdictions were especially different, particularly given the obligation to co-operate under the EIR Recast and the fact that some Member States have also adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency. While judges in all jurisdictions are constrained in how they operate under procedural rules, there is no reason why new methods, supporting co-operation and communication in cross-border insolvency, cannot be considered.

Given the potential increase in cross-border insolvency and restructuring cases following the economic crisis likely to be precipitated by the COVID-19 pandemic, which was ongoing at the time of writing this Report, but prior to the survey being distributed and answered, it is likely that there will be an increased need for co-operation, in order for the enhanced obligations set out in the EIR Recast to be met effectively. The current prevalence of virtual training and interactivity due to the inability to meet in person arising from current travel restrictions presents an opportunity to increase the reach of training in co-operation and the awareness of guidelines.
IX. Chapter 9: Reflections, Conclusions, and Recommendations of the JCOERE Project

9.1 Introduction: The JCOERE Research Project

This Chapter will provide some reflections based on the two Reports presented as part of the JCOERE Project. The Project began with the obligations imposed on courts to co-operate with courts in other jurisdictions and with insolvency practitioners in the European Union, which were introduced in the EIR Recast 848/2015. The obligations were newly introduced in the Recast Insolvency Regulation. As the Regulation itself did not come into force until June 2017, it is very early on in its application, and accordingly quite early to assess the overall impact of these enhanced obligations, particularly since no cases to date that deal with co-operation matters have been heard under the EIR Recast. Meanwhile, the European Commission published an intention to address corporate failure and rescue in its policy document entitled ‘A New Approach to Business Failure’.¹ It was therefore appropriate to consider preventive restructuring processes in light of the operation of the EIR Recast and, in particular, in light of the co-operation obligations contained therein. Thus, the JCOERE Project hypothesis was that the co-operation obligations would be particularly problematic in the context of preventive restructuring because of the nature of the substantive rules involved in restructuring, coupled with existing procedural challenges to co-operation. In short, the question was whether the ability of judges to comply fully with the co-operation obligations placed on courts by the EIR Recast would encounter substantive and procedural obstacles in the context of cross-border preventive restructuring.

9.2 The Preventive Restructuring Directive

Just as the JCOERE Project got underway in 2019, progress on the final passing of the Preventive Restructuring Directive (‘PRD’) 1023/2019 advanced significantly when the PRD was passed in June, the evolution of which was outlined in Chapter 5 of JCOERE Report 1. Accordingly, against a backdrop of lively academic commentary and considerable policy engagement from the EU Commission, the JCOERE Project began an interrogation into the key substantive rules, which were both core to an effective preventive restructuring process and also likely to be problematic in terms of the type of recognition and co-operation envisaged

by the EIR Recast. Based on experience with the Irish preventive restructuring process – the Examinership process – and familiarity with English Schemes of Arrangement, the JCOERE Project identified the following core rules or concepts as being particularly challenging to co-operation across jurisdictions:

- Provision for a stay of individual enforcement actions;
- Focus on a debtor in possession model;
- Cram-down of dissenting creditors, including intra-class cram-down and more importantly cross-class cram-down;
- Protection of new and interim financing of a restructuring; and
- The role of a court or administrative authority in approving a restructuring plan.

**9.2.1 Methodology**

In addition to a doctrinal approach to existing preventive restructuring processes with which we had familiarity, namely the Irish Examinership and Scheme of Arrangement process and the similar English Scheme of Arrangement process, the JCOERE Project adopted a comparative approach in relation to relevant restructuring processes (preventive or otherwise) in other jurisdictions within the EU.

Accordingly, project gathered responses to a questionnaire disseminated among insolvency and restructuring specialists of 11 Member States to gauge both existing preventive and restructuring frameworks and likely attitudes to the implementation of the PRD within these Member States. We enlisted the help of additional contributors (including but also beyond the jurisdictions of the original JCOERE Project Consortium) across the EU to complete this survey which is described in detail in Report 1. Additionally as described below, we also conducted a survey of members of the European judiciary for the purposes of this second Report.

**9.2.2 Different approaches to preventive restructuring in the EU**

Pertinent to the issues of both recognition and future court-to-court co-operation and co-operation between courts and insolvency practitioners, was the discovery of considerable differences amongst Member States both in relation to existing laws and to proposed implementation of the PRD. These differences were underpinned by a lively and contested academic debate on the merits of preventive restructuring, which was also reflected in the approach of lawmakers within the European Union during the negotiation on the scope of the provision of the PRD. While Report 1 of the JCOERE Project provides detail on different approaches within Member States responding to the JCOERE Questionnaire, Report 2 summarises, in Chapter 3, these different approaches through the utilisation of a taxonomy

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2 See Chapters 6-8 of JCOERE Report 1 for a distillation and comparison of the JCOERE Questionnaire responses. The 11 jurisdictions responding to the questionnaire included Ireland, Italy, Romania (the original JCOERE Project Consortium members), France, Germany, Austria, Spain, the Netherlands, Poland, Denmark, and the United Kingdom.
broadly categorising the approaches along a spectrum representing those interested in what is termed ‘robust restructuring processes’ and those Member States, which are resistant to preventive restructuring.

The fact that there are these differences is underpinned by the broad range of choice provided in the PRD. Despite aiming to harmonise an approach to business failure and preventive restructuring, there are so many options provided for in the PRD that it is a fairly weak harmonising instrument. This will obviously present challenges in terms of recognition and in terms of co-ordination as envisaged by the EIR Recast. The PRD is also somewhat unusual in its characteristics in that it does not envisage a harmonising ‘floor of rights’ that one might see in the area of employment law for example, or a set of ‘minimum standards’ that one might see in environmental law. Instead, Member States must comply with the PRD and implement a preventive restructuring process, but this does not mean that they cannot have additional restructuring processes, which do not exactly mirror the principles of the PRD.

Not only that but, as is pointed out in both of the JCOERE Reports, there is a lack of complementarity between the terms of the PRD and the EIR Recast. This means that a restructuring process in a particular Member State, may be one of a few processes found in the legal code in a particular Member State and may or may not be included in the EIR Recast. As discussed in this Report, a process outside of the EIR Recast is not subject to either the recognition or the co-ordination provisions. Examples of this set of affairs are available in France, where some of the restructuring procedures are covered by the EIR Recast and others are not. In Ireland, for example, the Examinership process is covered by the EIR Recast and the Scheme of Arrangement process is not. The same applies to the new Dutch WHOA legislation, where one procedure is envisaged to be included in Annex A and the other is not. Furthermore, as identified in this Report, a conscious choice may be made by the Member State to create a procedure that would sit outside of the EIR Recast.

9.3 The EIR Recast 848/2015

As described, the JCOERE Project was focussed at the outset on the interesting co-operation obligations imposed on courts in relation to both individual debtor proceedings (in our case always corporate debtors) and groups. These obligations, in addition to the impetus for their creation, were discussed in detail in Chapter 2. As we continued our analysis and research it became important to articulate the distinction between recognition of a procedure and continued co-operation obligations that might arise. As we see from the summary in the previous section, recognition of various restructuring processes may not even arise as the processes may be excluded from the EIR Recast. Furthermore, under the EIR, co-operation obligations will only apply to insolvency proceedings to which the Regulation applies.

Even if a process is included in the Regulation, there is the possibility that main proceedings will be accompanied by secondary or territorial proceedings within the scheme of the Regulation. This is where the distinction between recognition simpliciter and recognition plus
co-operation is most likely to arise. Given the nature of the creditors’ interests and the challenge to those interests, which is inherent in preventive restructuring, it may be very likely that this eventuality will transpire following implementation of the PRD by Member States. Therefore, whilst courts may follow the normal obligations of recognition of another hearing in a Member State, co-operation will be distinctively important as it is a real issue where a few different proceedings are being run.

However, the focus of our work was not on the original set of problems raised by the Regulation, which stem from the COMI concept and move through when secondary or territorial proceedings might be opened. Rather, our focus was on the co-operation obligations per se. The first part of our hypothesis – namely that substantive rules inherent in preventive restructuring might be particularly problematic – is borne out, we would argue, by the significant levels of theoretical disagreement and policy debate discovered during our research. While the PRD does set out essential basic principles in the form of minimum standards for restructuring frameworks, the scope and permitted derogations have made such disagreements possible, creating a fertile ground for further debate and the potential for not insignificant diversity among the Member State frameworks created under the PRD.

The variety of preventive restructuring processes allowed for, both under the PRD and outside of it, will aggravate issues of co-operation as it is more likely that territorial and secondary proceedings will be maintained. Most importantly, the PRD will not be implemented across the EU until 2021 and so it is early days to predict how all of these variations will play out.

### 9.4 Co-operation as a Separate Concept from Recognition

Because it is early days in terms of describing how co-operation obligations may be treated in national courts, our discussion of some conceptual analysis of the obligation courts might have to assist a foreign court in Chapter 5 is pertinent to the nature of the co-operation obligations. In these common law decisions, the courts regard the obligation to assist a foreign court or officer of that court as standing separately from the issue of recognition of a proceeding or a court order arising from such a proceeding. It is possible that over time obligations to co-operate will emerge as a separately justiciable concept, not necessarily linked to the resolution of the recognition per se.

### 9.5 Co-operation and the European Judiciary

We demonstrated in Report 1 both how complex the Preventive Restructuring Directive itself was and the complexity generated around its design and implementation. However, when we turned to procedural obstacles and focussed on the courts and the nature of the obligation per se, we discovered a multilevel range of complexity.

The first issue concerned, of course, when and how the obligation to co-operate would apply. Many questions that arose are generated by the applicability of the Regulation itself. However, additional questions were generated by the terms of the co-operation obligations.
These are considered in Chapter 3 and include unanswered questions of liability and consequences in the event of non-compliance with the obligation.

In our applied research, which included considerable engagement with members of the judicial wing of INSOL Europe, we also discovered a considerable diversity of views amongst European judiciary regarding co-operation in live cases. Some judges expressed particular concern regarding propriety in terms of constitutional and administrative law in the context of co-operating with another court, with others regarding this matter in purely pragmatic terms. We began to understand the variety of cultures, which persist within the European Union. These differences are clear in areas such as judicial training, required qualifications and judicial appointments but do not end with these practical differences and continue on to areas of judicial reasoning and function. Chapter 4 of this report considers these issues in depth, with Chapter 8 complimenting this analysis by exploring the responses of members of the European judiciary to the survey questions on some of these very issues. There was considerable divergence of experience, outlook and approach to matters of co-operation, particularly when these have been couched in terms of a positive obligation.

Furthermore, even when a generally positive approach was taken to the concept of European integration and co-operation in a broader context, (underpinned in rule of law concepts described in Chapters 1 and 4) we also identified considerable concern regarding the mechanics of co-operation. Even though some mention of specific issues is made in the Regulation, there is little to assist regarding the actual practice of co-operation. In this context, we considered the experience of the judiciary by engaging positively with them in workshops and through the survey, which is discussed in Chapter 8. We also considered the relevance and applicability of existing guidelines, which are described in Chapter 6. Overall, we found that many judges favoured creating their own protocols, something that is reflective of the US experience, (considered in chapter 7).

9.6 UNCITRAL Model Law and Guidelines

In this context it is not entirely clear that the aspirational, optimistic tone of the guideline documents discussed in Chapter 6 have engaged proactively with the legal principles, both substantive and procedural, which we have hypothesised will serve to block such co-operation. We also found a lack of awareness and willingness to utilise such guidelines amongst the judiciary, with this reaction being gleaned from the responses to the judicial survey analysed in Chapter 8. It is unclear from the survey why this is the case, but it is something that the Commission may want to consider in conjunction with national training initiatives, particularly given the emphasis that the Commission has given to judicial networking and training in the last decade, as discussed in Chapter 4.
9.7 Cross Border Insolvency?

Overall one of our most interesting, if not somewhat puzzling discoveries, was the fact that despite companies operating across borders in the EU, when it came to insolvency the cross-border nature of the trading patterns did not seem to result in significant cross-border insolvency issues or more accurately any formal argument, litigation or settlement of these issues. This phenomenon was first highlighted to us by practitioners in the field, who constantly expressed reservations regarding the frequency of any of these issues arising in practise, let alone in litigation. There seems to be a pattern of matters, which might have a cross-border element to them, being resolved informally. Indeed, it may be recalled that a contention in Chapter 2 was that a tendency towards co-operating prior to the introduction of the Recast, in the sense of concluding (in)formal agreements and protocols, was not particularly unusual amongst those practitioners in common law jurisdictions. Furthermore, the prevalence of informal resolutions possibly stems from the fairly rigid conception of the COMI rules, which has now become embedded in EU law given that the first Regulation was passed in 2000.

Though they clearly anticipated that such cases might arise, the judges that we surveyed also had generally low levels of experience with cross-border insolvency cases. This was despite the fact that most of these judges either specialised in insolvency law, habitually attended international conferences, such as those held by INSOL Europe, or both.

Within this unusual and surprising reality, we discovered some disquiet based on lack of knowledge of other Member States approaches and some level of disquiet regarding the lack of availability of official sources of information regarding the processes of other Member States. This is particularly aggravated in the context of preventive restructuring given the range of approaches and considerable concern about the prospective operation of the obligations in the Regulation. As discussed in Chapter 8, even the matter of receipt of information is far from clear-cut. Co-operation should also be considered in light of the adversarial nature of proceedings in certain jurisdictions, but not others. In other words, in certain jurisdictions, judges must generally rely only on sources that are opened to them by one side or the other during the course of a proceeding. Such a dynamic being present in only some EU jurisdictions may create a situation where some judges can freely attain necessary information, whereas others are confined by rules embedded in their legal system. In addition to this perceived informational challenge, judges continued to mention the simple barrier of language in a European context.

We also discovered that there was some resistance to a pan-European approach from practitioners based on what has been described as jurisdictional reach. This is discussed in Chapter 5 and can be seen in evidence in some of the cases discussed therein where arguments are made that particular actions are not covered by the Regulation and do not require ceding of jurisdiction or do not require compliance with co-operation obligations.
These kinds of issues, concerning practitioner and court interest in keeping the litigation within state is also reflected in the more sophisticated US approach.

9.8 Some Future Trends

In Chapter 7 we considered a different federalised group of States, namely the United States, to provide additional understanding of what might emerge in Europe as we continue to focus on integration of Member State insolvency cases, ranging from recognition of forums by second Member States, the possibility of co-ordination between courts of different jurisdictions and how that might be accomplished and ultimately harmonisation of state laws. It is possible that as the European Union becomes more integrated that patterns of recognition, co-operation and forum shopping may begin to reflect patterns that have emerged in the United States over a longer period of 100 years. More integration implies a greater knowledge of the characteristics of particular jurisdiction, reflected in the taxonomic characterisation presented in Chapter 3. Thus, certain jurisdictions may appear more attractive as forums for insolvency litigation and this may become an acceptable feature of the European Union.

As we progress incrementally towards harmonisation in Europe and as we discover through our work in preventive restructuring and in relation to cross border practise generally that, in fact, there is a commonality of concepts (eg. actio pauliana and variants thereof) across European jurisdictions, it is likely that greater convergence will occur. Against that background deliberate forum shopping driven by a search for efficient and expert courts, a concentration of legal and financial expertise in a particular jurisdiction and a willingness or openness to accept jurisdiction over cases may be a feature of future European practise. It is arguable that this has already developed in relation to the recognition of the jurisdiction of England and Wales as a restructuring centre in the last recession and the recognition of certain states, Ireland, the Netherlands and Luxembourg as the location for the FinCos of inward investing multinational companies.

9.9 Conclusion

In conclusion, it is not entirely clear that there will be an integrated European approach to preventive restructuring. This is for a variety of reasons. First, this is because of scepticism regarding the potential harmonising effect of the PRD. A second complication is the interface between the PRD and the EIR, which we have mentioned in various contexts throughout this report. Thirdly, while in some ways recognition determined by a COMI test under the Regulation may be fairly straightforward in the context of traditional insolvency processes, we do not expect that this will be the case in preventive restructuring; first, because not all of the processes will be covered by the Regulation but secondly even where they are, we expect to see secondary proceedings arising to protect the interests of the parties in the face of such radical rules as an ongoing stay, cram down and cross class cram down. In this context, it is also worth bearing in mind that co-ordinated group proceedings are optional in nature under
the EIR Recast – in that there is an opt out for the insolvency practitioner without the necessity to justify the decision – thus, we anticipate that this may yield a similar result, namely multiple proceedings in order to protect the interests of local parties and perhaps, even as a commercial decision. Fourthly, even if a process implemented under the PRD is covered by the Regulation, we remain puzzled by the empirical evidence surrounding a lack of cross-border insolvency issues. We consider the role of the practitioner in retaining jurisdiction for whatever reason is important here. Fifthly, even where the issues arise, we also detected considerable concern from the judiciary regarding the mechanics of co-operation and the interface between co-operation and concern for procedural transparency and consequent issues of administrative and constitutional propriety.

As a way forward, we intend to continue our focus on the procedural and substantive issues that judges, in particular, may experience in the future when dealing with obligations to co-operate. In keeping with the aims and deliverables of the Project, we will consider these issues through the creation of case studies, which will consider hypothetical scenarios based on the rescue processes envisaged in the PRD and potential obstacles to co-operation that may arise. In addition, we will also further consider the guidelines analysed in this Report and how they could pertain to these issues, by providing information to judiciary and other relevant parties on how to address situations where co-operation is not possible and how the obligations imposed under the Regulation could be addressed. It is hoped that this solution-driven research in the coming months will help to ameliorate some of the difficulties that judges might experience in the future.

In terms of future research questions that might be pertinent to consider, it is anticipated that further research will be required to consider how the PRD is transposed by different Member States, and whether an integrated and harmonised approach materialises. In addition, as the Recast Regulation becomes properly embedded into EU law in time, it is anticipated that further research will be required to consider how recognition relates to co-operation in light of different approaches in case law to assistance (which we would consider to be an equivalent concept to co-operation) as distinct from recognition or enforcement of court orders. Furthermore, additional research is called for as to how co-operation will practically be carried out by the judiciary across the variety of jurisdictions in the European Union, which at present display different characteristics in terms of judicial culture.
Annex I: Documents presented at Judicial Wing Meeting at INSOL Europe Annual Congress in Copenhagen.

Judicial Co-Operation Supporting Economic Recovery in Europe

This project (no. 800807) is funded by the EU Justice Programme (2014-2020).
StylishHotelGroup is a hotel group with its COMI in Ireland. It has a range of corporate entities in a group structure. Some of these companies are property ownership companies, some are operational. Typically the property ownership companies have 1-5 employees, whereas the operational companies in the group have on average 100 employees (operating the hotels).

In the period 2005-2010 the Group engaged in considerable expansion and borrowed over €500 million euro from its main banker. This loan eventually became a non-performing loan which was temporarily taken over by the Irish state agency (NAMA) but was then sold on to GermanBank AG.

In 2017 StylishHotelGroup and GermanBank AG entered into a contractual debt settlement agreement which wrote down the total amount owed on the loan and provided for a longer repayment plan. Although concluded in Ireland the contract contained a choice of German law clause. ['the 2017 agreement']

In 2018, finding itself unable to comply with the terms of the ‘the 2017 agreement’ StylishHotelGroup decided to avail of the Irish preventive restructuring process and petitioned the Irish High Court to have an Examiner appointed.

Most of the trade creditors were supportive of the application to have an Examiner appointed but GermanBank AG objected strongly.

The High Court refused to appoint an Examiner on the grounds that there was no reasonable prospect of all of the companies in the group receiving the required investment to survive. However, the parent company appealed to the Irish Court of Appeal and an Examiner was appointed to all the relevant companies in the StylishHotelGroup despite the objections of GermanBank AG and despite the presence of the existing ‘2017 agreement’ whereby this bank had already agreed to a write down of its debt.

The Examinership process is very similar to the process envisaged by the European Directive on Preventive Restructuring 2019/1023 in its most robust form. It involves the imposition of a stay or moratorium on all actions against the company and any related company (i.e. member of the group) for a pre-determined period of 3 months, which can be extended by the court. It also provides for intra and cross class cram- down on approval by the court.

The Examinership has commenced. Unhappy with the prospects of further write down, GermanBank AG seeks to bring an action on foot of ‘the 2017 agreement’ to enforce this prior agreement in the court in Germany. The Irish companies argue that the Examinership proceeding in Ireland takes precedence.

GermanBank AG argues that ‘the 2017 agreement’ must exclude the possibility of the companies applying for the Examinership process as GermanBank AG have already taken a discounted debt repayment proposal under this ‘2017 agreement’. There is no specific statement to this effect in the agreement. The Irish court had rejected this argument in its initial decision to appoint an Examiner.

For information the Irish Examinership process, although pre-dating the new EU Directive 2019/1023 by thirty years, was modelled on the US Chapter 11 and contains many features of the Directive in its most radical form. In particular it is possible that as the Examinership or rescue progresses, the GermanBank AG debt (which represents 98% of the companies’ debts) will be written down a second time and the debt repayment agreement could be substantially altered by the process. This is of immediate concern to GermanBank AG and consequently they wish to enforce the 2017 agreement.
in the German court. In contrast the Irish companies argue that the possibility of rescuing the entire group as a viable entity is reliant on the company availing of the preventive restructuring process (the Irish Examinership process) and re-arranging its debt structure with the agreement of its creditors:

It might be of interest to note the following statement regarding the Irish preventive restructuring process known as Examinership from the Irish Court of Appeal in the case on which this case study is based:

“78. Measured, therefore, against the statutory objectives of Part 10 of the 2014 Act, …[the Examinership process]… I can accordingly see no real difference in principle between the two types of contractual agreements so far as the appointment of an examiner is concerned. Of course, it may be said that such an application for examinership is inconsistent with prior contractual agreements and commitments on the part of the petitioning company or companies, but, as I have already sought to explain, this is true almost by definition of every application for examinership.

79. Putting this another way, I cannot find anything in the 2014 Act which enables a court considering an application for examinership to distinguish between the inevitable breach of a loan agreement (with, for example, a promise to repay a loan by a given date) on the one hand and a breach of the obligations contained in a debt settlement agreement regarding the orderly disposal of assets for debt reduction purposes on the other. One cannot really beautify by fancy words or nice phrases that which for some - and for secured lenders in particular - must be an unpalatable feature of the examinership process, namely, that it involves the judicial variation and dishonouring of all types of commercial contracts.

80. The fact, therefore, that an application for examinership would be inconsistent with the performance of the obligations imposed on a company under the terms of a settlement agreement cannot in itself - and I stress these words - be a dispositive consideration for a court determining whether to appoint an examiner under s. 509(1) of the 2014 Act, precisely because the entire examinership system is premised on the assumption that pre-existing commercial contracts (of whatever kind) will be overridden, varied, negated and dishonoured in the wider public interest of rescuing an otherwise potentially viable company.”

**Issue 1**

In light of Articles 19 and 20 and Articles 42-44 of the EIR-Recast 848/2015 is the German court obliged to recognise the Irish rescue proceedings and co-operate with the Irish court thus allowing main proceedings with a stay to continue even though

a. this affects other proceedings being opened elsewhere and

b. would operate quite drastically on the rights of the German creditor?

If yes, how would an obligation to co-operate work in this context?

In your experience, if relevant what sort of issues would typically arise which would require co-operation?

The first issue is the applicability of **Article 19 of the EIR-R (European Insolvency Regulation- Recast)** which imposes the obligation to recognise “any judgment opening insolvency proceedings handed down by a court of a Member State which has jurisdiction pursuant to Article 3…. from the moment that it becomes effective.”

The second issue relates to the obligations imposed on courts and insolvency practitioners to co-operate in insolvency proceedings under **Articles 42- 44 and Articles 57-59 of the Recast Regulation**
2015/848. These relate in the first instance to the facilitation of “the coordination of main, territorial and secondary insolvency proceedings concerning the same debtor”, and in the second instance to the facilitation of “the effective administration of the proceedings” where the proceedings relate to “two or members of the same group”.

**Issue 2**

If the German court recognises the Examinership process which it most likely will, this will mean that the stay operated under the Irish Examinership process will operate against GermanBank AG.

Then the question is if the GermanBank proceeds in the German court what will the approach of the German court be?

Is it possible to open secondary or territorial proceedings which might allow for enforcement of the 2017 agreement against the principle of the stay?

Do the co-operation obligations affect the decision to open/not to open secondary proceedings...will they make a difference?

Does the obligation to co-operate add an additional constraint on the German court?

Alternatively is the obligation to co-operate something less significant than the initial question of recognition?

For example does the obligation to co-operate simply mean that if the German court sought clarity on how the Examinership process would proceed, the Irish court might be obliged to co-operate with this request?

Would this involve an obligation to provide information on the process in general and/or on the specific process?

**Issue 3**

GermanBank AG seeks to enforce the debt settlement agreement- ‘the 2017 agreement’ as a contract subject to German law. GermanBank AG intends to argue before the German court that this action in the German court relates to a specific contract and is not primarily related to insolvency and so the Recast Regulation does not apply and that the German court is free to hear this action and enforce ‘the 2017 agreement’, despite the Examinership process proceeding in Ireland. Similar arguments have been made in some recent cases which have been considered by the CJEU.iii

**Does this argument sideline the Regulation? iv**

Bear in mind the Irish proceedings are opened and the Irish stay affects all actions.

Should the German court co-operate to make the stay effective thus facilitating the rescue regardless of the argument?

Attached are copies of both the Preventive Restructuring Directive 2019/1023 and the EIR-Recast 848/20.

Endnotes
I would like to thank particularly, The Honourable Judge Michael Quinn, The High Court of Ireland and Judge Nicoleta Nastase, Romania for their assistance in clarifying this case study. The case study itself is derived from an Irish case *Re Kitty Hall Ltd.* [2017] IEHC and [2017] ICEA 247. Some adjustments to the facts have been made including the insertion of the German choice of law clause and the move on the part of the German Bank seeking to enforce the ‘2017 Agreement’ in a German court. In reality the compromise or scheme proceeded and was approved by the Irish High Court in December 2017, Baker J.

First introduced under the Companies (Amendment) Act 1990 and now contained in Part X of the Companies Act 2014.

The following cases are relevant to the final Issue 3

**Case 535/17 NK (liquidator) v BNP Paribas Fortis NV, 6 February 2019.**

NK v BNP Paribas

Prior to insolvency proceedings money transferred to Fortis bank- this amounted to an act of embezzlement. During the insolvency proceedings conducted in the NL proceedings were brought against the bank. Under Dutch law the liquidator can bring an action in tort against a bank to repay money where the money has been paid at a disadvantage to other creditors: ‘Peeters- Gatzen vordering (PGV). (This is similar to a claim arising out of mistaken payments).

In Dutch law, this is an action in tort, which can be brought by individual creditor / liquidator and/ or anyone affected. The defendant bank, NK Fortis, said it was a tort claim and therefore should be brought in Belgium. In contrast the Dutch liquidator argued that this was a claim normally brought by a liquidator and therefore the Dutch court had jurisdiction.

ECJ disagreed. It decided that just because the liquidator brings the claim it does not mean it is an insolvency procedure. It is still a tort and because individual creditors can bring the claim the Belgian court could have jurisdiction. The PGV is covered by the concept of ‘civil and commercial matters’ within the meaning of Article 1(1) Judgement Regulation:

“26 The Court has held that only actions which derive directly from insolvency proceedings or which are closely connected with them are excluded from the scope of the Brussels Convention and, subsequently, Regulation No 44/2001 (see, to that effect, judgments of 22 February 1979, Gourdain, 133/78, EU:C:1979:49, paragraph 4, and of 19 April 2012, F-Tex, C-213/10, EU:C:2012:215, paragraphs 22 and 24). Consequently, only those actions, as described, fall within the scope of Regulation No 1346/2000 (see, to that effect, judgment of 9 November 2017, Tünkers France and Tünkers Maschinenbau, C-641/16, EU: C: 2017:847, paragraph 19 and the case-law cited).

27 Moreover, that same criterion, as stated in the Court’s case-law on the interpretation of the Brussels Convention, was set out in recital 6 of Regulation No 1346/2000 in order to delimit the subject matter of that regulation, and was confirmed by Regulation (EU) 2015/848 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on insolvency proceedings (OJ 2015 L 141, p. 19), not applicable ratione temporis to the present case, which provides in Article 6 that the courts of the Member State within the territory of which insolvency proceedings have been opened have jurisdiction for any action which derives directly from the insolvency proceedings and is closely linked with them.

28 The decisive criterion adopted by the Court to identify the area within which an action falls is not the procedural context of which that action is part, but the legal basis of the action. According to that approach, it must be determined whether the right or obligation which forms the basis of the action has its source in the ordinary rules of civil and commercial law or in derogating rules specific to insolvency proceedings (judgments of 4 September 2014, Nickel & Goeldner Spedition, C-157/13, EU:C:2014:2145, paragraph 27; of 9 November 2017, Tünkers France and Tünkers Maschinenbau, C-641/16, EU:C:2017:847, paragraph 22; and of 20 December 2017, Volach and Others, C-649/16, EU:C:2017:986, paragraph 29).”

... “33 Also, according to the case-file submitted to the Court, the action brought by the liquidator against Fortis is an action for liability for a wrongful act. The purpose of such an action is therefore for Fortis to be found liable on the basis of an alleged failure to fulfil its monitoring obligations, under which it ought to have refused the
cash withdrawals made by PI amounting to EUR 550 000, because, according to the liquidator, the withdrawals gave rise to the loss suffered by the creditors.

34 Therefore, having regard to these factors, such an action is based on the ordinary rules of civil and commercial law and not on the derogating rules specific to insolvency proceedings...”

Case 337/17 Feniks sp. z o.o. v Azteca Products & Services SL 4 October 2018
Feniks/Azteca
Feniks was a creditor of Coliseum (a general contractor with whom Feniks had an investment agreement regarding a construction project in Poland). Coliseum was technically insolvent in that it was unable to pay subcontractors, but proceedings had not yet been opened. Coliseum sold property (in Poland!) to Azteca (Spain) in partial fulfilment of prior claims by Azteca. This transaction would normally be subject to some sort of clawback action. Under Polish law any creditor (and not just an insolvency practitioner or appointed liquidator) can bring a claw back action. Feniks as a creditor of Coloseum brought a claw back action against Azteca to clawback money before Polish court on the basis of Article 7(1) (a) Judgment Regulation. Azteca argued that the correct forum was the Spanish court
The question for the CJEU was whether an actio pauliana is covered by the rule of international jurisdiction provided for in Article 7(1)(a) Judgment Regulation? Such an action is where a person entitled to a debt repayment requests that an act, whereby his debtor has transferred an asset to a third party which is allegedly detrimental to his rights, be declared ineffective in relation to the creditor, And the response from the CJEU was that an actio pauliana which is based on the creditor’s rights created upon the conclusion of a contract, falls within ‘matters relating to a contract’ of Article 7(1) (a) Judgment Regulation. In terms of the interface between the Recast Regulation and these provisions of the judgement regulation there is a lack of certainty and clarity as to the borderline between insolvency matters and other causes of actions.

I wish to acknowledge the lecture provided by Lucas Kortmann RESOR at the EIRC Conference, hosted by German Arbeitsgemeinschaft Insolvenzrecht und Sanierung with INSOL Europe and the Law Society, Brussels 27 June 2019 which provided references and explanations for these cases amongst others.

This publication was funded by the European Union’s Justice Programme (2014-2020). The content of this document represents the views of the authors only and is his/her sole responsibility. The European Commission does not accept any responsibility for use that may be made of the information it contains.
Annex II(a): Survey of Judicial Practice in Cross-Border Restructuring Cases - Co-Operation and Communication

Introduction

The Judicial Co-Operation for Economic Recovery in Europe (JCOERE) Project (No. 800807) is a research action project funded by the EU Commission DG Justice. The project has a number of research goals:

- The most important part of the project focuses on the obligation imposed on courts in the Recast Regulation 848/2015, which provides a procedural framework for resolving cross-border insolvency cases, to co-operate in cross-border insolvency matters. To this end, the project undertook to engage proactively with the European judiciary to document their perception of the obligation to co-operate in practice, including possible obstacles and proposed resolutions.

- The obligation to co-operate in insolvency matters does not of course occur in a vacuum. Accordingly, the project focuses on restructuring and rescue frameworks to determine if there are substantive or procedural obstacles to court-to-court co-operation. This is particularly important given the new EU Preventive Restructuring Directive.

- The first part of the project interrogated the following jurisdictions: Ireland, Italy, Romania, France, The Netherlands, Germany, Denmark, Austria, Poland, Spain, and the UK with a view to identifying different substantive rules which might raise problems regarding co-operation. We are now in the second phase of the project. Identifying procedural aspects of these and other European jurisdictions which might raise obstacles to co-operation. For this reason we are conducting this survey and we are particularly interested in hearing from members of the judiciary in the sample of Member States listed above. However, if you are a member of the judiciary of another EU Member State, we welcome your participation as well.

- It might be timely to let you know that at this point in the research project, our impression is that while court to court co-operation is in no way resisted, it does not really express itself in a formal way, nor does it seem to arise as much as might have been expected given policy investment in this issue and academic commentary. We have received this impression from engagements with the Judicial Wing and the relevant practitioner forums through the INSOL Europe network. The research has in effect become more open ended. For this reason, we are very interested in your opinions and your experience or lack of experience in these issues.
The purpose of this short survey is to engage with the European judiciary along with civil servants and administrators who deal with cross-border insolvency and restructuring cases to gather data on your experience with court to court co-operation. **Please note that the survey should take you about 15 minutes, unless you choose to offer additional commentary.**

We would be grateful for your response by **24th May 2020**.

You have two choices as to how you wish to complete this short questionnaire:

1. Access our online survey [here](#).
2. Fill out this form and send it to jennifer.gant@ucc.ie. The boxes below can be “ticked” by simply clicking in them.

*Responses via the survey link are fully anonymous and any surveys returned by email will be treated anonymously as well. The data gathered with this survey will form a part of Report that will be submitted to the European Commission and processed according to EU and University College Cork ethical rules.*

We thank you in advance for taking the time to participate in our project. Should you have any questions at all, please do not hesitate to contact Professor Irene Lynch Fannon, Principal Investigator (i.lynchfannon@ucc.ie) or Dr Jennifer L. L. Gant, Post-Doctoral Researcher on the project (jennifer.gant@ucc.ie).

The JCOERE Team
Preliminary Survey Questions

This first set of questions are general questions about your role as a person who may decide insolvency or restructuring cases in your jurisdiction. Their purpose is mainly to help us to categorise the information we obtain. Thank you in advance for engaging in this survey. Your time and participation is greatly appreciated.

1. What is your current role?
   - Judge ☐
   - Mediator or Arbitrator ☐
   - Other Administrative Authority ☐
   - Civil Servant ☐
   - Other ☐
   If other, please explain:

2. Which of the following choices best describes what you do in your role?
   - I hear insolvency and/or restructuring cases only: ☐
   - I also hear commercial and/or corporate law cases: ☐
   - I hear all kinds of civil cases: ☐

3. Common law and civil law jurisdictions differ in the way that the members of the judiciary are trained generally. Before you qualified as a judge or administrative decision-maker, were you required to take specific training? If so, please describe the nature of the training required in your jurisdiction.
4. Were you required to take specialist training in order to decide on insolvency and/or restructuring cases in your jurisdiction?

Yes ☐
No ☐

a. If so, what training were you required to take? (describe in a few words, if possible)

b. If you specialise in insolvency cases, what requirements does your jurisdiction have for continuing professional development (CPD) in this area?

5. Have you received any specialist training in insolvency and restructuring related cases in the last 5 years? If so, how many days approximately does this training amount to?

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5. Have you taken any training about judicial co-operation and/or communication with the courts of other Member States?

Yes ☐
No ☐

a. Have you co-operated directly with courts of another state on insolvency and restructuring matters at all in your career?

Yes ☐
No ☐

b. If you have co-operated directly with courts of another state in insolvency and restructuring matters, has it been:

Only on cases within the EU ☐
Only on cases with jurisdictions outside of the EU ☐
On international cases including both EU and non-EU jurisdictions ☐

c. Have you co-operated directly with courts of another state in non-insolvency matters within the EU?
Yes ☐
No ☐

d. Have you co-operated directly with courts of another state in non-insolvency matters outside of the EU?
Yes ☐
No ☐

e. If you have co-operated on other matters directly with courts of another state, which matters have you co-operated on and with which jurisdictions? Please note them in the comment box.

6. How long have you been deciding on insolvency and/or restructuring cases?
0-3 years: ☐
3-7 years: ☐
7-10 years: ☐
10-15 years: ☐
More than 15 years: ☐

7. In which jurisdiction do you work?

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Survey of Judicial Practice in Co-operation and Communication

*Questions 8 and 9 refer to co-operation generally, while questions 10, 11 and 12 relate to insolvency and/or restructuring specifically.*

8. Have you ever needed to co-operate or communicate with a court in another European jurisdiction in a cross-border matter generally?
   - Yes ☐
   - No ☐

9. How many cases have you heard in your career that have required you to communicate and/or co-operate with a court in another jurisdiction, generally?
   - 0 ☐
   - 2-10 ☐
   - 11-25 ☐
   - More than 25 ☐
   - NA ☐

10. Have you had to co-operate with a court in another European jurisdiction in an insolvency or restructuring case?
   - Yes ☐
   - No ☐

11. How many insolvency related cases per year do you have to decide that require cross-border co-operation or communication with court in another EU Member State?
   - 0 ☐
   - 1-5 ☐
   - More than 5 ☐

12. How many insolvency related cases have you decided on in your career that have required you to communicate and/or co-operate with a court in another EU Member State?
   - 1 ☐
13. One observation made on the JCOERE Project so far is that cooperation between courts is not as big an issue as we initially believed. As such, the following questions are academic in nature to test the general awareness among the EU judiciary of the guidelines and projects that have been done in this area to date. In your career have you ever heard of any of the following guidelines and projects relevant to court-to-court co-operation?

Yes ☐

No ☐

14. If you have heard of any of the guidelines relevant to court-to-court cooperation, please indicate which ones below:

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<td>The EU Cross-Border Insolvency Court-to-Court Co-operation Principles (JudgeCo) [2014]</td>
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<td>European Legal Institute (ELI) Project on the Rescue of Business in Insolvency Law [2017]</td>
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<td>Best Practices in European Restructuring: Contractualised Distress Resolution in the Shadow of the Law (CODIRE) [2018]</td>
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<td>Assessing Courts’ Undertaking of Restructuring and Insolvency Actions: best practices, blockages, and ways of improvement in the EU (ACURIA) [2019]</td>
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<td>ALI/UNIDROIT Principles of Transnational Insolvency Procedure (2005)</td>
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<td>World Bank Principles for Effective Insolvency and Creditor/Debtor Regimes [2011]</td>
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<td>ALI Transnational Insolvency: Global Principles for Co-operation in International Insolvency Cases [2012]</td>
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<td>The ALI-III Guidelines Applicable to Court-to-Court Communications in Cross-border Cases (2000)</td>
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15. Have you ever referred to any of the guidelines listed in the question above in order to assist you in protocols for communication or co-operation in cross-border insolvency or restructuring cases?

Yes   □

No   □

16. Would you prefer to create a protocol for communication and co-operation on a case by case basis?

Yes   □

No   □

17. If you have referred to any of the listed guidelines or project publications, please indicate which (if any) that you have referred to in the past by reference to the guidelines and projects listed in question 13:

1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 □ 6 □ 7 □ 8 □ 9 □ 10 □ 11 □ 12 □ 13 □ 14 □
If the guidance or documentation you referred to was not listed above, please note it here:

18. Have you ever attended international or European judicial events? (For example, the European Judicial Training Network (EJTN) or the INSOL Europe Judicial Forum):

   Yes □
   No □

   What events do you attend (or plan to attend)?

19. Would it be helpful for you to have access to information about substantive rules in other jurisdictions, such as the mechanisms of preventive restructuring?

   Yes □
   No □
   Unsure □

20. Are there rules in your legal system about how you can obtain information external to the cases you hear, such as information about substantive rules in other jurisdictions?

   Yes □
   No □

21. If there are rules restricting your freedom to access to information about substantive rules in other jurisdictions, please specify here if possible.

22. How would you prefer to access information about substantive insolvency rules in other jurisdictions?
Information provided by the state or courts □
A practitioner’s textbook □
An academic text or report □
Downloadable PDFs of country reports and other information □
A simple website presenting information □
An interactive website □
A combination of the above or something else entirely (please specify below):

23. Would it be helpful to have access to information and case-studies that provide different experiences with court-to-court co-operation in cross-border insolvency or restructuring cases?
Yes □
No □
Unsure □

24. In what format would you prefer to access this information:
A book or set of documents □
An e-book or documents sent by email □
Downloadable PDFs of country reports and case studies □
A simple website presenting the information □
An interactive website □
A combination of the above or something else entirely (please specify below):

Case Studies of Court-to-Court Co-Operation in Insolvency and Restructuring (Optional)
25. The JCOERE Project is also tasked with developing case studies exemplifying situations in which court-to-court co-operation has occurred. These will be included in a database accessible by all European judges who may find it useful to see how similar problems have been dealt with in different jurisdictions. If possible, please provide an example from your experience where you have had to co-operate or communicate with a court in a different jurisdiction with a brief summary of the case facts, the issue that required co-operation or communication, and how you resolved or otherwise dealt with the co-operation and communication. You can either set it out below or email jennifer.gant@ucc.ie or i.lynchfannon@ucc.ie at your convenience with your case study example.

26. Thank you for your kind participation in this project. If you would like to receive updates or be informed when our databases have been completed, please provide your email here or send a separate e-mail to jennifer.gant@ucc.ie or i.lynchfannon@ucc.ie.
Annex II(b): Sondaj privind practicile judiciare în cazurile de restructurare transfrontalieră - Cooperare și comunicare

Introducere

Proiectul de Cooperare Judiciară pentru Redresare Economică în Europa (JCOERE) (nr. 800807) este un proiect de cercetare finanțat de Comisia Europeană Direcția Generală Justiție și Consumatori. Proiectul are o serie de obiective de cercetare:

• Cea mai importantă parte a proiectului se concentrează pe obligațiile impuse instanțelor de Regulamentul (UE) 848/2015, care oferă un cadru de reglementări procedurale pentru soluționarea cazurilor de insolvență transfrontalieră, pentru cooperarea în problemele de insolvență transfrontalieră. În acest scop, proiectul s-a angajat să colaboreze în mod activ cu sistemul judiciar european pentru a documenta percepția acestuia asupra obligației de cooperare în practică, inclusiv obstacole posibile și soluții-propuse.

• Obligația de a coopera în materie de insolvență nu apare desigur fără rost. În consecință, proiectul se concentrează pe reglementările referitoare la structurarea și redresarea pentru a determina dacă există obstacole de fond sau de procedură pentru cooperarea între instanțe. Acest lucru este deosebit de important având în vedere noua Directivă a UE privind restructurarea preventivă.

• Prima parte a proiectului a analizat următoarele jurisdicții: Irlanda, Italia, România, Franța, Olanda, Germania, Danemarca, Austria, Polonia, Spania și Marea Britanie, în vederea identificării unor reguli de fond care ar putea ridica probleme în ceea ce privește cooperarea. Acum suntem în a doua fază a proiectului: identificarea aspectelor procedurale din aceste jurisdicții și din alte jurisdicții europene care ar putea ridica obstacole în calea cooperării. Din acest motiv, efectuăm acest sondaj și suntem interesați în special de punctul de vedere al membrilor sistemului judiciar din eșantionul de state membre enumerate mai sus. Cu toate acestea, dacă sunteți membru al sistemului judiciar al altui stat membru al UE, sunteți bineveniți să participați.

• Ar putea fi oportun să vă anunțăm că în acest moment al cercetării în cadrul proiectului, impresia noastră este că, deși cooperarea între instanțe nu este
împiedicată, ea nu se exprimă cu adevărat într-un mod formal și nici nu pare să se ridice la nivelul așteptat, având în vedere investiția politică în această problemă și comentariile academice. Am primit acest punct de vedere prin parteneriatul cu Aripa Judiciară (Judicial Wing) și prin intermediul forumurilor practicenilor prin rețeaua INSOL Europe. Cercetarea a devenit, în realitate, mai deschisă. Din acest motiv, suntem foarte interesați de părerile dvs. și de experiența dvs. sau lipsa de experiență în aceste probleme.

Scopul acestui scurt sondaj este de a colabora cu sistemul judiciar european, împreună cu funcționarii publici și administratorii care se ocupă de cazurile transfrontaliere de insolvență și restructurare pentru a colecta date despre experiența dvs. privind cooperarea între instanțe. Vă rugăm să rețineți că sondajul ar trebui să dureze aproximativ 15 minute, cu excepția cazului în care alegeți să oferiți comentarii suplimentare. V-am fi recunoscători dacă ne-ați transmite chestionarul completat pana cel târziu la data de ..........2020.

Aveți două opțiuni cu privire la de completare al acestui scurt chestionar:

3. Accesați chestionarul online aici.
4. Completați acest chestionar și trimiteți-l pe adresa nicoletamirelanastasie@gmail.com sau cristidrg@yahoo.com. Căsuțele de mai jos pot fi "bifate" printr-un singur click.

Răspunsurile prin link-ul sondajului sunt pe deplin anonime și orice sondaje transmise prin e-mail vor fi de asemenea prezentate ca fiind anonime. Datele colectate cu ocazia acestui sondaj vor face parte dintr-un raport care va fi transmis Comisiei Europene și prelucrat în conformitate cu normele etice ale UE și Universitatea Colegiul Cork.

Vă mulțumim anticipat că ne-ați acordat timpul necesar pentru a participa la proiectul nostru. Daca aveți orice fel de întrebări, va rugăm sa contactați fără ezitare pe Professor Irene Lynch Fannon, Principal Investigator (i.lynchfannon@ucc.ie) sau Dr Jennifer L. L. Gant, cercetător post-doctoral în cadrul proiectului (jennifer.gant@ucc.ie).

Echipa JCOERE
Întrebări preliminare ale sondajului

Acest prim set de întrebări reprezintă întrebări generale despre rolul dvs. de persoană care poate soluționa cazurile de insolvență sau de restructurare din jurisdicția dvs. Obiectivul lor este în principal să ne ajute în structurarea informațiilor pe care le obținem. Vă mulțumim anticipat pentru implicarea în acest sondaj. Timpul și participarea dvs. sunt în mod deosebit de apreciate.

1. Ce funcție îndepliniți în prezent?

Judecător ☐
Mediator sau Arbitru ☐
Altă autoritate administrativă ☐
Funcționar public ☐
Alte funcții ☐

În cazul în care îndepliniți un alt rol, vă rugăm să explicați:

2. Care dintre următoarele alternative descrie cel mai bine ce faceți în virtutea funcției pe care o dețineți??

Sunt specializat doar în cazuri de insolvență și / sau restructurare: ☐
Soluționez și cauze de drept comercial și / sau corporatist: ☐
Soluționez toate tipurile de cauze civile: ☐

3. Competența în sistemele de tip *common-law* și cele de drept civil diferă în funcție de modul în care membrii sistemului judiciar sunt instruiți în general. Înainte de a vă califica ca judecător sau factor de decizie administrativă, a trebuit să urmați o pregătire specifică? Dacă da, descrieți natura formării necesare în sistemul dvs. judiciar.

195
4. A trebuit să urmați o pregătire de specialitate pentru a putea soluționa cauzele de insolvență și / sau de restructurare ce vă revin spre competentă soluționare?

Da ☐

Nu ☐

d. Dacă da, ce pregătire a trebuit să urmați? (descrieți în câteva cuvinte, dacă este posibil)


e. Dacă sunteți specializat în cauze de insolvență, ce forme de pregătire sunt prevăzute de legislația dvs. pentru dezvoltarea profesională continuă în acest domeniu??


f. Ați participat la cursuri de specialitate în materia insolvenței și restructurării în ultimii 5 ani? Dacă da, cate zile a durat aproximativ această pregătire?

0 ☐

1-5 ☐

6-10 ☐

Mai mult de 10 ☐

5. Ați participat la cursuri de instruire cu privire la cooperarea judiciară și / sau comunicarea cu instanțele din alte State Membre?

Da ☐

Nu ☐

f. In cariera dvs, v-ați întâlnit cu situații în care a fost nevoie de cooperare judiciară în materie de insolvență și restructurare?

Da ☐

Nu ☐

g. Dacă v-ați confruntat cu situații de acest gen, au fost:

Doar cazuri în interiorul Uniunii Europene ☐

Doar cazuri ce vizează jurisdicții din afara Uniunii Europene ☐
În cazuri internaționale ce includ atât Uniunea Europeană, cât și jurisdicții jurisdicția din afara UE ☐

h. Ați cooperat în alte domenii decât cel al insolvenței în interiorul Uniunii Europene?
Da ☐
Nu ☐

i. Ați cooperat în alte domenii decât cel al insolvenței ce vizează jurisdicții din afara Uniunii Europene?
Da ☐
Nu ☐

j. Dacă ați cooperat în alte probleme cu alte jurisdicții, care sunt problemele în care ați cooperat și cu ce jurisdicții? Vă rugăm să le notați în caseta de comentarii.

6. De cât timp soluționați cauze în materie de insolvență/restructurare?

0-3 ani: ☐
3-7 ani: ☐
7-10 ani: ☐
10-15 ani: ☐
Mai mult de 15 ani: ☐
Sondaj în materia practicilor judiciare în cooperare și comunicare

Întrebările 7 și 8 se referă la cooperare în general, în timp ce întrebările 9, 10, și 11 se referă în special la insolvență și / sau restructurare

7. Ați avut vreodată nevoie de cooperare sau comunicare cu o instanță dintr-o altă jurisdicție europeană într-o chestiune transfrontalieră, în general?
   Da ☐
   Nu ☐

8. Câte cazuri ați soluționat în cariera dvs. care v-au solicitat să comunicați și / sau să cooperați cu o instanță din altă jurisdicție, în general?
   2 ☐
   1-10 ☐
   11-25 ☐
   Mai mult de 25 ☐
   Nu este cazul ☐

9. A fost necesar să cooperați cu o instanță din altă jurisdicție europeană într-un caz de insolvență sau de restructurare?
   Da ☐
   Nu ☐

10. Câte cauze legate de insolvență în care este necesară cooperare transfrontalieră sau comunicare cu instanța de judecată dintr-un alt stat membru al UE, trebuie să soluționați pe an?
    0 ☐
    1-5 ☐
    Mai mult de 5 ☐

11. Câte cauze legate de insolvență ați soluționat în cariera dvs., care v-au solicitat să comunicați și / sau să cooperați cu o instanță dintr-un alt stat membru al UE?
    3 ☐
Sondaj privind cunoașterea ghidurilor de îndrumare în materie de cooperare și comunicare

12. O observație făcută până acum în proiectul JCOERE este aceea că cooperarea dintre instanțe nu este o problemă atât de mare cum am considerat inițial. Ca atare, următoarele întrebări sunt de natură academică pentru a testa în ce măsură sistemul judiciar din UE are cunoștință de ghidurile de îndrumare și proiectele realizate până în prezent. În cariera dvs., ați auzit vreodată de oricare dintre următoarele ghiduri și proiecte relevante pentru cooperarea între instanțe?

Da □
Nu □

13. Dacă ați aflat despre oricare dintre îndrumările relevante pentru cooperarea judiciară, vă rugăm să indicați care din cele de mai jos:

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<td>2</td>
<td>The EU Cross-Border Insolvency Court-to-Court Co-operation Principles (JudgeCo) [2014]</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>The UNCITRAL Model Law</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>The Role of the Judge in Restructuring of Companies within Insolvency (INSOL Europe Judicial Wing) [2013]</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>European Legal Institute (ELI) Project on the Rescue of Business in Insolvency Law [2017]</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>Conference on European Restructuring and Insolvency Law (CERIL) Statement 2018/01 in Insolvency Regulation (Recast) and National Procedural Rules</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>Best Practices in European Restructuring: Contractualised Distress Resolution in the Shadow of the Law (CODIRE) [2018]</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Assessing Courts’ Undertaking of Restructuring and Insolvency Actions: best practices, blockages, and ways of improvement in the EU (ACURIA) [2019]</td>
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<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>ALI/UNIDROIT Principles of Transnational Insolvency Procedure (2005)</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>World Bank Principles for Effective Insolvency and Creditor/Debtor Regimes [2011]</td>
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<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>ALI Transnational Insolvency: Global Principles for Co-operation in International Insolvency Cases [2012]</td>
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<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>The ALI-III Guidelines Applicable to Court-to-Court Communications in Cross-border Cases (2000)</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

14. V-aţi referit vreodată la oricare dintre materialele enumerate în întrebarea de mai sus, pentru a vă ajuta în protocoalele de comunicare sau cooperare în cazurile transfrontaliere de insolvenţă sau de restructurare?

Da ☐

Nu ☐

15. Aţi prefera să creaţi un protocol pentru comunicare şi cooperare de la caz la caz?

Da ☐

Nu ☐

16. Dacă v-aţi referit la oricare dintre ghidurile enumerate sau publicaţiile de proiect, vă rugăm să indicaţi (dacă este cazul) la care v-aţi referit în trecut, cu referire la ghidurile de îndrumare şi proiectele enumerate la întrebarea 12:

1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 6 ☐ 7 ☐ 8 ☐ 9 ☐ 10 ☐ 11 ☐ 12 ☐ 13 ☐ 14 ☐

201
Dacă ghidul sau documentația la care faceți referire nu a fost enumerat mai sus, vă rugăm să notați aici:

17. Ați participat vreodată la evenimente judiciare internaționale sau europene? (De exemplu, cele organizate de Rețeaua Europeană de Formare Judiciară (EJTN) sau Forumul judiciar INSOL Europa):

Da ☐
Nu ☐

La ce evenimente ați participat (sau aveți de gând să participați)?

18. Ar fi util să aveți acces la informații despre regulile de baza din alte jurisdicții, cum ar fi mecanismele de restructurare preventivă?

Da ☐
Nu ☐
Nu sunt sigur ☐

19. Există reguli în sistemul dvs. judiciar despre cum puteți obține informații ce exced cauzelor pe care le soluționați, cum ar fi informații despre regulile de fond din alte jurisdicții?

Da ☐
Nu ☐

20. Dacă există reguli care restricționează accesul dvs. la informații despre regulile de fond din alte jurisdicții, vă rugăm să specificați aici.

202
21. Cum preferați să accesați informații despre regulile de insolvență din alte jurisdicții?
Informații furnizate de stat sau instanțe ☐
Un manual al practicianului ☐
Un text sau raport academic ☐
Fișiere PDF descârcabile ale rapoartelor altei țări și alte informații ☐
Un site web simplu care prezintă informații ☐
Un site web interactiv ☐
O combinație între cele de mai sus sau cu totul altă variantă (vă rugăm să specificați mai jos):

22. Ar fi util să aveți acces la informații și studii de caz care oferă jurisprudență diferită cu privire la cooperarea judiciară internațională în cazurile de insolvență transfrontalieră sau de restructurare?
Da ☐
Nu ☐
Nu sunt sigur ☐

23. În ce format preferați să accesați aceste informații:
O carte sau un set de documente ☐
Un e-book sau documente transmise prin e-mail ☐
Fișiere PDF descârcabile ale rapoartelor de țară și studii de caz ☐
Un website simplu care furnizează informații ☐
Un website interactiv ☐
O combinație între cele de mai sus sau cu totul altă variantă (vă rugăm să specificați mai jos):
Studii de caz privind cooperarea între instanțele de judecata în materie de insolvență și restructurare (opțional)

24. Proiectul JCOERE are, de asemenea, sarcina de a dezvolta studii de caz care ilustrează situații în care a avut loc cooperarea între instanțele de judecată. Acestea vor fi incluse într-o bază de date accesibilă tuturor judecătorilor europeni, cărora le-ar putea fi de folos să vadă cum au fost rezolvate probleme similare în diferite jurisdicții. Dacă este posibil, vă rugăm să furnizați un exemplu din experiența dvs. în care ați fost nevoit să cooperați sau să comunicați cu o instanță dintr-o jurisdicție diferită, cu un scurt rezumat al datelor din speța respectivă, problema care a necesitat cooperare sau comunicare și modul în care ați rezolvat sau v-ați descurcat cu problemele de cooperare și comunicare. Puteți să o descrieți mai jos sau prin e-mail la nicoletamirela.nastasie@gmail.com sau cristidrg@yahoo.com, după cum doriți, cu exemplul dvs. de studiu de caz.

25. Vă mulțumim pentru amabilitatea de a participa la acest proiect. Dacă doriți să primiți actualizări sau să fiți informați când baza noastră de date este completă, vă rugăm să ne furnizați e-mailul aici sau să trimiteți un e-mail separat la nicoletamirela.nastasie@gmail.com sau cristidrg@yahoo.com.
Introduzione

Il progetto The Judicial Co-Operation for Economic Recovery in Europe (JCOERE, n. 800807) è un progetto di ricerca finanziato dalla Direzione Generale Giustizia della Commissione europea. Il progetto ha una serie di obiettivi:

- La parte più importante del progetto si concentra sull'obbligo di cooperazione in materia di insolvenza transfrontaliera imposto ai tribunali dal Regolamento n. 848/2015, che fornisce un quadro procedurale per la risoluzione dei casi di insolvenza transfrontalieri. A tal riguardo, il progetto si interancerà in modo proattivo con la magistratura europea per documentare la percezione di quest’ultima riguardo all'obbligo di cooperazione nella pratica, compresi i possibili ostacoli e le proposte di risoluzione di questi ultimi.
- Ovviamente, l'obbligo di cooperare in materia fallimentare si inserisce in un contesto normativo. Pertanto, il progetto si concentra sui quadri di ristrutturazione e salvataggio al fine di determinare se vi siano ostacoli sostanziali o procedurali alla cooperazione giudiziaria. Ciò è particolarmente importante in considerazione della nuova Direttiva UE sulla ristrutturazione preventiva.
- La prima parte del progetto ha coinvolto i seguenti ordinamenti: Irlanda, Italia, Romania, Francia, Paesi Bassi, Germania, Danimarca, Austria, Polonia, Spagna e Regno Unito, al fine di individuare le diverse norme sostanziali che potrebbero sollevare problemi in materia di cooperazione. Siamo ora nella seconda fase del progetto che consiste nell’identificare gli aspetti procedurali dei diversi ordinamenti europei che potrebbero creare ostacoli alla cooperazione. Per tale motivo abbiamo elaborato il presente questionario e siamo particolarmente interessati a ricevere un feedback dalla magistratura degli Stati membri sopra elencati. In ogni caso, se appartiene alla magistratura di un altro Stato membro dell'UE, accogliamo con favore anche la Sua partecipazione.
- Appare opportuno comunicarLe che, giunti a questo punto del progetto di ricerca, la nostra impressione è che la cooperazione giudiziaria, pur non essendo in alcun modo
osteggiata, non abbia trovato alcuna veste formale, né sembra aver luogo nella misura che ci si sarebbe potuto aspettare, in considerazione dell’investimento in termini di regolamentazione e dell’analisi dottrinale compiuta. Abbiamo ricevuto tale impressione dall’interazione con la componente giudiziaria e i relativi forum di professionisti della rete INSOL Europe. La ricerca si è, dunque, allargata. Per questo motivo siamo molto interessati alle Sue opinioni e alla Sua esperienza o inesperienza rispetto a tali temi.

Lo scopo di questa breve indagine è di coinvolgere la magistratura europea, insieme ai funzionari e agli amministratori di procedure di insolvenza che si occupano di casi transfrontalieri in materia fallimentare, al fine di raccogliere i dati relativi alla Sua esperienza nella cooperazione con altri tribunali. **Si prega di notare che l’indagine dovrebbe durare circa 15 minuti, a meno che non si scelga di fornire un commento aggiuntivo.**

Le saremmo grati se volesse farci pervenire la Sua risposta entro il giorno ________.

Ha a disposizione due opzioni per la compilazione di questo breve questionario:

5. **Compilare il presente modulo ed inviarlo all’indirizzo mail nuovodirittofallimentare@dipp.unifi.it**
   Le caselle sottostanti possono essere "spuntate" semplicemente cliccandoci sopra.

6. **Accedere al nostro sondaggio online, qui.**

Le risposte al sondaggio fornite tramite il link sopra indicato sono completamente anonime ed anche i moduli restituiti via e-mail saranno trattati in modo anonimo.

La ringraziamo in anticipo per il tempo dedicato alla partecipazione al nostro progetto. Per qualsiasi domanda, non esitate a contattare il Prof. Lorenzo Stanghellini all’indirizzo e-mail stanghellini@unifi.it.

Il Team JCOERE
Domande preliminari

Questa prima serie di domande generali riguardano la posizione da Lei ricoperta. Lo scopo di queste ultime è, principalmente, quello di aiutarci a classificare le informazioni che otteniamo. La ringraziamo in anticipo per la Sua partecipazione a questo questionario. Il Suo tempo e la Sua partecipazione sono molto apprezzati.

27. Quale delle seguenti opzioni descrive meglio l’attività da Lei svolta?
- Tratto solamente casi riguardanti la materia fallimentare: 
  - ☐
- Tratto anche casi in materia di diritto commerciale e/o societario: 
  - ☐
- Tratto ogni tipologia di casi in materia civile: 
  - ☐


29. Le è stato richiesto di seguire un corso di formazione specialistica per decidere casi in materia di diritto fallimentare nel suo ordinamento?
- Sì ☐
- No ☐

g. In caso affermativo, quale tipologia di corsi Le è stato richiesto di seguire? (breve descrizione)

h. Se è specializzata in materia fallimentare, quali sono i requisiti previsti nel Suo ordinamento per l’aggiornamento professionale in tale materia (opzionale)

i. Ha frequentato un corso di formazione specialistica in materia fallimentare negli ultimi 5 anni? In caso affermativo, in quanti giorni è consistito approssimativamente?
- 0 ☐
- 1-5 ☐
30. Ha seguito un corso di formazione sulla cooperazione giudiziaria e/o sulla comunicazione con le corti di altri Stati membri?

Sì ☐
No ☐

a. Ha mai cooperato in materia fallimentare?

Sì ☐
No ☐

b. Se ha cooperato in materia fallimentare, è stato:

Solo all’interno dell’UE ☐
Solo al di fuori dell’UE ☐
In casi internazionali riguardanti ordinamenti UE e non UE ☐

c. Ha cooperato con riferimento a questioni attinenti ad una materia diversa, all’interno dell’UE?

Sì ☐
No ☐

d. Ha cooperato con riferimento a questioni attinenti ad una materia diversa, al di fuori dell’UE?

Sì ☐
No ☐

e. Se ha cooperato con riferimento a questioni attinenti ad una materia diversa, di quale materia si tratta? Si prega di riportarle nella casella dei commenti.

31. Da quanto tempo si occupa di casi in materia fallimentare?
0-3 anni: □
3-7 anni: □
7-10 anni: □
10-15 anni: □
Più di 15 anni: □
Questionario sulle prassi giudiziarie in materia di cooperazione e comunicazione

Le domande 8 e 9 si riferiscono alla cooperazione in generale, mentre le domande 10, 11 e 12 riguardano specificamente il diritto fallimentare.

32. Avete mai avuto la necessità di cooperare o comunicare con il tribunale di un'altro ordinamento europeo riguardo ad una questione transnazionale, in generale?
   Sì ☐ No ☐

33. Quanti casi ha conosciuto, nel corso della sua carriera, che le hanno richiesto di comunicare e/o di collaborare con un tribunale di un altro ordinamento, in generale?
   4 ☐ 2-10 ☐ 11-25 ☐ Più di 25 ☐ NA ☐

34. Ha dovuto collaborare con il tribunale di un altro ordinamento europeo nell’ambito di un caso in materia di diritto fallimentare?
   Sì ☐ No ☐

35. Quanti casi in materia fallimentare deve decidere, in un anno, che richiedono una cooperazione transfrontaliera o di comunicare con il tribunale di un altro Stato membro dell’UE?
   0 ☐ 1-5 ☐ Più di 5 ☐

36. Quanti casi in materia fallimentare ha deciso, nella sua carriera, che le hanno richiesto di comunicare e/o di collaborare con un tribunale di un altro Stato membro dell’UE?
   5 ☐ 2-10 ☐ 11-25 ☐
Questionario sulla conoscenza delle linee guida aventi ad oggetto la cooperazione e la comunicazione

37. Nel corso del Progetto JCOERE è emerso che la cooperazione tra tribunali è una questione che presenta un rilievo inferiore rispetto a quanto previsto all’inizio dei lavori. Per tale motivo, le seguenti domande sono di natura accademica, al fine di testare la consapevolezza generale della magistratura dell’UE in merito alle linee guida e ai progetti realizzati in questo settore fino ad oggi.

Nel corso della sua carriera è venuto a conoscenza dell’esistenza delle seguenti linee guida e progetti riguardanti la cooperazione giudiziaria?

Sì ☐
No ☐

38. In caso affermativo, si prega di indicare quali:

*Linee guida e progetti in materia di cooperazione giudiziaria*

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<td>European Communication and Co-Operation Guidelines for Cross-border Insolvency (Coco Guidelines) 2007</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>The EU Cross-Border Insolvency Court-to-Court Co-operation Principles (JudgeCo) [2014]</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>The UNCITRAL Model Law</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>The Role of the Judge in Restructuring of Companies within Insolvency (INSOL Europe Judicial Wing) [2013]</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
39. Ha mai fatto riferimento ad una delle linee guida sopra elencate al fine di trovare supporto nell’ambito di protocolli, aventi ad oggetto la comunicazione o cooperazione in casi transfrontalieri di diritto fallimentare?

Si ☐

No ☐

40. Preferirebbe fare ricorso ad un protocollo per la comunicazione e la cooperazione, creato ad hoc per ogni singolo caso?
41. Se ha fatto riferimento ad una qualsiasi delle linee guida o dei report elencati, La preghiamo di indicare a quale ha fatto riferimento in passato tra le linee guida e i progetti elencati nella domanda 12:

☐ 1  ☐ 2  ☐ 3  ☐ 4  ☐ 5  ☐ 6  ☐ 7  ☐ 8  ☐ 9  ☐ 10  ☐ 11  ☐ 12  ☐ 13  ☐ 14

Se la linea guida o il documento a cui si fa riferimento non risulta elencato sopra, si prega di indicarlo di seguito:


42. Ha mai partecipato ad eventi internazionali o europei riservati alla magistratura? (Ad esempio, l’European Judicial Training Network (EJTN) o l’INSOL Europe Judicial Forum):

☐ Sì  ☐ No

A quali eventi ha partecipato (o intende partecipare)?


43. Riterrebbe utile avere accesso alle informazioni sulle norme sostanziali di altri ordinamenti, come i meccanismi che regolano la ristrutturazione preventiva?

☐ Sì  ☐ No

☐ Non so

44. Sono presenti nel Suo ordinamento regole per l’ottenimento di informazioni esterne al giudizio, come ad esempio informazioni sulle norme sostanziali vigenti in altri ordinamenti?

☐ Sì  ☐ No
45. Se vi sono regole che limitano l’accesso alle informazioni sulle norme sostanziali in vigore in altri ordinamenti, si prega di specificarle di seguito, se possibile.


46. Come preferirebbe accedere alle informazioni sulle norme sostanziali in materia fallimentare di altri ordinamenti?
Informazioni fornite dallo stato o dai tribunali ☐
Un libro di testo scritto da un professionista ☐
Un testo o un report accademico ☐
Un PDF scaricabile contenente un report e altre informazioni ☐
Un semplice sito web contenente le informazioni ☐
Un sito web interattivo ☐
Una combinazione di quanto sopra o qualcosa di completamente diverso (specificare di seguito):


47. Sarebbe utile avere accesso a informazioni e a casi di studio che forniscono esperienze diverse di cooperazione giudiziaria transfrontaliera in materia fallimentare?
Si ☐
No ☐
Non so ☐

48. Quale formato ritiene migliore per ottenere tali informazioni:
Un libro o un insieme di documenti ☐
Un e-book o documenti inviati via e-mail ☐
Un PDF scaricabile contenente un report e casi di studio

☐

Un semplice sito web contenente le informazioni

☐

Un sito web interattivo

☐

 Una combinazione di quanto sopra o qualcosa di completamente diverso (specificare di seguito):
Casi di cooperazione giudiziaria in materia fallimentare (facoltativo)

Il progetto JCOERE ha anche il compito di sviluppare casi di studio che esemplifichino situazioni in cui si è verificata una cooperazione tra corti. Questi ultimi saranno inclusi in una banca dati accessibile a tutti i giudici europei che ritengano utile venire a conoscenza di come problemi simili sono stati affrontati in ordinamenti diversi. Se possibile, si prega di fornire un esempio tratto dalla Sua esperienza in cui ha dovuto cooperare o comunicare con un tribunale di un diverso ordinamento con una breve sintesi dei fatti del caso, la questione che ha richiesto la cooperazione o la comunicazione e come ha risolto o altrimenti trattato le questioni riguardanti la cooperazione e la comunicazione. Può indicarlo, a Sua discrezione, qui di seguito o inviare una e-mail a nuovodirittofallimentare@dipp.unifi.it con l'esempio del caso di studio.

La ringraziamo per la gentile disponibilità a partecipazione a questo progetto. Se desidera ricevere aggiornamenti o essere informata quando i nostri database saranno stati completati, La preghiamo di fornirci la Sua e-mail nella casella sottostante o di inviare una e-mail a nuovodirittofallimentare@dipp.unifi.it.
Annex III: Chapter 6 - Additional Guidelines

As indicated in the course of Chapter 6, there are additional guidelines and projects, which were not discussed as part of that Chapter, that have addressed some areas or aspects relevant to cooperation. First, as the JCOERE project focuses on cooperation within the EU, it was felt that the Asian Development Bank Good Practice Standards for Insolvency Law (“ADB Standards”) may not be as relevant as the European and International guidelines contained in the Chapter. As a result, the analysis of this standard under the two relevant headings – the sharing or obtaining of information and disclosure requirements and asset co-ordination – will be conducted in the coming paragraphs. As also indicated, while both the ACURIA (Assessing Courts’ Undertaking of Restructuring and Insolvency Actions: best practices, blockages and ways of improvement) 622 and CODIRE (Contractualised distress resolution in the shadow of the law: Effective judicial review and oversight of insolvency and pre-insolvency proceedings)623 projects refer to issues such as information disclosure, the main focus of the projects was not as directly relevant to court-to-court and practitioner

The ADB Standards: The sharing of information about the debtor

The Asian Development Bank, in its Good Practice Standards for Insolvency Law of 2000, takes into consideration the sharing of information. Good Practice Standards 8.1 and 8.2 provide that “the law should prescribe, as fully as possible, for the provision of relevant information concerning the debtor” and that, in addition, also an independent comment and analysis on such information should be provided.

This provision is particularly relevant if we consider the principal aims of the Good Practice Standards elaborated by the Asian Development Bank, which include the creation of a common basis for the insolvency laws of the Asian countries and the enhancement of a dialogue between their courts and representatives.

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The availability of proper information and the consequent transparency that derives from it is understood by the Asian Development Bank studies as a fundamental element of an effective co-operation and, more in general, of shared insolvency law standards. This point is particularly highlighted with regard to the rescue process of a business.

In summary:
- All relevant information about the debtors must be provided, along with an analysis of such data.

The ADB Standards: Stay in the context of a reorganisation

The Asian Development Bank deals with the present issue with its Good Practice Standards n. 5.4 and 5.5.

Good Practice Standard 5.4 provides that, in the context of a reorganisation, “the automatic stay or suspension of actions should be as wide and all-embracing as possible” and that it should apply to all creditors and persons bearing an interest in the property of the debtor. Instead, Good Practice 5.5. provides that the stay should be of “limited specific duration” and that relief from the stay should be granted on the application of affected creditors or other persons.

The above-mentioned provisions of the Asian Development Bank seem to be aligned with the other guidelines and best practices proposed by other international institutions and, also in this case, the value of a reorganisation efforts that preserve the assets and going concern of the debtor seems to be fully recognised.

In summary:
- In a reorganisation scenario, an automatic stay, as wide as possible, is recommended.
- A relief from such stay should be granted on application of the creditors or other actors.

CODIRE: The need for adequate and updated information

CODIRE is a research project carried out by Università degli Studi di Firenze (Project Coordinator), Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, and Universidad Autónoma de Madrid.

Two main objectives drove the project action:

a) the formulation of harmonised guidelines for effective judicial review of and oversight of fair and efficient insolvency and pre-insolvency proceedings;

b) the development of policy recommendations addressed to policymakers at European and national level.
The project also aimed to cast light on other key issues, highlighted both in the Recommendation on a new approach to business failure and insolvency (2014/135/EU) and in the Preventive Restructuring Directive (2019/1023/EU), henceforth PRD.

More specifically, in order to remove or at least reduce obstacles to an effective cooperation between foreign courts, such provisions consider possible incentives for the creation of a common ground in the European insolvency context by providing shared, core principles to the actors involved in the restructuring process.

The CODIRE project, suggests a set of guidelines and policy recommendations that focus on:

a) The importance of identifying (and addressing) the crisis in a timely fashion;

b) The role of fairness during the proceedings, both under a procedural and substantive point of view;

c) The development of a common basis with respect to the content and structure of restructuring plans and the role of the professionals involved;

d) The development of best practices with regard to the confirmation and implementation of restructuring plans.

It is hoped that the adoption and implementation by the various Member States of the best practices outlined in the CODIRE project may, therefore, achieve the goal contained in both the PRD and in the EIR Recast, namely the creation of common basic norms in order to remove obstacles to an effective cooperation between foreign courts.

With specific regard to the sharing of information and disclosure requirements, it is worth noting that Policy Recommendation n. 2.5 of CODIRE requires adequate information to be

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626 Lorenzo Stanghellini, Riz Mokal, Christoph G. Paulus and Ignacio Tirado, Best practices in European Restructuring: Contractualised Distress Resolution in the Shadow of the Law (Wolters Kluwer, 2018), Introduction, p. XVIII. The full report is available at <https://www.codire.eu/publications/>. Many CODIRE guidelines and policy recommendations are relevant in the context of the analysis of substantive and procedural obstacles to judicial cooperation (and coordination) in cross-border insolvency cases. In fact, as already noted in Report 1 of JCOERE Project, the PRD envisages provisions that - both directly and indirectly - impact the framework set by the Regulation 848/2015 See JCOERE Report 1, Identifying substantive rules in preventive restructuring frameworks including the Preventive Restructuring Directive which may be incompatible with judicial co-operation obligations, p. 10. The full report is available at <https://www.ucc.ie/en/jcoere/research/report1/>

627 In this regard, it is worth remembering that Recital 12 of the PRD, once explained the scope of Regulation 848/2015 and its limits (‘that Regulation does not tackle the disparities between national laws regulating those procedures’), stresses the ‘need to go beyond matters of judicial co-operation and to establish substantive minimum standards for preventive restructuring procedures as well as for procedures leading to a discharge of debt for entrepreneurs’.

That said, Recital 13 of the PRD is coherent with the premises laid down by Recital 12. Pursuant to it, the PRD ‘aims to be fully compatible with, and complementary to, that Regulation, by requiring Member States to put in place preventive restructuring procedures which comply with certain minimum principles of effectiveness’ see Appendix to the Exposition of the terms of the PRD.

provided to stakeholders. Further recommendations refer to additional information requirements benefitting the actors involved in a restructuring process. Whilst these principles will feed into the quality of restructuring practices in Europe and are reflected in the PRD they only indirectly affect the ability of courts to cooperate as envisaged by the EIR Recast.

**In summary:**

À Actors involved in a restructuring process should be provided with an adequate and updated set of information.

**CODIRE: The role of professionals to maximise the value of the assets**

CODIRE’s Policy Recommendation 7.2 concerns the sale of debtor’s assets and the best practices to maximise their value. In this regard, this Recommendation provides that, if the plan is completely or mainly based on the realisation of the debtor’s assets, ‘the law should provide for the appointment of a professional entrusted with the task of implementing the plan concerning the sale of the debtor’s assets in the best interest of creditors’.

Similarly, regarding restructuring plans, Guideline 7.2 recommends the appointment of a professional to realise assets should the restructuring plan envisage the sale of assets ‘having a relevant economic value’. These two provisions, read together, stress the importance of the appointment of a professional that is invested with the necessary power to maximise the value of the debtor’s assets in the best interest of all the parties involved. With a view to harmonising the insolvency law of the countries involved in cross-border insolvency proceedings, it might be useful to incorporate, at a domestic level, the best practices mentioned above and, therefore, develop a common ground for the coordination of the actors involved.

**In summary:**

À The appointment of a professional invested with the necessary power to maximise the value of the debtor’s assets is recommended.

**ACURIA: Disclosure and transparency**

ACURIA is a research project carried out by the Centre for Social Studies of Portugal (Project Co-ordinator), Università degli Studi di Firenze, Uniwersytet Gdanski and Maastricht University. It was aimed at identifying best practices and legal and procedural strategies in the field of business insolvency and restructuring law that are suitable for replication in different jurisdictions. This, in turn, was in order to enable courts to provide a better response in those cases.

In addition, ACURIA planned to:
a) support the development of stronger legislation and policies at domestic and EU levels, with special regard to insolvency and cross-border insolvency; and

b) promote the cooperation between the academic world, practitioners and economic actors.

ACURIA takes into consideration the substantial and procedural rules that become relevant during an insolvency proceeding (intended to also include restructuring proceedings) and conducted a comparative analysis between various European jurisdictions, namely Italy, the Netherlands, Poland and Portugal.

The findings of the research show that these jurisdictions have some common features, for example, their favour for ‘rescue-solutions over liquidation outcomes’ and ‘the absence of specialised courts to trial insolvency and restructuring cases’.629

Resonating with our discussion in Chapter 4 of this Report, ACURIA also highlights a deep heterogeneity amongst the relevant jurisdictions, regarding some procedural and substantial aspects of their insolvency laws, such as the existence of precautionary measures in order to prevent further damage to the insolvent’s estate and the appointment of the insolvency practitioner.

Furthermore, the project focuses on some possible ways to enhance the response of the courts when facing insolvency cases and, in this regard, it stresses the importance of:

a) timelines of the proceeding, by creating and developing early warning devices;

b) predictability and legal certainty, by providing specialised training to judges and insolvency practitioners in insolvency law, economic sciences, and accounting;630

c) haste and efficiency, by means of new information technologies, in order to streamline the communication between the parties involved, including judges and insolvency practitioners;

d) participation by simplifying the interaction of all the relevant parties of the proceeding and by implementing technological devices to allow meetings to be held at a distance;

e) transparency by means of clear communication with the stakeholders and requiring appropriate disclosure.631

With a particular focus on the sharing of information and disclosure, ACURIA stresses the importance of transparency in the context of corporate restructuring and insolvency


630 This issue is considered in Chapters 4 and 8 of this Report.

procedures and, for this reason, it requires the relevant actors to disclose ‘information at the decisive stages of the process, such as the sale of assets, through transparent methods’ pursuant to Guideline e) of the ‘Ways of improvement’.

Guideline e) accounts for both the ‘procedural’ and ‘substantive’ aspects of the disclosure duties in this context, by also suggesting the use of ‘publicised virtual auctions’ in order to effectively share the relevant information.

**In summary:**

À The disclosure of all the relevant information and the adoption of transparent methods during the decisive stages of the proceeding are recommended.
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