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MIGRATION:
A HEIDEGGERIAN
ANALYSIS

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PhD Thesis Submission
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JULY 2013
I hereby declare that this thesis is my own work, and has not been submitted for another degree, at University College Cork, or elsewhere.

Signed: ____________________________________

Andrea Martínez Vázquez
To Ireland
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<tr>
<td>BDT</td>
<td>Building, Dwelling, Thinking</td>
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<td>BT</td>
<td>Being and Time</td>
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<td>BP</td>
<td>Basic Problems of Phenomenology</td>
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<td>EP</td>
<td>The End of Philosophy</td>
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<td>EOR</td>
<td>The Essence of Reasons</td>
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<td>FCM</td>
<td>The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics</td>
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<td>HCT</td>
<td>History of the Concept of Time</td>
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<td>Hölderlin’s Hymn “The Ister”</td>
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<td>IM</td>
<td>Introduction to Metaphysics</td>
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<td>On the Origin of the Work of Art</td>
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<td>On Time and Being</td>
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<td>WICT</td>
<td>What is Called Thinking?</td>
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INTRODUCTION

Migration has been widely studied in the social sciences, as an increasingly important social phenomenon and as a specific kind of human experience, which in turn, has an effect on social identity. Much of the research on migration has focused on the marginalization of migrants as a result of economic inequalities and cultural stereotypes. There is a vast available body of studies that addresses migrant experience, which has developed a theoretical framework that regards migrant identity as a distinct type of identity (Brah, 1996, Clifford, 1997, Knott and McLouchlin, 2010 etc.). Since the early ‘90s different strands of this growing discourse have been grouped together under the term ‘Diaspora Studies’. This scholarship is dedicated to studies of migration in its diverse forms and focuses on the dynamics of ‘othering’ that migrants are subjected to. As Knott and McLouchlin explain, use of the term ‘diaspora’ for exiled communities broadened in the early ‘90s:

It began to encompass those groups hitherto identified as immigrants, ethnic minorities, exiles, expatriates, refugees, guest workers and so on. The social sciences, from political science to anthropology, had begun to explore the intersections of diaspora with other aspects of social, spatial and cultural relations. Thus, not all diasporas were necessarily to be seen as the victims of great catastrophes. (2010, p.9)

This scholarship emerges out of cultural socio-constructivist theories that emphasize the role that power structures play in defining the individual, but which also attribute to him or her the agency to change them. Post-colonial studies and third-wave feminism intersect in Diaspora Studies and shape its conception of cultural contexts and the role of the individual in them (Spivak, 1996; Gopinath, 2003; Anzaldúa, 1987; etc.). I have mainly focused on this literature, as it is dedicated to theorizing about migrants, based on sociological empirical studies, which is used to generate and support theories of migration. Although there are plenty of issues that these scholars have encountered that I consider crucial to the migrant experience, some of the basic assumptions underlying their theories are open to criticism. Perhaps the most serious problem, as I see it, is that they intend to bring about social changes by affecting the way migrants think of themselves. To this end they tend to promote new terms that migrants should ascribe to
themselves in order to feel ‘empowered’, while these terms in fact remain largely inaccessible to such migrants due to the nature of academic writing and publishing. This scholarship is problematic not only due to its severely limited reach, but also because it is contentious in its agenda and inherent assumptions.

One of my main objections is the extent to which Diaspora Studies theorists emphasize differences between the experiences of migrants and non-migrants. To make their case, they need to highlight the ‘othering’ processes in host societies, which force migrants to choose between assimilation and exclusion. However, the laudable aim of respecting individual differences and fragmented identities has also led to a self-ghettoizing tendency, where there is little, if anything, in common even amongst individual migrants. As a result, the ‘oppressor’ is deemed incapable of understanding the ‘oppressed’; and the ‘oppressed’, even as they have their oppression in common, are left with their differences, which theorists tell them they should emphasize, only to be left with little to no bonding similarities. Social difference, for example, according to race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, etc., thus becomes a source of value that is taken to express and underscore the uniqueness of each individual migrant. Alternatively, the intersectionality of migrants’ oppression is what is considered the centre of focus. Bernard Waldenfels calls such approaches the ‘divinization of the other’, where the other, in its status of difference, is elevated onto a moral pedestal as that which is ‘entirely other’ (Waldenfels, 1951, p.5). In this respect, the framework presented by much of theory of migration remains superficial, clouded by the preferred ways in which migrants are to supersede the social dynamics that marginalize them.

However, looking at human experience in its social environment requires more depth and is far more complex than just the categorization of differences and the presentation of ethical and normative solutions. Waldenfels (1951, p.10), whose aim is to develop a more accurate Phenomenology of the Alien\(^1\), also criticizes the marking of cultural differentiations as superficial. He does not

\(^1\) The alien is that which is other or strange. Waldenfels applies the terms to intercultural encounters from a phenomenological perspective. The alien is distinguished from the Other by processes of exclusion, “I am where you cannot be, and vice versa” (p 73).
advocate a universalist approach to culture, but rather sees human experience within culture as something that neither belongs “to each of us nor to all of us” (p. 71). In that sense, the experience we share is something that both separates us and connects us simultaneously, where both dynamics play equal importance. It is my contention that a Heideggerian perspective offers an important contribution to a study of migration that can speak both to that which separates us (which, with Heidegger, we might refer to as the ‘ontic’ differences) and to that which connects us (which, with Heidegger, we might refer to as the shared ‘ontological’ concerns).

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger addresses the superficiality of the study of certain social phenomena. He accuses the sciences of forgetting the main question, that of Being. His aim is to develop a fundamental ontology, one that reveals the shared grounds of our Being. Instead of assuming an abstract ontology, Heidegger first looks at Being as it is experienced by us on a daily basis, and then draws out the elements that are foundational for our existence. An approach that complements our interpretations of empirical data on migration with an ontological basis does not presume that we have exhausted our studies into individual differences amongst different social groups. However, it is my contention in this thesis that such an approach, which inquires into what it means to be “us” by drawing common aspects of existence, is required. There is a side that has been forgotten in the social sciences: that of the shared grounds that shape us. Heidegger believes that inquiring into our Being will result into looking at the different elements that define our daily existence. Inquiring into Being ‘arises from the average understanding of Being’ but which also speaks of its ‘essential constitution’ (*BT*, 1962, p.28). Leaving such an account unanalyzed allows superficial assumptions to be made (for instance, through ascribing moral characteristics to Being) that may simply reflect what the researcher wants the object of study to be, which explains the abundance of unjustified prescriptive terminology in Diaspora Studies. The lack of both depth and of an account of the common aspects of experience on the part of Diaspora Studies research is a problem that I believe can be addressed through Heidegger’s phenomenology.
Heidegger offers a thorough analysis of issues or questions that we have in common as ‘Dasein’, i.e., as beings who are concerned with their existence and to whom things matter and are meaningful. The idea is that, while we share those issues or questions (for example, that we all know of our own mortality, that we are all inextricably embedded in a life with others, and so forth), we respond to them in different ways, depending on our individual circumstances and on the specific social and historical contexts in which we find ourselves. The existential analysis that Heidegger proposes intends to reveal how we exist in our world, what concerns us as human beings, and what the existential structures common to all of us are, in order to allow us to understand the wider existential context of the specific ways in which we engage with those shared concerns and common structures in our everyday dealings. As important as it has been for the social sciences, specifically for branches such as Diaspora, Migration, Post-Colonial and Feminist studies, to understand and highlight the differences amongst different groups of people, and to make those differences visible and portray them as valuable for society, a look at the grounds of experience as a place for bridging such differences will provide a different kind of insight into the social phenomena addressed by the aforementioned schools. To this end, it is critical that we remain aware of the particular contexts in which different lives take place. This is why a fundamental ontology, according to Heidegger, first requires a study of everyday experience. The reasons for the focus on everyday experience are that 1) it is what is most familiar for us (bringing ontology closer to us); and 2) it shows that although we are all different at the level of everyday life, we still have in common certain questions to which we all respond in different ways. There is an ontology of every-day-life; and ontology is an everyday practice of human beings (although rarely made explicit).

This is a further crucial insight of Heidegger’s that can be brought to bear on migration studies: not everything that influences how we experience our life can be made explicit. Especially in his later work, Heidegger makes mystery an important aspect of his philosophy as something that must be preserved. There are phenomena, or aspects of phenomena, ‘enigmas (Rätsel)’, that will remain unintelligible to us, and such lack of accessibility already changes our
understanding of that which can be understood. He points at the ‘mystery of
Being’ (*WICT*, 1951, p.52), towards which we must be open in order to attain a
deeper understanding of ourselves, as such mysteries cannot be penetrated, but
can only be ‘sensed’ through their presence (O’Donoghue, 2011, p.10). The
enigmas that Heidegger emphasizes in his later work serve, in a way, as a
humbling mechanism towards that which we think we know by pointing out that
there are things that we cannot know, but can only infer. In this sense, he poses
enigmas as part of our inquiry, but that are normally conceived as in conflict with
science. Such understanding posits any query of a phenomenon as limited by its
nature and its context, where truths also depend on the recognition that there is a
limit to our knowledge. Opposing the classical scientific tradition that posits the
object of study as something that can be comprehensible in its totality and can be
fully described through definitions and categories, Heidegger offers a relational
and dynamic explanation of things, which are dependent on their contexts and
may thus change with them. Any concepts used in a study therefore work as a
provisional interpretation of reality, as opposed to a fixed theoretical
determination. In *Being and Time* Heidegger already states that the validity of
scientific concepts is temporal. As these come to a crisis, such crisis opens the
possibility for the renewal of any science. In this sense, proposing the revision of
the concept of the migrant by opening new perspectives on it, will allow for the
reorientation of this concept into new directions that will hopefully provide a
more accurate understanding of this social phenomenon.

The revelation of a shared ground of experience and common existential
structures, I believe, already transforms our understanding of individual existence,
since it implies that there is something existentially prior to individual differences,
which can be appealed to as a basis for mutual understanding. Emphasizing such
grounds does not negate the importance of social dynamics of inclusion and
exclusion, but it offers alternative ways of understanding them based on both a
common existential structure that grounds our being and on a shared world where
our existence takes place in a variety of ways. The main aim of the present project
is to show, first, how Heidegger is a valuable source of new ways of
understanding for the social sciences, and, second, how his philosophy can be
mobilized to expand and deepen the analysis of the migrant experience. Furthermore, it lets us discover the existential structures common to human beings, which can serve as a meeting point for communication and mutual understanding. It places the emphasis on the fundamental concerns as opposed to the socially constructed differences, directing the focus towards that which is shared and not towards that which segregates, without overlooking the individual or cultural differences that arise from particular contexts.

The first chapter is meant to set the scene for different issues in migration opened up by a Heideggerian perspective. First I present a summary of the relevant literature on migration as it appears in the school of Diaspora Studies. Beginning with the event of physical displacement, this literature attempts to describe the transformation of the migrant’s identity as a redefining process in which marginalizing circumstances play an essential role. The marginalization of migrants is explained in terms of colonization and economic social order, which, from this perspective, define who stands as the ‘other’ in society. They emphasize the political position of standing against the ‘oppressive structures’ that, according to them, define the migrant experience. Concepts like ‘hybridity’ and ‘third space’ are proposed as means to deal with and oppose cultural oppression. Also in the first chapter, I explain my main three criticisms against Diaspora Studies’ view of migrants and their experience. Firstly, the concepts Diaspora Studies uses to attempt to change the social order can, at most, serve as alternative forms of speaking of diversity, but not as political tools that can grant power to marginalized groups of migrants in any given context. In this regard, a Heideggerian perspective would highlight that the many issues that migrants struggle with may not be just ‘their’ issues (i.e., issues of ‘marginal interest’), but actually issues that are of shared general concern.

Second, the widely used concept of the ‘hybrid subject’, originally proposed by the cultural theorist Homi Bhabha (1994), stands for those culturally and socially fragmented identities that do not necessarily cohere with one another, but that are so often part of the same individual. Bhabha and his fellow scholars claim to use this ‘new ensemble’ as a way to destabilize the dominant cultural forms. I propose that hybridity, as an identity that marginalized groups can
ascribe to, can only be result of combinations of other previously established sources of identity, such as religion and class, which undeniably remain more identity-defining than a self-definition as a ‘hybrid subject’. Hybridity is a new form of identification, but not one that ‘destabilizes’ previous ones; it does not by itself transcend marginalization. In this sense, a Heideggerian perspective denotes the lack of need for definite ethical stances through his understanding of both authenticity and becoming homely.

My third criticism is that the mentioned scholarship misuses its own concept of identity. They state that identity is fragmented and multiple and therefore lacking a centre and impossible to unify. However, by assuring that it is also possible to liberate the migrant, it is implied that the migrant functions as a unit, or that his/her identity is based on a central aspect that can be liberated. This means that the idea of social liberation often promoted in theories of migration is not necessarily compatible with the description of the fragmented identity of the migrant, as if the migrant needed to step out of its own characteristics and become something more than itself, since identifying as a migrant presupposes both an oppressed state and a fragmented identity. Heidegger can possibly offer an understanding of identity that is based on our engagement and response to shared ontological concerns, not on a normative agenda of personal improvement.

I conclude the first chapter by arguing that many current theories on migrant identity are insufficient and biased towards the goal of political liberation. I criticize the Diaspora Studies project for making the description of migrant experience a normative one. Masked by the presupposed rigor of the social sciences, a description of the migrant’s characteristics is turned into a set of guidelines to be followed. I propose that we do not need such a teleological understanding of migration. On the contrary, assuming a political stance makes any analysis of the migrant experience problematic, since it is based on the assumption that the invention of new concepts must aid a specific social agenda.

Chapter Two addresses important criticisms against the social sciences approach including that of Diaspora studies. The main focus of this chapter is the normative status often given to claims regarding migration, especially those based on assumptions of individual agency and of the need of emancipation and
representation of the other. Such claims are contested through Heidegger’s concept of authenticity. Through the use of Heidegger’s philosophy, the need for an account that considers ontological as well as contextual and particular aspects of experience is introduced. In order to understand the foundations of Being, Heidegger first looks at everyday existence in order to disclose its fundamental structures. This is the main axis that can be exploited in the social sciences. Because Heidegger not only pays attention to individual differences, but also makes a point to uncover a common shared world, this could provide a balance for the research on migrants. Those shared grounds destabilize the fixed concept of the migrant as something that cannot be fully explained, but they also open themselves up as bridging concerns that facilitate an understanding of connections amongst different (types of) migrants and between migrants and non-migrants. In this respect it is important to understand a Heideggerian approach as a phenomenological method, which does not so much target the what of the objects of philosophical research, but rather, the how of that research. For Heidegger, this means to allow things to show themselves as they are. Instead of presupposing the answer through the question, through the ‘what’, phenomenology informs us of the how without predetermining the what of the studies object (BT, 1962, p.59).

Heidegger does not look for objective definitions, but for answers to fundamental questions that are common to everyone. His aim is not to define things through ascribing to them properties or categories, but by identifying the main issues that arise through experience. This, according to Heidegger, is the way to access the theme of ontology: that of ‘Being’ that is accessed through lived existence, in its manifold expressions. According to Heidegger, the social sciences do not address the question of the meaning of Being but only the characteristics specific to different entities. He proposes a fundamental ontology that accounts for the context. I adopt this Heideggerian stance insofar as I argue that looking into shared ontological issues and not only individual and cultural differences, can bring about a better understanding of migration. The shared grounds that the literature on migration proposes are based in empirical characteristics, like race, class, legal status, not in existential issues that are not confined to empirical data.
The first section of the second chapter is dedicated to Heidegger’s criticism of the social sciences as presented on *Being and Time*. Summarizing, Heidegger opposes the distinction between an observer and a separate reality, such position is now commonly held in the social sciences research. However, Heidegger criticizes the objective posture within the social sciences regarding their concepts as they are assumed to be timeless. Heidegger points out that both questions and concepts are always already shaped by human values that are not absolute. In terms of the literature on migration, social science understands its normative claims as based on true and universal values, without recognizing that those values are contextual. Heidegger also accuses the social sciences of being anthropocentric, of ascribing too much importance to the individual. This aspect can still be found within the Diaspora studies through the assumption of individual agency and the relevance given to subjectivity.

The second section of Chapter Two is dedicated to the concepts of Dasein and World and how they can contribute to the discourse on migration. Heidegger uses Da-sein (Being-there) as a way of expressing that in order to be, one must be placed or located somewhere. Dasein brings the real, seemingly external world, into individual existence. Our understanding of subject/object as separated entities, where the observer is detached from the observed external reality is also challenged by the concept of Dasein. A being that is always already located somewhere cannot be described as a kind of being (its what) without making reference to its situation (its how), that is, Dasein’s involvement in the world is self-defining. Heidegger incorporates the necessary contextualization into the nature of who we are, as existing beings. Dasein is the only entity whose being is an issue for itself, that is, we are concerned with our ontological status and that of others. One of Dasein’s distinct ontic characteristics is that it is ontological, concerned with its own Being (*BT*, 1962, p.35) Although Dasein is always expressed through an entity because it must express itself with certain characteristics; it is dynamic and temporal. It is not fixed and, although it possesses specific characteristics, it is not reducible to them. When dealing with Dasein, Heidegger states, “an understanding of Being…is already included in conceiving anything which one apprehends in entities” (*BT*, 1962, p. 22). The
ontological priority for Dasein is the implicit understanding of the relation with its being and with the being of other entities.

As expressions of Dasein, we are able to understand entities and ourselves in our ontic states, or our existentiell possibilities, but this understanding is grounded in Dasein’s capability to also grasp entities ontologically. In this sense, through Dasein’s involvement in the world, its possibilities are restricted by its circumstances. Not everything is possible for any given Dasein; Dasein cannot make anything it wants out of its circumstances as these are restricted by a definite context. Dasein does have possibilities, but these are not under its complete control. The world, thus, restricts but also discloses Dasein’s possibilities (BT, 1962, p.182). Dasein and world share an intrinsic and inseparable link. The world is also what allows us to understand these interactions as it forms what Heidegger calls the totality of significance, this is what Heidegger calls ‘the worldhood of the world’ (BT, 1962). The world provides Dasein with meaningful relations through which Dasein understands itself. Dasein and World stand for essential ways in which we exist, even if the forms these ways take vary depending on the social, historical and cultural context of each Dasein. They inextricably form part of Heidegger’s fundamental ontology. Analyzing migrants from a Heideggerian perspective is not only to account for the differences amongst them, but also to look into a general underlying ontological structure, which is rooted in specific ontic characteristics.

The third section of the second chapter focuses on the question of authenticity, which is not only a core concept in Heidegger’s early work but also addresses the agenda of ‘liberation’ as it is formulated in current social theory of migration. I criticize the Diaspora Studies literature for offering a better and prescriptive understanding of oneself as a migrant in order to oppose prejudices and discrimination dynamics. In order to explain my criticism through Heidegger’s concept of Authenticity, I first review his concept of das Man, as they are closely related. 

Das Man refers to the anonymity of social practices that one tends to conform to, usually without reflecting on their merits or purposes. Heidegger claims that Dasein prefers to flee into the anonymity of das Man, averaging itself
out with everyone else into a state of normalcy and comfort (BT, 1962, P.164). The relevance to migration shows in that das Man determines the social norms that we rarely stop to question because we live in them, in the social context that created them. In migration, switching societies also involves an adaptation to a new das Man. In the new das Man, the migrant can feel excluded and exposed if he/she is not acquainted with the social norms of the host society. In this way, migration exemplifies the element of intelligibility that das Man provides to any Dasein. The relevance of authenticity for Heidegger shows through the question of how to “be one’s own” in the midst of the inherent phenomenon of das Man. Heidegger speaks of modifying existentiell (or concrete) possibilities while remaining in das Man. Even though Dasein is always restrained by a definite set of possibilities and by society, Heidegger claims that Dasein must engage in a kind of understanding, one that understands those material possibilities that he/she has been thrown into. Heidegger does not specify whether authenticity is attainable but he speaks of Dasein’s ‘ownmost potential’, as if the possibility of becoming authentic was there for any Dasein, but not necessarily actualized in each of them (BT, 1962, p.223).

For Heidegger, being authentic is a fundamental issue for Dasein because it stems from our necessary involvement in das Man. In this sense, the question of authenticity can arise for the migrant in terms of understanding his/her possibilities within the context he/she is situated in, just as for any other Dasein. Questioning the norms in the social realm might be more accessible to migrants as they face social adaptation. The migrant’s confrontation with the new society presents more concrete possibilities for such fundamental questioning although it does not necessarily lead to authenticity. I analyze authenticity in migration also as a challenge against normative claims in Diaspora studies. The circumstances that allow migrants to face situations that bring about the questioning of social norms provide neither an ideal nor permanent characteristics that make migrants more “aware” than other people. Thus, the assumption that there is something to be prescribed about how to understand oneself as a migrant is one step too far from what is a fundamental question in Dasein’s existence which shows itself through the experience of migration.
Chapter Three is dedicated to the notions of home as a crucial concept both in the research on migration and in Heidegger’s philosophy. I attempt to present the beginning of a regional ontology of the home, as an in-between analysis that draws Heidegger’s fundamental account of the home and the empirical findings that point at certain concrete characteristics and elements in regards to the relevance of the home in migration. I begin with a literature review on the research of migration that focuses on this topic. Relations between home, identity, belonging, and the experience of homeliness are drawn. Questions arise regarding the fixity of the home and its temporal and spatial transformations. There is a parallel made between the findings of the research on home and migration and Heidegger’s analysis of the home. In the first section, home is divided in sense of belonging (rootedness), mobility, and return. For Heidegger, the journeying towards the home is, instead of linear, cyclical and an existential aspect of our lives (HHI, 1996). Thus the account given by the research on migration is empirical and dedicated to concrete (ontic) factors, while Heidegger views the home as something of fundamental relevance.

In the second section, I examine the different elements that Heidegger points out as relevant to the home. He also distinguishes the experience of the homely from the physical place of origin, or the homeland. For Heidegger, the desire to feel at home is an existential one. He speaks of the necessity of a homecoming, or a return to the homeland, as a rediscovery of what was once familiar. The idea of homecoming already points at a journey outside of the home, away from the unfamiliar. Not only do we stop feeling at home when we are taken out of our comfort zone, but we are already in a state of homelessness as part of our existential structure. This is Heidegger’s main contribution to the social sciences analysis of the home, its opposite. For Heidegger, homelessness is important existentially as he considers it an inherent element of our being. To be homeless is to turn away from it, and to Heidegger, this is something we constantly do in order to forget our own nothingness and finitude. However, to become homely, we must experience the strange, the uncanny, the foreign. Drawing a comparison with the social research on migration, the importance of the foreign for the migrant is that it also allows him/her to see the differences
from his/her home. The migrant is then able to compare that which is foreign with that which is familiar. An existential analysis of the distinction homely/homelessness in migration expands such notions beyond the concrete experience of not-being-at-home, and gives it existential relevance. For Heidegger, homecoming and becoming homely are cyclical processes that establish a constant relation between the home and the foreign. This, for him, also involves an understanding of the familiar in a historical sense, of what is one’s own, one’s culture and one’s history. I also analyze Heidegger’s concept of dwelling. For Heidegger, dwelling is a fundamental activity of Dasein. To dwell is to find oneself at home, to inhabit a place and make a home of it. In the lectures on Hölderlin, Heidegger explains that since human beings “are not of themselves”, to “dwell in one’s own is what comes last and is seldom successful, and always remains the most difficult” (1996, p.21). In this sense, Heidegger draws a relation to the home through engaging with it. Dwelling is an activity that requires one to be involved in the place where one is situated, and that place is also linked to a world that contextualizes it. Finally, I focus on Heidegger’s lectures on Hölderlin’s poetry (1996) on rivers as directly related to dwelling. There he uses the river as a representation of the locality of dwelling of human beings, and relates its journeying to our own history. The river is both locality and journeying: through its course, it allows for dwelling places to arise, while it itself dwells in its own journeying. The river represents the movement out of the homely into the unknown and the process of homecoming.

Heidegger’s main contribution to the discussion of the home is the introduction of the relevance of homelessness. By examining existence in a broader sense, in the way we relate to the world and how we live in it, Heidegger points to homelessness as an inherent element to the ability to dwell and experience a feeling of familiarity anywhere. Heidegger implies that we have an existential desire to feel at home, and as such it is part of our ontological constitution. The importance that Heidegger gives to homelessness provides a different perspective on migration. If this element brings about common concerns regarding the grounds of our existence, then, the feeling of being without a home, or a place where we feel comfortable, in migration, gives rise to such concerns.
more readily. The responses to such concerns, however, differ depending on the particular experiences and not all necessarily lead to rediscovery of familiarity.

The fourth and last chapter is dedicated to Heidegger’s concepts of the uncanny, finitude and groundlessness. None of these issues have been addressed by the social sciences and yet Heidegger sees them as fundamentally rooted in our existence. The first section of the chapter explains Heidegger’s anti-anthropocentric view, which helps with understanding the groundlessness that he then claims as our existential ground. I then address the concept of the uncanny as explained in his early writings, in relation to nothingness, Anxiety and Being-towards-death. Heidegger affirms that Dasein constantly refuses to acknowledge the groundlessness of its existence, and instead takes refuge in the assumption that our surroundings are stable. However, he claims that Dasein, in moments of anxiety, is called back to its own Being, where Dasein faces the dilemma of whether or not to confront its own groundlessness. Feelings of anxiety are common in the first stages of migration. Facing a nothingness in the sense that we don’t really know what is coming because it might be completely unfamiliar can easily bring existential issues to the foreground. Furthermore, the endings of the lives that were lived before migration (even as these endings might be only temporal) are also mourned while the migrant is confronted with building up a new life. I compare Heidegger’s treatment of the uncanny in *Being and Time* with that of his later writings, where he separates different ways of encountering this experience. In *Der Ister*, Heidegger states that we are the most uncanny of beings because we turn away from ourselves. Thus, for Heidegger the negation of our essence as finite and groundless determines our everyday existence. Yet, such groundlessness erases the possibility of ever finding absolute and permanent truths for us. Our life is shaped by such fragility and instability, and yet we turn away from it in order to be able to carry on with our daily lives.

I conclude the last chapter explaining how fundamental issues, such as groundlessness, that have been forgotten by the social sciences, surface in particular instances, but can also be shaped by regional circumstances. For instance, migration as a region that has been defined by, for instance, border-crossing, physical displacement, etc., can bring to the foreground fundamental
issues such as the instability of our individual lives. I thus criticize the social sciences for not addressing such fundamental concerns while explaining why Heidegger provides a more in depth analysis of human experience which can contribute to the research on migration.

Heidegger specifies that in order to revise the empirical sciences and develop more appropriate approaches, it is necessary to disclose the underlying structure of existence, that is, not only to describe the characteristics of entities, but to discuss the structure of their Being. Heidegger clarifies that ‘to be’ is not only the description of the characteristics of entities, but is also the relation to Being which all beings share. The Diaspora studies scholarship has applied ontic characteristics to the migrating experience and has called it ontology. Although through the crisis of homelessness in migration, ontological questions are brought to the foreground, this does not mean that only migrants are capable of such crises, but that through these experiences, the foundations of Being surface as an issue. It also does not mean that the migrant possesses the privilege of a permanent state of questioning and remembering Being; such a claim would merely repeat the mistake made by Diaspora Studies, of failing to acknowledge Dasein’s temporality and understanding it as a fixed entity alone, by speaking of the ontic aspects as ontological characteristics. It would be a mistake to ascribe ontic characteristics to the awareness that comes with migration, since that would imply an understanding of the migrant as a ‘better’ type of entity. In certain situations, questioning our being becomes more pressing, for instance, if we feel unstable or vulnerable (i.e. migration). However, those specific situations can also be experienced by non-migrants, although the migrant can speak of that which is foundational to any other Dasein.

The relation between Heidegger’s fundamental ontology of Being and its exemplification in the migrant is the main issue to be addressed, if Heidegger’s philosophy relates and contributes to redefining migrant identity. How does the relation between Heidegger’s existential analysis and the experience of the migrant play out and how do they help explain each other? In the final section of this fourth chapter I outline some of the implications of using Heideggerian ontology to explain the migrant experience. It is necessary to disclose the
underlying fundamental structure of being, not reducing migrants to their characteristics. This concludes my reassessment of the experience and concept of the migrant.
CHAPTER 1: Migrant Identity in the Social Sciences

In order to address the topic of migrant identity, it is important to review briefly the theories that have brought about the current conception of identity in relation to society, that is, social identity. This concept gained central focus in the social sciences from the second half of the 20th century, primarily as a result of the rapid change in surrounding social contexts (Howard, 2000). With the rise of migration, the expansion of communication technologies, and the current global exposure to the emphasis on individuality, social identity became an issue that needed to be addressed and defined. Its political implications in terms of race, class, gender, and other systems of social stratification have become evident. The concept of social identity was and continues to be questioned and (re) defined in differing social contexts, in attempts to explain society itself. Two prominent examples of this can be found in the fields of cultural theory and the social sciences. I review here the main trends of each field, outlining my main criticisms of these theories regarding their assumptions about social structures and the individual. Outlining the main problems of these theories is essential as these theories limit our understanding of the migrant identity.

1.1 IDENTITY IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

Psychology is the discipline that has primarily discussed social identity, its roots and its building process. It has characterized social identity as something that is intrinsically related to its context in a variety of ways. There are four main approaches to identity in this field: social cognition, social psychology, psychoanalysis and developmental psychology.

In the area of social cognition, for instance, psychology defines cognitive schemas as the representations of identity in our minds. Schemas are organized packages of information which can be divided into two kinds: self-schemas, defined by one’s personal characteristics, preferences, goals, behavior patterns; and group schemas, indicating social positions and stereotypes (Howard, 2000). These schemas serve as ways of explaining social relationships, indicating that
identities are rooted in the social context (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Thus, in social cognition, identity is the mental processing of external stimuli in relation to the individual.

In social psychology, Henri Tajfel & John Turner (1986) developed Social Identity Theory, which was originally employed to understand the psychological basis of intergroup discrimination and studied the extent to which individuals identify themselves in terms of group membership. They also conducted several studies that focused on the individual’s relation towards in-groups vs. out-groups and how an individual distributes rewards or is more prone to discriminate against certain groups depending on his/her relation to them. Schemas of representation are drawn from the cognitive tradition and applied such schemas to different populations in terms of the individual. It explains social identity in terms of the internal representations of the group to which the individual belongs, but it does not explain how the process of forming an identity occurs.

In the psychoanalytic tradition, Sigmund Freud describes identity as unstable and as a constant negotiation among the different elements of the id, the ego and the superego. The ego develops through a dialogue between the inner drives and the expectations of the external world. Identity is then constructed through this process of negotiation, which, according to Freud, is fundamentally generated through interpersonal interaction, especially during infancy (Howard, 2000, Martin-Alcoff, 2000). Freud adds the ‘unconscious’ as an underlying layer of identity, one we have no access to but that affects our behavior. In this sense, Freud views part of identity as determined by drives we cannot control or change. Carl Jung (1953) would later emphasize the idea of a stable centre as an expression of a primordial unconscious state during infancy, in which subject and object were not yet differentiated. According to Jung, this ‘oneness’ would later develop into the unconscious of the adult mind as a ‘permanent state of identity with objects’. Closely related to psychoanalysis, Melanie Klein developed the concept of ‘projective identification’, explaining identity as composed of representations of the self in relation to others throughout a process primarily developed in early infancy (Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983). In summary, the psychoanalytic tradition emphasizes three major points in terms of identity. It sees
the self as a centre where the ego, super ego, and the id meet. This meeting point allows for the construction of identity, which is primarily determined during childhood. Lastly, the unconscious, while remaining inaccessible, determines identity construction and is in direct relation with the ego.

Erik Erikson, a developmental psychologist, focused on the development of the individual’s identity throughout his/her lifetime. Erikson established different developmental stages as crucial in order to form a healthy identity. Erikson asserted identity as maintaining continuity and coherence over time. He viewed the different developmental stages as a coherent process that leads the individual to maturity. Although he recognized that identity was never an ‘achieved’ state of being, he held the notion that a sense of continuity is maintained in order for the self as a single unit of being (Brah, 1996). Erikson also endorsed the notion of an inner essence of identity. Third wave feminists have problematized this view by contrasting it with one where identity is fragmented and the different fragments are not necessarily coherent (Ortega, 2001).

In sociology, Erving Goffman’s application of symbolic interactionism (originally proposed by George Herbert Mead) stated that people attach symbolic meaning to objects, behaviors, themselves and other people (Howard, 2000). These meanings are developed and transmitted to others through social interaction. Language plays the key role in communicating these meanings in society. Goffman’s elaboration on this theory suggested that the meaning of identities varies across situations given that these identities are located in certain social spaces. Furthermore, this theory attempts to explain that role identities obtain different levels of importance in any individual, establishing a hierarchy that is based on the social context. It also emphasizes the negotiating process that is required for identity construction. Symbolic Interactionism, among other prevailing theories within the social sciences, sees identities as generated and constructed through an internal and external dialectic that is conditioned within specific social worlds (Howard, 2000; Vertovec, 2001).

More recently, Richard Jenkins developed an overview of different theories on social identity within the social sciences. One of the highlights of his
work is his take on social identity which he defined as ‘collective identity’. He described it as a dialectic interplay of processes of internal and external definition (Lamont & Volnar, 2002). Similar to Mead’s idea that we cannot realize ourselves, except insofar as we can recognize the other in his/her relationship to us, Jenkins claims that this dialectic shows, on the one hand, how our internal identification process must be recognized by others for a collective identity to emerge, and, on the other hand, how we draw our internal identification from the community in order to differentiate ourselves (Lamont & Molnar, 2002; Taylor & Spencer, 2004). Similarly, Gergen & Gergen (1987), endorsing the social constructionist perspective, view identity as a patchwork that is not necessarily coherent. They observe that one individual can express different identities and behaviors depending on the social context.

Further developments in social interactionism propose an ‘overall self’ formed by multiple identities, each of which is linked to different elements of the social structure. According to Stryker (1980), an identity is a ‘internalized positional designation’ for every different position that a person has in society. Interaction does not occur between people, but between people’s differing elements that relate to certain groups or contexts. This approach differentiates between placing an emphasis on the social structure, which is the fixed role that the context demands of the person, and an emphasis on the agency of the individual of transforming or creating this role (Stets & Burke, 2003).

Although these theories on identity generally agree on the inherent relation between the individual and its context, the main debates that arise from them are: the question of identity as a unit or as multiple identities, the possibility of an essential core, the possibility of a sense of continuity of identity and the possibility of agency. Identity, even when addressed as a social phenomenon, is normally perceived as unified and cohesive, or at least of possessing an underlying core to which we can refer to as the ‘self’. However, as we look more closely at our roles in society, as part of the economy, the political spectrum, and our respective families; independent expressions of different identities appear. Our roles vary depending on what function we perform in different contexts, and
given the structural variety of these, our identities at times seem incoherent and discontinuous.

Nonetheless, the notion of an axis that regulates our different social identities still permeates many discourses. An essence or a centre that makes us ‘who we are’ seems to alleviate the fragmentation that we encounter in society. When Stryker (1980) states that ‘parts of the person’ are the ones that interact with the context, but not people per se, he explains that the parts that are ‘held back’ are irrelevant in terms of the meaning required from each identity in every different context. However, he refers back to a ‘self’ in which these identities are contained. I would suggest that this ‘overall self’ is just as irrelevant as the parts that are ‘held back’ during distinct social interactions. Moreover, some social theories go further proposing that we are active agents able to transform our roles in society for our convenience. Agency has been endorsed by a number of social theories as the motor for radical social change (Anzaldua, 1987; Butler, 1993; Lugones; 1989). It implies that there is always a possibility for individual action in a social context. I will argue that it is possible to add new elements to the way different aspects of society operate, without implying that there is an essential core to our identities and without erasing already existing elements of the structure that form our social environment.

1.2 IDENTITY AND MIGRATION IN CONTEMPORARY CULTURAL THEORIES

Recently, the relationship between identity and physical space has been more thoroughly addressed within the social sciences as an expression of the importance ascribed to context and social worlds. This focus normally brings up issues of mobility, migration, and identities based on a sense of being at home. These issues have been addressed by recent cultural theories focusing on diasporic communities. The current approaches view identity as socially constructed, as a constant, and normally conflicting negotiation between the individual and the social structures that oppress him/her, and signal the possibility of resisting these structures (Anzaldua, 1987; Bhaba, 1994; Hall, 2000; Said, 2000, Spivak, 1996). The trends addressing migrant identity tend to focus on the political implications
of oppression, which are mainly based on social identities (sexual, racial/ethnic, religious, etc.). They base their discourse on the assumption that there is a historically and socially established ‘other’, the post-colonial, the migrant diasporic, or the gendered/queer subject, and believe there are ways of ‘resisting’ the structures that oppress the ‘othered’ identities. In the present section, I review major current cultural theories that focus on the importance of physical space, and social and historical context regarding identity construction.

1.2.1 Diasporic Identity

The field that deals with migration and identity is that of Diaspora Studies. Heavily influenced by the works of Stuart Hall (1990), Homi Bhabha (1994) and Paul Gilroy (1993), it originates primarily from post-colonialism and Black studies. The concept of Diaspora is etymologically rooted in Greek and is translates as ‘to scatter through’. In Diaspora Studies, identity is seen as a hybrid multiplicity that can never be reduced to a unity. The link established between physical space and identity construction becomes evident through the process of leaving one’s homeland, that is, by migrating. Madan (1996) defines the migrant as ‘a person who has crossed the border’, seeking to engage in a new beginning in order to increase his/her possibility of a better life. Similarly, Diaspora also refers to the dispersal of people who, metaphorically and/or physically, ‘will never be able to return to the places from which they came (Hall, 1990)’. This concept was initially used to highlight ‘the catastrophic origin, the forcible dispersal and the estrangement of diasporic people’ in their places of settlement (Brah, 1996; Cohen, 1997). It has also been defined as ‘expatriate minority communities that are dispersed from an original ‘center’ to at least two ‘peripheral places’ (Safran, 1991)’. Diasporic individuals tend to maintain a ‘memory, vision, or myth about their original homeland and believe that they are not and perhaps cannot be fully accepted in their host country’ (Safran, 1991). They see the ancestral home as a place of eventual return and are committed to the maintenance or restoration of this homeland. Their consciousness and solidarity is significantly defined by this continuing relationship with the homeland (Clifford, 1997). They often go
through a difficult process of settling in the new society and struggle to build new kinds of identities, ‘consciously or unconsciously by drawing on more than one cultural repertoire (Madan, 1996)’.

Clifford (1997) makes a point of differentiating diasporic populations from diasporic discourses. Diasporic populations do not ‘mean’ to stay in the host society. Unlike immigrants, they do not travel to recreate their original ‘home’ in the new place. However, he does recognize that there are diasporic forms of longing, memory and (dis) identification that are shared by a broad spectrum of minority and migrant populations, who, once separated from their homelands, increasingly find themselves in relations with the former country of residence. He states: ‘diasporic discourses reflect the sense of being part of an ongoing transnational network that includes the homeland not as something simply left behind but as a place of attachment in contrapuntal modernity’ (Clifford, 1994). However, the term diaspora is now used to describe other social groups that have been displaced or have migrated for a variety of reasons, such as economic inequalities within and between regions, expanding mobility of capital, people’s desire to pursue opportunities that might improve their life chances, political strife, wars, etc. (Brah, 1996). These changes lead to multi-locale attachments across nations, which involve a ‘dual loyalty’ to the homeland and the host country (/countries) (Clifford, 1994). Given this alienated spatiality, it is possible to feel both that one belongs and does not belong to either society at the same time (Radhakrishnan, 1993).

Addressing the modern crisis of identity, Diaspora Studies generally views this crisis as part of a wider process of social change. This process involves avoiding fixation on a stable identity in society (Hall, 2000; Talyor & Spencer, 2004). Identity, within Diaspora theory, is conceived as constructed, fragmented and unstable, as well as rooted in spatial metaphors (Brah, 1996, Clifford, 1997; Hall, 1990; Madan, 1996). Stuart Hall (1990) defines identity as a ‘production’ which is never ‘complete, always in process, and always constituted within, not outside representation’ (Hall, 1990, p.222). It is not continuous or discontinuous, but framed among the simultaneous vectors of similarity, continuity and difference (Hall, 1990). Identities are also multiple, and given that they are always
in ‘flux’, they are neither fixed nor singular (Brah, 1996). The perceived continuity, or ‘core’ of identity is enunciated as the ‘I’ and is the process by which that enunciation occurs. Thus, ‘Diaspora identities are constantly producing and reproducing themselves anew, through transformation and difference’ (Hall, 1990). For Clifford (1997), we can learn from diasporic identities that cultures are not preserved by being protected from ‘mixing’, but exist as a result of it.

Hall defines collective cultural identities as a matter of ‘becoming’ as well as ‘being’. They have histories in common, but undergo constant transformation. They are neither fixed nor ‘essentializable’, but are subject to a continuous play of history, culture and power (Hall, 1990). Collective identities are not reducible to the sum of the experiences of the individual members of a group. These identities share something in common around a specific axis of differentiation that is established through social structures (Brah, 1996). In this sense, the concept of identity that Diaspora studies endorses is similar to that of symbolic interactionism and social constructionism, but it also erases the idea of a ‘centre’ that unifies the multiple identities. Unity is proposed only for communication purposes among individuals when referring to themselves (by using ‘I’ to refer to themselves, they bring together such multiple identities). Although this view of identity arises from the different physical environments, it is also the case that our identities are multiple and change according to the social roles we partake in, for instance, as a father, a student, a lover, etc. We behave differently depending on the role we play with different people in different social environments. The question is, if our identities are multiple and at times radically different from each other, is the ‘individual’ at all relevant in society beyond its fulfillment of the different roles he/she plays?

The diasporic subject becomes ‘other’ after its border-crossing. ‘Other’, in this context, is not only understood as the unknown, the stranger, or the foreigner, but according to Lavie and Swedenburg (1996), the diasporic ‘other’ is also a legal and political entity that ‘disrupts’ the ‘homogeneity’ within the host society by virtue of its mere presence. Paradoxically, it is also proposed that the diasporic ‘other’ stands at the ‘periphery’ of society. Gayatri Spivak (1996) used the concepts of ‘periphery’ and ‘centre’ to refer to the relation between marginalized
populations and those in power: those who have a ‘voice’ within the dominant global discourse, and those who do not (Spivak, 1996). Thus, even when the diasporic ‘other’ stands out by its physical difference within the new society, he/she is not part of the dominant social discourse and holds no positions of power. Post-colonial authors have posited that the “other” is a result of colonization, ‘other’ being the populations colonized by the West (Spivak, 1996). The focus on those colonizing and central societies is exemplified by contemporary migration trends and the attempt to imitate and obtain the privileges of the North American lifestyle in developing countries. Thus, the diasporic subject aspires to the centre, but cannot get rid of his/her marginality.

The diasporic subject becomes ‘other’ through border-crossing, engaging in an active and planned endeavor towards a foreign land, where he/she is then exposed to political, social, cultural and legal ‘othering’ It is the constructed binary of ‘us’ and ‘them’, ‘centre’ and ‘periphery’, that defines the experience of the diaspora (Brah, 1996). Diasporic subjects therefore find themselves as ‘other’ within a context that has already established their ‘otherness’. The diasporic subject, in turn, experiences this context, as ‘other’. Clifford (1997) states that the diasporic experience is then constituted by experiences of discrimination and exclusion, forcing the diasporic subject to acquire a different sense of historicity and identity within their new location. The diasporic self is often made aware of his/her ethnicity, if it is different from that of the host society. This poses the need for negotiation with mainstream identity while at the same time understanding the link with one’s own history, that being personal and cultural (Radhakrishnan, 1993). The diasporic subject symbolizes the ‘out of the country’ and in many occasions, the ‘out of language’ experience and its representations (Lavie & Swedenburg, 1996).

The permeating influence of power structures is evident not only through the ‘othering’ of the diasporic subject, but in the global context as well. According to Clifford (1997), Diasporas and diasporic forms are, to varying degrees, the product of regimes of political domination and economic inequality. Demographic phenomena such as the conflict in the U.S. border with Mexico, the legal and illegal population movements migrating to Europe (mainly originating
from developing countries), and the recent increase on stricter immigration policies in developed countries evidence the influence of economic inequalities in population movements. Relations among countries, normally based on power, are the main regulators between and across changing diasporic constellations. According to Brah (1996), the concept of diaspora is centered on these configurations of power that differentiate and situate Diasporas internally and in relation to one another.

There is a notion of uprootedness among diasporic populations, of occupying no specific cultural space, but of being immersed in different social circles and cultural ties (Gray, 2000). At the heart of the concept of diaspora lies the image of a journey. Paradoxically, the aim of diasporic journeys is to settle (Brah, 1996). Paradoxes of this nature continually appear within the diasporic experience and its elements.

1.2.1.1 Home within Diaspora

According to Brah (1996), one of the central elements of the diasporic experience, home, becomes a place of desire for the diasporic imagination, while it is also the lived experience of locality at the same time. Home is defined, within this theoretical framework, as ‘an invocation of narratives of ´the nation’ (Brah, 1996). It becomes a floating, yet rooted signifier, portraying a site of daily lived experience where ‘feelings of rootedness ensue from the mundane and the unexpected of daily practice’ (Brah, 1996, p. 4). The concept of home includes social networks of friends and family and is a place with which we remain intimate ‘even in moments of intense alienation from it’(Brah, 1996, p.6). It is initially conceptualized and understood as the location where ‘feeling at home’ was first experienced. For this reason, the concept of home is tied to the notion of identity; it is implicit in the story we tell about ourselves (Sarup, 1996).

Diasporic theorists agree with the importance ascribed to the concept of home regarding those who migrate (Brah, 1996; Clifford, 1997, Lavie & Swedenburg, 1996). According to Radhakrishnan (1993), the diasporic self inevitably historicizes the moment of departure as the moment of rupture from the
‘natural home’, which in turn becomes a desire for a ‘homely’ feeling. This moment becomes self-defining for the diasporic subject. Furthermore, Gilroy (1993) states that within the diasporic experience, there is a ‘homing desire’, or a search for ‘feeling at home’. This feeling, however, does not necessarily have to stem from the place of initial departure or origin. Previous to Diasporic studies, Said, writing on the experience of exile in his book Orientalism, describes home as an unreachable location once one has departed from it. Home, metaphorically, not physically, becomes a mythic place of no return. The “feeling at home” that Gilroy (1993) mentions, no longer arising from the place of origin, is fragmented into two or more locations. This does not imply, however, that the diasporic subject does not feel anchored in the place where he/she happens to be settled. According to Brah (1996), the question of home becomes linked with processes of exclusion or inclusion and how these are experienced subjectively. The political and social environment and the personal struggle directly influence the question of home over ‘belonging’. Inclusion entails ‘feeling at home’ as individuals when we conform to the roles or identities we are expected to fulfill in different social environments. Brah distinguishes the experiential ‘feeling at home’ from the physical declaration of a place as one’s ‘home’. This distinction becomes repeatedly relevant throughout the diasporic experience.

If return is no longer possible, the question emerges of whether there is such a thing as a Promised Land for diasporic communities. In terms of migration, in some diasporic populations, the promise is that of the return, while in those migrating populations striving for a higher standard of living, the promise is that of the land across the border or the host society (i.e. immigration towards the U.S). Nonetheless, return to the homeland is perceived as a necessity with regards to diaspora, because of a sense that living in the diasporic stage is to live in alienation from one’s true history and heritage. The return is sometimes conceived as the cure for the ills of diaspora, as a result of ‘feeling inauthentic’ in the receiving land (Radhakrishnan, 1993). The return, if possible and plausible, is viewed as a political choice, as a desire to restore the homeland or to continue to struggle with the diasporic state (Clifford, 1997). However, oftentimes it is not the case that once the migrant returns to the homeland their feeling of alienation
will subside. On the contrary, the individual is confronted by the revelation that ‘home’ no longer brings about the ‘feeling of home’. It is not necessary that even given the possibility of restoring or changing the homeland, that the individual would desire to do so. The idealization of ‘home’ and the experience of alienation in diasporic populations figure in diasporic discourses as a necessity for action and change. If the individual feels alienated, there is the sense that he ‘must’ do something about it, at ‘home’ or in the host societies, as a mode of acceptance, or as political action.

Another constitutive element for the diasporic subject is the border, since it becomes a metaphorical and physical symbol of migration. Brah (1996) defines borders as arbitrary lines that are social, cultural and psychic, and have been constructed to sustain the segregation of outsiders or ‘Others’. Borders limit the possibilities of identities. All migrants necessarily encounter a border that closes the nation in on itself and distinguishes it from the other nations. These borders, in the view of Diaspora studies, are also open the possibility of communication among individuals pertaining to different nation states (Madan, 1996). Within diasporic and transnational communities, the stranger, the diasporic subject, becomes an instrument in redrawing the boundaries of national identities (Lamont & Volnar, 2002). Diasporas are then seen as means of transportation for symbolic boundaries from one cultural context to another.

The concepts of border and diaspora are referred within some feminist circles as ‘politics of location’. In Notes towards a Politics of Location, Rich (1984) speaks against a totalizing gaze, proposing a focus towards the local. Brah (1996) considers this approach valuable given that when one speaks about ‘Diaspora’ in general, the issue of displacement and dislocation can easily fade out of focus. Feminist theories have played an important role in addressing the issues of home, location, displacement and othering from a political perspective. Regarding the issue of ‘politics of location’, the notion of ‘locationality in contradiction’ has emerged as a way of explaining a ‘dispersed positionality’, or a ‘simultaneous situatedness’ within spaces of class, race, ethnicity, sexuality, etc., and of movement across both cultural, religious and linguistic boundaries and geographical and psychic borders (Brah, 1996). This approach intends to
overcome those discourses about border-crossings and diasporic identities that imply a common standpoint or a universalized notion of ‘border consciousness’. The politics of location, on the other hand, places the multiplicity of semiotic spaces at diasporic borders in the discursive foreground, emphasizing the play of political power and how it can be either maintained or eroded by certain ways of thinking (Brah, 1996).

Borders symbolize the binary oppositions established by nation states. However, they also signal the hybridization of identities that resist the arbitrariness of these lines (Anzaldúa, 1987; Bhabha, 1994; Lavie & Swedenburg, 1996). The border is seen as a way of transcending the imposed national boundaries through possible models of ‘corroding’ the center by making it ‘marginal’ (Lavie & Swedenburg, 1996). Gloria Anzaldúa (1987), who makes the borderlands the central axis of her theory regarding chicano lesbian identity, believes in the possibility of creating spaces between the borderlands, where tolerance of contradictions and ambiguities would be nourished.

Lines drawn discursively or physically can be open to questioning and repositioning. However, the ‘border’ is no ‘open space’, it is only a line defined by global politics and nation states. It becomes ‘materialized’ when you know you will be asked for a passport as opposed to not asked; where an individual legally belonging to a certain state, has to prove his/her legality in another. The space surrounding the border is a place where different elements of each state communicate, but only certain elements can communicate. It is not the case that ‘cultures just meet in the border’. This is impossible because of the complexity of any culture or the variety of cultures within one state. The physical closeness between two states is much more visible in the lands surrounding the border, which allows for a stronger cultural influence in the way societies comport themselves on either side. However, it is not in this space that different cultures can influence the legal or the political systems of the nations in question, given these systems establish the physical border as such. It is not possible to ‘resist the line’ by virtue of hybridization. The ‘line’ is ‘there’, expressed only through the legal operations that take place in a territory and that split such territory in two.
This split is evidenced only by the change in the legal treatment of individuals that depends on whether they belong to one side or the other.

Spivak (1996) initially proposed the solution of “making the centre marginal”. She stated this process was possible by being aware of one’s own privileges and through ‘hybridization’. This statement is problematic since it assumes that through one’s thoughts, it is possible to relocate and/or (re)signify the individual’s peripheral position. If it were the case that one could convince others that the periphery were actually central in thought, this would pose problems. Since these peripheral and central positions are tied to the physical space and political structures, how does this communication change anybody’s position, let alone privileges? It is fair to say that by envisioning the centre as marginal, there will be, for instance, no decrease of migration towards developed countries, so this political agenda will have no political impact whatsoever. It is not only about the impact on the political spectrum, but about the impact on other ‘centres’. What is the centre that becomes marginal? It is not clear whether the centre to be ‘marginalized’ is an economic, an academic, or a legal centre, or whether all centres are to be targeted. If these different aspects are addressed, it becomes much simpler to challenge the possibility of a political change through ‘self awareness’. What then becomes questionable is whether that is even the point; whether this political agenda of emancipation and reposition is something we can or should strive for in the manner suggested by these scholars. The problem is not the questioning of the dichotomy, but the periphery/centre relation to the social environment. Thus, the link between the subject as actively engaged in the (re)signification of peripheries and centres, and what actually occurs in terms of inclusion and exclusion in society, has not been properly addressed by Diaspora studies.

1.2.1.2 Imagined Spaces in Diaspora

Although most Diaspora theorists emphasize a sense of loss and displacement, they also present the benefits of the diasporic experience. Paul Gilroy (1993), for instance, emphasizes the possibilities and opportunities that diaspora opens
through cultural exchange, endorsing the development of transnational cultures and identities (Gray, 2000). According to Gilroy (1993), diasporic communities highlight ‘intercultural positionality’ on a global scale. He views the tension between the concepts of “home” and “dispersion” as creative and as being critical of essentialist discourses that defend fixed origins (Brah, 1996). Similarly, for Clifford (1997), the process of identification with historical and political global forces throughout the diasporic experience is not restricted to patterns of inclusion or exclusion, but can also incite a sense of ‘feeling global’. The dialectic between ‘here and there’ breaks linear history, ‘the present is constantly shadowed by a past that is also a desired and obstructed future; a renewed, painful yearning’ (Clifford, 1994, p. 318). For Clifford, this reveals the possibility of renewal and of a transnational community. Nonetheless, it is unclear how his understanding of temporality in the diasporic experience differs from the understanding of time of any other human being or how such understanding contributes to the ‘renewal’ of a ‘transnational community’. Diasporic populations are able to make ‘the best’ of their experiences of loss, marginality and exile, channeling them into skills of survival, strength, and cosmopolitanism (Clifford, 1997). Avtar Brah (1996) has attempted to enclose the common elements in the current diasporic forms in her concept of ‘diaspora space’. This term is supposed to serve as the point of convergence between the concepts of diaspora, border and dis-location, and current economic, political, cultural and psychic processes. Brah expects this term to challenge the subject position of the ‘native’, positing the global condition of culture as a site of ‘migrancy’.

The concept of hybridity has become prominent within diasporic and post-colonial discourses. It is the positive and emancipating aspect of diaspora. As initially presented by Homi Bhabha (1994), this concept depicts the fragmented identity, where different homelands for different cultures meet, where borders are blurred and a sense of continuity in identity is vague and sometimes lost. Hybridity stands within and in opposition to the ‘hegemonic power’ that created the minorities that conform to it. Through the segregation of cultures, hybridity is
able to form alliances, without trying to force all of its fragments into coherence, yet welcoming them into a heterogeneous existence (Lavie & Swedenburg, 1996).

Regarding notions of hybridity, there is disagreement as to whether its emergence in society is active or passive. Homi Bhabha is accused of constructing hybridity only as a passive response to the ‘Eurocenter’, instead of endorsing a constant self-search and self-production (Lavie & Swedenburg, 1996; Radhakirshnan, 1993). Radhakrishnan (1993) splits hybridity into two kinds: metropolitan and post-colonial. The former is that which occurs accidentally in a certain location as a result of being the meeting point for national and transnational citizenships, while post-colonial hybridity symbolizes the struggle to obtain the constituency and legitimization of the hybrid’s political identity. Just as diasporas have differing reasons for their departure and differing experiences of their journey and host society, hybridities are not equal, and, paradoxically, the heterogeneity within them has now been overshadowed by a generalized, softened, and even occidental notion of hybridity (Radhakrishnan, 1993). Similarly, bell hooks has pointed out that through the ‘diasporization’ or ‘hybridization’ of minorities, attention is deflected onto a broader generalized global spectrum, while long standing structured inequalities continue to occur at the local scale (Clifford, 1997).

Another example of these idealized spaces is the ‘third space’ (Bhabha, 1994). The ‘third space’ is a symbol of hybridity and of the imaginary homeland where the fragmentation of the self is recognized as an important factor in the construction of various forms of solidarity (Bhabha, 1994). Bhabha proposes it as a productive location for creativity and imagination, negotiating a space for diversity (Rath, 2004). It evidences the ‘in-betweenness’ of the diasporic identity, even when this ‘in-betweenness’ does not exist physically. This ‘in between’ is the hyphen of mixed identities (i.e. African-American, Chinese-American, etc.), and attempts to empower the hyphen, at least symbolically. Hyphenated identities, normally marginalized, are intended to be repositioned within the hegemonic discourse by highlighting and ‘exploding’ the hyphen as the meeting place for their diversity (Lavie & Swedenburg, 1996). This ‘in betweenness’, some claim, is also a strategic mobility tool, a culturally hybrid link that can be applied from
many spaces at once without fully inhabiting any of them (Bhabha, 1994; Fisher, 2003). However, Radhakrisnan (1993) stays skeptical regarding the power of the hyphen, given that in actuality one still has to face unequal mediation in terms of what aspect society chooses to focus on. She sees the emphasis on the hyphen as an attempt to ‘de-historicize’ the hyphen within the diasporic subject, when it would be more productive to emphasize its ethnic identity.

Bhabha’s concepts of third space and hybridity present a passive representation of the diasporic individual. Through this representation alone, Bhabha assumes the possibility of challenging the ‘hegemonic discourse’ responsible for creating the margins of society only by the presence of the hybrid subject in a homogenous society. As new concepts emerge for different identities, such as the hybrid subject, more social differentiations are created. The illusion of endorsing solidarity through a permeating concept that covers ‘all the hybrids’ only adds another box, another identity that one can ascribe to. This is not necessarily good or bad, but just another created social category which will either remain, representing certain characteristics or traits, or will fade as time passes and new social categories emerge. Not everybody has the same access to all identities. It is rather difficult to present oneself as a ‘hybrid’ if you are a Caucasian middle class male, or as a homosexual man if you are a Muslim female. The inclusion/exclusion dynamic always occurs, and is maintained by further differentiations. Radhakrisnan makes a good point in signaling this western version of hybridity as a new identity, but to say that it works as an opposition to social marginalization is a different matter. The ‘hybrid’ is a new layer that was originally presented within academic discourse. It poses an identity that theoretically ‘includes’ intercultural identities. However, in reality, it does not ‘bring minorities together’ because these minorities, before considering themselves as ‘hybrids’, they are ascribed to other and previously differentiated identities (ethnicity, religion, etc.). Therefore, hybridity as an identity cannot resolve inequalities brought about by economics and politics.

It may seem more soothing to believe there is a ‘third space’ where one can reach an ‘imaginary homeland’, but it cannot go anywhere beyond the mental picture that it portrays. There are spaces in urban societies where individuals from
different cultural backgrounds meet, and certain aspects of those backgrounds are communicated, but they do not create a ‘space’. Hybridization, as a concept that exemplifies the fragmentation of identities or that signals a new identity, is appropriate, but it does not unify cultures, it can only express an academic discourse that offers a new identity that, in turn, ‘speaks’ for and about the unity of certain identities.

Gloria Anzaldúa’s ideas (1987) have influenced the studies on diaspora and identity through her conceptualization of the mestiza. Mestiza is the female form of the Spanish word mestizaje, which signifies the process of ethnic mixing that occurred during the Spanish conquest in Mexico. To be a mestizo is to have both Spanish and indigenous ancestry. The mestiza and the process of ‘mestizaje’, become a representational space for all types of cultural hybridity (Aigner-Varoz, 2000). Anzaldúa (1987) states that individuals who belong to the margins have the ‘ facultad’, or the capacity, to understand the meaning of ‘deeper realities’ and to see ‘the structure below the surface’ because they have become sensitized through having undergone processes of displacement and exclusion. The borderland, for Anzaldúa, becomes an internalized metaphor that ascribes meaning to the mestiza. The mestiza situates herself within a ‘metaphorical borderland… a vague and undetermined place created by the emotional residue of an unnatural boundary’ (Anzaldúa, 1987, p.80). She considers these borderlands, in their ambiguity (that they are neither here nor there), as an empowering space, where definitions constructed by the colonial discourse can be actively questioned and refused (Ochoa, 1996). For Anzaldúa, it is in the experience of the borderlands where the basis for the social resistance and the creation of consciousness lies (Ramlow, 2006).

Anzaldua describes the ‘mestiza consciousness’ as one that has been produced and delimited by both sides of the binary (us and them, center and periphery), but never totalized by either (Ramlow, 2006). Through the ‘mestiza consciousness’, it is possible to break down dualistic hegemonic paradigms, by learning to ‘juggle cultures’ and to maintain a ‘plural personality’ where ‘nothing is thrust out, the good, the bad and the ugly, nothing rejected, nothing abandoned’ (1987, p.79). The new mestiza not only sustains contradictions but ‘turns
ambivalence into something else’ (Anzaldúa, 1987). Anzaldúa attempts to turn the ‘mestiza consciousness’ into a new value system, with images, symbols and metaphors that may serve to erase socially established dichotomies (Aigner-Varoz, 2000). She endorses tolerance for contradictions and for ambiguity because they offer the opportunity to perform differing roles in differing contexts.

She refuses to synthesize identities within the mestiza, and it is this multiplicity that allows her to understand other marginalized identities. The mestiza is the meeting point for multiple personalities. The mestiza is restless and in constant internal conflict. Anzaldúa describes this ‘psychic restlessness’ as a ‘struggle of borders, an inner war’. (1987, p.78) This state of conflict symbolizes the mestiza’s vulnerability.

Anzaldúa also uses metaphors, mainly drawn from Aztec mythic imagery, to portray the multiplicity of meanings that a concept can contain. Anzaldúa believes that metaphors have the power to redefine individual realities and, thereby, to build intersubjective spaces in the social realm (Aigner-Varoz, 2000). She normally chooses figures from Aztec culture in order to ‘rework’ the past, in order to expose its current hybridity (Radhakrishnan, 1993). She attempts to offer a decontextualized and dehistoricized manipulation of indigenous narratives with the objective of constructing a contemporary and radically different ethnic identity (Aigner-Varoz, 2000). This exercise is meant to show that it is possible to empower marginalized communities with intersectional identities by revealing how marginalized communities can exercise agency.

Anzaldua pushes for a ‘mestiza consciousness’ that is at the same time a ‘space’ for hybridity. Anzaldúa seems to remain largely unaware of the different philosophical questions and debates regarding the nature of consciousness, or, at the very least, seems adamant about ignoring them. Her concept of the ‘mestiza consciousness’ is just a term that she uses that contains some of her ideals regarding identity, but it does not acknowledge any of the proposed meanings and contents of consciousness. In the best case scenario, Anzaldúa’s consciousness is posed as a ‘different’ kind of self awareness, that of the mestiza, which is implied to be superior to others in terms of its capacity to understand tolerance and contradictions. Furthermore, Anzaldúa ascribes power and agency not only to
physical spaces (the borderlands), but to the *mestiza*. The *mestiza* is supposed to have the capacity to see deeper realities. Regardless of how “deep” reality can be, the *mestiza* can be nothing more than a lens, a mode of observing society. Evidently, Anzaldúa’s *mestiza* does not exist as a person, but as a perspective. The *mestiza* is not a meeting point of marginalities and cultures, it is not a space, and it cannot create consciousness. Anzaldúa is quite comfortable with speaking in metaphors in order to transmit certain feelings and ideas about what she envisions a new identity could be like, but enforces no rigidity in her arguments nor does she outline any defined concepts which could support her flowery language. As she says, the *mestiza* is ‘neither here nor there’, and neither is she. Moreover, one cannot ‘empower’ an individual or place, because people and places only reflect the social structure. Through discourse, it is possible to add elements to the description and explanation of these structures, but that does not give one power to ‘resist hegemony’.

Anzaldúa imbues her concept of the *mestiza* identity with ‘a plural personality’ where ‘nothing is rejected’; no identity and no culture are rejected. Besides her idyllic perspective of tolerance, it seems doubtful that she means this non-rejection in any serious sense. Must one not reject a racist personality? Must one not reject a person who endorses oppression and violence? Furthermore, one naturally dismisses certain identities depending on the context where one finds oneself. A ‘no rejection’ attitude would be dysfunctional and catastrophic in society. The same applies for elements of different cultures. Also, how are the characteristics of the *mestiza* extrapolated to others, for instance, to those others that define the borderlands? Is it only the *mestiza* communities and identities that can ‘understand’ the structures that have relegated them? This would prove as exclusive as the margins that Anzaldúa so severely criticizes. Furthermore, how are the *mestiza* identities to change the status quo through their new systems of symbols and metaphors if they are the only ones who can understand them?

Anzaldúa’s attempt to dehistoricize ancient Aztec mythology in order to ascribe a different meaning to it seems to diminish the relevance of the history of colonial oppression; a relevance which has been a crucial element in discourses that address migration and its political causes and consequences. The myths used
by Anzaldúa are historical and contextual, and should be recognized as such. Regardless of the different interpretative modes and the possible symbolisms that can be ascribed to these myths, there is a history to them that must be acknowledged if there is a point to be made regarding oppression and marginalization.

1.2.1.3 Feminism and Migration

Feminist theories influenced Diaspora Studies, not only because they view women as part of the marginalized in society, but because of the emphasis placed on the necessary application of their theories in the social and political realm. These theories, sometimes called Third world feminism, hold an ethical position of condemning oppression and endorsing human rights and respect for diversity. Similarly, third wave feminists address the topics of migration, race and colonialism and relate them to gendered identities. They believe these socially constructed borders can and must be transgressed.

Defining identity, Judith Butler (1990) states that this concept is a descriptive feature of experience. To her, the general idea of identity as continuous and coherent has been socially constructed. Butler sees identities only as impositions of a patriarchal society, ideals that have been created to control; they become internalized through a process involving social and historical relations that occurred mainly through inequality (McNay, 1999). In turn, these ideals do not exist but are only imperfectly replicated in society. Butler affirms that identities are copies of an idealized ‘original’, they are performative because there is no essence to them (Butler, 1993). The subject has the possibility of (re)signifying the terms that define identities. Since identities work through a socially recognizable and determined code that varies according to the context, the performativity inherent to identities allows them to be open to change and (re)construction, and specifically, to equate dominant and marginalized gender norms (Butler, 1993).

One of the main themes of Third World feminism is that of multiple identities within the self (Alarcón, 1990; Anzaldua, 1987; Lugones, 1989; Ortega,
The heterogeneous representations of race, gender and class across languages and cultures form multiple, shifting, and often self-contradicting identities within the subject (De Lauretis in Lavie & Swedenburg, 1996). Gloria Anzaldúa (1987) adds that these multiple and contradicting identities can also be performed. This performativity adds a playful aspect to identity, in which it is possible to blur the boundaries that confine them. For instance, in the immigrant queer community, the ‘closet’ opens up as a possibility for strategizing the use of their queer identity; it is no longer a confining boundary (Fisher, 2003). These feminists see the axes of domination as contradictory, and also as mutually supporting (De Lauretis, in Lavie & Swedenburg, 1996).

The ability to ‘perform’ these identities in order to blur their boundaries stems from the idea that the subject can be active with regard to its own identity, which expresses an assumption of agency. Although Butler (1993) is correct in assuming the lack of originality in any identity, it is not only through individual action that it is possible to change gender norms since gender is not ‘performed’ equally, nor it is equally relevant in all social contexts. It cannot be assumed that performing certain identities differently will necessarily lead to an interpretation that will result in equality of gender norms.

De Lauretis states that one decides ‘to reclaim one’s identity’ in order to establish a strategy (in Lavie & Swedenburg, 1996). It is as if one willingly occupied the subaltern position in order to push its boundaries. Alarcón (1990) explains it in terms of ‘being driven to grasp’ certain subject positions across varying contexts. As a socially displaced individual, one must ‘embody’ this drive to understand him/herself and his/her relation to the social reality. Whether this is a mode of consolation for one’s marginalized status or therapeutic self-acceptance remains unclear, but it is supposed to be an empowering discourse that attempts to push towards social action. This endeavor is evidently flawed because it assumes we can ‘choose’ identities. We cannot just spontaneously ‘choose’ to be white, or to be a lesbian. The possibility of performing certain identities that could be our own is a privilege only available to some.

By blurring the boundaries amongst identities, they propose a means for social action, one that seems to be based on a ‘different’ kind of consciousness.
within these feminist discourses. Whilst Anzaldúa pushes for a ‘mestiza consciousness’, Chela Sandoval endorses a ‘differential consciousness’, which is supposed to enable movement “between and among ideological positioning”. This consciousness “enables” us to choose to engage with or disengage from a power-transmitting system (Ortega, 2001). While for Sandoval we can enter and exit power systems at will, for Norma Alarcón, this consciousness allows us to ‘lose sight’ of the subject-object dichotomy in experience (in Lavie and & Swedenburg, 1996). Through all of these new conscious elements, the goal is to create new grounds upon which to ‘bridge’ the restricting social borders and form coalitions among marginalized gendered communities (Alarcón, 1990; Anzaldúa, 1987; Ortega, 2001).

Feminist perspectives on these issues make the mistake of ascribing characteristics to identity that it does not have. They establish certain ethical grounds assuming a superior status of authority when making judgments about what is good or bad for marginalized identities. These feminists end up engaging in the same behaviors they condemn. These perspectives also state that by virtue of agency it is possible to ‘disengage’ from ‘power transmitting systems’. Regardless of the lack of clarity about what system they are referring to, the claim seems to be based more on fantasy than on the requirement of clarifying definitions. At no point is any identity disengaged from a social system. One is engaged in certain elements of it, and disengaged from others, but in a social environment, unless one is outside the economy, has no voting rights and has no identity card, it is impossible to willingly and entirely disengage from it. Disengagement is only possible if one is located ‘outside’ society, and to be ‘outside’ society is to be excluded from ‘the rights’ that these authors highlight as the basis of their arguments. Furthermore, Butler’s (1990) assumption that identity was ‘created to control’ is simplistic and unclear. Identities emerged as a way of identifying with one’s group and one’s family, and in order to differentiate one’s group from other groups. They were not ‘created’, but certainly, power works in different ways for different identities in a much more complex way than Butler suggests. It has been through multiple differentiations in society that inequalities and discrimination towards many identities have come about.
1.3 CONCLUSION: CRITICISMS OF MIGRATION AS ANALYZED BY DIASPORA STUDIES

Although Diaspora studies and other contemporary cultural theories have focused on some crucial elements of migration, there are certain assumptions about identity and society within these theories that need to be revised in order to enable a more holistic understanding of migrant experience. I have identified three main problems that come up continually across these perspectives. They not only limit those perspectives, but invalidate them.

In their descriptions of society, these views place an emphasis on power structures in order to explain discrimination and marginalization. Inequalities and differentiation are inherent processes in our society, but power does not work in the same hierarchical manner across all parts of society because society itself is divided into different fragments. These demand that individuals play different roles according to the function they serve. There is no ‘hegemonic’ centre that we can blame marginalization on. I do not intend to deny that history and the current structure of our society have engaged individuals into exclusion/inclusion dynamics in different social realms. However, simplifying these dynamics into a binary of ‘us’ and ‘them’ across the board negates the complexity of our society and is conducive to further segregation.

Additionally, these approaches endorse the view of the individual as a social agent. According to them, an individual is capable of transgressing and changing the ‘social order’ through individual agency and political action. Interestingly, while recognizing the fragmentation of identities in society, these views hold on to the concept of the individual as a unity when it comes to social change. This is a self-contradicting viewpoint and grants power to the individual when it has none, especially in society as ‘a whole’. There is also the view that the individual can modify ‘society’ through collective action. Again, the ‘collective’ erases individual agency, defeating the argument these theories push for. If, however, we were to grant them the possibility of social change, it would have to be context specific. The aims would be directed to a specific goal within a specific part of society such as education, the legal system, etc. It is not possible to decrease, for instance, domestic abuse, through more classes on Gender studies.
The view of agency also allows for incorrect assumptions of causality. It is the perspective of the aforementioned theories that individual political action can lead to social change. Again, this is very simplistic. Even if specific targets within the political spectrum are established, one cannot assume A will necessarily lead to B. A may have many repercussions at different social levels that one cannot account for, one of which might be B, but not necessarily so. Aims such as ‘transgressing cultural boundaries’, or ‘equating gender norms’ are completely unrealistic, even more so if the belief is that the individual can achieve these goals. The individual cannot know what will happen when performing his/her role in a certain context because of all of the other social factors that come into play.

The emphasis placed on power structures, coupled with the idea of agency, posits the migrant subject as a subject in need of emancipation. It becomes a ‘call for justice’, a constant political endeavor, which is too broad and unrealistic. It is based on an ethical discourse that presupposes a generalization of what should be the treatment of individuals in society at large, without accounting for the difference in the social realms and how they work. A political agenda cannot be the point of academic theorizing since it cannot be assumed that the latter will translate into the political spectrum. It becomes only a mode of alleviating the concern for social inequalities, but it does not resolve them. These theories fail to achieve their goals simply because they cannot do it through the means available to them. Their problematic assumptions regarding the structure of society and the individual (in terms of agency) only reveal their loopholes and allow for a severe questioning of their foundations. Nonetheless, they have pointed out crucial elements of migrant identity and have set the path for further and better understandings of it. The descriptions offered by these perspectives serve to identify the conditions that have brought about migration and identity, but they do not account for the experience of either. It is my objective to offer an understanding of the migrant experience while acknowledging social structures and the role of the individual in them.
CHAPTER 2: Contemporary Migration Studies in the Context of Heidegger’s Critique of the Social Sciences

Theoretical positions in current migration studies commonly presuppose a socially constructed image of the individual migrant while at the same time assuming that migrants are able to change their identity and situation. For example, they claim that migrants are a product of their historical and social context but that they have individual agency to change it (Knott & McLoughin, 2010). Different ways in which migrants can understand themselves beyond exclusion practices and possibly change the characteristics of the society that have shaped their experience are proposed and discussed (for instance, as hyphenated identities, diasporic consciousness, etc.). However, while the importance of the social environment is undeniable, the normative stance inherent in a large number of current concepts of migrants and migration is problematic. Although it is obvious that certain attitudes and dynamics towards migrants need to change, a prescriptive view on migrants can easily lead to exclusionary dynamics towards those that do not meet a proposed norm. If, for instance, the characteristics that are attributed to migrants as hybrids (i.e. ambiguous, contradictory identities) are shared by some, but not by others, this can create further social division between the more “progressive, contemporary” migrants and the ones that are not. Despite the risk of such dynamics, the assumptions regarding migrants, even in their acknowledgment of individual differences, are nonetheless applied in a universal sense, not descriptively, but worse, prescriptively. That is, they are taken to describe not only the characteristics that (especially marginalized) migrants share in general, but also to establish characteristics of a normative kind, which specify supposedly “better” ways for migrants to live and understand themselves.

That we have come to understand “the other” in society as in need of recognition, representation, and emancipation is tied to Western liberal values. There seems to be little awareness in current literature on migration that such assumptions regarding individual agency and the importance of individuality are historically and socially contingent (Lugones, 1989; Ortega, 2001). What is important to remember, then, is that any proposed norm maybe itself questionable
and will anyway not be applicable to all migrants universally, at least not in the same way. Furthermore, such normative approaches to migration often suffer from methodological tensions because they, on the one hand, consider it beneficial to highlight differences amongst migrants and, on the other hand, still draw on categories that require that the experiences and situations of migrants are generalized. The attempt to define categories and to create ideals that can be ascribed to migrants ‘in general’ and at the same time to remain anthropocentric and individualist makes it difficult to look beyond what Heidegger calls “the ontic”, that is, the accumulation of objective facts and concrete characteristics. What is usually forgotten or neglected, however, are those issues that are not reducible to facts and definitions, but that nonetheless shape migrant existence as it is experienced and that are of concern to migrants and non-migrants alike. These issues Heidegger calls ‘ontological’. They comprise, for example, our self-referential structure that allows for the questioning of ourselves and our environment, including the concern about our finitude (O’Murchadha, 2008). This ontological dimension of human existence and thus of the lived, experienced existence of migrants remains unaccounted for in most of the social sciences. However, they are of fundamental importance for understanding how we come to interpret and live in concrete situations. For instance, that we are social beings is an ontological characteristic that defines our interactions with others in our daily lives.

My point is not, of course, to oppose the existing scholarship on migration in its entirety, but merely to offer another possible, namely Heideggerian framework with which to augment current research on migration. In a sense, this framework builds on the very debates it also critiques. The insistence on the acknowledgement of the various differences amongst migrants (differences which some of the theories propose should be emphasized as a matter of pride), which drove much of scholarship in the 1990s, was of critical importance. Only on the basis of it, we can now take a new look at what underlies those differences; a look that does not make the universalist assumptions that the emphasis on difference rightly opposed. It is important to note in this context that Heidegger not only acknowledges the undeniable influence of the social environment in which we
happen to be situated, but that he also looks at the existential structure of that which ends up giving rise to a diversity of experiences and which relates the being of the migrant to the being of Dasein in general. His aim is not to develop a set of empirical descriptions but to develop a fundamental ontology that is manifest in concrete experiences. By this he means to reveal the conditions that make possible our particular mode of being (TER, 1969). I believe that this framework can prove helpful in reconciling the currently conflicting tendencies in the literature: on the one hand, to reject universalizing and hence exclusionary practices, and, on the other hand, to assume that certain categories have general application and even normative force.

In Being and Time, Heidegger develops a critique of the social sciences, which still applies to contemporary social research, including research on migration. In the current chapter I first present Heidegger’s critique of the social sciences with a special focus on those aspects of his critique that are of direct interest to migration studies. In general, Heidegger challenges tacit assumptions in the social sciences that are passed off as universal but are really determined by historical and social factors. Instead he demands that concepts be continuously revised as their relevant contexts change. Furthermore, he accuses the social sciences of anthropocentrism because they rely too heavily on conceptions of individual agency (BT, 1962, p.70). This last criticism, related to Heidegger’s general critique, continues to be an issue in Diaspora studies. In the second section of the chapter I address Heidegger’s conception of the relation between Dasein and World, which also serves as a means of critiquing the subject/object model and the idea of an observable reality separate from the subject. Heidegger claims inter-dependence between the context and the individual, making any assumptions about society contextually dependent and thereby unstabilizing any normative claims regarding how one should live and understand oneself ‘in general’. Also, through his concept of Dasein, Heidegger draws out ontological concerns that are shared amongst different groups (e.g., finitude, inherent sociability, etc.), thus shifting the focus from empirical observable characteristics to those of an ontological kind. Finally, after laying out the general basis of critique against the social sciences, I focus on the problem of the normative.
Diaspora scholarship has dedicated much research to proposing prescriptive concepts while offering very little justification for them. It is my contention that Heidegger’s notion of authenticity offers a non-normative approach that challenges such prescriptive perspectives.

2.1 HEIDEGGER’S CRITIQUE OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

Heidegger questions the assumptions made by the sciences regarding the entities or objects they investigate and regarding their relation to them. According to him, these assumptions, such as the detachment between observer and reality, have been established as metaphysical principles. In opposition to these assumptions, which still permeate the empirical sciences, Heidegger denies that the world is split between a detached observer and a separate independent reality, as the Cartesian model of subject and object maintained (Howarth, 2004, p. 242). Instead, he argues that all of these assumptions are historically contingent. There are no ‘timeless truths’, but only ‘fossilized product[s] of specific theorists responding to specific historically inherited problems with the specific resources of their culture’ (Mulhall, 1996, p. 21). Therefore, no enquiry is without presuppositions. As Heidegger states in his *Introduction to Metaphysics*: Questions ‘are not given like shoes, clothes or books. Questions are as they are actually asked, and this is the only way they are’ (*IM*, 2000, p. 21). This means that our questions are already shaped by the way we ask them and that the context in which we ask them constrains the range of possible answers. No question is unbiased, because any question has an enquirer behind it, who is always already situated in a certain environment at a given time. This does not mean that scientific and/or philosophical enquiries are rendered impossible, but it means that our presuppositions are to be acknowledged and their origins investigated as well (Mulhall, 1996, p. 31). Heidegger attacks our blindness to such already made assumptions that shape the concepts we use in our sciences:

It simply no longer occurs to us that everything we have all known for so long, and all too well, could be otherwise - that these grammatical forms have not dissected and regulated language as such since eternity like an
absolute, that instead they grew out of a very definite interpretation of the Greek and Latin languages” (IM, 2000, p. 56).

Although in the quote above Heidegger makes reference to one specific assumption in particular, namely that of a neutral scientific language, whose historically contingent nature is usually ignored, his criticism targets the general failure to question established scientific concepts, which stands in direct conflict with the historical and fluid nature of our knowledge. In a similar vein, Heidegger also points at flaws in certain areas of philosophy insofar as they are driven by the search for timeless truths about reality. Heidegger accuses metaphysicians of being unaware of the background that constitutes our understanding and therefore of failing to acknowledge that this background shapes cultural changes and crises (Wrathall, 2000, p.12). There are no ‘eternal truths’; there is only contingent understanding, which in turn shapes historical changes. For Heidegger, such contingent understandings can be brought about by philosophy. Just as Descartes established the dualist model as a way to view and study the world, the deconstruction of the separation between subject and object can also open up different horizons of understanding. Heidegger does not think that philosophers can affect human activities in particular ways but that they can make way for ‘a change in all practices of an age’ (Wrathall, 2000, p. 23). In this sense, philosophy inherently ‘belongs to a higher order, and not just “logically” as it were, or in a table of the system of sciences’ (IM, 2000, p. 98). Philosophy thus may not have a direct impact on social dynamics or politics, as some scholars in Diaspora studies seem to expect, but it can shape the processes of understanding those dynamics. It can provide different grounds for understanding migrants without necessarily affecting migrants in particular.

Heidegger believes that the sciences do not necessarily have to continue in the same manner and that there are other possible ways for the sciences to proceed. Explaining the development of scientific research, Heidegger indicates: “the real movement of the sciences takes place when their basic concepts undergo a more or less radical revision which is transparent to itself” (BT, 1962, p. 29). That is, any real progress that a science might want to achieve must be
accompanied by a revision of its concepts, regarding their accuracy and their coherence with their current context. He stresses:

The level of a science is determined by the degree to which it is capable of a crisis of its basic concepts. In such immanent crises of the sciences, the relation of positively investigating and questioning to the interrogated matters becomes unstable” (BT, 1962, p. 29).

When a science comes to a moment of crisis, the researchers become aware of the failure of their concepts and can then engage in the process of questioning and revising them (Boedeker, 2005, p. 170). In crisis, it is possible to question the grounds and concepts of a science, as well as the approaches a science takes towards its objects of study (Polt, 1999, p. 32). If certain concepts of migration are shown to be inaccurate, a revision and re-conceptualization is deemed as necessary, maybe bringing about the questioning of the assumptions that grounded such concepts (for instance, the definition of migrant identity, the usefulness of imagined spaces, etc.).

Heidegger warns against attempts to explain social practices and different entities through merely abstract metaphysical conceptualizations as opposed to looking at the practices and the beings themselves. If we only look at things as ‘matters of fact’, the norms that construe them and that form our background understanding of them, become unintelligible (Brandom, 2005, p.39). This is what he calls the ‘forgetfulness of Being’ (1975a, p.50). What we have forgotten in metaphysics is our everyday understanding of the world, beyond abstract universals, which includes our ready-made interpretations that are grounded in our society and our time (Frede, 1993, p. 57). In the case of the human sciences, these ‘depend on human beings and values’ and our understandings of them, since the express objects of these studies are human beings. We cannot do without those meanings and values in order to provide, what we think, could be an ‘objective science’, but those meanings and values are always present in our enquiries (Howarth, 2004, p. 243). There is then a twofold limitation, of us as enquirers through the meanings and values that we have at a given time, and of the entity that is being studied with its own characteristics, which constrain its possibilities. The point is to revise and clarify the limitations on both sides for the sake of a better understanding of both the respective enquiry and the entities in question.
What Diaspora scholars routinely fail to acknowledge is that the normative values they put forward are not ultimate, but only a reflection of the values we consider worthy at the time and which have shaped their approaches to the study of migration to begin with. For example, the value placed on individuality and difference is a Western value that is not shared historically with other cultures like that of China. However, these values have shaped the discourse of the Diaspora studies literature promoting the uniqueness about being different.

Any human inquiry, shaped by the values and meanings of its time, is already investigating Being, in the sense that enquiring about a thing is enquiring about its being. Any of us, in any way we exist, has being. Any way of existence can be as a migrant, as a philosopher, as a mother, etc. Enquiring about migrants, for instance, is already enquiring about their being, about what makes peonies what they are. For Heidegger, the question of Being, about our mode of existence, is the ultimate and most crucial question. Both philosophy and the sciences elucidate Being by enquiring about the ways we and other beings exist. The ways in which we comport ourselves, in which we construe meaning and understand and interact with others, are all manifest when we engage in scientific activity or in philosophy. It cannot be otherwise, since we cannot abstract those ways from our scientific endeavors, and thus our inquiries are shaped by the ways in which we are and exist. In this sense, the question of Being is prior; it affects our understanding ‘of all other enquiries concerning particular things that are’ (Gelven, 1989, p. 30). As Heidegger explains:

[...] the question of Being aims therefore at ascertaining the a priori conditions not only for the possibility of the sciences which examine entities as entities of such and such a type, and in so doing, already operate with an understanding of Being, but also for the possibility of those ontologies themselves which are prior to the ontical sciences and which provide their foundations (BT, 1962, p. 31).

Looking into the conditions of possibility for the ontical sciences, such as social research on migration, is to look at the Being of Dasein as one that is able to make such ontical enquiries. A more accurate understanding will be possible in other ontical enquiries if we first look at our own being and what it is to exist for us (Mulhall, 1996, p. 31). For instance, looking into fundamental issues that arise in our existence will shed light into more particular understandings of migrants in
that if those issues are investigated, they will be part of the understanding of the migrant experience. For instance, if we understand migrants as dealing with fundamental issues, then the context is understood as shaping the way those issues are dealt with.

Moreover, Heidegger accuses the sciences of being rigid and inflexible, which poses a threat not only to their relation to philosophy, but to critical thinking altogether (Babich, 2007, p. 218). Critical thinking implies a questioning of the information and knowledge provided, which demands the continuous challenging of the veracity of established concepts and value-laden norms. Heidegger criticizes the social sciences for being too narrowly focused on the role of man and to have developed a pragmatic approach to their studies. Instead of developing critical approaches to their concepts, Heidegger accuses philosophy of merely collecting data and directing it towards the use of man. In a late essay Heidegger states:

> It suffices to refer to the independence of psychology, sociology, anthropology as cultural anthropology, to the role of logic as logistics and semantics. Philosophy turns into the empirical science of man, of all of what can become the experiential object of his technology for man, the technology by which he establishes himself in the world by working on it in the various modes of making and shaping. (*The End of Philosophy*, 2003, p. 57)

Heidegger criticizes the reduction of inquiry to an empirical focus alone, which turns the attention to concrete characteristics, without looking at the foundations of scientific research in critical thinking and analysis. Due to this reduction, the sciences end up being driven by the sole purpose of studying their objects for their pragmatic use, and not by how their concepts reflect the current social reality. If we take Heidegger’s criticism on board, then, research on migration, as an example of sociological research and of cultural anthropology, can deepen its empirical studies by questioning the foundations of its concepts and by further enquiring into the issues that arise through the experience of migration but that are an inherent part of human experience.
Heidegger was keen to distinguish his study of being from anthropology. His concept of Dasein\textsuperscript{2}, although often misinterpreted as simply meaning ‘human being’, is supposed to decenter ‘man’ from the main focus. Heidegger does not restrict his study to that of humans, as ‘human being’ is already one way (amongst many) in which Dasein may understand itself. Historically, we have understood ourselves in different ways, e.g., as mortals, as God’s creatures, as homo sapiens, etc. Similarly, ‘migrant’ is a historically contingent concept, which, as distinct from related to concepts such as ‘refugee’, ‘traveler’, ‘exile’, ‘wanderer’, etc., is linked to a specific understanding of the factors that are taken to constitute migration (border-crossing, legal status, etc); that is, the understanding of those factors is shaped by the cultural, historical and social context.

However, with Heidegger, any study of migrants should not be considered a study of a particular type or group of persons. His aim is to find a different way of addressing the question of the meaning of being, away from the subject/object dichotomy, and \textit{not} to construe a new anthropology (Haar, 1993). Heidegger sees anthropology as representing the “forgetfulness of Being”, that is, as humans being incapable of understanding themselves on the basis of the relations to others and their environment (Dastur, 2000, p.127). He thus rejects an anthropocentric perspective, which already implies the oblivion of being, as such a perspective constantly overlooks all of that which makes up existence by only focusing on the human. For Heidegger, this is the main failure of metaphysics: constantly overlooking the features of Being with ‘the conviction that the whole of Being depends on human representation’ (Dastur 2000, p. 127). Research on migration as conducted in the social sciences can also consider fundamental issues that shape and link both research and migrating experiences with their context, that is, concerns that influence both enquirers and that which is being enquired (i.e. home is an important element of existence both for migrants and for non-migrants).

Such fundamental issues reveal the concepts and categories of migration as reflections of our context and of our being as one that engages in scientific enquiry.

\textsuperscript{2} From the German “There-being”, or “being-there”. A broader discussion of Dasein is offered later in this chapter.
An anthropologist who has taken Heidegger’s criticism to task is James Weiner. Weiner attacks social constructionism because ‘it avows that the cultural significance people make of the world is the way the world achieves an effect and reality for them’ (2001, p. xiii). Constructionism overemphasizes the point of view of the individual by ascribing agency to subjectivity. This is also Heidegger’s critique of anthropocentrism: ‘the emphasis on the negotiation of subjectivities’, which in turn neglects to recognize the relevance of the historical grounds of social practices and rituals (Weiner, 2001, p. xiii). The question is always whether one can speak universally about human existence. If it is private and subjective, where is the philosophical value? Heidegger believes that through philosophical investigation and interpretative analysis it is possible to provide an understanding of what it means to be (Gelven, 1989, p.44). The conditions of possibility that are present in different entities and modes of being are to be understood in order to broaden our analysis “subjectivities”. In this sense, migrant experience as understood by the Diaspora studies fails to account for the conditions of possibility that allow both for migration and our understanding of it. Even though differences in migrating experience are undeniable, they can be understood as expressions of certain common conditions that made these differences possible.

Weiner is concerned with ‘the work of concealment’ in human action and social relations (Weiner, 2001; Howarth, 2004). In his view, focusing on individual agency overlooks what social practices conceal about the world and therefore what can be revealed through their study. Social practices reveal the intrinsic link between the world and humanity, as they are rooted in the structure of the world (i.e. seasons, weather, etc.). He aims to disclose ‘the grounding human conditions upon which social relations depend’, those ‘under which the world is perceived to be relationally based prior to our analysis of it’, that is, the way in which environment and language, determine sociability (Weiner, 2001, p.79). Although it is unclear whether Weiner fulfills his purpose in his ethnographic work, his critique of constructionism is not only close to Heidegger’s critique of the social sciences, but also takes an unusual position in the field. This position can be used to challenge current tendencies in Diaspora
studies and theories of migrant identity in terms of the emphasis given to agency and the prescriptive way in which some identities are proposed. By and large, these discourses tend to emphasize individual agency, and even though they do not forget the factors that shape migration, they overlook the conditions that make both agency and social factors possible. With Heidegger, we can say that these theories are to blame for ‘forgetting’ the grounds of being in that they focus on individual and cultural differences via empirical research without questioning the conditions that brought about such differences. Furthermore, they have taken their assumptions about subjectivity for granted (in terms of the power to bring about social change through individuality), without ever questioning whether they are justified or not.

Heidegger’s project can serve as an alternative way of understanding migrants and the dynamics of migration. When Heidegger criticizes traditional ontology for assuming timeless concepts and proposes its deconstruction by looking at our everyday lives, he shifts the focus of the enquiry from objective definitions to possible answers to concerns that are common in our existence. Although studies on migration research migrants’ reactions to their migrating process, the focus remains one of definition and categorization Fundamental ontology, for Heidegger, is of course distinct from empirical research, but it does not mean identifying the most general concepts or characteristics of particular beings either. Heidegger proposes ontology as phenomenology, which looks at everyday experience in order to disclose concerns that are common to the kind of being that we share. The contribution and challenge of a Heideggerian approach to the social research on migration is to look beyond the categories that particular contexts provide. That is, to look at the experience of migration as manifesting ontological issues that are not limited to migrants, but that reveal fundamental issues that are expressed through the particularities of the migrating experience and also in other situations, with other beings that share the same kind of fundamental issues as migrants do.

Just like the critique of reductionism, the emphasis on the importance of the particular contexts in shaping individuals is now commonplace in social research. However, most theories of migration focus on the particular ontic
aspects of migration (such as marginalizing dynamics, identity issues, etc.) without considering the relevant ontological aspects, which are not reducible to empirical facts but instead, shape our mode of existence. Heidegger’s fundamental ontology is dynamic and relational; however, theories on migration take a more static and rigid approach especially when they prescribe ways for migrants to deal with social dynamics. Theories on migration fail to understand not only the ontological issues that arise for us but that our enquiry stems from our capability for grasping beings as an issue to be investigated. Thus, it means remaining blind to that which allows us to begin any enquiry or which allows us to reflect upon our existence. This is what Heidegger refers to as ‘mineness’ [Jemeinigkeit], which, as the ability of understanding oneself, already presupposes an understanding of other modes of being. Heidegger’s project allows for engagement amongst beings in a process of identification, and not merely one of definition, that is, as beings have Being, I can identify certain aspect of my Being to theirs. Through the being that I already understand, there is an openness to understanding others, and for others to understanding me. As it is a kind of being that is shared, there is always already a point of understanding of that being that is common.

Heidegger allows for an understanding of being as one that is always already shaped by the world we live in. The latter eradicates the possibility of totalizing and universalizing any concept, and instead, roots concepts in their context. Against the assumption of the social sciences that we can define things and entities completely, Heidegger emphasizes that which remains concealed from us as a result of our own limitations. This does not mean that an enquiry cannot be successful at defining things or understanding the being of other entities, but it means that it is through a certain context that things are intelligible to us. In the contexts of our social world we understand migrants in the ways we do, and we may interpret issues relating to migration in different ways accordingly. For example, the way we understand migration now has been influenced by a global increase in this social phenomenon, and even the focus on the topic is a result of the current context. However, this does not mean that we understand anything about migration in its entirety. The lack of fixity that defines
our understanding is the reason why continuous revision of concepts is necessary in the social sciences and also why philosophical contributions to the questioning of their assumptions are so important.

2.2 DASEIN AND WORLD: AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO UNDERSTANDING EXISTENCE

Heidegger’s concepts of Dasein and World contest subject/object dichotomies and reveal the intrinsic engagement of Dasein with its natural and cultural environments. The essential relation of Dasein with its world speaks of both the kind of being that Dasein is and of its always already contextualized nature. Both concepts aid the analysis of migration by further evidencing the link with between migrants and their environments, not ontically, as it has already been established in the literature of migration, but as an inherent part of the being of migrants. Because migrants are an expression of Dasein, they are also defined by their engagement in the world.

2.2.1 Dasein

Dasein is necessarily in the world and makes Being an issue. The relation between this entity and its being is what Heidegger calls existence, which also involves an understanding of its world and what is contained in it (Haar, 1993, p. xxv). Existence is Dasein’s disclosedness, that is, Dasein exists as long as it ‘is’ there (Beistegui, 2003, p. 20). Because Dasein exists factually, it is always already thrown into the world. What Heidegger calls ‘facticity’ refers to the way in which one is open or exposed to something (Beistegui, 2005, p. 14). It is the situation Dasein finds itself in, involved with its surroundings in a particular way (Harman, 2007, p. 25). Dasein exists in that it is present in the world amongst other entities that form part of the world (Olafson, 1993, p. 101). In this sense, what makes Dasein the kind of being that it is, is its ‘thrownness’ in the world and that ‘thrownness’ already implies a particular situation. Migration, for instance, is a situation defined by certain social factors into which Dasein can be thrown. The context of migration then shapes the being of a migrant Dasein. That is, although
Dasein possesses ontological content, the circumstances and the context define its existence.

In order to develop his fundamental ontology, Heidegger focuses first on our everyday involvement in the world, to bring to light the basis for the intelligibility of the practical world (Guignon, 1993, p. 7). Every one of our projects is held against a culturally determined background of familiarity, which is for Heidegger, the world (Hall, 1993, p. 135). The practical world is what is more primordial to us, the specific forms of existence along with a particular equipmental context (Guignon, 1993, p. 13). In Basic Problems of Phenomenology, Heidegger states:

Self and world belong together in the single entity Dasein. Self and world are not two beings, like subject and object... [instead] self and world are the basic determination of Dasein in the unity of the structure of Being in the World. (BPP, 1988, p. 297)

In this sense, Being-in-the-world is one of the fundamental structures of Dasein. It allows for the unity between the reality and its observer as interdependent entities. The world for us then is our world in its variety of manifestations; it is the world that is only accessible to us (Guignon, 1993, p. 13). For Dasein, this means that the intelligibility of things depend on its world and also on its basic structure as Being-in-the-world. In a later text, Heidegger explains:

Dasein exhibits itself as a being which is in its world but at the same time is by virtue of the world in which it is. Here we find a peculiar union of Being-in-the-World with the Being of Dasein which itself can be made comprehensible only insofar as that which here stands in this union, Dasein itself with its world, has been made clear in its basic structure (HCT, 1992, p. 202).

Being-in-the-world evidences the link between world and our Being, a link that although present in the theories on migration, it is not taken as something ontologically prior to the social context. Being-in-the-world is the condition of possibility for the intelligibility of the world itself. Being-in-the-world is then an existentiale; it is an ontological structure of Dasein. Heidegger emphasizes the ‘in’ because it is what makes possible the feeling of familiarity we have in the world. ‘Being-in’ says Heidegger ‘is a state of Dasein’s being; it is an existentiale’, that is, ‘in’ does not mean inclusion alone, but its primordial sense is ‘to reside’, ‘to
dwell’ (*BT*, 1962, p. 80). In his later texts Heidegger will continue to refer to the importance of “dwelling” in (an analysis of such activity is presented in Chapter 4 in relation to migration). Being-in gives Dasein the ability to be involved with its surroundings and with that which appears as meaningful within the world (*Lafont*, 2005, p. 271). What is a priori is our ability to relate to things and care about them. ‘In’ does not denote inclusion, but involvement. In this way, Being-in is different from Being because Dasein’s involvement in the world is its definitive feature. The involvement that Heidegger considers as primary to our being (that of Being-*in-*the-world) shapes our engagements and our understanding of the world. The meanings we take for granted are shaped by the nature of our understanding, one that is always already engaged in its world. The importance that Heidegger gives to the way our understanding is shaped by our engagement diffuses the fixity of any concept we coin. Our familiarity with that world is our implicit understanding of being as making sense of our environment (*Dreyfus*, 1991, p. 108). In *Being and Time*, Heidegger speaks of such understanding and familiarity in terms of the world:

> [...] that wherein Dasein already understands itself.... is always something with which it is primordially familiar. This familiarity with the world... goes to make up Dasein’s understanding of Being. (*BT*, 1962, p.119)

The connection between world and Dasein as something that we are always already familiar is an absent element in the studies of migration. Although they do emphasize the relevance of the social and historical contexts, they do not see our understanding of the world as the condition of possibility to make sense of it. The intrinsic familiarity with the world (although not necessarily particular worlds) conditions our understanding of ourselves in it. Within that world, Dasein always already finds itself as having a certain set of possibilities. Dasein is ‘ability to be’, its being unfolds through its interactions with the world, through the realization of its concrete possibilities (*BT*; *Guignon*, 1993, p. 9). That is, Dasein’s understanding of itself as possibility is necessarily linked to Dasein’s worldly situations (*Couzens-Hoy*, 1993, p. 178). Diaspora scholarship’s understanding of possibility is that it emerges from the individual’s agency, to bring about social change via collective understandings and actions. Possibility is not understood as
being determinant of our being, but as something our being can manipulate. This is not entirely false, but Heidegger points at the nature of concrete situations as also determining possibility. The world of Dasein then is more than just one of possibilities, but different possibilities correspond to each particular Dasein (Olafson, 1993, p.101).

One of Dasein’s definitive characteristics is that its being is always an issue for it. This means that it can reflect on its own existence. Thus, Dasein cannot be thought of without necessarily also thinking of the possible ways in which it exists (Gelven, 1989, p. 48). Dasein has the capability to think of itself in ontological terms. In our pre-ontological understanding, as Dasein, we are always already concerned with our being and with that of others. Heidegger states: ‘That being which is an issue for this entity [Dasein] in its very being, is in each case mine’ (BT, 1962, p. 69). Mineness (Jemeinigkeit) for Heidegger means that because my being always belongs to me, that is, because I always have being for as long as I exist, it is always an issue for me (Polt, 1999, p. 44). This means that the kind of being which belongs to Dasein is of a sort that any one may call one’s own. Moreover, as we are the entities in question, the being that is mine, is also a general mineness, a mineness that belongs to the Being which underlies all beings. Heidegger states: ‘We are ourselves the entities to be analyzed. The being of any such entity is in each case mine’ (BT, 1962, p. 67). The being of Dasein is in each case mine because it is my own, but it also discloses Dasein’s openness to the world (Haar, 1993, p. xxv). The ‘Da’ of Dasein already signifies an openness to the world. This also means that fundamental ontology cannot be developed from generic universals, but that they are rooted in that which we are. Kisiel interprets this as ‘distributive universals of “in each case mine” according to the circumstances’ (Kisiel, 1993, p. 426). The approach to migration in the social sciences lacks this kind of insight into the way they build their concepts. These theories do not address the ontological factors that shape our interactions in the world and the way we engage with ourselves. Making being an issue for ourselves is something that we share in a fundamental way, a question that we inherently have the capability to ask regardless of the context. The social sciences lack such depth of analysis as the only focus on the definite and contextual factors that
shape any entity. In this sense, they focus on the region of migration and in its particular examples, while a fundamental issue is explained via the social context. Understanding that we share a kind of being that makes its own Being an issue can provide a new angle for the study on migrants as being subject not only to concrete and contextual factors but to ontological ones which they share with other beings.

### 2.2.2 World

Heidegger defines the structure of the world and its function as both the place ‘wherein’ we live out our interests and purposes and the ‘relations whereby things within that realm get their meaning’ (Sheehan, 2005, p. 199). The world discloses and opens meanings by providing and being ‘a set of possible relations in terms of which things get their significance’ (Sheehan 2005, ibid.). In this sense, the world is not just the totality of entities that are present, but it is a range of possibilities ‘in terms of which anything within that context can have significance’ (Sheehan, 2005, ibid.). The ‘whole which we understand as our world is already given in advance, so that we can encounter any particular entity’ (McNeill, 2006, p. 39). The possibility of encountering beings in their specific ‘beingness’ is enabled by the ‘whole’. The sense of world as the realm where relations acquire meaning and significance is relevant to the theories on migration because it is not then the individual who makes up independent meanings, but they are always already part of a ‘whole’. We do not individually ascribe meaning to things, but these acquire meaning in a world made up by relations that make any particular thing significant. In Chapter 4 I develop an analysis of the theme of home in migration attending to these other factors that allow for the creation of meaning (for instance, historical factors). Heidegger continues to emphasize in his later texts the network of relations that allow us to understand existence in the way we do.

The world is what constitutes meaning because it functions as a relational context that allows things to make sense. We are ‘our most general and fundamental way of “comporting” ourselves’ in the way we are towards things and other Dasein, and ‘these manners of comporting are the background without
which things and others could not be encountered, namely, the world’ (Hall, 1993, p. 133). The world ‘worlding’, for Heidegger, is the context of meaning that we encounter things in. Heidegger said:

The meaningful is the primary, [for] it gives itself immediately, without any detour of through across the apprehension of a thing. Overall and always, it signifies to me, who lives in an envoirning world, it is wholly worldlike, it worlds. (GA 63/67, 73; 71).³

This worlding is a ‘living through’ our temporalized, historical individual experience of the world, against the background of intelligibility which allows us to understand it through its worlding. As a totality of significance, the worldhood of the world structures Dasein’s understanding of itself and of everything that shows up in the world (Lafont, 2005, p. 270). The world that we form, with others, as Mit-dasein, is also many worlds. The meaning we give to things is a meaning we share with others, however, we also share different worlds. For example, the world of the human, as what is intelligible and relevant to us, is different from the world of sequoias or from the world of economics. In the human world, for instance, changing homes and migrating acquires a significant meaning to our existence. We share different worlds depending on how Dasein understands itself, or what worlds it belongs to. Hence, the world of migration is a world with elements common and relevant to migrants, or to those Dasein that understand themselves as migrants.⁴ Heidegger addresses the diverse realms of meaning by delineating four different senses of ‘world’ in Being and Time, two of which are ontical, and the other two, ontological.

The first sense of world in the ontic sense is the objective world (Lafont, 2005, p. 271). It is the world of the entities that are present-at-hand, as Heidegger puts it: ‘the totality of entities that can be present-at-hand within the world’ (BT, 1962, p.92). This is the conception of the world that belongs to the metaphysical tradition, which in Being and Time Heidegger calls nature or the real (BT, 1962, p. 255). The second, ontological sense of the world is the being of a particular set of entities and the being that they have in common (Lafont, 2005, p. 271). In a sense,

³ Translated by Theodore Kisiel in The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time
⁴ Also, in migration, the plurality of worlds is different insofar, as there is a doubling up “from the start”: homeworld/alienworld, originary home/ new home, originary Das Man/ new Das Man, etc.
these are ‘regional ontologies’ as they are frameworks according to which certain kind of entities ‘are’ (Carman, 2003, p.129). Nonetheless, these regions refer to entities which are present at hand, for example, the world of mathematics. Heidegger states that in this sense, the world ‘functions as an ontological term and means the being of entities’ of the first sense of the world (BT, 1962, p. 255). That is, although reality ‘as an ontological category is dependent on Dasein’s understanding of Being, the real is not’ (Carman, 2003, p. 131). Although the world is intelligible to us in a particular way, that world and what is within it is not dependent on our understanding; the world itself is real. This world refers to the Being without which certain kind of entities would not be such type of beings (Mulhall, 1996, p. 46). These first two senses of the world, for Dreyfus, represent inclusion, or the presence of things or objects in the world, whereas the next two, since they refer to Dasein, express its involvement in the world, as necessarily engaged (Dreyfus, 1991, p. 90).

The third sense of the world is ontical but in an existentiell sense, that is, since existentiell possibilities only apply to Dasein, this sense applies to the specific worlds in which a factical Dasein lives, for example its domestic or working environments (Lafont, 2005, p. 271). World in this sense has a pre-ontological existential meaning in that it discloses Dasein as what it is, but it has ontic significance because it refers to specific features of the world (Carman, 2003, p. 132). Our understanding of the world is pre-ontological, yet we dwell in particular practices and environments. In this sense, ‘the world is always prior to my world’ (Dreyfus, 1991, p. 90). For example, the public world, or in our home environment, each have specific characteristics, yet, they allow us to exist as Dasein in it. Similarly, the world of migration is one defined by ontic characteristics (i.e. legal status). However, the world of migration differs in that a migrant also can have a domestic or a work environment, which, in the case of the latter, might be over at 5 pm everyday. On the other hand, the world of migration seems to be a world that sets much more general parameters for Dasein as a whole. These worlds are “modes” of a total system of practices and equipment.

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5 Regional ontologies are dealt more in detail in Chapter 3 and 4
The way in which they express themselves is what Heidegger calls the ‘phenomenon of world’ (Dreyfus, 1991, ibid.).

The fourth sense of the world is ontologico-existential and it stands for the a priori character of worldhood in general. It makes any world in the third sense possible, that is, the worldhood of the world makes regional worlds possible (Mulhall, 1996, p. 46). While our worlds (domestic, working, etc.) vary greatly historically and culturally, worldhood is ‘the invariant ontological structure common to them all’ (Carman, 2003, p. 133). It contains the a priori by virtue of which any particular world is itself, it structures the sub-worlds, rather than their being ‘a mere collection of entities’ (Carman, 2003, ibid). The worldhood of the world is what constitutes the intelligibility from which we interpret any entity from any particular historical or social context. As a pre-conceptual, practical intelligibility, with which we can find our way in the world, the worldhood of the world, allows us to act towards things in a way ‘that has both a purpose and a point’ (Carman, 2003, p. 133). In this sense, this totality of significance also makes up the inter-subjectivity of the world as the world is always the one that I share with others. ‘The world of Dasein is a with-world’ (BT, 1962, p.153). As ‘mineness’ reveals the possible understanding with others via the being that we share, the worldhood of the world is the network of meanings that we have in common. Any enquiry, for instance, one on migration, is based on the intelligibility that the worldhood of the world provides.

Heidegger’s four senses of the world provide a different understanding of the different contexts we live in. Not only social, cultural and historical factors shape our interactions and understandings, but also in the ontological sense, the worldhood of the world allows for the understanding of such factors. Similar to the “mineness” of Dasein, the worldhood of the world as something that we ontologically share is an aspect that has not been considered by the social sciences (and the studies of migration). There is no account of a fundamental network of meaning that we build up from, but only a superficial social construction of it. There is no link evidenced between our creation of meaning and the nature of our being. The ontological level of analysis is missing in the discourse on migrants.
that destabilizes the idea that the individual via individual or collective action is a primary determinant of social change.

Heidegger’s fundamental ontology, in its phenomenological and hermeneutical nature, offers an understanding of existence through its everydayness. His existential analytic looks into our everyday experience, as this is the context from which our common understanding of things stems from. Thus, he reveals that any of our understandings are rooted both in our ontological capacity for such understanding and in the context in which we exist. Through his concept of Dasein, Heidegger exposes the relation between existence and Being, making it not only ontically defined but also ontologically. Dasein then is not an abstracted category nor can it be reduced to ontic characteristics. Furthermore, Dasein, as a being that necessarily exists, is ‘thrown’ into a world. The world provides a network of relations through which things obtain their meaning. We interact with things and others not as isolated entities, but as part of a context. We know objects through their use: for instance, I know in which contexts I can use a hammer as opposed to a fork. Similarly, we relate to others through the roles they play in our lives, as strangers, colleagues, family, etc. All of these relations take place in different ‘worlds’ in the ontic (yet existentiell) sense (the third sense of world mentioned above, i.e., the work world, the public world, etc). However, the worldhood of the world provides the intelligibility of any of these relations. The world, as it worlds, then delivers a referential totality significance that allows us to make sense of what we encounter in it (and also shapes and determines the construction of our concepts and values, i.e. those used in theories on migration).

The relationality that Heidegger emphasizes in his concepts and in his philosophy is twofold, as having ontic and ontological elements. It is the latter that can be an important contribution to the research on migration. Not considering migrants as entities defined by their ontic characteristics alone, but also through their ontological capacities offers a different understanding of their experience (for instance, the ‘mineness’ of their Being that they share with other Daseins). Furthermore, the ‘world of the migrant’ can also be understood both ontically and ontologically. In the ontic sense of world, the world of the migrant is defined by its ontic characteristics (i.e. border crossing, legal or illegal recognition
of migrant status, etc.). Ontologically, because the being of migrants is not
different from that of Dasein, they do not share a different world, but the same.
Nonetheless, the different aspects of the migrating experience regionally
circumscribe their being.

World and Dasein are crucial to Heidegger’s philosophy and to
understand the contributions his analysis of existence can make to the theory on
migration. Through his fundamental ontology, Heidegger finds that there are
certain issues that surface as relevant in our everyday existence and that shape our
engagements. These issues are part of the kind of being that Dasein is and express
themselves differently depending on the context. World and Dasein, intrinsically
linked, thus give rise to the expression of such existential issues and the
implications they have for any given Dasein. Such issues can be analyzed in the
understandings that Diaspora Studies has developed about migrants. In this first
instance, normative claims regarding how to understand oneself are put into
question by contrasting them with Heidegger’s understanding of authenticity.

2.3. THE QUESTION OF AUTHENTICITY: AGAINST THE
NORMATIVE BIAS IN DIASPORA STUDIES

One of the main flaws that I have identified in the theory on migration has been
the emphasis on narratives of empowerment and liberation via theoretical
concepts. These concepts imply a “better” way to understand oneself as a migrant,
one that is not marginalized and discriminated, but that sees and confidently
asserts oneself as having a multi-faceted, ambiguous, hybrid identity; and as being
able to challenge restrictive social norms and pre-existent prejudices. Challenging
the norm by means of normative claims is as pointless as it is paradoxical. It
implies a lack of understanding of the different instances in which not only the
discriminating and oppressive norm, but also the proposed normative claims that
are meant to help overcome it, fail to represent, bring together, liberate and/or
empower individuals or groups of migrants, all of which are said to be the goal.
Although these theorists resort to “active” means such as performativity, their
suggestions already marginalize a vast number of migrants, for instance, those
who do not have access to Judith Butler’s *Gender Trouble* and her deconstruction of gender proposing performativity as means for the transformation of gender roles. More than that, a presupposed “better way to be” is to imply that, if I embody or perform such understandings, I am somehow closer to some sort of liberation. Maybe in the “imagined spaces” they propose that might be the case, but that still leaves the question of why are such hybrids, mestiza consciousnesses, exploded hyphens deemed as somehow better and why should we ascribe to such normativity regarding ways of being and of understanding one another? If certain migrants happen to develop some of the characteristics of these identities, or if they understand themselves in similar ways to the proposed in the theories, that does not necessarily mean they should be presented as a prescriptive model.

Heidegger’s concept of authenticity as a non-normative approach provides a different understanding regarding different ways of being and of understanding oneself. In the context of Heidegger’s analysis in *Being and Time*, the topic of authenticity receives particular significance; and it has been the focus of debate in Heideggerian scholarship for decades. What is meant by the possibility for Dasein to be authentic remains a contentious question, also because of the purposeful lack of cues in Heidegger’s text as to how to be authentic. The answer heavily depends on one’s overall interpretation of *Being and Time*, while the relevance of the question is obvious even from a superficial perspective. In some of the scholarship, it is just taken as an ethical formula, pointing out a definite path of how to remain ‘true to oneself’. However, a closer look at Heidegger’s analysis of the concept reveals the complexity and profundity of the question. Heidegger poses authenticity as an existential in the depth of Dasein’s fundamental ontological structure, and yet, at the same time as an existentiell modification of *das Man*. The first clarification to be made on this matter is that Heidegger at no point proposes an ethical system, either directly or indirectly. He does not enumerate steps to be followed in order to become an authentic Dasein.

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for the reason that this would turn authenticity into an ontic question. Neither does
he conceive it as a teleological endeavor leading to some sort of ideal realization
(Gelven, 1989, p.52). This would defeat the entire nature of his existential
analytic.

The analysis of authenticity for the current purposes is twofold, first
addressing authenticity as a possibility for Dasein, and then taking Heidegger’s
approach to revise the normative claims in the Diaspora studies literature. In the
first instance, the problem of authenticity, according to Heidegger, emerges for all
Dasein, whichever way they understand themselves: as migrants, as nihilists, as
mortals, etc. Heidegger identifies structures that shape our everyday existence and
in the case of Dasein, as having a social nature, as providing intelligibility for
social interactions.

2.3.1 Das Man and Migration

Das Man is the term that Heidegger uses to introduce the fundamental structure in
Dasein that provides social meaning and allows Dasein to make sense of itself
(Keller and Weberman, 1998, p. 277). ‘Das Man is an existentiale’ of Dasein,
which means that it belongs to Dasein’s constitution (BT, 1962, p. 167). It
provides ready-made meanings of a social world, which Dasein adopts, uses and
conforms to. In answering the question of the ‘who’ of Dasein in its everydayness,
Heidegger describes das Man as ‘nothing definite,’ but, at the same time, as that
‘which we all are, though not as the sum’ (BT, 1962, p. 164). Das Man cannot be
pinned down; it is everyone and no one. It is all of us, but it is not the sum of
individuals, or societies, since that would be reducing such primordial existentiale
to onticity. Das Man is ‘the realest subject of everydayness’ (BT, 1962, p. 166)
because it is what provides the norms of everyone for any one. From how to use a
door knob to how to show respect to an authority, das Man provides the comfort
of that which is known and can be expected. In this sense, ‘publicness’ is an
‘essential ontological dimension of any shared human world as such’ (Carman,

7 Das Man has been translated differently across the scholarship as “The they”, “the anyone”, “the
one”, etc. I have kept the original in order to steer away from intricate problems of translations,
which, although of great scholarly importance, have no direct impact on my overall argument here.
In our daily lives, most encounters do not require that we ‘figure them out’. *Das Man* provides the pragmatic structure of everydayness. We already know what to do and what not to do in a restaurant, in a public bathroom, or in a lecture hall. *Das Man* makes everyday life easier for us, but it also ‘levels down’ our possibilities of being. It provides formats, but also narrows our envisioning of other alternatives. It ‘averages out’ our way to respond to our daily encounters. There are only so many ways (that we can easily think of) of asking for a coffee, so many ways to pay for it, and so many ways to deal with the counter that has the sugar, the milk, and the small spoons. *Das Man* averages the situation of getting a coffee, in the sense that we all get a coffee pretty much in the same way. Dasein is ‘disburdened by *das Man*’ of its being. It makes Dasein turn away from itself since it makes things easy for it (*BT*, 1962, p. 166). Dasein has ‘surrendered’ its being to *das Man*. Dasein leaves its choices to *das Man*, including the question of its own being. ‘Because *das Man* presents every judgment and decision as its own, it deprives the particular Dasein of its answerability’ (*BT*, 1962, p. 166).

Thus, *das Man* functions as a source of intelligibility. *Das Man* provides the social meaning and even selects what matters to us by making such meaning accessible for everyone. However, the intelligibility of its anonymous and tacit social norms cannot be traced back to a specific origin, nor can they be made explicit, accepted or rejected, in some absolute moment of clarity. *Das Man* permeates Dasein in its social nature, and does so necessarily, since Dasein is essentially Being-with [*Mitsein*]. In other words, we are inevitably subject to the prescriptions of *das Man* because we are essentially social beings. Heidegger maintains that implicit social norms largely predetermine for us what is appropriate and inappropriate in our encounters with other beings (Carman, 2003, p. 142).

*Das Man*, as the provider of cohesiveness in social norms, is tied to the historical and social context. For the migrant, this means that if the context changes, *das Man* will probably change as well. For example, *das Man* might have originally provided comfort, by allowing Dasein to blend in with everybody else. In this case, the migrant suddenly faces the possibility of being foreign to a new *das Man*, and of being singled out for not knowing the social norms of the
new society. At the same time, it is possible that *das Man* in the country or culture of origin did not provide comfort but alienation. In that case, assimilation in the new country might be able to in time provide the familiarity searched for in *das Man*. It could be said that as globalization continues to expand, a more general, yet ambiguous *das Man* is generated. For instance, most citizens in urban centres in the world are well acquainted with credit card use, or with the way one is expected to behave in a fast food restaurant. Nonetheless, the social specificities of each place remain, maybe in certain societies more strongly than in others, or with similar demographic environments (i.e. urban vs. rural). Thus, the new *das Man* for the migrant can represent a source of angst more than a source of comfort. The migrant has to adapt to the new social norms in order to be able to go about his or her everyday dealings efficiently. In the adaptation process, the migrant strives to achieve the comfort usually provided by *das Man* by learning the ways of the new society. A full recognition of the new *das Man* might never take place, but a minimal understanding of it is necessary. *Das Man* from different countries might be similar; for instance, ordering a pint in Canada is the same as ordering a pint in Ireland. However, looking closely at the social interactions, at, for instance, the degree of engagement of the bar tender with his/her costumers, differences may arise.  

As the migrant becomes more and more acquainted with the new *das Man* he/she may feel more or less comfortable in it. Some of the differences may be experienced negatively or might provoke confusion. It is also possible that the migrant acquires a better vantage point from which to critique a new society (or the previous one), precisely because he/she must learn explicitly (and thus be aware explicitly) the many tacit customs and assumptions that make up *das Man*. People that stay within their own culture have learned the social norms from a very early age. Once one migrates to a different culture, what it is assumed to be normal is suddenly put into question and thus our mistakes or awkwardness are explicitly revealed when we fail to conform to the foreign norm.

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8 Examples of studies that have addressed the difficult adaptation process in migrants are Fortier (2003), Ahmed (2006), Hoffman (1989), amongst others.
The response that migrants have to the new das Man varies as much as the social norms and the context in which they are grounded. Nonetheless, the aim to feel more comfortable is one that remains for any Dasein, even if that involves giving up some aspects of our own, or of a previous das Man. Heidegger’s concept of das Man, therefore, does not simply refer to the differences of social norms amongst cultures, but also to the existential comfort that is sought in the structure and the intelligibility it provides. Das Man, as an existential, expresses itself ontically through different contexts, such as different cultural forms. The concept of das Man provides an existential basis to social research on migration and on cultural differences that speaks of the web of social intelligibility that we always already partake of in different ways.

2.3.2 Authenticity: An existential issue and a challenge to the Normative

Heidegger identifies das Man as limiting of our possibilities and as inherent to Dasein’s structure. Can Dasein be anything other than das Man in its everydayness? Heidegger believes that the Dasein who “shrinks back” into the comfort of das Man is inauthentic. But if das Man is a necessary existential source of intelligibility in any public share world, the endeavor to step out of das Man seems pointless from the start. And yet, Dasein is a being that cares for itself, whose being matters to it, and which has the potential to answer to and about its own being. If this means that authenticity is possible for Dasein, then it must be possible without requiring the impossible complete neutralization or dissolution of das Man. Inauthentic Dasein has ‘fallen’ into everydayness, away from the awareness of our Being. It has gotten lost in das Man, in the actuality of everydayness.

When Heidegger states that ‘authentic being-one self’ is only possible through an existentiell modification of das Man, it brings up the question of whether it is possible to evade our facticity and thrownness to be authentic.
Authenticity, from the German ‘Eigentlichkeit’, stands in opposition to our falling in everydayness. It refers to something that is one’s own, and, presumably, not of das Man, and that is peculiar or specific to one’s own Dasein (Carman, 2005, p. 285). Therefore, the question for Dasein is how to be its own self within the social world that supplies Dasein with intelligibility and that it cannot do without. As Dasein is necessarily absorbed in the world, Dasein is also affected by the world. This absorption, in the mode of das Man and everydayness, shapes Dasein’s routine involvement. However, even in fallenness, the care of Dasein is revealed as it is involved in the mode of das Man (Gelven, 1989, p. 119). Dasein surrenders to the comfort of das Man and turns away from what is its own. Therefore, authenticity consists in relating differently to das Man because das Man is an existentiale. As such, das Man has ‘various possibilities of becoming concrete as something characteristic of Dasein’ (BT, 1962, p.167.), that is, the way in which das Man is expressed is intrinsically linked to its context and thus depends on the ontic to be interpreted as authentic or inauthentic. Dasein cannot existentially evade das Man:

Authentic being-oneself does not rest on some exceptional condition of the subject, detached from ‘the they’, rather, it is an existentiell modification of ‘the they -- of ‘the they’ as an essential existential (BT, 1962, p. 168).

Although Dasein is always social, its understanding of itself is not limited to or exhausted by das Man’s understanding (Keller and Weberman, 1998, p.275). Boedeker explains this through the existentiell modification posed by Heidegger as the possibility for authenticity. Existentiell modes are possible through the existential horizon, however, the existentiell mode in which Dasein enacts such existentials ‘is a possibility, but not a necessity’ (Boedeker, 2001, p. 213). As an existential, das Man is a source of intelligibility and social codes. However, das

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9 Also translated as self-owningly (Boedeker, 2001), self-determination, self-mode (Gelven, 2007).
10 It should be clarified, however, that Boedeker translates authenticity as “self-ownership”, a loaded concept in terms of the implications for the conception of the self. In most literature the concept of self-ownership is understood as the owning of my body and its resulting interpretation is the justification for private property. I believe this translation can be misinterpreted since Heidegger, as explained previously, does not have such understanding of the individual, therefore, it seems inaccurate. Nonetheless, Boedeker explains that the ownership of the self is “taking responsibility for the negativity that belongs essentially to Dasein’s Being.”


*Man Selbst*, i.e., the self who is determined by das Man, is the mode of enacting such existentials. *Das Man Selbst* is then what can be transcended in moments of authenticity. Therefore, the existentiell modification that Heidegger suggests in *Being and Time* has to do not only with the engagement in future possibilities through understanding, but also with the transcending of *das Man Selbst* (Boedeker, 2001, p.238). The priority remains *das Man* as an existential, over two possibilities: *das Man Selbst* or the Authentic Self, but the latter refers to what is actually Dasein’s own, as opposed to that of *das Man*. If we applied this understanding to migration, the proposed identities by the Diaspora scholarship are not an example of the Authentic Selbst as they do not take into consideration the existentiell possibilities rooted on each context. On the contrary, they propose a more generalized and more positive understanding of the experience of migration, embracing, in a sense, what they are individually (what is their own), but in terms of their characteristics, not their possibilities. All of this can supposedly bring about social change. These ideas are not a reflection of either an authentic self or of *das Man selbst*, but they only denote the difference between their conception of what is, for Diaspora studies, an understanding of a migrant that can bring about social change and a positive outlook in each member of the group and Heidegger’s concept of authenticity.

Charles Guignon also claims that *das Man selbst* is an existentiell modification of *das Man*. In fact, he quotes two passages from *Being and Time* that appear to involve a contradiction. On the one hand, ‘authentic being one self’ takes the definite form of an existentiell modification of *das Man* (BT, 1962, p.267). On the other hand, Heidegger states that *das Man* is an existentiell mode, clarifying that ‘proximally and for the most part Dasein is not itself but lost in the *das Man Selbst*, which is an existentiell modification of the Authentic Self’ (BT, 1962, p. 317). Guignon resolves this apparent contradiction by arguing that there is a ‘distinction between the authentic self and *das Man* as existentialia’ while he describes *das Man selbst* and authentic Being-onself as existentiell modifications of such existentials (Guignon, 1984, p. 329, p. 30). The authentic Being one-self then has to do with an understanding of our concrete possibilities in the future, but also of possibility as possibility (as Heidegger defines understanding in this way).
Authentic being oneself, however, arises from das Man, as an existentiale, as a provider of social intelligibility. Thus, das Man allows for authentic one-self to occur. For this same reason, Dasein can swing back and forth between authentic moments and most of its daily life permeated by das Man.

Authenticity then is the ‘surpassing of that common understanding which consists in reappropriating it in a way that is distinctively one’s own’ (Keller and Weberman, 1998, p. 276). Keller and Weberman rightly point out that that ‘much is intelligible to us outside the average, anonymous repertoire of das Man’ (Keller and Weberman, 1998, p. 276). Authenticity, as a possible understanding that emerges from das Man, is also open for migrants. As long as it involves the understanding of the possibilities within which I exist while always already engaged in das Man, the experience of migration shares authentic possibilities with that of any other Dasein. In this sense, the question of authenticity is one of shared nature, that is open to all the beings that share our mode, that of Dasein. However, a few other important aspects related to das Man and authenticity, are to be considered before engaging in the challenge to the normative. If we understand the relation between das Man and authenticity in this way, then we can draw different conclusions for the issue of social liberation regarding migration as something that is not formulaic but an existential possibility.

2.3.2.1 Anticipatory Resoluteness

Heidegger gives a specific term to how we relate to our future possibilities. Resoluteness [Entschlossenheit] involves decisiveness, but it also means an opening up, or a remaining open in a disclosing fashion. Specifically, Heidegger speaks of openly facing a particular and concrete situation that is already limited by certain possibilities. This situation reveals to us what is possible in the present moment (Harman, 2007, p. 73). Heidegger states: The situation is only through and in resoluteness’ (BT, 1962, p. 347). Dasein can ‘own’ the concrete situation in which it finds itself by understanding its Being as its own. ‘The resolution is

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11 Also translated as “forerunning resoluteness” by Taylor Carman (2003)
precisely the disclosive projection and determination of what is factically possible at the time’ (*BT*, 1962, p. 345). Resoluteness then is a ‘focused engagement’ with the actual, with the world and other Daseins, without being sucked into the lostness of *das Man* (Carman, 2003, p. 297). Resoluteness recognizes the ‘fallenness’ and thus the limitations of my choices, but it is also a positive attitude towards the possibilities of the situation I find myself in.

The anticipating aspect of resoluteness [*Vorlaufen*] speaks for the kinds of beings that we are in that we are temporal beings and thus capable of anticipating. Anticipation is directly linked with Being-towards-death in the existential sense, as in, awareness of my own vulnerability and that of my possibilities, whatever or whomever they include. Being anticipatorily resolute is ‘projecting wholeheartedly into the dying of possibilities that necessarily attend and define one’s being anything or anyone at all’ (Carman, 2003, p. 299). It involves both engaging in actuality and projecting forward. Anticipatory resoluteness also allows to negate the proposed model by Guignon of authenticity as completed wholeness, since it involves a looking and engaging with future possibilities. (See Carman2, p 267).

Resoluteness has also been interpreted as Heidegger’s conception of freedom. This freedom is understood as the revelation of Dasein of its finitude and then ‘owning up’ to itself through resoluteness (Nichols, 2000). ‘The resoluteness in which Dasein comes back to itself discloses the actual factical possibilities of authentic existing in terms of the heritage which that resoluteness takes over as thrown’ (*BT*, 1962, 383). Those factical possibilities have also been determined by the historical context. The authentic disclosing of history reveals the sources of our possibilities and of our ways of being (Guignon, 1984, p. 335). In a way, the social pre-understanding of *das Man* is transmitted historically. *Das Man* is the transmitter of the historical possibilities within our social context, although Heidegger points out that our average understanding of it is distorted in...
the form of tradition. Following Heidegger’s understanding of historical *das Man*, migrants then already carry a social understanding. Although not necessarily understood as heritage, traditions in their home country become expressions of *das Man* that also determine their factical possibilities, including those of migration. For instance, in post-colonial countries, the former colonizer is sometimes taken as a social example to be imitated. Such views may sway migrating tendencies towards the former colonizing country.

Heidegger asserts that tradition can prevent Dasein from understanding its own history. It remains stuck in traditional ways of understanding without questioning them. Dasein can be authentically related to its history by recovering the reasons and sources for our traditional understanding. For Heidegger, Dasein is always already contextualized in a historical and social ‘happening’, which merges with the others who are part of that context, making a ‘co-happening’ which Heidegger calls ‘destiny’. He says ‘Our fate has already been guided in advance in our Being with one another in the same world and in our resoluteness for determinate possibilities’ (*BT*, 1962, p. 436). He does not imply each action of ours is already pre-determined in an absolute sense, but that our history plays a role in the way we are in society and in the way we live. History of colonization, for instance, is a common factor in migration. Even though some migrants ‘choose’ to migrate, their choices have already been influenced by different historical factors.

Heidegger expands the notion of authenticity to history and the way Being-with-Others is transmitted historically in the form of heritage. The ‘co-happening’ is what a society has brought, within its own possibilities, into determining future ones. Such ‘co-happening’ already determines our Being, and also the *das Man* of each society, even though the role of *das Man* remains the same in all societies. The expression of the different factors that shape a society are what make up the differences amongst cultures. This becomes increasingly relevant when those cultures meet as a result of contemporary migrating tendencies and globalization as they are faced with different social expectations of what is considered to be the norm. If Dasein understands its possibilities as historical, Heidegger states that authenticity takes the form of a ‘repetition’ of
such possibilities. This is what Heidegger calls ‘authentic historicity’. For example, if I understand the reasons and historical moments that brought about the celebration of the Day of the Dead in Mexico, and I look into the historical process it has undergone, maybe I will feel more inclined to give importance to this tradition and will make an effort to maintain it. For Heidegger this means that we have understood ourselves authentically as ‘heritage’ (Guignon, 1984, p. 337). Such heritage is grounded in Being-with-others, it is Dasein’s understanding of itself in the light of a communal past that has determined its current context. This is relevant for Dasein’s future because by projecting into new possibilities, the way Dasein is, is always already influenced by its past, and by relating to it, it can better understand its own possibilities.

As an existential issue, authenticity arises in juxtaposition to the comfort of everydayness. It involves a questioning of the social norms that we cannot live without. Heidegger emphasizes the realization of both the actual and the possible as ways of understanding our being. Anticipatory resoluteness involves taking into consideration both the limitations of my context and the possibilities that arise as a result of it. Heidegger does not see a “liberation” from das Man as an ideal, but as a mode of understanding our mode of being, concretely modifying our understanding of what is the norm via questioning our being. We are for the most part engaged in normative ways as in they dictate appropriate patterns of behavior, but that is an aspect of our lives that is not to be deemed as wrong or bad, it is just a mode of existence that we need as Mit-dasein. Heidegger says Dasein flees into the comfort of everydayness because confronting and questioning fundamental conditions of our being is not a simple task. However, Heidegger does not imply that we are “better” Dasein for not fleeing into das Man, but that to understand what is one’s own is to face the nature of our being.

In this sense, authenticity is not a mode of liberation, but via anticipatory resoluteness, or what is interpreted as freedom, but an engaging with and inquiring into who we are. I do not think that the Diaspora Studies literature is entirely incorrect in stating that migrants, because of the discomfort of displacement, experience a type of questioning. However, to presume or to propose that the arising of such questioning is something that can be ascribed as
an ideal category for migrants is unjustified. The questions that emerge for migrants regarding their identity, their context, etc., reveal fundamental issues, for Heidegger, namely that of authenticity. The fact that such questions arise for migrants does not make them more authentic or liberated from the norm or from marginalizing dynamics. Thus, to propose normative claims as to how to understand themselves (as ambiguous, fragmented, hybrid, etc.), is to establish a new category that at its best serves as an ideal (one of an unjustified nature since these questions do not necessarily imply an automatic or permanent “improved” awareness of who they are and their surroundings) and at its worst, as an exclusionary practice for those who do not achieve such understandings of themselves.

What can be proposed to the literature on migration is that the context provides migrants more readily access to questions that are of a shared fundamental kind. Taking in consideration the criticism on the over-emphasis on agency in the literature, a point to be made is that it is the conditions that migrants find themselves in that bring about the possibility of such questions. However, migrants have the freedom, or the possibility of being anticipatory resolute to confront those questions and to look at both the actual and the possible in terms of their particular contexts. Physical displacement and finding themselves in a new society makes issues on identity more salient. What do I consider to be appropriate? What kind of humor or physical contact is expected of me? These questions are of a social kind, that might have not have arisen so evidently before migrating. As the migrant feels anxious about “fitting in” and “averaging” him/herself out with others, it is then possible to question the validity, the importance of social norms. It is possible then to consider one’s context and limitations in order to see ahead. It is also possible to question the norms and traditions from the place of origin and to understand one’s heritage. Although the reverse can also happen, where traditions are deemed, for instance, as a symbol of a past left behind that has no longer anything to do with us. To contrast one’s heritage with the one of another country is already to put into question how such traditions came about, although not necessarily an authentic understanding of one’s heritage. In this sense, maybe an initial phase is more accessible to
migrants, regarding issues on social intelligibility (*das Man*), one of a regional kind. Nevertheless, the possibility of an anticipatory resolute attitude, or of facing questions about the nature of our being in more depth, are not in any way intrinsic.\(^\text{13}\)

\(^{13}\) Examples of these questions will be addressed on chapter 4 (on finitude and groundlessness), which are also a crucial aspect for Heidegger’s authentic understanding.
CHAPTER 3: Home, Homelessness and Dwelling: a regional ontology

The early Heidegger provides a fundamental ontology of Dasein as it is expressed in our everyday existence. By outlining common fundamental issues, his analysis of our everydayness is imbued with an understanding of our Being. This provides an alternative approach to the methods of the social sciences, and offers, at least potentially, an ontological basis for what in the social sciences is researched only ontically. In this chapter, a closer comparison with issues in the social sciences is made with one of Heidegger’s topics: home. Home is an element that is crucial for the social research on migration. The scholarship has dedicated much of their investigations to describing the many forms of the importance that the home has for migrants. For this reason, Heidegger’s analysis of the home allows for a parallel comparison with the research on migration, also helping to elucidate why the Heideggerian analysis can offer a better understanding of the experience of the home, not only for migrants, but in our daily existence.

Focusing on the concerns that are fundamental to our shared existence can be a means for bridging concrete differences that tend to divide and separate us if we exclusively understand ourselves through them. Without proposing an all too optimistic ideal of bridging all differences, I believe the view on common ontological issues offers a different, and perhaps less conflictual way of understanding ourselves and others, as not only defined by inflexible and divisive specific categorizations. For this reason, I believe Heidegger’s approach can also balance the agenda of social change in Diaspora studies by providing incentives to understand migrants as beings whose existence can be understood in terms of their particular engagements with ontological/ existential issues or concerns. Thus, the new understanding of migrant existence, which I can only begin to develop here focusing on the issue of home, rests, on the one side, on fundamental
shared concerns of Dasein which open an inter-subjective realm; and, on the other side, on the acknowledgment of the relevance of the specific context of migration, its ontic characteristics, and how these shape and constrain possible modes of responding to and taking up those shared concerns.

In what follows I propose the beginnings of a regional ontology of migration, in this particular case, focusing on the issue of home. A regional ontology of migration is thus understood as an application of Heidegger’s fundamental ontology, which provides a common ground of issues and concerns, to the specific existential contexts and aspects of migration. A regional ontology defines issues that are common and specific to migrants, but which also stands in relation to a shared fundamental ontology of Dasein. This regional ontology of migration mediates between the individual and contextual differences addressed by Diaspora studies and the fundamental structure of being proposed by Heidegger. It sheds new light on research on migration by turning our attention away from defining characteristics according to which migrants may be objectified, and by turning it towards issues that are shared not only by migrants, but for which migration constitutes a particular context. Those issues can therefore help migrants to identify with others (migrant or not), without thereby denying the particular social dynamics, constraints and pressures that migrants typically encounter.

In Chapter 1 I briefly explained notions of ‘home’ according to Migration and Diaspora Studies, as a remembrance of the ‘narratives’ of migrants’ home-countries, also described as a feeling ‘rooted’ in and familiar with a specific environment. In this chapter I first expand on the conceptualizations of ‘home’ by different theorists on migration in order to look at some contemporary debates on this topic in the social sciences. I then review Heidegger’s approach to the notion of ‘home’ and to other related topics such as dwelling, homelessness, and journeying. In the third and last section of this chapter I explain what a Heideggerian perspective adds to the already vast research on home and migration. Heidegger looks at home from a phenomenological perspective, which considers inhabiting places to be an essential aspect of human existence.
Furthermore, he also gives an account of its counterpart, the experience of homelessness, which he claims to be just as important as the former.

3.1 THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ORIGIN: A FIXED HOME

Migration and Diaspora studies have classified different aspects of home in migration that surface as relevant in the experience of both the host country and the country of origin. The experience of both sites shapes the way migrants experience their lives and affects what they consider homely.

3.1.1 Home and Identity

Implicit but always present is the connection between identity and home. Although identity is considered by Diaspora studies to be fluid, this scholarship recognizes that we are born into relationships that are already based in a place, and that the bonding that arises as a result is a primary and localizable one (Madan, 1996). Home is a ‘spatial context where identities are worked on’ (Fortier, 2003). The identities of those who inhabit the home are continuously re-imagined and re-defined as much as the home is. Identities, especially those that migrate, are considered to be always ‘plural and in process’ (Brah, 1996). Moreover, the experience of migration makes space seem ‘decentered and exploded into multiple settings’ (Gilroy, 1993). Mobility and migrancy destabilize identities insofar as they detach identity from place (Chambers, 1994), while they also allow for the creation of new identities (Braidotti, 1994). Research on attachment to a place of origin has found that identities are not only enacted at the original home, but they are also recreated in the new place (Ralph and Staeheli, 2011). Once home is left behind, it is theoretically possible to create a new identity, since in the new place of settlement there are no ‘witnesses’ of the previous one. The migrant therefore is able to modify certain aspects of his/her identity, sometimes willingly, and sometimes as a result of the migrating process. Migrants might highlight certain aspects of their identity in the new country, for instance, nationality; and in the case that they go back home, they might reassume
their previous identity or combine it with new acquired aspects. Their identity becomes contextual, but at the same time decentered, in the sense that it is no longer one identity that they are able to ascribe to.

The expectation of an eventual homecoming is important to some migrants as an ‘ongoing search for a stable sense of self’ in a context which is necessarily in flux (Conway, 2005). Christou (2002, 2004, 2006) has found in a series of studies that the instability of identity that migrants face while living away from home underlies ‘the quest for an authentic sense of self’ linked to the act of returning home. These yearnings are interpreted as an idealization of a stable identity and a fixed home, while ‘in reality’, migrants tend to have ‘hybrid and dynamic identifications’ with multiple locales. Sarah Ahmed (2006) calls these disorientating feelings ‘sea-sickness’, pointing at the importance of raising questions about identity when ‘the ground is disturbed’.

3.1.2 Home and “feeling at Home”

Much of the literature on the concept of ‘home’ intends to explain how homes come to be lived, felt and made (Allan and Crow, 1989; Davidoff and Hall, 1987; Chapman and Hockey, 1999), including how they are experienced in migration (Rapport and Dawson, 1998). Avtar Brah (1996) makes the basic differentiation between ‘home’ and ‘feeling at home’, that is, between the place of origin/residence and a feeling of familiarity and comfort associated with a certain place. To put it differently, she differentiates between declaring one place as a home and feeling at home. For instance, I may reside in Berlin but feel that my home, or the place where I ‘feel at home’ is Ireland. It refers to a feeling of belonging to a social, cultural environment. Similarly, my place of origin may be Madrid, but I might feel more at home in Toronto. Brah (1996) refers to ‘home’ generally as the locality of origin where ‘feelings of rootedness’ arise from daily experience and the mundane. This ‘home’ includes family and other social relations, which are not necessarily built by us but into which we are mostly, as Heidegger would put it, ‘thrown’. Brah explains that this ‘home’ remains intimate to us even if we are alienated from it, in the sense that it remains the
place that has shaped us though its social and historical context. This originary home, as the place where social networks and emotional ties emerge, she claims, brings about the sense of ‘feeling at home’.

In the context of migration, Brah (1996) speaks of ‘homing desires’, as the desires to feel at home in spaces that provide a sense of feeling comfortable, through the physical and symbolical reconstitution that migrating demands (Fortier, 2003). Brah explains ‘the difference between ‘feeling at home’ and taking claim to a place as one’s own as the difference between the originary sense of home as the ‘lived experience of locality’ and the search for a new feeling of that familiarity, which can eventually result in claiming a place as one’s own in a more active way. Fortier (2003) also uses the concept of ‘homing desires’ and defines it as a longing to belong. Instead of deriving from an already constituted home, this longing to belong arises from the very movement of desire. Once one has moved, the desire for familiarity arises as the wish to claim a place as one’s own. Such desire also travels with the geographical movement of migration. Among the many different desires that shape, push or lead migration, the search for a home that promises more stability, i.e. in the financial or political sense, but also a sense of ‘feeling at home’ is one of the strongest. The movement that defines migration, according to Fortier, is also the movement of desire (Fortier, 2003). However, homes are always made and remade ‘as grounds and conditions change’ (Ahmed et al., 2003). ‘Homing’ entails processes of home building (Hage, 1997), whether at home, that is, at the place of origin, or in migration. For Eva Hoffman (1989), ‘making home’ is about recreating, or creating for the very first time, what she calls ‘soils of significance’. This also means that the affective qualities of the home go hand in hand with more concrete materialities, such as objects, rooms, borders, etc.

Phenomenological analyses have shown that home-ness (or feeling at home) is often experienced as ‘involving a sense of inside-ness, a boundedness that may be grounded in ‘taking for granted’ the environment and a socially known world’ (Rowles, 1983). The process of home building in migration is explained as ‘the gathering of intimations of home’, as fragments which are imagined to be traces of an equally imagined homely whole, ‘the imagined past
“home” of another time and another space’ (Hage, 1997, p. 74). This explanation evidences again the link between the ‘material past’ home with a specific location and the desire for the homely. Thus, home-building involves a ‘continuous act of production and reproduction which is never fully complete’ (Gedalof, 2003). That is, a person can constantly be creating attachments and connections that allow them to feel more settled in a given place. In time, however, those attachments might get lost, while new ones might emerge, maintaining the building of a sense of home in a constant building process.

The social research on home and migration distinguishes between the geographical site of origin and the experience of familiarity and belonging that arises there. In migration, this plays out as the desire for experiencing such familiarity and belonging again (or in some cases, for the first time). Home thus becomes a crucial factor in the process of migration, namely as marking the distinction between the place of origin and the feeling that it evokes; a feeling that migrants search for in the host society.

3.2 HOME AND BELONGING: THE OTHER INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE HOME

Brah (1997) points out that the concept of ‘home’ implicitly refers to an existing ‘other’. Home signals inclusion for those who belong to ‘that’ home, but it is also ‘intrinsically linked to processes of exclusion’. These processes socially regulate feelings of belonging, and they are also a common topic for those who migrate. Inclusion/exclusion dynamics and questions of privilege and marginality in terms of movement are the main focus of studies on diasporic communities and in feminist and post-colonial discourses. Since the concept of ‘diaspora’ has developed as a sign of multi-locality and hybridization within cultural theory, this scholarship questions the language of integration, assimilation or inclusion assumed within national frames (Ahmed et. al, 2003). For example, Gayatri Spivak states that our desire for a ‘home’ is unavoidable, especially for those people who stand in the margins of society. She explains that migrants create closed communities in order to emulate the feeling of home - a place where they
do not feel excluded, where nostalgia is elicited for a past that ‘never was’, where power relations did not affect them negatively.

Processes of inclusion and exclusion depend on the categorization of people as belonging or not belonging (Ralph and Staeheli 2011). Dominant groups impose categories of belonging on migrants. Even when belonging is a subjective feeling, it is socially defined. Feeling at home or belonging depend on being recognized by others. It is not enough to “claim membership of a particular home”, but such membership must be ‘validated’ by the society to which one claims to belong. Validation normally depends on whether the ‘member-to-be’ shares certain criteria of similarity with others in that given society. Surprisingly, the focus lies on the degree of sameness to members of the dominant social group (Braakman and Schlenkhoff, 2007; Devlin Trew, 2007). Ralph and Staeheli (2011) interpret this as a teleological process, that is, as a process with the goal of ‘coming to belong’ in their new homes by means of imitating certain mannerisms or practices typical of the host society.

The home is understood as built from relationships and social networks. These are places dependent but also interconnected with other places, maybe other homes. Identities and feelings of belonging are also place dependent and are not constrained to a specific place (Ralph and Staeheli, 2011). For instance, belonging has been divided in the literature into ‘being’ and ‘longing’ (Probyn, 1996). ‘Being’ focuses on the ‘performance and reiteration’ of the normal codes of behavior that are acceptable in order to belong, while ‘longing’ suggests a different mode of membership that transcends the site where dynamics of belonging and not belonging take place. For the authors who use this distinction, ‘being’ represents the social norms that migrants, previous to their migration, would have followed in their place of origin, in a sense, their past “stable” identity that allowed them to ‘fit in’ their society. ‘Longing’, on the other hand, is meant to represent some sort of resistance or alternative to the expected forms of belonging, since it is always tied to the desire for another place, which may include its own norms and ways of belonging. Regardless of where the migrant finds him/herself, if there is longing, there is the acknowledgment of an alternative to the present reality and a sense that a different reality is possible.
However, processes of inclusion/exclusion do not only occur for migrants in the host society. Home can establish a clear distinction between the initial site of estrangement (‘home as not home’; the originary home as unhomely) and a (futural) home as a ‘new site of possibility’ (Fortier, 2003). The familiarity found in the home may even be rejected when one no longer feels familiar in it (Frontier, 2003). The discourse of migration directed towards a ‘homecoming’, to a home of comfort and belonging is then questioned (Fortier, 2003). Sometimes becoming a stranger does not occur after leaving home, but is instead the cause of leaving it. These groups range from LGBT migrant communities, to exiles and refugees who already feel not-at-home in their homelands and for whom the concept of home is already a myth and an ideal (Fortier, 2003). Under these conditions, leaving home is necessary for some kind of liberation from social constraints, which can be loosened from a distance. ‘Homing desires’ can thus provide motivations for leaving home. For instance, gay migrants may enact only some of their identities at any given time, depending on the place they are in. They might feel that they are able to enact their sexuality more freely in certain contexts and may hide it in others. When leaving home is the condition of possibility for experiencing ‘feeling at home’, a model of ‘multiple belongings’ allows migrants to re-assess and re-engage the initial site of estrangement (Fortier, 2003). In this way, multiple locales make possible the expression of different facets of identity.

3.3 HOME: MOBILITY AND RETURN

Although Brah makes a distinction between a physical home and the experience of feeling at home, other scholars in the field have problematized the conceptualization of the original home as being a fixed origin (Gilroy, 1993). The idea that roots are only in one place restricts the experience of home. Aspects of different places of residence can be as influential as those of the home. Also, the elements of the environment that culturally and socially shape individuals vary through time. Places are not static; the cultural and social environment that belongs to the home changes over time. Tradition is fluid and although we recognize some of the same elements of our culture over the years, elements of it
are reconstituted and reshaped (Madan, 1996). For instance, certain dates, like Christmas, might be traditionally celebrated in certain ways, with specific dishes, songs, etc. Over time, factors like globalization and changes within a culture might re-shape the ways traditions are kept, adding or subtracting elements to and from the celebrations. As migrants return to their homes, if they do, they might encounter such changes and may even contribute to them, while nonetheless being able to recognize them as aspects of their traditions.

The idea of the home as origin and mobility as transcendence and transformation is put into question (Ahmed et. al, 2003). Instead, home and migration are understood in terms of a plurality of experiences (Ahmed, 2003, p.2). The experience of migration is complex and involves a diverse set of multiple relations and belongings, it is not a simple dichotomy of home vs. abroad. Being at home and migrating do not necessarily occur separately, and both of them may include experiences Ahmed (2003) calls ‘uprootings’ and ‘regroundings’. Home is then conceptualized in an ambivalent fashion, as extending outward and, at the same time, as grounded. Mobility and stasis, displacement and placement go into making a home (Clifford, 1997). Although home plays an important role in grounding people to a place, people who do not cross borders still live in homes that are experienced as fluid (Ralph and Staeheli 2011) Such fluidity is experienced through the passage of time and the social and cultural changes that naturally occur in places. The migrant can serve as a figure that evidences both aspects of home, however, home can be experienced as mobile through other changes that are not geographical. Cultural changes make some of the inhabitants aware of the transformations in their society and these inhabitants will adapt accordingly. However, in migration, the changes in the home are experienced more sharply because of the element of geographical displacement.

In addition to being mobile, home is also not necessarily located in only one particular locale. Home is built through a dynamic process of ‘localizing particular sets of relationships that do not necessarily depend on the essential qualities of a particular place’ (Nowicka, 2006, 2007) Home includes the people and the objects we share a home with, and therefore their connection to the world.
Emplacement revolves around mobility, given that those relationships that are built at home are not static. The changes experienced in personal relationships, familiar sites, etc. in the home, even the migration of others around us are what these authors consider makes a seemingly fixed home, mobile. Nonetheless, I suggest that although these examples express the non-fixity of the place of settlement, these changes are of a different nature than those that the migrant experiences, which are based on the geographical movement that takes place through migration.

Nevertheless, a sense of a home that is ‘spatially extensible even as grounded’ is sustained in groups as marginalized as in low income migrants, regardless of the differences amongst exiles, refugees, business migrants, etc. (Ralph and Staeheli, 2011). Research on marginalized groups of migrants suggests that they remain emotionally and culturally attached to their place of origin and that they tend to form strong bonds with those in the new country who belong to their homeland (Levitt, 2001; Mahler, 1995).

For migrants, the physical home becomes a mythic place, a place of no return (Brah, 1996). As the place left behind goes through physical and social transformations, the migrant will never be able to return to the place he/she left as it once was, other than in a geographical sense. Yet, that place often remains unchanged in the memory of the migrant, encapsulated in their attachments and emotional interpretations. Therefore, home is not only ‘a sense of place’, but it is also a material place, where attachments once emerged. The desire for a home is constituted “through both movement and attachment” (Brah, 1996). By developing emotional attachments we tend to feel more settled, and through the physical movement of migrating, the desire to create those attachments is also the desire to feel more at home.

Contemporary migrants seem to strengthen and deepen their ties to multiple places and not just to a singular home (Ralph and Staeheli, 2011). As some migrants develop attachments in the new place of residence with people that belong to the same country as they do, they form a sense of familiarity through these communities. However, it is not only through bonding with co-nationals that migrants get attached to a place. Many also develop bonds with migrants from
other countries or regions, or with people who are from the place they have migrated to. In many cases, the new country is at times considered a ‘second home’. The concept of diaspora and/or migration gives home the possibility of bearing multiple places, which does not exclude the possibility of ‘feeling anchored in the place of settlement’ (Brah, 1996, p. 194). It is certainly possible to find a ‘second home’ and remain attached to the place of origin. This also means that one is not tied to the ‘immediacy of location’. However, even as migrants are able to develop attachments to other places of settlement, they do not necessarily detach themselves from previous ones, and they cannot be described as ungrounded.

Studies report that maintaining contact with the place of origin at times serves as an adaptive response to a hostile environment (Ralph and Staeheli, 2011). For example, illegal immigrants in the United States, who often feel rejected by the society and often face economic failure, have been found to want to strengthen the ties with the home country. Mahler (1995) specifically looked at groups of migrants that had very negative experiences in the United States in economic, legal and social terms and discovered that this protective response of attaching more strongly to the homeland is often connected to a rejection of the new place they found themselves in.

Maybe referring to the experience of finding the unhomely ‘at home’, Ahmed (1996) points out that in our sense of home there is an ongoing process of ‘rehearsal and reconstitution’ that can be worked out through ‘encounters with the stranger within’. Gedalof (2003) proposes something different, a modeling after an imagined community. She describes ‘home’ as produced through a constant process of ‘adjustment, transformation, negotiation, definition - a never ending ongoing work’ that intends to reproduce an appearance of ‘stability and fixity.’ What can be taken as valuable in Gedalof’s proposition is the revelation that ‘feeling at home’ is always emotional. It is a felt experience that is based on something that is neither fixed nor stable. In this sense, Heidegger will also focus on the felt experience of the homely, paying attention to the feelings that arise in places where we feel safe and comfortable.
The experience of migration comes with a variety of experiences of the ‘home’, which must be acknowledged in their specificity (Fortier, 2003). There is no ‘migration in general’ as one describable experience or one set of characteristics shared by all migrants. The danger for the Diaspora studies on home and migration is to construct ‘migrant ontologies’: ‘when migration is elevated as a form of being in world’. In the following sections I argue that it is possible to respect such specificities with the aid of a phenomenological discussion and a Heideggerian reading of the concept of focus.

3.4 INTRODUCING A HEIDEGGERIAN HOME

Heidegger starts analyzing the ‘unhomely’ in *Being and Time* and it becomes a central focus in his later philosophy, in particular in his interpretation of Hölderlin’s poetry. Heidegger brings up the necessity of understanding the unhomely in order to understand the meaning of home, or being at home. In his later philosophy he refers to this experience as a passage through the foreign in order to become homely. Heidegger speaks of this passage in order to symbolize a process, a journey that begins by leaving the home, a home that for him is always already unhomely, since human beings are homeless at their very core. In the present section, I consider his idea of ‘home’ and the surrounding cluster of concepts that are necessary to understand it (for example: dwelling, the foreign, journeying, locality, the river, etc.). I also analyze Heidegger’s interpretation of Hölderlin’s poetry insofar as it contributes to his discussion on home and dwelling.

I first lay out the definition of ‘home’ as presented by Heidegger and its relation to the process of ‘homecoming’ and Heidegger’s later conception of ‘homelessness’. Finally, I discuss Heidegger’s concept of dwelling, which addresses the question of how do we come to be at home. Since Heidegger states that we must journey into the foreign, I expand on his concept of ‘journeying’, which is directly linked to that of ‘locality’ and his discussion of Hölderlin’s

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14 Heidegger translates *Deinon* as *Unheimlich* in German. *Unheimlich* is translated in the literature as uncanny or unhomely.
poetry and rivers, which is meant to explain why the journey takes place to begin
with. Heidegger’s analysis of the home allows for a comparison with that of the
studies on migration and also for his contribution to their notion, one which will
be addressed in the different issues of the following sections. This allows for
expanding the Diaspora studies analysis of the home into a regional ontology of
such a relevant concept for migrants.

3.4.1 Die Heimat\textsuperscript{15}: Home and Homeland Explained

Home in the social sciences has already been defined as the place of origin, or the
place of residence, but also as the experience of ‘feeling at home’. Similarly,
from a Heideggerian perspective, the definition of home seems to be divided in
two; the phenomenological and the physical place. Heidegger tends to
differentiate between the facticity that is always already there in our existence and
how we experience this physicality.

Heidegger has been criticized for his concept of ‘Heimat’ as it has been
associated with provincialism and conservatism, implying that it has destructive
political implications. The return to a physical “homeland” as it has been
addressed in the social sciences, or its idealization, point at the possibility of less
restrictive understandings of the concept itself. Although Heidegger did delve into
an analysis of Germany as homeland, he also criticized its failure to make the
passage through the foreign. Heidegger’s account of “home” is broader than some
of his critics understand it to be. Heidegger grounds meaning and commitment in
the ‘thick facticity’ of the world. There is the physical place where we feel safe,

\textsuperscript{15} Although some authors only translate Heimat as ‘homeland’ (Beistegui, 1998, 2003; Wrathall
and Malpas, 2000), in the translation of the lectures on Hölderlin, McNeill and Davis translate
‘Heimat’ as either ‘home’ and ‘homeland’. In Casey (1997), Pattison (2000) and Young (in
Dreyfus and Wrathall, 2002), it is only translated as ‘home’. Heimat contains both meanings, for
homeland, signifying the historical relation between the place of origin and the individual, its
cultural and social context, etc. Home entails the experience of the familiar, of a dwelling place
where we develop attachments and where we feel a sense of comfort and belonging. Heidegger
explains in his “Letter on Humanism”: ‘The word [“homeland”] is thought … in an essential
sense, not patriotically or nationalistically, but in terms of the history of being’ [what does this
mean???], whereas ‘home’ signals the dwelling of human beings in different sites with a sense of
familiarity and belonging. I will mostly use ‘home’ as translation for Heimat, but will use
‘homeland’ only when referring to that social and cultural history which Heidegger points at.
where we feel we belong, but the felt experience allows for more diverse and less fixed interpretations (PLT, 1975).

Heidegger describes home as a human abode, a place of rest, security, and belonging. Heidegger thinks that rest is a ‘grounded repose in the steadfastness of one's own essence’ as opposed to mere cessation of activity (HHI, 1996, p. 20). The abode, says Heidegger, takes a while to become such, but once it has, it is where ‘human essence is preserved in its inviolability (ibid.).’ Angus (1987, p.30) interprets this as ‘anything that is truly present’. In Introduction to Metaphysics, Heidegger declares that ‘Appearing is the very essence of being’ (p.101), so anything that presences, remains ‘inviolable in its centeredness’ (Angus, 2001, p.30). The rest that is found in the abode is that centre around which action is concentrated, which allows for presencing to occur in a steadfast manner. Heidegger says that human abodes are resting sites where ‘nature is concentrated’, and where ‘something intimative’ (HHI, 1996, p.21) gathers around human beings. These places allow for nature or us to rest, but not necessarily in an inactive way, but where things and beings interact in a harmonious fashion. In Heidegger Reexamined, Young states that the home is the ‘hearth of ethos’ (1999, p.396). He describes the home as a ‘thick conception of human facticity’, where human beings reside, where their actions take place, and where their character and attitudes are formed. Home is where Dasein is initially ‘thrown’ in the world, and within this particular site, Dasein ‘must… seek to become homely’ (Young, 1999, p. 396). I interpret this “must” not in as a normative stance, but as Dasein always already trying to feel homely, Dasein must feel homely because it is what it strives for.

Always pointing out the link between the spatial and the existential, Heidegger states that human abodes receive human beings, although always in a specific site. To put it differently, Robert Mugerauer gives an existential definition of home where it is ‘the region that allows, admits arrival, abiding and is governed by giving’ (2008, p.22). His definition follows Heidegger’s in that regions bring things together and require our involvement. In such regions we find intelligible relations with the things around us, which are always ‘nearing’. Home ‘welcomes’ human beings and grants them being-at-home. While the literature on
home in migration gives importance to attachment in terms of relationships, objects, places, etc., Heidegger sees the region as that which grants the possibility of attachment, they require our involvement in order to find anything intelligible. The intelligibility of our environment in this sense, is a prerequisite to forming the “soils of significance” that are found in the home.

It is because we are Being that we already find ourselves in a ‘home’, and simultaneously, Being is our very the ground of our existence, and so it ‘receives’ as well as it ‘gives’ us Being. Being remains that which allows us to be, it is the fundamental ground that binds us together but that remains concealed since each of us is a specific being that is in particular places. In the home we also find the intersection of temporality, between the past - what we remember of how the home came to be home - and the futural possibilities of ourselves in or outside of it (Young, 1999, p. 396). As beings are historical, the home also holds temporality as a structural element, including a projection towards the future by being the place where plans are sketched out, while also stretching into the past by being the place where memories are kept and past events are remembered. The Diaspora studies literature also gives importance to the memory of the home and how the place of origin does not remain fixed, but changes over time. However, the difference lies in that the literature attributes these changes to the place. Home is not fixed, but mobile in a temporal sense. Conversely, Heidegger places temporality at the core of any of our encounters. We are temporal beings, thus, things are intelligible to us in a temporal sense. It is only because we are temporal, that is, temporality serves as a background to our understanding of anything, that we interpret our environment as changing. Thus, it is not that the home is fixed or not, but that temporality permeates our understanding of it.

3.4.2 Away from home: the importance of being homeless

One of Heidegger’s main points about home is the relation with its opposite. Homelessness for Heidegger is inherent in our lives, and stepping out of what we consider to be homely can have a positive value. For migrants, the experience of what is strange occurs in the host society, through the encounter with new social
norms, new language, new laws, etc. The migrant experiences the foreign concretely, through the daily interactions and the remembrance of the home. For Heidegger, however, the foreign and the not-being-at-home have an existential relevance. Their importance lies in what they can reveal about ourselves. The “homing desires” addressed in the literature on migration speak for an intrinsic desire to feel at home. Migrants reveal this fundamental concern in their concrete situation, but it is nevertheless one that has ontological meaning for humans.

3.4.2.1 Homesickness, Homelessness and the Foreign

From his early writings, Heidegger gives importance to the feeling of not-being-at-home, but also to one of longing for the home. In his lecture course *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, Heidegger speaks of homesickness not in relation to a concrete home but to our surroundings. Heidegger says that we are homesick, that we are “always waiting for something” or being “called upon by something” (p.5). Heidegger relates homesickness to our relation to the world. For him, to be at home means to be “within the whole”, and that “whole” is the world (p.5). However, Heidegger says that in our homesickness, there is a drive that pushes us towards being as a whole. He states “We have somehow always already departed toward this whole, or better, we are always already on the way to it”. We are related to that world and that wholeness, and so we are called by it, nonetheless, our attunement is always partial. It is always in relation to the whole and not, and for Heidegger, that “not” rests on finitude. We are always in between the world and our finitude, and thus called by a wholeness that we cannot completely relate to. So for Heidegger, being-at-home is not only an impossibility (because we are always inherently homesick), but it is also related to our world and the way we engage in it. We have an intrinsic desire to be-at-home, and Heidegger seems to imply that we can at least understand our homesickness via the understanding of ourselves and the world (philosophizing, he believes, is an inquiry into the whole).

For Heidegger the feeling of homelessness also goes beyond mere location and is instead of existential significance. In his later writings he does draw a more
concrete relation to places, but continues to speak of home and homelessness in the way in which we relate to ourselves and our world. Just as we are homesick, Heidegger believes we are also inherently homeless, and we turn away from that. Turning away from homelessness is interpreted as a turning away from one’s essence and being (Mugerauer, 2008). Homelessness is, for Heidegger, ‘a symptom of the oblivion of being’ (O’Donoghue, 2011, p.13). To question homelessness is to investigate it beyond the human sense, in the realm of being. Being and human beings are intrinsically related; homecoming and homelessness concern both in their togetherness and in their mutual belonging. By the same token, Being at home necessarily includes its opposite, in a dialectical relation in which, in order to understand the homely, we must understand what unhomeliness means. Homelessness is ‘a separation within what already belongs together’; homecoming lies in a ‘coming back together’, even if separated (Mugerauer, 2008). In the moment of turning, the start of homecoming, we begin to discover our nature as close to the abyss of nothingness, where the call emerges from nowhere. Ereignis is a ‘turning back,’ into originary homelessness in order to gather oneself with the rest, including the unconcealed darkness of the abyss.

Human beings, Heidegger says, are ‘in their essence as Katastrophe’, that is, they turn away ‘from their own essence’ (HHI, 1996, p. 77). That is, we forget our groundlessness and our fragility in our everyday lives. Heidegger seems to imply that because this can be a cyclical movement, human beings are constantly becoming homeless, with possible moments of coming ‘into their own’. Moreover, in Introduction to Metaphysics, Heidegger states that ‘man is the strangest of all’ not only because he ‘assesses his life amid the strange’, but because he tends to depart from ‘the customary, familiar limits’; he ‘tends towards the strange’ because the strange, the uncanny, is overpowering (ITM, 2000, p.127). Signaling the move towards the uncanny either as a rupture of the routine or out of curiosity, there seems to be a back and forth dynamic between the uncanny and the comfort of everydayness.

According to the process that Heidegger draws between the venturing out into the foreign in order to become homely, it can be assumed that the foreign contains in itself the promise of the return.
For only where the foreign is known and acknowledged in its essential oppositional character does there exist the possibility of a genuine relationship, that is, of a uniting that is not a confused mixing but a conjoining in distinction. (*HHI*, 1996, p.54)

The foreign, as containing the experience of the unhomely, is in a dialectical relation with the homely, where through its experience we can become homely.

Being properly at home ‘is always a matter of homecoming; the result of a journeying through the foreign, a return’ (Young, 1999, p.89). Heidegger takes on Hölderlin’s idea that the untraveled spirit fails to be fully at home, in which case there can be no proper ‘appropriation’ or turning. The point of the passage through the foreign is to ‘learn from the foreign for the sake of what is one’s own, where the otherness of the foreign is acknowledged, and ‘its difference, respected’, without attempting to assimilate or imitate one another (Young, 1999, p. 91). Young interprets Heidegger’s relationship to the other, or the foreign, as Hegelian, considering the other necessarily free and equal in order to have the possibility of an enriching relationship (1999, p.97). The encounter with the foreign/other in these terms allows for clarity ‘with regards to one’s own unique identity.’ Young connects the concept of Sorge (Care) in Heidegger with that of the foreign, establishing a relationship of care and respect for the ‘preservation of the foreignness of the foreign’, whatever form the ‘foreign’ might take. For example, Heidegger speaks of historical people ‘satisfying their own essence through the dialogue with other languages’, which could indicate that the foreign allows us to understand what is ‘our own’ better and more profoundly, based on linguistic, cultural and/or historical differences. The depth of how we get to understand these other cultures or languages, relates to how we understand our own. However, Heidegger does not see the relation towards the foreign as simple, as a ‘mere taking over the other’ or as ‘self-assured affirmation’ of that which is natural or organic (Young, 2002, p. 143).

The homely/unhomely distinction is therefore a process. The passage through the foreign is not a simple outcome of ‘wandering around’ or of purposefully searching for the ‘unhomely’. Heidegger states the opposite, that ‘Being unhomely… is a seeking and searching out the homely, a seeking that a time does not know itself’ (1996, p.74). It can be said that from a certain call of
our own Being, a felt need for a homely place, we venture out into the foreign. At times it might not be clear that it is the ‘homely’ that we are in search of, but as we wander out of a familiar zone, we encounter the strangeness that can bring about the understanding of the distinction, and maybe the understanding of the search itself. Julian Young explains: ‘The one who is unhomely always relates back to the homely, and can only do so by not attaining the homely’. Venturing out of the homely requires a turning away from it; however, it also implies a constant relating back to it. It is ‘a forgetting as well as it is a remembering.’ This ‘forgetting’ of the home, is also a kind of ‘thinking’ initiated by thinking of the homely (Young, 2002, p.91). Relating back to the source is what makes up our history as beings. However, Heidegger does not mean ‘source’ as a return to a metaphysical ‘origin’, but as the search for the homely, for satisfying one of our fundamental ontological desires. Heidegger calls this relating back to the source ‘thoughtful remembrance’, or the acknowledging that one belongs or belonged to a certain ‘elsewhere’. Heidegger emphasizes how central is the encounter with the foreign; it is ‘the fundamental truth of history, a truth from out of which the essence of history must unveil itself’ (1996, p.49). To understand belonging to an ‘elsewhere’ is to understand the relation between our being and that which shaped us, which could be the homeland, in a historical and cultural sense, or could be understanding the nature of our being. Relating back to the source allows us to trace back and contextualize our existence and thereby understand it better.

Although Heidegger emphasizes the idea of venturing out of the ‘home’ in order to find the foreign and then become properly homely; it is also possible that we find the homely in that which is the opposite, for instance, a place that was strange and fearful before can become our home over time. The danger of that which is foreign looses its power and the distinction between homely and unhomely is lost, at least temporarily (Young, 2002, p. 75). In contrast, we have a situation where the homely is found in what is unhomely, but not as a process of transforming the ‘unhomely’ into ‘homeliness’, but in the foreign by itself. Heidegger calls this phenomena ‘the adventurer’, where the difference between homely and unhomely is entirely lost, and danger loses its meaning. There is no ‘remembering’ of the home permeated by care, and thus, the adventurer cannot
gain insight from his experiences ‘into his own essence’ (Young, 2002, p. 92).
The experience of ‘feeling at home’ is a fundamental aspect of human existence.
It allows us to build familiarity and seemingly stable relations.
Heidegger speaks of boldness as a type of courage to experience the
foreign or the unhomely, and it is that boldness to venture out which allows us to
‘appropriate one’s own.’ Quoting Hölderlin, he says that the ‘yet untraveled spirit
fails to be fully at home in the Heimat’. The point of the journey is to ‘learn from
the foreign for the sake of what is one’s own.’ Moreiras (2008) specifies that
when one is capable of ‘binding together what the poet had at home and what is
necessary in the foreign’; then he is finally ready to return home. However, being
unhomely always remains a potential, as a re-understanding or re-
contextualization of what we experience as homely. Just as what was alien once
can give rise to a homely environment, our experience and understanding of what
is homely might change over time. That is, the venturing out towards the foreign
can also be a cyclical process. Heidegger states in The Ister: ‘Becoming homely
makes manifest the essential ambiguity of being unhomely’ (1996, p.115). After
the initial shock to our routine, eventually, we are able to find our way back into
the comfort and familiarity of everydayness. Becoming unhomely allows for the
return to the homely as much as becoming homely brings the possibility of the
unhomely.
As the passage through the foreign refers more to an experience of the
unfamiliar than to the condition of possibility for understanding, it might be closer
to the experience of migration. The migrant chooses to (or has to) accept
venturing out into the foreign and is thus confronted with social differences that
will allow him/her to make comparisons. Details like the time dinner is had are
openings for small realizations in terms of how the migrant lives (-ed) his/her
daily life in comparison to those inhabiting his/her new environment. The migrant
thus necessarily learns about these differences that separate his lifestyle from
others. In this sense, the migrant is already involved in a ‘forgetting as well as a
remembering’ because he/she relates back to what was his/her own (or of his/her
own culture), while at the same time having to make some changes in order to
adapt to the new society. However, one could understand the analogy between the
foreign and migration in two ways: simply by comparing the necessity for the migrant to understand at least the basics of the foreign culture and having to learn from it for his/her own sake, or more importantly, as an invitation to remain open towards what is foreign. For the latter, just as with the uncanny, the openness is not necessarily implied in migration. The migrant might be reluctant to adapt to the new society for various reasons, or might only make the necessary changes and take a negative attitude towards the new culture. Such responses are easily brought about by marginalization dynamics that prevent the migrant from remaining open to the foreign culture. In this sense, both host society and migrant are very much likely to ‘accept’, or at least to resign themselves to the foreign while failing to be ‘open’ towards it.

3.4.3 Coming to be at Home: Becoming homely and Homecoming

Becoming homely entails the understanding of homelessness. Being unhomely, as a condition attached to human beings, also shows itself as something ‘not yet awakened, not yet decided, not yet assumed potential for being homely and becoming homely’ (HHI, 1996, p. 115). Although it remains ‘a potential’, ‘homecoming’ or turning towards one’s essence is not an easy task. Heidegger emphasizes this in a couple passages in The Ister: ‘Finding one’s own, and appropriating what one has found as one’s own is not that which is most self evident or easiest but what remains the most difficult (1996, p.49).’ Appropriation, is the turning directed towards a togetherness. Later on, in the same text, Heidegger restates his hypothesis: ‘What is properly one’s own, and appropriating it is most difficult (1996, p.125).’ However, becoming homely ‘in one’s own’ entails that human beings ‘initially and for a long time, and sometimes forever’ are not at home (1996, p.49). In assuming we are at home, ‘human beings are those who are unhomely’.

For Heidegger, becoming homely ‘entails the encounter between the foreign and one’s own as the fundamental truth of history.’ Therefore, we must experience a passage through the foreign in order to come to be at home. Heidegger states
The law of being homely as becoming homely consists in the fact that historical human beings, at the beginning of their history, are not intimate with what is homely, and indeed must even become unhomely with respect to the latter in order to learn the proper appropriation of what is their own in venturing into the foreign, and to first become homely in the return from the foreign (HHI, 1996, p.125).

Initially, then, we are not in connection with what is homely, so we must turn towards the foreign in order to appropriate what is our own.

The Greek word for ‘homecoming’ is ‘nostos’, which, in Homer’s Odyssey, plays an important role for Odysseus, who strives to get back to his wife Penelope after the Trojan Wars. Nostalgia then, is pain for homecoming, or the yearning to go home, better understood as homesickness, although it now applies for a longing towards the past. In his study on homecoming, Brendan O’Donoghue summarizes Joseph Campbell’s examination of myths and the archetype of homecoming. In such stories the hero generally follows a three-part pattern of departure, initiation and return, where the reason for departure normally comes from a certain ‘call’ or mission. In the Odyssey, Odysseus leaves Ithaca in order to go to war, but he also envisions his return home. This “type” of homecoming follows the more concrete aspect of home, as having a definite route and returning to a specific site. In this sense for example, the traveler or the migrant always “relates back” to the homely. The experience of nostos is common as a ‘presencing in the manner of absencing’, where the home permeates the experience of travelling as well as the experience of homecoming (Young, 2002).

Always parallel to the physical process of homecoming are the existential interpretations regarding the importance of the return. George Steiner for example, defines homecoming as the process and goal of authentic being, that is, other than homecoming to one’s homeland, a homecoming to what and who one is, is also important, if not necessary (O’Donoghue, 2011, p.12). Heidegger also interprets homecoming as more than just the factual returning to the geographical homeland. He understands it as a return to ‘nearness to the origin’ (1996, p.145). In nearness things occur in togetherness, but nearness is not measurable, nearness is always near, and so it is the origin. The origin is not something that can be pointed at in a specific location, but is a network of relations, made of things,
people, etc. The nearness to these things in not measurable in the sense that as they appear, they are always approaching, they are never here, exactly where I am, and simultaneously, other things and relations are also nearing in a certain togetherness.

Returning to ‘homecoming’, Robert Muggerauer interprets it beginning the turn into ‘one’s own.’ Homecoming is not achieved by arriving into one’s homeland from a journey abroad but once the source is ‘re-experienced’, this return opens up ‘what is properly one’s own.’ Homecoming, in a way, is only the beginning of the turning. It is only genuine when it is an arrival into what is one’s own. ‘Eigen’ is a term already used by Heidegger when referring to ‘authenticity (Eigentlichkeit)’ in Being and Time. Just as he did for authenticity, Heidegger does not trace a definite path towards a genuine turning, but only points at the importance at the arrival to one’s own, that being authentic or genuine. Heidegger presents traces or glimpses of a homecoming, it is never a concrete ethics. Being at home and homecoming is a process and a felt experience, it is not definite. The return, then, is a self-opening to the place of arrival and origin. It is to re-experience what was once possibly taken for granted. Such relations, objects that were part of our familiar environment and that for a period of time were no longer, are “re-discovered” both in their newness (for the time that they were not experienced and might have changed) and in their familiarity (for the past experience of them). This self-opening is a ‘freeing and a welcoming into one’s nature, place and proper relationships.’ It is a rediscovering and freeing oneself into the previously familiar.

In Rememberance of the Poet, Heidegger relates everydayness to the people and things at home that initially seem familiar, but ‘as yet they are not really so.’ The simple factual return does not make a homecoming. The familiar is ‘near, and already coming to meet thee’, but even after arrival, the ‘returning one’ is still ‘returning’, he/she has not yet reached home. This newcomer should continue to search for the home, even as the home is already ‘coming to meet him.’ Finding home, in this case, is interpreted as ‘being able to dwell in it as possession.’ The arrival to the home does not imply the finding of it. Homecoming is a constant process, it is not a simple loss and attempted recovery,
but it is about ‘concealment and disclosure’ of the granting of being (Mugerauer, 2008, p. 334)

When Heidegger refers to a coming back into ‘the nearness of the origin’, he refers to Hölderlin’s interpretation of home and homecoming, in which the former is the proximity to the source and the latter is the return to where what is sought after is ‘near’, in its immeasurability. Only at the source can one find what is one’s own, in returning to its proximity. As Mugerauer puts it in his book *Heidegger and Homecoming*, homecoming is ‘the granting of the gathering together, letting what gathers together come into its own, all together and each. (2008, p.22)’ Homecoming also means that one ‘receives’ such homecoming; it is a gift, just as Being is a gift. This homecoming is “primal” and foundational, not achieved or willed by humans. This homecoming is similar to the ‘home’ as ‘governed by giving’. Home and homecoming then offer similar openings to humans; they both welcome human beings and grant them an ‘opening’ where they can receive the gift. Upon our arrival, as a beginning of the turning into one’s own, we encounter an openness to things, where we can begin ‘gather together’ into the world. Home and homecoming are linked in that the arrival home is the beginning of genuine homecoming (Mugerauer, 2008,).

The ‘turning’ is an event [Ereignis] or an appropriation, where there is such disclosing/granting of the abode with what is one’s own. Although normally explained as an event or a happening, appropriation is more like a ‘gathering-giving’ of ‘belonging-together’ (Mugerauer, 2008, p. 292). At the moment of arrival, world and mortals arrive together in mutual appropriation. For Heidegger, appropriation, or such event, brings man into ‘his own’ (TB, 1962, p. 23). Appropriation is a ‘law’, that which gathers mortals into ‘the appropriateness of their nature and there holds them’ (OWL, 1982, p. 129). It is an inconspicuous phenomenon, ‘the simplest of simplicities’ as in it grants to mortals their home within their nature (Mugerauer, 2008, p. 359). World and mortals belong together in the sense that mortals cannot be without a world. To be in the world is to be in nature, but also, the world is our primary home. For this reason, the simplest of simplicities is this belonging together, since it cannot be otherwise.
The definition of ‘appropriation’ in Heidegger is important in order to better understand the ‘gathering’, ‘granting’, and mutual bearing between world and mortals. This ‘gathered nature’ is the realm of homecoming. Appropriation, as the simplest of laws, is pre-spatial, it opens place, it brings things, beings together. In ‘Ereignis’ things come into their own as things: ‘no longer presencing as mere beings, they fit into their proper nature and in the appropriating of world’ (Mugerauer, 2008, p. 356). Appropriation ‘gives homecoming as arrival, as the giving of the essence of mortals who arrive, and as the giving of language and thinking as all are given in homecoming (Mugerauer, 2008, p. 364). In this ‘giving’ as coming home to ‘Ereignis’, we are ‘given’ our belonging in the form of being gathered into it. Appropriation grants homecoming, it grants that initial transforming turn, now understood as the beginning of genuine homecoming. In Time and Being, Heidegger summarizes ‘Thought at the moment of arrival, beyond man and being, mortals and world arrive together in mutual giving in appropriation’ (2002, p. 23).

The notion of homecoming addresses the realization of the belonging together of both world and mortals as part of their fundamental ontology. In the gathering of world and mortals, homecoming is possible, since it is the realization of what makes up the home. The home, as world, provides intelligible and meaningful relations to mortals. Such realization enables mortals to understand the nature of the home as interdependent of them, but also as part of the process of coming ‘to their own’. A particular expression of such realization is the openness to rediscover new acquired meanings in a home that we have not been in touch with for a long time. It is the understanding of how our relations in this home have shaped what we have become.

If we strive towards homecoming, according to Heidegger, we must first accept that humanity exists in a state of homelessness (O’Donoghue, 2011). In the process of homecoming, the world reveals itself as holy, in experiencing the world as ‘gathered’, as bestowing and opening. Heidegger reveals the relation between ourselves and our homes, or homely places, as one of dwelling.

3.4.4 Dwelling: A primordial activity
Heidegger declares the Earth\textsuperscript{16} as our first human abode, but also as the first relation to where we dwell (Young, 2002, p. 20). He says: ‘To be a human being means to be on earth as a mortal. It means to dwell’ (PLT, 1975, p. 147). Dwelling, for Heidegger, is one of Dasein’s main activities. As one primarily dwells at home, in a particular site or abode, dwelling is also ‘to take shelter’, its a kind of ‘rest’, where one is ‘in the inviolability of one’s essence’ (Young, 2000, p. 20). Similar to becoming homely, dwelling in what is one’s own ‘is what comes last and is seldom successful and always remains what is most difficult (HHI, 1996, p.21.).’ The activity of dwelling is then intimately linked with homecoming. Dwelling is ‘to be at peace…to be protected from harm and threat, safeguarded…that is, cared for and protected’ (Young, 2000, p.189). Hence, the fundamental character of dwelling is this caring for and protection (Young, 1999).

Heidegger often made a point on emphasizing the importance of care (Sorge) for beings. To be Dasein, to exist as a human, is to care for one’s being, to care for the being of other beings, to make ‘being’ an issue for ourselves. In dwelling, there is a sense of safety and protection, which simultaneously allows for the possibility of protecting and providing safety for others. In Building, Dwelling, Thinking, Heidegger states: ‘To dwell, to be at peace, means to remain at peace within the free sphere that cares for each thing in its own nature. (1975, p.327)’ If we feel safe and comfortable, in theory we are not only free to care for

\begin{quote}
Earth [...] shatters every attempt to penetrate it. [...] The earth appears openly cleared as itself only when it is perceived and preserved as that which is essentially undisclosable, that which shrinks from every disclosure and constantly keeps itself closed up. (OWA 172/36)
\end{quote}

The Earth is those objects and elements but stripped off their meaning, only standing in their materiality. Without the world, objects are not significant, as the Earth cannot be networked into the significance that the world provides. In this way, the world reveals the unintelligibility of the Earth, although it remains dependent on it. In this sense, the Earth is our first abode, although it remains concealed from us in terms of its intelligibility.

\textsuperscript{16} In “The Origin of the Work of Art, Heidegger differentiates 'Earth' from 'World'. The world presents us with intelligible relations that we work with on a daily basis, that being the meaning and usefulness of objects as well as the understanding of our relations to our environment. The Earth, however, remains concealed. It is the background that allows those meaningful relations to emerge. Heidegger states:
ourselves or for the matters of our being, but also to care for the being of others. The home is therefore not an isolated place of dwelling, but is always linked to a world, and the comfort experienced in the home is also dependent on the comfort felt in a given society or in how we feel in our world. The sense of safety and protection that dwelling brings about allows us to care for others. Caring enables dwelling, as feeling comfortable is already a form of caring for the status of my Being. Similarly, when I dwell, I am then able to provide a feeling of safety and protection for others, through my own caring for them. Caring for my Being is thus inherent in dwelling.

The concept of dwelling has been given a more spatial interpretation in Edward Casey's *Fate of Place* adding that it is always an ‘in-dwelling’, pointing at the fact that it is always in a place, the place we inhabit (1998, p.274). Dwelling allows us to feel ‘centered’, but Casey reverses the equation by also focusing on the embodiment of the individual who dwells, by saying that I, the dweller, am also a ‘centering’, ‘insofar as I give direction to things and rooms in that same dwelling’ (1998, p.294). Casey states that such centeredness of both self and thing the ‘gift of dwelling,’ something that is necessarily connected to the inhabitation of a certain concrete place. Heidegger evidences this connection vastly in *Building, Dwelling, Thinking* (1975), where he says ‘Everything that is, belongs (1975, p.158).’ Everything that is a ‘thing’ belongs to a certain context, a physical place, maybe a particular someone. For instance, a cup is a cup since a cup by definition is a container, which is an object that can contain something, since it has enclosed walls and a bottom, such an object cannot be made of liquid, but maybe of solid, etc. Each of these descriptive aspects refers to another one that can be explained by another set of references. In the same manner, the objects we interact with are somewhere; for example, my cup is on the table, next to the black binder, in the office. There is always the need to contextualize the object that we are referring to. In this same sense, our inhabiting a new culture (in the case of migration) is also an “in-dwelling” of certain aspects that become meaningful as we become familiarized with its traditions and customs.

Dwelling, according to Heidegger, is the goal of building. We build places, houses, so that we can inhabit them and dwell. In a play with words, *Buan*
meaning dwelling and *Bauen* meaning building, Heidegger finds another way to connect the physicality with the experience of dwelling: ‘Dwelling is building and building is dwelling (1975, p.145)’. Dwelling is ‘the manner in which mortals are on earth’, but building, as it is paired up with dwelling ‘unfolds into the building that cultivates growing things ‘which also allows for ‘the building that erects buildings’ (*PTL*, 1975, p 147). The building of the home is a process or a journey towards a dwelling place. For instance, some migrants, when they move to a new space, will put up pictures of their family back home, or decorate it in a certain way that reminds them their home, or that make the new space more homely. This is also part of such “building”, through the modification of the space we live in in order to dwell in it more comfortably.

Similarly, dwelling does not only occur at a physical location, but it is historical, it represents the movement of the journey (Moreiras, 2008, p.2). To be human is to be ‘a staring’ at such things one has built through one’s dwelling but it is also the looking ahead at such future creations that can also be dwelling places (Edwards, 2005, p. 120). Also, to dwell is to ‘bring things to the presence before oneself and others, either through practices of cultivation or practices of construction' (Edwards, 2005, p. 119). Practices of cultivation are cultural, through poetry, art, music, etc.; whereas practices of construction are the building of “things” in their usefulness and “ready to hand-ness”. However such things gather the environment, or those other things that belong together with it. For instance, a fork makes reference to knives, spoons, plates, etc. In this sense, migrants may use such practices of cultivation in order to refer to their homeland, to their families, traditions, etc.

Dwelling is not a solution to homelessness, but it is rather a learning to live with it (Young, 2000). Young (ibid.) calls Heidegger’s stance one of ‘heroic alienation’, which entails the ‘courage to carry in the face of the nihilating pressure of the nothing’, as fundamental to life and world. Homecoming, dwelling, authenticity, amongst others, are used by Heidegger as indicators of how we deal with our existence, in terms of facing the nature of our Being or fleeing from it. It is often the question whether they become ethical aims or if Heidegger is ever too vague in elucidating the ways of achieving them. Heidegger
does not give us ethical maxims but only hints at what the experience might feel like. As the later Heidegger focuses more on the phenomenological aspects of our existence, what these concepts indicate is the felt experience of dwelling in the understanding of our own Being.

Heidegger states that: ‘To be a human being means to be on earth as a mortal. It means to dwell (BDT, 1975, p.150)’. To dwell as a mortal is to be aware of the contingency of the circumstances, the unavoidable presence of finality, and so, as one builds, that which one builds reveals the conditionality of the dwelling that produced it (Edwards, 2005, p.127). To dwell as a mortal is not only the nearness of death, but also the vulnerability that holds life together, it is to be aware of our inevitable end. Edwards adds, ‘Death as an insuperable limitation and inevitable failure is what makes life distinctively human’. It is not only to know that one will die, but that everything is contingent upon a ‘constellation of circumstances that will someday no longer hold together’ (Edwards, 2005, p. 127). In Poetically....Man Dwells, Heidegger clarifies: ‘Only man dies, and indeed, continually, so long as he stays on this earth, so long as he dwells' (1975, p.222)’. It is obviously not the case that only humans die, but they care about their own death and the death of others. They fear and even respect it; hence the diverse rituals dedicated to those who die. Therefore, dwelling is shaped by our concern about death and our caring for it.

As constantly facing death\textsuperscript{17}, the ‘No-thing’, the groundlessness of being, Dasein is permeated by a ‘radical ontological insecurity’ (Young, 2000, p. 206). For Julian Young, this insecurity stands in opposition to dwelling. Dwelling is to feel safe, but not necessarily to fail to acknowledge the fragility of that safety. Dwelling, is not mere existing, but there is a “sublime” aspect of the place where we dwell. By belonging to something ‘incomparably greater than any fragile human fragment can we look the finitude of that fragment squarely in the eye’ (Young, 1999, p. 88). It is by acknowledging not only our own groundlessness but also the vastness of our Being that we can come to be at home and to dwell. The Holy, the sublime, is prior to any gods; it is a ‘reservoir of unconcealment, a

\textsuperscript{17} A more thorough discussion on the importance of death and groundlessness can be found in Chapter 4.
darkness illuminated for us only in the open we inhabit’ (Young, 1999, p. 88.). If we fail to feel at home in the world, the possible commitments we can make to it or to the beings in it lack any sort of importance and authority. Young states that ‘Only in a world disclosed as sublime is the protectedness which constitutes dwelling possible’ (1999, p.88). The comfort and protection that is experienced in dwelling, allows for us to gather with things and world in a harmonious and comfortable fashion. The sublime is present in dwelling because it links both my care for my environment and the recognition of my fragility in the face it.

3.4.5 Rivers, Locality and Journeying: Portraying Dwelling as a process

Heidegger draws from Hölderlin´s poetry, in this case he specifically refers to The Ister, in order to illustrate his thoughts on dwelling but also as an image that speaks for many elements of human life. He says, they are evidently ‘bearers of and as yet veiled meaning’ (1996, p.15). The river is directly related to dwelling through its journey. The journey symbolizes the process of homecoming; through its journeying, the river determines our coming to be at home upon the earth. Heidegger states: ‘The river ‘is’ the locality that pervades the abode of human beings upon the earth, determines them to where they belong and where they are homely (heimisch)’ (1996, p. 21). The river is essential in becoming homely into what is one's own. The river is a representation of the locality of dwelling of human beings, and its journeying is related to our historical essence (Young, 2002).

The river is both locality and journeying, it represents such unity. The river gives rise to a locale, a place where we can dwell, a home that is our own (Eigene), and in Hölderlin’s language, gives rise to a ‘Fatherland’. The river symbolizes a place of homecoming and its process (Young, 1999). The river gives rise to a place of dwelling, as stated by Hölderlin in his poem: ‘Here, however, we wish to build, for rivers make arable the land’ (Heidegger, 1996, p.147). The river then becomes the rising and the building of die Heimat, the river, although in flux, is a locale, a physical reference with essential existential meaning. The river determines the ‘over there’ and the ‘there’ it arrives while
already departing (Young, 2002). The river in flux is a locale; locality is intrinsic to the river.

Place begins where movement ceases (Angus, 2001, pg. 17). Locality is the ‘constituting movement’ prior to a place being defined. It is not the origin of place but it is an orientation (ibid.). Angus exemplifies this orientation by explaining that the ‘here’ is defined as such in the movement of the return from the ‘there’. This movement creates a line, a border between both locales. Here and there, once movement has stopped, become places. Locality is their intrinsic configuration. On boundaries, Heidegger defines them as ‘not that at which something stops… but a boundary is that from which something begins its presencing. (1975, p. 154)’; the border is not a place, but a line between to places. Locality is understood as a returning back, and the border is the line that appears as crossed. Crossing, also a movement gives origin to the border. The ‘thing’ which begins its presencing in movement, is in return from the there. Locality then requires Da-sein and Hier-sein, an opening out and a returning towards (Angus, 2001, p. 18). It comes to represent the dynamic way in which we speak of places. If, for instance, I was to explain where Cork is in relation to Dingle, I would say its located further to the east of Ireland. I would say how many miles there are in between them and maybe give the specific coordinates of Cork city. I could even draw a route in a map to show how to get from Dingle to Cork. Both places lack movement, but locality is the orientation I use in order to explain the relation between them. Heidegger states: ‘The river is the journeying of a historical coming to be at home at the locale of this locality. (HHI, 1996, p.33)’ The river journeys; it is in movement as a locality, it dwells by moving, bringing forth a dwelling place. The river is therefore both locality and journeying.

The river is both temporal and spatial. The rivers ‘intimate and vanish into time’. The flow of the river can represent the flow of time, but they are also ‘of time and are time itself” (HHI, 1996, p. 12). In their flowing, rivers are oriented in a twofold direction; as vanishing ‘the river is underway into what has been. As full of intimation, it proceeds into what is coming’ (HHI, 1996, p. 29). Heidegger poses the river as another representation of temporality, as a fleeting present, a past directed towards the source and as a directing towards an upcoming future.
The river, then, possesses a destiny; it is historical. It includes ‘commemorative remembering’ (*Andenken*) but it also awaits for what is coming; it is futural (Young, 1999, p. 84). Hence, the river, through its temporality, is also a journey. Heidegger explains journeying as temporality in *The Ister*: ‘For journey the sequence of moments, in this case, the sequence of individual now points has after all, from time immemorial been named a “flowing”’.(1996, p.39)

Heidegger states that ‘The river dwells’ in order to point out the intrinsic element of the locale to the river. Our becoming homely can be traced to an ‘over there’, to a point of departure, and also to a point of arrival. ‘The river is in the state of wandering’, however, such wandering is not aimless (Pattison, 2000, p. 178). The river retains the connection to its source as it shapes the landscape. ‘The river makes paths on the previously pathless earth’, and it is that state of wandering what allows to make oneself ‘at home on earth’ (Pattison, 2000, p. 179). When the river ‘journeys’, it journeys between locales, between the point of departure and the point of arrival, and it is that journeying which allows both locales to exist and to be connected to one another. Heidegger explains

The river determines the journey, and the relation grounded therein, the relation of those locales that have been brought about in journeying and thus themselves journey (*HHI*, 1996, p.36).

It is the sequence of moments; of ‘now points’ that Heidegger calls the flow of the river. The river represents the journey of becoming homely, and it is this journeying what is its very nature. Heidegger states in his lectures on Hölderlin: ‘What is proper to the river is thus the essential fullness of a journey. The river is a journey in a singular and consummate way’ (*HHI*, 1996, p.30). Heidegger calls the ‘consummate essence of the journey’ one that corresponds to the locality of the locale. In the discussion of locality, it was defined as that which is in movement, it has not yet arrived into bringing forth the locale, and it is the movement of the place towards its ‘placeness’. The river is the journeying of locality. The essence of the locale, within the locality, is that it journeys, and for Heidegger, this is not contingent, but it is concealed and intrinsic to the journey.
He states ‘The essence of the locale, in which becoming homely finds its point of departure and its point of entry, is such that it journeys’ (HHI, 1996, p.35).

The river also has care [Sorge] for man’s locality; such is the river’s vocation; in allowing men to dwell, it safeguards them, allows them to experience a feeling of safety (Franz, 1998). The journeying that the river is, in its vocation of care, is directed as well towards attainting the ‘earth as ground’ of the homely. Heidegger explains in a brief quote his conceptualization of journeying:

Because vanishing can also be directed into what it is to come, and intimating into what has been, this naming of the rivers testifies to their rich, yet originarily unitary essence, which we have encapsulate in the name of journeying. (HHI, 1996, p.32)

The river is then a concealed unity of both journeying and locality. For Heidegger not only are locale and journey less rigid, more fluid definitions of space and time, but further, that locale and journey more accurately encapsulate the experience of space and time.

The river provides an insight into the historical past, indicating the rising of the dwelling place, as well as the upcoming journey, both intrinsic to the flux of the river. The river as journeying provides the way of explaining homecoming as movement through the foreign. The interaction between the foreign and the homely, the process of homecoming, constitutes the historicality of man (Franz, 1998). The river prevails through its journeying, while through its course; it makes ‘grounds’ for the homely. It is through the intrinsic quality of the river as journeying that the process of homecoming as a passage through the foreign becomes possible. Heidegger states:

The journeying into the unhomely must go “almost” to a threshold of being annihilated in the fire in order for the locality of the homely to bestow its gladdening and rescuing. (HHI, 1996, p.134)

Heidegger proposes that the reason why Hölderlin writes about rivers in his poems is because the spirit of the river is ‘what experiences the journeying of unhomeliness as becoming homely’ (Franz, 1998, p. 694). After all, it is the process of homecoming that is the point of the passage through the foreign and of journeying in general. The spirit, says Heidegger, is initially not at home, and it must relate back to the source in order to become homely. However, as
journeying, the river ‘can never forget the source, because in flowing, that is, in issuing from the source, it itself constantly is the source and remains the locality of its own essence’ (HHI, 1996, p.138). Like the river, the poet prepares the way for ‘the holy’ or ‘the sublime’ among men. Both are signs pointing the difference between mortals and divinities.

The river is the representation of becoming in-the-midst-of-flux (Pattison, 2000, p.178). The stream is the context, but it is also the poetic, as grounding, dwelling and wandering (Sallis, 1993, p.385). The figure of the river is poetic because of the meaning it articulates. It is the in between, a demi-god, between the vision of the sublime, the arising of the poetic, and the dwelling places of mortals, sketching out where they are built. The river is a ‘being between’ since it is seen to originate in the mountains, the place where the gods dwell, and descending into the lands, making habitable for mortals (Pattison, 2000, p. 178). The poetic seeps through the flux of the river and our ontological homelessness bridging together gods and mortals ‘in their mutual boundedness’ (Pattison, 2000, p. 180).

The river does not only present the journey towards a homecoming, but it also reveals how both journeying and locality paradoxically include each other. Locality journeys and the journeying itself is a locality, both which are made possible in the river. It represents also past and present and future as part of its flux, and the source of the river, again, as something that is always present, always referred back to. It expresses the dynamic nature of becoming homely, but it also posits it as a symbol of the connection between the sublime and mortal existence. The river allows for human existence by making “arable” land, but it also allows for the sublime. Heidegger compares the river to poets in the sense that it can point to such aspects of existence that can be experienced as holy.

The complexity of the river image reflects also the complexity of the process of homecoming. One aspect has multiple meanings, always in paradoxical relation with its opposite. The experience of becoming homely, as existential or more specifically grounded in cases such as migration also reflects such complexity. The migrant, hence its name, even as it is located in a place, is to an extent still migrating; maybe through finding a way of becoming comfortable in the new place of residence, maybe from sketching out plans of when to return
home, etc. It is the temporalizing, the futural planning, or the looking back, which also speaks of such journeying. Throughout experience, there is also always the possibility of the poetic to arise, not only through realizing the sublime aspects of existence, but also necessarily, through the encounter with the foreign. Such situations can potentially raise the question of their meaning. In any case, Heidegger explains the routes through which such realizations come about.

The migrating experience is easily compared to the river image because of the concrete similarities that run parallel to the existential journey that Heidegger describes. Venturing out from the source into other landscapes and making/finding dwelling places makes for an easy comparison between the river and migration. However, the river speaks more of a cyclical process. Migration can occur only from the homeland to the new country, sometimes including its return, or, as mentioned above, it may also include a continual migrating. However, the river is constantly journeying and constantly dwelling. In migration dwelling is what one aims at, a home, a dwelling place at the end of the journey. The river is always both, always arriving while already departing towards new grounds that will again demand its locality as dwelling. The river represents the possibility of understanding our being while such understanding remains impermanent. Even as we might come to authentically project our possibilities, as soon as we do, we are already encountering new situations that will demand the same from us, or the everyday will carry us in its familiarity towards new situations. The river as an existential process unifies the possibility of homecoming and its process.

3.5 CONCLUSION: MIGRATING TOWARDS THE HOMELY

The social sciences have focused on important elements of the migrant experience, both physical and experiential. Brah speaks of the material home as well as feeling at home, where the latter is not necessarily experienced only in one place or in the place of origin. Ties between the physical and the emotional are pointed out as intrinsic, for example in Eva Hoffman’s ‘soils of significance’, but they are realized as possibly paradoxical, where ‘homing desires’ or the desire to
feel at home emerges from not feeling at home within the homeland. Cultural theories on migration and their relation to the homeland mostly propose home as dynamic and fluid. They depict the homeland as dependent on the relations that are built and maintained in different places of residence but whose attachments are subject to change as well as the relation to the place of origin. The meaning of a home changes out of the necessity of learning to dwell within the foreign. It is possible that the feeling of the uncanny and the unfamiliar never truly goes away, and so finding comfort within the foreign becomes a prerequisite for daily existence. As a result, the idea of home as the place where we feel safe and protected, where we ‘return to our own being’ becomes less fixed. It allows for example, for a multiplicity of homes, none of which provide a full sense of safety and protection. The ‘presencing in the manner of absencing’ is the memory of the original source, of the point of departure of the journey. The home left behind in order to look for ‘something different’, something unfamiliar and strange, becomes the promise of return, the mirror where one might or might not find oneself again. Migration allows, forcefully, building dwelling places, to build familiarity within the unfamiliar, to emulate the feeling of comfort through the memory of it. The distinction between homely and unhomely is blurred, while yet aspiring towards a ‘homelier’ place.

Although Heidegger also focuses on the dual structure of the home and of experience in general, pointing at the importance of the physical elements and the existential relevance they bring to experience, his theory offers a much more complex description of the experience of what it means to feel at home. Social theories of migration state that home building is always an incomplete process, since new elements keep being added to the idea of the homely. Heidegger already defines homecoming as a process, as the beginning of the turn towards one’s own, where one’s own is never arrived at, but remains in nearness. While cultural theories on migration propose possible solutions in order to change specific aspects of the identity of the migrant, or of his self interpretation, Heidegger offers a more enigmatic and holistic interpretation of experience, calling for elements beyond our materiality that speak to us deeply about our being in the world. Heidegger contributes to the research on home in migration by
examining such experience from a phenomenological lens that also accounts for sets of shared issues that people respond to. To consider Heidegger’s account of the home is to understand experiences beyond their particularities, by taking into consideration those fundamental issues that shape any experience.

Maybe the most important element Heidegger can add to the understanding of migration is that of homelessness. We do not start from the home as homely, but homecoming starts from homelessness as the root of human beings, which is also the reason why homecoming is only the beginning of the turn. Homelessness arises from anxiety in the face of death, of nothingness. To face the abyss is also to face that which we do not know, which might induce awe or fear in us. Because we turn away from our own essence, we remain and homeless. In fear of facing the No-thing, we flee into the comfort of seeming stability. To turn to our essence, that which faces the groundlessness of Being, is to search for the uncanny, it is to pass through the foreign. In this way, the foreign and the homely stand in a dialectical relationship with one another, building the process of homecoming and enriching the understanding of each other. Homelessness then is one of the fundamental aspects that Heidegger draws on to describe the homely and to explain how any of our experiences is shaped by certain defining aspects, in this case, our finitude and our constant avoidance of it.

To the homely, the foreign and the process of homecoming, Heidegger adds the human activity of dwelling. We not only live in places, but we make homes of them, we build places where we can feel safe, we dwell. Heidegger relates our way of being in the world with the way we build that world, according to our necessities but also according to our permanent state of homelessness. We have a longing desire to build a home, to safeguard and to be safeguarded, and Heidegger puts that longing at the core of being human; he puts home and the homely (and homelessness, of course) at the center of our being, which in turn is expressed in our activities. The social sciences do not acknowledge such core aspects that shape any of our experiences.

His use of rivers as signs, as in between mortals and divinities, and referring to the sublime also points to something which is beyond our reach as humans, but that we need in order to realize our own smallness. That smallness,
which is ours, is the smallness with which we live and dwell; it is important insofar as it gives us a scale of our existence on earth. The acknowledgment of that human smallness is never present in the social sciences, maybe due to the ethical ways they propose in order to supersede certain social dynamics. The focus on the agency of the individual alone prevents from understanding our intrinsic smallness. Furthermore, the river symbolizes a journey, which holds locality within itself, which allows for dwelling. As if humans dwelled in the course of their life by building their own dwelling places, as if through the course of searching, we found dwelling, but also, we sensed our historical origin in its nearness, as it is carried through the journey.

Both Heidegger and research on migration have identified the concept of home as crucial. The latter takes home as an issue surfacing in the migrating process, and Heidegger deems it a fundamental concern in human experience, and homecoming as an existential cyclical process, although it can be linear alone in the case of migration. The migrant crosses actual borders and leaves a material home. Heidegger proposes home and its related concepts as crucial to the understanding of our existence. Through his philosophy, the migrant is an entity that serves both as an example and as an image of that which we all potentially experience.
CHAPTER 4: Fundamental questions in different regions: the void of the uncanny

4.1 Migration: The fundamental rising through the regional

In his early texts Heidegger presents a fundamental ontology of Dasein, including the elements that he considers to be at the root of our Being, those elements without which we would not be Dasein. These elements that make up our basic ontological structure express themselves throughout our existence. Heidegger’s later focus on home and dwelling speak for fundamental experiences of human beings: the experience of home, or of feeling safe and protected in a given place is matters that are existentially relevant. These common issues that Heidegger reveals throughout his writings are always necessarily linked with the ontic realm. The world that we live in, with its definite characteristics, its different social contexts, etc., allows for the expression of said issues. For these reasons, the fundamental common issues express themselves in different ways, as they are shaped always already by a given context.

In the case of migration, such experience is already defined by definite characteristics such as physical displacement of the homeland. The characteristics that define migration are ontic, and the literature has focused on these ontic properties. These specific characteristics of the experience of migration and
migrants already provide the context that shapes their experiences (for instance, border-crossing as a necessary characteristic of the migrating experience). However, their context is also defined by other particularities, like the place being migrated to, its society, the age of the migrant, the race, and so forth. Nonetheless, the common fundamental issues permeate any of these realms, but more importantly, in the regional framework of migration, they can provide an analysis that considers ontological and existential aspects and that not only focuses on the characteristics of migration. These fundamental aspects speak of that which allows migrants or any other kind of expression of Dasein to be what they are. This layered analysis starts off with the fundamental, going through the regional and acknowledging the particular, at every step being aware of the fundamental concerns that seep into any of these realms. What remains relevant is that the fundamental aspects of our existence – our caring, dwelling, the possibility of the uncanny – arise through all of our particular experiences, shaping, along with the context, our existence in the world.

Heidegger defines regions [**Gegende**] as providing the conditions of possibility for the intelligible relations that we encounter in the world. Regions allow things to emerge as intelligible in their relation to our environment. We ‘discover’ the ready-to-hand in regions and they are essential to understanding the ‘pre-given publicly shared parts of an environing world’ (Casey, 1997). For instance, we understand a piano as an instrument that produces music, that is, through its use, a use that has been given by the shared social elements of our environment. Through the specificity of regions we understand relations amongst objects and people. Regions point to what allows for the disclosure of the spatial world where we interact. Regions then are an in-between, pointing to the conditions of possibility for how we understand things in their particularity. Regions bring things together as meaningful parts of our environment and require of our involvement in order for such meaning to arise. A region is not stepped into as if one were an external entity, rather, we are already within one, we are involved in them as we encounter things and beings. Proposing a regional ontology of migration is acknowledging both the particularity of any situation and the conditions of possibility, the ontological structures and issues that we share.
and that allow situations to be intelligible. It is not only particular characteristics that define migrants, but the relation that these characteristics have to their context, which in turn, provides them with meaning. Such regional ontology entails relating the characteristics of migration to our possibility of understanding them also as the expression of the conditions that provide our possibility of finding such characteristics intelligible.

The mere categorization of beings forgets existential features and simply distinguishes types and entities. Diaspora studies scholarship has established its types and categories while remaining forgetful of ontological structures. It has investigated individual and cultural differences amongst migrants, and has also catalogued certain experiences migrants have in common. Theories on migration have only focused on the characteristics that bring migrants together. They have overlooked the structure that supports and allows for those characteristics to take place to begin with. Furthermore, their suggestions of ‘imagined spaces’ for transcending marginalizing social dynamics that some migrants are subjected to reveal a normative agenda. Heidegger’s existential analysis of Being through his concepts of authenticity, anticipatory resoluteness and becoming homely are not of an ethical kind. They point to an understanding of Being that takes into consideration both actuality and possibility. They ask for an understanding of ourselves and our circumstances, whatever they might be, in order to always project forwards. Such understanding emphasizes not only our own fragility, but the fragility of fixed concepts, thus standing in opposition to what the scholarship on migration proposes.

A regional ontology allows for the possibility of unifying the ontic with the fundamental ontology. It provides an opening for an inter-subjective understanding of experiences through those aspects that are shared. It does not separate according to individual differences, but acknowledges them, while offering an understanding of ourselves that goes beyond them. This understanding brings together different experiences through the expression of fundamental issues within them. Thus, it is possible to understand oneself as a migrant, even if ontically one is not migrating, and migrants are not just an isolated kind of entity, defined only by their characteristics, but their experiences are shared and can be
identified with by other beings, allowing for a shared fundamental understanding of our existence. Identifying with such fundamental commonalities brings our ontological structures to the foreground, with which a regional ontology acknowledges both its ontic limitations and the conditions that allow migrants, or any of us, to exist in the ways in which we do.

Diaspora studies scholarship has studied many of the relevant aspects that surface in the migrating experience. As shown in Chapter 2 and 3, however, some of these aspects are also existentially relevant for us in a fundamental way. Heidegger reveals the importance of the aspects found empirically in a different level of enquiry, that of our being. In the present chapter I focus on Heidegger’s criticism towards the social sciences regarding their forgetfulness of being, of the ontological aspects that define us. Heidegger pushes for an anti-anthropocentric understanding of existence where he takes into account other dimensions that impact our everyday lives and our understanding of them. Any social account of human existence is not only to study the concrete social factors that define it, but also the ontological structures underlying our assumptions and values. With this in mind, I focus on Heidegger’s account of the groundlessness of being through his concepts of Being-towards-death, the uncanny both in early and later texts and also of the Fourfold. The purpose of such focus is to show that these factors also aid the development of regional ontologies, in this case, one on migration. The issues that Heidegger considers to be fundamental are also revealed in situations like the ones migrants face.

4.2 Beyond anthropocentrism: Heidegger’s being, dwelling and the fourfold

Heidegger delineates different existential structures that manifest in whatever ways Dasein takes up its existence, depending on context and situation. Ontically, Dasein can be described by having definite and concrete characteristics, for instance, those attributed to migrants, medical doctors, mothers, criminals, etc. However, Dasein cannot be reduced to any of these ontic descriptions. To put it simply, no migrant is merely a migrant, but also, for example, a mother, son,
teacher, tailor, nurse, lover, from an urban or rural background, of a certain class, gender, etc. Independently of different contexts and roles, migrants are, just like non-migrants, Dasein, irreducible to ontic 'objective' determinations or characteristics; ‘there’ and engaged in a world; ontological in the sense that their own being is an issue for them. Such is the link that Heidegger makes between the ontic realm and Dasein’s ontological structure, as always already present in our everyday existence. That which is thematized or interpreted is Being, that Being which is already an issue for us. For the early Heidegger, being is ‘grounded in an entity, namely Dasein’ (BP, 1982, p. 229). That is, Being is understood via the entity that we are and which necessarily exists somewhere.

In his later texts, Heidegger becomes even less anthropocentric by making Dasein no longer the source of meaning of Being. An example of this occurs through his explanation of the ‘thinghood’ of the thing, (as opposed to its ready-to-hand-ness), which effects a decentering of Dasein from the picture (Harman, 2007, p. 130). Even as Dasein is capable of creating objects, their ‘thinghood’ is not dependent on Dasein. Furthermore, Heidegger places more emphasis on that which is never fully disclosed but that is always present (i.e. the earth, the gift of Being, nearing nearness, etc). That which lies concealed reveals to us the limitations of our own being. In line with this view, Heidegger switches from a more scientific style to a poetic one. He emphasizes some of his early perspectives on interpretation and makes his writings more ambiguous and inconclusive, in order to reflect in writing the concealment of Being. Heidegger continues to oppose conceptual determination and to elucidate instead the limits of knowledge (Pattison, 2000, p. 193). This leads him to speak of the ‘mystery of Being’, which he describes as that which is not fully comprehensible and which can only be sensed indirectly (Young, 2002, p.19, Pattison, 2000, p.190).

Regardless of the differences between Heidegger’s early and his later works, his project need not be viewed as changing substantially, and neither does his fundamental understanding of Being.\textsuperscript{18} What runs through both phases of

\textsuperscript{18} Some of the scholars that agree with the thesis of continuity throughout Heidegger’s project are Charles Taylor (2005), Thomas Sheehan (2005), Gunter Figal (2007), Taylor Carman (2003), Jeff Malpas (2006), etc.

[…] this turning is not a change of standpoint (i.e., of the question of being) from Being and Time, but in it the thinking that was sought first arrives at the locality of the dimension out of which Being and Time is experienced, that is to say, experienced in the fundamental experience of the oblivion of being. (1947, p. 249-50)

Heidegger continues to focus on those issues that are existentially present for us and which are ontologically relevant, although he re-orientates our attention from a focus on individual (albeit social) Dasein to one that is less anthropocentric. The features Heidegger sees as existentially fundamental in his later texts are of a broader inter-subjective nature. He focuses less on the individual’s relation to others and to its environment, and seems more concerned with the relation of the whole of Being to its many forms. But again, even though this has been often downplayed in the literature, the early Heidegger also emphasizes that Dasein is always already Mit-Sein (Being-with).

Another concept of his later writings that emphasizes this anti-anthropocentric perspective is that of the fourfold. The fourfold is a broader understanding of the coming together of what Heidegger distinguishes as four different dimensions of ‘thinghood’. A thing can gather the four elements of the fourfold: earth, sky, divinities and mortals. The unity that the thing brings can also be called ‘world’. The fourfold is then what allows the world to be as such. Heidegger describes the fourfold as belonging together in a ‘dance’.

The round dance is the ring that joins while it plays as mirroring. Appropriating, it lightens the four into the radiance of their simple oneness. Radiantly, the ring joins the four, everywhere open to the riddle of their presence. (PLT, 1975, p. 180)
Dance expresses the dynamic nature of the dimensions of the fourfold. The four elements mirror the thing in different ways. Appropriating is the gathering together of things, and thus the dance of the fourfold forms a unity, a ring, that mirrors the fourfold in any given thing we encounter, and which allows it to express its ‘thinghood’ as such.

The four elements display different aspects of what makes up the world as conditions that make our lives possible in the way they are. Each of the four elements elucidates the life that ‘brought to presence the actual thing before us’. Each of the four is ‘a particular dimension of conditionality (BDT, 1975, p. 121).’ They also point at what is concealed and what is accessible to us. Earth and the divinities remain concealed from us. They signal the limits of our own understanding and of our own incompleteness. For instance, describing the earth, Heidegger says that it ‘appears cleared as itself only when it is perceived and preserved as that which is by nature undiscoverable […] The earth is essentially self-secluding’ (PLT, 1975, p. 46-7). Earth is the background against which the totality of the significance of the world emerges. It reminds of how what is concealed allows for the unconcealed to be revealed. The earth is everything that the world gives sense to, but without the already constructed social meaning. Edwards states that to speak of the earth is ‘to be reminded of that always unilluminated darkness’ from where all that is given a name or a word comes from. The earth signifies the ‘dark and unnamable substance of things’, even as that substance is the necessary condition, the source for ‘any thing that is’ (Edwards, 2005, p. 124). Earth and sky are usually associated with nature, while divinities and mortals with culture, not in opposition with one another, but as elements which are equally important in the fourfold. The earth is usually contrasted with the sky, where the earth is more ‘spatial’ and the sky is more ‘temporal’, as it speaks of the cycle of seasons and the course of stars and planets. Nonetheless, both are spatio-temporal horizons of dwelling.

Mortals, then, belong to the fourfold through dwelling, which is the ‘basic character of Being in keeping with which mortals exist (BDT, 1975, p. 151).’ Mortals preserve the fourfold in its essential being, in its presencing. To dwell is to bring ‘the presencing of the fourfold into things’; however, things “secure the
fourfold” when they, as things ‘are let be in their presencing’ (BDT, 1975, p. 151). A thing ‘gathers the fourfold’ and gathers other things that belong together with it (BDT, 1975, p. 150). What Heidegger means is, for instance, that a cup belongs to its context, to the things around it, the room, the table, etc. and so also this context is brought together in it. The divinities are not of this world, but they announce a place of wholeness. Mortals await for the divinities ‘in hope they hold up to the divinities what is un hoped for’ (BDT, 1975, p. 150). The divinities allow for mortals to recognize their own limitations and their incompleteness, but also as looking towards the future in hopes of that ‘completion’. Heidegger proposes that those divinities from another world are whatever ‘holds the promise of our healing self transformation’; which may come in the form of poems, paintings, works of philosophy, etc. The wait for the divinities entails a hope for a better future.

When Heidegger states that we “dwell under the sky” he means that we live in relation to those dimensions, also defined by the change of seasons that therefore impact our social practices. The divinities-mortals axis, on the other hand, embraces us as ‘mortals amongst mortals’ i.e. finite Mit-Dasein, while the divinities dimension, understood secularly, refers to ‘poets’ who can find new frames of intelligibility or meaning, or value, or show what it means to be and inspire hope about the future, and can possibly do so for an entire culture. Mortals dwell alongside divinities, on earth and under the sky. All dimensions are equally important.

Heidegger uses the fourfold to lay out a more holistic explanation of our being in terms of the relationality of our existence and everything that is involved in it. It is not only the earth, as the place where we find ourselves in the cosmos, but the manner in which everything in it becomes intelligible, through social practices or through the given meaning to objects. Furthermore, as mortals, within our concern about our own death, we also understand our existence as incomplete.
and tend to believe there are ideals that can be modeled after, for our own sake, for our relation with the world around us. 19

The fourfold provides another way of understanding the relations within a given context. In migration the objects and the landscape that migrants relate to and long for are shaped by different elements, the culture, the landscape and climate, the history of a given country, etc. Thus, we can understand migrants also in relation to the significance they give to different elements of their homes and how that significance is constructed. In any given culture, nature, weather, climate, landscape, etc. influence the practices and understandings of spatiality and temporality. Migrants thus take their practices and understandings from one country to the next, and adapting these also to the new landscape, in a different climate, weather, etc. In this sense, the sky seems to be the more evident influence in the adaptation process. Nonetheless, the divinities pointing and new possible modes of intelligibility also can vary from culture to culture. What one culture considers as valuable and worthy of praise and hope may be different in another one. Eastern and Western cultures, for instance, have developed different values regarding individuality, thus, the characters that are to be considered poets, visionaries, thinkers, etc. may differ from China to North America. Furthermore, the relations amongst the inhabitants of a certain place, also influenced by weather, seasons, divinities, etc., are shown in their traditions. Traditions reflect the different values of each culture. However, death is an aspect of existence that all cultures deal with, although in different ways. The traditional ways in which

19 Heidegger states that the fourfold is not the final condition of the things that are brought to presence. The condition of the conditionality in the fourfold he calls Die Lichtung (clearing, openness). It indicates the final condition of that which does not come into presence, which is the condition of any presence. “The clearing” allows for what is seen, to be seen for what it is. ‘The clearing’ is another sort of gift, which we cannot create; the presence of human beings is also granted by the clearing (Edwards, 2002, p. 126). ‘The clearing’ allows for every ‘event of revelation’ to occur. It opens the possibility of presence, and ‘grants the possible presencing of that presence itself.’ It is prior to anything that may be disclosed within it, it is ‘the undisclosable, unrepresentable condition of disclosure itself.’ (Edwards, 2002, p. 142).
death is dealt with speak of how the people of a given place relate to this feature of life. For Heidegger, our relation to death is a fundamental issue to be faced because it reveals other aspects of our being. Although migrants, for instance, carry different understandings and practices that depend upon factors in nature, they face, like any other humans, the critical question of the end of their existence. The fourfold allows us to expand our understanding of migration beyond history and culture into how these are determined by natural factors. However, a look into the issue of finitude brings another way of de-focusing the individual into what Heidegger calls the groundlessness of being.

4.3 THE UNCANNY AND THE GROUNDLESSNESS OF BEING

Heidegger emphasizes the crucial importance of the uncanny in both his early and later writings. The possibility of not-being for Heidegger is, paradoxically, one of the most determinant factors in our existence. Dealing with that possibility is to confront the question of our being, which is for Heidegger, the most fundamental. In the present section I review the different concepts that Heidegger uses to refer to the possibility of that nothingness and the different ways in which it is disclosed in our lives. I first give an account of anxiety as the permeating fundamental mood that brings about the realization of the Nothing as explained in What is Metaphysics? I then explain the experience of the Uncanny and how it relates to Anxiety as explained in Being and Time, as well as its relevance to the topic of migration. I also cover nothingness in relation to finitude. In the second part of this section, I give an account of the different ways of experiencing the Uncanny as explained in Heidegger’s later texts.

4.3.1 The Uncanny and Anxiety: from not-Being to finitude

There is no definite object to Anxiety; what threatens us ‘is already there, and yet nowhere’ (BT, 1962, p. 186). There is no specific thing that can be pointed out as what is bothersome or instability provoking. Heidegger says that ‘we cannot say what it is before which one feels ill at ease’ (WIM, 1977, p. 101). The experience
of Anxiety is described as a feeling in which the familiarity of the world seems to disappear (Gelven, 1989, p. 114). However, things and beings do not disappear, rather there is a:

‘receding of beings as a whole that closes in on us in anxiety and oppresses us. We can get no hold on things. In the slipping away of beings this “no hold on things” comes over us and remains (WIM, 1977, p. 101)’.

The relation between anxiety and Nothing is explained in two different, yet not disconnected ways in Heidegger. The first, in *What is Metaphysics?* is the revelation of the relation between beings and Nothing. The fact that there are beings is found through anxiety. The second explanation of the relevance of the nothing is found in *Being and Time* and it has to do with our finitude. I begin with the first conceptualization of the relation between anxiety and Nothing to then explain Anxiety in relation to the Uncanny and the groundlessness of Being. I finish this section with *Being and Time*’s explanation of nothingness, finitude and Being-towards-death.

In anxiety, Heidegger says, ‘the nothing is encountered at one with beings as a whole’ (*WIM*, 1977, p.102). What this means is that the nihilation of the nothing discloses ‘beings in their full’, but also in their ‘concealed strangeness as what is radically other’ (*WIM*, 1977, p. 103). What is revealed is that there are beings, and not nothing. The openness of beings is disclosed to Dasein for the first time. Thus, the nothing is not a ‘counter concept of beings’, but it belongs to ‘their essential unfolding as such’. That is, nothing and the Being of beings belong together (*WIM*, 1977, p. 104). In this sense, the anxiety explained in *What is Metaphysics?* discloses a Nothing that has to do with the amazement at the existence of beings. It has to do with encountering beings, trees, birds, plants, etc., not as part of our daily lives, but as provoking instability in us because their being is connected to ours in that we are something as opposed to nothing at all. This anxiety is relevant to migration as much as it is relevant to any other context that can bring about such experience of bewilderment at beings, that is, it is of a fundamental kind, related to Being, that is not specific to migration.

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger states that Dasein flees from *das Unheimliche* (translated as ‘the uncanny’). The uncanny poses anxiety for Dasein because it
pulls Dasein out of the comfort of familiarity. Facing the uncanny, we no longer feel safe and at home. The everydayness of das Man is broken to give space for what is utterly other. And yet, according to Heidegger, ‘the publicness of das Man suppresses everything unfamiliar’ (BT, 1962, p. 237), preventing the uncanny from revealing itself ‘in the basic state of mind of anxiety’ (BT, 1962, p.321). Heidegger states that Dasein is ‘anxious about Being-in-the-world itself’ (BT, 1962, p. 185).

Anxiety goes hand in hand with the experience of das Unheimliche\(^{20}\) where that which is familiar seems to be broken by moments of utter inadequateness. This anxiety is related to the one described above in that there is a break in our routine, but it is not directed to encountering beings ‘as a whole’ through the nothing, but to realizing the groundlessness and the nothingness at the root of our being. It is the feeling of such anxiety that brings Dasein back from its absorption in the world because ‘everyday familiarity collapses’ (BT, 1962, p. 233/189). Everyday familiarity in migration is an aspect that is necessarily confronted as the migrant uproots its life in a familiar space to an unfamiliar one.

Once this realization occurs, our place in the world no longer feels so stable, let alone comfortable. The way in which I exist no longer appears as fixed, or something under my control. Groundlessness means that Dasein has ‘no meaning or content of its own; nothing individualizes it but its empty thrownness’ (Dreyfus, 1991, p.180). It involves our being aware of the fact that there is no actual ground for meaning and that we rely on a loose network of assumptions about our world. It also reveals that we lack a ground for what we think our meaningful existence depends on. We are disclosed as groundless and meaningless. Our seemingly stable lives are revealed as vulnerable and fragile. Some migrants experience such vulnerability when life as they knew it suddenly changes and any idea they had of a fixed identity is suddenly challenged by a new environment, showing the relevance of the social context against what we normally consider to be self-chosen, independent and fixed identities. The

\(^{20}\) Normally translated as “uncanny” (Being and Time- Macquarrie and Robinson). The feeling of Angst, according to Heidegger is uncanny in the sense that we no longer feel at home. The familiarity of our mundane environment is lost.
experience of migration can also bring about the questioning of the ground that we stand on in the sense that it rests in a network of assumptions that we have taken for granted. The realization that feeling ‘out of place’ can have such a deep impact in our everyday lives makes migrants feel fragile, maybe initially, in their new environment. Anxiety, in this context, is a common feeling for migrants and it has the possibility of revealing the vulnerability intrinsic to our lives although it might not necessarily reveal the nothingness the No-thing that grounds our existence.

Although covered up, the uncanny is ‘the basic kind of Being in the world’ (*BT*, 1962, p.322), and as such, it calls Dasein from the uncanniness of its Being. This is what Heidegger calls ‘the call of conscience’, where Dasein is called back to itself from itself, and outside of *das Man*. The call summons Dasein out of its comfortable understanding of itself and of its environment, away from the mundanity of its everydayness, where Dasein remains comfortably and possibly lost in such ‘averaging’ of his existence. This uncanny call brings with it the possibility of revealing Dasein’s incompleteness and finitude. The call, if Dasein responds, can strip away the assumption of stability in our lives and reveal our lives to be fragile and vulnerable due to their own finality and the instability of our own surroundings. In this sense, the uncanny is what allows for the possibility of the call, of a different understanding of our Being. By shaking Dasein out of its ‘comfort zone’, the call provides Dasein with the possibility of questioning itself. Thus, in *Being and Time*, the uncanny serves as a channel out of *das Man* and into allowing Dasein to face fundamental aspects of its Being.

The existential meaning of Nothingness in *Being and Time* is the confrontation with our own finitude. Michael Gelven explains our anxiety about ‘No-thing’ as the feeling of strangeness towards the possibility of our not-Being, which ‘cannot be compared to any other form of human experience’ (Gelven, 1989, p. 116). Our finitude, Heidegger says, as our deepest limitation, ‘refuses to yield to our freedom’ (*WIM*, 1977, p.106). Considering the possibility of not-Being has no metaphysical referent for us, we cannot bring ourselves to confront the nothing by our own will. The realization of our finitude is the realization of our death. It is what reveals Dasein’s temporality, in so far as it is determined by
its finitude. Part of our existence and of understanding its possibilities is to comprehend its ontological structure. However, although our own death is an inescapable element of our ontology, we constantly flee from it. The image of our own death creates an uncanny feeling because we have no actual relation to it.

‘Dasein is factically dying as long as it exists’ writes Heidegger, in order to reveal the constant decay and fragility not only of my life, but of its possibilities and of my surroundings (BT, 1962, p. 295). In the event of migration, for instance, migrants have “shut down” the possibility of continuing their lives in their home country in exchange for something better and/or different. Nonetheless, to be confronted with death is to face the nature of our existence, a confrontation that is open to both migrants and non-migrants. In this sense, the “dying off” the possibility of staying in their home countries is a situation that defines the migrating experience, but does not necessarily confront migrants with their own death.

To be aware of the utter possibility of death, is also to be aware of the possibility of the finality of what lies around us. Carman states that Dasein’s awareness of that ownmost possibility results in the realization that “every possibility open to Dasein leaves in its wake other possibilities that have been shut down, rendered null and void. ‘All possibility is bounded and conditioned by impossibility’ (Carman, 2005, p. 281). Every time I make a choice, for example, of moving to a new country instead of staying in my own, I have shut down numberless possibilities of what my life will be surrounded by. When Heidegger states that we are constantly dying, he refers also to other possibilities always being shut down for us. Dasein’s finitude is perceived as utterly uncanny, as furthest removed from the familiarity of its everydayness. Dasein, in order not to be subject to anxiety, immerses itself in everydayness assuming the stability and continuity of its existence. If we were constantly aware of our impending finitude, any project would seem pointless and irrelevant. Such an attitude is not what Heidegger refers to in Being-towards-death, but it is one of continuous projection forwards ‘in spite of’, as Heidegger says, being constantly dying. What Heidegger wants us to understand is that even though our lives, and our projects, are finite and transient, ignoring such aspects does not bring us any closer to an
understanding of ourselves. We constantly want to think of our lives as meaningful, and of our projects as relevant. Heidegger thinks that our lives are grounded in an abyss and that our Being is always facing the eventual nothingness of its existence. This, however, is not to prevent us from continuing to engage in projects even though any of these projects already speaks of the nullity of others, of the shutting down, the ‘dying off’ of other possible ones.

Heidegger proposes that we acknowledge, and not turn away from, the defining elements of our existence as they help us understand our own possibilities and ourselves. Thus, understanding the vulnerability and the finality of our lives allows us to have a better ‘informed’ projection. Because we are ‘that inability to remain’ and yet unable to leave our place, we constantly throw ourselves into possibilities (FCOM, 1995, p. 365). We can be nothing but what we are in actuality, yet, we are enraptured in the transition of projection. We are ‘seized by terror’ (in anxiety) but can also find the ‘bliss of astonishment’ through the understanding of the actual and the possible (FCOM, 1995, p. 366). Being-towards-death reveals a fundamental existential aspect that defines such possibilities. Instead of refusing to make plans or deeming them irrelevant because of their pointlessness or of making plenty of them without considering their realizability or the limitations of our own lives, Heidegger calls for both an acknowledgment of the factors that define our lives and, at the same time, an awareness of the ontological nature of our finite existence.

The importance of acknowledging concrete limitations might be a common issue for migrants, especially those referred to in the Diaspora Studies literature. Migrants often find themselves constrained legally and socially and cannot but become very aware of it. Working under those limitations is a common issue for migrants. Furthermore, many migrants (depending on whether they are illegal, marginalized, etc.) will try to decrease those constraints. For instance, the multiple demonstrations in the U.S. for legal reform for migrants are an effort to decrease the constraints that many illegal migrants face. Similarly, learning the language of the host country reveals limitations in terms of the possibilities to communicate with the population. Any such attempts already imply the acknowledgment of the concrete constraints that many migrants live with.
However, similarly to the previous concepts, particular and definite aspects (i.e. legal, social) are more easily acknowledged while the ontological ones are not necessarily so. The insight that Heidegger calls for through Being-towards-death comes from understanding the limitations of our being, most radically amongst them, our finitude. In this sense, migrants are not in a ‘better’ place regarding the possibility of such understanding, although ontically they have easier access to the projection of their existentiell possibilities. An ontological understanding of ourselves is the acknowledgment of our groundlessness, and as the kind of beings that migrants are, they share the possibility of such understanding with any other Dasein, in their case, maybe, although not necessarily exclusively, via their migrating experience.

The importance of the uncanny feeling is somewhat addressed in the literature on migration as the “other”. The other is meant to represent the migrant, as “other” to the host society, and vice versa. The “other” in these aspects is meant to represent that which is unknown, strange, different from what we know, and for the literature in social sciences, it is the basis from which dynamics of marginalization and discrimination emerge. From post-colonial, feminist, queer, etc. theories to current theories on migration, the concept of the “other” has represented those who are purposefully “unacknowledged” in society and relegated to a secondary status where such otherness is more easily discarded, marginalized and discriminated against (Brah, 1996; Butler, 1990, Hall, 2000; Spivak, 1996). In an attempt to counteract such social phenomena, these theories propose to “welcome” and “promote” otherness. One, as an illegal migrant, as a black woman, as a queer student, etc., is to embrace that otherness and “battle” the society that is trying to maintain it in the shadows. Embracing such “othered” identity is supposed to be a way of resisting the falsely normalized and normativized ways of being (i.e. the white man going to his office drinking a Starbucks) by presenting the social diversity that actually exists. For these social theorists, representing society by those standards is a way of maintaining in power

21 Gloria Anzaldúa has made a point that the “mestiza” has a better understanding of ambiguity and tolerance for the fact of being a migrant (specifically Mexican in the United States). She engages in an idealization of the migrant status ascribing them a better and inherent understanding of aspects that are context dependent.
sections of society (male, white, employed, etc.) that historically have had that power. Despite their honest attempts, simplifying as they normally normally do, such theories only attribute otherness to social groups. Their inquiry into the origin of otherness is only sociological, into the fear of facing a palpable unknown, but they do not question whether that unknown emerges from our own way of being. Heidegger will also propose a welcoming encounter with the uncanny, but from a different angle. Heidegger sees the uncanny (the utterly other) as a crucial experience in our lives that reveals fundamental aspects of our being.

4.3.2 The Uncanny: Deinon and the uncanniest of all beings

In his later texts, Heidegger speaks of deinon, which he translates as ‘unheimlich’, this time putting emphasis on the not-at-homeness of what is uncanny.\(^{22}\) If the home is where we dwell, where we feel comfortable in a familiar environment, an uncanny experience takes those feelings away from us. Deinon, however, expands his notion of the uncanny into different meanings, not all negative. For instance, experiences of awe can shake us out of our familiarity and bring us to a state of admiration for the world that surrounds us. His emphasis on the uncanny as also unhomely allows Heidegger to present the uncanny as a vessel towards homecoming. In Der Ister: Lectures on Hölderlin, Heidegger declares the human being ‘the uncanniest of the uncanny’ (1996, p.68).

Uncanniness is in all beings, but in humans it is evoked in its constant journeying and flowing; ‘humankind emerges from uncanniness and remains within it - looms out of it and stirs within it’ (1996, p.72). Heidegger paradoxically states “human beings are, in a singular sense, not homely, and that their care is to become homely” (HHI, 1996, p.71). The uncanny is the ground of human beings because it is in their nature to turn away from their essence. Heidegger explains the uncanny as part of what human beings are, moving between striving to be at home and turning away from themselves, and thus being unhomely. Uncanny as

\(^{22}\) Unheimlich is connected to the German Word “Heim” that means “home”. 
we are, the relation between uncanny experiences and striving to be at home can be seen to parallel migration. Although both can be encountered in different contexts, the existential relevance and understanding of both remains a possibility open for migrants and non-migrants.

Heidegger explains that the concept of the uncanny comes from the Greek *deinon*, meaning that which is fearful. Heidegger states: ‘The fear that *deinon* awakens can also be the fear pertaining to reverence and awe’, however, fear in ‘such reverence is not avoidance or flight, but rather a turning toward something in heed and respect… the awe pertaining to admiration, a standing firm in honoring that which awakes such fear’ (1996, p. 63). According to Julian Young, Heidegger defines four polarities of *deinon*, each of them having two poles, one representing ‘human nobility’ and the other, a ‘counter-turning’ of the human against its own essence.

The first refers to the uncanny as the object of fear and awe (Young, 1999). According to Heidegger, there are incidents that interrupt our everydayness and can inspire either awe or fear. The uncanny, that which is unknown and strange, which is seen as ‘out of the ordinary’ and can therefore allow for the ‘call of conscience’ can take these two forms. An awe-inspiring experience can be our admiration at a beautiful sky or natural landscape. It could also be a moment of experiencing love for someone, which can make everything else seem to fade into the background, as it might perhaps for a mother when she sees her child for the first time. On the other hand, the uncanny in its fearsome version can take place in a near death experience, attending the funeral of a loved one, or experiencing a natural disaster like an earthquake. The second polarity shows the uncanny as ‘violent’ and ‘powerful’. As the former, the uncanny is only frightful, but as the latter, it can be ‘something that towers above us and then it approaches what is worthy of honor’. Heidegger states that the uncanny is necessarily ‘inhabital’. This is the third polarity, which may involve being ‘exceptionally skilled within the sphere of the ordinary’, a kind of ‘mastery’, or the quality of being genuinely extraordinary. The fourth and final polarity grasps the ‘*unheimlich*’ (uncanny) as equivalent to ‘*unheimisch*’ (unhomely). The uncanny one is one who is not at home, that which is not homely in what is homely. According to Young, one may
be ‘unhomely’ either in relation to beings or to Being (1996). It is for this reason that the unhomely can also be uncanny, in the sense of ‘something that has alienating or frightening effect that gives rise to anxiety’.

Uncanny moments, both fearful and awe inspiring, remind us of our mortality and/or our vulnerability. However, we cannot remain in the uncanny and forget that we are also live through routines and in a seeming stability that we share with others. Summarizing, the uncanny is first, the experience that allows the call of conscience to take place, second, deimon, which includes positive and negative experiences of the unfamiliar, and third, the ground of human beings making them the most uncanny of the uncanny. The first two act as conditions of possibility for a different understanding. The third is always already implied by our ontological structure. It contains our striving towards comfort and familiarity and our turning away from our essence. Nonetheless, Heidegger thinks that we can, if only temporarily, become homely. We can face the uncanny inherent in us and allow it to shed light on a different understanding of ourselves.

In migration, the uncanny is necessarily an inherent possibility. Although Heidegger deems the uncanny something we might encounter in any of our experiences, it is possible that the migrant has a higher likelihood to find him/herself in an uncanny place. If I live in the same house, have a secure job and a nice family, for instance, it might be easier to lay back in the comfort of my life and to be content with it. However, the migrant decides or is pushed to step into a new society and all the different factors that come with it. Shock and anxiety are common feelings that migrants attest to, mostly due to the lack of familiarity and the demands of the new society. However, although the likelihood of encountering the uncanny is higher in migration, this does not mean that the migrant will necessarily view the uncanny as a possibility for reflection upon him/herself. The uncanny is an opening of the possibility to understand ourselves as transient and fundamentally incomplete. The migrant will not necessarily act on such possibility and might quickly flee into another ready-made comfort zone in order to rid himself/herself of his/her anxiety. Such comfort can be found by assimilating different aspects of the new culture, by finding other groups of people with similar experiences or cultural backgrounds, by reaffirming one’s
difference against the new society as one’s defining characteristic, or by a mix of any of these factors. None of them imply a reflective attitude towards the migrant’s Being. So, even as the migrant might more readily encounter the uncanny that does not make him/her more open towards it than any other Dasein is.

The awareness of our finality, although uncanny, comes to all Dasein. Because it is not only a property “attached to us”, but “our fundamental way of being”, the realization of our finitude is also of a fundamental kind (FCOM, 1995, p. 6). The fragility of what holds our lives together, of our projects and of our circumstances is something we will not necessarily face and reflect on. The possibility of such reflection can arise through a variety of experiences, some of them, as Heidegger notes, of an uncanny nature. In migration, the life back in the homeland marks a point of rupture from what once was possibly considered stable. If migration was desired, such rupture might be experienced positively, nonetheless migration remains a separation between what was and the creation of new ‘stable’ circumstances. For some migrants, however, the at least merely physical separation of one life along with its context and its elements within it in order to inhabit a new environment might not reveal the fragility and transience of the network of the migrant’s familiar elements. The ‘uprooting’ of a life for another might still be viewed as something one is ‘in control of’, depending on the factors that shape different migrating experiences. One might still fail to realize that certain conditions have allowed for any migration to take place and continue assuming a certain level of constancy and stability. In this sense, migration is a region that may also allow for the expression of fundamental issues, such as our own finitude, but that do not necessarily result in a coming face-to-face with the groundlessness of our being.

However, the possibility of recognizing transience in migration remains. For instance, if one continuously moves countries for work, education, economy, etc., a feeling of un-fixedness can arise. The lives lived are plenty in the sense that they happened in different places and in different contexts. Uprooting oneself constantly, while continuing to look for a feeling of familiarity, can bring about the realization of the transience and finality of our lives, whatever shape they may
take. This does not necessarily imply a constant awareness of death, but of ‘small
deaths’, of the people, the homes and familiar places left behind in order to find
new ones. The relationships that are experienced as constant are marked by
‘expiration dates’ that will no longer make them so. In this sense, the finality
inherent in our lives is realized in smaller ways, as transitioning in between
certain endings and future beginnings, between former homes and future ones,
while in a state of moving. Plans are shaped by an ongoing awareness of their
temporal and contextual limitations. Experiencing endings and beginnings
brought about by different factors and that imply the shutting off of one lifestyle
in a given place for another in a different one can lead one to question the stability
of any of them, of our own. Swinging back and forth between the search for the
familiar and the encounter with its opposite can become a lifestyle that may or
may not contain the realization of its fragility. Although the literature on
migration has not addressed the instability and transience of our lives as
fundamental issues, they can however show up through the migrating experience.
The regional aspects of migration, the impermanence lived in different places can
bring about the fundamental issues to the surface. For Heidegger, this is
confronting crucial aspects of our being, it is no longer a turning away from it, but
facing its most uncanny elements.

4.4 BEYOND PARTICULARITIES: THE GROUNDLESS GROUND
THAT GATHERS

In the discourse on migration, the realization of our existential
homelessness as revealing our groundless grounds is an aspect that has not been
addressed. Only the ontic aspects of feelings of not being at home and their effects
on migrants are studied (Ahmed et al., 2003; Fortier, 2003; Ralph and Staeheli,
2001, etc.). A frailty is encountered through the unfamiliarity of a new
environment that comes not only from the context but that calls the migrant to
turn towards his/her being. Existential homelessness allows for the understanding
of a shared fragility and the future encounter with our finitude. It only understands
not feeling at home as not just being isolated in a foreign country but as revealing
a shared vulnerability. The transience of our lives, however, reveals that there are
no absolute foundations or truths that sustain us, and that we are always already facing the Nothing in our existence, and our immanent finitude. The groundlessness of our Being discloses that we have no meaning of our own. Das Man provides our meaning historically and socially, but we are not the source of such meaning in any individual way. We are thrown ‘empty’ into a world that provides meanings for us, and such meanings are based on contingent and unstable assumptions about anything that is. There is no ground to then corroborate those meanings and our own, but only the impossibility of guaranteeing any sort of permanence or stability. In this sense, Heidegger’s groundlessness allows us to make two fundamental criticisms against the social sciences.

First, it challenges the illusion of objectivity in its concepts. The research on migration is keen to provide different meanings for the migrant and for the migrating process (i.e. hybrids and third spaces) without questioning the foundations of those meanings. Assumptions are made that these meanings are true or that set up an ideal to aspire to. There is even an implicit stance that certain kind of migrants are more capable of understand a wider variety of meanings (i.e. Anzaldúa’s mestiza consciousness). These Diaspora scholars posit concepts that can be ascribed to as they provide a more solid ground to stand on, more categories to define us better, more ways in which we can conceive ourselves as meaningful. The meanings and concepts that they provide are as equally grounded as the rest, that is, in a groundless ground. For Heidegger these all form a network of assumptions that may allow us to feel more stable. They do not actually provide more stability or more solid grounds to stand on. As there are no absolute truths, we cannot claim that the concepts on migration, especially the normative ones, as they are based on contextual values, give a complete or absolute account of this experience. The possibility of normative claims is severely compromised if we understand groundlessness as the basis for our concepts. Second, groundlessness reveals the complexity not only of our being, but also, the complex task of the common attempt to apply philosophy to empirical studies. While Heidegger presents a groundless ground over which we build systems and concepts to better our understanding of existence, social scientists have sometimes simplified his
explanations and adapt them to their studies without understanding the depth of his ontology (see Malhotra, 1987, Ortega, 2004).

Furthermore, groundlessness, as a fundamental aspect of our Being, runs through the regional and the particular. All our experiences are imbued with a groundless ground, even if it remains concealed. Groundlessness is in a sense a gathering together of the ontic, the regional and the fundamental aspects of our Being. All of what we understand, the specificities of our lives, the characteristics of migration, all which is meaningful is gathered together in groundlessness. Just as there is no escape from facing the No-thing, there is no escape from our groundlessness. We can only conceive of it as that which lies underneath any thing in our lives that we think of as meaningful. The lack of ground is something that we share; it is an inter-subjective abyss. We can acknowledge this groundless ground as the condition of possibility for such meanings, maybe acquiring then a better understanding of the kind of beings that we are. The uncanny, our inherent finitude and groundlessness are thus fundamental structures of existence that manifest themselves and show their relevance both in migration and in individual instances. Groundlessness, appears in our everyday dealings, experienced through angst, by confronting our finitude or by realizing the groundless ground of our concepts.

4.5 CONCLUSION: A REGIONAL ONTOLOGY OF MIGRATION

The philosophy of Heidegger, through its phenomenological and hermeneutical ontology, offers a more balanced and holistic view of migration. The Diaspora studies scholarship has dedicated its research to defining the different issues that migrants face through their experience and promoted concepts that aim at the bettering of the migrant status via identifying with them (i.e. hybrid, transnational community, hyphenated identities, diaspora space, etc.). Heidegger’s contribution to the research is the ontological relevance that existential factors have. Home, dwelling, groundlessness, and the uncanny, amongst others, are interpreted in two ways. The first interpretation acknowledges the concrete aspects of our
experience, and the second analyzes the ontological relevance through which the concrete aspects of our experience shape us.

By analyzing shared concerns that express themselves experientially and that we necessarily respond to, Heidegger opens a common ground that is to be understood ontologically. A regional ontology of migration brings together both the particularities of migrants and the importance of our fundamental ontology. It speaks for how fundamental issues are expressed regionally, through the ontic characteristics of migration, and particularly through individual experience. Heidegger’s ontological difference shows through the relation between the fundamental, regional and ontic aspects in a dynamic and relational way. Heidegger does not provide a necessary or universal foundation, but a dynamic relation amongst these three different levels of enquiry where each feeds off the other by being manifested in particular instances while still speaking of fundamental ontological aspects. There is an inter-dependence amongst these realms, yet no stable ground. Thus, the research is to be conducted towards a mediating principle amongst the realms, not towards finding absolute claims. Heidegger’s philosophy elucidates the pointlessness of such normative claims. Via concepts like authenticity, anticipatory resoluteness and becoming homely, Heidegger affirms the importance of understanding one’s ontological structure while acknowledging the limitations of our context. He does not establish a way to “improve” ourselves as individuals, but only points at how understanding both sides of our experience (ontic and ontological) can elucidate a more integral understanding of our Being.

A regional understanding then provides a ground that welcomes both differences that are contextually defined and shared issues that we engage in at different times in our lives. Using Heidegger critically, challenging the social sciences, but also extending the analysis of key concepts with which there is an affinity in the case of the migrant, can provide a groundless ground and yet a more in-depth analysis on the experience of migration.
CONCLUSION

The task of philosophy in the university is to deepen the consciousness of both science and life. It is the obligation of each individual to form his own worldview. Philosophy can only awaken critical consciousness, which would put not only worldviews, but the very process of forming them, to the test of life.

(Kisiel, 1993, p. 68)

The current trend in the social sciences to preach ‘otherness’ as the source of individuality and thus to emphasize social divisions and cultural differences is lacking in depth and rigor. Although it is certainly necessary to draw attention to cultural differences emerging from and leading to issues of race, class, gender, etc., focusing exclusively on these differences does not result in an accurate analysis and portrayal of social dynamics. In the case of migration, the Diaspora studies scholarship has developed definitions as well as proposed terms that do not describe concrete structures of experienced existence, but present a kind of
ideal referent. These terms presuppose particular conceptions of what the ‘good’ migrant is: one who is a hybrid subject, who creates imagined/diaspora spaces, who ‘explodes the hyphen’ and who is equipped with a ‘mestiza consciousness’. None of these terms merely describe aspects of how migration is experience, but instead present metaphors that migrants are expected to use to overcome the different marginalization dynamics that they are subjected to via the accentuation of difference and otherness.

Heidegger’s statement about ‘forgetting the question of Being’ in the social sciences can now be expanded by saying that, if not forgotten, philosophy’s role has been relegated in the social sciences. Heidegger contends that the terms and assumptions in the sciences must be revised, and philosophy provides a more rigorous method of problematizing not only the terms but also the process through which the terms are coined. Through the current project, my objective was to provide a different angle to analyze migration without discarding cultural differences, in order to question some of the concepts that are currently in use (i.e. hybrid subject, diaspora space, mestiza consciousness, etc.).

Experiences serve both as separating and bonding grounds, thus, highlighting one aspect of them does not provide a complete study of any kind of experience. Heidegger’s philosophy acknowledges both the different aspects of experience that separate us, and those that bring us together. He develops this fundamental ontology by focusing on everyday experience. He reveals that although our everyday lives differ, there are questions that remain common to us all. In both his early and later philosophy Heidegger continues to look at both the particular instances of experience and the fundamental issues that arise through them. I used both his early fundamental ontology and specifically his later focus on the experience of home to provide a more balanced and thorough approach to the migrating experience. The issues addressed (Das Man, Authenticity, Care, Being towards Death, Becoming homely, the passage through the Foreign, the Uncanny, etc.), can all be illustrated in migration, but also speak for a fundamental network of concerns that we share. Migration is shaped by certain social factors that delimit this experience from others. In this sense, it is neither an isolated individual incident, nor a universalist term. As an ‘in-between region’, it
allows for the expression of the fundamental without relegating the specific. In fact, the specific elements of migration meet with the fundamental issues through the analysis of such experience. For this reason, I propose a regional ontology of migration in the sense that it recognizes the individual differences amongst migrants, the particular factors that delimit migration, and the fundamental issues that are not only common to migrants, but to others. These issues can serve as a counter-balance against the over-emphasis in the literature on difference, which effectively celebrate individuality through otherness. Furthermore, these issues can also provide a deeper understanding of social factors and categories by analyzing them alongside with the fundamental questions that shape our engagement in any of these social factors.

Further analysis is necessary regarding a regional ontology of migration. Although in the current project ‘home’ was one of the issues that were addressed as relevant both existentially and in the migrating experience, other issues need further philosophical and phenomenological analysis. Borders, for instance, are also particularly crucial in migration (Ahmed et.al, 2003; Brah, 1999; Clifford, 1997 etc.) Heidegger develops in Being and Time an analysis of space, place, region and locality that the current project could not include but that could shed light into the understanding of borders in Migration23. Furthermore, temporality is another issue that could not be addressed in the current project but that is an integral part of Heidegger’s project. His understanding of time and temporality thus should also be considered and applied to the analysis of migration, as it certainly has an impact on how migration is experienced. For instance, the length of time that one has spent away from home, the perceived notions of past and present regarding the homeland, etc., are issues that can be further investigated through Heidegger’s analysis of temporality. Unfortunately it is beyond the scope of this project to elaborate on either of these issues, but there is certainly room for further development.

These investigations can then provide alternative ways to address the migrating experience, and maybe influence the Diaspora studies scholarship

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23 Edward Casey (1997) in his analysis of place already develops a phenomenological analysis that takes into consideration that of Heidegger.
towards a more rigorous revision of their terms. Especially the presentation of normative ideals is in urgent need of revision. Heidegger, in this matter, can also provide ‘pointers’ as opposed to specific ethical maxims that can refer to a more holistic understanding of experience, one beyond already made assumptions of the kind of beings that migrants are or that they should aspire to be. Heidegger summons inquirers to first ask the question of Being considering our nullity, fragility and finitude, and not just to develop ethical claims that are set on political agendas. As researchers on social dynamics then, appealing to Heidegger’s philosophy is a constant reminder of the unattainability of timeless truths and of definite ethical norms. Such understanding will necessarily change our approach to the study of experiences, that of migrants or of any other person.

In this sense, Heidegger’s project can both provide rigor and a constant reminder of the need for revising concepts while understanding that such concepts are developed through an understanding that is impermanent and contextual. Philosophy can help make research on migration more critical and more inclusive, by providing an understanding of fundamental issues, which are always already contextualized, and not by postulating merely hopeful ideals. In my future work I intend to continue emphasizing these crucial aspects that both Heidegger in particular and philosophy in general can contribute to current debates on migration in the social sciences.
Bibliography


