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State Building as Strategy:
An Interrogation of NATO’s Comprehensive Approach
in Afghanistan between 2006 and 2011

Daniel Derek Eustace
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Research Supervisor: Dr. Michael Cosgrave
DECLARATION

I, Daniel Derek Eustace, declare that the enclosed thesis “State Building as Strategy: An Interrogation of NATO’s Comprehensive Approach in Afghanistan between 2006 and 2011,” is my own work and has not been submitted for another degree, either at University College Cork or elsewhere.

____________________________________
Daniel Derek Eustace

Dated: ________________________________
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Introduction

Abstract, Methodology and Contribution to Existing Research

The core of this thesis is the study of NATO’s Comprehensive Approach strategy to state building in Afghanistan between 2006 and 2011. It argues that this strategy sustained operational and tactical practices which were ineffective in responding to the evolved nature of the security problem. The thesis interrogates the Comprehensive Approach along ontological, empirical and epistemological lines and concludes that the failure of the Comprehensive Approach in the specific Afghan case is, in fact, indicative of underlying theoretical and pragmatic flaws which, therefore, generalize the dilemma.

The research is pragmatic in nature, employing mixed methods (quantitative and qualitative) concurrently. Qualitative methods include research into primary and secondary literature sources supplemented with the author’s personal experiences in Afghanistan in 2008 and various NATO HQ and Canadian settings. Quantitative research includes an empirical case study focussing on NATO’s Afghan experience and its attempt at state building between 2006 and 2011. This study incorporates a historical review of NATO’s evolutionary involvement in Afghanistan incorporating the subject timeframe; offers an analysis of human development and governance related data mapped to expected outcomes of the Afghan National Development Strategy and NATO’s comprehensive campaign design; and interrogates the Comprehensive Approach strategy by means of an analysis of conceptual, institutional and capability gaps in the context of an integrated investigational framework.

The results of the case study leads to an investigation of a series of research questions related to the potential impact of the failure of the Comprehensive Approach for NATO in Afghanistan and the limits of state building as a means of attaining security for the Alliance.
Introduction

This thesis contributes to existing research on the comprehensive approach, NATO, and international security theory. With respect to the comprehensive approach, this concept became the focus of much inquiry from approximately 2003 onwards as NATO attempted to implement it in Afghanistan. To date, three lines of inquiry have predominated the literature. The first line of inquiry relates to a definitional emphasis, i.e. attempting to situate the concept in a context of existing theories of conflict management or resolution. Frequently, this approach conflates the concept with national-level attempts to improve effectiveness via increased coordination amongst government departments. This thesis broadens this perspective significantly to the extent that the analysis situates the concept in an international arena that necessarily implicates a vast array of civil and military actors. Further, it examines the concept as both an archetypal model of exogenous state building and as a strategy type.

The second line of inquiry emphasizes an institutional approach. This literature is concerned with why institutions (such as governments or alliances) should adopt the concept; in this approach, the concept is viewed as a “solution” to some theoretical dilemma, normally related to complex international security problems. This thesis places the concept squarely in the light of history and shows, at least in the context of Afghanistan, that the application of the theory into practice not only failed, but offers credible explanations for that failure.

The third line of inquiry focusses on structural issues, that is, examining or offering mechanisms or processes by which the comprehensive approach may be operationalized, and this is certainly prevalent in literature related to NATO specifically. In this category, the stress is on coordination deficits or resource scarcities, and finding solutions to these in order to make the concept “work.” This thesis shifts the debate beyond mere critiques of the concept and proposes instead that efforts to implement it be abandoned altogether.

Supporting this research is a series of subtexts that seek to explain why the strategy failed in the Afghan context beyond that of generalized descriptions or historical narratives. While the paper presents empirical evidence of NATO’s failure to achieve its strategic
objective in Afghanistan, the primary objective is the explanation for that failure in theoretical terms.

Key words: comprehensive approach, NATO, state building, counter-insurgency, strategy, campaign assessment.
Introduction

Structure of the Thesis

The thesis seeks to address a series of questions related to NATO’s intervention into Afghanistan, its attempt at state building between 2006 and 2011, the results of this effort and the impact of its failure to achieve its strategic objective on the Alliance itself and for future cases wherein NATO may be called upon to intervene again. In order to satisfy these questions, the thesis contains five chapters as follows.

Chapter 1 is a literature review of the Comprehensive Approach which is at once an archetypal model of state building and a formal strategy which was adopted by NATO in Afghanistan in order to attempt to leverage non-NATO actors and resources necessary to stabilize the country. I argue that this strategy developed in response to changes in the international security environment following the end of the Cold War and has conceptual lineage with other state-building-related theories such as civil-military cooperation, the effects-based approach to operations and counter-insurgency.

Chapter 2 establishes the historical narrative of NATO’s intervention into Afghanistan in 2003 and traces the rationale and process by which the Alliance adopted the Comprehensive Approach strategy. I argue that NATO’s decision to absorb the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission was the result of a complex mixture of external and internal pressures including those from Alliance nations which had accepted leadership roles in the pre-NATO ISAF mission and which desired to expand ISAF’s leadership pool and increase military force capacity by transferring responsibility for the mission to NATO at the institutional level. I show that the adoption by NATO of the Comprehensive Approach strategy occurred haltingly and over time but was ultimately reflective of the desire of some Alliance members to undertake state-building activities based on a normative principle that the mission in Afghanistan was consistent with broader humanitarian values and not specifically tied to the US global war on terror. That the Alliance did not itself possess the necessary capacity to undertake these state-building activities generated a strategic-level requirement to adopt the
Comprehensive Approach in order to leverage the capacities of non-NATO actors and organizations.

Chapter 3 provides evidence as to why the Comprehensive Approach strategy was not successful in Afghanistan. This research establishes as a starting hypothesis that the dominant feature of the strategy is the ability of military and civilian actors and organizations (particularly non-governmental organizations [NGOs]) operating in the same engagement space (in this case Afghanistan) to coordinate and collaborate in order to achieve commonly held objectives. In order to investigate how the Alliance attempted to actualize the strategy and to understand why such levels of coordination and collaboration were not achieved, an integrated interrogational framework provides for analysis at strategic, operational and tactical levels and describes how NATO attempted to actualize the strategy at each one. It concludes that conceptual, institutional and capability gaps were present at all levels and that these gaps contributed to the strategic failure previously illustrated.

Chapter 4 provides the results of a detailed analysis of Afghanistan following five years of NATO’s state-building project. It establishes a conceptual framework through which civil and military evaluation and assessment regimes may be understood in order to allow for an analysis based upon two important indicative models—the *Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS)* and ISAF’s campaign design. These two models incorporated specific time- and condition-based objectives for both the Afghan government and NATO, and the analysis identifies the status of these objectives in 2006 (when the Alliance adopted the Comprehensive Approach as its formal strategy for the Afghan mission) and then again in 2011, by which point the state-building project had all but ended and the transition towards an exit strategy was initiated. This analysis revealed that in 2011 the majority of the desired state-building objectives had not been achieved and that Afghanistan remained a failing, if not failed, state.
Introduction

Chapter 5 examines the potential impact of NATO’s strategic failure in Afghanistan on the international community as a whole and the Alliance itself and considers how or if this failure will impact on future cases wherein NATO may be called upon to intervene again.
Chapter 1: The Comprehensive Approach: A Literature Review

Introduction

This chapter presents a literature review of the Comprehensive Approach as both a model of integrated approaches to complex crises and as NATO’s strategy in the context of NATO interventions into fragile, failing or failed states for the purpose of engaging in stabilization, reconstruction and state-building activities. While the concept remains contested in several domains, there is now a significant body of research available to permit exploration and systematization of the concept as distinctive within the broader field of international security studies. Although there has been an expansion of interest in the comprehensive approach in scholarly circles, the extant contributions to identifying and analysing the related literature did not benefit from this expansion: this is the gap that this chapter seeks to close.

The comprehensive approach is interconnected theoretically and historically to several other concepts, and as such, it may be useful to describe it as a distinctive node within an expansive conceptual network that implicates theories of crisis management, conflict termination, peace building, civil-military relations and state building amongst others.

Some of the literature identifies the comprehensive approach as merely an extension of national-level strategies to improve inter-departmental coordination (for example, whole-of-government, inter-agency and so on). This thesis posits, however, that the Comprehensive Approach is of a significantly more complex order of magnitude given the vast array of actors implicated by the strategy, its desired outcomes and its

1. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization may also be referred to as the “Alliance.” When capitalized the word refers specifically to NATO; when lower case it refers to a generic alliance. The capitalized version of Comprehensive Approach will, throughout this thesis, refer to the NATO strategy specifically; this may also be abbreviated to “CA.” The non-capitalized style comprehensive approach will refer to the generic model or to the concept as utilized by non-NATO entities.

2. See, for example, Julian Brett, “Recent Experience with Comprehensive Civil and Military Approaches in International Operations,” (Danish Institute for International Studies, DIIS Report 2009), and S. Blair and A. Fitz-Gerald, “Stabilisation and Stability Operations: A Literature Review” (Centre for Security Sector Management, Cranfield University, 2009).
manifestation in an alliance setting and, therefore, it will not attempt to scope the full range of material available given that literature surveys which focus on national-level inter-agency coordination issues have already been published.3

Given that we explore the adoption, evolution and application of the Comprehensive Approach in the specific context of the NATO mission in Afghanistan in later chapters of this treatise, the intent of this review is to provide a more expansive overview of the subject while, as indicated earlier, not straying too far from the core concept as it is understood in the context adopted by NATO.

Sources

The literature review is intended to be inclusive, although not exhaustive, as indeed the volume of available material is beyond a singular effort. As the focus is NATO’s Comprehensive Approach, it is not surprising to determine that some of the material emanated from within military or military-related organizations, including military colleges, institutes and defence publishers. At the same time, a large portion of the material was published in scholarly and peer-reviewed journals or as online reports published by recognized research institutes or professional associations focused on international relations or security affairs. In addition, there has been an increase in academic interest in the subject, and the review includes both undergraduate and graduate-level theses that address some aspect of it.

In order to present the material in a coherent fashion, I decided to organize my review around a series of questions as follows, and it will more or less address these questions in order:

Chapter 1: The Comprehensive Approach: A Literature Review

What evolutions in the international security environment caused the comprehensive approach (and other variants of integrated approaches to crisis management) to appear?

Is the comprehensive approach a new idea or did it evolve from other, earlier, concepts?

How and why did the comprehensive approach become NATO’s official strategy in the context of its mission to stabilize Afghanistan?

Is the comprehensive approach as adopted by NATO an effective strategy for so-called state-building ventures?

Origins of the Comprehensive Approach

I turn first to the question of evolutions in the international security environment with a temporal focus initiating at the end of the Cold War. Following the break-up of the Soviet empire and a reduction in East–West tensions due to a clearly exhausted Soviet Union, the United States, attended by its Western allies, was poised for a “unipolar moment.”

This supposition assumed that the largely bi-polar structure which had characterized the international security environment following the Second World War would morph into a multi-polar one or that emerging powers, such as Japan, would contest the now singular position of the United States. Krauthammer believed that this evolution in the international security environment was the beginning of a new US-dominated period of history:

The unipolar moment means that with the close of the century’s three great Northern civil wars (World War I, World War II and the Cold War) an ideologically pacified North seeks security and order by aligning its foreign policy behind that of the United States. That is what is taking place in the Persian Gulf. And for the near future, that is the shape of things to come.

5. Ibid, 25.
Chapter 1: The Comprehensive Approach: A Literature Review

While the new environment heralded a significant diminution, if not elimination, of the threat of major war, the unfreezing of the security situation generated the potential for conflict in states and regions that would have previously been considered de-stabilizing to the otherwise frozen bi-polar structure. This potential was actualized in the Gulf (1990), Bosnia (1992–1995), Rwanda (1994) and Kosovo (1999), amongst other settings. As such, by the mid-1990s it was clear that while the threat of major war had receded, complex emergencies would continue to rise in the future and that this would require new forms of responses from governments, militaries and civil actors including NGOs.6

Given the founding mission of NATO as defender against a threat of potential Soviet aggression, the dissolution of the Soviet empire had a profound effect on the Alliance. The events of 1989–1991 signaled the beginning of a protracted period of Alliance transformation from an organization which was focused primarily on defence to one which was increasingly concerned with security in a broader sense. For example, a 1984 survey of NATO-related literature revealed that most analyses had so far dealt with the military functions of the Alliance and its role in the defence against external aggression.7 That said, analysis of earlier periods in NATO’s history revealed an underlying stratum of security orientation that occasionally manifested during periods of détente with the Soviet Union.8

An important internal debate occurred during an interval of détente in the 1960s in which France, led by Charles de Gaulle, proposed that the bi-polar security dilemma could be resolved through dissolution of NATO altogether. This proposal was rejected by NATO, and France left the Alliance military structure which “multiplied the challenge represented by the sense of a declining threat.”9 The crisis of legitimacy created by this combination of internal discord and subsiding external threat resulted in a revitalized

examination of the “transatlantic bargain” and the leadership role played by the US in NATO’s political dimension.¹⁰ The Report on the Future Tasks of the Alliance, or Harmel Report, published in 1967, acknowledged the evolving security environment and confirmed that the Alliance had both a defense and security role. As Bozo explained:

Yet NATO’s security functions had been implicit and in many ways passive during the first two decades; they were now explicit, and the pursuit of an active role in the management of East-West relations would, from then on, be the test of the Alliance’s being, in the words of the Report, “a dynamic and vigorous organization which is constantly adapting itself to changing conditions.”¹¹

The transformation process resulted in two major initiatives: engaging and cooperating with former adversaries including establishing institutional mechanisms to do so and projecting NATO into peace-making and crisis-management operations; actions in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) in 1992, 1993 and 1995 are the primary examples of this latter initiative.¹² In December 1995, United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1031 authorized the stand-up of the NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) to be deployed into Bosnia, and this mission represented a significant milestone in NATO’s transformation process. Far from maintaining its traditional defensive posture, NATO-led troops engaged in a proactive peace agreement implementation action that involved non-NATO troop contributing nations (including Russia) and a team of civilian specialists which provided technical advice to various actors in the Balkan theatre, including NGOs.¹³

The IFOR mission underscored the reality that these types of engagements would, by necessity, require NATO to work alongside a diverse set of non-NATO actors. With

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¹¹ Bozo, 74.
¹² Ibid, 77.
Chapter 1: The Comprehensive Approach: A Literature Review

respect to the civil-military interface, IFOR established a robust civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) capacity that was assigned to:

conduct civil military operations in support of the military implementation of the peace plan; promote cooperation with the civilian populace, various agencies, and national governments; leverage capabilities of NGOs, international organizations (IO) and national governments; create a parallel, unified civilian effort in support of the peace plan implementation; and assist governmental, international, and non-governmental humanitarian, public safety, and health contingencies.  

IFOR CIMIC teams engaged in a full spectrum of activities, including re-building infrastructure, training police and working alongside NGOs to support work with internally displaced persons. While considered successful at the tactical level, the IFOR CIMIC campaign suffered from a series of institutional and organizational shortfalls, including incompatible CIMIC doctrine amongst various troop-contributing nations; disorganization with respect to the deployment of CIMIC assets, particularly reservists; and a lack of unity of command which resulted in “turf battles” between various military headquarters as well as between civil and military actors. A related issue was the strained relationship between IFOR CIMIC assets and NGOs which was the result of mismanaged expectations on both parts following the transition from the preceding UN mission United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to IFOR.  

Prior to IFOR, NATO’s understanding of CIMIC was limited to host-nation logistic-support issues and ensuring that the civilian population did not interfere with military operations. Experiences in Bosnia emphasized, however, the critical interface between military and civil actors across many other dimensions in the context of complex operations. Important lessons (such as the elastic nature of civil and military roles, the

15. Ibid, 122–135.
primacy of the political nature of such missions, the value and roles of non-national actors such as NGOs, and the importance of engaging host nation actors in order to facilitate mission transition) were relevant at the time and are arguably enduring.\(^{17}\)

Throughout the 1990s humanitarian crises continued unabated, and the international community was confronted with conflicts in Liberia (1990), Kuwait (1990), Northern Iraq (1991), Somalia (1993), Haiti (1994), Rwanda (1994), Bosnia (1995), Sierra Leone (1997), Congo (1998), East Timor (1999) and Kosovo (1999). In most instances, these conflicts were of an intrastate, rather than interstate, type, and as a result, the international community struggled with concepts, both legal and normative, related to the right to intervene into sovereign states for the purpose of ending violence and enforcing international (i.e., UN) resolutions.\(^{18}\)

This debate was particularly active following the failure to intervene into Rwanda in 1994 in order to forestall a genocide which ultimately saw between 500,000 and 1,000,000 deaths. Ultimately, the right to intervene evolved into the international norm “right to protect” which was introduced by Canada in 2001, pioneered as a principle objective of the newly founded African Union in 2005 and affirmed by the United Nations Security Council in 2006. While considered a highly important and valuable emerging international norm, debates continued surrounding the authority for military intervention into sovereign states as well as why and how nations choose to intervene, or not, into specific crisis scenarios.\(^{19}\)

The nature of the intervention debate was altered radically by the decision of the United States to intervene in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003. In both cases, military actions taken were designed to facilitate regime change which was viewed by the prevailing US administration as a unilateral right based on a fundamentalist neo-

\(^{17}\) Ibid, 137–138.


\(^{19}\) See, for example, William A. Boettcher III, “Military Intervention Decisions Regarding Humanitarian Crises,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48, no. 3 (June 2004): 331–355.
conservative view of America’s power and pre-eminence in the international system. In both cases, the military actions were successful in defeating the adversary’s military forces and ousting regime leadership from power. In both cases, however, what was foreseen as short, focused campaigns to address the immediate threats emanating from those states evolved into protracted, costly and damaging exercises in state (re)building.

In spite of the dissimilarities in motivation between the Afghan/Iraq cases and the previous examples of so-called humanitarian intervention, all of these events pointed to a fundamental change in the international security environment: that is, a recurrent propensity to generate complex crises that required some form of response in order to contain immediate or potential threats to persons, states or the international system.

As such, the international security environment was configured on the basis of potential threat types which invariably include large-scale conventional aggression by a peer or near peer competitor; instability resulting from fragile, failing or failed states; the spread of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) weapons or weapons-grade materials into the hands of aggressor states or non-state entities such as terrorist groups; the proliferation of conventional weapons and weapon systems into unstable regions or states thereby exacerbating potential or ongoing conflicts; and threats posed by disruptions to information or cyber systems that may have military or economic repercussions. With respect to the threat posed by failing or failed states NATO doctrine asserts:

Failing states are likely to become a more persistent and pervasive threat to global security. For example non-state actors may exploit the vacuum caused by their deterioration. There is potential to undermine the security of the Alliance in a world where concern for personal and collective security is gaining prominence over the defence of territory against conventional attack. A failed state that has little strategic significance in the traditional sense of resources or geographical location can take on strategic importance as a potential base for non-state actors. The Alliance may therefore

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choose, or be called upon, to intervene more frequently to stabilize
dangerous situations in poorly or ungoverned territory.\textsuperscript{22}

These developments occurred in a context of changes to underlying structural conditions
in the international system (including globalization, shifts in political geometry that
emphasize non-state entities, demographic changes, poverty and growing income
disparity, environmental degradation and proliferation of new civil and military
technologies). All of these conditions have the possibility for generating conflict or
supporting potential adversaries including state actors, factions within states, or non-state
actors any of which could resort to conventional, non-conventional or “hybrid” forms of
warfare.\textsuperscript{23}

This general description of the security environment integrates three important
characteristics. First is the focus on human activity which recalls Rupert Smith’s “war
amongst the people.”\textsuperscript{24} Second is the spectrum of conflict, the nature of which, in the
contemporary context, is frequently characterized as layered and simultaneous vice linear
and sequential. Third, references to complexity and chaos are ubiquitous throughout
contemporary security environment literature, and a complete volume focused on this
subject and its varied implications for NATO highlighted the expectation that complexity
is likely to remain a hallmark of Alliance operations in the future.\textsuperscript{25}

In order to generate appropriate responses to these complex scenarios, Western military
planners frequently view these states from a systems’ perspective in order to identify and
analyse relationships and dependencies amongst various sub-elements that make up the
system (i.e., the state) as a whole. This analysis, in turn, theoretically provides planners
with information needed to identify how the system should be improved on the basis of
actions taken or resources expended.

\textsuperscript{22} NATO, AJP-01(D), \textit{Allied Joint Doctrine}, Issued December 2010, 2-4.
\textsuperscript{23} Ibid, 2-6.
\textsuperscript{24} For a fulsome explanation of this term see Rupert Smith, \textit{The Utility of Force} (London:
Penguin Group, 2005).
\textsuperscript{25} Christopher M. Schnaubelt, ed., \textit{Complex Operations: NATO at War and on the margins of
The inherently complex nature of societies conflated with the plethora of crises that may be contributing to state fragility or failure in the first place may lead to what Pam calls a “paradox of complexity.”26 This paradox results from the identification and labelling of a problem as complex which in turn leads to a conclusion that the solution to the problem must also be complex. This may prohibit useful action until a suitably complex solution can be devised, and this has propelled Western militaries (and NATO) to seek out a means of understanding and responding to these sorts of conditions.

These efforts generated a belief that such complex crises could not be solved by military means alone and that interventions into fragile, failing or failed states would require the integrated application of all instruments of power (i.e., an integrated civil-military response). “To advance reform, prevent state failure, and promote peace and recovery in war-torn states, donors need to employ the entire panoply of policy instruments at their disposal. In short, stove-piped policy responses are ‘out,’ integrated approaches are ‘in.’”27 While such thinking “supports a growing consensus that outward-focused, integrated, and multidisciplinary approaches to security threats and challenges must be the norm”28 individual governments, and the Alliance, have struggled to translate what appears to be an easily describable objective into a coherent and functioning practice in reality. Stewart and Brown believed that in designing integrated approaches to fragile states, the donor community is essentially “flying blind” due to a lack of knowledge regarding how to combine development, governance, rule of law and security; how to sequence these; and how to resolve the short-, medium- and long-term objectives of the various actors involved in such interventions.29

Amongst the many challenges inherent in these integrated approaches is the relationship between militaries and NGOs which are operating in the same engagement space and

29. Stewart and Brown, 131.
which may be undertaking similar humanitarian, re-construction or development activities. While NGOs generally operate on a set of principles that include neutrality, impartiality and the preservation of humanitarian space, militaries generally differentiate between actors that benefit from and support the intervention and “spoilers.”

Given that militaries in crisis situations may play a necessary role in the delivery of humanitarian aid to populations in areas where a lack of security does not permit safe access for NGOs or other aid delivery mechanisms, this is presumed to be a short-term solution, and once the security situation improves, military forces should cease such activities and allow NGOs to carry out this work. The situation is significantly more complex, however, in terms of reconstruction and development, and “there are many questions that the aid community does not seem to have clear answers to.”

Comprehensive Approach as State-Building Model

All of the foregoing—an evolved security environment, the emergence of manifold failing and failed states, an acknowledgement of the complexity (bordering on chaos) inherent in these scenarios, and the intensified requirement for military forces and civilian agencies to operate in the same engagement space—required a coherent model that could effectively address these conditions. From approximately 2003 onwards, emergent models centered on principles of civil-military integration (such as the comprehensive approach) were increasingly, although not uniformly, adopted by most Western governments as a means of responding to these challenges.

As an archetypal model of integrated approaches, the comprehensive approach proposes that security actors “promote the external and internal coordination of policy instruments and the coherence of objectives between different actors,” including military forces and all other organizations, agencies or other actors which are engaged in an intervention.

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(including the host nation). Further, it aims to “reinvigorate the way crisis responses should be planned and carried out in view of enhancing both its efficiency and legitimacy by harmonizing the interaction and interdependence of tasks and actors involved.” The model envisions that interactions between security and civil actors will occur both horizontally and vertically. The horizontal dimension requires the effective interaction of actors operating at the same level (tactical or field level, operational and strategic), while the vertical dimension necessitates effective interaction between these levels. While no one definition of a comprehensive approach model has been universally accepted or adopted and there are significant challenges inherent in fostering the effective interactions the model presumes, the intrinsic value of the model supports a belief that these shortfalls must be eventually addressed and overcome.

The optimism surrounding this model is based on various axioms that generally include a positive correlation between the coherent application of national instruments of power and a comprehensive approach (thereby making it presumably easier to achieve), and that a comprehensive approach provides for flexibility and cost effectiveness while addressing complex or hybrid threats.

While challenges to the model frequently cite an inevitable civil-military gulf, Hallett stressed that emphasis on the civil-military divide is of extremely limited utility. He views the comprehensive approach as “not simply the optimization of civil-military interaction, nor is it an internationalization of central planning in an effort to improve the efficiency of international community inputs.” This is based on a nuanced assessment that neither civil nor military actors are monolithic in their structures, processes, cultures.

32. Ibid.
33. Ibid, 23.
34. Ibid, 28.
or other characteristics and that it is entirely possible that either civil organizations or military forces may possess similar capabilities.\(^{37}\)

This line of reasoning is extended by Angstrom who believes that much of the current research on the nature of civil and military entities and their relationships is based on an assumption that these categories are “fixed and global.”\(^{38}\) His thesis posits that this assumption is unhelpful in understanding the changing nature of civil and military actors and that these are better understood as malleable norms. If so, this gives rise to a spectrum of possible modes of civil-military interaction beyond the traditional view that civil-military relations are primarily concerned with the control of the military by governments.

While Angstrom’s approach may account for the rise of certain phenomenon (such as private military security companies), the attempt to categorize the nature of civil and military actors on the basis of how they act, rather than on the source of their authority to act, leads to potential confusion and does not address the very real requirement for improved coordination and collaboration between legally authorized and internationally recognized civil and military entities engaged in a common space. This leads to a second, and equally recurring, challenge to the model that revolves around issues of coordination or unity of command. For example, Aaronson opines that:

> it is currently impossible to identify an international institution capable of coordinating all the efforts required to meet the challenges of a comprehensive approach to hybrid threats. Though this is a difficult and sensitive issue, it would nevertheless be useful to bring a variety of capabilities from different contributors to a single organization. But what would be its mandate and legal framework, and how would one ensure that it was recognized by all as the overall coordinator?\(^{39}\)

\(^{37}\) Ibid.


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This gives rise to the question of how to think about the comprehensive approach. For example, it has been described as a philosophy, a way of thinking, an emergent phenomenon, a principle, a broader political level process, a collaborative process, doctrine, the generation and application of national and international instruments of power, the management of relationships, a means, a technique, a tool and, of course, a strategy.

Wendling states that “the comprehensive approach ‘travels’ a lot, according to Sartori’s expression. Its significance is so vast, its origins so diverse and its meanings so varied that there is a risk of wanting to compare the use of the concept in its widest sense, without paying attention to the specific context in which it is implemented.” This wide variation in ideational approaches reveals the difficulties associated with concept definition and, therefore, situating the concept in a universally putative scheme. As a result, many of the organizations implicated by a comprehensive approach do not possess consistent or coherent interpretations, and this, in turn, leads to an inability to translate the concept into a useful instrument. I should point out that while this problem could lead to a conclusion that the concept is so vague, and its applications so diverse, as to render it meaningless, this would not be a valid assumption. As the remainder of this thesis will highlight, both individual nations and the Alliance took numerous concrete steps to embody it in both doctrine and practice, and while there was no firm agreement on where the conceptual edges of the model lay, it is clear that the model was central to national and international efforts to address the complex security and development challenges underway in Afghanistan and elsewhere.

Initially, NATO’s own position on the CA was to explain and emphasize the importance of the concept while avoiding definitive stances which could lead to the development of practical direction for the Alliance short of general policy pronouncements. For example, NATO’s web page on the CA states:

41. Major and Moelling, 22.
the need to promote a Comprehensive Approach applies not only to operations but more broadly to many of NATO’s efforts to deal with 21st century security challenges, such as fighting terrorism, improving energy security, preventing proliferation of weapons and dangerous materials, protecting against cyber-attacks and confronting the threat of piracy.\footnote{42}

As the CA became embedded in NATO policy, it began to appear in various guises, most recently within NATO’s revised planning doctrine which posits that “a comprehensive approach emerges through the determination of various actors to play their part to resolve a crisis” and that a CA can be described as a “means to ensure a coordinated and coherent response to crisis by all relevant actors.”\footnote{43} In December 2010 NATO promulgated Allied Joint Publication 01-D, \textit{Allied Joint Doctrine} that provided a more definitive view of the CA for NATO operations:

NATO experiences in Afghanistan, Kosovo and other operations confirm the complexity of contemporary crises. Complex crises do not lend themselves to simple definition or analysis. Today’s challenges demand a comprehensive approach by the international community, including the coordinated action from an appropriate range of civil and military actors, enabled by the orchestration, coordination and de-confliction of NATO’s military and political instruments with the other instruments of power. This needs to be a broader cooperation and planning in accordance with the principles and decisions of relevant senior NATO bodies.\footnote{44}

Meharg and St-Pierre linked the increasingly complex environment to “approaches to establishing security and to rebuilding states affected by conflict” and identified 10 distinct approaches in the literature as follows:\footnote{45}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \footnote{42}{See \url{http://www.nato.int/summit2009/topics_en/19-comprehensive_approach.html}.}
\item \footnote{44}{NATO, AJP-01(D), \textit{Allied Joint Doctrine}, Issued December 2010, 2-11.}
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Of these, the first five are identified as strategic-level approaches (which is consistent with my classification of the Comprehensive Approach as NATO strategy), while the latter five are identified as operational-level approaches. Although the authors discuss these variants or models in relation to specific nations or organizations (for example, NATO is associated only with the Comprehensive Approach), their methodology is somewhat restrictive in nature. For example, PRTs are arguably representative of an ISAF-associated effort to operationalize the Comprehensive Approach at the tactical level, and while the Comprehensive Approach is identified specifically with NATO, nations such as Canada and the United Kingdom explored variants of this model while, unlike NATO, falling short of adopting it as a formal strategy.

Integrated approaches to crisis management have been a feature of the international security environment from approximately the mid-2000s, and de Conning and Friis suggested that the interest demonstrated in such approaches may be linked to a number of trends, amongst them the requirement for budgetary efficiency in crisis management; a need for greater coherence when different actors occupy the same space (with Afghanistan as the prime example); a need for operational efficiency in order to reduce the time spent in crisis management thereby reducing the number of casualties in order to
maintain public support for the operation; and a requirement for some organizations, such as NATO, to improve their legitimacy as they reach out to other actors. As I will note later in this thesis, these rationales, particularly with respect to NATO, fall into one of three classifications: institutional or functional rationales; theoretical rationales (particularly related to the acceptance of state building theories) and norm-based rationales.

Wendling situated the concept in relation to broader theories within the realm of social science, in particular that of human and societal security; civil-military relations; peacekeeping and peace building; organizational issues in public policy and, most significantly, theories of state building. Within each of these areas of inquiry, the comprehensive approach is identified as an answer to some theoretical dilemma. This inquiry thus situates the comprehensive approach in an ideational context as much as it may be considered a type of forcing function to develop additional institutional capabilities or to leverage external ones. Of these ideas, several recurrent and persistent themes emerged from the literature, including the concept of human security and its implication for strategy; the nature and meaning of the comprehensive approach itself, not just in terms of labelling or definitions, but as strategy designed to achieve specific security objectives; the nature of civil-military cooperation which is arguably the root mechanism of the comprehensive approach, including the importance of the civil contribution (and the involvement of the host nation or indigenous peoples); and the relationship between the comprehensive approach and other concepts such as effects-based thinking, counter-insurgency and civil-military cooperation.

A persistent characteristic of the current security environment is the prevalence of fragile, failing and failed states and the plethora of negative consequences such situations manifest for human security. The concept of human security is, therefore, central to understanding the comprehensive approach as a strategy for responding to complex crises and undertaking state-building measures in order to improve human security in such settings. As Borgoman-Loup explains:

this evolution in ideas has resulted in the notions of human security and sustainable security. It is generally agreed that a state that is secure both within and outside its borders is stable, with a balance between good governance and sustainable economic development. The end of the Cold War made possible international cooperation to manage crises with a long term view not only of ending conflict but also of dealing with the root causes.47

Central to the comprehensive approach is a discussion regarding “pragmatic ways and means of developing flexible and adaptive mechanisms, tools and processes for comprehensive crisis management that ultimately benefit the people suffering from crises and conflict.”48 It is the presence of violence in contested settings which arguably necessitates military involvement in a comprehensive approach and which distinguishes it from other forms of peacekeeping operations or the rubric of civil-military cooperation more generally.49 This is highly significant to Thruelsen who explains:

This means that, whereas the interdependence between the political ambitions of the comprehensive approach and the realities on the ground are ultimately tested in a non-permissive environment, the two realities have to merge, otherwise the mission will fail. In the benign environment of the 1990s in, for example, the Balkans, the consequences of not merging governance with security were relatively minimal. In Afghanistan, however, the comprehensive approach has come up against the hard reality of conflict, which is thus the crucial challenge when a strong military actor engaged in a counter-insurgency campaign led to a large extent by military goals is leading the efforts.50

Neal and Wells trace the development and attempted implementation of the CA in NATO and link it to both “the need for effectiveness in an increasingly complex international environment, and efficiency in an era of declining defense resources.” While those conditions arguably generated the requirement for some form of coherent model to address them, the authors recognized that more than one model was possible and identified four concepts that could be associated with the CA:

- an externally-driven comprehensive approach, led by an international political entity like the UN or the European Community, which NATO supports;
- an Alliance-wide CA focused on NATO-led military operations that are multi-organizational/multi-national and of a complex nature;
- national-level activities requiring “whole-of-government” (in the United States) or “cross government” (in the United Kingdom) approaches; and
- sub-Alliance-wide activities, such as the “application of a CA in a 3-star operational headquarters” as proposed by Julian Lindley-French.

This analysis is representative of literature which was concerned not only with problems associated with actualizing the strategy within NATO but also fundamentally understanding it. Given that the article was written in 2011 and that NATO had been actively pursuing the Comprehensive Approach in Afghanistan since at least 2006, the misidentification of the strategy as either national- or operational-level is indicative of the struggle, in my opinion, of fully accepting the fact that the strategy was not, in fact, working and that further analysis would somehow finally reveal the elusive recipe for its success.

In spite of having no officially agreed upon definition of the CA, efforts to parse the concept in NATO led to competing ideas and had “effect on how tools to perform and measure it can be developed, as well as for how educating and training on the approach

52. Ibid., 3.
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should be conducted.\textsuperscript{53} Although the CA with its focus on bringing civilian and military actors together to address the contemporary security environment “must be a core competency of NATO,”\textsuperscript{54} analysis emanating from the Alliance posited that the concept as originally envisioned was shown to suffer in terms of its practical application and its ability to assume “robust collaborative interaction based on an agreed end state, overall mission objectives, and the means through which those objectives should be achieved.”\textsuperscript{55} According to Hallet:

this thick agreement is seldom obtainable, and when achieved, suffers from three major deficiencies: failure to embrace local actor priorities—it reflects the interests and objectives of the “International Community” more than those of local actors; statement generation on common objectives without resource commitments; and failure to provide adequate direction for mission agreed objectives. In other words, there is a guidance gap between the thick CA political level agreement and the guidance necessary for planners to do their work.\textsuperscript{56}

This analysis led to a conclusion that while “problems of an extremely complex nature and present security environments require activities beyond the organic capability set of any one single organization,”\textsuperscript{57} the CA as a strategy to achieve this cannot, as will be described in later chapters, effectively meet these challenges.

Having now reviewed or been familiarized the Comprehensive Approach as a model which was ultimately adopted by NATO as its primary strategy in the Afghan campaign, it will be useful to briefly introduce three doctrinal concepts that developed and matured to varying degrees within NATO and which I identify as antecedent concepts to the Comprehensive Approach; these are: the effects-based approach to operations, civil-
military cooperation and counter-insurgency. The intent of this section is to address the question of whether the comprehensive approach developed as a new idea or did it build on earlier doctrinal or conceptual platforms. I argue the latter case.

**Effects-Based Approach to Operations (EBAO)**

For NATO, the effects based approach to operations (EBAO) was considered an evolutionary, if not revolutionary, development in terms of how the Alliance could operate in the complex security environment and, in particular, how such complex missions could be planned on the basis of understanding a systems’ approach.

EBAO is an evolution of the US concept of effects-based operations (EBO). As an operational air force-centric doctrine, US EBO was concerned with the need to improve targeting such that the kinetic effects of bombing or destroying physical targets could be somehow linked to the non-kinetic objectives or end states of the operation; that is, EBO sought to link tactical actions to operational-level outcomes. Over time, the emphasis on effects expanded the EBO concept from its tactical-operational focus to a more expansive view of effects across the entire tactical-operational-strategic continuum.\(^{58}\) This, in turn, gave rise to the centrality of systems’ theory, and systems’ theory figures prominently in EBO, and later EBAO, doctrine. In this context, systems’ theory is assumed to, if not eliminate that complexity, at least permit a degree of certainty in the planning and execution of military campaigns in complex environments. This is a significant development for Mitchel who believed:

> In terms of military science, EBAO represents the meeting place between the social sciences and the long domination by the natural/physical sciences of time and space within the Operational Planning Process. It is not a chance encounter; the development of EBAO is an attempt to reduce the complexity produced by the non-linear strategic interaction in modern conflicts.\(^{59}\)

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This desire to reduce the complex nature of modern warfare led to criticisms of the effects-based approach, citing both the enduring nature of warfare as inherently complex (i.e., what’s new?) and an unrealistic expectation that such scientific approaches could reduce massively complex systems to a point at which second, third or “n” order effects could be accurately predicted.\textsuperscript{60} The promise of reducing complex systems into manageable military problems via tools such as systems of systems analysis and operational net assessment led to the rejection of EBO as US doctrine by the then commander of US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), General Mattis, in August 2008.\textsuperscript{61}

While EBO waxed and waned within the US military doctrinal community, NATO initiated conceptual development on its own version of EBO as early as 2003, and in 2007, NATO published the bi-strategic Pre-Doctrinal Handbook on NATO’s Effects-based Approach to Operations.\textsuperscript{62} This publication defined EBAO as “the coherent and comprehensive application of the various instruments of the Alliance combined with the practical cooperation with involved non-NATO actors, to create desired effects necessary to achieve objectives and ultimately the NATO end state”\textsuperscript{63} and was based upon a series of principles including the requirement to harmonize the contributions of the various instruments of the Alliance and, where appropriate, the actions of sovereign states and other actors.

Smith-Windsor identified three broad influences that potentially caused NATO to pursue EBAO. First, was the change in the international security environment which saw linear and attritionist approaches—which were the hallmark of the Western–Soviet competitive

\textsuperscript{60} Han de Nijs and Andy Williams, “On the Introduction of Effects Based Assessment into NATO’s Processes, Organization and Tools,” (13\textsuperscript{th} ICCRTS, C2 for Complex Endeavors, 2008), 6.


\textsuperscript{62} “bi-strategic” refers to the two major strategic command entities that constitute NATO’s military structure: Allied Command Operations (ACO) with its headquarters in Mons, Belgium, and Allied Command Transformation (ACT) with its headquarters in Norfolk, Virginia. ACT is responsible for training, concept and doctrine development; ACO commands NATO operations via its subordinate joint force commands in Brunssum, and Naples.

era — give way to out-of-area crisis prevention and humanitarian operations. These types of operations caused the Alliance to consider the requirements for operating in complex environments and scenarios which, in turn, required the Alliance to work more closely with non-NATO and civilian actors, and this was reflected in NATO’s 1999 Strategic Concept.  

Second was the role, increasing power and availability of technologies that could enhance the intellectual capability of military planners, and she cites Hunerwadel who posited that the availability of new technologies permit “collaborative information sharing and the imposition of very precise effects across vast distances; they also benefit from theory that enables better anticipation of some complex system behaviours.”

Finally, she acknowledged the possibility that EBAO simply represented an evolution of earlier military thought extending back over generations. For example, Napoleonic thought revealed that “during a campaign whatever is not profoundly considered in all its details is without result. Every enterprise should be conducted according to a system; chance alone can never bring success.” This Napoleonic proposition may well be descriptive of modern-day EBAO theory.

A key aspect of EBAO is the desire to generate effects by actions within an engagement space in order to accomplish objectives and the end state. The engagement space refers to “that part of the strategic environment in which the Alliance decides to engage and where the interaction of different actors creates conditions that may be acceptable or unacceptable to the Alliance in terms of its end state. For easier understanding, the engagement space is divided into military, political, economic and civil (MPEC) domains.” These four domains are analysed from a systems’ perspective in order to gain

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knowledge of the main actors so that appropriate actions, both kinetic and non-kinetic, may be taken; actor behaviour altered; and desired effects achieved. EBAO consists of four primary functions which “are carried out in a continuous, interactive, parallel process and should not be regarded as sequential steps.” These are knowledge development, planning, execution and assessment. 68

EBAO developed many conceptual elements which were picked up by the CA, particularly an emphasis on interaction and harmonization with non-military actors and means. That said, EBAO remained pre-doctrinal as a result of some members of the Alliance remaining unconvinced of its efficacy and concerns regarding the implication that it may require the generation of non-military capacity as well as what obligations and burdens this might engender for Alliance members. The manner in which the EBAO pre-doctrinal material was circulated and promulgated beyond Allied Command Transformation also raised apprehensions in Allied Command Operations and elsewhere. 69

While many of the basic concepts found in EBAO, particularly that of the importance of effects at the operational and strategic levels, have become enduring features of NATO doctrine, the term itself and interest in it as formal canon has all but disappeared and has been supplanted by the CA. For example, EBAO does not appear in any recent NATO doctrine including AJP-01, Allied Joint Doctrine (December 2010); the Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (December 2010); and the NATO Operations Assessment Handbook (March 2011). The latter publication does, however, retain many EBAO concepts and theories.

68. Ibid., 2-7 to 2-8.
69. Author discussion held with General R. Henault (Retired), former Chair of the NATO Military Committee, June 6, 2012.
Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC)

The term civil-military cooperation is frequently conflated with civil-military coordination (CMCoord) and the subject of civil-military relations more generally. While CMCoord seeks to promote “the essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies that is necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles” within NATO, “CIMIC is the link to the civil environment and the military facilitator in a comprehensive approach.” It is a set of not only military functions that support the commander’s mission by establishing and maintaining coordination and cooperation between the military force and civil actors in the commander’s area of operations but also military capabilities that may be applied across the strategic-operational-tactical continuum. The core functions of CIMIC include civil-military liaison; support to the military force; and support to civil actors, with this latter function representing the key link between CIMIC and the CA. Discharging these CIMIC functions raises a number of important issues including how goals and objectives of civil and military actors may be reconciled, what are the impacts of military-driven assistance and reconstruction efforts, and how civil and military actors can share information in order to achieve a level of mutual awareness and understanding.

NATO acknowledges that not only is the operating environment complex but that complexity is the result of diverse civil actors which will be present and influencing the environment and therefore how NATO conducts operations. “The civil environment involves a myriad of ethnic, religious, ideological and capability drivers, which require

71. United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Civil-Military Guidelines and Reference for Complex Emergencies, 2008. OCHA’s mandate includes the coordination of humanitarian response, policy development and humanitarian advocacy. For more information see www.unocha.org
73. Interallied Confederation of Reserve Officers (CIOR), “CIMIC Capabilities - An overview of doctrine, structures and courses in selected NATO member countries,” (Results of the CIMIC-study in CIOR 2010).
74. Ibid.
sustainable solutions in societies ravaged by conflicts, disasters or humanitarian catastrophes."\(^75\) While earlier CIMIC doctrine, particularly that which was developed in the US, focused on ensuring that civilians did not interfere with military operations,\(^76\) those operations which occur in the context of counter-insurgencies, humanitarian missions, post-conflict stabilization, or disaster recovery are, by definition, occurring in the midst of a civilian population which cannot be marginalized. Indeed, the strategic centre of gravity in most counter-insurgency theory and doctrine is the contested population.

For Anders, the purpose of CIMIC is clear: force protection for the military. Although he recalled US Secretary of State Colin Powell’s 2001 statement that NGOs are a valuable force multiplier for the military and identified this as a seminal moment in the development of comprehensive approaches, his main argument was directed not at military forces per se but, rather, at private military and security companies (PMSC) who engaged in activities normally conducted by NGOs. So while he acknowledged the research which pointed out the generally conflictual nature of civil-military relations, he viewed the lessons derived from this research as a possible means of explaining and indeed improving NGO-PMSC relations.\(^77\) Given an ongoing quest in both military and civil sectors to understand how civil-military relations in operational settings may be improved, this line of reasoning is, however, less than persuasive.

While NATO CIMIC doctrine stresses that the implications of military action on the civil environment should be considered at all stages of an operation, it also recognizes that “it may be impossible to achieve harmony between the civil actors and the requirements of the military mission.”\(^78\) For example, in the Afghanistan context, tensions between military and civilian actors was particularly acute in relation to issues such as the conduct of night raids into suspected insurgent houses and civilian casualties caused by military

\(^75\) NATO, AJP-9, ix.
\(^78\) Ibid.
operations,\textsuperscript{79} and such actions may be reflective of NATO’s traditional focus on the defense of territory rather than the protection of civilian populations which is normally the responsibility of affected states and governments.\textsuperscript{80}

Funding projects that are perceived to contribute to mission success (i.e., support stabilization and reconstruction efforts) or, in the case of COIN, provide opportunities to influence the local population by means of economic or infrastructure incentives are also a key CIMIC function. Within NATO:

there are two main types of funding sources for CIMIC field work—national funding and grants to NATO operational level command entities. National level funding in the mission theatre will be coordinated through the respective J9\textsuperscript{81} in order to de-conflict and harmonise all field work efforts at the appropriate level. Prioritisation of CIMIC field work (e.g., reconstruction and development) remains with the commander in the joint operational area. Command responsibility in CIMIC is to consult and co-ordinate the conduct of CIMIC field work at subordinate levels.\textsuperscript{82}

The funding of such projects by military forces remains a highly contested practice within the international development community for at least two reasons. First, the practice is perceived to blur the roles of military and civilian development actors and agencies in contravention of the core humanitarian principles of neutrality and impartiality\textsuperscript{83} and there is scant evidence that such aid contributes positively to either the overall level of economic well-being on the ground or supports the goal of stability.\textsuperscript{84} As explained by Harvie on behalf of the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance (ALNAP):

Hearts and minds tactics—the exchange of material rewards for information, cooperation and political support—have a long history in military practice and are deemed to have force protection benefits.

\textsuperscript{80} Metcalfe, Haysom and Gordon, 24.
\textsuperscript{81} The J9 is the senior CIMIC officer in a headquarters staff.
\textsuperscript{82} NATO, AJP-9, 3-13.
\textsuperscript{83} United Nations General Assembly Resolution 46/182.
However, they remain deeply contentious from the perspective of the independence and impartiality of humanitarian action. In Afghanistan, the military’s delivery of assistance in similarly painted vehicles, dressed in civilian clothing, and the conditionality placed on military aid in return for intelligence have been particularly controversial.85

The practice of engaging in non-military activities, such as acting as development agents, also weakens the overall capacity of the military force and redirects military resources from focusing efforts on establishing security and, thereby, setting the conditions for civilian actors and agencies to engage in reconstruction activities.86 Reflecting on the role of military forces providing humanitarian assistance, Clarke asserted that “a military force may hope to be seen as a humanitarian actor, but that is both logically impossible and militarily self-defeating.”87

An additional challenge within CIMIC doctrine and practice is that of information sharing amongst military and civilian actors in the engagement space. NATO’s proposed solution to this issue is viewed primarily, although not exclusively, as a technical challenge. To address this, NATO established a Civil-Military Fusion Centre (CFC) which maintains a civil-military web portal and “facilitates the sharing of open-source unclassified information between civilian and military actors working on complex crises in order to enhance their sense of shared awareness.”88 The CFC represents a functional concept in the context of a more expansive CIMIC model that incorporates an operating concept of Future Comprehensive Civil-Military Interaction (FCCMI) which “aims to enhance NATO’s ability to interact at the most appropriate levels with non-NATO Actors.

88. See https://www.cimicweb.org/Pages/v6/welcome.html.
in order to improve Alliance contributions to crisis prevention and management.\footnote{89} This model is shown at Figure 1.

![Figure 1. Future Comprehensive Civil-Military Interaction](image)

Given the criticality of civil-military cooperation to the CA, Rietjens was concerned with the identification of an appropriate process model through which key questions regarding the execution of civil-military cooperation could be explored, and his research questions were:

- What are the phases in the process of civil-military cooperation?

- What factors influence the process of civil-military cooperation and can enhance the understanding of the phases in this process?

- What constitutes the outcome of civil-military cooperation?\footnote{90}

In a later analysis, he shifted his emphasis from process identification to an examination of fundamental requirements for effective civil-military cooperation including information gathering, the need for civil-military cooperation, the nature of military institutions, as well as the concerns of the local population and humanitarian

\footnote{89} NATO tasking for the military implementation of the CPG 2006–2007 (IMSM-0387-2006). This document orders ACT to complete MC 0550 Para 24a task by developing the Future Comprehensive Civil Military Concept, (October 2006).

\footnote{90} Sebastiaan Rietjens, “Civil Military Cooperation to a Complex Emergency: Just Another Drill?” (PhD diss. University of Twente, 2006), xi.
organizations. His conclusion that civil-military alliances are generally ad hoc in nature underscored his assertion that improved cooperation must be based on the development of structures to take into account the various information requirements such alliances demand. Information, and more broadly, knowledge, was also at the centre of de Carvalho and Haugevik’s analysis of civil-military cooperation in the context of multinational and interagency operations. The challenge of information sharing between civil and military actors in the context of the CA will be analysed in greater detail in Chapter 3.

The civilian actors most frequently cited as problematic in the context of civil-military cooperation are NGOs that will, and must, operate in the same engagement space as military forces during complex crises. Significant intellectual effort was expended on the challenges this fact produced and on seeking processes or models that could be utilized to ensure effective interaction. Borgomano-Loup, for example, suggested that NATO select appropriate degrees or levels of interaction or cooperation with NGOs and asserted that consistency, effectiveness, efficiency and subsidiarity were the most important qualities for military-NGO relations. While asserting that enhancement of interaction between NGOs and NATO is both desirable and feasible, “priority should be given to the NGOs whose field of competence is close to NATO’s activities.” Other analysts emphasized the key role played by NGOs in such crisis settings and that NGO capabilities should be leveraged by crisis management actors. I acknowledge here that the term NGO has not yet been given precise meaning and that it is being applied rather loosely; this imprecision will be addressed later in Chapter 3 when I examine and compare militaries

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94. Ibid., 60.

and NGOs in a context of how NATO attempted to implement the CA at strategic, operational and tactical levels.

**Counter-Insurgency (COIN)**

Having chosen to situate EBAO and CIMIC as both conceptually antecedent to the CA and as evolved or evolving NATO doctrine, situating theories and practices of counter-insurgency in relation to the CA presents an arguably more complex challenge. This is true for three reasons. First, it has been suggested by some analysts that a “comprehensive approach” is merely a desirable characteristic of successful counter-insurgency operations or that the CA and COIN may be conflated conceptually. Second, if these propositions are deemed to be incorrect (as I will argue), then it remains to show what the nature of the relationship between COIN and the CA actually is. Third, recent evolutions in COIN theory point to the rise of a “globalized insurgency” which raises the potential requirement for developing a “globalized counter-insurgency.” Such thinking may, in turn, underscore the challenges associated with the conduct of counter-insurgency operations in a defined geo-spatial location (i.e. Afghanistan) and help to explain further why it was unsuccessful in that context.

The study of COIN affords a significant body of literature developed over successive periods of history by multiple theorists and practitioners, many of whom are now recognized as prominent contributors to this field. Of these COIN luminaries such names as Mao Tsetung, T.E. Lawrence, Charles Callwell, David Galula, Robert Thompson, Frank Kitson, John Nagl, David Kilcullen and, most recently, David Petraeus, would be amongst the best known and most cited.

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97. An extensive collection of COIN references may be found at the UK Joint Services Command and Staff College, Library Bibliography, Research Guide Series, Counter-insurgency, 2011.

98. For a recent and insightful discussion of the contribution various “warrior-scholars” have made to counter-insurgency theory and practice see Andrew Mumford and Bruno C. Reis (ed), *The Theory and Practice of Irregular Warfare – Warrior scholarship in counter-insurgency* (London and New York: Routledge, 2014).
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COIN literature tended to emerge from the experiences and reflections of “warrior-scholars” in relation to specific historical conflicts many of which provided the basis for evolutionary COIN thought. These span several decades and geographical settings and were arguably linked to ongoing developments or changing conditions in the international environment at the time. Thus, many of the most-studied counter-insurgencies are identified with specific “eras” and for the sake of expediency these may be classified as:

- Colonial Era (COIN example: Boer War)
- Revolutionary Era (COIN example: Mao’s takeover of China)
- De-colonization Era (COIN example: Malaya, Kenya)
- Cold War Era (COIN example: Vietnam, Northern Ireland)
- Modern Era (COIN example: Afghanistan, Iraq, Sri Lanka)
- Post-Modern or Globalized Era (COIN example: ISIS in Syria and Iraq?)

The above “shopping list” of counter-insurgencies operations should not lead to a conclusion that COIN remained the dominant form of military doctrine throughout these eras. Similarly, while Mao’s insurgency (which culminated in victory in 1949) is an oft-cited example of insurgent innovation (in that he eschewed the principle of territorial dominance in favour of “winning the population”) the adoption of Maoist principles by most Western nations (particularly the British) during the subsequent eras did not necessarily translate into counter-insurgent victories. The US failure in South Vietnam (as the foremost example) ensured that US COIN doctrine remained subservient, if not

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99 A theory of “warrior-scholarship” forms the framework of Mumford and Reis’s study *The Theory and Practice of Irregular Warfare*. See Chapter 1 of this volume for a detailed discussion of the theory.


101 The British are frequently heralded as the most successful counter-insurgents due to “successes” in Kenya, Malaya and Northern Ireland. This “myth” is effectively negated by Andrew Mumford in his work *The Counter-Insurgency Myth*, and is also addressed by John Mackinlay in *The Insurgent Archipelago* wherein he suggests that the colonial “effect” had ensured that the local populations had already more or less acquiesced to British control and this made the task of COIN more likely to succeed.
enslaved, to so-called conventional warfare doctrine which stressed mass, speed and technology.\textsuperscript{102}

Western interventions into Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 significantly altered the trajectory of COIN as the subject gained new prominence in theory, doctrine and practice due to the devolution of these campaigns into COIN-dominated operations. According to Andrew Mumford, “If the War on Terror is the defining conflict of the early twenty-first century, then counter-insurgency is the defining mode of waging war against the enemies of Western states.”\textsuperscript{103}

While General Richards was prepared to argue in 2007 that NATO did not possess COIN doctrine of its own,\textsuperscript{104} by 2009 ISAF had adopted COIN as its primary operational approach. This coincided with the appointment of General Petraeus as Commander of ISAF (COMISAF), who had recently shifted from his command appointment in Iraq, and common canon asserts that his COIN methods and associated troop surge were responsible for the apparently improved security and stability conditions in that country.\textsuperscript{105} With approximately 2600 deaths in Iraq in 2011 and increasing levels of violence throughout 2012, 2013 and into 2014, the so-called successes created by COIN in that setting do not, however, appear to be enduring.\textsuperscript{106}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{103} Andrew Mumford, \textit{The Counter-Insurgency Myth}, 5.
\textsuperscript{104} John Mackinlay, \textit{The Insurgent Archipelago} (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 45.
\textsuperscript{105} See http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/2672/counter-insurgency-in-iraq-and-afghanistan-an-interview-with-john-nagl. “Victory has a thousand fathers, and the success of the surge has a thousand causes. Certainly the new counter-insurgency strategy Gen. Petraeus implemented by focusing first on providing security to the population, the additional troops he had with which to implement that strategy, the tribal outreach we both took advantage of and encouraged, the Sunni awakening, and the ‘Sons of Iraq’ flipping from fighting with al-Qaida to fighting against al-Qaida, and the subsequent decision by Sadr and the Shia militias to renounce armed violence and take political action to achieve their objectives—all of those things factor in to the success of the surge. I would say that the mental construct that Gen. Petraeus had of how to counter an insurgency was the single most important factor. He understood what he was trying to accomplish in a different way than his predecessors did and he took advantage of opportunities as they became available to him,” 18 September 2008.
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But what exactly is COIN and how does it differ from the CA? NATO defines COIN as a “set of political, economic, social, military, law enforcement, civil and psychological activities required to defeat insurgency and address any core grievances.”

This definition is instructive from two perspectives. First, the definition itself is straightforward, if not deceptively simple, given the vast array of activities and spheres of endeavor it implicates. Second, some form of linkage to the CA may be assumed given reference to those activities which fall within the civilian realm.

NATO’s doctrine is similar to many Western nations which also adopted or revised their COIN doctrine in light of their participation in the Afghan and Iraqi operations. Oft cited COIN theorist David Galula provided a useful summary of the most prominent COIN theories which underlie much of that doctrine, including his four “laws” of counter-insurgency:

1. The aim of the war is to gain the support of the population rather than control of territory;
2. Most of the population will be neutral in the conflict; support of the masses can be obtained with the help of an active friendly minority;
3. Support of the population may be lost. The population must be efficiently protected to allow it to cooperate without fear of retribution by the opposite party; and
4. Order enforcement should be done progressively by removing or driving away armed opponents, then gaining support of the population, and eventually strengthening positions by building infrastructure and setting long-term relationships with the population. This must be done area by area, using a general decline in terrorist-related violence, the security situation in Iraq remains fluid. In December 2011, U.S. forces completely withdrew from Iraq. Terrorists and insurgent groups continue to conduct large-scale, lethal attacks that often target personnel and facilities associated with both American organizations and the Government of Iraq. Insurgents also continue to carry out effective small-scale attacks throughout Iraq that cause fewer casualties but hinder free movement and influence public opinion regarding safety and security.”

108. Ibid., 1-4 to 1-5.
pacified territory as a basis of operation to conquer a neighbouring area.\textsuperscript{109}

The focus of COIN is, thus, closely related to a contested population, and COIN theory provides various prescriptions for how a counter-insurgency may “win hearts and minds.” David Kilcullen described a three-pillar framework for COIN which, not surprisingly, held that security, political and economic pillars are necessary to obtain control of a population, and these are based on information including intelligence, information operations and media operations. His model is presented at Figure 2.\textsuperscript{110}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{kilcullen_coin_framework.png}
\caption{Kilcullen’s COIN Framework}
\end{figure}

This multi-faceted approach is echoed in most national COIN doctrine and points to the need to eliminate root causes of an insurgency as the only logical means of permanently defeating it.\textsuperscript{111} Chapter 3 of this thesis will examine the extent to which the US and ISAF resourced the COIN campaign in Afghanistan from the perspective of force ratios, including the ratio of counter-insurgents to insurgents and counter-insurgents to the population and I will argue that while various COIN theories were understood by the US


and its NATO allies, these were not translated into practice, with the result that the COIN campaign in Afghanistan subsequently failed.

While there is a relationship between COIN and the CA, they differ in three substantive ways. First, the CA is a strategy, while COIN is an operational-level approach. This is clearly the view of Emile Simpson who noted that “Counter-insurgency in Afghanistan is frequently described as a strategy. It isn’t. Counter-insurgency is an operational approach: a method which organises actions in service of a strategy, but not a strategy in itself. A strategy connects an operational approach to its ends, the objectives of policy, and adjusts both in so doing.”

In this regard, the relationship between CA and COIN is similar to the CA and other operational-level approaches (for example, programs undertaken by international organizations to strengthen specific aspects of the “host nation”). These operational-level tools are utilized to achieve specific objectives (for example, security, improved governance, or improved economic conditions) which are situated at the end of conceptual lines of operation embedded in an overarching (i.e. comprehensive) strategic campaign framework.

However, as in conventional war, were operational doctrine to be up-scaled to the level of policy, there would be a risk that it would crowd out real strategic debate: hard political choices about what political end-state is to be sought may well be neglected, as the generic policy aims of doctrine, such as ‘avoiding state failure’, become the actual policy aims.

Second, COIN and the CA differ on the basis of focus. Counter-insurgency operations are military-led and are, not surprisingly, focussed on the insurgency, and more specifically, on the insurgents. The endstate of COIN operations is the successful defeat of the insurgency and this can only be achieved if the insurgents are defeated militarily (e.g. Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka), physically isolated from the host population (e.g. Malaya) or integrated into the mainstream political process (e.g. Northern Ireland).

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113. Ibid, 144.
Success in counter-insurgency, therefore, is constructed of a subjective interpretation of an eradication of insurgent violence; however, this is often the result of overt political compromise, which questions whether ‘success’ is therefore the right word to describe a strategic outcome.\footnote{114}{Andrew Mumford, \textit{The Counter-Insurgency Myth}, 13.}

This contrasts with the CA, which is focussed not only on the short-term internal security situation and the threat posed to the “legitimate government” by the insurgency (the intent of which is to seize political power) but on broader factors and conditions which are necessary to achieve long-term stability and prosperity such that future insurgencies are unlikely to emerge again. In the case of Afghanistan, for example, the inability of NATO to address the regional and, indeed, international, factors at play in Afghanistan (particularly the role of Pakistan) virtually ensured that the COIN operation, which was limited in force size, geographical scope and timeframe, could not succeed.

Third, and finally, COIN and the CA differ in their treatment of the host nation as the most significant actor in the crisis. Most COIN doctrine models insurgency as a struggle between insurgents (who are generally assumed to be indigenous actors who possess some form of grievance and seek to resolve that grievance through the acquisition of political power); the local population which may be either neutral or supportive of the insurgency to some degree or another; and counter-insurgents who are external actors and whose role it is to “win hearts and minds” on behalf of the host nation government such that the majority of the local population no longer supports the insurgency on the assumption that this is the decisive factor to achieve success.\footnote{115}{Ibid, 2.}

This model is in contrast with the CA which views the host nation government as the critical actor. While the importance of good host-nation government is noted in most COIN doctrine, actions of the indigenous government are generally not portrayed as the critical factor in determining the ultimate outcome of the COIN operation. Rather, the government is viewed as a well-meaning recipient of external beneficence which is prepared to act rationally and consistently within the framework desired by the external
intervenes. Clearly, the evolving situations in Afghanistan and Iraq belie this assumption. In these cases, the actions of these governments (to undermine the democratic transfer of power in Afghanistan and to pursue sectarian exclusivity and dominance in Iraq) have led to retardation, if not outright reversal, of whatever gains were made under the periods of external intervention in those states.

In the final section of this discussion of the relationship and relevance of COIN to the CA, the theory of insurgency as a globalized phenomenon will be introduced. I have already noted Mao’s innovative contribution to “pre-globalized” insurgent theory, namely, that “winning” the local population, and not territory per se, was deemed the decisive factor in a successful insurgency. In addition to this general formula, Mackinlay summarized other elements of the Maoist approach, as follows:

- Insurgency is the expedient of the weaker side – it would not choose to be an insurgent if other options were available
- He identified the importance of the population of the intervening side, as well as the population of the local population
- He stressed the importance of ideology – the message
- He made the important connection the environment (urban vs rural for example) and the opportunities these provided to the insurgent
- He exploited the human terrain by the identification of “an overwhelming sense of grievance”
- He used the reaction of the counter-insurgent force to drive the local population towards the insurgent cause (via over-reaction, for example)\(^\text{116}\)

These tenets of insurgency formed the basis of much counter-insurgency theory throughout what could be described as the entire “post-Mao” era, i.e. the sum of all of

eras that followed. In this sense, Mao is the insurgent prototype which “provided the central concept for Western thinking.”

This predominantly Maoist approach to COIN theory shifted in 2009 with the appearance of Kilcullen’s *The Accidental Guerrilla* and Mackinlay’s *The Insurgent Archipelago*, both of which posited that the insurgency emanating from within radicalized Islam and embodied by al Qa’ida (AQ) was now a “globalized” insurgency and that previously held COIN theories needed to be significantly revised to match this new threat to Western security.

For Kilcullen, “accidental guerrillas” are created by a deliberate (i.e. non-accidental) process whereby AQ “infects” a given state by establishing a presence in ungoverned or conflict-affected areas and proceeds to spread violence and radical ideology to other regions. This uptick in violence is designed to prompt an intervention by external (Western) forces in order to address the threat to state stability and this, in turn, creates conditions for AQ to turn the population against the interveners and support or ally with AQ which is now viewed as a type of “liberating force.”

Given characteristics inherent in globalization more generally – the spread of western cultures and economies and the effects of these on conservative societies; the ubiquity of communications technology (particularly the internet and social media); and easy access to global travel – he posits that AQ has both the motivation and means to operate on a global basis. In this model, individual AQ cells need not be physically linked or coordinated in any formal fashion and global insurgency is thus the aggregate of these individual cells all working towards a common endstate (which includes the establishment of a caliphate in the Middle East which would be used as a launching pad against the West).

This “aggregation model” is critiqued by Mumford who is concerned that the “‘global’ nature of Al-Qaeda’s insurgency, as Kilcullen depicts it,

117. Ibid, 12.
119. Ibid, 17.
does run the risk of being conceptually misleading…There is an uncritical understanding in Kilcullen’s work that insurgencies today are global because of their connectivity or the expanse of common motives and tactics, not simply by dint of their geographical dispersal.”

While acknowledging the intrinsic Maoist roots of his theory, Mackinlay’s view of insurgency is also globalized in nature. He views contemporary insurgency as possessing four characteristics. First, unlike the Maoist approach which assumed a shift in insurgent focus along a continuum of military-political action, contemporary insurgency is fundamentally a political process throughout which utilizes violence (including terrorism) for specific political purposes. Second, the specific techniques of a given insurgency are correlated to the types of societies in which the insurgency manifests, be this under-developed, developing or developed. Third, insurgency is understood to be an act of desperation, undertaken only when political ambitions are not matched with the power commensurate to translate this ambition into reality. Finally, and in direct acknowledgment of Mao’s key principle, contemporary insurgency “has to involve the population; its energy, its ability to sustain itself and to continually replace and regenerate its losses, arise from popular support.”

Mackinlay’s model of globalized insurgency links acts of violence which manifest from within Western societies (or Western leaning ones) to a global network of insurgents who may or may not have been “radicalized” in any specific conflict. To the extent that insurgents may, therefore, be “domestically grown” and linked via communications technology to insurgents in other locations, there is no requirement to maintain traditional (i.e. Maoist) forms of sanctuary.

The communities which are the heartlands of the insurgent energy, the energy that has attacked our cities and our populations, live and act on a different plane. They stretch around the world in an archipelago of individuals, cells and communities; they have no territory, they exist in isolated but interconnected groups that are

120. Andrew Mumford in Mumford and Reis, *The Theory and Practice of Irregular Warfare*, 128.
121. John Mackinlay, *The Insurgent Archipelago*, 5
horizontally related rather than vertically ordered, and their shared sense of outrage is regenerated by the exertions of the media and the visibility of the campaign. In these wispy, informal patterns, without territory and without formal command structures they are not easily touched by the kinetic blows of a formal military campaign.\textsuperscript{122}

Both Kilcullen and Mackinlay posit similar solution sets to address the globalized insurgency challenge. Kilcullen describes his approach as “full spectrum strategy” that balances all elements of national power (the “DIME”) which

is used to build reliable local alliances and partnerships with key leaders and influencers in the population. These partners, in conjunction with the intervening force, then develop a political strategy designed to improve governance, security and economic conditions and so extend government control over the population and the environment while marginalizing the enemy in a physical and political sense.\textsuperscript{123}

In order to achieve these objectives, the counter-insurgency campaign needs to synchronize “civil and military efforts under unified political direction and common command-and-control, funding and resource mechanisms”\textsuperscript{124} and include a “comprehensive approach that closely integrates civil and military efforts, based on a common diagnosis of the situation and a solid, long-term commitment to the campaign.”\textsuperscript{125}

While acknowledging the requirement to include “an array of government departments and non-government agencies”\textsuperscript{126} in the COIN operation, Mackinlay stressed the essentially non-military nature of the problem, suggesting that the globalized insurgency would be better understood as a form of “political violence”\textsuperscript{127} and not as a form of warfare. This is underscored by the fact that the globalized nature of insurgency makes it

\textsuperscript{122} Ibid, 6.
\textsuperscript{123} David Kilcullen, \textit{The Accidental Guerrilla}, 106.
\textsuperscript{124} Ibid, 112.
\textsuperscript{125} Ibid, 265.
\textsuperscript{126} Ibid 231.
\textsuperscript{127} Ibid.
difficult to identify a campaign centre of gravity for either the insurgents or the counter-insurgents.\textsuperscript{128}

In spite of the similarities between these two analyses – the labelling of the AQ insurgency as “globalized”, as well as the evidently “whole of government” approach to dealing with this insurgency – neither author offered particularly useful solutions to the problem. Kilcullen admits that, with respect to Afghanistan, nothing prescribed by him was “particularly new or controversial in conceptual terms” and that the problem lay in the international community’s inability to implement strategic solutions effectively. Mackinlay’s appreciation of this same situation appeared to be even more dire:

\begin{quote}
The international dimension of a new era of coalition forces was an obstacle to operational effectiveness that was never addressed with conviction. Expectations were too high; it had taken NATO states several decades to agree how to direct and fight a conventional engagement in the relatively small operational space along the German inner border – why should anyone imagine that the 75 nations and several hundred civil agencies who poured into these new, byzantine scenarios could achieve the same degree of operational cooperation in just a few years?\textsuperscript{129}
\end{quote}

In this sense, both Kilcullen and Mackinlay merely establish the contradiction inherent in their own models, namely, that state-based solutions to a globalized phenomenon are likely to be ineffective. Situating local acts of violence as nodes within a broader insurgent “campaign” to acquire political power (on a global basis?) may lend credence to terrorists, or simply criminal elements, who are willing to identify with a supra-national “cause” in order to inflate or disguise their true intentions or capabilities. By these authors own admission, states in which the vast majority of the indigenous population do not support an insurgency are not likely to be at risk. A more worrisome trend is the participation of radicalized Western nationals in active insurgencies. To the extent that such individuals are further radicalized, and gain “hands-on” training and experience in conflict zones, their return to their Western homes does present an increased level of risk.

\textsuperscript{128} Ibid, 223.
\textsuperscript{129} John Mackinlay. \textit{The Insurgent Archipelago}, 53.
While a theory of “globalized counter-insurgency” may help to explain why COIN operations in limited geo-spatial settings are rarely successful in the post-modern era, other critics of counter-insurgency as a means of achieving state stability frequently point not to factors such as under-resourced counter-insurgent force levels or revolutions in insurgent techniques as causes of failure, but rather, view the entire premise of COIN as one based on ongoing Western imperialism, underscored by liberal theories of how states actually advance.

Marshall, as a representative of this school, is particularly concerned with counter-insurgency myths, such as the British myth that heralded successes in Malaya and elsewhere were “moderate, benign, and egalitarian” or that the so-called “invisible hand” of the market is an effective conflict moderation tool. The concern of Marshall, and others, is the fact that phrases such as winning hearts and minds papers over the reality that counter-insurgencies have historically involved high levels of violence towards indigenous populations who were seen as harbouring insurgents or providing, at a minimum, logistical support and succor. While this view is an important one and worthy of further study, such critiques must not be allowed the intellectual failing of permitting comparisons between cases which are situated in periods of history in which such imperial actions were commonplace and the modern or post-modern eras in which international laws and norms designed to protect local populations are generally accepted and adhered to. At the same time, it must be acknowledged that violence is a necessary feature of counter-insurgency and that some of the most successful examples, such as the destruction of the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka in 2009, were also exceptionally violent.

I have now asserted that the CA evolved as NATO strategy in the context of pre-existing concepts and extant doctrines in various stages of maturity and acceptance, including EBAO, CIMIC and COIN. While each of these concepts arguably claimed lineage to

national sources, the iterative nature of Alliance and national doctrinal influence is relevant and is present in these cases. Each of these concepts also demonstrated that a CA was either necessary or assumed, and each made specific reference to a CA or offered some definition of it.

To summarize, from EBAO two central theories emerged: the notion that action-effects linkages may be identified, analysed and utilized to manage military operations, as well as a systems’ approach to understanding the operating environment itself.

From CIMIC the importance of civil-military interaction in the complex operating space, coupled with a diversity of actors, generates significant challenges in the conduct of military operations, particularly in relation to the utility of military forces as providers of aid and as reconstruction agents as well as the sharing of information amongst disparate civil and military actors.

Finally, from COIN, we see the development of conceptual models that implicate a broad set of actors and actions in multiple spheres in order to address insurgencies and the proposition that insurgencies cannot be defeated without attendance to root causes and this, in turn, edges towards the requirement for building effective state institutions that can address those root causes.

It was noted that theories of insurgency and counter-insurgency evolved through a series of identified historical eras, and that the modern era continued to be influenced by Maoist approaches. New COIN theories, such as “globalized insurgency”, have evolved in order to help explain post-modern models of insurgency which to appear to have adopted tactics and techniques derived from the nature of globalization more generally. Whether the failure of NATO and its allies to defeat the insurgency in Afghanistan was the result of poor application of “classical” COIN theory and doctrine, or if Afghanistan is merely but one “stop” on the insurgent archipelago, remains to be seen.

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Comprehensive Approach as NATO Strategy

I turn now to literature that identified and traced NATO’s adoption of the CA as formal strategy in the Afghanistan setting. The adoption of the CA strategy by NATO cannot be de-linked from its Afghan enterprise, as it was NATO’s willingness to assume the ISAF mission in 2003 and the subsequent expansion of that mission into a full-blown state-building project that caused the Alliance to seek an effective strategy which could address the full range of civil and military imperatives that the mission evidently required to succeed. That said, the adoption of the CA had implications for the Alliance which went well beyond ISAF and revealed underlying tensions amongst Alliance members and other international organizations regarding the role of the Alliance in the international security environment.

It is possible to trace the evolution of the CA strategy within NATO via a trajectory of official publications and statements by NATO officials as well as via a review of literature sources from analysts both in and outside of the Alliance.\footnote{134}{For example,\cite{johnson2011what} on, “What are you prepared to do? NATO and the Strategic Mismatch between Ends-Ways-and Means in Afghanistan – and in the Future,” \textit{Studies in Conflict and Terrorism} 34, no. 5 (May 2011): 383.} Meharg and St-Pierre earlier correlated the CA and NATO on an exclusive basis and posited that “NATO has developed a formalized Comprehensive Approach strategy for its operations,”\footnote{135}{Meharg and St-Pierre, 72.} and interviews and discussions between myself and various senior NATO players confirmed the view that the Alliance did adopt such a strategy in the context of the ISAF mission.\footnote{136}{For example, author discussion held with General R. Henault (Retired), former Chair of the NATO Military Committee, June 6, 2012.} Given the testing circumstances under which it was adopted, combined with the highly complex and bureaucratic character of the Alliance, the adoption process was admittedly uneven and disjointed, and this is also reflected in the literature.\footnote{137}{M. J. Williams, \textit{The Good War: NATO and the Liberal Conscience in Afghanistan} (Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 109.}

With respect to official sources, the CA is clearly linked to early Alliance CIMIC doctrine which acknowledged the 1999 \textit{Strategic Concept’s} recognition of the changed
nature of the international security environment and the possibility that the Alliance must stand ready “to contribute to effective conflict prevention and to engage actively in crisis management, including crisis response operations.”\textsuperscript{138} The document stressed that interaction between the Alliance and the civil environment was crucial to the success of operations, and it provided guidance to Alliance CIMIC operators regarding the types, roles and mandates of various organizations and agencies with which the Alliance may interact.\textsuperscript{139} While not describing a comprehensive approach per se, CIMIC doctrine identified several key features of the concept, including a prescient overview of the challenges such an approach generates.\textsuperscript{140}

An initiative by Denmark in 2004 formally placed the Comprehensive Approach on the Alliance’s agenda under the heading of Concerted Planning and Action (CPA) in order to address perceived shortcomings identified in NATO’s operational experiences in Bosnia and Kosovo and now echoed in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{141} As a result, the CA was identified as a key element emerging from the Riga Summit in 2006, the Declaration of which stated:

\begin{quote}
Experience in Afghanistan and Kosovo demonstrates that today’s challenges require a comprehensive approach by the international community involving a wide spectrum of civil and military instruments, while fully respecting mandates and autonomy of decisions of all actors, and provides precedents for this approach. To that end, while recognising that NATO has no requirement to develop capabilities strictly for civilian purposes, we have tasked today the Council in Permanent Session to develop pragmatic proposals in time for the meeting of Foreign Ministers in April 2007 and Defence Ministers in June 2007 to improve coherent application of NATO’s own crisis management instruments as well as practical cooperation at all levels with partners, the UN and other relevant international organisations, Non-Governmental Organisations and local actors in the planning and conduct of ongoing and future operations wherever appropriate.\textsuperscript{142}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{139} Ibid, 40.
\textsuperscript{140} Ibid, 44.
\textsuperscript{141} Petersen and Binnendijk, 1.
By 2008 the Alliance was committed to the state-building project in Afghanistan and was convinced that the Comprehensive Approach was the correct way forward, and the Bucharest Declaration of that year asserted that:

Experiences in Afghanistan and the Balkans demonstrate that the international community needs to work more closely together and take a comprehensive approach to address successfully the security challenges of today and tomorrow. Effective implementation of a comprehensive approach requires the cooperation and contribution of all major actors, including that of Non-Governmental Organisations and relevant local bodies. To this end, it is essential for all major international actors to act in a coordinated way, and to apply a wide spectrum of civil and military instruments in a concerted effort that takes into account their respective strengths and mandates.\(^{143}\)

In order to actualize the CA strategy, the Alliance approved a Comprehensive Approach Action Plan in order to “improve the coherent application of NATO’s own crisis management instruments and enhance practical cooperation at all levels with other actors, wherever appropriate, including provisions for support to stabilisation and reconstruction.”\(^{144}\) The plan was to enhance capabilities in five major areas of work: planning and conduct of operations; lessons learned, training, education and exercises; enhancing cooperation with external actors; public messaging; and stabilization and reconstruction which will require “better coordination of NATO’s military efforts in this field with those of its partners and other international and non-governmental organizations.”\(^{145}\) NATO’s commitment to the CA was further evidenced by the 2008 Strategic Vision which stated:

There can be no lasting security without development and no development without security. Success requires a comprehensive approach across security, governance and development efforts and between all local and international partners in support of the Afghan


\(^{144}\) Ibid.

\(^{145}\) See [http://www.nato.int/summit2009/topics_en/19-comprehensive_approach.html](http://www.nato.int/summit2009/topics_en/19-comprehensive_approach.html)
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Government. We will intensify our contribution to such a comprehensive approach.146

By 2009 the state-building project in Afghanistan was clearly faltering and ISAF, now heavily influenced by the United States, adopted the operational tenets of counter-insurgency, and NATO COIN doctrine published in 2009 stated that:

a comprehensive approach, which places emphasis on achieving a common understanding of the situation and a unity of purpose and effort, is the only way of achieving a successful outcome. It is vital that interaction and cooperation between those planning and coordinating political, military and economic activities take place at every level, to ensure a unified, comprehensive approach to crisis and a political settlement that underpins resolution.147

In order to support planning in the now defined comprehensive engagement space, the NATO operational planning process (OPP) was re-branded as the Comprehensive Operational Planning Directive (COPD) in 2010. Whilst this military planning doctrine retained many of the earlier concepts which were embedded in OPP and EBAD doctrine, the theory of comprehensiveness was pervasive throughout.148

The 2010 revision of NATO’s strategic concept continued the trajectory of entrenching the CA as fundamental strategy for the Alliance, asserting that “the lessons learned from NATO operations, in particular in Afghanistan and the Western Balkans, make it clear that a comprehensive political, civilian and military approach is necessary for effective crisis management.”149 The political guidance on ways to improve NATO’s involvement in stabilization and reconstruction operations issued in 2011 solidified the link between the CA and stabilization and reconstruction in fragile, conflict and post-conflict affected states. It stated:

147. NATO, Allied Joint Publication 3.4.4 Counterinsurgency, Study Draft 2, May 2009, 1-5.
Stabilisation and reconstruction efforts contribute to a comprehensive approach to crisis management and to complementarity, coherence and coordination of the international community’s efforts towards security, development and governance. For the purposes of this political guidance, stabilisation and reconstruction activities should be understood to include support to establishing long-term stability and strengthened governance, local capacity building and the promotion of ownership by the relevant national authorities, encouragement of the rule of law and establishing the basis for economic, human and social development.\textsuperscript{150}

Many early observers of NATO’s evolutionary adoption of the CA were in general agreement with the overall theoretical construct and its importance for the Alliance.\textsuperscript{151} At the same time, the significance of the strategy for NATO’s transformation from a collective defence organization into a multi-purpose security organization became clear and the implication that this would potentially require new capabilities, particularly enhanced civilian capacity, generated debates both in and outside of the Alliance.\textsuperscript{152}

Many of these discussions focused on the reality that while NATO’s leadership was evidently committed to the concept at the strategic level, a lack of institutionalization, coupled with multitudinous and disparate opinions regarding the exact nature of the concept (even to the point of having no agreed definition), resulted in confusion. Thus while some observers posited that “NATO does not own a Comprehensive Approach,”\textsuperscript{153} others were more concerned about how NATO should adapt in order to ensure that the CA was successfully implemented.\textsuperscript{154}

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\textsuperscript{150} NATO, Public Policy Division, \textit{Political Guidance on ways to improve NATO’s Involvement in Stabilization and Reconstruction}, 2011, 2, accessed 5 September 2013; available from \url{www.NATO.int-publications@hq.NATO.int}


\textsuperscript{153} NATO, NATO Defense College, “10 Things you should know about a Comprehensive Approach,” summary of the 17\textsuperscript{th} Partnership for Peace International Research Seminar (Stockholm, October 2008).

\end{flushleft}
Analysts sought to understand what motivated the Allies to contribute to the ISAF mission and what the relationship between that mission and the CA was more generally. Hynek and Marton, for example, posited that troops “were deployed to Afghanistan to deal with a complex set of tasks. Among them, in order to assist in state building and to provide governance assistance at the sub-state level”\textsuperscript{155} and that the deficiencies in this project necessitated a comprehensive approach. That said, in spite of the expenditure of significant intellectual effort to grasp the significance of the CA strategy, there was not, by 2011, an officially approved definition of it, and it was becoming increasingly obvious that the concept was extending into a wide variety of domains. Far from narrowing towards a precise set of doctrinal prescripts, “the development of a family of various texts (thought pieces, concepts and doctrine) related to the CA,”\textsuperscript{156} would possibly remain the norm. As such, analysts were now more likely to identify the “children” or “cousins” of a Comprehensive Approach than attempt to submit a singular and, therefore, potentially limiting definition.

While some analyses of the concept rose to the brink of the arcane (such as Hallet’s description of the CA as a “design process that that reduces the inter-organizational interaction transaction costs and provides a structure that enables self-synchronization among diverse organizations”\textsuperscript{157}), others were concerned with grounding the CA as a strategy in the realm of action. For Frioriksson, for example, the concept was inextricably linked to interventionism, and he interrogated military and humanitarian activities and tools in relation to their primacy, consequences, sequencing, balance and prioritization in peace-keeping, peace-enforcement or peace-making interventions.\textsuperscript{158} Rynning was equally concerned about how the strategy was to be actualized on the ground, and he argued that the Comprehensive Approach possessed “abundant intuitive appeal but no

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\textsuperscript{155} Nik Hynek and Peter Marton, eds., \textit{Statebuilding in Afghanistan – Multinational contributions to reconstruction} (London: Routledge, 2011), 3.
\textsuperscript{158} Andri Mar Frioriksson, “International Peacekeeping – NATO’s Comprehensive Approach and Its Application in Afghanistan,” paper submitted for partial completion of a Bachelor of Arts Degree, Bifrost University (2011), 44.
\end{flushleft}
strategy of action” and that it “ties people and organizations together but does not tell them what will happen when the grid locks.”\textsuperscript{159}

Other observers of the Alliance downplayed the difficulties NATO was experiencing in Afghanistan. Olson, for example, asserted that the “big existential questions about NATO—out-of-area operations, enlargement, transformation, partnerships—these questions at their core have been answered.”\textsuperscript{160} This rather cheery perspective was not evident, however, in much of the material generated during the period in which the Afghan insurgency was growing and the expanding analytical discussion suggested that the inability of the Alliance to successfully institutionalize the Comprehensive Approach represented a strategic vacuum which rendered the possibility that “the Alliance’s military value to its members is likely to be questioned.”\textsuperscript{161}

**Critical Views of the Comprehensive Approach**

In this final section of the review, I turn to literature that offered opinions (generally negative) about the effectiveness of the CA as NATO strategy in relation to its interventionist state-building objectives in Afghanistan (and presumably beyond).

As pure model, the comprehensive approach was designed to promote and enhance coherence amongst the many actors involved in an intervention. While this mantra of coherence is inextricably associated with the comprehensive approach, critics concerned about the preservation of humanitarian space rejected coherence between military and humanitarian actors on both normative and ideological bases. Meharg, for example, asserted that these types of attempts to integrate civil and military actions in the realm of aid and reconstruction had created a situation in which “humanitarian space no longer


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exists.”\textsuperscript{162} This had serious repercussions for humanitarian organizations which opted to participate in these integrated missions as she believed that they had effectively abdicated their responsibility.\textsuperscript{163}

Cornish was equally concerned about the impact of this integrative trend, and he argued that an evolutionary shift towards the development of effective patterns of communication, coordination and cooperation between civil and military actors was disrupted by 9/11 and the subsequent war on terror resulting in war-fighting missions “which for the most part were quickly dressed in human rights and humanitarian clothing.”\textsuperscript{164} While asserting that the intent of integrated approaches was laudable, the effect “resulted in humanitarian and development aid programming becoming subordinated to political interests in counterproductive ways.”\textsuperscript{165} This resulted in the NGO community rejecting the agenda implied by such integrated missions with the by-product that “humanitarians are now seen as obstructionist and antiquated by the political and military communities.”\textsuperscript{166} The politicization and militarization of aid resulting from the use of comprehensive approaches was a common and recurring theme in the literature, and it was asserted that the use of aid to win hearts and minds was not only inconsistent with normative humanitarian principles but also ineffective.

For example, Douglas pointed to Iraq and Afghanistan as significant events in the context of increasing levels and forms of civil-military interaction but argued that progress was haphazard and that it was necessary to broaden thinking about civil-military relations more generally. This, he thought, would involve potentially more difficult reforms to improve civil-military relations as well as institutional reforms which potentially affect “areas of policy that were once purely the internal business of an agency.”\textsuperscript{167}

\textsuperscript{162} Meharg, \textit{Helping Hands and Loaded Arms – Navigating the Military and Humanitarian Space}, 1.
\textsuperscript{163} Ibid, 116–119.
\textsuperscript{165} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{166} Ibid, 3.
Metcalf sought to explain why the relationship between military and humanitarian actors was continually fraught and unconstructive. While acknowledging factors frequently cited in the literature such as differences in terminology, cultures and concepts, she posited that it was more likely a result of fundamental differences in motivations, goals and approaches and that, in keeping with earlier observers, linked these to the “principles of humanity, impartiality and neutrality which humanitarian actors, in theory at least, strive to adhere to.” While some observers of the comprehensive approach viewed the inherently different cultures and roles of humanitarian and military actors as the primary source of friction, others pointed to inter-institutional competition and conflict as well as lack of coherence of policies towards state fragility as serious impediments to actualizing the strategy. I take up this line of thinking in Chapter 4.

In evaluating comprehensive approaches, Stewart and Brown posited that the necessary ethos would rarely emerge at once but would, if it did at all, emerge as the result of an iterative process. In their view, the range of possible forms of interaction between civil and military actors included two extremes: the very difficult to achieve “gold standard” wherein objectives, strategies, tools and sequencing are fully aligned at interagency level and the exact opposite, wherein objectives are basically incompatible, there is little information flow among actors about who is doing what, and little knowledge of or interest in adopting an integrated approach.

de Coning echoed the view that while greater coherence in the international peace building system was desirable, this was based on an assumption that a sufficient level of shared values, principles, goals and objectives existed amongst the various organizations and actors in the system, and he challenged this assumption.

In addition to the foregoing critiques of the comprehensive approach as an ineffective model, other challenges remained with respect to the attempted actualization of the strategy in an alliance context in general and in NATO specifically. These challenges

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169. Ibid, viii.
170. Ibid.
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included conceptual, institutional and capability gaps at all levels—tactical, operational and strategic—and, again, I will investigate these in detail in Chapter 4. At this point, I will identify some material that addressed specific challenges to NATO’s attempt to actualize the CA as well as some material that offered potential solutions to the gridlock.

Mariano examined NATO capacity in relation to its abilities to conduct war fighting, peacekeeping and humanitarian aid at all levels of conflict—tactical, operational and strategic. He posited that to be successful in the new security environment NATO would require capacity in each block of the nine-block matrix such an analysis produces and offered evidence that NATO did not possess such capacities. At the same time, he argued that “NATO has no authority and limited capacity to integrate peacekeeping and humanitarian aid into its core competencies of collective defense.”

The question of whether NATO should (or could) generate civilian capacity from within the Alliance itself or whether the CA strategy was intended to leverage civil capacity from external organizations and agencies was never fully resolved. For example, while Thruelsen labelled the mission in Afghanistan as “being implemented with a lack of civilian resources,” it was not clear where such resources were to be found. Alternatively, Jakobsen recognized that NATO does not have the civilian capacities that a fully-fledged CA requires and proposed that the Alliance first “get its own house in order by creating a common understanding of its role in CA, as well as the mindset, doctrine and procedures that will enable it to employ its own resources in accordance with CA requirements for success.” He posited that the adoption of the CA was hampered by, amongst other factors, the extent to which NATO should utilize military capabilities to fulfill essentially civilian tasks if no civilian assets were available.

172. Mariano in Meharg, Helping Hands, 156.
173. Williams, 103.
176. Ibid.
Friis and Jarmyr conceptualized the CA on a basis of “developing categories and definitions of various kinds of interactions and between various kinds of actors,” and this discussion was extended by Thruelsen in a later work in which he examined the role of international military forces in Afghanistan and their interplay with other actors. He concluded that the Afghan mission lacked the glue to bring all of the necessary actors together and that this could result in a NATO “retreat to types of operations on which the ‘NATO family’ can more easily find a broad political consensus, such as peace support, peacetime military engagement or anti-piracy.” This view was supported by Williams who asserted that “the organization’s traditional resources make only a small contribution to providing security in post-conflict states” and that this necessitated the attempt to create new capability merging civilian and military efforts.

The idea that NATO would develop its own capacity in order to address civilian shortfalls was roundly rejected by Kashmeri who believed that organizations other than NATO, specifically the European Union (EU), had already developed effective civil-military instruments and that any attempt by NATO to duplicate this would be unsuccessful and unnecessarily expensive. D’Hollander referenced the NATO concept of Smart Defense as recognition of the growing financial pressures that underscored Kasmeri’s view.

It is necessary to point out that not all observers of the NATO strategy, or indeed the comprehensive approach as a general model for dealing with complex crises, were unsympathetic or critical. Two cases in point highlight, however, the intellectual challenges the support of this model required. In the first case, Coletta proposed that the application of principal-agent theory may hold promise with respect to finding a way out of the coordination dilemma. He explains that:

177. Friis and Jarmyr, 3.
179. Williams, 64.
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Principal-agent categories abstract from real life situations the structure of incentives facing employers and their labor force in order to explain why work does or does not get accomplished. A solution to the principal agent game typically reflects the perspective of the leader, the person or entity that controls production inputs and enjoys direct utility from the work completed.\textsuperscript{182}

He identified the United States as the most logical candidate for principal in the context of the Afghan mission and developed a model whereby the most active players in the mission would submit themselves to a bargaining process led by the US. While recognizing the need to take each actor’s perspective into account in order to ensure burden sharing, the US would be permitted to “impose participation thresholds restricting other actors’ involvement in designated complex emergencies.”\textsuperscript{183} While this is an intriguing theory which may, in fact, describe the mechanism by which a given international society could arrive at decisions related to complex crises, I would suggest that it is not reflective of the Alliances’ current decision-making process, which is based on the principle of unanimity and which, therefore, affords an equal voice to the least powerful members. At the same time, the theory presupposes that the international community may be equated to (or may assume) some form of structure akin to an organization wherein the “labor force” (states, IOs, NGOs, etc.) all possess a common perspective or understanding of the problem and are willing to accept and provide resources to achieve the goals of the so-called principal—an assumption certainly not borne out in practice (see Chapter 3) or in theory (see Chapter 4).

In another example, Egnell’s 2008 article “Between reluctance and necessity: the utility of military force in humanitarian and development operations,” offered a skeptical, albeit measured, view of the comprehensive approach. While questioning the “theoretically weak assumption of increased effectiveness from civil military integration,”\textsuperscript{184} he suggested this problem could be addressed by focusing on outcome-based thinking which would identify the precise aim of operations and translate this into specific operational


\textsuperscript{183} Ibid: 315.

and tactical objectives that would be assigned to civil or military elements as appropriate. He explains that:

> It may not simply be a problem of finding the right method. In some cases, increased integration into coherent comprehensive approaches may be the more effective solution. In other cases, a clear line of demarcation between certain actors and their activities may be the answer. The important thing is that such calculations are made, and that they are holistic in that they involve both short- and long-term effects, intended and unintended, at all levels of operations.\(^{185}\)

By 2013, his somewhat fuzzy stab at a systems’ approach to addressing complex crises gave way to a view far more precise in nature. In his article “Civil–military coordination for operational effectiveness: Towards a measured approach,” Egnell argues that with sufficient strategic guidance in place, the various intervening actors (civil and military) would have only limited reasons to cooperate and coordinate in the field. This is based on an appreciation that various agencies and organizations working at operational and tactical levels possess unique competencies and are fully capable of undertaking tasks and fulfilling their respective responsibilities and could do so while remaining within their respective stovepipes. “For the sake of effectiveness and efficiency—which in the end means saving lives—as well as to avoid confusion about actors and responsibilities in the eyes of the local population, each agency should therefore also focus on their core competencies and avoid dabbling in other areas.”\(^{186}\) In this sense, Egnell essentially refuted the basic premise of the comprehensive approach and falls, I believe, into that camp which tends towards the assertion of theories that explain away the need for a comprehensive approach while not admitting that the theory itself is simply unattainable in practice.

Given that we have systemized the Comprehensive Approach as a strategy in the context of NATO’s response to complex crises, in particular the ISAF mission in Afghanistan, the question of how well NATO apprehended that strategy and the effect it would have

\(^{185}\) Ibid.
on the Alliance is an important one. Some observers pointed to an absence of “unambiguous leadership” and “a clear lack of unity” as contributing to a lack of effective strategic direction.\(^{187}\) Thruelsen had earlier postulated that the ISAF mission suffered from a lack of coherent political strategic understanding as well as “lacking an appreciation of the context and importance of mission success,”\(^{188}\) and other observers recognized that with the ISAF mission “NATO assumed a serious responsibility”\(^{189}\) and that “it permeates both its other operations and largely shapes its institutional evolution.”\(^{190}\) This impact of NATO’s failure to achieve its strategic objective in Afghanistan will be taken up in some detail in Chapter 5.

A realist line of argument posited that the ability of the Alliance to effectively actualize the CA would not, in fact, have resulted in campaign success in Afghanistan due to conditions that were present in that setting, including pervasive Afghan government corruption, falling public support for the mission in NATO capitals and the ability of insurgents to utilize Pakistan for unimpeded re-supply and force generation, and Chaudhuri and Farrell identified this problem as an “operational-strategic disconnect.”\(^{191}\) While Jakobsen suggested that “it has been wrong to hail its CA as a ‘sine qua non’ for success in Afghanistan, as the new strategy remains a work in progress.”\(^{192}\) Suhrke argued that NATO’s commitment to the Afghan mission:

appears less the product of a deliberate strategy than the result of a “disjointed incrementalism” where sub-rationalities of organizational interests, vested interests and rhetoric traps are prominent. … These features of the intervention are not surprising given that it was a non-routinized response to a conflict unfolding in


\(^{188}\) Peter Dahl Thruelsen, “NATO in Afghanistan – what lessons are we learning and are we willing to adjust?,” 4.

\(^{189}\) Haldun Yalcinkaya and Dilaver Arikan Acar, “NATO Peacekeeping in Afghanistan: Expanding the Role to Counterinsurgency or Limiting it to Security Assistance,” \textit{Defence Against Terrorism Review} 2, no. 2 (Fall 2009): 59.


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a complex environment and a first out-of-area engagement. Nevertheless, they appear as principal “lessons” and a tale of caution for the alliance if it is committing itself to an operation, regardless of the formal designation and ideological framework of the operation.193

Conclusion

As the comprehensive approach evolved, many Western nations and international organizations explored, experimented with and adopted, to one extent or another, variations of the model, although none adopted it as a formal strategy with the exception of NATO. As the state-building project in Afghanistan appeared to founder and the costs, both human and financial, associated with the mission mounted, the core theories on which the model was premised came under critical assessment. Thus, the critical line of inquiry returned to the matter of strategy in a context of security writ large.

In the context of a single nation, the attainment of security is related to ideas such as existentialism, power projection and human security. In the context of an alliance such as NATO, the attainment of security, and the adoption of strategies to achieve it, relates to both the security of the members which make up the alliance and the alliance itself (to the extent that it is seen as a provider of security to its members or, at the very least, a significant security contributor). In this sense, adopting a strategy to attain security for an alliance speaks to the role of the alliance in relation to its members as well as to other organizations, institutions and nations outside of the alliance and with whom the alliance must interact or influence in order to achieve its strategic and, therefore, security objectives.

Wagnsson argued that NATO members, rooted as they are in Westphalian construct and tradition, are under pressure to shift “towards institutionalization of security cooperation and a broader definition of referent objects of security” and that “the Alliance is severely torn between traditional constructions of ‘the self’ and a need for change.”194 She

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identified that NATO possessed a variety of roles in the international security environment—firefighter, watchdog, good neighbour and seminar leader—and that NATO’s ability to evolve successfully in a post-Westphalian world will depend on how well NATO develops in each of these roles, and she concluded that “the globalized threat environment is likely eventually to force NATO to fully recognize the need for a more post-Westphalian approach to security.” If so, strategies that NATO selects to attain security in a post-Westphalian environment must meet both the security needs of its members and be effective in their broader, external manifestation. To the extent that NATO selected the CA as a strategy to maintain (or re-attain) security in the post-9/11 context, it is posited that neither of these important litmus tests was achieved.

195. Ibid.
Chapter 2: NATO’s Comprehensive Approach to State Building in Afghanistan

Introduction

This thesis posits that NATO adopted the Comprehensive Approach in response to the state-building challenges it faced in Afghanistan from approximately 2006 onwards, although the evolution of this strategy is linked to its reaction to the terrorist attacks in 2001 and its willingness to assume leadership for the mission in 2003. At the same time, Afghanistan was considered the first real test of NATO’s out-of-area mission statement adopted in the NATO 1999 Strategic Concept. M. J. Williams asserted that “following a decade of operations in the Balkans, NATO rewrote its strategic concept to account for the new strategic environment—an ‘international discourse coalition’ asserting a new transatlantic security agenda in the public space.”

The aim of this chapter is to trace the broad narrative of NATO’s experience in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2011 and explain why it adopted the Comprehensive Approach as its strategy. The temporal period under study has as its “left flank” the year in which the United States was attacked by a terrorist organization that had direct and indirect connections to the state of Afghanistan. NATO’s response was to invoke, for the first time, Article 5 of the NATO Charter which declared that an attack on one NATO member was an attack on all. Arguably, NATO elected to engage in Afghanistan as a result of a complex mixture of external and internal pressures, including a desire to demonstrate solidarity with the US, prove its willingness and capability to operate outside its traditional area in response to the evolved security environment, and ameliorate those Alliance members which were providing leadership to ISAF and were pressuring NATO to accept responsibility for the mission at the institutional level.

The “right flank” of 2011 brings the narrative as close to current as is reasonable. In addition, the selected year provides an opportunity to examine the efforts of the US and

1. Williams, 30.
3. Williams, 60. He asserted that the NATO response to 9/11 was also motivated by the crisis in transatlantic relations evolving out of the US intention to invade Iraq.
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NATO to address the conditions in Afghanistan for a full decade, and there is sufficiently rich data available for this period to illustrate the point that these efforts have not succeeded. At the same time, to paraphrase Mr. Churchill, if 2011 was not the end of the Western intervention into Afghanistan, it was certainly the beginning of the end.

On 22 June 2011 the President of the United States outlined his intention to begin the withdrawal of US military forces from Afghanistan with the aim of transitioning security in the country to the Afghan military by the end of 2014. This decision was consistent with an earlier agreement between NATO and the Afghan national government which also planned for the transition of security from NATO to Afghan forces in a phased approach ending in 2014. At time of writing, a series of negative incidents involving US and NATO forces were prompting a re-evaluation of the transition timetable with a view to frontloading the process such that NATO forces would shift to a support role, requiring Afghan forces to take responsibility for combat operations throughout the country by mid-2013.

While the size of the Afghan national army (ANA) increased to approximately 195,000, it continued to struggle with a significant attrition rate, and as of early 2012, only 11 of 168 Army Kandaks (equivalent to a Western battalion) were rated as independent.


5. “In August 2008 security responsibility for Kabul city transferred to Afghan Forces. In November 2009 President Karzai expressed his ambition to see the Afghan National Security Forces take the lead security responsibility across Afghanistan by the end of 2014. At the July 2010 Kabul Conference, the Joint Afghan-NATO Inteqal Board (JANIB) was established as the mechanism to assess districts and provinces for transition and at the November 2010 NATO Lisbon Summit the Inteqal (Dari and Pashtu word for transition) process was agreed between the Afghan Government and NATO. In March 2011 President Karzai announced the first set of Afghan provinces and districts to start the transition process and the first transition ceremony took place in Bamyan province in July 2011. In November 2011 President Karzai announced the second set of Afghan provinces, districts and cities to start the transition process.” NATO Media Backgrounder, December 2011, accessed 17 March 2012; available from http://www.NATO.int/NATO_static/assets/pdf/pdf_topics/20111207_111207-Backgrounder-Inteqal-en.pdf.


and other indicators generated multiple analyses which suggest that, far from being capable of providing security in 2014 or earlier, there is a strong possibility that these forces will, in fact, be engaged in an Afghan civil war once all NATO forces have withdrawn.\(^8\)

These analyses have created a heightened sense of concern amongst many sectors of Afghan civil society and non-governmental organizations that improvements (minor as they have proven) in living standards, education, human rights and gender equality may be at risk.\(^9\) This is underscored by observations of various powerbrokers, including President Karzai, who appear to be preparing for a post-NATO, post-US environment that would require them to accommodate the demands of fundamentalists in order to forestall an attempt by the Taliban to overthrow the central government once again and push the country back into civil war. The announcement by President Karzai supporting a code of conduct for women issued by the Ulema Council is seen as indicative of this trend.\(^10\)

While the US and NATO maintain that the comprehensive plan adopted in Lisbon in 2010 for stabilizing the country while simultaneously increasing the quantity and quality of indigenous Afghan security forces remains extant, several NATO members have already significantly reduced their military and civil commitments to the mission, and by the end of 2011, it was suggested that the mission had, in all but name, become almost fully “Americanized.”

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10. President Hamid Karzai, Kabul, 6 March 2012, news conference. The “code of conduct” issued by the Ulema Council, as part of a longer statement on national political issues, is cast as a set of guidelines that religious women should obey voluntarily, but activists are concerned it will herald a reversal of the trend in Afghanistan since 2001 to pass laws aimed at expanding women’s rights. See: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/mar/06/hamid-karzai-afghanistan-womens-rights.
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The Effect of 9/11

On September 12, 2001, one day after the terrorist attacks in the United States, NATO invoked Article 5 of the NATO Charter for the first time in its history and pledged “to provide the assistance that may be required as a consequence of these acts of barbarism.” To the later chagrin of some senior US officials, this offer of assistance was rejected by the US, although NATO did undertake a number of unilateral steps, including enhancing intelligence monitoring, increasing security at bases and other locations, deploying the Standing Naval Force to the eastern Mediterranean and moving airborne early warning platforms to the US in order to free up American platforms for the mission in Afghanistan.

By October 2001 the US, along with partners Canada, Denmark, Norway and France, launched Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) in order to topple the Taliban, locate or kill Osama bin Laden and destroy the terrorist networks and training facilities from which the 9/11 attackers were presumed to have emanated. With an emphasis on teaming special forces with indigenous Afghan fighters from the primarily Northern Alliance (and aided by US precision-guided munitions), the military operation to remove the Taliban from power was decisive and relatively short-lived. While other allies (including Germany and the United Kingdom) had also joined the coalition, it was clear that all these nations were involved on a purely bi-lateral basis and that NATO per se was not committed.

M. J. Williams cited Gerard Toal who believes that the invasion of Afghanistan represented a counter-modern tendency. Counter-modern acts are committed when national governments territorialize abstract and amorphous global risks into more specific threats from rogue states. In counter-point, however, Williams argued that “these attempts to territorialize risk are not so much counter-modern, as they are counter-late modernity. Policy makers find it difficult to shift from the state-based, threat-oriented

11. The North Atlantic Council (NAC) declared: “The Council agreed that if it is determined that this attack was directed from abroad against the United States, it shall be regarded as an action covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which states that an armed attack against one or more of the allies in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all.” Accessed 5 September 2013; available from http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2001/1001/e1002a.htm.
system of international security to one that is based on managing risks.” Inevitably, the territorialization of the terrorist threat emanating from Afghanistan raised the issue of the terrorist threat in its global manifestation and the extent to which such amorphous threats may be addressed in a global context.

**ISAF Established**

In December 2001, the United Nations sponsored a conference in Bonn, Germany, which resulted in the Bonn Agreement—a UN-backed framework to establish a transitional authority in Afghanistan and provide a roadmap toward “the establishment of a broad-based, gender-sensitive, multi-ethnic and fully representative government.” As a generalized postwar reconstruction strategy, it affirmed that an interim authority would be led by Hamid Karzai, included guidelines for writing a constitution and conducting elections and outlined the future Afghan government. Maley argued that the seeds of Afghanistan’s future problems lay in the Bonn Agreement itself, in that it did not take into account what type of state Afghanistan should be, based on its internal dynamics and history; the result of which was a “bloated state structure that breeds internal competitiveness.”

It is significant to note that this initial step towards the stabilization of Afghanistan was UN-led; in fact, the UN had been monitoring the situation in Afghanistan for some time and a series of United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) expressed increasing concern at the actions of the Taliban and the threat these posed to the larger international community. Between 1996 and 2011 the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) issued 36 Afghan related UNSCRs, including UNSCR 1386 in December 2001 establishing the International Security Assistance Force as called for in the Bonn

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13. Williams, 133
Chapter 3: Interrogating the Comprehensive Approach

Agreement and UNSCR 1401 in March 2002, which established the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan.

These expressions of international action are consistent with the role of the UN, which is to “establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained.” 16 Williams posits that this is consistent with neoliberal thinking about institutions “whereby agreements and contracts exist to reduce transaction costs, lower uncertainty and manage collective action problems.” 17

While many of the Afghan-related UNSCRs dealt with the formal extension of the two UN-authorized missions and other housekeeping matters, the list of issues to be resolved outlined in these documents provides insight into the variety, profundity and persistence of the challenges facing the country throughout the entire period, including violations of human rights, narcotics proliferation, corruption, civilian casualties, the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and many others. 18

In spite of the establishment of the ISAF mission and the participation of several NATO members, ISAF and Afghanistan did not figure prominently at the NATO Prague Summit in November 2002, at least officially. The primary focus of the summit was the addition of seven new members to the Alliance and the ongoing transformation of its military command arrangements. While the summit declaration acknowledged and commended the UK, Turkey, Germany and the Netherlands for their willingness to assume command of ISAF, it resolutely stated that “the responsibility for providing security and law and order throughout Afghanistan resides with the Afghans themselves.” 19 This was consistent with an earlier statement in the document which pledged NATO to “further

16. Preamble to the UN Charter.
17. Williams, 93.
18. The complete set of UNSCRs related to Afghanistan and other related subjects, such as international terrorism more generally, may be found at http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions.html.
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promote peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area,” a clear affirmation of intent to remain concentrated on NATO’s traditional area of interest.

Of the approximately 5000 ISAF personnel (civilian and military) on the ground in Afghanistan in 2002–2003, 90 percent were drawn from NATO or Partners for Peace (PfP) nations, and the leadership of ISAF continued to rotate amongst various NATO nations. Between February and August 2003, a joint leadership arrangement saw ISAF under German–Dutch administration, and during this period, there was increasing pressure on NATO to increase its participation and role in the Afghan mission. These pressures were “in large part to end the arduous task of searching for a new ‘lead nation’ every six months to run ISAF.” At the same time, the readiness of NATO to accept leadership for the ISAF mission was also reflective of several Alliance members’ willingness to participate in a reconstruction mission, which was both consistent with broader humanitarian objectives and also in partial counter-balance to the US global war on terror. While a study of the process and motivations of the various actors involved with the decision to have NATO accept command of the ISAF mission is indeed worthy, there is not a specific requirement to delve into this in detail; my primary concern is the effect this decision had on the subsequent campaign.

20. Ibid.
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**ISAF: NATO Takes Over**

In April 2003, NATO’s foreign ministers authorized Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) to examine plans for an Alliance-wide mission and on August 11, 2003, NATO agreed to take on the leadership of ISAF. In October of that year the UNSC expanded the ISAF mission mandate beyond Kabul to include the entire country, and in December 2003, NATO announced its intention to establish five provincial reconstruction teams (PRT) in addition to the nine under US control. The first NATO-run PRT would be in Kunduz, in the north under German command; this PRT was previously established by the US and would require ongoing US support in order to function, a point of early friction concerning the perceived level of support being provided to ISAF by NATO members in general.

Although more will be said regarding PRTs later in this thesis, it should be noted that the PRT model has been heavily criticized for pursuing a “government-in-a-box” approach to state building. This criticism, while valid, should be tempered with an appreciation of these organizations as manifestations of bi-lateral agreements between Afghanistan and PRT lead nations. A more important distinction is to be made between those PRTs operated by ISAF and those operated by the United States. For the most part, ISAF PRTs focused on the provision of security within relatively defined areas, whereas US PRTs engaged in wide-ranging activities, including the direct provision of aid by military forces and other state-building endeavours. The ISAF model relied more heavily on civilian agencies and NGOs to engage in aid and reconstruction, and this was considered a more nuanced and, therefore, successful approach.

Between early 2004 and late 2006, the ISAF mission underwent expansion both in terms of force levels (although these continued to be viewed by the US and others as too

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23. UNSCR1510.
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meagre) and geographically. By April 2004, NATO troop contributions had risen to only 6500 with most of these from Canada and Germany, and a noted lack of helicopter platforms underscored that the mission was not being given priority by NATO members, despite public statements to the contrary.26

In January 2004, a new Afghan constitution was approved with a strong presidential-style government, and in June following the Istanbul Summit, NATO pledged to increase support for the ISAF mission and declared that it would support the emergence of a secure and stable Afghanistan. Although an agreement was made to raise troop levels to 10,000, it emerged that 1000 of these would be held in reserve in Europe, and this gave rise to further criticism by the US that NATO was continuing to under resource the mission. It is revealing that the Istanbul Declaration acknowledged that while collective defense remained the core purpose of NATO the threat environment had evolved and that NATO itself must adapt: to what extent was not yet entirely clear.

Between July 2004 and February 2005, discussions ensued between the US and NATO related to merging the US OEF mission and ISAF under a unified NATO command; however, this was rejected as several NATO members, particularly Germany, had represented the mission to their domestic audiences as one of peacekeeping, not combat, although combat was occurring in many parts of country on a regular basis.27

**ISAF Expansion**

In February 2005, NATO announced that it would expand the ISAF mission beyond Kabul and the northern provinces with the intent of having a presence across the entire country by 2006. It was not entirely clear which nations would provide the additional forces necessary to accomplish this; however, the US announced that as new NATO troops deployed to the Western provinces, US troops would be re-deployed to the more

troublesome southern and eastern areas, and an agreement to merge the two missions was made in principle, albeit with many details left undecided. By the summer of 2006, ISAF had expanded across the entire country, establishing headquarters and PRTs based on a geographic regional command configuration with the US deployed primarily in the eastern region adjacent to the Afghan–Pakistan border which was identified as the porous region through which Taliban fighters and logistical support for the growing insurgency were transiting.

The insurgency expanded steadily between 2002 and 2006 with attacks increasing by approximately 400 percent over that period. Similar to Iraq, a lack of US post-conflict planning has been identified as a primary causal factor for the insurgency, although this may be considered as too simplistic. Beyond a lack of military planning, some analysts posit that it is the US “way of war” which led to this development.

Maley posited that focusing on the purely military aspects of the insurgency is too limiting and that broader regional factors must also be examined, in particular the approach to Afghan–Pakistan relations which have virtually never ascribed to a Westphalian model of secure borders and mutual non-interference. Indeed, Yasmeen argued that the Pakistani view is almost entirely regional, balancing its need for strategic depth in relation to India with a desire for regional economic cooperation. These factors would suggest that any attempt to impose a military solution will likely fail and that political engagement with all actors in the region, including the most conservative, will be necessary.

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28. Williams, 64.
31. Comments made by Samina Yasmeen at a conference 10–11 April, 2012 in Toronto. Ms. Yasmeen is Director of the Centre for Muslim States and Societies at the University of Western Australia. See http://munkschool.utoronto.ca/blog/soldiers-policymakers-and-scholars-debate-afghanistan-at-conference.
ISAF Adopts a Comprehensive Approach Strategy to State Building

In November 2006, the bi-annual NATO summit was held in Riga, Latvia, and the ensuing declaration stated that “contributing to peace and stability in Afghanistan is NATO’s key priority,” a clear shift from earlier positions. For the first time, a strategy of Comprehensive Approach as a means of achieving stability was placed on the summit agenda, and the ensuing declaration acknowledged the evolving security environment and the “challenges from instability due to failed or failing states” and led to the following assertion:

There can be no security in Afghanistan without development, and no development without security. The Afghan people have set out their security, governance and development goals in the Afghanistan Compact, concluded with the international community at the beginning of the year. Provincial Reconstruction Teams are increasingly at the leading edge of NATO’s effort, supported by military forces capable of providing the security and stability needed to foster civilian activity. Guided by the principle of local ownership, our nations will support the Afghan Government’s National Development Strategy and its efforts to build civilian capacity and develop its institutions.

Arguably, with this declaration, NATO had entered the realm of state building, and there can be no complete examination of NATO’s evolution towards a strategy of

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32. NATO, Riga Summit Declaration, 29 November 2006, Para 5, See http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2006/p06-150e.htm.
34. Ibid. The Afghanistan National Development Strategy or ANDS is an Afghan driven framework for development containing numerous benchmarks and indicators of development in the areas of security, governance, rule of law, justice and human rights, economic and social development and several so-called cross-cutting issues. This document will be examined and utilized as a basis of assessing Afghanistan’s development progress between 2006 and 2011 in Chapter 3 of this thesis. The Afghanistan Compact referred to in this quote was the result of the London Conference held 31 January – 1 February 2006; it spells out the goals of the Afghan government and the international community and refers to the Afghanistan Millennium Development Goals Country Report 2005- Vision 2020.
35. Osinga and Russell suggest that NATO’s entry into state-building was signalled by its adoption of a new Comprehensive-Strategic-Military Plan in 2008. I believe that the 2006 Riga Summit declaration is a clear statement of intent to support state building in Afghanistan. See Frans Osinga and James A.
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Comprehensive Approach without a brief treatment of this subject. Indeed, the concepts and associated practices of state building have come to occupy a major position in the literature, and as witness to the relevance of this topic, NATO has generated bibliographies that address the nature of the state, post-conflict reconstruction and peace building, as well as failing and failed states amongst other interrelated themes.\footnote{At the same time, academic interest in the subject of state building and its relationship to a variety of social science disciplines has increased, and literature reviews have attempted to address the full spectrum of state-building-related theories and practices.}{37} 

A Brief Introduction to State-Building Theory

Within the literature several reoccurring leitmotifs are evident. First is a focus on definitional analysis of the various concepts and terms which are associated with state building, in particular, defining the nature of the state and attempting to categorize states in accordance with some scheme. Thus the appearance of “fragile states,” “weak states,” “failing states,” “failed states,” “collapsed states” as well as a number of other classifications.\footnote{Given a wide variety of definitions—which emphasize particular aspects of state formation, functionality and structures—there is no universally accepted lexicon. That said, the US Center for Global Development captures the essence of the failing state as follows:}{38}

A ‘failing state’ can be defined in various ways. In political science it has come to mean a state which is not able to maintain internal security. We give the term an economic meaning: a failing state is a low-income country in which economic policies, institutions and

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\footnote{See Hannan and Besada’s appendix for an overview of how these types of states are defined by numerous international organizations and nations.}{38}
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governance are so poor that growth is highly unlikely. The state is failing its citizens because even if there is peace they are stuck in poverty. The failure may well, however, be wider. Empirically the combination of poverty and stagnation substantially increases proneness to civil war. Through various routes the state may become a hazard to its neighbours and conceivably to the world.\(^{39}\)

Second is a focus on causative analysis (i.e., what factors cause a state to be classified in accordance with a particular definition of state fragility or failure and what factors cause states to shift from one classification to another). According to Hannan and Besada, “the forces leading to the emergence of fragile states are seen as numerous and diverse. They encompass economic causes, intra-state conflict and international factors, among others.”\(^{40}\) The identification and measurement of these diverse factors leads to the development of numerous approaches to analysing and classifying the internal conditions of such states and conducting inter-state comparisons in order to support putative schemes that may, in turn, generate potential policy options for dealing with them.

Third is a focus on the impact of fragile, failing or failed states (however defined) both in relation to internal populations which may be subject to political, economic, social or physical deprivations or violence and external populations (i.e., neighbouring states or the international community at large). This is based on the premise that fragile, failing and failed states generate, incubate, support or export various threats or de-stabilizing conditions such as trans-national terrorism, ethnic-cleansing, large-scale refugee movements or violence-prone state-based or non-state-based actors or organizations.

Fourth is a focus on early warning, that is, utilizing the classification schemes previously mentioned to assess the potentiality of a given state to shift from one classification to another, based on a series of indicative factors, thereby providing an opportunity for another state, coalition of the willing, alliance or the broader international community (as mandated by the UN) to engage the fragile, failing or failed state in some fashion. According to Rotberg:


\(^{40}\) Hannan and Besada, 7.
That said, research on failed states is insufficiently advanced for precise tipping points to be provided. It is not yet correct to suggest that if GDP [gross domestic product] falls by X amount in a single year, rulers dismiss judges, torture reporters, or abuse the human rights of their subjects by X, or if soldiers occupy state house, or civilian death rates rise more than X per year, that the state in question will definitely tip from weak to failing to failed. All we know is that the sum of those actions suggests that all is not well in the depths of Ruritania, misery is spreading, and the future shape and fate of the state is at serious risk.  

This, in turn, leads to hypotheses regarding the optimal means of dealing with such states and implicates theories of post-conflict reconstruction, aid, development, stabilization, peacemaking, peacekeeping, security sector reform, counter-insurgency, peace building, nation building and state building. While the literature offers a variety of definitions for these policy instruments, the focus is frequently on attempting to understand how they differ from each other and on their inter-relationships in both theoretical and empirical terms. 

In this regard, state building is primarily concerned with (re)creating, strengthening and maintaining state-society relations and working with executive, judicial and legislative branches of a state at all levels of government down to and including the local level. State building implies that indigenous capabilities or capacities are inadequate or unavailable to meet the tasks required to operate a functioning state and that these capabilities and capacities must, therefore, be imported. Naude and McGillivary cited Maxwell who identified six state-building policy instruments, the selection of which is actor and case dependent. They are:

- engaging in bilateral or multilateral dialogue;
- bypassing government by providing humanitarian aid and NGO development directly to affected groups;

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43. Blair and Fitz-Gerald, 12.
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- incentivizing government by rewarding performance or extending conditional support;
- investing in state capacity by providing aid for governance and institutional building;
- investing in non-state capacity by strengthening NGOs and the business sector directly; and
- engaging in direct military intervention.\textsuperscript{44}

The process of generating or re-generating functioning instruments of state power is generally understood to be a long-term process in contrast with peace building which is centred on establishing conditions of non-violence such that longer term state-building projects may take hold.\textsuperscript{45} Numerous factors play into the probable success or failure of the long-term project, not the least of which are decisions regarding the degree to which the process should focus initially on strengthening the central instruments of the state, or assume a more decentralized posture. In the case of both Iraq and Afghanistan, some analysts believe that the “Baghdad-first, Kabul-first” approach, which was adopted by the US, fostered a high level of dependence on external resources, and although attention ultimately shifted to other population centres (based on the expansion of the PRT network in Afghanistan, for example), the culture of dependence supported by patterns of aid distribution were too deeply engrained to overcome a sense of abandonment on the part of the rural populations.\textsuperscript{46}

Fifth, and finally, is a focus on the effect of various policy instruments on the host nation, in particular how various approaches are likely to change conditions within the state. This leads to a hypothesis that whatever policy instruments are selected to engage with fragile, failing and failed states and attempts are made to address or alleviate the causes of such failure, they will, themselves, fundamentally alter elemental aspects of the target state, in particular, the indigenous population. This is due to unforeseen transformations in

\textsuperscript{45} OECD DAC, State building in Situations of Fragility, 4.
\textsuperscript{46} Robert M. McNab and Mason Edward, “Reconstruction, the Long Tail and Decentralisation: An Application to Iraq and Afghanistan,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 18, no.3 (2007): 374.
internal power structures, dislocations in economic structures and relationships and stresses on social relationships, including inter-group, inter-tribe or inter-ethnicity connections or power relations. Thus the selection of policy instruments, which are generally categorized as “soft” or “hard” depending primarily on the presence of exogenous military forces, will potentially alter the character of the fragile, failing or failed state and propel it along a trajectory that may or may not result in a desirable or improved condition.

The importance of conceptualizing and respecting the people affected by an intervention—the indigenous population—is a theme that appears as a form of sub-text in most interventionist literature. Of particular interest to this thesis, Karlborg’s article “International quest for local legitimacy in Afghanistan: A tower of Babel?” reported the findings of a study which sought to identify and compare how NATO and the UN framed their understanding of what she termed “local legitimacy.” In this sense, local legitimacy refers to how the indigenous population views the intervention from their perspective and the extent to which the intervention is accepted as “legitimate.” The results of her study found that both NATO and the UN possessed very similar conceptions of how they framed local legitimacy in so far as it was tied not to the quality of the assistance provided to the Afghan population (and their perception of that assistance) but rather to the Afghan state. Afghan civilians were not generally considered as having a role in determining the level of local legitimacy apart from that of being victims of either coalition or insurgent attacks and this, she found, “rhymes poorly with the recent shift in both UN and NATO policy discourse towards increasing international support of the transition to Afghan lead of all security management in the country.” While generally disappointed with the framing of local legitimacy as primarily confined to the institutional or state level, she portrayed NATO’s pursuit of the Comprehensive Approach, particularly after 2008, as indicative of a shift towards connecting

48. Hannan and Besada, 35.
international assistance to the local population, albeit via a trajectory of increasing the strength and authority of the Afghan government.

Angstrom explores Lake’s approach to understanding state failure who believes that the quest for political order in failed states is key to understanding how the actors view both the problem of the failed state and the potential solution (i.e., the parties failed to agree on political order or the nature of the state).[^50] Thus, the achievement of order in society must precede the development or “awarding” of legitimacy on the central government. In this sense, legitimacy will be acquired once the society sees that the central government is capable of providing security for its people; if the source of that security is an external intervener, and not the central government, “these interventions need not have a positive effect on the resurrection of the state from state-collapse.”[^51] At the same time, the achievement of neither political order nor governmental legitimacy presupposes a democratic or liberal version of these conditions.

Fukyama posits that the extant Western pattern of state building tends towards three distinct, but frequently overlapping, phases. Phase one is post-conflict reconstruction in which outside powers provide stability via the provision of military and police forces, humanitarian relief and technical assistance to restore various infrastructure systems such as electricity, water and banking systems. Phase two may be loosely defined as development and involves the creation of self-sustaining state institutions, designed to survive the withdrawal of the interveners; this is considered far more difficult to achieve than phase one and is generally tied to conditions on the ground rather than a specific timetable. Phase three “has to do with the strengthening of weak states, where state authority exists in a reasonably stable form but cannot accomplish certain necessary state functions like the protection of property rights or the provision of basic primary education.”[^52]

[^50]: Angstrom, 390.
[^51]: Ibid.
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Given the difficulties associated with development, there is a temptation to suggest that external interveners should eschew the development function altogether. In practice, however, the ability to differentiate between the delivery of humanitarian aid and practices associated with development in states where basic institutions simply do not exist is highly problematic. In some historical cases, such as post-war Germany and Japan, elements of state functionality continued to survive in spite of overwhelming physical destruction, and this provided a platform for development; this was not the case in Afghanistan (or Somalia, for example) where it may be argued that the state was not only dysfunctional, but never existed in the first place.\(^\text{53}\)

By one definition, a state consists of “coercion wielding organizations that are distinct from households and kinship groups and exercise clear priority in some respects over all other organizations within substantial territories.”\(^\text{54}\) Given that Afghan tribes and militia groups were not under control of any centralized state coercive apparatus, the challenge of exogenous state building in Afghanistan was clear. If so, Afghanistan may not meet the minimum standard imposed by this definition, and this pattern has been ingrained over multiple generations. Williams argued that characteristics extant in Afghan society call into question the ability to form a state in the Western model including “lack of ethnic uniformity; complicated familial and tribal identities; and complexity of relationships and power that challenges attempts to centralize control.”\(^\text{55}\) Most telling, when any degree of central control has been achieved, it has only been accomplished through extensive external support and when such support no longer exists, neither does the centralization.

**Response to a Growing Insurgency**

Throughout 2007 and 2008, the insurgency grew in intensity and expanded to all areas of the country, including the northern and western regions which had previously been

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55. Williams, 19.
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relatively peaceful. NATO members assigned to those regions, particularly the Germans and French, were now having to engage in combat and were experiencing casualties from direct attacks and IEDs, and this was generating significant negative effects within their domestic political environments.

The statement following the NATO summit in Bucharest in April 2008 declared that Afghanistan was now NATO’s top priority and that the “Euro-Atlantic and wider international security is closely tied to Afghanistan’s future as a peaceful, democratic state, respectful of human rights and free from the threat of terrorism.”56 In order to assist Afghanistan to achieve these goals, NATO now recognized that:

the international community needs to work more closely together and take a comprehensive approach to address successfully the security challenges of today and tomorrow. Effective implementation of a comprehensive approach requires the cooperation and contribution of all major actors, including that of Non-Governmental Organizations and relevant local bodies. To this end, it is essential for all major international actors to act in a coordinated way, and to apply a wide spectrum of civil and military instruments in a concerted effort that takes into account their respective strengths and mandates. We have endorsed an Action Plan comprising a set of pragmatic proposals to develop and implement NATO’s contribution to a comprehensive approach.57

While the comprehensive approach may be traced to NATO’s approach to crisis management and state building as manifested in the 1999 Strategic Concept, its evolution towards formal NATO strategy progressed from the Concerted Planning and Action Initiative (CPAI), championed by Denmark in 2004. The significance of the CPAI was the recognition that stabilization and reconstruction required efforts at the strategic and operational levels and could not be confined to the tactical level alone. At the same time, there was a growing understanding that NATO could not achieve its state-building objectives without the participation and cooperation of individual member nations and other significant international actors, including NGOs.

56. NATO, Bucharest Summit Declaration, 3 April 2008, para 6.
57. Ibid, para 11.
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As indicated previously, the comprehensive approach was formally introduced and discussed at the Riga Summit in 2006, and the summit tasked relevant NATO bodies to determine how to integrate the concept into their work. Early Alliance adopters included some of the Scandinavian countries, Canada, the UK and eventually the US.\textsuperscript{58} In reality, NATO did not view the Comprehensive Approach as a new capability per se but rather as a strategy to overcome a capacity and coordination deficit at the operational and strategic levels.

By 2008, the Taliban had “coalesced into a resilient insurgency” and would “maintain or even increase the scope and pace of its terrorist attacks.”\textsuperscript{59} Following his election in 2008, President of the United States, Barack Obama, initiated a review of the situation in Afghanistan and announced on 27 March 2009 that the US would launch a “comprehensive, new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan,”\textsuperscript{60} including the immediate deployment of 17,000 additional US troops. The mission for these troops was to increase the ability of the US to secure the eastern and southern regions of the country where the insurgency was most prominent, increase security along the Afghan–Pakistan border, increase the size of the Afghan security forces through training and mentoring, and provide security for the Afghan presidential election scheduled for August 2009. Unfortunately, and in spite of the upsurge in US and NATO security forces, the international community deemed the 2009 Afghan presidential election to be deeply flawed, and following an attempted, but failed, run-off vote to appease critics of the electoral process, Hamid Karzai was re-affirmed as president until 2014.

In January 2010, President Karzai joined more than 70 countries and international organizations in London in order to plan for a new phase in the Afghanistan conflict. The primary goals for the conference included drafting plans for the transition of security to the Afghans themselves and enticing the Taliban to participate in a political process of reconciliation. The conference was held in the context of a deteriorating security

\begin{footnotes}
\item[58] Williams, The Good War, 104.
\item[60] Speech by President Barack Obama, 27 March 2009, accessed 5 September 2013; available from http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/09/03/27/A-New_Strategy-For_Afghanistan_and_Pakistan.
\end{footnotes}
environment, which was the subject of a UN report in which the UN Secretary General stated:

We are now at a critical juncture. The situation cannot continue as is if we are to succeed in Afghanistan. Unity of effort and greater attention to key priorities are now a sine qua non. There is a need for a change of mindset in the international community as well as in the Government of Afghanistan. Without that change, the prospects of success will diminish further.61

The UN report highlighted the fact that in the third quarter of 2009, there was an average of 1244 incidents per month, a 65 percent increase over 2008, and 784 conflict-related civilian casualties between August and October 2009 representing a 12 percent increase over the same period in 2008. In order to attempt to reverse this trend, the US opted to employ a surge strategy similar to that previously employed in Iraq. This translated into a commitment to deploy an additional 30,000 US troops along with an additional 9000 troops from the rest of the international community, bringing the total in theatre to approximately 135,000.

While plans for the security transition were agreed upon at the London Conference and further steps approved across all major lines of operation, Afghan requests for greater control of international funding were rebuffed based on a requirement to demonstrate concrete improvements in levels of government corruption—an accusation earlier labelled by Karzai as “propaganda.”62 With respect to reconciliation, Karzai revealed a plan to create a national peace council to oversee the integration of Taliban rank and file, most of who were believed to fight within a few miles of their home and principally for local reasons.63 The UN revealed that it had held talks with Taliban representatives concerning guarantees of safety should the Taliban lay down arms; however, these and other “secret” negotiations between the Taliban and various parties, including Karzai and

unspecified US representatives, resulted in no concrete progress. This was no surprise to some observers who believed that the insurgency was, in fact, close to victory.\textsuperscript{64}

On 5 December 2011, a second Bonn Conference was held in order to re-affirm the international community’s long-term commitment to Afghanistan. Although the Taliban and Pakistan were invited to attend this conference, neither was present, and observers (and critics) of the outcomes stated that “the conference was full of empty rhetoric and underscored the hurdles threatening the future of Afghanistan.”\textsuperscript{65}

Summary

The narrative of NATO’s increasing level of involvement in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2011 and its adoption of the Comprehensive Approach may be understood in the context of an intersection between the external dynamics caused by modulating levels of US attention towards Afghanistan and the internal dynamics of the Alliance, in particular, the dichotomous views between those members who viewed the mission as an extension of a perceived obligation to the US and those who viewed the mission as a genuine expression of NATO’s role in an evolved security environment. The latter cohort attached to this view a belief in the efficacy of exogenous state building and NATO’s capacity and willingness to act in that regard; arguably, it was this belief that supported the adoption of the Comprehensive Approach.

These dynamics were played out in a context of asymmetric power relationships between the US and NATO, the UN and NATO, and between the US, NATO and the government of Afghanistan. Maley argued that at no time did an elite consensus form in any of these institutions concerning a credible theory of victory.\textsuperscript{66}

\textsuperscript{64} Comments made by Omar Samad at a conference 10–11 April, 2012 in Toronto. Mr. Samad was Afghanistan’s Ambassador to Canada from 2004 to 2009 and to France from 2009 to 2011. See http://munkschool.utoronto.ca/blog/soldiers-policymakers-and-scholars-debate-afghanistan-at-conference.


A temporal analysis of the evolution of NATO’s involvement suggests that three overlapping phases are evident. The first emerged in 2001–2003, during which period several Alliance members participated in the OEF mission in support of the US global war on terror and provided rotational leadership to ISAF. This period focused on regime change and counterterrorism, specifically the removal of the Taliban from power, the hunt to find Bin Laden and the destruction of the al-Qaeda networks that were operating inside Afghanistan.

The second phase involved the establishment of the transitional government in Kabul and the exodus of the Taliban to safe havens outside of Afghanistan which appeared, at least to the US, as a signal that the threat posed by the Taliban had been eliminated. Once these conditions were present, NATO agreed to command the ISAF mission and a period of (attempted) state building was initiated. It was during this phase that the insurgency re-emerged and NATO adopted the Comprehensive Approach in order to address the requirement to stabilize the country and build state institutions which would theoretically provide the Afghan government with the means and capacity to exercise control from the centre. This phase occurred in the period of approximately 2003 until 2011, although the core of the state-building project was focused in the period 2006–2011.

The third phase relates to the adoption of counter-insurgency by the US and NATO. By 2009, it was evident that a number of serious problems were becoming entrenched, the most cited of which include corruption, civilian casualties caused both by insurgents and ISAF forces, narcotics production and a general lack of progress in virtually all areas of civil society and the economy. The appointment of General Petraeus resulted in the adoption of counter-insurgency doctrine resulting in a significant surge of US and ISAF force levels. This doctrine was adopted in order to establish conditions in local areas such that newly trained Afghan forces could provide security and allow civil society and the economy to improve. Training and mentoring of the Afghan security forces was viewed as a critical requirement both to increase their size as well as to improve their overall operational capabilities, and a significant effort was directed towards this aspect of the mission. Indeed, the outcome of this training and mentoring program was directly linked
to the announced transition beginning in 2013 and ending, assuming conditions are met, in 2014 as previously discussed.67

The phases as outlined ought to be considered as overlapping, that is to say, that counter-terrorism actions were ongoing throughout the entire period, as was the attempt to build and strengthen state institutions. That all of these activities were occurring simultaneously within the same geographic space while looking forward to a transition of international forces out of the country led to criticisms that the mission had devolved into one of confusion and a “rush to declare victory and leave”68 on the part of the international community. Other observers suggested that the international community had no actual strategy for Afghanistan between 2001 and 2009, that is, between the period of regime change and the adoption of counter-insurgency as a coherent doctrine.69

Regardless of how one chooses to interpret NATO’s involvement in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2011, it is clear that the mission evolved and thickened at all levels: tactical, operational and strategic.

At the tactical level, NATO members found themselves engaged in active combat against a determined, intelligent and versatile set of opponents. These engagements resulted in significant and unexpected casualties, and these complicated the ability of many Alliance members to justify and maintain their participation in the mission in the face of growing domestic scepticism and political pressure.

At the operational level, NATO agreed to expand the mission spatially and to commit increasingly large numbers of forces in order to set the conditions for stabilization and reconstruction to occur. This approach faltered partly as a result of an imbalance between the required time for stabilization to manifest and the pressures wrought by a growing


68. See, for example, “America’s Retreat from Afghanistan – The Spectre of Comparisons,” The Economist (February 4, 2012).

69. Comments made by David Bercuson at a conference 10–11 April 2012 in Toronto. Professor Bercuson is the Director of the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary. See http://munkschool.utoronto.ca/blog/soldiers-policymakers-and-scholars-debate-afghanistan-at-conference.
insurgency, and this imbalance ultimately led to a shift in operational focus towards counter-insurgency.

At the strategic level, NATO accepted command of the ISAF mission in order to ameliorate both external (primarily US) and internal stresses. As US interest in Afghanistan waned in relation to the perceived threat emanating from Iraq, NATO found that its earlier, but rebuffed, offer of assistance to the US was now more than welcome. That several Alliance members were already committed to and engaged in the Afghan scenario and pressuring NATO headquarters (HQ) for greater involvement made the decision virtually impossible to avoid. However, it was not foreseen that the relatively calm state of affairs following the ouster of the Taliban would devolve into a full-scale insurgency or that NATO would become the primary agent for state building which ultimately required the adoption of the Comprehensive Approach. Based on an understanding of strategic theory, it may be surmised that the confluence of interaction at all levels combined with the complexity inherent to exogenous state building reduced the probability of success for the Comprehensive Approach, and the extent of that failure is the focus of the next two chapters.
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Aim

The aim of this chapter is to interrogate the CA strategy from ontological and epistemological perspectives and posit a model through which the theories underlying the CA may be analysed: this is supported by an investigation into how NATO attempted to actualize the CA at strategic, operational and tactical levels in Afghanistan. The predominate theory supporting the CA as a model of exogenous state building is the ability and willingness of civilian and military systems (broadly defined) to coordinate and collaborate at high levels in order to achieve mutually agreeable objectives. This chapter will demonstrate that this assumption is largely unattainable in practice and that NATO’s failure to achieve its strategic objectives in Afghanistan are linked to conceptual and pragmatic weaknesses of the CA as both theoretical model and military strategy.

Integrated Interrogational Framework

In order to achieve the stated aim, an integrated perspective of the CA as actualized in Afghanistan is required. This, as Rynning reminds us, is a result of the fact that “the Western campaign there reveals flaws that are general and therefore fundamentally worrisome.” 70 Table 1 provides an integrated interrogational framework for gap analysis and the basis of evaluation of the CA as a strategy for state building in Afghanistan. It provides for analysis at strategic, operational and tactical levels and identifies how NATO attempted to actualize the strategy at each one. It then views the CA from the perspective of conceptual, institutional and capability gaps, which are defined as follows. Conceptual gaps speak to the adoption and maintenance of untested, unproven or false beliefs about the organization or system itself, about the environment it is operating in or the nature of the problem(s) it is facing. Institutional gaps speak to the inability of an

organization or system to evolve correctly or in time for the successful adoption of a new strategy. Such adaptations may include organizational structures, processes or attitudes and beliefs. Capability gaps speak to an inability on the part of an organization or system to design, develop and adopt new methods required to execute a selected strategy or adapt existing ones successfully.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LEVEL</th>
<th>METHODS OF ATTEMPTED ACTUALIZATION</th>
<th>CONCEPTUAL GAPS</th>
<th>INSTITUTIONAL GAPS</th>
<th>CAPABILITY GAPS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>STRATEGIC</td>
<td>In the NATO context, the NAC is the political-strategic level, HQ NATO the political-military level and SHAPE the military-strategic level.</td>
<td>Gain, build and strengthen external partnerships</td>
<td>Lack of internal consensus: role and mission</td>
<td>Ineffective partnerships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Conduct strategic communication</td>
<td>Lack of coherent internal and external narratives</td>
<td>Persistent national stovepipes</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lack of understanding of the engagement space</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPERATIONAL</td>
<td>In the Afghan context, either HQ JFCB or HQ ISAF may be considered the operational-level HQ.</td>
<td>Conduct COIN</td>
<td>Insufficient COIN force ratios</td>
<td>Absence of effective civil-military planning capability</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Build host-nation security capacity</td>
<td>Restrictive national caveats</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Lack of coherent command and control model for CA</td>
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<td>Lack of coherent CA doctrine</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TACTICAL</td>
<td>In the Afghan context, either HQ ISAF or the regional command (RC) HQs may be considered the tactical-level HQs.</td>
<td>Support PRTs</td>
<td>Ineffective PRT model</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Practice CIMIC</td>
<td>Lack of cultural intelligence and associated training</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Misunderstanding roles of military vs civilian actors</td>
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Table 1. Integrated Interrogational Framework

**Gap Analysis: Strategic Level**

NATO’s strategic-level efforts to implement a CA in Afghanistan focused on gaining, building and strengthening external partnerships as well as conducting internal and external strategic communications, and these actions exposed a number of conceptual, institutional and capability gaps.
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The requirement to engage external partners has already been linked to the idea that “NATO sees its comprehensive approach as a ‘collective endeavour’ which involves developing strategic partnerships with external civilian and political organisations, rather than the development of internal civilian capacity.” Of the many potential partnerships NATO sought to build, NATO’s relations with the UN, EU and major NGOs were the most important, and the degree to which these partnerships operated effectively in the Afghan context will be described in relation to strategic capability gaps.

The conduct of strategic communications describes “the articulation of cross-government [or Alliance] guidance on influence and supports the synchronisation of the words and deeds of friendly actors to maximise desired effects,” and this will be discussed in the context of strategic conceptual gaps.

Strategic Conceptual Gaps

The first strategic conceptual gap relates to the importance of narrative in conflict. “In war, narrative is much more than just a story. ‘Narrative’ may sound like a fancy literary word, but it is actually the foundation of all strategy, upon which all else—policy, rhetoric and action—is built. War narratives need to be identified and critically examined on their own terms, for they can illuminate the inner nature of the war itself.” In attempting to actualize the CA at the strategic level NATO struggled to develop and maintain effective internal and external narratives which were vital to the shaping of opinions of key target audiences.

Internal narratives relate to how an organization, in this case the Alliance, seeks to explain to its own members what the organization is, why it exists, why it does what it does and provides a coherent and logical intellectual framework for understanding how the members can relate to it. Developing and maintaining strong internal narratives

72. UK, JDP 3-40, Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution, 42.
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provides a basis for organizational cohesion and positive motivation towards stated organizational goals. As Schuurman explains:

Such a narrative would seek to place news events within a storyline that presents government actions as being in accordance with the values and interests of their citizens. Freedman points out that developing such narrative constructs should be an integral part of foreign counterinsurgency campaigns as such interventions are often discretionary in the sense that they are not about the intervening state’s national survival, making the fostering of public support very important.74

External narratives relate to how an organization seeks to explain itself to relevant audiences outside of the organization who are identified as important to helping the organization achieve its goals. Such audiences may be labelled as supportive, non-supportive or neutral and external narratives must take these positions into account. Given that both internal and external narratives speak to an organization’s core values, they must be matched with actions that are supportive of the narrative and are consistent at all levels.

With respect to the attempt to actualize the CA, this required both internal and external narratives in order to, on the one hand, assuage Alliance members that the mission in Afghanistan could be achieved without the requirement to generate significant non-military resources and, on the other, provide a convincing rationale for external actors to buy in and support the NATO idea and mission without compromising their own.75

Although NATO was partially successful in its furtherance of the CA as an internal narrative to achieve unity of purpose amongst Alliance members, the lack of a coherent external narrative contributed significantly to NATO’s inability to influence important external audiences. These audiences included those who were considered generally supportive (such as the UN), generally non-supportive (such as the insurgents) or generally neutral (such as a large portion of the Afghan population and the

humanitarian/NGO community), and Lindley-French suggests that a key weakness of the Alliance effort was the “inability to speak with one voice to actors in the region.”\(^{76}\) For example

The president had already told the American people that the 2009–2010 surge of U.S. troops in Afghanistan was critical for our nation’s security, while simultaneously telling them that we had to begin withdrawing those troops in July 2011. Unfortunately, this not only sent a conflicting message to Americans and our allies in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), but also encouraged Afghans and Pakistanis to hedge against a NATO withdrawal by double-dealing with the Taliban or other militant groups.\(^{77}\)

Betz argued that missions fail when militaries do not take into account the information dominant nature of the operating environment and view the war of ideas as a secondary, rather than primary, aspect of the struggle.\(^{78}\) If organizations are unable to match rhetoric with action, this will be exploited by the opposition, and there are many examples of this occurring in the Afghan campaign, such as slow or potentially misleading reactions to civilian deaths caused by Alliance tactical actions.\(^{79}\) Alternatively, the Taliban utilized information management effectively to expose Alliance rhetoric-action disparities and were able to maintain and promulgate their own narrative effectively to the Afghan population.\(^{80}\) As Hultman explained:

as long as the military operations by the international forces lead to high levels of civilian casualties, the insurgents can exploit the situation; because even if people do not support the cause of the Taliban, the disappointment caused by indiscriminate attacks by the international forces may lead people to consider the Taliban option.\(^{81}\)

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80. Ibid.
A second, and equally significant, strategic-level conceptual gap relates to the Alliance’s lack of understanding of the engagement space. In this instance, the engagement space included not only Afghanistan as a physical place but also the surrounding region and its distinctive historical-cultural-social properties. Knowledge of the engagement space is vital to the success of campaigns which seek to transform unstable states to stable ones. NATO’s acceptance of the ISAF mission in 2003 occurred in the context of a seemingly benign security environment, and the prospect of engaging in counter-insurgency, let alone state building, was not, as they say, on the organizational “radar screen.” As a result, the Alliance did not possess a deep appreciation of the operating environment in which they found themselves. Most telling, the Alliance lacked intelligence in several domains including the nature of Afghanistan as a social-political entity, the nature of Afghan culture, the nature of the insurgents and the regional dimensions of the conflict.82

With respect to cultural dimensions, Dansie believes that a lack of cultural sensitivity on the part of the intervening forces was a driving factor in the non-compliant behaviour of the insurgents,83 and instructively, Brigadier-General David Fraser, former Commander of ISAF’s Multi-National Brigade Sector South, admitted, “I underestimated one factor—culture. I was looking at the wrong map—I needed to look at the tribal map not the geographic map. The tribal map is over 2,000 years old. Wherever we go in the world we must take into account culture.”84 The nature of Afghan culture remained problematic for Alliance forces, particularly in relation to such cultural norms as the status of women in society and the unspoken, but highly prevalent, sexual relations between older men and young male “dancers.” As Western Alliance forces became increasingly engaged with Afghan forces and society in general, tensions were raised in relation to the issue of

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values transfer, the desire to prevent harm and the strategic implications of these on the relationship with the host nation.\(^{85}\)

These gaps in intelligence and knowledge more broadly led NATO and the international community to conceptualize theories as to why and how the state-building enterprise should be conducted in Afghanistan. The first of these theories was based on the status of Afghanistan as a threat to the international community, given its purported role in supporting international terrorist organizations. This model visualized Afghanistan in the context of the war on terror and, as previously discussed, fitted with a counter-modern tendency to territorialize abstract and amorphous global risks into specific threats from rogue states.

The second theory emphasized the humanitarian nature of the mission and aligned the kinetic counter-insurgency campaign with humanitarian objectives. Stewart argues that this approach “misleads us in several respects simultaneously: minimising differences between cultures, exaggerating our fears, aggrandising our ambitions, inflating a sense of moral obligations and power, and confusing our goals.”\(^{86}\) This is the “failed state” paradigm which presupposes that failed states constitute a risk to the international community and that external interventions are both necessary and justified to “fix the failed state”\(^{87}\) in order to eliminate the risk.

The third theory isolated Afghanistan as a unique case and de-linked it from regional considerations. This approach allowed the international community to downplay, for example, the role of Afghanistan in exacerbating various grand strategic issues centred in the region, including ongoing US–Iranian tensions, the role of Afghanistan in the Indian–Pakistan rivalry (in particular the desire for Pakistan to achieve strategic depth) as well as the role of emerging superpowers China and Russia and their challenge to suppress

\(^{85}\) Final report of the NATO-HFM-204 RWS on “Effective Collaboration in Joint Multinational Multiagency Teams and Staffs,” (Toronto, Canada, 4–6 Oct 2010): 4. I was a contributor to this report.


radical Islam within their own borders\textsuperscript{88} while simultaneously exploiting new economic opportunities in Afghanistan and beyond.\textsuperscript{89} These factors, and others, resulted in NATO failing to align with other actors in the region, instead of with them.\textsuperscript{90} As Muktar explained:

\begin{quote}
The strategic solution may be inextricably linked to the problem—Afghanistan is a mosaic of ethnic, religious, and tribal factions all with internal and external sources of support. Together, the mosaic ‘pieces’ compose an image of what we call Afghanistan. The mosaic, however, is only loosely bound by a weak central government. It is primarily held together by the fragile balance and interrelationships between each ‘piece’ and the association of that piece to external regional stakeholders. Any effort to strengthen the role and influence of the central government or any one of the factions will create a bias threatening the entire mosaic. Significant disruption of the mosaic would be resisted by internal forces and likely provoke one or more external players to covertly or overtly intervene. An effective regional strategy would be one that moves to stabilize the internal mosaic, not remake it or disrupt the precarious balance between each of the internal pieces and the external stakeholders.\textsuperscript{91}
\end{quote}


\textsuperscript{90} This is the opinion of Mr. Ramesh Thakur, Director of the Centre for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (CNND) in the Crawford School, Australian National University and Adjunct Professor in the Institute of Ethics, Governance and Law at Griffith University. He was Vice Rector and Senior Vice Rector of the United Nations University (and Assistant Secretary-General of the United Nations) from 1998–2007. Comments made at a conference 10–11 April 2012 in Toronto, Canada. See http://munkschool.utoronto.ca/blog/soldiers-policymakers-and-scholars-debate-afghanistan-at-conference.

\textsuperscript{91} Mukhtar, “Afghanistan: Alternative Futures and their Implications,” 66.
Strategic Institutional Gaps

At the strategic level, NATO exhibited institutional gaps in three areas: a lack of internal consensus surrounding the nature of the Afghan mission and the implications of this for the role of the Alliance itself, a lack of sufficient institutionalization of the CA, and an inability to overcome differences extant in numerous civil-military paradigms.

The fact that the Afghan mission was an out-of-area state-building enterprise generated much discussion within the Alliance as to its proper role in the international security community. Kitchen viewed the Alliance through a prism of multiple identities, spanning the formal institution itself through that of security community and a political community in the realm of security. These identities are reinforced by how the Alliance responds to challenges, and this is largely influenced by the choices of its member nations. Following the Prague Summit of 2002, NATO reaffirmed its commitment to “further promote peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area,” and while already unofficially engaged in Afghanistan, this did not figure as a primary issue at that time. As the extent of NATO’s involvement grew from 2003 onwards, internal debates exposed fissures amongst Alliance members with respect to what the Afghan mission heralded for the future of the Alliance and its role in the international community, in particular, whether NATO should remain a regional, Atlantic-focused defensive organization or become a manager of global security issues in cooperation with other democratically-inclined “international societies.”

The imperatives of the Afghan mission not only exposed differing internal perceptions of the Alliance but also revealed an underlying tension between various member states’ appreciation of the US role in the Alliance and the extent to which the Alliance was being used to further the US war on terror. These concerns were largely expressed by France and other northern European members who were actively engaged with furthering a Euro-centric security capability in the form of the European Common Security and

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Defense Policy (CSDP) and which some Alliance members viewed as a means of counterbalancing US influence in Europe.\textsuperscript{94}

The difference in American vice European world-view was made clear in the Afghan mission, which the US regarded as part of the larger war on terror and which the Europeans viewed as a “state building mission and for which they thought they were well positioned.”\textsuperscript{95} While the US had arguably engaged in state-building enterprises from the 1890s onwards,\textsuperscript{96} failures in Vietnam, Haiti and Somalia engendered a position amongst US policy makers that the US was not well suited to state building and that the US military, in particular, should remain a war-fighting institution.\textsuperscript{97} While these positions speak clearly to philosophical or normative considerations, issues of domestic politics and varying impacts of constrained resources amongst Alliance members are also significant, and “this induces a dynamic of alliance politics that state actors attempt to either mitigate, navigate, or exploit—depending on their interests and views.”\textsuperscript{98} Yalcinkaya and Acar posit that strategic ambiguity created by diverging focus between attempting stabilization through reconstruction and development on the one hand and conducting kinetic counter-insurgency on the other signified a de facto “two-tier alliance.”\textsuperscript{99}

Given that NATO struggled with the CA at the strategic conceptual level and could not internally agree on the meaning of the Afghan mission from a normative perspective, a lack of CA institutionalization speaks to how NATO attempted to internalize the concept and translate it into viable operational and tactical doctrine. As late as 2010, Jakobsen was prepared to argue that the Alliance was “still in the process of laying the foundation

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{95} Williams, The Good War, 64.
  \item \textsuperscript{96} David Lake, “The Practice and Theory of US State building,” \textit{Journal of Intervention and State Building} 4 no. 3 (September 2010): 260.
  \item \textsuperscript{97} Condoleezza Rice, “Rethinking the National Interest,” \textit{Foreign Affairs} 87, no. 4 (July/August 2008): 24.
  \item \textsuperscript{98} Nik Hynek and Peter Marton, eds., \textit{State building in Afghanistan Multinational Contributions to Reconstruction} (New York: Routledge, 2011), 1.
  \item \textsuperscript{99} Haldun Yalcinkaya and Dilaver Arıkan Acar, “NATO Peacekeeping in Afghanistan: Expanding the Role to Counter-insurgency or Limiting it to Security Assistance,” \textit{Defence Against Terrorism Review} 2, No. 2 (Fall 2009): 75.
\end{itemize}
for future institutionalization” of the CA and that initiatives such as the indoctrination of EBAO into formal NATO doctrine and practice, various Multinational Experiments (MNEs) to test aspects of the CA concept and the FCCMI (referred to earlier) were all “too late” to be of any use in Afghanistan.  

This is not to suggest that concrete steps were not taken to actualize the concept in theatre, including the appointment of a NATO Senior Civilian Representative; the appointment of development advisors (DEVADs) at ISAF and regional-command levels; the establishment of a Post-Operations Humanitarian Relief Fund (POHRF); and in 2007, the creation of a Comprehensive Approach Team. While these initiatives were designed to facilitate interaction between the military and civilian actors in theatre, the root problem of coordination and collaboration remained extant. Hull argued that this problem is an entrenched characteristic of the CA, given that the idea of voluntary coordination (or even cooperation) cannot replace the need for direction within a system and that this level of control is only to be found within organizations or states where legal or other bureaucratic mechanisms can ensure compliance.

As a result, Hull argued that the CA must necessarily be understood within the context of which type of organization or system is attempting to implement it, and four typologies are cited: national approaches, intra-agency approaches, inter-agency approaches and international-local approaches. Arguably, the degree of control possible is greatest in national approaches and is reduced as one moves towards international-local approaches (i.e., the CA), wherein widely divergent goals and potentially abrasive cultural barriers between military and civilian organizations may exist.

At the same time, the CA suffered from the manner in which it was introduced into the organization, that is, as a broad statement of intent not founded upon rigorous research or other means of organizational adoption. Normally, NATO applies a very logical and

100. P.V. Jakobsen, “Right Strategy, Wrong Place;” 82.
101. Ibid, 84.
103. Ibid, 7.
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exact methodology for the adoption of new strategies and capabilities, referred to as the NATO Concept Development and Experimentation (CD&E) policy, which was not utilized as a means of introducing the CA into the organization. CD&E is described as:

one of the tools that drive NATO’s transformation by enabling the structured development of creative and innovative ideas into viable solutions for capability development. The CD&E aims at capturing the best ideas and enabling potential solutions to be explored through Concept Development, tested and validated through Experimentation, either within NATO or collaboratively with nations.104

The structured approach to CD&E, while iterative, may be classified as an essentially four phased approach which incorporates concept initiation, project planning, concept development as well as concept assessment and validation.105 As concepts move through these phases, it may be possible to identify a level of concept maturity ranging from the formulation of a principle idea through to full implementation in all key aspects of the system and organization.106

That the CA was not subjected to a formal CD&E process prior to its adoption at the strategic level helps to explain why it was unevenly accepted and poorly implemented. For example, my assessment following a NATO CD&E conference in December 2010:

identified that many HQs, Branches and Agencies within NATO (let alone in the nations) were involved in some aspect of concept development, experimentation and/or the operationalization of CA and that these efforts were uneven and uncoordinated. There was a recurring demand for NATO to achieve a level of internal coherence in this field prior to formally linking with other IOs, NGOs or the

105. Ibid, 7.
106. In NATO doctrine these aspects are referred to as doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities and interoperability (DOTMLPFI).
nations. It was not clear at the end of the conference which NATO agency had the mandate to move the CA concept forward.\textsuperscript{107}

By now, it is clear that the CA implicated NATO not only as a formal institution but implicated as well a larger system in which the institution must function in order to achieve a desired level of civil-military coherence. In fact, if such a system exists, it will do so in the context of a “system of systems” wherein other institutions or actors operating in the same engagement space (physically or virtually) will interact. This leads to an examination of the final strategic-level institutional gap, that is NATO’s inability to overcome various civil-military paradigms wherein these paradigms represent aspects of the civil and military systems broadly defined. What is also clear is that the CA \textit{does} require civil and military systems to interact in some manner in order to achieve mutually agreed upon goals or an end state. The spectrum of potential civil-military interaction, which may be described as dynamic and mutative, is illustrated at Figure 3.\textsuperscript{108}

![Levels of Civil-Military Interaction](image)

\textbf{Figure 3. Levels of Civil-Military Interaction}

While these labels are very general in nature, the manner in which the civil-military systems may interact depends on the underlying characteristics of the systems which must be somehow identified and classified. Fritz-Millett believes that institutions may be

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{108} Stephen Fritz-Millett, “A Trainer’s Perspective on Research & Development in Support of the Comprehensive Approach,” paper submitted to the NATO Workshop HFM 204-RWS (Toronto, October 2010), 9.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
investigated in the context of McKinsey’s 7S Framework and that this model may also be useful as a means of classifying system characteristics. Originally designed as a business organizational change tool, the model is based on the assumption that while an organization or system may have a formal structure, the organization or system comprises a series of seven inter-related elements as illustrated in Figure 4.\textsuperscript{109}

![Figure 4. McKinsey’s 7S Framework](image)

These seven elements are defined as follows:

- **Strategy.** Actions an institution plans and then enacts in response to or anticipation of changes in its external environment;

- **Structure.** Basis for specialization and co-ordination influenced primarily by strategy and by organization size and diversity;

- **Systems.** Formal and informal procedures that support the strategy and structure;

- **Shared Values.** The dominant values, beliefs and norms which develop over time and become relatively enduring features of institutional life;

\textsuperscript{109} See [http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/strategy/enduring_ideas_the_7-s_framework](http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/strategy/enduring_ideas_the_7-s_framework).
• **Style.** This is more a matter of what actors in the institution or system do than what they say; i.e., what are they focusing attention on?

• **Staff.** The people / human resource management processes used to select and develop personnel in the institution or system, socialization processes, ways of shaping basic values, ways of inculcating novices, and career management practices; and

• **Skills.** The distinctive competences—what the institution or system does best, ways of expanding or shifting competencies.

Given that the content of these elements in the assessment of civil versus military systems is highly distinctive, the results of this distinctiveness will potentially generate impediments to civil-military interaction at the “cooperate” and “collaborate” levels and the remainder of this section will examine these elements in greater detail.
Strategy

In the context of this discussion, the primary issue is not about the adoption by NATO of the CA as a strategy (which has already been described) but rather the more general problem of how military and civilian organizations and systems, viewed homogeneously, think about and adopt strategies and how these different approaches inhibit the ability of these organizations and systems to mesh their selected strategies in order to achieve a common purpose. It also raises the question of competitive strategy, that is, is it possible that military and civilian organizations will compete to advance their respective strategy over the other in order to achieve unique objectives that cannot be satisfied by cooperating or collaborating? If so, this generalized tendency would suggest that the CA would be continually at risk as military and civilian organizations and systems vie for control of the overall process.

This problem implicates organizational theory and organizational culture, and a detailed discussion of these is not possible here. That said, Kimminau’s study of civil-military relations and strategy is instructive from the perspective that organizational theory “proposes that the military or the services, as organizational units themselves, will advance their own tools and solutions to problems. While this behaviour is much like Kaplan’s law of the instrument—the boy who has a hammer will find that everything needs pounding—it also is supposed to reinforce group autonomy, legitimacy, and position in larger organizations or governments.”\(^\text{10}\) If this is true for military organizations and systems, it may be true for civilian organizations and systems as well. If so, the question is whether or not this leads to competition based on a tendency to advance unique or exclusive tools and solutions, and this potential problem is linked to issues of organizational culture. Kimminau identified three models for how organizational culture may impact specifically on strategy:

- Shaping a “toolkit” of habits, skills and styles from which people construct “strategies of action.”

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- Setting the boundaries of strategic debate by language, logic and conceptual categories.
- Guiding and circumscribing thought, influencing the way strategic issues are formalized, and setting the vocabulary and conceptual parameters of strategic debate.\(^{111}\)

Military and civilian cultures that inculcate and maintain separate and exclusive tools and solutions (including habits, language, concepts and working methods) generate divergent approaches to strategy and, therefore, to the potential selection of a specific strategy in a specific setting. Given that the CA strategy was generated by a military organization in order to resolve an essentially military problem (but one that required cooperation and collaboration of civilian organizations and systems to succeed), it is possible that the CA strategy was not consistent with civilian tools and solutions and, therefore, not capable of achieving the necessary level of acceptance within the civilian realm.

Structure

In the Western model, military organizations and systems are highly structured in order to ensure civilian control of the application of deadly force on behalf of a state, and that such application occurs with maximum efficiency when required.\(^{112}\) The continental, or general, staff system which evolved from Napoleonic practice (if not earlier) is now the standard model for all Western militaries. In this system, each staff position in a headquarters or unit is assigned a letter-prefix corresponding to the formation’s element and one or more numbers specifying a role. This list reflects the basic structure:

1. personnel and administration;
2. intelligence and security;
3. operations;
4. logistics;
5. plans;

\(^{111}\) Ibid, 80.
\(^{112}\) Cross, 93.
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6. signals (i.e., communications or information technology);
7. training;
8. finance and contracts; and
9. CIMIC.

The described staff system is normally replicated at tactical formations down to brigade level and up through all operational-level formations, although the size and responsibilities of the staffs will vary based on the nature of the mission and specific force composition. At the strategic level, the organizational structure is dependent on the specific organization in question, and Figure 5 illustrates the current NATO command structure for NATO’s Allied Command Operations (ACO).

![Figure 5. NATO Allied Command Operations Command Structure](image)

Of particular relevance to this discussion is the ubiquitous presence of embedded planning staffs at virtually all levels in a military organization. These planning staffs allow a military HQ to assemble and analyze large quantities of data and information relatively quickly and provide military commanders with detailed plans for highly complex problem sets, whether such problems relate to short-term tactical plans or longer-term operational campaign planning. The outcome of the planning process will normally generate a series of documents, such as campaign plans, operations orders, force generation requirements and specific directives to subordinate commands (land,
aerospace and maritime components; special forces; and logistic commands, for example). These details establish the premise that a common characteristic of military organizations is a high degree of structure, generally hierarchical in nature and emphasizing clear lines of authority and responsibility for decision making at all levels. This is in contrast with NGOs and humanitarian organizations that will be operating in the same engagement space with military organizations and with which the CA necessitates interaction.

NGOs employ significant numbers of field workers in both aid and development activities, and given the need to respond to crises both globally and domestically, the structure of a given organization in the field may vary from mission to mission and location to location based on assessed needs. Given the number and diversity of these types of organizations and the requirement to adapt structures according to mission requirements, this generates a highly complex humanitarian system, which does not easily complement the highly structured military system with which it will interact.

The nature of the humanitarian system requires a degree of coordination in a given mission in order to improve efficiencies, and the United Nations developed a “cluster system” which aims to strengthen overall response capacity as well as the effectiveness of the response. That said, it is extremely difficult to achieve a high degree of coordination in a mission given the large number of humanitarian actors with widely divergent mandates, objectives, budgets and resources, and this was particularly evident in Afghanistan. Weiss and Hoffman suggest that these deficiencies may also be explained by the requirement for humanitarian agencies to act in ways conducive to

114. Peter Willetts, “What is a Non-Governmental Organization?,” (Centre for International Politics, School of Social Science, City University, Northampton Square, London, August 2006), 7.
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gaining public awareness and support in order to attract funding and that this tendency may lead to competition, rather than cooperation, within the sector.\textsuperscript{117}

This manifest contrast between military and civilian approaches to organizational structure is reflective of their primary missions. For the military, this is the requirement to use force to compel an adversary in accordance with legal direction from political masters, whereas humanitarians seek to provide assistance to populations in extremis in a neutral and unbiased fashion, and these two missions cannot be easily reconciled.

\textbf{Systems}

In McKinsey’s 7S model, systems are defined as formal and informal procedures that support the structure and the strategy. In a military context, such procedures equate to doctrine which is defined as fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. Militaries view doctrine as important and invest a great deal of time, effort and intellectual capacity to develop it, including the incorporation of formal processes for capturing lessons learned from ongoing or previous operations in order to integrate these into future iterations of doctrine.\textsuperscript{118}

While NGOs also develop and maintain systems necessary to function as formal organizations (for example, to hire and train staff, raise funds, deliver programs and evaluate outcomes) these systems have traditionally been more informal, although this is arguably evolving. Three aspects of NGO systems are of particular interest to the military: understanding the size, scope and capabilities of NGOs operating in a military engagement space; the ability and willingness of NGOs to operate in complex environments where the military may be expected to provide security; and the ability of NGOs to monitor and evaluate projects in order to be able to inform and coordinate with military organizations operating in a common engagement space. Each of these entreaties

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{118} NATO maintains the Joint Allied Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC) which is located in Lisbon, Portugal. The website is \texttt{www.jallc.NATO.int}.
\end{flushright}
poses challenges given the number of humanitarian organizations, the multiplicity of their approaches as well as the dynamic and complex nature of the operating environment.

The mirror aspects of these issues represent key concerns for the humanitarian community, namely: the potential threat to humanitarian space posed by military organizations and systems engaged in the business of providing aid and undertaking development projects in the context of COIN or other military imperatives; the ability of militaries to provide “just the right amount” of security when and where it is needed in order to permit humanitarian action without compromising humanitarian principles; and the desire for information sharing and coordination, which may be misunderstood as a desire for control.119

With respect to the size, scope and capabilities of NGOs, it has been identified that “despite many years of evaluation and analysis in the humanitarian field, some very basic information about the humanitarian system as a whole—its size, reach, scope of action and capability—remains unknown. In other words, we lack a shared understanding of what the humanitarian system actually is, as well as a means of gauging its success.”120

This fact leads to claims that military organizations and systems have shifted their mandates into realms previously exclusive to humanitarians and that this is problematic for both. In scenarios where NGOs cannot operate due to a lack of security, the military must determine to what extent it wishes, or can, address immediate humanitarian requirements. Similarly, humanitarian organizations which must operate in secure environments often, although not exclusively, rely on the military to provide this security, and there is a resultant tension based on roles and the process of handing off aid functions, as the security situation improves or degenerates.

With respect to evaluation of humanitarian programs and their effectiveness, the challenges associated with collecting, analysing and reporting data to support targeted aid or development actions was evident in the earlier examination of the ANDS. While the

humanitarian community requires accurate measurement of results in order to satisfy donors and ensure legitimacy in the larger international community, the military requires accurate evaluation and reporting of progress of humanitarian programs to the extent that these are relevant to the military campaign, be it one of stabilization or COIN. According to the International Council of Voluntary Agencies:

There has been some progress among the clusters in establishing joint information collection systems, but humanitarian agencies need to increase technical expertise to develop common assessment tools and establish clear thresholds to mandate a rapid response from clusters and donors. Aid agencies regularly conduct assessments and baseline surveys in communities, yet there are no common tools with which to systematically collect data on a scale to identify gaps and vulnerabilities.121

Similar to the potentiality for military and civilian organizations to compete on the basis of strategies, this may extend to the realm of underlying systems that support those strategies. Ackoff, for example, suggested that it would be rare if a representative of one of the many disciplines in some way related to a problem did not feel that his particular approach to that problem would be very fruitful, if not the most fruitful,122 and Ozbekhan extended this view to the institutional level.123

Shared Values

McKinsey’s model defines shared values as the dominant values, beliefs and norms which develop over time and become relatively enduring features of institutional life. In the context of this discussion, the questions to be investigated are twofold: first, do military and civilian organizations and systems possess unique value sets, and second, to what extent are these compatible or conflictual?

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To the extent shared values within a given organization or system conflict with those of another organization or system, it may be advanced that the possibility of cooperation or collaboration between them is diminished. In order to investigate this from a theoretical perspective, it will be necessary to identify a means of describing homogeneous military and civilian organizations and systems in relation to the possibility that these possess unique shared values.

One approach is to examine such organizations and systems from the perspective of professions, that is, do the organizations and systems, viewed homogeneously, constitute a profession and does the profession promote shared values that distinguish it from other professions? Part of this investigation must also determine if the organizations and systems under study identify themselves with a profession (i.e., do they consider themselves a profession) and do other relevant entities (society, government and other professions) recognize them as such. Canadian military doctrine defines a profession as follows:

A profession is an exclusive group of people who possess and apply a systematically acquired body of knowledge derived from extensive research, education, training and experience. Members of a profession have a special responsibility to fulfill their function competently and objectively for the benefit of society. Professionals are governed by a code of ethics that establishes standards of conduct while defining and regulating their work. This code of ethics is enforced by the members themselves and contains values that are widely accepted as legitimate by society at large.124

While NATO member states express a unique community of values,125 the commonality and sharing of those values does not confer on the organization itself the status of profession, although it clearly maintains institutional practices and beliefs that support the idea of the military as a profession as understood and practiced by its members including responsibility to society, expertise, identity, unique standing within society, and

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vocational ethics which make explicit the particular values and obligations that form the foundation of the profession.\textsuperscript{126}

The particular values that arise from the Canadian version of the military ethos include duty, loyalty, integrity and courage, and these are supported by fundamental beliefs and expectations, including accepting unlimited liability, fighting spirit, discipline, teamwork and physical fitness. Unlike associational professions in which individual members function independently and provide some sort of service for a client (i.e., doctors and lawyers), the military profession is considered a collective profession in that it is the collective organization as a whole that must act. As such, collective professions require a high degree of specialization and organization (for example, maintaining functional structures and a hierarchical rank system). Given that individual-level expertise is spread throughout the entire organization, a high degree of control and coordination is required in order to ensure that the organization’s mission can be achieved, and thus, the adoption of a core ethos and set of values is critical. Value sets identified in the context of the military profession are designed to ensure individual member adherence to the organization and to generate organizational coherence; these characteristics are necessary given the purpose of the organization (i.e., to fight wars) and the requirement for individual members of the profession to accept unlimited liability as a cost of entering it.\textsuperscript{127} Alternatively, humanitarian organizations and systems ascribe to an internationally accepted set of principles that are enshrined in UN resolutions and other international legal agreements; these are frequently identified in the context of a humanitarian imperative.\textsuperscript{128}

The core principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence are adhered to by virtually all humanitarian organizations and systems, and the values on which they are based are consistent with the organizational and systemic objectives of the humanitarian


\textsuperscript{127} Ibid, 27 and 32. Unlimited liability refers to the obligation of members of military forces to put themselves in harm’s way if so ordered and be prepared to sacrifice their lives in order to accomplish the mission.

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sector. While the humanitarian sector generally ascribes to a common set of values, the sector does not meet the basic definition of a profession and does not, in fact, consider itself to be one, although efforts to professionalize it have been underway for some time.\textsuperscript{129}

Given a lack of standards within the humanitarian sector, it is not possible to identify members who operate within it as members of a “humanitarian profession,” although they may well be members of another recognized profession, such as doctors or engineers.\textsuperscript{130} Okros and Keizer suggest that the characteristics of a profession give rise to five attributes: jurisdiction, expertise, responsibility, identity and vocational ethic and they amplify as follows:

Professions are seen as operating in (and normally seeking to regulate and/or control) a specific jurisdiction as a domain, field of action or social function over which society and regulatory bodies acknowledge the primacy of the profession,\textsuperscript{131} and changes in roles, functions or services provided by a profession or in functions provided by another profession can result in “contested jurisdictions.”\textsuperscript{132}

This analysis would suggest that opportunities for conflict between military and humanitarian organizations and systems may be the result of the pursuit of objectives based on mutually engrained, but mutually exclusive, value sets. For example, while militaries rarely undertake missions based on a premise of impartiality to all parties involved in a conflict,\textsuperscript{133} humanitarian organizations seek to deliver aid to any and all parties, regardless of their role. While this value may be noble in intent, the outcome may be a prolonging of the conflict leading to further violence.\textsuperscript{134} Humanitarian organizations

\begin{itemize}
\item 129. Ibid, 9.
\item 130. Ibid, 56.
\item 131. Alan Okros and Willemijn Keizer, “Humanitarianism as a Profession,” in Meharg, Helping Hands and Loaded Arms, 83.
\item 132. Ibid, 85.
\item 133. “Traditional peacekeeping” may be the exception.
\item 134. See, for example, Adam Groves, “NGOs in New Wars: Neutrality or New Humanitarianism,” (March 15, 2008), accessed 5 September 2013; available from http://www.e-ir.info/2008/03/15/ngos-in-new-wars-neutrality-or-new-humanitarianism.
\end{itemize}
may, in fact, function unintentionally as a logistical support system for parties in the conflict, thus exacerbating it. As Leriche pointed out:

The cunning co-option of the massively valuable resources of the humanitarian aid system is how many militaries and paramilitaries have continued to support their soldiers and campaigns despite the loss of military assistance. The determination of aid organizations to remain neutral, however noble, enables local commanders to continue to pillage aid resources intended for those who suffer. Those with guns never go hungry.  

Style

The 7S model proposes that organizations exhibit a cultural style and that this is revealed by behaviours of actors in the organization, particularly key managers. Schein defines organizational culture as “a pattern of shared basic assumptions that was learned by a group as it solved its problems of external adaptation and internal integration that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems.”

Behaviours, as opposed to declarations, expose what is important to the organization (and therefore the actors), and at the same time, symbols, including symbolic language, support an organizational identity that is commonly understood by the actors. To the extent military and humanitarian sectors increasingly operate in common spaces and find themselves working on common problem sets, there is a possibility that organizational identities (of which organizational culture could be considered the external “personality”) are under pressure.

Given what has been revealed in the realms of strategy, structure, systems and shared values, a possibility exists that differences in organizational style between military and humanitarian organizations and systems may also inhibit high levels of coordination and


collaboration. In order to examine this possibility, the focus will be on one specific aspect of organizational style, namely organizational decision-making processes.

Heyse classifies NGOs into role categories of implementers, catalysts or partners and suggests that in each of these roles both operational and strategic decisions will be made. In this context, operational refers to decisions concerning who the NGO will select to provide services for (or not) and strategic refers to decisions around issues such as funding, policies, lobbying and marketing amongst others. The concern is the processes by which NGOs make operational and strategic decisions in contrast to how military organizations and systems make operational and strategic decisions. This is necessary in order to ascertain if different approaches to decision making may inhibit cross-sector coordination and collaboration. Heyse’s review of NGO literature disclosed that “the internal affairs of NGOs have generally long been ignored” and that “only a few studies pay explicit attention to the internal decision-making processes of NGOs, either empirically or theoretically.” In order to analyse NGO decision-making processes, it is first necessary to further classify the levels at which decisions may be taken, and these are described as micro (individual level), meso (intra-organizational level) and macro (or close to what we have described as systemic).

Of these levels meso is of primary concern in relation to the issue of humanitarian-military interaction, given that the most frequent and consequential interactions will occur at the organizational level. It is possible that decisions taken at the micro level could have significant impact on meso-level decisions, depending on the role and degree of influence that an individual decision-taker holds within the organization; however, it would be difficult to determine how micro-level decisions affect organizational-level decisions without investigating the internal processes of a specific organization and the behaviour patterns of individuals within it. At the other end of the scale, studies of macro-level decision making could reveal patterns across organization types, and while useful, this information may not assist with understanding how a specific organization

138. Ibid, 278.
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will make decisions in a specific setting. March’s typology of decision-making models, rooted in organizational decision-making theory, is offered by Heyse as a means of analysing NGO decision-making patterns. The March models are labelled consequential, appropriate and garbage-can decision making, and Table 3 illustrates these in relation to a series of characteristics.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key questions</th>
<th>Consequential</th>
<th>Appropriate</th>
<th>Garbage Can</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What alternatives of action are available?</td>
<td>In what kind of situation am I?</td>
<td>Is there an alternative/solution that “needs” a problem?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What consequences (in terms of costs and benefits) will each alternative have?</td>
<td>What kind of person am I and what kind of organization is this?</td>
<td>Which organization members can create a link between a solution and a problem, and are these organization members in a position to decide?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How likely is it that these consequences become real?</td>
<td>What should a person such as me, in an organization such as this, do in a situation such as this?</td>
<td>If so, is there a choice opportunity in which a decision can be taken?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How are these potential consequences valued and prioritized by the decision makers?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mode of reasoning</th>
<th>Consequential</th>
<th>Appropriate</th>
<th>Garbage Can</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sequential</td>
<td>Instant</td>
<td>Simultaneous</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizationally prospective</td>
<td>Retrospective</td>
<td>Individual prospective</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
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<tr>
<th>Type of behaviour</th>
<th>Consequential</th>
<th>Appropriate</th>
<th>Garbage Can</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maximizing</td>
<td>Obligatory</td>
<td>Entrepreneurial</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anticipatory</td>
<td>Rule based</td>
<td>Persuasive</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<th>The inference pattern</th>
<th>Consequential</th>
<th>Appropriate</th>
<th>Garbage Can</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Information decision making</td>
<td>Decision making by analogy</td>
<td>Decision making by linking</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome of decision making</th>
<th>Consequential</th>
<th>Appropriate</th>
<th>Garbage Can</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Optimal decisions (ideally)</td>
<td>Congruent decisions</td>
<td>Coincidental decisions</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Characteristics of March’s Three Decision-Making Models

Consequential decision making refers to “a rational process of consideration in which employees of an organization try to pursue the organizational goals to the best of their ability. This is referred to as goal maximization.”

The process of generating or identifying alternatives; evaluating them in terms of costs, benefits and risks; and selecting the optimal solution to achieve the organization’s goals is described as

139. Ibid, 279.
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sequential due to the structured and ordered nature of the process, and this model relates most closely to the decision-making processes sustained by military organizations and systems at operational and strategic levels.

Appropriate decision making is a “process of consideration in which employees of an organization behave in a manner expected of them in a particular situation.” This leads to the selection of actions which are normative as opposed to calculative, and these are based on an understanding that rules of behaviour are already available for a given situation; employees are expected to understand these, and this leads to instant decision making. In a military context, this sort of reflexive approach is often valued at the tactical level where timelines to make decisions are short and repetitive training is designed to inculcate quick and unhesitant decisions; at operational and strategic levels, however, where the consequences of decisions may be far-reaching, such an approach could lead to bounded decisions or what is sometimes referred to as “situating the estimate.”

With respect to garbage-can decision making, “problems, alternatives for action, decision makers and choice opportunities are assumed to exist simultaneously in a so-called ‘garbage can.’ Decisions are made when employees with the authority to decide have a choice opportunity to couple a particular problem with an already existing alternative for action.” This could occur, for example, when an NGO has excess financial, human or other capacity but no crisis is occurring requiring a response; the sudden appearance of such a crisis may be considered a choice opportunity. It is more problematic to identify a military example of this type of decision-making process, unless one chooses to include so-called “wars of choice” in this typology.

At the micro-level, NGO decision-making processes are concerned with the motivations of individuals to make decisions, and various theories have been advanced to explain this, including a desire for organizational survival in order to maintain job security and personal preferences of employees to work within specific areas of interest regardless of

140. Ibid, 280.
141. Ibid, 281.
142. Given that such wars, if they exist, are the purview of political leadership, and not military, this would be stretching the point.
the empirical need for such services. The challenge at this level is to ensure that individual interests are aligned with organizational goals.

At the macro-level, the external environment is posited to be the dominant factor influencing decision-making processes. Resource dependence theory assumes that organizations require access to resources in order to survive and that this will cause an organization to reduce dependence on external actors who possess the most relevant resources while negotiating with those who have the most power as a means of achieving organizational goals. Alternatively, institutional theory posits that “organizations will be responsive to regulative, normative and cognitive pressures, resulting from the dominant norms and rules in their environment. Adjusting to these pressures is a way to gain more legitimacy for the organization.” Because NGOs may not be able to meet the expectations of all external stakeholders simultaneously, organizations develop rational myths through which they adopt certain practices in theory, but not in practice.

Heyse offers an explanation for NGO decision making at the meso-level based on ideal-typical organizational settings, described as administrative, institutionalized and ambiguous. In administrative organizations “principles of instrumental rationality, maximizing behaviour and consequentiality will determine the decision making process,” and this is most likely to engender the consequential decision-making model. Such organizations value formal structures and authority, maintain sanctions and incentives, and have a high degree of specialization: military organizations are best represented by this ideal typology.

Institutionalized organizations have a “value of its own, beyond its formal tasks, to both insiders and outsiders” and decisions are made “appropriately” due to a common value system and shared organizational ideology. Recruitment, training and socialization practices ensure that employees adopt the value system of the organization and can make appropriate decisions in the presence of informal rule systems. While military organizations possess some characteristics of institutionalized organizations, especially a

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143. Heyse, 284.
144. Ibid, 286.
145. Ibid.
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high degree of socialization and training, the absence of a formal structure in such organizations (or at least a very weak one) is not consistent with the military typology.

In addition to lacking a formal structure, ambiguous organizations do not possess compliance or coordination mechanisms and decision making processes are typified by persuasion and compromise; Heyse posits that garbage-can decision-making processes would be expected to be prominent in these types of organizations.\textsuperscript{146} Characteristics of ambiguous organizations include: constantly dealing with new issues, a high workload, unstructured work processes, inconsistent and ill-defined preferences, as well as fluid participation (meaning “participants vary in the amount of time and effort they devote to different domains”\textsuperscript{147}).

Although it is not empirically possible to directly correlate organization types or decision-making preferences to structural characteristics of an organization, such as size, there is some evidence to suggest that as NGOs move from less professional to more professional practices, or intra-organizational solutions, there will be a tendency to adopt an administrative model of organization and practice consequential decision making.\textsuperscript{148} If this is true, it may be posited that “less professional” NGOs will sustain institutionalized or ambiguous organizations and practice appropriate or garbage-can styles of decision making.

The earlier discussion of strategy, structure and systems in military organizations highlighted the role and importance of operational and strategic planning, and in this context, planning may be considered a formal structured method of arriving at a decision. In order to manage the decision-making process, military organizations devise systems of planning which may be described as a type of consequentialist decision making and which fit administrative organizations, of which the military may be considered archetypal in nature.

\textsuperscript{146} Ibid, 287.
\textsuperscript{147} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{148} Ibid, 288.
Both military and humanitarian organizations and systems confront complex problems and operate in complex environments, and therefore, the ability to arrive at a decision that accounts for that complexity and yet achieves the objective is extremely difficult. The military sector has a long association with decision sciences and operational research (OR) and commonly utilizes theories, techniques and decision-support tools including modeling and simulation (M&S) to complement the planning process at higher (e.g., operational and strategic) levels.\textsuperscript{149}

While the complexity of a problem may derive from various factors, military operations and the decisions required to initiate them are most affected by human or social aspects and operational research techniques and tools have evolved from hard methodologies (which feature primarily mathematical or statistical approaches) to soft methods (which incorporate behavioural and social science theories). Examples of the former include stochastic programming and system dynamics; examples of the latter include cognitive mapping and group facilitation.\textsuperscript{150}

In the context of a CA to state building, the emphasis, as we have already witnessed, involves taking actions at the tactical level in order to generate effects at the operational level through the design of a campaign plan that represents a roadmap of change, leading towards a future set of conditions in the environment.\textsuperscript{151} Daellenbach advances three streams of decision-support systems based on the perspective of the decision makers in relation to the problem and their view of the system in which the problem exists. He classifies problems on the basis of two types of complexities: “Technical complexity associated with the physical, mathematical, or computational nature of the problem and human/social complexity associated with the interrelationships between the


\textsuperscript{150} Ibid, 5–6.

\textsuperscript{151} Ibid, xiii.
stakeholders.”\textsuperscript{152} The streams of decision support are defined as functionalist systems approaches, interpretive systems approaches and emancipatory systems approaches.\textsuperscript{153}

These approaches to decision making reveal characteristics that may be mapped to military and humanitarian organizations and systems as well as to the complex problem inherent in a CA. For example, military organizations generally maintain an emphasis on functionalist approaches, given their focus on advancing new weapons systems and the requirement for both mass and technical superiority to defeat an enemy. As such, the military operational planning process stresses the importance of defining the problem clearly, limiting the number of variables and structuring well-defined objectives and end states and assumes that the decision maker has the ability to implement the selected option. Having stated that, however, military planners are highly cognizant of the human aspects of military problems and are well aware that such problems cannot be segregated from the larger system in which they are manifested.

Humanitarian organizations would be arguably comfortable with the concepts and orientation embedded within emancipatory approaches, given their foci on assisting populations in extremis and advocating for social change to promote individual and collective well-being. While understood as a “philosophy” of decision making, there remains, however, a deficit of practical methods of putting this philosophy into practice.

Arguably, the CA encompasses elements resonant of interpretive approaches in that “different stakeholders with different world views have different, possibly conflicting, perceptions about the problem situation and its major issues.”\textsuperscript{154} As observers to a complex problem, military and civilian organizations and systems, particularly humanitarian organizations, bring to the CA diverging world views, and while


\footnotesize{153. Ibid, 3–5.}

\footnotesize{154. Daellenbach, 3.}
recognizing the need for compromise, there is no common understanding of “which changes are systemically desirable and culturally feasible” to achieve a CA.

In the context of a CA to state building, I have observed that military and humanitarian sectors are most likely to interact at the meso-level, and as a consequence, the requirement to understand the process of decision making at that level is paramount. Given that military organizations possess most frequently the characteristics of administrative organizations and practice consequentialist decision making, this invariably leads to the development of highly structured planning processes that seek to reduce risk, a not surprising revelation given the nature and purpose of military operations. While many aspects of functionalist systems’ approaches to decision making remain extant in military organizations (as a result of the need to acquire and employ highly technical weapons and other systems), the shift from large-scale, kinetic, force-on-force threats to complex crises and engagement in state-building enterprises require new approaches to decision making, such as those exemplified by interpretative approaches. This shift also gives rise to an increase in the human/social complexity scale, requiring new theories, techniques and decision-support tools.

Humanitarian organizations possess most frequently the characteristics of institutionalized or ambiguous organizations and practice appropriate or garbage-can decision making, although it may be argued that to the extent these organizations professionalize they may adopt administrative organization characteristics and practice consequentialist decision making. While emancipatory systems’ approaches are philosophically congruent with humanitarian values, there is a lack of workable means of translating this into practice, and as result, interpretive approaches would likely be more common.

While a potential shift of both military and humanitarian organizations towards interpretive systems’ approaches bodes theoretically well for the possibility of engaging in common decision-making practices that would support a CA, fundamental issues remain. First, it may be argued that neither organization type would choose interpretive

155. Ibid.
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approaches if other options were available as default (i.e., functionalist for the military and emancipative for humanitarians). Second, a commonality of approach does not necessarily resolve underlying issues that arise from the interaction of different organization types and decision-making processes. Third, the subjectivist bias inherent in the interpretive systems’ approach ensures that organizations which possess different world views may hold “conflicting perceptions about the problem situation and its major issues,”\textsuperscript{156} and the answers to many important questions, such as “which changes are systemically desirable and culturally feasible”\textsuperscript{157} may remain contested.

**Staff**

While we have opted to investigate the elements of the McKinsey 7S model discreetly, it is necessary to recognize the integrative nature of the model, the interplay amongst various elements and how these may affect each other. This is particularly germane to the staff element, which is described as the “people/human resource management processes used to select and develop personnel in the institution or system, socialization processes, ways of shaping basic values, ways of inculcating novices, and career management practices.”\textsuperscript{158} It is clear that aspects of the staff element will be fundamentally shaped by other elements of structure, systems, shared values and style, and given the interplay amongst these, it is possible that staff (i.e., humans in the organization or system) will be of a distinct type based on differences (already identified) in the other elements and that these will be markedly different across military and humanitarian sectors.

In the military context, human resources represent a capability that is inextricably linked to operational mission accomplishment, and modern Western militaries maintain sophisticated (and arguably complex) human-resource management systems which are designed to manage the “full lifecycle” of a military member. From this description, it is clear that a number of organizational and systemic aspects must be implicated in order to ensure that a fully trained personnel capability is available at the right place and right

\textsuperscript{156} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{157} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{158} Fritz-Millet,9.
time in order to respond to crises, and this helps to explain why militaries engage in extensive human-resource management planning. For example, Figure 6 illustrates the Canadian Forces Military Personnel Management Conceptual Model.

![Figure 6. Canadian Forces Military Personnel Management Conceptual Model](image)

Given that the military is an instrument of state power subjugated to civil authority, the management of military personnel must rest on strong societal, regulatory and legislative powers that circumscribe the roles, responsibilities and authorities of those within the system. These frameworks manifest in specific legislative acts, regulations, orders and instructions that address a multitude of individual and organizational-level matters, including the nature and conditions of service (including universality of service and deployability), discipline and the requirement to obey lawful commands.\(^{159}\) These, in turn, generate a series of defined programs that address all aspects of military socialization, training, occupational standards, career management as well as

\[^{159}\text{Canada, CFJP 1.0, 2-1. The concept of universality “mandates that all Regular Force members are ‘at all times liable to perform any lawful duty.’ The legislative imperative means that a member who cannot ‘at all times … perform any lawful duty cannot serve within the Regular Force, except of course during recovery and transition periods.” The concept of universality therefore extends to that of “deployability” which demands that all regular force personnel must be physically fit and be prepared and willing to deploy anywhere at any time.}\]
compensation and benefits. While similar types of programs are found in other public sector organizations and the private sector, the underlying philosophy remains distinct to the military.\textsuperscript{160}

This highly structured approach to personnel management within the military sector contrasts with the humanitarian sector which has not embraced such practices for both philosophical and resource-related reasons. For example, a recent study of the humanitarian sector revealed that “evaluations continue to identify problems with high staff turnover and a need to invest more in human resource management systems. There continues to be widespread acknowledgement of the need to invest more in national staff development.”\textsuperscript{161}

While militaries are subject to cyclical budgetary pressures, the percentage of national resources assigned to the military is relatively consistent over time, except in extraordinary situations (such as war) or the build-up to such. This measure of consistency, thus, allows the military to allocate internal resources in such a manner so as to maximize overall capability, balancing available resources against expected or potential future missions.\textsuperscript{162} This again contrasts with humanitarian organizations that are subject to the willingness of donors to provide funds, and this process of constant fund-raising affects the availability and capability of human resources.\textsuperscript{163}

Jakobsen asserted that a lack of resources for NGO training, particularly joint civil-military training, is a key inhibitor to effective cross-sector cooperation. He noted, for example, that while NGOs are routinely invited to attend CIMIC and peace-support-related training by NATO and many member nations, “it is a problem for NGOs to find the time, money and personnel required to respond positively to NATO requests and invitations for cooperation, especially ones that involve courses lasting a week or longer.”\textsuperscript{164} Conversely, it is extremely rare for military personnel to attend training,

\textsuperscript{160} Canada, CFJP 1.0, 1-3.
\textsuperscript{161} ALNAP,11.
\textsuperscript{162} For example, the percentage of Canadian GDP spent on the military between 2002 and 2011 hovered between 1.1 and 1.4. Source: \textit{http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS}.
\textsuperscript{163} Meharg, “Clash of the Titans,” 131.
\textsuperscript{164} P. V. Jakobsen, “Right Strategy, Wrong Place, 87.
exercises or conferences sponsored by NGOs or humanitarian organizations, and as a result, this “contributes to the perception in the NGO community that NATO–NGO cooperation is driven and dictated by military concerns.”

In addition to disparities in levels of professionalism due to lack of training in humanitarian organizations, differences in approach to occupational standards and employment practices also generate the potential for friction between military and humanitarian sectors. In the military context, personnel are “required to perform general military duties and common defence and security duties, not just the duties of their military occupations or occupational specification,” and this results in an organizational population which has undergone common socialization and training experiences, leading to a strong identity. While the presence of a strong identity within military organizations is necessary to ensure the high degree of organizational cohesion required to function effectively in dangerous or violent missions, it may also lead to individual and organizational conservatism. Tamas asserts that “one of the main factors contributing to resistance to fundamental change in organizations is their employees’ natural desire to maintain the integrity of their personal structure of meaning, the cultural and psychological framework that defines their place in the social universe.”

Meharg explains that:

Identity, derived from *identitas*, and from idem, meaning same, is the quality or condition of being a specified person or thing. It refers to the state of being, or relating to, the same substance, nature and qualities that can determine one’s role in relation to society. Insofar as identity refers to the characteristics shared by organisations, it refers both to the material conditions that constitute place, and the behaviours, actions and rituals that relate to such material conditions. That is, identity refers to the specific places created by people sharing a way of life, as well as to the particular experiences in such places. Identity, therefore, is specific and sets people apart through various elements that are distinct and particularistic, including the places they claim as their own.

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165. Ibid.
166. Canada, CFJP 1.0, 2-2.
167. Tamas, 188.
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Given a trend towards marketization\(^{169}\) of humanitarian organizations in order to generate funding, humanitarian field staffs remain in an almost permanent state of deployment to crisis zones, and while this practice may enhance an individual’s sense of purpose and contribution, the effect on a psychological level can be potentially damaging. This fact is well appreciated by military organizations, which adopt strict policies regarding operational tour lengths and frequency of deployments into operational zones, practices that humanitarian organizations cannot easily adopt due to limited resources and the need to be present when and wherever crises emerge.\(^{170}\)

This brief comparison of only limited aspects of the human-resource element in McKinsey’s 7S model would suggest that significant differences between military and humanitarian approaches to human-resource management, training standards, occupational standards and employment practices will generate and sustain employees with vastly different capabilities, perspectives and approaches to crisis scenarios. Underlying these differences may be perceptions based on ideas of military and humanitarian identities, and to the extent the essence of the CA generates a requirement for coordination and collaboration across these sectors, a possibility exists that the fundamental essence of their respective identities may be threatened.

Skills

The McKinsey model describes the final “S” of skills as “the distinctive competences—what the institution or system does best, ways of expanding or shifting competencies.”\(^{171}\) The CA anticipates that military and civilian, especially humanitarian, organizations and systems will occupy a common space in order to engage in a range of aid, developmental and state-building activities supported by a secure environment. As previously described, the nature of shifting roles and responsibilities in that common space—in particular a

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169. Hoffman and Weiss, 149. This term is used by Hoffman and Weiss who explain that “humanitarianism and, more specifically, the tasks that form its operational capacities are increasingly subject to pressures to marketize and privatize. Budgetary as well as ideological influences have pushed private, market-based approaches for logistics, transportation, and security. Humanitarian action is seen as a product, and agencies are viewed as producers of services for hire.”

170. Ibid, 147.

tendency for militaries to undertake activities normally considered the purview of humanitarians—suggests that the assumed necessary levels of coordination and collaboration across these sectors are potentially elusive. With respect to competencies, these may be viewed through both individual and organizational lenses, and it is not necessarily assumed that organizational competency is the mere sum of competencies held by individuals within the organization, although it is contended that these will likely be related in some positive manner.

Given the highly sophisticated approach to military human-resource management, it will not be surprising to discover an equally sophisticated approach to military competency development. Once again, the focus of competency development is related directly to operational-mission accomplishment; in other words, military members must possess the necessary competencies to function in a full range of operational conditions, up to and including combat. Smith asserted that militaries may be employed to accomplish four major functions: ameliorate, contain, deter or coerce, and destroy. Each of these functions must be supported by scores of individuals from private to general, each carrying out individual actions in the context of a highly complex and frequently violent operational environment. \(^\text{172}\) The Canadian Forces (CF) classifies primary military functions from a universalist perspective, contending that functions of Command, Sense, Act, Shield and Sustain are required in all mission types, \(^\text{173}\) but similar to Smith’s view, these too are descriptive summaries of a vast number of individual actions based on a level of individual competency nested in the context of a larger organizational one, and the investigational issue here is to determine how those competencies are acquired.

In the context of the CF, competency development is achieved through the CF professional development system (CFPDS). The purpose of the CFPDS is “the ethical, social and intellectual development of CF personnel and the accumulation of a sufficient Professional Body of Knowledge (PBK) to deal with the broad range of leadership and staff responsibilities throughout the full spectrum of military activities that can be

anticipated during an individual’s career.” Guiding the CFPDS is the “Canadian military professional ideology consisting of two components: the theory-based body of knowledge defining the profession’s specialized expertise; and the profession’s value system. The former is referred to as the General System of War and Conflict (GSWC), and the latter is the Canadian Military Ethos.”

The GSWC is the theoretical construct of conflict and war into the now-familiar levels of tactical, operational, strategic and political. Building on this theory, military professionals are expected to possess a very wide base of knowledge, and this is classified into three knowledge categories: core, supporting and specialized.

As this knowledge is acquired over the duration of a total career, military professionals ostensibly improve their ability to comprehend increasingly complex problems, and this process is generally linked to levels of responsibility in the organization which, in turn, is reflective of the hierarchical rank structure. In order to acquire the knowledge necessary to advance in responsibility, the military career lifecycle is envisioned as a series of developmental periods, which are defined as “a timeframe in a career during which an individual is trained, employed and given the opportunity to develop specific occupational or professional skills and knowledge. Development periods are distinguished by progressive increase in the levels of accountability, responsibility, authority, competency, military leadership ability and the knowledge of operations and war.” These periods are characterized by a combination of education, training and experience which is career managed in a deliberate fashion in order to generate a depth of highly competent military professionals in the officer and non-commissioned cadres.

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175. Ibid, 19.
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Given similar issues identified in other elements of the 7S model, it will not be surprising to determine that humanitarian organizations do not possess the ability to maintain competency development systems equal to that of the military. For example, with respect to the identification of a humanitarian professional body of knowledge, the following knowledge priorities, shown in Figure 7, were identified in a scoping study conducted for Enhanced Learning and Research for Humanitarian Assistance (ELRHA).\footnote{Walker and Russ, 31. Approximately 1500 humanitarian workers participated in the survey.}

![Figure 7. Humanitarian Knowledge Priorities as per the ELRHA Scoping Study](image)

Of interest, each of the four leading knowledge categories has approximate currency in the military sector, and it may suggested that security and safety may be mapped to “force protection,” monitoring and evaluation to “assessment,” needs assessment to “planning” and international humanitarian law to the “law of armed conflict.” That said, significant differences between military and humanitarian approaches to skill sets are revealed in the survey result as shown in Figure 8.
While undoubtedly important, the acquisition of these individual-level soft skills may not translate into organizational-level competencies that are arguably required in complex crises, chief among them the requirement to foster effective organizational leadership. “Leadership in the NGO sector was considered weak by some interviewees. As one noted, there is not a forceful enough group of senior people running emergency responses in the big NGOs. And it’s become too managerial—not enough capacity to speak out well on the big issues.”

A vital aspect of the military professional development system is the generation of leadership at senior levels with a variety of important transformative competencies; however, there is no equivalent process in the humanitarian sector. It is not uncommon, therefore, for senior military officers attempting to coordinate or collaborate with humanitarian organization leadership in a crisis scenario to hold vastly different competencies, resulting from longer years of service, greater levels of senior field experience as well as higher professional and academic education levels. While the military promotes the importance of formal academic education for all officers (and many non-commissioned members), the humanitarian sector has no structured approach to granting professional or academic qualifications.

178 Walker and Russ, 32.
179. ALNAP, 36.
180 While not competency-based per se, this also begins to speak to other issues such as predominant age and gender employment differences between the sectors.
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In summary, the military sector promotes and maintains systems of competency development that are designed to train, educate and professionally develop effective leadership at all levels, as leadership is understood to be a, if not the, critical factor in achieving operational mission success. Conversely, humanitarian organizations have traditionally focused on the attraction of employees and field workers who empathize with the organization’s philosophical orientation but who may not bring with them the necessary skill sets to succeed and which may not be acquirable in light of ongoing pressures to fund-raise and deploy on a constant basis. As a result, a significant competency disparity may exist between military and humanitarian sectors at both individual and organizational levels, further exacerbating the dilemma of achieving an effective degree of coordination or collaboration in the context of a CA.

Strategic Capability Gaps

Capability gaps speak to an inability on the part of an organization or system to design, develop and adopt new methods required to execute a selected strategy or successfully adapt existing ones. With respect to the adoption of a CA strategy, NATO experienced strategic-level capability gaps along two lines: an inability to foster effective partnerships with the UN, EU and major NGOs as well as the persistence of nationally based stovepipes.

The importance of partnerships to the success of a CA has already been articulated, and NATO explicitly recognized this point in the 2011 statement *Political Guidance on ways to improve NATO’s Involvement in Stabilization and Reconstruction* in which it was highlighted that “it will be important in this context for the Alliance to seek, in accordance with the Comprehensive Approach Action Plan, unity of effort with the other members of the international community, in particular its strategic partners the UN and the EU.”181 Such an approach is seen as both necessary, in that these organizations

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possess civilian capacity which could be potentially marshalled to achieve state-building goals, as well as desirable, in the context of transforming NATO from a “static, collective defense organization into a flexible security alliance with a potential for global reach.”

Thakur argued that the failure to achieve a balanced civil-military approach to state building in Afghanistan was the result of the United Nations early decision to maintain a light footprint which effectively resulted in the outsourcing of key military and political decisions to NATO, and this, in turn, reinforced the military nature of the mission. However, the UN’s reluctance to effectively engage with NATO in Afghanistan is arguably due to the broad-based membership of the organization which must accommodate the grand strategic views of Security Council members Russia and China which view NATO as “a military instrument of Western ’neo-imperialism.’”

With respect to the NATO–EU relationship, this too is constrained by structural and organizational factors inherent in the Alliance which requires unanimity on the one hand, while struggling with ongoing political disagreements between Alliance members on the other, in particular, relations between Turkey and Greece. This led Hull to describe the EU–NATO relationship as a “frozen conflict,” and Hull links internal NATO friction as a key impediment to the advancement of a CA, given that “applying the new standards requires the consensus of all Member States.”

Jakobsen described the NATO-NGO relationship as the least developed, even in comparison to the UN or EU, and he argued that it is “unrealistic to expect NATO to be able to create the culture of cooperation and the joint planning, execution and evaluation of operational activities with NGOs that effective CA cooperation calls for,” and this point was underscored in the previous analysis of strategic institutional gaps, specifically

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185. Hull, 6.
186. Jakobsen, 87.
the attributes of military and civilian organizations and systems, as framed by the McKinsey 7S model.

Given the difficulties surrounding the achievement of effective strategic-level partnerships in the international community necessary for CA to facilitate state building, it has been suggested that “the Comprehensive Approach will only ever ‘work’ if one member (the United States) leads which, while attractive in the short term, will tend to undermine the legitimacy and multinational ethos that is vital for mission success. This would reinforce the tendency of member nations and partner institutions to retreat into stovepipes and thus undermine unity of purpose and effort.”\textsuperscript{187} The persistence of national stovepipes is directly linked to the political nature of the Alliance as a group of individual nations each seeking to achieve national objectives while attempting to satisfy, perhaps minimally, the designs of the Alliance. To the extent that individual nations pursue objectives to mollify domestic political audiences or attempt to balance domestic and international obligations simultaneously, this may lead to a lack of coordination amongst nations, and it will be shown later that this tendency—represented by the PRT movement—undermined the effectiveness of operational-level efforts in Afghanistan.

**Gap Analysis: Operational Level**

*Operational Conceptual Gaps*

At this point, the integrated investigational framework shifts from the strategic to the operational level, and the pattern of investigating gaps along conceptual, institutional and capability contours continues. At the operational level, NATO attempted to actualize the CA by subsuming extant COIN and CIMIC doctrine and, latterly, by focusing on building Afghan security-force capacity. Having already identified the weaknesses associated with these initiatives, the purpose of this analysis is not to re-describe them but

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rather to explain why these were not successful due to persistent operational-level conceptual, institutional and capability gaps.

At the operational level, NATO’s attempt to actualize the CA strategy was encumbered by the absence of a coherent command and control (C2) model and operational-level CA doctrine. In my previous analysis of strategic institutional gaps, the concept of command was arguably implicated in all elements of McKinsey’s 7S model, although elements of staff, style and skills are intimately affected by it. NATO defines command and control as two distinct, but interconnected concepts, as follows:

**Command.** The authority vested in an individual of the armed forces for the direction, co-ordination, and control of military forces.\(^{188}\)

**Control.** That authority exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate organisations, or other organisations not normally under his command, which encompasses the responsibility for implementing orders or directives. All or part of this authority may be transferred or delegated.\(^{189}\)

These definitions suggest that the nucleus of command is the legal authority invested in an individual to issue orders and make decisions, while control relates to the associated management functions or processes by which such orders and decisions may be carried out. Pigeau and McCann extend these definitions by explaining that command is “the creative expression of human will necessary to accomplish the mission,” while control represents those “structures and processes devised by command to enable it and to manage risk.”\(^{190}\) The essence of this analysis focuses on NATO’s extant concepts of command and control in the context of complex operating environments such as Afghanistan and in relation to NATO’s attempt to actualize a CA strategy which implicates both military and civilian organizations and systems. NATO’s current

\(^{188}\) NATO. AAP-6. It also defines command as: An order given by a commander; that is, the will of the commander expressed for the purpose of bringing about a particular action; a unit, group of units, organisation or area under the authority of a single individual; to dominate an area or situation; and; to exercise a command.

\(^{189}\) Ibid.

\(^{190}\) Ross Pigeau and Carol McCann, “Using the Command and Control Framework to Analyse Command Challenges,” Defence R&D Canada (Toronto, 1999), 4.
understanding of C2 remains embedded in traditional military doctrinal approaches, even while attempting to acknowledge the requirement to somehow include non-military actors in a C2 construct. For example, NATO’s Comprehensive Operational Planning Directive (COPD) requires that a strategic operational planning group (SOPG) “will have to ensure that the C2 is adequate for the multinational nature of the forces from all contributing nations and articulates arrangements for coordination with non-NATO entities” and that “coordination with cooperating non-military and non-NATO entities should include agreement regarding the arrangements and mechanisms to be established for coordination and the exchange of information to synchronise actions in theatre.”

Given my previous examination of the difficulties associated with various military-civilian paradigms, such objectives may appear far-reaching, and it may be reasonable to suggest that a more achievable level of ambition in such complex environments would, at a minimum, be the establishment of a coherent military C2 structure.

In this context, the notion of coherent relates to the military concept of unity of command which “provides the necessary cohesion for planning and execution of operations. This can only be done by vesting the authority to direct and coordinate the action of all forces and military assets in a single commander.” Although retained as a general principle of joint and multinational command, NATO doctrine acknowledged the inherent difficulty of applying this principle in practice and suggested that “unity of command is rarely possible when dealing with non-military agencies, so unity of purpose and effort is more appropriate; because goodwill, a common purpose, clear and agreed division of responsibilities, and an understanding of the capabilities and limitations of others become

191. NATO. COPD, 3-88.
192. NATO. AJP 01 (D), 1-7.
193. Ibid. “At the military strategic, operational and tactical levels of command, a fundamental tenet of C2 is unity of command, which provides the necessary cohesion for the planning and execution of operations; this was identified earlier as a significant part of a principle of operations—unity of effort. Command relationships, by which this authority is achieved, will be determined when a joint force is established. These relationships will acknowledge the constraints that may be placed on the use of national force components and supporting national assets and the extent of military activities of other authorities in a designated Joint Operations Area (JOA). As a minimum, a commander would normally have Operational Control (OPCON) over all NATO or attached forces within a JOA. When unity of command (for forces or agencies outside the Joint Force) cannot totally be achieved, unity of effort has to be assured by establishing clear coordination arrangements.”

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essential elements in maximizing collective effort.” In spite of such lofty theoretical objectives, the reality of military disunity in the Afghan setting did not support the broader intent, and Hope deconstructed the problem of unity of command in that campaign. He argued that “from a strategic perspective, no one was in charge” and traced this to the initial US reliance on extant US headquarters to command US forces in theatre even as ISAF, as a multinational and ultimately NATO entity, was formed.

While SHAPE tasked JFCB to act as the operational-level headquarters for the Afghan mission (thereby relegating ISAF to tactical status), JFCB had, in fact, no authority over the US headquarters in theatre and was arguably “too far removed from the realities of Afghanistan to provide the necessary planning or operational guidance.” This unofficial disunity became official in 2006 when the US headquarters Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan (CFC-A) transferred responsibility for the ground campaign to ISAF and “operations became split between Commander U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), and Commander U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM).” Hope’s study of the lack of unity of command in Afghanistan concluded grimly that “failure to address the current problems of unity of command will result in the failure of the alliance—and the coalition—in Afghanistan.” Figure 9 illustrates the overall (and arguably confusing) command structure in Afghanistan in 2008.

194. Ibid.
195. Hope, 10.
196. Ibid.
197. Ibid, 1.
198. Ibid, 14.
Reference to the CA in NATO doctrine affirms that “the success of a comprehensive approach is dependent on a common sense of purpose and resolve, mutual understanding and collaboration, and appropriate resourcing” and that, in the absence of unity of command, mutually agreed objectives must be underpinned by unity of purpose. Achieving unity of purpose amongst disparate military and civilian organizations and systems assumes a common understanding and agreement with respect to what constitutes mission success, and given a diversity of objectives, attempts to identify and agree on a universal definition is highly unlikely.

Albert and Hayes suggest that associating mission success with effective C2 structures and processes is problematic because “the very definition of the mission is a function of command.” In this sense, an inability to adequately define mission success or identify attainable objectives represents a failure of command, and thus, “while C2 may be necessary, it is not sufficient to guarantee mission success,” which is impacted by other important factors, such as the availability of resources and the actions of multitudinous players in the engagement space.

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199. NATO, AJP 01(D), 2-12.
201. Ibid.
While Pigeau and McCann unpack the command concept along dimensions of competency, authority and responsibility, “control structure and process is instantiated in a variety of mechanisms, including doctrinal guidelines, rules of engagement, organizational structure, software technologies and equipment,”\(^{202}\) and suggest that control’s sole purpose “is to support command by allowing it to take action in the operational context.”\(^{203}\) Conversely, Albert and Hayes view command and control as a set of integrated functions, including establishing intent; determining roles, responsibilities and relationships; establishing rules and constraints; and monitoring and assessing the situation and progress.\(^{204}\) In their model, C2 is seen as a process by which these functions are pursued and achieved effectively, and they argue that C2 as practised by NATO is “equivalent to current doctrine”\(^{205}\) and that newer approaches, which may be more efficacious in complex operational environments, should be represented via a spectrum of C2 models.

In order to explain the relationships amongst command, control and the environment in which these functions take place, Albert and Hayes offer a C2 conceptual model and in this approach, command and control functions are not assumed to be static but are affected by their respective qualities which, in turn, impact behaviours and generate effects in the environment. Each of the major model sub-components—command, control, behaviours and effects— are subject to the availability of appropriate information (and the quality thereof), and all of this taken together determines the variable outcome of mission effectiveness. It is clear in this model that availability of quality information represents a critical dependency to achieve mission effectiveness, and if so, it is important to determine how such information is attained and how it potentially impacts the selection and execution of actions in the operational environment. Albert and Hayes deconstruct this problem through a domain-dominant lens, which incorporates a concept of “sense making,” which posits that the information domain impacts the physical domain via a combination of processes which occur in cognitive (i.e., individual) and

\(^{202}\) Pigeau and McCann, 4.
\(^{203}\) Ibid.
\(^{204}\) Alberts and Hayes, 34.
\(^{205}\) Ibid, 50.
social (i.e., collective) domains and that these in turn impact the collaborative ability of individuals and organizations in a system. Given my previous analysis of the levels of civil-military interaction and the criticality of coordination and collaboration to the achievement of a CA, the following explanation by Albert and Hayes is highly significant:

For the purpose of exploring and understanding C2, we are interested in a set of these behaviours that involve a common or shared purpose or objective. Collaboration is defined as “working together for a common purpose.” There is a spectrum of collaboration. Words like sharing, coordination, consultation, synchronization, and integration could be used to describe differing degrees of collaboration. But comparing what one may mean by coordination versus consultation is difficult if not impossible unless we explicitly define the dimensionality of collaboration. Once we define the dimensionality of collaboration, we can fix the point on each dimension that corresponds to a given descriptor (e.g., coordination). In fact, it is typical to think about coordination in varying degrees (e.g., close coordination). When looking at a spectrum, it is often helpful to define the endpoints, in this case maximum collaboration.

With respect to the discussion of “maximum collaboration,” the following endpoints are germane:

- **Extent**: Inclusive – all participants involved (collaboration cuts across organizational, functional, spatial, and temporal boundaries including echelons of command);

- **Access**: Full and equal access – all participants have equal access to all other participants;

- **Communications**: Unconstrained – sufficient bandwidth;

- **Level of participation**: Participatory – all participants fully engaged;

- **Frequency**: Continuous – participants engaged without interruption;

- **Synchronicity**: Synchronous;

- **Richness**: Rich – multimedia, face-to-face; and
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**Scope:** Complete – involves data, information, knowledge, understanding, decisions, and actions.\(^{206}\)

From Figure 3, collaboration represented the optimum space in a conceptual spectrum of civil-military interaction, and the maximums delineated above may, therefore, be considered as qualitative descriptors of that collaborative space. The challenge to collaboration across civil-military sectors is, therefore, related to the quality, quantity and types of information that can or must transpose between the sectors at each point along the interaction spectrum. As one moves from less demanding forms of interaction (such as coordination) towards the maximalist collaborative space, these information demands become potentially overwhelming or even de-stabilizing to the organizations or systems implicated, and Albert and Hayes posit that “the endpoint on the spectrum of patterns of interaction—everyone with everyone else, all the time, and using the full range of media—is simply impractical as an approach for a large-scale military organization or an international effort.”\(^{207}\)

The challenges to a CA strategy identified in this brief analysis of approaches to C2 are arguably related to an absence of CA doctrine at the operational level, which, by this stage, is fully implicated as the level at which such strategies must be actualized. NATO doctrine writers, supported by various theorists, have sought to incorporate CA language, concepts and practices into revised and emerging NATO doctrine, and several references have already been made to some of this material.

The December 2010 NATO publication of the *COPD* is arguably the most recent effort to integrate CA concepts into extant NATO planning theory and processes at strategic and operational levels, and indeed, there are multiple references to the CA throughout this document.\(^{208}\) While the *COPD* integrates elements of conceptual precursors to the CA (such as EBAO, effects assessment and civil-military cooperation), there is no reference to discrete CA doctrine per se.

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\(^{206}\) Albert and Hayes, 151.
\(^{207}\) Ibid, 102.
\(^{208}\) NATO. *COPD*, 1-2.
Mitchel argued the case that the “the central thrust of CA is to create more synergy between the military and non-military resources to maximize the desired effect at all levels of policy and plans, the tactical, the operational, the strategic, and the political normative. In this regard CA represents a desire for a more effective doctrine when dealing with complex conflicts.” While the COPD and other NATO publications reference this desire for more effective doctrine, there is no single source of information on the subject, and intriguingly, the NATO On-line Library associates the CA to NATO’s relations with the EU and references at least one publication that is highly critical of the CA concept writ large.

Given that the literature review has already covered much of the necessary ground, it only remains to restate that a lack of coherent CA doctrine has been linked to conceptual difficulties surrounding the core concept. Mitchel frames this problem as “the very nature of the CA requirement for multiple political actor cooperation at the strategic level within a conflict situation (which) inhibits CA’s development of C2 capacities to support a ‘standalone’ doctrinal framework that reaches the tactical level. The wide range of suggestions and disagreements as to what CA encompasses at the political/normative level, from different actors, both state and non-state, is representative of the inherent dilemma.” He further argued that:

> Quite simply, as conflict situations change one would expect that the interests of participating actors to change, threatening the unity of command and—more importantly as far as the CA philosophy is concerned—the unity of effort. Without CA C2 capacities lead by a single political master, CA will find it difficult to develop as a complete doctrine—and therefore the desired synergetic effect will be very difficult to achieve.

Mitchel’s conclusion was consistent with that of NATO’s own investigation into CA capability gaps which recognized the importance of developing a coherent CA structure.

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209. Mitchel, 11.
210. This would be Wendling.
211. Mitchel, 12.
212. Ibid, 13.
in order to ensure adaptability from mission to mission. Although various models were investigated, analysed and described, the overall conclusion acknowledged that “the existence of any knowledge bases on various approaches and the results of their implementation is not known,” and that further research would be necessary to resolve this dilemma.

Operational Institutional Gaps

While the majority of the discussion and arguments have focused on aspects of the CA in the realm of ideas and models, action taken by NATO at the operational level implicates the role of military forces to actualize the strategy in practice. Given that COIN was a primary vehicle by which NATO intended to advance the security component of the operational-level security-development nexus, it is reasonable to investigate if the institution acted in a manner consistent with its stated objectives. This would suggest that the institution would have needed to generate the capacity and capability to meet the requirements identified and adopted as guidelines for success.

By the time NATO and ISAF adopted COIN doctrine as a means of achieving the desired level of security in Afghanistan, COIN theory, concepts and practices had advanced to a sufficiently high level of maturity such that these were well understood throughout the Western militaries engaged in the campaign and were generally accepted by political leadership both in NATO and key allies. According to ISAF in 2010, “the strategy is focused on COIN operations designed to protect population centres, support improved governance, and create a sustainable security environment for the Government of Afghanistan.” However, the Afghan campaign was not, in fact, resourced to a level consistent with accepted COIN doctrine, and the risk of failure as a result was well understood. This problem was further exacerbated by the imposition of troop-contributing-nation caveats, which restricted how and where ISAF could utilize the forces


assigned to it. This not only created friction between ISAF and troop contributing nations (and between contributing nations themselves) but further handcuffed the relatively small number of troops engaged in COIN.

The issue of force levels and force ratios in counter-insurgency has been the focus of numerous studies, and several were neatly summarized in a 2012 US Army internal memorandum. It stated:

Paragraph 1-67 of FM 3-24 discusses ratios of counter-insurgents to insurgents. The FM cites the numbers for previous conflicts as 10 or 15 friendly troops to 1 insurgent. It then proclaims that a better requirement is 20 to 25 counter-insurgent for every 1,000 residents in an area of operations for effective counter-insurgent operations.  

The interest in force ratios in COIN is rooted in historical practices and has been the subject of several analytical studies which have sought to identify ideal or winning ratios of counter-insurgents to insurgents and counter-insurgents to population. For example, Galula argued in his 1964 seminal text *Counter-insurgency Warfare* that the French lost in Indochina due to their inability to force generate 10–20 counter-insurgents per insurgent, and in 1986, Cable’s work *Conflict of Myths, The Development of American Counter-Insurgency Doctrine and the Vietnam War* suggested that any such examination of force ratios would need to account for the large number of supporting personnel engaged in the campaign and that a more accurate approach would be to consider only trained manoeuvre counter-insurgency forces. These and similar analyses began to inform official policy, for example:

The Reagan Administration elected to increase financial pressure on the Soviet forces in Afghanistan, by facilitating the insurgent’s battle of exhaustion, based on the ten to one ratio. The strategy worked and United States assistance allowed the Mujahedeen to


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erode the Soviet will to invest the resources and manpower necessary to succeed in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{217}

In his article entitled “Force Requirements in Stability Operations,” Quinlivan focused on counter-insurgent force levels not in relation to the number of insurgents, but in relation to the size of the population in which the operation was occurring.\textsuperscript{218} Based on a series of six case studies, he observed that COIN operations had ranged from 6.6 to 20 counter-insurgents per 1000 population, but did not offer conclusive prescriptions for success. Alternatively, McGrath’s study “Boots on the Ground: Troop Densities in Contingency Operations” analysed seven operations and suggested that a winning ratio would be on the order of 13.6 counter-insurgents per 1000 population.\textsuperscript{219} Kozelka’s monograph reinforces the 20 per 1000 population ratio, but states that while:

\begin{quote}

each situation is unique and a fixed ratio will not guarantee success, there is a strong correlative relationship between force levels and success. This is because in COIN, numbers do matter. The COIN force must have adequate strength to establish and maintain widespread security to protect the population against insurgent violence and intimidation. The case studies show that the closer force levels approach the ratio of 20 security forces per 1000 population, the greater the possibility the COIN force will reach the tipping point to success. When the nature of the war being fought is COIN, the strategy and force size must be nested with providing security for the people.\textsuperscript{220}
\end{quote}

More recent analyses amplify these baseline studies and three may be noted in particular. Goode’s 2009 article “A Historical Basis for Force Requirements in Counter-insurgency” reinforced the counter-insurgent to population ratio argument as the key force-generation metric.\textsuperscript{221} He noted Quinlivan’s and McGrath’s contributions to understanding the

\begin{footnotes}
\item[220] Glenn E. Kozelka, “Boots on the Ground: A Historical and Contemporary Analysis of Force Levels for Counter-insurgency Operations” (School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, AY 2008), iii.
\end{footnotes}
importance of this and cited McGrath’s inclusion of a police to population ratio, which he suggested should be on the order of 4 police per 1000 population.

While focused on the counter-insurgent to population ratio as a key determinant for success in COIN, Goode posits that this cannot be a pre-set factor but must adapt in relation to levels of violence, which he opts to measure as “the number of counter-insurgents (i.e., security forces) killed in action each year per million residents. This number includes both local and intervening forces. There were two reasons for choosing this metric. First, it measures the amount of violent resistance to the security forces’ attempts to control the nation or region. Second, it is more reliably recorded than other possible metrics.” Goode’s analysis revealed “that the minimum counter-insurgent force is 2.8 soldiers per 1,000 residents, with more forces required as the violence level increases. Additionally, the larger the proportion of security forces drawn from the local population, the fewer personnel will be needed to deal with the violence.” From this, he deduces three significant possibilities:

If the threshold equation is correct, three things should be observed. First, in conflicts where the counter-insurgent effort achieved and maintained a force equal to or greater than the threshold, the violence level should drop to and stay at a relatively low level. Second, if the counter-insurgent side never achieves the force threshold, the violence should increase until the insurgents win a military victory. Third, if the counter-insurgent forces are entirely comprised of persons from outside the host nation—mathematically, if L is zero—the counter-insurgents should fail.

Theil’s paper “COIN Manpower Ratios: Debunking the 10 to 1 Ratio and Surges” contributes to the discussion by re-focusing on the counter-insurgent to insurgent ratio issue—this is not surprising given the US decision to surge troops to Afghanistan in a fashion similar to that undertaken earlier in Iraq, and views of the success of this approach, both pro and con, have already been offered.

222. Ibid, 50.
223. Ibid, 53.
224. Ibid.
225. Theil, COIN Manpower Ratios.
While positing that the officially accepted ratio of 10:1 was likely too great, he argued that a necessary ratio did indeed exist and offered that a 4:1 ratio “can serve as a basic planning figure for counter-insurgent planners.” However, his study also concluded that a lower ratio (i.e., one approaching a level of only 3:1) favoured the insurgency thereby generating “a significantly higher chance of exhausting the incumbent government and achieving victory.”

In “Manpower and Counter-insurgency: Empirical Foundations for Theory and Doctrine” Friedman provided a detailed and mathematically supported analysis which, in summation, could neither confirm nor definitively refute the relevance of force ratios or density to the probability of success in a given counter-insurgency and argued that “unless its proponents can muster systematic support, the rule of thumb for deploying 20 troops per 1000 inhabitants in the area of operations should be scrapped.”

While the utility of applying this research to the Afghan counter-insurgency may, therefore, be open to question, it will be recalled that ISAF, under General Petraeus, instituted COIN as the predominant operational approach from approximately 2009 onwards, and this underscored the argument for a troop surge which ended in 2011. Given my earlier examination of the state of Afghanistan in 2011 and the importance of the COIN campaign in relation to the CA, it would appear pertinent to undertake such an analysis, the aim of which is to determine if NATO and its key members generated sufficient forces to achieve mission success in light of the adoption of widely promulgated COIN theory and doctrine. This is important because:

It is also clear that in Afghanistan this doctrinal security force-to-population ratio is understood and used as a planning metric by ISAF operational commanders. During Operation Moshtarak, planners in British-led Task Force Helmand identified the necessary COIN ratio to be twenty-five counter-insurgents per 1,000

226. Ibid, 8.
227. Ibid.
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population, and this produced an imperative to generate more friendly forces.\textsuperscript{229}

The challenge to undertaking such an analysis relates to the ability to define and agree on key variables under study which, as we have seen in the analysis of changing conditions in Afghanistan between 2006 and 2011, is no simple feat, given the complexity of the operational engagement space. In order to proceed with such an analysis at least five variables would need to be defined:

- What timeframe will be selected? Given that the insurgency shifted in intensity between 2006 and 2011, the specific timeframe selected will likely produce variable outcomes.

- What engagement space will be selected? Engagement space in this analysis will be relevant along two vectors: geographic space and population, although population density in a given location would be relevant for “micro-level” studies.

- What is the size of the insurgency? Can the number of insurgents be identified? Again, size will also be important in relation to both time and space factors (i.e., when and where they are operating).

- What is the size of the counter-insurgency? Can the number of counter-insurgents be identified in relation to both time and space factors, and which forces should be included? This last question is particularly relevant to the inclusion of Afghan security forces.

- Which force ratio analyses should be selected? Counter-insurgent to insurgent ratios or counter-insurgent to population ratios?

The choices made in relation to these variables could result in an entire series of micro-studies, and this may well be a valuable contribution to a future understanding of how the Afghan counter-insurgency campaign evolved: for our purposes, however, a macro overview will suffice. Annex A to Chapter 3 provides the results of an analysis of force ratios – both counter-insurgent to insurgent and counter-insurgent to population ratios at

\textsuperscript{229} Johnson, 144.
the height of the COIN campaign which I have identified as March 2011. While this analysis of counter-insurgency force levels is by no means definitive, there is sufficient evidence to suggest that the mission was under resourced even at the peak of the counter-insurgency effort, and given widely accepted theories of COIN and force generation ratios, NATO and its troop-contributing nations were aware of the risks their actions would pose.

National Caveats

National caveats are defined as “restrictions that individual troop-contributing countries impose on their own forces’ activities.”²³⁰ In practice, national caveats restricted the ability of ISAF leadership to employ troops when, where or how they were needed, in spite of being under ISAF command. In general terms, those nations that were willing to deploy troops to the more violent areas of Afghanistan tended to impose fewer caveats than those operating in less dangerous territory. Although as the insurgency expanded from 2006 onwards, virtually all ISAF contributors were engaged in active combat operations to one degree or another, and there was ongoing pressure from ISAF HQ and Brussels for nations to remove caveats. Saideman and Auerswald are concerned with the sources of decision making within Alliance members and how these processes cause different members to impose caveats. Traditional views related to balancing against threats, tailoring actions to public support and the role of national culture were considered but were found to be wanting as explanations. The source of these differences appears, in fact, to be related to the types of governance practiced by the member state and the relationship between governance types and individual-level decision making that is possible in the context of multi-lateral operations. To clarify:

Some institutional forms, such as coalition cabinets, tend to impose caveats on their deployed troops and then resist dramatic alterations to those caveats. … In other cases, such as presidential and majoritarian parliamentary governments, domestic institutions

empower individuals as the key actors, necessitating that we understand their historical experiences and their inclinations. These countries are capable of rapid and dramatic changes in policy.\textsuperscript{231}

Regardless of the reasons propelling member nations to impose caveats, by 2008, the issue was identified as a major problem within ISAF, and the NATO Joint Allied Lessons Learn Centre ascertained that “all nations have some form of caveats and associated command veto. Some nations have stated that if they are pushed too hard to remove written caveats, these caveats will simply become unwritten until the nation is tasked to do something not within its intentions. These nations would then implement their national command veto and simply refuse to be a part of the planned operation.”\textsuperscript{232}

The import of this analysis is the linkage between caveats and force-generation requirements, and given that most contributing nations were reluctant (or unable) to generate additional forces, the fight to remove caveats remained an ongoing challenge for NATO and ISAF leadership.\textsuperscript{233} In spite of these pressures, as of April 2010 only 22 of 43 troop-contributing nations were caveat-free.\textsuperscript{234} This situation created tensions amongst the various contributors, particularly as casualty levels continued to rise unevenly, and this tension was further exacerbated by widely different levels of domestic support for the mission and for NATO itself.\textsuperscript{235}

Operational Capability Gaps

The analysis of civil and military organizational decision-making processes undertaken previously revealed that military organizations possess most frequently the characteristics


\textsuperscript{232} NATO, JALLC, \textit{Overcoming Constraints in Force Generation}, 18 December 2008, 17. The CJSOR is the Combined Joint Statement of Requirements, i.e., the “shopping list” of forces NATO would want to generate for a mission and against which individual troop contributing nations would bid to supply the various types and quantities of forces.


\textsuperscript{234} Ibid.

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of administrative organizations and practice consequentialist decision making; this leads to the development of highly structured planning processes in contrast to humanitarian organizations which are less likely to adopt such methods. This strategic-level institutional gap translates at the operational level into a capability gap which may be described as the inability on the part of implicated military and civilian organizations to design, develop or adopt planning methods that allow for common understanding and coherent integrated action which is critical to the success of the CA. 236

Reference has already been made to the COPD, which is NATO’s most recent planning doctrine, and this document states that “planning in a multi-dimensional environment generates particular challenges for both civilian and military actors. Experience shows that not only may there be no formally appointed lead agency to provide overall coordination, but that those organisations capable of reacting quickly are very often military in nature.” 237 While the COPD is replete with references to the CA and establishes an identifiable philosophical orientation towards the concept, detailed processes for strategic- and operational-level planning exhibit tendencies to view non-military actors simply as inputs to the military planning process. 238

That said, the COPD directs that “cooperating non-NATO entities” must be designated or authorized at the political, or NAC, level and that actions taken in relation to these types of entities at the military strategic or operational levels will focus primarily on coordination and liaison functions. 239 With respect to the issue of joint civil-military planning, operational-level direction requires that “given NAC authorisation for direct liaison and coordination with relevant national and international actors, the JFC will arrange for their participation in the operational planning as required,” although there is no specific method or process attached to this direction. 240

237. NATO. COPD, 1-3.
238. Ibid, 2-2
239. Ibid, 3-79 and 4-28
240. Ibid, 4-33
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A more specific planning-related imperative is concerned with “effects development,” and the COPD recognizes that the analysis of systems and system elements (which comprise the engagement space) may not be influenced by military means alone. This then generates a requirement to ascertain non-military means during the planning process and identify which actors can generate the desired effects; this logically necessitates interaction with those actors, and the COPD identifies four types of potential interaction:

1. complementary non-military activity in support of military action;
2. complementary military actions in support of non-military activity;
3. mutual support; and
4. de-confliction of critical activities.²⁴¹

Tamas asserts that “vocabulary used indicates there is a substantive control orientation in perception of ownership of the intervention by the military”²⁴² and that the presumption that NATO does planning in order to achieve effects overlooks the critical role of the host nation which should own the process. This is an important observation as much of the doctrinal and analytical discussion relating to the obstacles to achieving coherent civil-military interaction focuses on exogenous military and civil organizations, and there is a paucity of analysis in the literature concerning how the intervention target can and should be engaged prior to the intervention occurring (i.e., during the planning stage).²⁴³ He explains that:

Another area where a change in mindset is required is linked to the notion of “agency”—the question of who is doing the acting and who is being acted on. Most military discourse reinforces the notion that ‘we’ act on ‘them.’ The military draws on intelligence, it decides what needs to be done, and then others in the field receive their ordinance(s). This structure is not surprising considering the historical uses of military planning, but it is not well suited for

²⁴¹ Ibid, 4-42.
²⁴² Tamas, 97.
²⁴³ There is far more available regarding the role of indigenous actors in the literature addressing state formation and state building.
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Fourth Generation Warfare, especially the 75 per cent that is non-kinetic. 244

Borgomano-Loup advanced explanations as to why the military would like to have a more systematic and institutionalized approach to dealing with civilian organizations, especially NGOs, which she labels as “predictability” and “effectiveness,” and she suggests the motivation for incorporating NGOs into the military planning process is to gain access to their capabilities. She also suggests that this has a legal component, in that the military force commander may build a legal framework in theatre to outline responsibilities towards civilians working in the area of responsibility. While this argument underscores the “military as control agent” theory, Borgomano-Loup is supportive of enhancing relationships between the military and NGOs, including the provision of advice, but concludes that any specific scheme must preclude “any integration of NGOs in the planning of operations as decisive operational actors.” 245

In addition to multinational or alliance level, obstacles to effective civil-military or interagency planning exist at national levels and in settings other than Afghanistan. The United States (which is arguably the most advanced Western nation in terms of codification and legislation related to establishing formal interagency mechanisms at the federal level) has, in spite of such efforts, continued to experience significant deficiencies. For example, a study conducted in 2009 noted that the US Department of Defense adaptive planning construct “complicated the accommodation of inputs from the interagency partners, given the lack of civilian capacity to participate in and contribute to such planning.” 246 Both Nilsson and Hull also highlight the asymmetry of planning resources as a key inhibitor to interagency planning. 247

Given these descriptions of seemingly intractable obstacles to coherent civil-military planning regimes at the operational level, particularly in relation to the intended capability as stated in extant NATO doctrine, questions regarding the causes of these

244. Tamas, 182.
245. Borgomano-Loup, 52 and 60.
246. Earle, 42.
obstacles may lead to conclusions regarding the assay of civil-military planning on a more generalized basis. Of particular interest would be the potential identification of metaphysical factors or elements which fundamentally preclude the desired coherence for civil-military planning in the context of a CA strategy to state building. The earlier analysis of civil-military paradigms undertaken in the context of McKinsey’s 7S model has already addressed some of the underlying dynamics which may logically impede the ability of civil and military organizations from collaborating in joint operational-level planning particularly, although not necessarily, as direct causation, inimical decision-making styles.

Smith and Shrimpton suggested that the intervention into Afghanistan (and Iraq) was qualitatively different from earlier efforts to rebuild states affected by conflict following major wars along two axes: time and strategy. The effort to rebuild Western Europe following the Second World War was, for example, a decades-long project that was clearly tied to a Cold War (grand) strategy. Alternatively:

these [Afghan and Iraq] interventions commenced while lacking coordinated and coherent civil-military planning, and they have morphed repeatedly, without clear long-term visions and without promises of long-term commitments. Nation-building has neither been promised nor applied in earnest, yet the 3D Approach has the trappings of nation-building. 248

Ryan offered three explanations for this evident deficiency of coordinated and coherent civil-military planning which may be encapsulated as lack of trust, loyalty and common instrumentality for planning. With respect to the issue of trust, military organizations are ingrained with a propensity towards secretiveness as a result of the types of operational information they possess, and the potential impact that inadvertent release of this information could have. This tendency to stress operational security (OPSEC) generates a high level of compartmentalization within military organizations themselves, and most information is shared on a need to know basis only, particularly in relation to operational matters, including planning. Militaries classify virtually all types of information with

levels of classification permitting release or sharing of information to specifically designated parties only. In the case of operational information, this would virtually always be classified as secret or higher, given the potential for such information to compromise operational factors such as the location of forces or timing of impending operations. This mindset frequently results in information over-classification, which further restricts information flow but which protects information disseminators, allowing them to err on the side of caution.

As a result, the inclusion of individuals or organizations in operational planning who do not possess approved security clearances is highly problematic, and this obviously points to civilian organizations or actors, in or out of government. Most civilian organizations outside of government, including humanitarian organizations or other types of NGOs, would rarely employ personnel with government security clearances, and thus, sharing of classified information is virtually impossible from the military organization’s perspective. The issue of trust is, thus, related to the willingness of organizations, both military and civilian, to accept risks that are generated as a result of engaging in collaborative planning and sharing information necessary to achieve the desired products. According to a senior NATO official in 2011, however, there is still “some way to go in order to achieve levels of trust needed to achieve comprehensive approach.”

This is further explained by LaRose-Edwards:

Civilian agencies active in post-conflict or humanitarian situations have learned the importance of trust and voluntarily sharing amongst themselves, especially as overall command and control is not an option. The evolution of civilian agency interaction using mechanisms such as the cluster lead concept has not been smooth and remains contentious. In truth it will remain a constant challenge as agencies and relationships vary to reflect changing contexts. Be it civil-military, civil-civil, or military-military, degrees of successful interaction will depend on observing basic principles of trust and partnership to be found in any joint human endeavour. Human

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nature remains constant, and if they don’t trust each other, coordination will remain ephemeral.\textsuperscript{250}

In order to operationalize the CA strategy, some form of cross-organizational, cross-departmental or interagency entity must be formed in order to engage in operational planning. Given the transitory and ad hoc nature of task forces, working groups or equivalent entities, Ryan posits that the members of such entities will continue to exhibit primary loyalty to their home organization, rather than the temporary organization to which they have been assigned. Further, he suggests that the mere existence of such temporary entities reveals the limitations of the individual organizations to solve the problem.\textsuperscript{251}

With respect to planning instrumentality, Ryan provides a succinct overview of various US planning methodologies and tools designed for interagency planning but argues that each has significant shortcomings in relation to planning for current operations. As a result, the tendency is to rely on proven methods, such as the joint operational planning process which is, as a military-driven model, reliant on rationale decision making which, in turn, is based on a series of assumptions:

- Participants agree on the rules of decision making.
- Participants share a common language.
- Organizational and cultural contexts do not significantly influence decision making.
- The problem or goal can be clearly identified and agreed on by all participants.
- The problem can be solved by an instrumental rationality of allocating means to ends.
- The basic required means are known and will be available.

\textsuperscript{251} Ryan, 22.
• Information required to make a decision is available or can be acquired.

• Consistent choice criteria are agreed on by participants.

• The environment is relatively stable during the decision-making process.

• Sufficient time is available to generate, consider, and evaluate alternatives.

• When planning occurs at multiple levels, decision making is nested and proceeds from the top down.252

Given my inquiries into the nature of civil-military paradigms discovered via the McKinsey 7S model, it is clear that these assumptions and a reliance on rational decision-making processes may explain, if only partially, the limitations to effective interagency planning.

Perez raises the possibility that the fundamental challenge to effective interagency planning (or doing interagency planning at all) lies in the realm of complexity in the operational environment and that attempts by organizations to solve problems in such an environment (frequently described as “ambiguous, complex, uncertain, and ill-structured”253) may simply not be possible.

The fundamental aim of planning, particularly military planning for complex operations, is “designed to optimize logical, analytical steps of decision making in conditions of uncertainty and ambiguity,”254 which hopefully will advance a common understanding or appreciation of a future set of conditions that will result from the actions planned and executed. Perez argued, however, that:

the challenge of prediction in human affairs has always plagued philosophers, political scientists, and statesman. Their predictions have been notoriously unreliable. Socio-political phenomenon, which include wars, are not susceptible to simple cause-effect

252. Ibid, 25.
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analysis. Causes and effects in human affairs are tangled, multi-causal, multi-directional, and contingent.\textsuperscript{255}

From this perspective, it is possible to imagine that two forms of complexity intersect in the current operating environment: the quotidian complexity of conducting operations in such an environment and the complexity of the problems to be solved. With respect to the former, Pam labels this emergent policy by which “bureaucratic incentives, organizational routines, interagency interactions and simple but profound differences in perception of reality regularly produce results that are not intended or anticipated by any central policymaking intelligence.”\textsuperscript{256} The concept of emergence in complexity theory “concerns the emergence of complex large-scale behaviours from the aggregate interactions of less complex agents.”\textsuperscript{257} Rinaldi explains that:

According to this model, the global emergent properties (the strategic decisions) of the government come about not because of the personal, organizational, and national goals of the agents (players), but rather because of the interactions (political maneuvering) between the agents within the governmental hierarchy. And a prior knowledge of the agents does not suffice in comprehending the emergent decisions of a government.\textsuperscript{258}

With respect to the complex problems to be addressed, the primary challenge is to define, at root, what the problem actually is, and this, itself, requires an accepted framework from which to investigate it. Rational decision-making models, such as the military operational planning process, have been criticized as incapable of determining the nature of the problem, and other approaches, such as “design” have evolved in order to address this concern.\textsuperscript{259}

With or without advanced approaches to planning, the challenges embedded in a CA to state building remain that of conceiving a future condition or end state, determining what

\textsuperscript{255} Perez, 41.  
\textsuperscript{256} Pam in Schnaubelt, 34.  
\textsuperscript{258} Steven Rinaldi, quoted in Ibid, 30.  
the end state looks like and deciding whether an end state is, in fact, achievable. Pam concluded, and this author agrees, that:

the interaction between our Complex Operations and their complex problems, and the multiplication of unintended consequences, suggests that complex strategies and plans may simply be impossible to effectively coordinate. By contrast, we have a much greater chance of getting many diverse actors all moving in the same direction if we’re pursuing a small number of objectives that can be clearly explained to all (and supervised).  

**Gap Analysis: Tactical Level**

*Tactical Conceptual Gaps*

The tactical level of conflict is that at which forces are employed and take actions in order to achieve operational-level effects. Ruffa and others believe that the tactical level has increased in importance in terms of its ability to influence civil-military relations at higher levels. This implicates two aspects: the phenomenon of the “strategic corporal” who, by his or her actions, can have a magnified effect on a campaign courtesy of social media streams and the involvement of tactical forces in what Ruffa calls “ancillary tasks,” i.e. the delivery of aid.

In the context of my integrated interrogational framework, the primary tactical-level efforts in NATO’s Afghan campaign revolved around two major activity clusters: the practice of CIMIC as well as the establishment and support of PRTs. In reality, these two activities were intermeshed, and it is generally adduced that PRTs represented the physical and organizational manifestation of CIMIC doctrine or theory; I have opted to identify these as separate on the basis that general-purpose and special military forces frequently engaged in CIMIC or CIMIC-like activities outside of the PRT construct.

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260. Pam in Schnaubelt, 42.
At the tactical level, the conceptual gap to be addressed relates to a fundamental misunderstanding, or lack of appreciation, of the distinct roles to be played by military and civilian actors and the consequences of this on overall mission effectiveness. The issue of the militarization of aid was introduced earlier in this paper, and various analyses, such as those undertaken by ALNAP, highlighted the concern within the humanitarian sphere over this trend. The conceptual gap to be investigated extends beyond this particular challenge in that actions undertaken by both military and civilian organizations on the ground blurred their respective roles to such a degree that the Afghan population was frequently unable to distinguish between them, and this, in turn, led to a conflation of scepticism, apathy and rejection on the part of the population.

Three factors contributed to this development. First, the lack of civilian capacity, relative to the military capacity, ensured that the level of reconstruction and development ambition advertised to the Afghan population could not be achieved, and the gap between promises made and projects completed generated disappointment and frustration leading, in some cases, to a turning away from the exogenous military and civilians entities to domestic actors, including insurgents, who appeared to be more capable and effective in addressing immediate needs. In order to attempt to overcome this lack of civilian capacity, IOs and NGOs opted to engage commercial entities which could offer both short-term reconstruction and development capabilities as well as provide their own security, thereby ostensibly remaining at arms-length from the military. This trend added further to the confusing mix of actors engaged in reconstruction and development activities, as these commercial firms often utilized the services of former military members who acted, and often looked like, active military forces.263

Second, military organizations which were engaged in reconstruction and development activities, primarily, although not exclusively, in the PRT construct utilized these opportunities to interact with the local population in order to achieve military objectives, such as intelligence gathering or conducting influence activities, including psychological operations. In this sense, military organizations did not choose to distinguish between the

function of acting as reconstruction and development agents (and adhering to the principle of impartiality as proclaimed by the humanitarian sphere) and the conduct of various military functions which are implied, if not mandated, by the imperatives of COIN.  

Third, and as related previously, military organizations opted to engage in reconstruction and development both in order to be seen as helping the population (thereby benefiting from positive relations in terms of force protection) and in order to assist with the “build” phase of the “clear, hold and build” model on which the entire premise of the COIN campaign was constructed. The deficiencies inherent in this model have already been identified, including a lack of ANSF capability, the resilience of the insurgency, the under-resourcing of ISAF troop levels as well as the issue of national caveats. While there was a military troop surge in the later stages of the counter-insurgency under President Obama, the lack of a “civilian surge” ensured that the build phase could not succeed, and Jakobsen opined that:

The result has been a vicious circle from a CA point of view. The limited involvement of the civilian organizations has forced deeper NATO involvement in humanitarian and reconstruction activities than ever before. This has triggered protests from the humanitarian NGOs, as well as greater reluctance towards deeper involvement in both the EU and the UN. This will force even greater US military and NATO involvement which will then trigger more protests and greater CA reluctance from the civilian actors.  

_Tactical Institutional Gaps_

While the PRT model was originally transplanted by US forces from Iraq to Afghanistan, responsibility for the Afghan PRTs began to shift to ISAF in 2003, and the number of PRTs expanded to 26 by 2008. Of these, the US remained the lead nation in 12 PRTs; the other 14 were led by 13 different nations (Germany led in both Kunduz and Feyzabad). In addition to the lead nations, an additional 13 nations contributed to PRTs, and of these,

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the majority were non-NATO members. Terms of reference for PRTs were established in 2005 by a PRT executive steering committee chaired by the Afghan Minister of Interior, and the following mission statement was incorporated into the ISAF operational plan:

Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) will assist The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to extend its authority, in order to facilitate the development of a stable and secure environment in the identified area of operations, and enable Security Sector Reform (SSR) and reconstruction efforts.

NATO defines a PRT as “a joint, integrated military-civilian organisation, staffed and supported by ISAF member countries, operating at the provincial level within Afghanistan. A PRT is operated by a single nation or a coalition of two or more nations. A PRT is generally responsible for covering one province, but some have responsibility for two or more.” PRTs are the product of direct bi-lateral agreements between the establishing/lead nation and the Afghan national government, and as such, there were no country-wide or consistent agreements as to PRT size or composition or, indeed, what priorities would be pursued or activities individual PRTs would engage in; these decisions were determined by leadership in establishing nations and were influenced primarily by the proposed location of the PRT in relation to the perceived level of security in the province or region. For example, while the US led in 11 PRTs that were located in Regional Command East or South (regions most affected by violence), only the United Kingdom, Canada, the Netherlands, New Zealand and Turkey operated in those RCs, with the remainder of the lead nations concentrated in the relatively safer RCs North and West.

The gap to be investigated relates to an assessment of the effectiveness of the PRT model as a means of achieving operational-level objectives and, ultimately, contributing to the success of the CA strategy. NATO and ISAF stated that the PRT model has been successful and that, in their view, “PRTs are an effective, flexible, low-cost instrument

267. Ibid, 3.
268. Ibid, 4.
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that can easily be adapted to other conflicts.”

Not surprisingly, this view was shared with member nations which either led or contributed to PRTs, including the main contributor, the US.

Contrary positions identified three fundamental flaws in the PRT model that have contributed to a widely held assessment that PRTs have failed to meet their original promise. First, is the inherent resistance from the humanitarian community based upon the already well-understood concern with mixing military and civilian actors and processes into the same engagement space. Many humanitarian agencies objected to PRTs on grounds of ideology and principle and, thus, opted not to share information or cooperate with PRT-led initiatives. While this issue does not speak directly to the efficacy of the model itself, it does represent a significant driver.

Second is the difficulty associated with the independent nature of the PRTs based on strong levels of national control which largely determined how PRTs operated and set priorities. McNerney provides an example of the results of these different approaches: while the US-led Mazar PRT made it a priority to support civilian-led missions (such as police training, disarmament and judicial reform efforts), the US-led PRT in Gardez resisted State Department requests for police training assistance. Piiparinen suggests that PRTs could be described as no more than a “loosely coupled system” and that “the relationship between PRTs and ISAF HQ, as well as that between PRTs and RACs, could be described more as information-sharing than a coherent command structure.”

This sentiment was echoed by a senior Canadian Forces officer who stated that PRTs tended to operate on their own due to a lack of trust and communications between PRT and RC

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leadership, and when civilian workers from the Kandahar PRT visited RC South headquarters out of necessity, they worked in a location separated by a “physical wall.”

Third, and perhaps most vital, is the determination if the PRT model actually worked. This issue implicates two aspects of assessment or evaluation: the ability to measure outcomes of PRT activities and programs in relation to their stated goals as well as the ability to assess to what extent civil-military cooperation actually contributes to mission success (i.e., does the fact of civil-military cooperation enhance or improve the probability of achieving success more so than if there is no cooperation).

Zyck cited reports issued by Save the Children (2004), USAID (2008) and the US National Defense University (2009), all of which essentially concluded that PRTs did not have in place metrics or measures of effectiveness to determine if objectives were being met, and “no single evaluation or study of PRTs located by the author provided quantitative or structured qualitative evidence on how PRTs had improved access to education or medical care, impacted household incomes, reduced child mortality, improved security or had any other direct impact.” While assessments of PRT performance by individual lead or contributing nations may well have been conducted, these are not readily available or shared, and this may speak either to the imperatives of national control or the fact that the outcomes may not be palatable to those who were funding the PRT effort.

The second aspect of assessment or evaluation speaks to a determination if civil-military cooperation as practiced in the context of the PRT model actually contributed to the achievement of PRT objectives, and here again, there has been very little study of this issue. Rietjens asserts that “there still is no widely used framework to interpret the success or failure of civil military cooperation, nor is there a solid set of performance

measurements with which to frame an understanding of the raw data.”  

Ultimately, however, and in keeping with the planned transition to an Afghan lead in 2014, it is probable that all PRTs will be dismantled and the legacy of this model will be analysed in greater detail. This transition is evidently welcomed by Afghan leadership who believe that Afghan capacity will have increased to such a level that structures such as PRTs will no longer be necessary. Rynning views this transition more critically and posits that the PRT experience revealed that “the Western allies lacked a concept of intervention” and of particular relevance to this thesis that “the consistent lack of integrated thinking must be attributed to a wide and wavering strategic framework.”

*Tactical Capability Gaps*

NATO CIMIC doctrine addresses the issue of cultural competence in the context of principles governing the civil–military relationship and asserts that:

> a sustained competence towards civil and military culture, local customs and ways of life is of fundamental importance to all missions. Moreover, a common understanding of the role and position of man, women and children (gender) is essential for success. In a politically sensitive environment a thoughtless violation of a local law or custom can create highly unfavourable news and seriously undermine the mission’s chances of success.

Similarly, the COPD is concerned with the influence of culture in a context of assessing characteristics of actors in the engagement space in order to “begin to assess the receptivity, susceptibility and vulnerability of actors to different types of military influences, as well as their ability to adapt to changes in the strategic environment.” UK doctrine speaks to the significance of culture to the military and asserts that

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276. Rietjens, 42.
280. NATO. AJP-9 CIMIC, 2-2.
281. NATO. COPD, 3-26.
“enhancing cultural capability contributes to the success of operations through risk reduction and the exploitation of opportunities, including the potential to influence behaviours and perceptions.”282 The military’s interest in culture is also linked to the imperatives of COIN, in particular, as a means of “shaping” the population, and US COIN doctrine asserts that “successful conduct of COIN operations depends on thoroughly understanding the society and culture within which they are being conducted.”283

Davis argues that the renewed focus on culture (at least for the Canadian Forces) is directly linked to experience in Afghanistan and views “cultural intelligence” (CQ) as “an essential contributor to the ability to determine adversarial intent; to work effectively across joint, interagency, multinational and public domains (JIMP), to access and exercise whole of government (WoG) approaches, and to negotiate the demands of interrelated defence, diplomacy, and development (3D) objectives.”284 CQ is defined as “as the ability to recognize the shared beliefs, values, attitudes and behaviours of a group of people and, most importantly, to effectively apply this knowledge toward a specific goal or range of activities” and notes that “although CQ does not represent a mathematical relationship of capabilities in the same way as an intelligence quotient (IQ), it is considered to be a unique facet of intelligence; the usage of CQ parallels the use of Emotional Quotient (EQ) to refer to emotional intelligence.”285 Importantly, she also discriminates between cultural intelligence and mere cultural knowledge.286

Given the nominal attention paid to the importance of culture due, principally, to recent experiences in Afghanistan (and Iraq), troop-contributing nations developed pre-deployment training programs in order to provide forces with a measure of cultural knowledge and awareness, based upon analyses of political, economic and social information. In addition to delivering basic facts regarding the particular culture in

285. Ibid, xiii.
286. Ibid, 9.
question, additional skills and competencies (related to subjects such as cultural
sensitivity, relationship building, cross-cultural communication, language ability as well
as listening and observation skills) are occasionally offered, although these are generally
reserved for specialists such as CIMIC operators or special operations forces. Davis
asserts that while CQ does not consist of any one of these skills or competencies “in
isolation,” it does encompass most of them.287

Given that pre-deployment training is, by definition, the responsibility of troop-
contributing nations, the character and quality of that training is subject to national
faculty, availability of resources and the training priorities established for a given
mission, or phase of a mission. While most ISAF troop-contributing nations provided
some modicum of culturally related pre-deployment training, it has been generally
assessed that this was uneven across nations and rarely, if ever, attained the level of
proficiency implicated by CQ.288

Anecdotal evidence from deploying troops from across ISAF nations have indicated “that
present cultural awareness training provided prior to deploying to Afghanistan is not
sufficient,”289 and the author, as a recipient of the Canadian version of this training, can
personally attest to the assertion that “the cross-cultural training is dated, ineffective, too
academic, repetitious, too general, and often inaccurate.”290 This fact is particularly
worrisome in the context of the proposed transition of security from ISAF to ANSF,
which is based on an ability to effectively train Afghan forces.291

Selmeski underscores this requirement for cross-cultural skills in the context of a CA and
argues that “leaders must be able to work with a diverse group of people and
organizations ranging from 24-year-old congressional staffers, to Northern Alliance

287. Ibid, 11.
Training Program,” Thesis (Naval Post Graduate School, Monterey, California, 2005), 42.
290. Andi O’Conor et al, Cross-Cultural Training Strategies for Improving the Teaching,
Training, and Mentoring Skills of Military Transition Team Advisors, Report Prepared for the United States
Army Research Institute for the Behavioural and Social Sciences, Washington: eCrossCulture Corporation
(2009), 3.
291. Ibid, 1.
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warlords, to representatives from nongovernmental organizations.” He describes cross-cultural skills as a “meta-competency” and opines that military attempts to inculcate culturally attuned forces “tends to be a knee-jerk reaction to the deployment-of-the-day and focused on content delivery rather than fostering general competence across the profession.”

These observations do not apply solely to Canadian or US forces. For example, while the UK has been frequently touted as the very best of the Western nations to succeed at COIN (due to their long experience in Malaya and Northern Ireland and their ability to work successfully with other cultures), senior British observers have concluded that much greater emphasis must be placed on the cultural, as opposed to technical, aspects of modern conflict.

Integrated Interrogational Framework: Outcomes

The aim of the integrated interrogational framework was to provide a means of analysing the efficacy of the Comprehensive Approach to state-building strategy, as practised by NATO in the Afghanistan setting. The framework identified a series of initiatives undertaken by NATO at strategic, operational and tactical levels that were designed to be complimentary and mutually reinforcing.

At the strategic level, the focus was on gaining, building and strengthening external partnerships in order to leverage the capabilities of those organizations while simultaneously conducting strategic communications, both internally and externally, in order to influence both alliance and non-NATO actors that the mission was achievable if sufficient military and civilian capacity could be generated.

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293. Ibid, 26.

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At the operational level, NATO, and ISAF specifically, adopted counter-insurgency as a set of theories and practices to clear, hold and build specific provinces and regions of the country in order to suppress the growing insurgency and permit reconstruction and development activities to take effect. This was coupled with a significant effort to build host-nation security capacity in order to allow for a transition from a NATO lead to an Afghan lead not later than 2014, which was announced as the planned mission termination target date.

At the tactical level, ISAF and troop-contributing nations practised civil-military cooperation tactics, techniques and procedures with a view to maintaining force protection and undertaking quick impact projects that would have concrete, short-term positive impact on local populations and shift loyalties from local power brokers (and the insurgents) in favour of the central Afghan government, from whom this largesse was presumed to have emanated. The pinnacle of CIMIC organizational and structural manifestation was the PRT, which was introduced by the US following its incubation in the Iraq setting but quickly adopted by ISAF as a means of integrating available civilian capacity with built-in security in order to generate integrated reconstruction and development effects at the provincial level throughout the entire country.

In keeping with the structural approach to analysis, each of the three levels—strategic, operational and tactical—were interrogated from a perspective of concept, institution and capability given that these attributes are fundamental to the successful adoption and actualization a given strategy. In other words, the “right” concepts must be understood and communicated to an effective institution willing to adopt the concepts and generate the necessary capability to turn concept into action. To the extent that some aspect of this formula goes wanting, we may identify the problem as a type of gap that must, in order to be successful, be overcome. Each of these lines of inquiry were pursued with respect to the adoption and attempted actualization of the CA to state building in the Afghan setting, and a brief summary of the conceptual, institutional and capability gaps at each level now follows.
Chapter 3: Interrogating the Comprehensive Approach

Conceptual Gaps

Conceptual gaps were evident at all levels of analysis. At the strategic level, NATO’s desire to elicit support from non-NATO entities gave rise to a belief that effective partnerships could be created through focused dialogue supported by a dual-track narrative designed to provide a convincing rationale for external actors to support the NATO mission while simultaneously attempting to maintain Alliance cohesion in the face of an evolving mission objective and a surprisingly violent and robust insurgency.

Hampered by an “inability to speak with one voice to actors in the region,” NATO was additionally handicapped by a lack of understanding of the engagement space in which it was operating. This led to a series of serious issues, the most problematic of which was arguably a lack of appreciation of the regional dimensions of the conflict and resulted in a narrow focus on Afghanistan and a lost opportunity to engage other regional actors, particularly Pakistan, which were intimately involved in supporting the insurgency as a means of projecting strategic depth.

At the operational level, the conceptual gap related to a lack of coherent doctrine to support the CA. While the CA was increasingly introduced into a variety of NATO publications (and was the subject of numerous conferences, experiments and exercises), the lack of an organized and consistent doctrinal point of reference allowed for wide interpretation of the strategy amongst Alliance members, and this generated a “wide range of suggestions and disagreements as to what CA encompasses.” The lack of agreed doctrine led naturally to widely varying interpretations as to how the strategy ought to be actualized at the operational level.

Given the conceptual fluidity at the strategic and operational levels, it was not surprising to ascertain that the strategy could not be effectively understood at the tactical level. As this level relates to actions taken by military and civil players in the same engagement space, the CA as (loosely) interpreted allowed for a blurring of roles leading to inter-

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296. Mitchel, 12.
organizational friction and a lessening of integrated mission effectiveness. This problem was driven by a variety of other factors (including a lack of overall civilian capacity; the utilization of the PRT construct to achieve military objectives, such as intelligence gathering; and the entry of military actors into the “build” phase of the COIN campaign to the frustration of the humanitarian and developmental sectors).

Institutional Gaps

As an institution, NATO opted to declare the CA as extant strategy in order to achieve success in the complex operating environment of Afghanistan, specifically, as well as a guiding principle for all future crisis response operations that NATO might choose to engage in. That said, as late as 2010, the Alliance was “still in the process of laying the foundation for future institutionalization” of the CA and it was arguably “too late” to be of any use in Afghanistan. The adoption of new NATO capabilities, of which the CA would certainly qualify, is generally subject to a rigorous process under the rubric of the NATO CD & E policy; however, in the case of the CA, this policy was not followed with the result that the full panoply of institutional resources and processes could not effectively absorb or support it.

While NATO struggled to institutionalize the CA strategy internally, the imperatives of the increasingly dire situation in Afghanistan did not allow for lengthy analyses, and ISAF began to engage relevant non-NATO actors in order to leverage their capacities and generate the desired integrated effects. As these two systems, civil and military, engaged at the operational level in order to find mechanisms for effective cooperation and collaboration, the distinctive and enduring nature of these systems and organizations emerged as impediments. Analysis of various systemic and organizational elements revealed inimical and persistent characteristics across the realms of strategy, structures, systems, shared values, style, staff and skills, and it was concluded that that this exacerbated the dilemma of achieving an effective degree of coordination or collaboration in the context of a CA.

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Led by the United States, the Afghan COIN campaign was championed by General Petraeus from approximately 2009 onwards, resulting in a “military surge” that ended in 2011. The intent of this surge was to bring the level of deployed forces to one that would result in a suppression of the insurgency similar to what had (evidently) occurred in Iraq. Following a macro-level analysis of force ratios at the height of this surge, it was concluded that the mission was under resourced and that NATO and its troop-contributing nations were aware of the risks this lack of force generation and capacity would pose to the success of the COIN campaign and the mission in general.

Adding to the lack of military-force capacity, troop-contributing nations continued, in spite of pressure at all levels, to maintain national caveats that restricted how, when and where ISAF leadership could employ the forces theoretically under ISAF command. This fact created tensions within the Alliance, and as casualties mounted, the problem of national caveats eroded domestic support for the mission.

Of all the institutional efforts to actualize the CA strategy, the PRT model was the most visible manifestation. While touted by NATO and various Alliance members as a highly effective approach to contributing to reconstruction and development at the provincial level, there was widespread opposition to PRTs from humanitarian and development agencies, in part due to the widely varying nature of the PRTs themselves, given their bilateral and national foundations. While there were numerous ideological and practical criticisms of the PRT model, the most vital question was the determination of PRT effectiveness, and it was advanced by at least one analyst that no single evaluation or study of PRTs could reveal evidence that PRTs had improved any material aspect of the Afghan economy or society or “had any other direct impact.”

Capability Gaps

At the strategic level, NATO’s inability to overcome disagreements with important partners in the state-building enterprise, particularly the UN and EU, undermined the

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298. Zyck, 2.
“multinational ethos that is vital for mission success,” and it was argued that absent these global partnerships, a CA strategy could succeed only on the basis of having a strong lead nation, a concept that would ironically cause Alliance members and other partners to retreat into stovepipes—the exact antithesis of a CA.

Shifting to the operational level, virtually all NATO publications that referenced the CA deemed that a vital aspect of working with external partners was an ability to conduct joint military-civil planning and assessment. The vexing problem of how to achieve effective joint planning was the focus of much reflection and experimentation in NATO and member nations, and while several methods and processes were developed, especially at national level, it was identified that none of these had been effectively operationalized or institutionalized “in a way that has broken down the separate civilian and military stovepipes.”

The nature of the complex problems to be solved in the context of exogenous state building, combined with the inherent complexity of intra- and inter-organizational behaviours, requires an ability to solve these complex problems at a higher level of understanding than is currently possible with the processes and tools available to both military and civilian organizations. While new approaches, such as design, have evolved in order to attempt to address this capability shortfall, there remains the more fundamental challenge of conceiving a future condition or end state that can be agreed by all parties to state-building enterprise, especially the host nation itself.

The issue of the host nation rises clearly at the tactical level in the form of culture and the ability of intervening military forces (and civilian actors) to acquire and apply cultural intelligence, which is distinguished from and is viewed as a higher level of capability than cultural knowledge. The capability gap identified relates to the uneven delivery (or absence altogether) of appropriate pre-deployment training and awareness that might lead to the acquisition of cultural intelligence (as well as the resultant impact this has on cross-cultural relationships) and, of great significance in the Afghan context, the ability to

300. Pam in Schnaubelt, 45.
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 transfer knowledge and skills from one cultural perspective to another. Given the desire to transfer security from NATO to the ANSF, this cross-cultural training capability is vital to the NATO end state for transition by 2014.

In summary, it is clear that conceptual, institutional and capability gaps were identified at strategic, operational and tactical levels and that, far from transitory, these gaps reveal that the CA to state building in the Afghanistan setting was virtually bound for failure. Whether this strategy would succeed in another less complex engagement space (if such a space exists) is an open question. That said, important lessons may be derived from that experience including what does the failure of the CA in Afghanistan imply for NATO as an institution and for future NATO interventions into failing or failed states? Those questions will be the focus of Chapter 5.
Annex A to Chapter 3: Macro-level Analysis of COIN Force Ratios as at March 2011

The aim of this analysis is to provide a macro-level overview of COIN force ratios in Afghanistan at the height of the COIN campaign which I have identified as March 2011. Five key variables – timeframe, engagement space, insurgency size, counter-insurgency size and force ratio analysis – are described in Table 3 and the resulting calculations based on these variables are shown in Table 4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLE</th>
<th>SELECTIONS</th>
<th>RATIONALE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Timeframe</td>
<td>March 2011.</td>
<td>This was the “height” of the troop surge. It would be assumed that the surge level would be selected to maximize probability of mission success.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engagement Space</td>
<td>Entire country.</td>
<td>It has already been demonstrated that the insurgency was active throughout the country during the selected timeframe and that ISAF was to provide security on a country-wide basis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurgency Size</td>
<td>Low estimate. High estimate.</td>
<td>By using these estimates as a range, the analysis may provide insight into ISAF’s decisions and actions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter-Insurgency Size</td>
<td>ISAF forces only. ANSF forces only. ISAF plus ANSF forces.</td>
<td>By using these force sizes, the analysis may provide insight into the utility of ANSF forces to achieve mission success with/without ISAF assistance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force Ratio Analyses</td>
<td>Counter-insurgent to insurgent. Counter-insurgent to population.</td>
<td>Both methodologies have been shown to be utilized in the literature, and both may provide insights into the outcome of the Afghan counter-insurgency.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. COIN Analysis - Variables, Selection and Rationale
### Variable Data Data Sources

**Engagement Space**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Data Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Insurgency Size**

| Low Estimate | 20,000 | ISAF, Press Briefing, 3 December 2009 |
| High Estimate | 36,000 | Dr. Antonio Giustozzi, London School of Economics [http://www2.lse.ac.uk/researchAndExpertise/Experts/a.Giustozzi@lse.ac.uk#](http://www2.lse.ac.uk/researchAndExpertise/Experts/a.Giustozzi@lse.ac.uk#) |

**Counterinsurgency Size**

| ISAF forces only | 132,000 | [http://www.isaf.nato.int/troop-numbers-and-contributions/index.php](http://www.isaf.nato.int/troop-numbers-and-contributions/index.php) |
| ANSF forces only | 270,000 | Ibid: this represents 118,000 ANP and 152,000 ANA |
| ISAF plus ANSF forces | 402,000 | Ibid |

### Force Ratio Analysis

**Counterinsurgent/Insurgent Ratios**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>ISAF Forces Only/Low Insurgent Estimate</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>ISAF Forces Only/High Insurgent Estimate</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>ANSF Forces Only/Low Insurgent Estimate</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>ANSF Forces Only: High Insurgent Estimate</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>ISAF plus ANSF Forces/Low Insurgent Estimate</td>
<td>20.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>ISAF plus ANSF Forces/High Insurgent Estimate</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Counterinsurgent/Population Ratios**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>ISAF Forces Only/Population per 1000</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>ANSF Forces Only/Population per 1000</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>ISAF plus ANSF Forces/Population per 1000</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>ANP/Population per 1000</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4. Afghanistan COIN Macro Level Force Ratio Analysis as at March 2011
Analysis: Counter-insurgent to Insurgent Ratios

The analysis in Table 5 reveals a range of counter-insurgent to insurgent ratios from 6.6 to 20.1 which is the product of two major factors: the estimated size of the insurgency and the combinations of ISAF and ANSF forces. The range is wide enough to satisfy the requirements of the predominant theories although FM 3-24 (10–15:1) and Galula (10–20:1) are satisfied only by cases 3, 5, and 6, while Cable (2:1) and Theil (4:1) are satisfied by all cases.

A critical supporting variable to this analysis is the effectiveness of ANSF forces. For example, Case 3 assumes that only ANSF forces are engaged against the low insurgent estimate, and this is the only case where ANSF alone achieves a ratio within the doctrinal range of 10–15:1. Two factors are germane to this variable. First, it has already been stated that ISAF will withdraw the majority of its troops from Afghanistan by 2014 (if not earlier), and the prospect of ANSF leading the counter-insurgency campaign is, therefore, all too probable. If so, the effectiveness of that force, as opposed to its numerical size, becomes the critical factor, and based on my earlier analysis of the status of the ANSF at the end of 2011, the potential problem becomes obvious.

For example, it will be recalled that of as of early 2012 only 11 of 168 Army Kandaks were rated as independent, and if this ratio remains, this would represent approximately 6 percent of the total ANA.301 If this percentage were applied to the ANA force size in March 2011 and assuming a 50 percent ANP effectiveness level (which has not yet been achieved) the results of Case 3 would drop to a ratio of 3.4:1 (low insurgent estimate) or 1.89:1 (high insurgent level) respectively, results potentially lower than even Cable’s theory which assumes that a large portion of the force remains out of contact.

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**Analysis: Counter-insurgent to Population Ratios**

The analysis reveals a range of counter-insurgent to population ratios of 4 to 12.4 counter-insurgents per 1000 population, and this range fails to achieve the level of forces desired by FM 3-24 (20–25), McGrath (13.6) and Kozelka (20), it meets the threshold range set by Quinlivan (6.6–20) and exceeds that of Goode (2.8). The analysis also revealed that an ANP to population ratio of 3.6 is below the target of 4 police per 1000 population suggested by McGrath, but this again assumes an unrealistic 100 percent ANP effectiveness rate.

The challenge to this methodology is the identification of the specific engagement space in which the counter-insurgency is being conducted. While the macro analysis selected the entire country (based on an awareness that the insurgency was operating throughout Afghanistan in 2011) and in relation to ISAF’s mission objectives, it may be assumed that, like the population itself, counter-insurgent forces were not distributed evenly across the entire space. While counter-insurgent forces may move in order to mass in a specific area of operations in order to generate a high counter-insurgent to population ratio for a period of time, so too could the insurgents. Therefore, any overwhelming force ratio in favour of counter-insurgents in a localized area is likely to be temporary if they are unable to remain there for an extended period or if there are insufficient force levels overall (which this analysis would suggest was the case in March 2011) and this could result in overwhelming force ratios in favour of the insurgents in a different area of operations.
Chapter 4: The “State” of Afghanistan: Failure of the Comprehensive Approach

Aim

Chapter 2 provided the historical narrative of NATO’s growing involvement in Afghanistan and the background to its adoption of the Comprehensive Approach. As the Afghan mission thickened at all levels, NATO increasingly recognized that attaining and maintaining an appropriate security-development nexus was vital to achieving the international community’s desire to rid Afghanistan of the terrorist networks which had flourished prior to 9/11 and to building a fully functioning Afghan state, capable and willing of resisting the return of those terrorist elements in the future. Given that NATO did not possess the necessary civil capacity to engage in the full range of state-building endeavors envisioned and required, it adopted the Comprehensive Approach strategy in order to address the identified capacity gap.

The aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of the status of Afghanistan’s level of progress towards stabilization, reconstruction and development over the period 2006 to 2011. This is achieved, first, via an overview of two key evaluation regimes—the Afghan National Development Strategy and the ISAF Campaign Plan—in order to describe the key state-building objectives of NATO and the Afghan national government, and second, through a comparative analysis of key effects and outcomes embedded in those regimes to empirical open-source data from various actor cluster perspectives. The conclusion of the summary evaluation is that in 2011 Afghanistan may be evaluated as a failing, if not failed, state and that state building initiatives by NATO and other entities failed to achieve their objectives. More specifically, the desired end state of the ISAF campaign design was not achieved nor were most of the expected outcomes of the ANDS.

Of course, NATO was not alone in Afghanistan. The US, as both lead NATO actor and an important actor unto itself, was also engaged in state-building efforts, and many of the criticisms offered with respect to the Comprehensive Approach may be applied equally to
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the US and other Alliance members who adopted similar concepts. In addition to NATO and the US, many important international organizations, such as the UN, attempted to improve conditions in Afghanistan, and thousands of non-governmental organizations, ranging from the very largest to the very smallest, were on the ground, as indeed many of them were prior to the US intervention in 2001.¹

That said, NATO assessed the complexity involved in state building and accepted, if reluctantly, that challenge, leading to a decision to attempt to engage and coordinate all of the disparate actors in the Afghan theatre of operations. This, in turn, led to the adoption of the Comprehensive Approach strategy. To affirm that NATO expended considerable effort at strategic, operational and tactical levels to achieve this in Afghanistan is correct; to assert that it failed to achieve the necessary synergy is also correct and, more importantly, that the results of those efforts were ultimately insignificant. It is to those results that I now turn.

Campaign Assessment and Evaluation Regimes

Unlike conflicts in which tactical military action may decide the outcome of an operational-level campaign and produce a decisive strategic victory, efforts to stabilize and reconstruct Afghanistan in the midst of an active insurgency engendered a different concept of victory, based on the degree to which the state was stabilizing and developing consistent with a Western-imposed model. Thus, military assessments and civilian evaluations² of how the state and its component characteristics and elements were changing over time generated a vast array of data through which attempts were made to judge the status of the campaign and provide evidence of the extent to which its operational and strategic objectives were being achieved.

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¹ “Afghanistan has two main categories of registered, nongovernmental, not for profit organizations with legal entity status: NGOs which number approximately 2000 and social organizations which number approximately 3100 both as of April 2012.” Council on Foundations - United States International Grantmaking, accessed 5 September 2013; available from http://www.usig.org/countryinfo/afghanistan.asp.

² For clarity, the term “assessment” will refer to a military assessment regime, such as a campaign design, while the term “evaluation” will refer to civilian programs.
Much like the story of the blind man and the elephant, assessments and evaluations of progress in Afghanistan were linked to the perspectives of the actors undertaking them, and six major actor clusters may be identified:

- **Afghan cluster** including national-, provincial- and district-level government entities, Afghan-led NGOs and other Afghan civil-society entities;

- **Military cluster** including NATO (NATO Alliance Council, Supreme Allied Command Operations, Headquarters Joint Force Command Brunssum, ISAF) and participating Alliance members;

- **International organization cluster** including United Nations, World Bank and European Union;

- **Donor cluster** including individual nations which provided financial or other aid on a direct bi-lateral basis including nations which deployed provincial reconstruction teams;

- **Non-governmental cluster** including the International Red Cross and Crescent, CARE, the International Crisis Group, and Médecins Sans Frontières; and

- **Analytical community cluster** including such organizations as the Brookings Institute, Afghan Analysts Network (AAN), Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), British Agencies Afghanistan Group (BAAG) and the European Network of National Civil Society Organizations (ENNA).

Each of these clusters and the individual organizations that constituted them focused on aspects of change within the country based on their perspective, organizational mission and specific objectives, and as a result, a plethora of assessment and evaluation regimes produced a vast quantity of information, frequently producing incongruous findings. This is true within NATO itself, wherein different versions of campaign assessment methodologies and metrics were maintained at strategic, operational and tactical levels,
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and decisions as to which metrics would be tracked and analysed frequently changed with theatre-level headquarter rotations to meet the desires of an incoming commander.³

Campaign assessment is a relatively recent operational concept and is defined as “the continuous monitoring and evaluation of the current situation and progress of a joint operation toward mission accomplishment.”⁴ In complex operations, such as the Afghanistan mission, many facets of the operational environment may provide indications of campaign progress (or lack thereof), and the selection of what to measure, by whom and when was extremely important. As an example of the difficulties associated with determining how to conduct and maintain campaign assessment effectively, the following issues were identified following a study by me of the status of campaign assessment practices in JFCB in 2006:

There was not widespread knowledge of campaign assessment throughout JFCB and the concentration of those few people involved with it continually rotated out. There was no institutionalized method to ensure that their knowledge was captured and passed on to the next generation of planners, operators and analysts who were subsequently responsible for campaign assessment both in the field and in the HQ. There was a tendency to focus on short-term issues and specific problems that were raised in most campaign assessment reports and campaign assessment evolved into a short-term issue focused reporting mechanism. As a result, its primary value as a gauge towards mission end-state was undermined. There was no official NATO doctrine related to campaign assessment and the gradual transition towards an effects-based approach to operations created gaps in knowledge and provided unintended opportunities for individuals and staffs to fill those gaps with ad hoc solutions.⁵

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³ At one stage, Joint Force Command Brunssum (JFCB), the operational-level headquarters overseeing ISAF, was tracking (with my assistance) approximately 300 campaign metrics on a monthly basis in order to provide the commander with an overall assessment of how well the ISAF mission was progressing. That many of these metrics were qualitative in nature, and thus subject to the interpretation of personnel assigned to collect them in the field, added to the scepticism surrounding the assessment process in general, and the accuracy of the reported data on which important decisions needed to be based.

⁴ United States, United States Joint Publication 3, Joint Operations, 45.

Assessment and Evaluation in Afghanistan

It is necessary to distinguish between campaign assessment, which is a military-driven activity, and the act of tracking and evaluating social, economic and other data for public policy purposes or in order to support the targeting of aid or development efforts or funding. The former activity is designed to provide military commanders and planners with information regarding the status of objectives embedded within a military campaign or operations plan, while the latter is undertaken to support public policy and development objectives in the broadest sense.

In the Afghanistan scenario, these two distinct activities became conflated as NATO elected to embed public policy and development indicators within their military plans. This was based on a rationale that achievement of an appropriate security-development nexus was key to stabilizing the country and region and, therefore, to mission success. That very few of the development indicators (and the assets and actions necessary to improve them) were controlled by NATO created a situation in which either military resources were expended in non-military spheres (such as the delivery of humanitarian aid or funding of development projects) or military organizations attempted to control how civilian organizations operated in order to align their activities and objectives with the military campaign: this may be appreciated as another interpretation of the Comprehensive Approach in action.

While it is clear that a large number of assessment and evaluation regimes were utilized by a multitude of organizations to track change in Afghanistan, for the purpose of this thesis, I am primarily concerned with the regimes utilized by NATO and the Afghan national government. NATO, and more specifically its subordinate headquarters ISAF, developed the ISAF campaign plan which evolved over time in response to changing conditions on the ground. That said, it remained relatively consistent over the entire period in relation to its end state, major lines of operation and desired effects. The success of this campaign plan, or lack thereof, may be considered as a benchmark of NATO’s Comprehensive Approach strategy, as it fully incorporated both military and non-military goals and its end state sought an integrated civil-military solution.
With respect to the Afghan perspective, the ANDS provided the plan for how the Afghan national government sought to portray and pursue its overarching development objectives and align them with the actions, objectives and resources of the international community. The ANDS outlined goals which were supported by specific development metrics across all aspects of Afghan society, economy and governance, and it is, therefore, appropriate that while I examine the degree to which NATO achieved its objectives, the perspective of the Afghan state itself is highly germane to any evaluation of the intervention.

The Afghanistan National Development Strategy: Historical Lineage

The ANDS has its historical roots in the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) of September 2000. The MDGs addressed the following development-related objectives:

- eradicate extreme poverty and hunger;
- achieve universal primary education;
- promote gender equality and empower women;
- reduce child mortality;
- improve maternal health;
- combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases;
- ensure environmental sustainability; and
- develop a global partnership for development.

Each of these MDGs incorporated a series of specific targets to be achieved generally by the year 2015. MDG 1, for example, included a target to “halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose income is less than $1.25 a day.”7 The MDGs were the primary expression of the UN Millennium Declaration (Declaration) embodied in UN

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7. Ibid.
General Assembly Resolution 55/2 which outlined the UN’s commitment to a series of shared values and principles, leading to a number of key objectives.

These objectives addressed and defined the UN’s goals with respect to peace, security and disarmament; development and poverty eradication; protecting the common environment; human rights, democracy and good governance; protecting the vulnerable; meeting the special needs of Africa; and strengthening the United Nations.\(^8\) Embedded within each of these key objectives were several time-bound resolutions to take specific actions to address global issues or to achieve the objectives of previously approved international programs.\(^9\)

Following the Declaration, the UN mounted the UN Millennium Campaign and the Millennium Project in 2002 in order to “develop a concrete action plan for the world to achieve the MDGs and to reverse the grinding poverty, hunger and disease affecting billions of people.”\(^10\) The project resulted in a report to the UN Secretary General in 2005 entitled “Investing in Development: A Practical Plan to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals.”\(^11\)

With respect to Afghanistan, the Afghanistan constitution approved in January 2004 evolved out of the Afghan Constitution Commission as mandated by the Bonn Agreement of 2001. Although the constitution did not specifically refer to the MDGs, the preamble provided a series of statements related to civil society; the rule of law; social justice; protection of human rights; and the “strengthening of political, social, economic, and defensive institutions of the country.”\(^12\) It indicated as well that the constitution observed the United Nations Charter and respected the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

\(^{8}\) United Nations, General Assembly Resolution 55/2, 18 September 2000.

\(^{9}\) As an example of the latter, Para 25 of the section addressing Human Rights, Democracy and Good Governance includes the resolution to combat all forms of violence against women and to implement the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (noted as UN General Assembly Resolution 34/180, annex).


\(^{11}\) See [http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/reports/fullreport.htm](http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/reports/fullreport.htm).

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In March 2004, the Afghan national government endorsed the Millennium Declaration and the MDGs with a caveat that extended the target dates from 2015 to 2020 with an Afghan-specific baseline of 2002 to 2005. This was due to “lost decades and the lack of available information.”\(^{13}\)

On 31 January 2006, the Afghan national government and the international community met in London in order to “strengthen their partnership to improve the lives of Afghan people, and contribute to national, regional, and global peace and security.”\(^{14}\) The result of the London Conference was the Afghanistan Compact, essentially a political agreement binding the Afghan national government and the international community towards the achievement of the Afghan MDGs (AMDGs).

This political agreement was closely joined to the *Interim Afghanistan National Development Strategy (I-ANDS)*, also published in 2006, which provided for the first time a detailed roadmap of the Afghan government’s plan to achieve the AMDGs. The *I-ANDS* represented a significant initiative given that it was Afghan-led and incorporated not only specific targets and indicators across the full spectrum of security, governance as well as economic and social development but also direction for the execution of plans to meet those targets, including a delineation of budget management and monitoring and coordination processes and structures such as the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board, the Afghanistan Development Forum and the Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief.

*The Afghanistan National Development Strategy: 2008*

The I-ANDS remained extant until the promulgation of the full ANDS in 2008, which laid out national development targets for the five-year period 2009–2013. The ANDS reads, in part:


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The ANDS serves as Afghanistan’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) and uses the pillars, principles and benchmarks of the Afghanistan Compact as a foundation. The pillars and goals of the ANDS are:

1. **Security**: Achieve nationwide stabilization, strengthen law enforcement, and improve personal security for every Afghan.

2. **Governance, Rule of Law and Human Rights**: Strengthen democratic processes and institutions, human rights, the rule of law, delivery of public services and government accountability.

3. **Economic and Social Development**: Reduce poverty, ensure sustainable development through a private-sector-led market economy, improve human development indicators, and make significant progress towards the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

A further vital and cross-cutting area of work is eliminating the narcotics industry, which remains a formidable threat to the people and state of Afghanistan, the region and beyond.\textsuperscript{15}

The three pillars of security, governance and the economy represent the core of the ANDS, and these pillars incorporated 124 expected outcomes, generating 760 specific policy actions or activities, supported by 253 indicators. Expected outcomes ranged from the very broad to the very specific, and the associated policy actions conformed to this pattern. The 253 indicators are predominantly quantitative in nature and were accompanied by baseline data and targets, although a significant number of these remained “under assessment.”

Given the fragile status of Afghanistan’s nascent governmental, organizational and structural capacities during this period, the number, scope and sophistication of the ANDS-expected outcomes and policy actions arguably reflected a Western-oriented perspective towards state building, and although the ANDS was ostensibly an Afghan project, the document reveals a propensity towards outcomes and actions which would be consistent with those IOs and NGOs from which the funding for these initiatives would be largely derived.

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**ISAF Campaign Plan**

As previously discussed, ISAF was created as a result of UNSCR 1386 in December 2001 with a mandate to “assist the Afghan Interim Authority in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas, so that the Afghan Interim Authority as well as the personnel of the United Nations can operate in a secure environment.” Between December 2001 and August 2003 the ISAF mission was led successively by the UK, Turkey and Germany (ISAF I, II and III) and in August 2003, NATO formally accepted command of ISAF. Although NATO originally intended to assign responsibility for ISAF IV to Regional Headquarters Allied Forces North (RHQ AFNORTH), it was determined that it was not fully prepared to deploy, and as a result, the mission was delegated to Joint Headquarters Centre (JHQ CENT), an army-centric, tactical-level headquarters subordinate to RHQ AFNORTH.

Although authorized by the UN in October 2003 to expand beyond Kabul to all of Afghanistan, ISAF IV was not sufficiently resourced with troops or equipment to accomplish this, and the focus remained on Kabul and its immediate environs throughout its seven-month tour. During this period, the ISAF IV campaign plan was developed based on staff work previously undertaken by ISAF III; the ISAF IV campaign plan schematic is shown at Figure 10.

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17. The revised NATO command and control structure adopted in 2004 resulted in RHQ AFNORTH being designated as Headquarters Joint Force Command Brunssum (HQ JFCB), and JHQ CENT was renamed to Component Command – Land Headquarters Heidelberg (CC-Land HQ HD).
18. The DPs highlighted in blue (DP 11 Loya Jirga and DP 13 General Election) were considered vitally important to the achievement of the overall campaign. The ISAF IV Campaign Plan schematic and all subsequent examples of ISAF products were kindly provided by LCol K. W. Smith (Retired), a former member of the ISAF IV planning staff.
The purpose of campaign design is to “understand conceptually the broad solutions for attaining mission accomplishment and to reduce the uncertainty of a complex operational environment.” \(^{19}\) Figure 10 is a typical example of a military campaign design in that it illustrates several standard conceptual design elements including (in this instance) five lines of operation, supported by several decisive points (DPs), leading to a “centre of gravity” and the achievement of an “end state.”

Lines of operation signify conceptual progressions of mission accomplishment represented by a series of linked DPs or effects denoting physical or nonphysical changes in a significant aspect of the strategic, operational or tactical environment; although this concept is most frequently applied at the operational level. It should be noted that DPs do not equate to decision points, which are often anticipated in temporal, conditional or physical aspects of a campaign and which may cause the commander to take a decision upon realization of such aspects. The concept of a centre of gravity, a key Clausewitzian concept, is defined as “the hub of all power and movement, on which everything

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depends. That is the point against which all our energies should be directed.” As can be noted in the ISAF IV campaign design this was defined as “Afghan willingness and capability to act responsibly.”

I submit three observations with respect to this campaign design in particular. First, there is no necessary conceptual dependency between the successful achievement of the centre of gravity and the attainment of the end state; the ISAF perception of what constituted acting responsibly would not necessarily lead to the establishment of a fully constituted and functioning Afghan security force. Second, while the end state envisioned for ISAF IV concentrated on the future capability of the Afghan security force, it is evident that several DPs clearly supported humanitarian, reconstruction or governance objectives (for example DPs 1, 5, 8, 12, 13 and 14). As such, this represents an early indication of ISAF’s appreciation that more than merely military force was required to achieve the strategic objective. Third, there are no dependencies displayed between or amongst the DPs appearing on different lines of operation. For example, DP 8, the attainment of full operational capability for Kabul International Airport (KIA), was critical for the attainment of DPs 5 and 14—establishment and handover of humanitarian/reconstruction structures—yet it remains isolated in the “protect the mission” line of operation.

The overall ISAF campaign was conceived as a series of phases, and each phase resulted in adaptations to the original campaign design. Phase I, Assessment and Preparation, included operations to secure Kabul and environs; this phase was essentially completed by October 2004. Phase II addressed the physical expansion of ISAF forces throughout Afghanistan and was concluded by October 2006. Phase III, Stabilization, was initiated in 2006 and remained arguably extant throughout 2011.

Given the announcement by NATO and the US to be fully disengaged from combat operations by 2013 leading to a significant withdrawal of troops by 2014, it is clear that the emphasis placed on conditions allowing for the adoption of the transition phase was, over time, superseded by a pre-determined decrease in force-level requirements. By 2006, the ISAF campaign design had evolved into one that focused on three major pillars of

20. Clausewitz, On War, 596.
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security, governance and social-economic development in order to mirror the priorities of the ANDS and this campaign design, with minor variations, remained extant throughout 2011; this design is shown at Figure 11.

![Campaign Design - COMISAF Vision of Resolution](image)

**Figure 11. Campaign Design - COMISAF Vision of Resolution**

In addition to grouping numerous effects within the three pillar model, this design also highlighted a number of significant, if subtly illustrated, concepts and intentions. First, it should be noted that while NATO opted to lead the security pillar and support the governance and social-economic development pillars, these pillars, in fact, overlapped, and this underscored the direct participation by NATO in these non-security related functions.

Second, while the design provided for multiple end states, (ISAF, NATO, Government of Afghanistan and the UN), the end states were not clearly articulated but appear to be represented by the achievement of a cluster of DPs across all three pillars. Similarly, it is
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not clear which effects in which pillars are linked to a given end state. For example, could the ISAF end state be achieved if the effect related to establishing basic civil infrastructure was not accomplished?

Third, while each of the three pillars supported a desired outcome, the design did not provide a means of understanding how these outcomes were interlinked, nor did it provide any indication of relative criticality or suggest that variations in time to accomplish these conditions were considered. As mentioned previously, while the ISAF campaign plan did evolve over time (primarily in response to the lack of progress on the ground), it remained quite consistent throughout the period of study, and this was reflected in the new COMISAF’s initial assessment of the situation in 2009.

Farrell and Rynning submit that NATO “had an operational plan but no real campaign plan and no strategic guidance.”21 As a member of the operational analysis branch in HQ JFCB in 2005-2006, and a staff officer in ISAF HQ in 2008, I would offer a view that NATO invested a great deal of effort to develop ISAF campaign plans which were nested in a higher level political, i.e. strategic, setting. That said, I would agree with Osinga and Russell’s later assessment that “the organization [NATO] proved itself unable to develop strategic coherence on the ground in Afghanistan,”22 as, indeed, this speaks directly to the difficulties associated with the Comprehensive Approach as state-building strategy.

Prior to transitioning to the central issue of assessing the effectiveness of the ISAF campaign in the context of the Comprehensive Approach, it will be useful to briefly highlight the theoretical and terminological differences between military assessment and civilian evaluation regimes. Having already introduced a variety of military terms to describe aspects of a campaign and campaign design and the relevance of these to the achievement of operational and strategic objectives, it will be profitable to situate this within a broader theoretical model of evaluation.


Terminology Mapping Between Military Assessment and Civilian Evaluation Regimes

Table 5 maps comparative civilian and military terms utilized in respective evaluation regimes. Underpinning both civilian and military evaluation regimes is an acceptance of systems’ theory as a means of understanding the environment in which a military campaign or civilian program will be undertaken, and general systems’ theory provided the basis of NATO’s EBAO doctrine, which was previously identified as a precursor to the Comprehensive Approach.23

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civilian24</th>
<th>Military (NATO)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Program goals</td>
<td>End state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Descriptive program theory</td>
<td>Systemic analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normative program theory</td>
<td>Effects-based plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generalization theory</td>
<td>No direct comparison</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervening mechanism theory</td>
<td>Effects development and linkage with actions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact theory</td>
<td>Change in effects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome theory</td>
<td>Effects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementation environment theory</td>
<td>Considered as part of actions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment theory</td>
<td>Actions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generalization evaluation</td>
<td>No direct comparison, but considered implicitly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervening mechanism evaluation</td>
<td>Effect-action analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact evaluation</td>
<td>MOE analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome evaluation</td>
<td>Effects development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementation environment evaluation</td>
<td>Considered as part of MOP analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment evaluation</td>
<td>MOP analysis</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5. Terminology Mapping Between Military Assessment and Civilian Evaluation Regimes

In this context, systems’ theory posits that actions or treatments taken in relation to specific aspects of the environment will produce effects or outcomes which are measureable via analysis or evaluation. Both regimes distinguish between the degree of accomplishment of an action or treatment (in military terminology a measure of performance [(MOP)] and the degree of accomplishment of an effect or outcome (in military terminology a measure of effectiveness [(MOE)]). Again, in both regimes, there is a desire to understand how actions or treatments generate effects or outcomes, as this analysis may lead to adjustments in the overall campaign or program.

It was earlier identified that DPs denote physical or nonphysical changes or effects in an aspect of the operational environment and, as such, they are generally equated with effects and written so as to describe the desired condition or change in the environment. For example, from Figure 11 the DP “Afghan Borders Controlled” describes a condition which was not present in the operational environment at the point in time in which the campaign design was developed but was considered to be a significant and desirable effect to be achieved. In contrast, from Figure 10, DP 7 “Initiate synchronized operations” is not in fact a DP or an effect, but a description of an intended set of actions. These examples illustrate the evolution and more nuanced understanding of effects-based theory in military planning between 2003 and 2008.

**Methodology**

Having now described the history, context and underlying theories associated with the ISAF campaign design for Afghanistan and the *Afghan National Development Strategy*, it will be useful to map the ISAF desired effects to key *ANDS* expected outcomes, given the theoretical equivalency of effects and outcomes in this context. From a temporal perspective, the comparative analysis focuses on the period from approximately 2006 to 2011; 2006 being the year in which the *I-ANDS* was initially promulgated and NATO formally adopted the Comprehensive Approach and which was reflected in the ISAF three-pillar model featured in its campaign design.
While each of the ANDS 124 expected outcomes may be considered important in the context of the overall plan, this analysis identified those outcomes most comparable to the ISAF effects displayed in Figure 11. The advantages of this approach are that: first, it allows for a reasonably direct comparison of effects and outcomes viewed as significant to both ISAF and the Afghan national government, and second, the 26 ISAF effects included in the campaign design relate to highly critical elements of the ANDS, and it may be posited that a study of these representative elements may lead to an appreciation of the whole.

Annex A to Chapter 4 maps the ISAF desired effects illustrated in Figure 11 to corresponding ANDS expected outcomes, and these have been organized in accordance with the three pillars of security, governance and social-economic development. Consistent with the campaign design for those security effects which overlapped the other two pillars, these have been organized into distinct “sub-pillars.” For each ISAF effect, a corresponding ANDS expected outcome has been identified and in several instances it was deemed necessary to include more than one expected outcome along with their corresponding indicators, baselines and target data from the ANDS (if provided).

**Evaluation Data Sources**

For each pillar, sub-pillar and overall summary, an evaluation of the degree to which the ANDS expected outcomes were achieved for approximately the period 2006–2011 is offered based on the availability of data in relation to the corresponding ANDS indicators. In some cases, data corresponding to the indicator or the timeframe was not available, and where data not corresponding to the timeframe is used to support an evaluation this is noted.

With respect to evaluation data sources, a number of selected data schemas from each of the six actor assessment and evaluation clusters introduced earlier were identified and studied. The selected actors are provided at the end of the bibliography, and data selected to support evaluation identified in specific sources is cited for each specific observation.
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It should be noted that in all cases the data cited emanates from non-classified sources. While this is necessary in order to allow for dissemination of this thesis into non-classified environments, this is not unduly restrictive. Many classified reports necessarily draw on unclassified sources given that various international, governmental and non-governmental organizations possess the focus, credibility and expertise required to analyze specific aspects of the environment in question. Given the size, scope and organizational maturity of the actors selected for this analysis it was possible, in most cases, to identify data points for both the 2006 and 2011 timeframes from the same source(s). This is important, of course, given that this significantly improves the probability that the data collection processes and subsequent analysis was consistent over time and therefore validates the ability to make the observations and comparisons offered. In all cases, the data was drawn from readily accessible print-based or on-line published reports.
Annex A to Chapter 4: Mapping ISAF-Desired Effects and Corresponding ANDS-Expected Outcomes to Selected Indicator Results, 2006–2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pillar</th>
<th>ISAF Desired Effect</th>
<th>ANDS Expected Outcome</th>
<th>ANDS Indicators</th>
<th>ANDS Baseline</th>
<th>ANDS Target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>S1</td>
<td>Afghans accept ISAF’s role</td>
<td>No equivalent</td>
<td>No equivalent</td>
<td>No equivalent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**S1 Evaluation ANDS Indicator: No equivalent**

**Selected Indicators:**
1. Between 2006 and 2011, the percentage of Afghans surveyed who believed the country was “moving in the wrong direction” due to security issues increased from 6 to 45%.¹
2. Between 2006 and 2011, the percentage of Afghans surveyed who cited insecurity as the country’s biggest problem increased from 27 to 38%.²
3. In 2010, 6% of Afghans surveyed believed that violence was due to foreign forces—this increased to 8% in 2011.³
4. In 2011, 76% of Afghans surveyed indicated that encountering foreign forces was their greatest cause of fear (higher than any other category).⁴
5. In 2011, 21% of Afghans surveyed believed that the main reason illegally armed groups (IAGs) were fighting was due to the presence of foreign troops.⁵
6. Of those surveyed by the United Nations Development Program in 2010, 55% were “unfavourable” towards ISAF and international forces.⁶

**Quote:** “The international forces are considered responsible for inadequately taking into consideration the consequences their operations can have on the civil population; for their incapability to distinguish the innocent civilians from the ‘rebels’; for their indiscriminate air-bombings and night raids, and for house-searching. One of the most commonly heard complaints is the feeling that the foreign troops do not act within the limits of a defined legal system, and instead exclusively respond to their own code of conduct, free of any public accountability. All the interviewees ask for clear and accessible instruments that they can use when they feel a situation of injustice is being imposed on them by the foreign troops.”⁷

**Evaluation:** ISAF’s desired effect of having Afghans “accept ISAF’s role” is an early expression of what will later be labelled “winning hearts and minds” in the context of conducting counter-insurgency operations (COIN). It also reflects a desire on the part of ISAF to be able to conduct operations without interference from the indigenous population and, at the very least, not support IAGs, i.e. the Taliban.

**Based on the indicators selected, it may be evaluated that ISAF Desired Effect S1 was not achieved by 2011.**

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² Ibid.
³ Ibid.
⁴ Ibid.
⁵ Ibid.
⁷ INTERSOS, *The Foreign Troops Through the Afghan Eyes: opinions, perceptions and rumors in Herat, Farah and Badghis, November 2011*
### ANNEX A

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pillar</th>
<th>ISAF Desired Effect</th>
<th>ANDS Expected Outcome</th>
<th>ANDS Indicators</th>
<th>ANDS Baseline</th>
<th>ANDS Target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>S2</td>
<td>Afghans accept Afghan National Army</td>
<td>Enhanced public trust on government ability to deliver justice and security as IAGs are disbanded and reintegrated.</td>
<td># of districts cleared from IAGs</td>
<td>21 districts complied</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**S2 Evaluation**  
**ANDS Indicator:** # of districts cleared from IAGs.

**Selected Indicators:**
1. Over the 12 months between 1 July 2010 and 30 June 2011, a total of 2099 damaging attacks were recorded in Afghanistan, with damaging attacks classed as operations by sub-state armed actors which directly resulted in loss of life, damage, or disruption.  
2. These attacks represent a 19.3% increase from the preceding 12 months and equate to an average operational tempo of 175 attacks per month.  
3. These attacks occurred in all 33 provinces of Afghanistan.  
4. The majority of insurgent violence in the period was recorded in the south of Afghanistan, with the provinces of Helmand (372 attacks) and Kandahar (262 attacks) accounting for 30% of all recorded attacks.

*Quote:* “These two southern provinces remain the heartland of the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan and levels of violence were significantly high for a number of reasons. Firstly, ISAF forces had a significant contingent of troops in the region, with an estimated 16,200 soldiers in Helmand alone, providing a significant and attractive target of opportunity. Secondly, ISAF and Afghan forces attempted to clear insurgent-held areas in these provinces and hold them in order to promote stability, governance, and central government rule. Such operations increasingly made security forces the target of insurgent operations.”

**Evaluation:** The ANDS indicator assumes that once a district or area has been “cleared from IAGs” that the IAGs will not return to that location as they are “disbanded or reintegrated.” This assumption has been clearly and consistently shown to be incorrect over the entire period of 2001–2011. During earlier periods, the northern and western sectors of the country were relatively violence-free, but by 2008, IAGs were attacking ISAF and Afghan-government targets throughout the country. Several districts, particularly in southern Afghanistan, have been fought for on successive occasions as the IAGs seek to regain control over vital population areas or key logistic points or transit routes. In 2011, it was accepted that IAGs were capable of striking anywhere in the country.

**Based on the indicators selected, it may be evaluated that ISAF Desired Effect S2 was not achieved by 2011.**

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9. Ibid.  
10. Ibid.  
11. Ibid.  
12. Ibid.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pillar</th>
<th>ISAF Desired Effect</th>
<th>ANDS Expected Outcome</th>
<th>ANDS Indicators</th>
<th>ANDS Baseline</th>
<th>ANDS Target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>S3  Afghan General Staff and Ministry of Defence Mission Capable</td>
<td>ANA operationally capable of performing those missions and tasks assigned.</td>
<td># of recruited ANA personnel</td>
<td>64,996 (Apr 2008)</td>
<td>80,000 (end 2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>% of ANA personnel trained</td>
<td>77% (2008)</td>
<td>100% (2013)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**S3 Evaluation**  
**ANDS Indicators:** # of recruited ANA personnel / % of ANA personnel trained

**Selected Indicators:**
1. As at October 2011, the ANA had 173,150 personnel on strength.13
2. As at October 2011, the ANA annual attrition rate was 32.4%.14
3. In August 2011, the total number of reporting ANA units in the field increased to 204, and the number of units achieving an operational effectiveness rating of “effective with assistance” or higher was sustained at 147; alternatively, 37 units (18 %) of fielded ANA units are in the lowest assessment categories, “developing” or “established,” due to an inability to perform their mission or the immaturity of a newly fielded unit.15
4. The ANA’s highest-rated kandak, 2nd kandak, 2nd Brigade, 205th Corps, which achieved the rating of “independent” remains dependent on ISAF for combat support and combat enablers. In locations without a large ISAF footprint, the ANA has exhibited little improvement and there is little reporting on their operational strengths and weaknesses.16

**Evaluation:** When the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) stood up in November 2009, the focus was on reversing the negative growth trends of the Afghan National Security Force and producing soldiers and police to meet the needs of counter-insurgency operations. By 2011, the size of the ANA had increased well beyond the original projections as laid out in the ANDS due to the growing understanding of the international community that the Afghan national government would require a large, capable military force to ensure security and stability once ISAF forces withdrew. While the size of the force increased as the international community assigned significant funding and personnel to the training mission, the overall quality remained highly fragile with virtually no formed Afghan units capable of operating independent of ISAF forces or without direct ISAF enabling support.

**Based on the indicators selected, it may be evaluated that ISAF Desired Effect S3 was partially achieved by 2011.**

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14. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pillar</th>
<th>ISAF Desired Effect</th>
<th>ANDS Expected Outcome</th>
<th>ANDS Indicators</th>
<th>ANDS Baseline</th>
<th>ANDS Target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>S4</td>
<td>Afghans accept Afghan National Police (ANP)</td>
<td>Enhanced public trust on government ability to deliver justice and security as IAGs are disbanded and reintegrated.</td>
<td># of districts cleared from IAGs</td>
<td>21 districts complied</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S5</td>
<td>Security and governance in key zones</td>
<td>Enhanced public trust on government ability to deliver justice and security as IAGs are disbanded and reintegrated.</td>
<td># of districts cleared from IAGs</td>
<td>21 districts complied</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S6</td>
<td>IAGs integrated or marginalized</td>
<td>Enhanced public trust on government ability to deliver justice and security as IAGs are disbanded and reintegrated.</td>
<td># of districts cleared from IAGs</td>
<td>21 districts complied</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*S4/S5/S6 Evaluation  ANDS Indicator: # of districts cleared from IAGs.*

*Selected Indicators, Sources and Evaluation: As per S2*
Chapter 4: Annex A

### Security

**Pillar**: S7

**ISAF Desired Effect**: ANP sufficiently developed

**ANDS Expected Outcome**: ANP operationally capable of performing those missions and tasks assigned and crime rates reduced.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ANDS Indicators</th>
<th>ANDS Baseline</th>
<th>ANDS Target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td># of recruited ANP personnel</td>
<td>80,426 (Apr 2008)</td>
<td>82,000 (end 2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of ANP personnel trained</td>
<td>55% (Apr 2008)</td>
<td>100% (2010)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**S7 Evaluation ANDS Indicators: # of recruited ANP personnel / % of ANP personnel trained**

**Selected Indicators:**

1. As at October 2011, the ANP had 139,070 personnel on strength.  
2. As at October 2011, the ANP annual attrition rate was 16%.  
3. The ANP has demonstrated improvement in its ability to conduct limited, independent policing operations and to coordinate operations with other Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) elements. These improvements are largely attributable to a number of exogenous factors, including low insurgent threat levels in the given operating environment and ISAF enablers. ISAF mentor reporting shows that the majority of ANP units still rely heavily on coalition assistance, especially in contested areas.  
4. As with the ANA, the operational performance of ANP units is also suffering from US and coalition force reductions. Each of the three ANP pillars saw an increase in the number of units that were not assessed due to recently fielded units that are not reporting or not partnered due to lack of available coalition forces. Within the Afghan Border Police (ABP), 11 of the 12 units were not assessed due to long-standing partnering shortages. Additionally, four Afghan Civil Order Police (ANCOP) kandaks located throughout theatre were not assessed. Finally, within the AUP in key terrain districts, 17 of the 22 units not assessed were in Regional Command-Centre.

**Quote:** “The ANP development effort is being rushed, funding is being cut, and there are significant trainer and partner shortfalls. The ANP are not supported by effective rule of law in terms of courts, detention facilities and a functioning legal system. The most effective element, the ANCOP, has an unacceptable attrition rate. Other police units have major problems with leadership corruption and loyalties to local power brokers. The border police are particularly corrupt. The Afghan Local Police work as long as they are supported by large elements of Special Forces, but these forces are not large enough to meet current expansion goals, and it is unclear what will happen when Special Operations Forces (SOF) advisors leave.”

**Based on the indicators selected, it may be evaluated that ISAF Desired Effect S7 was partially achieved by 2011.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pillar</th>
<th>ISAF Desired Effect</th>
<th>ANDS Expected Outcome</th>
<th>ANDS Indicators</th>
<th>ANDS Baseline</th>
<th>ANDS Target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S7</td>
<td>Insurgency contained</td>
<td>Enhanced public trust on government ability to deliver justice and security as IAGs are disbanded and reintegrated.</td>
<td># of districts cleared from IAGs</td>
<td>21 districts complied</td>
<td>51 districts targeted</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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18. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
### 4. Annex A

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pillar</th>
<th>ISAF Desired Effect</th>
<th>ANDS Expected Outcome</th>
<th>ANDS Indicators</th>
<th>ANDS Baseline</th>
<th>ANDS Target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>S8 Evaluation</strong></td>
<td><strong>ANDS Indicator: # of districts cleared from IAGs.</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observation, Sources and Evaluation: As per S2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 4: Annex A

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pillar</th>
<th>ISAF Desired Effect</th>
<th>ANDS Expected Outcome</th>
<th>ANDS Indicators</th>
<th>ANDS Baseline</th>
<th>ANDS Target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>S9/S10</td>
<td>Afghan borders controlled</td>
<td>Operational border posts able to protect national sovereignty.</td>
<td>Index on equipping the border posts</td>
<td>Under assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Operational border posts able to protect national sovereignty.</td>
<td>Index on equipping the border posts</td>
<td>Under assessment</td>
<td>100% (2013)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**S9/S10 Evaluation: ANDS Indicator: Index on equipping the border posts**

Selected Indicators:

1. There was no available data on the equipping of border posts.
2. No Afghan government has ever accepted the Durand Line as an international border. This refusal has continued for more than a century under regimes of all political stripes, some of which called for the reincorporation of the territory into Afghanistan or the creation of a new state of Pashtunistan. Pakistan, by contrast, has always insisted that the Durand Line constitutes its recognized international border with Afghanistan.\(^{22}\)
3. There are approximately 100 border posts on the Afghan side of the Durand Line.\(^{23}\)
4. There are approximately 1000 border posts on the Pakistani side of the Durand Line.\(^{24}\)
5. As of September 2011, the Afghan Border Police end strength was 20,852 personnel. The ABP remains on schedule to meet all growth objectives for officers and patrolmen, but remains short of non-commissioned officers, with only 3,800 of an assigned total of 5,600. This shortfall, as well as the shortfall of untrained patrolmen, remains the primary focus for training efforts.\(^{25}\)
6. Despite some small strides in policing the border, police on both sides have been mostly ineffective. This is particularly evident south of Kabul in the Zabul, Kandahar and Helmand provinces that border the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Pakistani Baluchistan. IAGs in these provinces have benefitted tremendously from the support of networks in Pakistan that need not fear any effective border control.\(^{26}\)
7. Past attempts by US representatives to persuade both countries to conduct joint border patrols have failed due to a lack of trust. Pakistani reluctance has been the major factor in the failure to launch joint patrols; the government in Islamabad wants a much larger commitment from Afghan leaders before acknowledging that such exercises might be a success. In particular, leaders in Islamabad have said they are unwilling to discuss joint patrols until the Afghans come closer to establishing more posts on their side of the border.\(^{27}\)

**Quote:** “For the people who live along it, the Durand Line has never constituted an international border. They act as if it does not exist, crossing freely from one side to another as they please wherever they please, in part because in many places the line’s location is only vaguely known. There are villages located in Pakistan that have their farmland in Afghanistan and vice versa. Governments recognize this fact by not demanding papers from local people even at formal border crossings. In this regard, one participant familiar with police issues noted that about half the population of the Pakistani border town of Chaman on the road to Qandahar crosses the border daily into Afghanistan. This includes the Afghan police employed at Spin Boldak border crossing a kilometer away who commute to their post from homes in Pakistan.”\(^{28}\)

Based on the indicators selected, it may be evaluated that the intent of ISAF Desired Effects S9 and S10 were not achieved by 2011; it cannot be determined if the ANDS indicator, per se, was achieved.

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24. Ibid.
Chapter 4: Annex A

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pillar</th>
<th>ISAF Desired Effect</th>
<th>ANDS Expected Outcome</th>
<th>ANDS Indicators</th>
<th>ANDS Baseline</th>
<th>ANDS Target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>S11 ANSF tactically and operationally self-sufficient</td>
<td>As per S3 and S7.</td>
<td>As per S3 and S7.</td>
<td>As per S3 and S7.</td>
<td>As per S3 and S7.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**S11 Evaluation**

*Observation, Sources and Evaluation: As per S3 and S7*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security</th>
<th>S12 ANA able to assume coordinating authority</th>
<th>Effectively coordinated security sector.</th>
<th>Index on progress of establishing joint coordination centers for the ANA and ANP</th>
<th>Under assessment, 13 coordination centers proposed</th>
<th>Enhanced coordination amongst security sector ministry/departments (2013)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**S12 Evaluation**

*Observation, Sources and Evaluation: As per S3 and S7*

**SECURITY PILLAR EVALUATION**

Of 12 ISAF Desired Effects related to the security pillar 8 (S1, S2, S4, S5, S6, S8, S9, S10) were evaluated as not having been achieved by 2011. Of prime significance is the fact that the focus of the security aspect of the campaign was on defeating the insurgency in order to allow the country to stabilize and thereby improve its governance and social-economic capacities. By 2011 the insurgency was not defeated and Afghanistan remained unable to move forward. In addition, there was a growing trend towards so-called “green on blue” attacks. These occur when Afghans from the ANA or ANP (or at least dressed as such) attack ISAF or US forces. Between 2005 and 2010 there were 13 such attacks, while in 2011 there were 9 and in 2012, through March alone, there were 12.29

Based on the indicators selected, it may be evaluated that the security pillar was partially achieved by 2011.

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27. Ibid.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-Pillar</th>
<th>ISAF Desired Effect</th>
<th>ANDS Expected Outcome</th>
<th>ANDS Indicators</th>
<th>ANDS Baseline</th>
<th>ANDS Target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security/ Governance SG1</td>
<td>Key Enabling Strategic Infrastructure</td>
<td>ANA operationally capable of performing those missions and tasks assigned</td>
<td>Index on equipping the ANA training centers</td>
<td>Under assessment</td>
<td>TBD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Government offices physically equipped to fulfill their role.</td>
<td>Index on the progress of providing basic facilities and amenities to all government offices.</td>
<td>Under assessment</td>
<td></td>
<td>By end 2013, all the councils and offices including municipalities will have basic facilities and amenities including adequate built up space, computers, communication facility and furniture. The key officials at national and sub national level will have adequate means of mobility to make connection with the communities they are serving.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Justice institutions have access to infrastructure, transportation, equipment, and supplies adequate to support effective delivery of justice services.</td>
<td>Index on the progress of providing justice institutions access to infrastructure, transportation, equipment, and supplies adequate to support effective delivery of justice services</td>
<td>Under assessment</td>
<td></td>
<td>By end 2010, justice institutions will be fully functional and operational in each province of Afghanistan, and the average time to resolve contract disputes will be reduced as much as possible.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Pillar</td>
<td>ISAF Desired Effect</td>
<td>ANDS Expected Outcome</td>
<td>ANDS Indicators</td>
<td>ANDS Baseline</td>
<td>ANDS Target</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security/ Governance</td>
<td>SG1 Evaluation ANDS Indicators:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Index on equipping the ANA training centers.</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Index on the progress of providing basic facilities and amenities to all government offices.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Index on the progress of providing Justice institutions access to infrastructure, transportation, equipment, and supplies adequate to support effective delivery of justice services.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Selected Indicators:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>As of July 2006, all training and education in the Army is managed and implemented by the newly formed Afghan National Army Training Command (ANATC), a two-star command which reports directly to the Chief of the General Staff. All training centres and military schools are under ANATC HQ. Individual basic training is conducted primarily by Afghan National Army instructors and staff at ANATC’s Kabul Military Training Center, situated on the eastern edge of the capital. The ANA are still supported, however, with various levels of Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A) oversight, mentorship, and assistance. Formal education and professional development is currently conducted at two main ANATC schools, both in Kabul. The National Military Academy of Afghanistan (NMFA), located near Kabul International Airport, is a four-year military university, which will produce degreed second lieutenants in a variety of military professions. NMFA’s first cadet class entered its second academic year in spring 2006. The Command and General Staff College, located in southern Kabul, prepares mid-level ANA officers to serve on brigade and corps staffs. A National Defense University has been established at a site in northwestern Kabul. All initial officer training has been re-located to the new NDU facility.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>After the overthrow of the Taliban regime in 2001, the government of Afghanistan and the donor community recognized from the very outset that government institutions were mere weak skeletal structures. Two years after the Taliban were ousted from power, most of the district headquarters in Afghanistan did not even have proper buildings from which to run local administration. In 2004, in an effort to strengthen local governance, the government of Afghanistan launched the Afghanistan Stabilisation Programme (ASP). The main objectives of the ASP were to extend the reach of the government of Afghanistan into the districts and provinces through building physical infrastructure and enhancing the capacity of local governance. When the Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG) was established in 2007, the ASP was subsumed in it. However, due to changes in leadership and the lack of trust from the donor community, the program still has not achieved what was envisioned in the original plan. According to the August 2010 report of the ASP, since 2005 only the Asian Development Bank and the Government of Afghanistan, using funds from the national budget, had contributed US$16.5 million to the program. The ASP contracted an additional 59 infrastructure and 82 equipment projects, but according to the ASP program manager they do not have enough money to pay for all contracted projects once they are completed. According to the ASP’s report issued in August 2010, the projected cost of the program until 2014 is US$357,547,000, but only US$5,520,174 is committed, resulting in a shortfall of US$352,026,826.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>The Afghan justice system lacks sufficient resources and an adequately trained staff. Only 11.6% of judges have a university law degree, and only 56.7% had completed any judicial training prior to their appointment. Construction or rehabilitation is needed in 97.8% of Afghanistan’s court facilities, and there is a severe shortage of professional resources—such as access to Afghan laws and Supreme Court decisions and to textbooks.</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>While there are improvements in Afghan government revenue collection with a projected 32% increase in fiscal year (FY) 2010–11 (International Monetary Fund, 2011), the tax to GDP ratio in FY2010 is still only 9.1%—among the lowest in the world—and the Ministry of Finance (MoF), whose basic operating budget is only two-thirds met by national resources (excluding all development assistance), has itself warned of the increasing gap between domestic revenues and external financing. US estimates of the costs for the training mission and funding support for the ANSF in FY2012 is $12.9 billion. The MoF predicted that revenue for year (FY2011/12) will reach $1.5 billion and for recurrent costs (salaries, hazard pay and food), Afghan revenues would pay for a fifth of the costs of the ANP and a third of the costs of the ANA. It is likely that the donor footprint will gradually shrink, with total grants projected to decline from an estimated more than 40 percent of GDP in 2010/11 to less than 30 percent of GDP in 2013/14. These developments will weigh heavily on economic activity and require difficult decisions to ensure fiscal survival.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Evaluation:** With the emphasis placed on increasing the size of the ANSF, significant funding for military training facilities, primarily donated by the US, has resulted in the development and equipping of numerous army and police training facilities across Afghanistan. The issue going forward is the ability and willingness of the international community to continue funding these as the NATO and US missions wind down. Of course, this issue is linked with the wider challenge of funding the Afghan security sector writ large, and selected indicator No 4 highlights the overall fiscal challenge that the country faces.

Based on the indicators selected, it may be evaluated that ISAF Desired Effect SG1 was partially achieved by 2011.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-Pillar</th>
<th>ISAF Desired Effect</th>
<th>ANDS Expected Outcome</th>
<th>ANDS Indicators</th>
<th>ANDS Baseline</th>
<th>ANDS Target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security/ Governance</td>
<td>Narco-criminal influences isolated</td>
<td>Eventual eradication of poppy production and crack down on drug trafficking.</td>
<td># hectares (ha) of poppy cultivated land area</td>
<td>193,000 ha</td>
<td>By 2013, the area under poppy cultivation will be reduced by half compared to 2007 levels</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SG2 Evaluation**  
**ANDS Indicator:** # ha of poppy cultivated land area

**Selected Indicators:**
1. Opium poppy-crop cultivation in Afghanistan reached 131,000 ha in 2011, 7% higher than in 2010.\(^{30}\)
2. Opium poppy-crop cultivation in 2007 was 193,000 ha (one-half would be 96,500 hectares).\(^{31}\)

Based on the indicators selected, it may be evaluated that ISAF Desired Effect SG2 was not achieved by 2011.

**SECURITY/GOVERNANCE SUB-PILLAR EVALUATION**

While ISAF Desired Effect SG1 was evaluated as partially achieved by 2011, SG2 was clearly not. Given the criticality of poppy production to the related effect of corruption and the relationship between narcotics production and the funding of criminal and insurgent activity, the failure to achieve SG2 compromised the sub-pillar and weakened the overall campaign outcome.

Based on the indicators selected, it may be evaluated that this sub-pillar was not achieved by 2011.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security/ Social- economic Development</th>
<th>SSED1</th>
<th>Freedom of Action in Key Zones</th>
<th>Enhanced public trust on government ability to deliver justice and security as IAGs are disbanded and reintegrated.</th>
<th># of districts cleared from IAGs</th>
<th>21 districts complied</th>
<th>51 districts targeted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SSED2</td>
<td>Freedom of Action Established</td>
<td>Enhanced public trust on government ability to deliver justice and security as IAGs are disbanded and reintegrated.</td>
<td># of districts cleared from IAGs</td>
<td>21 districts complied</td>
<td>51 districts targeted</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SSED1 and SSED2 Evaluation**  
**ANDS Indicator:** # of districts cleared from IAGs.

**Selected Indicators, Sources and Evaluation:** As per S2

\(^{30}\) United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and Ministry of Counter Narcotics (MCN), *2011 Afghan Opium Survey*.  
\(^{31}\) Ibid.
### SECURITY/SOCIAL-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT SUB-PILLAR EVALUATION

Based on the indicators selected, it may be evaluated that this sub-pillar was not achieved by 2011.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pillar</th>
<th>ISAF Desired Effect</th>
<th>ANDS Expected Outcome</th>
<th>ANDS Indicators</th>
<th>ANDS Baseline</th>
<th>ANDS Target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Governance</td>
<td>G1</td>
<td>Independent media functioning</td>
<td>Index on progress of creating an environment for free and independent media</td>
<td>Media law is drafted, needs amendments</td>
<td>Media law to be passed and implemented by 2008</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**G1 Evaluation**  
ANDS Indicator: Index on progress of creating an environment for free and independent media

**Selected Indicators:**

1. In 2006, Afghanistan was ranked 130 out of 168 states in terms of press freedom.  
2. In 2011/2012, Afghanistan was ranked 150 out of 179 states in terms of press freedom and trending downwards.  
3. In Afghanistan, violence remained the main concern for journalists, who were under constant threat from the Taliban, religious extremists, separatist movements and political groups.

Based on the indicators selected, it may be evaluated that ISAF Desired Effect G1 was not achieved by 2011.

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33. Ibid.  
34. Ibid.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pillar</th>
<th>ISAF Desired Effect</th>
<th>ANDS Expected Outcome</th>
<th>ANDS Indicators</th>
<th>ANDS Baseline</th>
<th>ANDS Target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Governance</td>
<td>G2</td>
<td>Representative government elected</td>
<td>Strong and capable Independent election commission holding regular national and sub-national elections as mandated by the constitution.</td>
<td>Index on the progress of creating a strong and capable independent election commission holding regular national and sub-national Elections as mandated by the Constitution.</td>
<td>Under assessment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**G2 Evaluation ANDS Indicator:** Index on the progress of creating a strong and capable independent electoral commission holding regular national and sub-national Elections as mandated by the constitution.

**Selected Indicators:**

1. According to Article 156 of the constitution of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, the Independent Election Commission (IEC) has the authority and responsibility to administrate and supervise all kind of elections as well as refer to general public opinion of the people, in accordance the provision of the law.35
2. Presidential and provincial council elections took place for the second time in August 2009, this time directly managed by the Afghan-led IEC.36
3. Turn-out was significantly lower than in 2004/05, due to poor security, but it was an important indication of reduced public interest (and disapproval of the incumbent government). Reports of widespread fraud necessitated an extensive re-count. In the end, a second round of elections did not take place, due to the opposition candidate withdrawing; President Karzai was sworn in on 19 November 2009.37
4. Flawed parliamentary elections in September 2010 led to fallout that, in 2011, threatened to seriously destabilize the country. Following the certification of election results by the IEC, President Hamid Karzai took the unprecedented step of creating a special court to review the results. After street protests in Kabul and eight months during which parliament was immobilized by uncertainty, the special court disqualified 62 members of parliament out of 249 seats. A compromise in September 2011 resulted in nine members of parliament being removed.38

**Quote:** “President Hamid Karzai’s re-election on 2 November 2009, following widespread fraud in the 20 August presidential and provincial polls, has delivered a critical blow to his government’s legitimacy. The deeply flawed polls have eroded public confidence in the electoral process and in the international community’s commitment to the country’s nascent democratic institutions. Concentration of power in the executive to the exclusion of the legislature and judiciary has also resulted in a fundamental breakdown in governance while strengthening the hand of the insurgency.”39

Based on the indicators selected, it may be evaluated that ISAF Desired Effect G2 was partially achieved by 2011.

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36. Ibid.
37. Ibid.
### Chapter 4: Annex A

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pillar</th>
<th>ISAF Desired Effect</th>
<th>ANDS Expected Outcome</th>
<th>ANDS Indicators</th>
<th>ANDS Baseline</th>
<th>ANDS Target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Governance</td>
<td>G3</td>
<td>Governance to provinces</td>
<td>Sub-national governance policy developed.</td>
<td>Index on the progress of putting in place legal, policy, institutions and other systems and procedures for strengthening the sub-national governance.</td>
<td>Under assessment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### G3 Evaluation

**ANDS Indicator:** Index on the progress of putting in place legal, policy, institutions and other systems and procedures for strengthening the sub-national governance.

**Selected Indicators:**

1. Creation of the IDLG in September 2007 was the first major step in reform of the sub-national governance system. IDLG initiated a draft sub-national governance policy with the help of inter-ministerial committees.  
2. The 34 provincial councils (PC) in Afghanistan are the only directly elected formal local body. Its role depends largely on the incumbent chair and his or her relations with the governor in the province. Although the PC is expected to play a key role once the policy is adopted, it is currently under-resourced and largely marginalized by other key actors at the sub-national level.  
3. The provincial and district governors are appointed by the President, with support from the IDLG. They play a key role, including the chairing of the provincial development councils (PDCs), where all development funds are managed. Moreover, the governor has significant authority over the police in the province and direct authority over the district governors.  
4. In addition to the formal institution there are many non-statutory bodies and informal governance institutions in Afghanistan. The former includes the community development councils (CDCs), the district development assemblies (DDAs), PDCs and the shuras, jirgas, mirabs, manteqas and ulemas. These institutions continue to play a key role at the sub-national level where governance is as likely to be sought from traditional tribal structures or in some areas from the insurgents. This most likely reflects the absence of a state alternative rather than a deliberate choice.  
5. As of September 18, 2011, only 60% of civil servant positions were filled in the 14 most insecure provinces. This is an improvement from April 2011—when only 50% of positions were filled—but lack of security and candidates’ lack of experience and education continue to pose challenges in filling local positions.  

Based on the indicators selected, it may be evaluated that ISAF Desired Effect G3 was partially achieved by 2011.

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41. Ibid.  
42. Ibid.  
43. Ibid.  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pillar</th>
<th>ISAF Desired Effect</th>
<th>ANDS Expected Outcome</th>
<th>ANDS Indicators</th>
<th>ANDS Baseline</th>
<th>ANDS Target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Governance</td>
<td>G4</td>
<td>Rule of law established</td>
<td>Public can rely on effectively organized and professionally staffed justice institutions.</td>
<td>Index on the progress of putting in place systems so that public can rely on effectively organized and professionally staffed justice institutions.</td>
<td>Under assessment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**G4 Evaluation ANDS Indicators:** Index on the progress of putting in place systems so that public can rely on effectively organized and professionally staffed justice institutions; Index on the progress of putting in place systems so that Criminal and Civil justice is administered effectively, and in accordance with law, the Constitution, and international standards.

**Selected Indicators:**

1. Judicial structures have been established in accordance with the 2004 Constitution. The Afghan government has finalized a National Justice Sector Strategy (NJSS) and has agreed to implementation of reforms with the assistance of the international community through a National Justice Programme (NJP). Progress on reforms though has been slow.  
2. Some courts and prosecutors’ offices have benefited from the provision of equipment, human resources and training. However, perceptions of improvements in securing the rule of law remain weak.  
3. The legal institutions are still largely failing to fulfill their duties in protecting people under the law and in addressing past and current human rights abuses and corruption.  
4. Access to justice, in particular for women, remains difficult.  
5. The inability of the formal justice sector to deliver increases the chance of parts of the population turning to the Taliban for justice.

**Quote:** “Afghanistan’s justice system is in a catastrophic state of disrepair. Despite repeated pledges over the last nine years, the majority of Afghans still have little or no access to judicial institutions. Lack of justice has destabilised the country and judicial institutions have withered to near non-existence. Many courts are inoperable and those that do function are understaffed. Insecurity, lack of proper training and low salaries have driven many judges and prosecutors from their jobs. Those who remain are highly susceptible to corruption. Indeed, there is very little that is systematic about the legal system, and there is little evidence that the Afghan government has the resources or political will to tackle the challenge. The public, consequently, has no confidence in the formal justice sector amid an atmosphere of impunity. A growing majority of Afghans have been forced to accept the rough justice of Taliban and criminal powerbrokers in areas of the country that lie beyond government control.”

Based on the indicators selected, it may be evaluated that ISAF Desired Effect G4 was not achieved by 2011.

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46. Ibid.
### Chapter 4: Annex A

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pillar</th>
<th>ISAF Desired Effect</th>
<th>ANDS Expected Outcome</th>
<th>ANDS Indicators</th>
<th>ANDS Baseline</th>
<th>ANDS Target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Governance</td>
<td>G5 Reduced corruption in governance</td>
<td>Corruption reduced.</td>
<td>Index on the progress of introducing systems, mechanisms and procedures to reduce and monitor corruption at different levels in the government and the judiciary.</td>
<td>Under assessment</td>
<td>By end-2013, the corruption in the judiciary and the government at all levels especially in security, customs, civil administration and municipalities will be significantly reduced.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**G5 Evaluation** *ANDS Indicator:* Index on the progress of introducing systems, mechanisms and procedures to reduce and monitor corruption at different levels in the government and the judiciary.

**Selected Indicators:**

1. The Corruption Perceptions Index ranks countries/territories based on how corrupt a country’s public sector is perceived to be. It is a composite index, drawing on corruption-related data from expert and business surveys carried out by a variety of independent and reputable institutions. Afghanistan’s score for 2011 was 1.5/10—this produced a ranking of 180/183 states—one of the very worst rankings on the globe.\(^1\)

Based on the indicator selected, it may be evaluated that ISAF Desired Effect G5 was not achieved by 2011.

**G6 Evaluation** *ANDS Indicator:* Index on the progress of putting in place legal, policy, institutions and other systems and procedures for strengthening the sub-national governance.

**Selected Indicators, Sources and Evaluation:** As per G3

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47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid.
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pillar</th>
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<th>ANDS Expected Outcome</th>
<th>ANDS Indicators</th>
<th>ANDS Baseline</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GOVERNANCE PILLAR EVALUATION</td>
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</table>

While ISAF Desired Effects G2, G3, and G6 were evaluated as partially achieved by 2011, G1, G4, and G5 were evaluated as not having been achieved and the issue of corruption remains at the very top of the international community’s list of concerns. There does not appear to be any viable solution to this problem, and it may result in a significantly reduced level of international donor funding following the withdrawal of ISAF and US forces from Afghanistan in 2014.

Based on the indicators selected, it may be evaluated that this pillar was not achieved by 2011.

Social and Economic Development

| SED1 | Displaced persons and refugee (DPREs) return issues resolved. | Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) return voluntarily according to agreed principles and procedures. | # of returnees (male, female) | 3 million refugees (Pakistan 2.1 million, Iran 900,000) and 140,000 IDPs (estimated) | Scenario One. Present trend lines improve permitting 800,000 – 1 million returns Scenario Two. Current trends continue permitting 600,000 – 800,000 returns Scenario Three. Current trends deteriorate permitting 400,000 – 600,000 returns |

SED1 Evaluation

ANDS Indicator: # of returnees (male, female)

Selected Indicators:

1. According to the National IDP Task Force, 330,298 IDPs were displaced by armed conflict, human rights abuses and other general violence as of 31 October 2010. 52
2. Although more than five million Afghan refugees returned between 2002 and 2008, more than two million registered refugees remain in Pakistan and 900,000 in Iran. 53
3. The number of conflict-induced IDPs has been rising steadily since 2007, increasing by 27% in 2011 and almost doubling since the end of 2008. Of these, 76% reported being forced to leave their homes at some point during the conflict. Of these, 41% were internally displaced, 42% were externally displaced and 17% were both internally and externally displaced. Many individuals were displaced multiple times. 54
4. When asked about the current conflict, 17% surveyed stated that they are currently thinking of leaving the country. 55

Based on the indicators selected, it may be evaluated that ISAF Desired Effect SED1 was not achieved by 2011.

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54. Ibid.
55. Ibid.
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<th>ANDS Target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social and Economic Development</td>
<td>SED2</td>
<td>Reduced poppy cultivation through alternative livelihood.</td>
<td>Index on the progress of reducing poppy cultivation through alternative livelihood.</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>By end 2010, decrease in the absolute and relative size of the drug economy in line with the Government’s Millennium Development Goal target</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SED2 Evaluation**  
**ANDS Indicator:** Index on the progress of reducing poppy cultivation through alternative livelihoods

**Selected Indicators:**
1. Gross revenues from opium trade are estimated to be equivalent to as much as third of measured GDP (opium is not reflected in the official GDP numbers).  
2. Afghanistan is the source of 9% of the world’s opium production and the area under cultivation more than doubled from 2003 to 2007.  
4. While 98% of Afghan opium farmers are ready to stop opium poppy cultivation if access to an alternate livelihood is provided, relatively few of them have realistic alternatives available.  
5. Afghan Deputy Minister for Counternarcotics Mohammed Azhar declared, “The price of opium is now seven times higher than wheat … our farmers have no disincentive to cultivate poppy.”  
6. In 2011, there was a 43% increase in the price of dry opium at harvest time compared to 2010, and that farmers surveyed in 2011 cited the high sale price as the most important reason (59%) for cultivating opium poppy.


Based on the indicators selected, it may be evaluated that ISAF Desired Effect SED2 was not achieved by 2011.

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58. UNDOC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2012, April 2012.
59. Ibid.
60. Afghan Ministry of Counter-Narcotics.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pillar</th>
<th>ISAF Desired Effect</th>
<th>ANDS Expected Outcome</th>
<th>ANDS Indicators</th>
<th>ANDS Baseline</th>
<th>ANDS Target</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social and Economic Development</td>
<td>SED3</td>
<td>Key enabling structures</td>
<td>Expanded public power grid.</td>
<td>% of households electrified in urban areas</td>
<td>30% (2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>% of households electrified in rural areas.</td>
<td>10% (2011)</td>
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<td>% of non-residential consumers provided electricity.</td>
<td>35% (2011)</td>
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<td>Improved connectivity throughout Afghanistan and to the foreign destinations within the region.</td>
<td>% of target 3263 km of regional highways or roads to the neighbouring countries fully upgraded and rehabilitated.</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>% of all villages connected by all-weather roads</td>
<td>2236 kilometers (km) has been rehabilitated</td>
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<td>Fully upgraded and maintained ring road and roads to neighbouring countries by March 2009.</td>
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<td>40% of all villages to be connected by all-weather roads to the national road system by the end of 2010.</td>
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<td>Pillar</td>
<td>ISAF Desired Effect</td>
<td>ANDS Expected Outcome</td>
<td>ANDS Indicators</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Increased domestic and international passengers and freight traffic by air.</td>
<td>Increased access for urban households to basic services.</td>
<td>Index on the progress of the process of completion of International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) compliance for Kabul and Herat Airports.</td>
<td>40% Kabul</td>
<td>Kabul International Airport and Herat Airport are in compliance with the International Civil Aviation Organization’s (ICAO) and the International Air Transport Association’s (IATA’s) requirements by March 2011. In line with MDG investment in water supply and sanitation will ensure that 50% of h/h in Kabul has access to safe piped water 30% of h/h in other major urban areas will have access to piped water by March 2011</td>
</tr>
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<td>% of households having access to safe water supply in Kabul.</td>
<td>18–21% h/h has access to safe piped water</td>
<td>50% by March 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>% of households having access to piped water supply in other major urban areas except Kabul.</td>
<td>15–18% h/h has access to safe piped water</td>
<td>100% by March 2011</td>
</tr>
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<td>% of households having access to sanitation facilities in Kabul.</td>
<td>5–8% h/h have access to improved sanitation</td>
<td>100% by March 2011</td>
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<td>% of households having access to sanitation facilities in other major urban areas except Kabul.</td>
<td></td>
<td>100% by March 2011</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Index on the progress of providing increased availability of affordable shelter.</td>
<td></td>
<td>100% by March 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social and Economic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>% of households having access to sanitation facilities in other major urban areas except Kabul.</td>
<td></td>
<td>100% by March 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development</td>
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<td>100% by March 2011</td>
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</table>

% of households having access to safe piped water and sanitation facilities in Kabul, 30% by March 2011, 60% by 2013.
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<th>ANDS Baseline</th>
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</table>

**SED3 Evaluation** ANDS Indicators:

1. % of households electrified in urban areas
2. % of households electrified in rural areas
3. % of non-residential consumers provided electricity
4. % of target 3263 km of regional highways or roads to the neighbouring countries fully upgraded and rehabilitated
5. % of all villages connected by all-weather roads
6. Index on the progress of the process of completion of International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) compliance for Kabul and Herat Airports
7. % of households having access to safe water supply in Kabul
8. % of households having access to piped water supply in other major urban areas except Kabul
9. % of households having access to sanitation facilities in Kabul
10. % of households having access to sanitation facilities in other major urban areas except Kabul
11. Index on the progress of providing increased availability of affordable shelter

(Identifying) Selected Indicators:

% of households electrified in urban areas

- As of 2010 the Afghan Electrical Power Authority (DABS) reported a total of 786,302 customers nationally; of these, 454,098 were located in Kabul Herat or Kandahar. This represents approximately 70% of the households in Kabul.
- Demand in Kabul has tripled over the past five years and is rising each year. Samadi estimates Afghanistan will need around 3,000 megawatts (MW) to meet the country's needs by 2020, compared with current supply of around 600 MW.  

% of households electrified in rural areas

- Access to electricity in rural areas is very limited; some estimates put it at 7% of the total Afghanistan population. (There are no reliable estimates of rural electricity coverage). Sources of power, except for those villages in the close proximity of the grid, are micro hydro power, private diesel generation, candles, batteries, solar lanterns and hurricane lamps for light and biomass for cooking.

% of non-residential consumers provided electricity

- In 2010 DABS reported a total of 70,688 non-residential customers on the electrical grid.

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64. Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat (DABS), Downloaded from [http://www.dabs.af/en/](http://www.dabs.af/en/).
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<table>
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<th>ANDS Target</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% of target 3263 km of regional highways or roads to the neighbouring countries fully upgraded and rehabilitated</td>
<td>•By the end of 2008, some 86% of the regional road network was operational, with the remainder to be completed by 2010. Work was under way or funding confirmed for the remaining regional roads, with the exception of a 50 km section east of Herat. The improved roads include almost 2,100 km (63%) of regional roads, 650 km (14%) of national roads; and 6,000 km (22.5%) of provincial and rural roads.</td>
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<td>% of all villages connected by all-weather roads</td>
<td>•Proportion of households within 2 km distance from drivable road; (urban, rural, Kuchi), national (93.9, 65.7, 60.9) National Avg = 70.7%</td>
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Index on the progress of the process of completion of International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) compliance for Kabul and Herat Airports

•Italy has pledged 137 million Euros for the expansion of the Herat airport, the second largest after Kabul airport.  
•Implementation of Kabul International Airport Transition Plan: The objective of this project, funded by the Government of Afghanistan, was to enhance the capability of the Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation (MoTCA) to take over responsibility for the management, operation and maintenance of those facilities and services at Kabul International Airport that will be transferred from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)/International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to MoTCA at the end of the transitional period covered by the project. This project, which began in December 2007, was extended through March 2011 and is now completed. 
•Flight Safety Oversight: The objective of this project, funded by the Government of Afghanistan, was to enhance the flight safety oversight capability of the Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation (MoTCA). This project, which began in September 2008, was extended through February 2011 and is now completed. 

% of h/h having access to safe water supply in Kabul  
% of h/h having access to piped water supply in other major urban areas except Kabul

•Proportion of population using an improved drinking water source in all urban areas was 58.1 percent  

69. Ibid.  
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% of households having access to sanitation facilities in Kabul</td>
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<tr>
<td>% of households having access to sanitation facilities in other major urban areas except Kabul</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Proportion of population using an improved sanitation facility was 37% nationally; there was no change between 2007 and 2010&lt;sup&gt;71&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Index on the progress of providing increased availability of affordable shelter</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Proportion of urban population living in slums was 92.8 percent&lt;sup&gt;72&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Proportion of households with secure tenure was 56.2 percent&lt;sup&gt;73&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Based on the indicators selected, it may be evaluated that ISAF Desired Effect SED3 was partially achieved by 2011.</td>
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Social and Economic Development SED4
National emergency response capability established
Nation prepared for disaster management.
Index on the progress of putting plans, systems and mechanisms in place at all levels for disaster management.
Under assessment
By end 2010, an effective system of disaster preparedness and response will be in place.

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<sup>72</sup> Ibid.
<sup>73</sup> Ibid.
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>SED4 Evaluation</strong></td>
<td><strong>ANDS Indicator:</strong> Index on the progress of putting plans, systems and mechanisms in place at all levels for Disaster Management.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Selected Indicators:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>1. Long-term capacity development for risk and vulnerability reduction has not been adequately addressed by the Afghan government and the international community. Accordingly, significant capacity development is still required within existing institutions of the Afghan government, specifically the Afghan National Disaster Management Authority (ANDMA), the main institution focused on managing natural disaster prevention, preparedness and emergency response.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. The failure to closely link the work of humanitarian and development actors in Afghanistan has caused challenges associated with recurrent environmental hazards to persist. Limited snow and rainfall during the past winter and spring caused a slow-onset drought, which affected the food security of people in 14 provinces in 2011. The drought (which is the eighth in 11 years) reflects the critical importance of implementing not just short-term humanitarian relief but also longer-term resilience-building measures. It prompted the revision of the 2011 Consolidated Appeal (CAP) on 2 October 2011 to include US$2142 million to ensure immediate assistance to affected people through September 2012.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Quote: “The revised National Disaster Management Plan (NDMP) takes into account the current status of risks, in terms of hazards, vulnerability, infrastructure availability, institutional capacities and constitutional clarity in Afghanistan. In accordance, it provides procedures that may be implemented with immediate effect and subsequently upgraded as more resources become available and capacities of stakeholders get built. Its immediate purpose is to bring about greater role-clarity and coordination amongst national level disaster response agencies. The Plan needs to be followed up with elaborate and long-term interventions as the country’s capacity grows. Detailed risk analysis needs to be carried out for this. It strives to be the starting point of a long-term exercise (in line with Hyogo Framework for Action 2005–2015) that will ensure efficiency in disaster risk reduction in all sectors and at all levels in the country. Such an exercise will need to go down to the grassroots and work with communities.”</td>
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Based on the indicators selected, it may be evaluated that ISAF Desired Effect SED4 was partially achieved by 2011.

### SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PILLAR EVALUATION

ISAF Desired Effects **SED1, SED2** and **SED3** were evaluated as not having been achieved by 2011, although SED4 was partially achieved. Given the centrality of these indicators to the human conditions in Afghanistan, the failure to progress in these areas seriously compromised the pillar and ensured that the overall campaign outcome could not be achieved.

Based on the indicators selected, it may be evaluated that this pillar was not achieved by 2011.

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SUMMARY EVALUATION

Given the lack of significant achievement across all pillars studied in this analysis, it is clear that the overall condition of Afghanistan did not advance in accordance with either the ISAF-desired effects or the expected outcomes of the Afghan national government as articulated in the ANDS during the period under study. While the ANSF increased dramatically in size, and some indicators of governance and the economy have improved, this is generally attributed to significant levels of external aid and the presence of the international community in various forums. As such, the concern going forward is the ability and capacity of the indigenous government to maintain these gains and build upon them. That said, the summary evaluation of the country must remain as one of a failure, if not failed state, and this is the common conclusion of three leading international evaluation instruments for 2012: the UNDP Human Development Index; the Fund for Peace Failed State Index and the Carlton University Indicators for Foreign Policy Report.

The UNDP Human Development Report publishes the Human Development Index (HDI) which was introduced as an alternative to conventional measures of national development, such as level of income and the rate of economic growth. The HDI represents a push for a broader definition of well-being and provides a composite measure of three basic dimensions of human development: health, education and income. Afghanistan’s HDI is 0.398, which gives the country a rank of 172 out of 187 countries with comparable data. The HDI of South Asia as a region increased from 0.356 in 1980 to 0.548 today, placing Afghanistan below the regional average. 77

The Failed States Index (FSI), produced by The Fund for Peace, is a critical tool in highlighting not only the normal pressures that all states experience, but also in identifying when those pressures are pushing a state towards the brink of failure. By highlighting pertinent issues in weak and failing states, the FSI—and the social science framework and software application upon which it is built—makes political risk assessment and early warning of conflict accessible to policy-makers and the public at large.

In 2006, the Fund for Peace Failed State Index conferred a score of 99.8 on Afghanistan placing it at number 10 overall (1 being worst, 144 being best in 2006). This score positioned the country within the “warning” category. Between 2006 and 2012, Afghanistan fell to number 7 with a score of 107.5 and this downward trend continued in the 2012 with Afghanistan falling one more position to number 6; this score is worse than Haiti and Yemen and places the country in “high alert” status with only Somalia and the Congo in “very high alert” status. 78 The FSI 2012 Summary for Afghanistan is as follows: “Afghanistan’s dire security conditions make it one of the most dangerous countries in the world. With a whole host of pressure groups—from drug lords to the power-hungry Taliban—Afghanistan’s central government in Kabul faces many threats to its stability and permanence. About 80% of civilian deaths were attributed to the Taliban’s militant campaign in 2011, with the numbers increasing over 2010 figures. The lack of political cohesion exacerbates the government’s inability to provide for its citizens. As major portions of the Afghani society prescribe to nomadic and traditional ideals, many do not view Kabul as the primary authority over national politics. Additionally, the provision of public services and economic development outside of populated areas are severely underdeveloped, which will likely remain so until Afghan security conditions ameliorate. It remains to be seen what effect the 2014 NATO withdrawal will have, especially given Kabul’s high dependence on the assistance of external actors.” 79

The Norman Patterson School of International Affairs, Carlton University Country Indicators for Foreign Policy Report provides a global fragility ranking for 2011 for 197 countries. The global rankings indicate that the most fragile country in 2011 was Somalia, followed closely by Afghanistan. Their study of the evolution of fragility over a period of 1980 to 2010 indicates countries that are stuck in a “fragility trap,” those that move in and out of fragility and those that have successfully exited fragility in the last decade or so; Afghanistan has remained constantly in the top 20 persistent fragile states for the entire period of analysis, and there is no indication that this is likely to change for the foreseeable future. 80 In summary, Afghanistan may be evaluated as a failing, if not failed, state and that state-building initiatives by NATO and other entities failed to achieve their objectives. More specifically, the desired end state of the 2006 ISAF campaign design was not achieved nor were most of the expected outcomes of the ANDS.

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77. UNDP Human Development Report 2012.
78. Fund For Peace Failed State Index, 2006 and 2012.
79. Ibid.
80. Norman Patterson School of International Affairs, Carlton University Ottawa, Canada, Assessing State Fragility – A Country Indicators for Foreign Policy Report, June 15 2012.
Chapter 5: NATO and the Effect of Strategic Failure in Afghanistan

Aim

Having now analysed and assessed NATO’s Comprehensive Approach strategy in some detail, this chapter seeks to answer the following question: if it has been demonstrated that NATO failed to achieve its strategic objective in Afghanistan, what does this imply for the Comprehensive Approach as strategy and what are the potential impacts of this failure for NATO going forward?

NATO in International Society

The challenges posed by fragile, failing and failed states were identified as “the main security challenge of our time.” Whether this proves to be prescient or not, there is no doubt that the number of states which qualify for inclusion in that unfortunate club remains distressingly high. Of the several cases which have confronted the international community in the past decade, Afghanistan has come to epitomize this challenge, given the duration, scale and cost (both human and financial) of the Western intervention, which was initiated in 2001. Even though it is not yet entirely clear what the future of Afghanistan holds, it is clear that while the operational objectives to overthrow the Taliban and eliminate the Afghan-based al-Qaeda threat were achieved, the strategic objective of transforming the Afghan state into a secure, stable and prosperous one was not, and the potential for future re-emergence of the Taliban and their terroristic allies remains high, as does the potential for civil war following the withdrawal of Western military forces in 2014 or later.

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Suhrke argued that two visions for post-2014 Afghanistan were possible: the first rooted in a long-term partnership between NATO and Afghanistan as declared at the 2012 Bonn Conference; the second rooted in a “Heart of Asia” strategy in which “Afghanistan’s security and development are anchored in a regional web of co-operation among countries that identify themselves as Afghanistan’s ‘near and extended neighbours’” and which does not include any form of permanent Western military presence. At time of writing, it was not clear if either of these visions were being actively pursued or if frequent statements about NATO’s ongoing engagement in Afghanistan beyond 2014 were sufficient to dispel the abandonment narrative, which claims that “Western nations must not again abandon Afghanistan as they did after 1989. From this narrative flows the conclusion that Western military engagement has been, and will continue to be, a stabilising force.”

Rich makes a link between the choice of some form of continuous engagement or complete disengagement from Afghanistan and a potential shift in the strategic posture of Western states in terms of their domestic approach to counter-terrorism. His concern is that a complete disengagement from Afghanistan would signal the end of the war on terror (in the sense that it was being conducted “over there”) and that the focus would shift to “an intense counterinsurgent campaign against Islamic militants in Western cities, leading to a de facto militarisation of security policy, a heightening of domestic surveillance, and a likely further diminution of civil liberties in the process.” To the extent that aspects of all of these trends have been arguably ongoing for some time, the final disposition of Western in forces in Afghanistan is not likely to have the direct effect he proposes.

A more vexing, and more probable, challenge potentially precipitated by a total Western disengagement relates to the size and capabilities of the Afghan Security Forces at the point of disengagement. To the extent these forces are unable resist a concerted offensive

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5. Ibid, 7.
from indigenous or foreign insurgents, this risks the country reverting back to pre-2001 status. This, however, is only one aspect of this challenge in that the ANSF itself may become engaged in internal conflict as various powerbrokers, aligned along ethnic or tribal lines, attempt to re-assert their former prominence. As Thruelsen explains:

An early transition of security responsibility in a fragile political environment would be risky and needs to be anchored in more long-term programmes offered as part of the SSR package. Otherwise one might simply end up creating more informally empowered structures that fill the vacuum left by the departure of the international forces, but which are accountable to neither the local population nor the host nation.\(^7\)

Chellaney’s focus is less fixed on external sources of security for the country and more concerned with the potential for outright partition of Afghanistan along tribal, ethnic and/or linguistic lines. He posits that such divisions are already the de facto condition in Iraq and Libya and that a partition of Afghanistan may further destabilize the region. He opines:

With a war-exhausted United States having run out of patience, outside forces are in no position to prevent Afghanistan’s partition along Iraqi or post-Yugoslav lines, with the bloodiest battles expected to rage over control of ethnically mixed strategic areas, including Kabul. In this scenario, Pakistani generals, instead of continuing to sponsor Afghan Pashtun militant groups such as the Taliban and their allies such as the Haqqani network, would be compelled to fend off a potentially grave threat to Pakistan’s unity.\(^8\)

Such potentially dire outcomes underscore the reality that the West’s and, more specifically, NATO’s failure to achieve its strategic state-building objectives in Afghanistan are far-reaching and of greater significance than to that country alone. As an institutional experiment in out-of-area operations, the Afghan experience exposed


Chapter 5: NATO and the Effect of Strategic Failure

differences amongst Alliance members across a number of significant dimensions, including risk tolerance and force generation capacity, and there is a burgeoning analytical industry concerned with the impact of NATO’s failure in Afghanistan on the Alliance itself going forward. While this line of inquiry is indeed worthy of study, a second, and arguably more important, inquiry concerns how its failure in Afghanistan will impact NATO’s approach to future crisis management scenarios based on two assumptions—first, that such crisis management scenarios will continue to manifest in the international security environment due to the already cited prevalence of fragile, failing and failed states, and second, that while the Afghan experience has indeed had a deleterious impact on the Alliance and will potentially constrain its range of options going forward, the Alliance itself will survive as a viable entity and will be called upon to respond in some fashion to future crises.9

In order to assess the impact of NATO’s failure to achieve its strategic objective in Afghanistan and specifically the failure of the Comprehensive Approach strategy which was at the core of the Alliance efforts to build the Afghan state, it is necessary to recognize that NATO has evolved from a traditional military alliance based on a clearly identified threat to one in which members now view their participation as one facet of a less tightly bound security policy menu. That menu provides members with options to participate with varying levels of commitment to Alliance operations, as they seek to pursue security policy agendas sometimes with or through NATO, sometimes with or through smaller groups of states that may or may not also be members of NATO, or outside the Alliance sphere altogether.10 At the same time, the size of the Alliance has increased, and this has resulted in both a widening of the range of capabilities that members may (or may not) contribute and a greater divergence of opinion as to the role of the Alliance in the evolved security environment. In spite, or perhaps as a result, of this trend, the institutional dimension of the Alliance has developed into a highly

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9. For example, NATO was requested by the US to lead the campaign to protect Libyan citizens under assault by the Gadhafi regime in 2011.
10. An example would be Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR in 2011 (Libya) in which several Alliance members, notably Germany, refused to participate, while several non-NATO states were heavily involved. Also, the French mission to Mali in 2013 was undertaken outside of NATO, and the mission was eventually turned over to the UN as a peacekeeping mission with other organizations, including the EU, overseeing a training mission that included UK troops.
complex and sophisticated bureaucracy with large headquarters, large staffs as well as operating rules and standards which address a vast array of subjects.

While membership and institutional facets are important lenses through which to assess the evolved complexion of the Alliance, they are inherently elastic in nature, as it is conceivable to imagine both increased and (less likely) decreased membership levels as well as institutional transformations resulting from internal necessities or external pressures. Of a more enduring nature, and arguably more germane to this thesis, is an appreciation of the Alliance as a type of community operating on a common set of values and norms.

According to Williams, the realist reluctance to acknowledge the social creation of reality puts NATO at a disadvantage. He argued, as Kitchen did, that NATO was always more than just a military alliance and that it was also a social creation with a clear values base related to “democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law.” This, in turn, would generate the requirement to define “new interpretations of international political norms and international law” in order to address the contemporary security environment.

The concept of a generic international society is differentiated from the idea of human society as a whole or a specific society in a given state. An international society consists of a group of states that have opted to be associated with one another because, in so doing, it is deemed beneficial for them. While this reason could be based solely on defensive or security requirements, the strength of a self-defining international society is that it not only creates opportunities to generate concrete benefits for the participants but may also be reflective of the core values of the participating states, and as a result, a values-based international society is more likely to endure. In this sense, the conceptualization of NATO as an exemplar of an international society based on set of

12. Ibid, 121.
common values and norms is, therefore, arguably the key determinant for how the Alliance may be expected to act over time.\(^{13}\)

Having identified NATO as a unique international society, the question then turns to how it can both respond to and shape other international societies or individual states that potentially threaten the security of the Alliance community. In the Cold War version of the Alliance, the answer to this question was relatively straightforward, in that the essential role of the Alliance was to respond with military force to threats from potential aggressors, specifically the Soviet Union; this recalls the role of the Alliance as a defensive organization. Considering the post-Cold War version of the Alliance, we now see the organization operating as a form of security manager, responding to a wide range of complex threats from both state and non-state actors.\(^{14}\)

With respect to threats that are deemed to emanate from fragile, failing and failed states, the NATO community does not permit membership to such entities within its own community; therefore, these types of problematic states are outside of that community. While it would perhaps be a fruitful study to identify and analyse the dominant values and norms of such states in order to identify potential causality between those values and norms and the linkage to state fragility, for the purpose of this exercise, it may simply be noted that, for whatever reason, such states will not likely embody the values and norms identified with the Alliance community. Here again, while this supposition is not designed to ascribe a level of uniformity across all Alliance members, the overall picture will be one of a group of states that are essentially liberal, democratic and supporting market-driven economies.\(^{15}\)

The Effect of Strategic Failure on NATO

I turn now to the potential impacts and implications of NATO’s strategic failure in Afghanistan with a view to understanding how the Alliance’s experience in that setting

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14. Webber, Sperling and Smith, 39.
15. The evolving political environment in Turkey may present a challenge to this theory.
may influence future choices concerning crisis management, generally, and the
ingagement with fragile, failing and failed states, specifically. Deliberation over how the
Afghan experience may influence the Alliance going forward may be assessed in a
context of three predominant analytical frameworks.

The first relates to the ongoing debate over the status of the Alliance as one that is strong
and enduring or weak and in decline. As the literature is replete with arguments that
support both conclusions, it may be posited that factors affecting these latent trajectories
remain complex and the ultimate fate of the Alliance uncertain. That it has survived as a
viable entity through numerous crises and over a significant period of time (a unique feat
in the history of alliances) would suggest that—while the impact of this latest crisis, the
strategic failure in Afghanistan, will certainly influence the Alliance going forward— it is
unlikely that it will be the decisive cause of Alliance disintegration.

The second relates to the role of the Alliance in the evolved security environment, in
particular, its ability and willingness to act as manager of security crises on a global basis
or remain as a defensive alliance focused on the European theatre. This question, and the
factors which are likely to influence the decision, is not a result of the Afghan experience
alone but includes other shifts and drivers in the international security environment,
including the grand strategic shift from offensive to defensive liberalism, the US pivot
towards the Asia–Pacific region, the so-called “Arab Spring” as well as the state of the
global economy in general, and the Euro-centric crisis, in particular.

The third relates to the ability of the Alliance to generate the capacity required to operate
in the complex security environment and, if not, how to maintain relevance and
legitimacy going forward. This issue raises the possibility that the primary threat to the
Alliance is not external, but internal, and implicates the ability of the Alliance to maintain
and build upon nascent relationships developed as a result of its Afghan experience ( i.e.,
how to leverage that experience and those relationships such that the Alliance may
contribute to the international crisis management “team” without exposing members to
choices that risk participation in NATO operations and, therefore, weaken the Alliance).
Chapter 5: NATO and the Effect of Strategic Failure

Of vital importance are the role of the US as provider of much of the capacity required to operate out of area and the potential impact of “cross-Atlantic fatigue.”

These frameworks—status, role, and relevance—both influence and are influenced by the Alliance experience in Afghanistan. As the Afghan mission evolved towards a state-building project it not only consumed the Alliance (which recognized the importance of the mission to its reputation) but exposed internal rifts and generated frictions amongst Alliance members. Divisive issues (such as burden sharing, caveats, casualties and differing conceptions of the mission) suggest that at least two theories surrounding these problems may be offered. The first would suggest that the Afghan mission simply illustrated the degree to which the Alliance was not structured, resourced or otherwise prepared to operationalize the strategic concepts that it had adopted following the end of the Cold War, in other words, that the Afghan mission brought these shortcomings into fruition. The second would suggest that tensions, disparities and disagreements amongst Alliance members were characteristic of the Alliance from its inception and that the Afghan mission merely exposed these latent factors in an accentuated fashion.

In either case, the failed state-building project in Afghanistan has impacted the Alliance in numerous respects. For example, while some observers have suggested that NATO’s strategic failure in Afghanistan may trigger the end of the Alliance itself, it is unclear the degree to which NATO’s willingness to operate out of area and subsequently engage in the Afghan state-building project is truly reflective of a committed long-term policy, or if its failure to achieve its strategic objectives in this scenario is a one-off, albeit humbling, experience.

While the breakup of the Alliance remains unlikely, the Afghanistan mission exposed serious rifts between various members within the Alliance and between the Alliance and

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the US. These rifts are based primarily on internal debates regarding the types of missions NATO should be engaged in and a lack of capacity to deal with the most pressing issues which, in turn, calls into question the relevance of the organization. This may be characterized largely as a collective defense versus global security debate writ large.\textsuperscript{20} This debate gives rise to three potential scenarios for how the Alliance may be affected by its experience in Afghanistan.

The first scenario implicates the framework of NATO’s future status, as the Alliance may be seen in America as a weakened military alliance that cannot be trusted to defend the West’s interests (as America sees them), and the US may elect to act in crisis situations without the involvement of NATO (as it did immediately following 9/11). It may, therefore, reduce or withhold the types of technology and support the Alliance requires to operate in the future security environment, and this would constrain the ability of the Alliance to participate in such ventures or require the Alliance itself or European members to acquire the necessary resources.\textsuperscript{21} This scenario is exacerbated by the US pivot towards the Asia–Pacific region, which is viewed by the US as a potential focus for future conflict due to the rise of Chinese economic and military power and the presence of several unresolved political and territorial disputes. This was underscored by Jamie Shea who stated:

\begin{quote}
NATO members will have to come to terms with these strategic game changes, obvious from the moment that China emerged as the first non-democratic global economic superpower for several centuries . . . . The bad news, however, is that the U.S. pivot occurs at a time when the Europeans face a number of security headaches in their neighborhood (Mali, Sahel, Middle East, Balkans, Gulf of Guinea, Gulf of Aden, etc.) that will certainly obligate European NATO members to preserve a certain number of operational forces in order to respond to these pressing challenges, instead of the temptation of restructuring their armed forces that could have been felt after 2014 and the end of the NATO operation in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{22}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{20} Williams, \textit{NATO, Security and Risk Management}, 123.
\textsuperscript{21} Kashmeri, 142.
\textsuperscript{22} Jamie Shea, “NATO and the U.S. Pivot to Asia: To Follow or Not to Follow?,” German Marshall Fund of the United States, Transatlantic Security Task Force Series, Policy Brief (May 2013), 2. Mr. Shea is NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Emerging Security Challenges.
Cuccia extended the analysis of potential NATO futures to emphasize the central role of the US in the Alliance and he outlined four potential scenarios:

**Scenario A**: US leadership relationship with NATO continues on the same path;

**Scenario B**: US leadership in NATO increases;

**Scenario C**: EU leadership in NATO increases; and

**Scenario D**: The NATO Alliance breaks apart.23

With respect to Scenario D, this could manifest if US national security interests diverge from the Alliance and if the European members develop diverse individual concepts for their own or collective security or defensive requirements. Given the combination of the US strategic pivot towards Asia–Pacific and the struggles arising out of the “European project,” such a future cannot be entirely discounted. In order to forestall this eventuality, it would logically appear to necessitate that one of the remaining three scenarios plays out. An alternative possibility exists wherein a re-balancing of leadership between the US and European allies occurs and the Alliance acquires additional capacities from non-US members; this would obviously require a re-invigorated Euro-zone and a significant improvement in European finances. If such changes are not possible, the Alliance may yet survive but be reduced to a “paralyzed political forum.”24

The second scenario implicates the framework of NATO’s role in that Alliance members may be reluctant to take up new risks that are not seen as a direct threat to the Alliance and its members. As observed by Hoehn and Harting “the Alliance’s new strategic concept will undoubtedly seek to balance NATO’s various roles at home and abroad, but there should be little doubt that, for the time being, NATO’s focus will be at home. The away game appears to be beyond NATO’s reach.”25 If such an attitude prevails, it will reduce the Alliance’s opportunity to function as an important secondary institution in the

23. Cuccia, 30–34.
25. Andrew R. Hoehn and Sarah Harting, *Risking NATO: Testing the Limits of the Alliance in Afghanistan* (Santa Monica CA, RAND, 2010), 76.
international security environment and could shift the emphasis back to a purely
defensive alliance.26 This scenario is described by Wendling as a “worst case” in that:

NATO would experience strong dissent about its future
engagements. No doubt it would continue to exist, because many
European countries have hardly any alternative for their defence, but
would have to refocus on the defence of its territory and the vital
interests of its member countries. On the other hand, there would
undoubtedly be no more new wide scale operations outside allied
territory. This would obviously profoundly affect transatlantic
relations, and probably open the way for new cooperation
configurations between the European countries and the United
States, with consequences that are difficult to foresee in terms of the
cohesion of the Europeans.27

The third scenario implicates the relevance of the Alliance going forward. It is possible
that the problems the Alliance encountered in Afghanistan were symptomatic of
problems existing within NATO and not necessarily related to the specific Afghan
setting. These problems were fuelled by increasingly divergent conceptions of world
order and belief in the efficacy of military force amongst the allies.28 In order to
overcome this conceptual/policy gridlock, the Alliance must choose to remain primarily a
means of organizing military force on behalf of the UN in only limited scenarios or
acquire a broader set of capabilities to transform the organization into one able to
participate in a wider range of missions on a global basis.29

While it has been argued that “NATO will continue down the path of global
engagement,”30 evolving conditions may militate against this, including aging
populations; a growing Muslim population in many European allied nations; a lack of
financial capacity to acquire the technology, equipment and transportation means

26. Williams, The Good War, 139.
27. Dr. Cecile Wendling, The effects of managing the crisis in Afghanistan on the future of NATO,
paper presented at the SGIR 7th Pan-European International Relations Conference (Stockholm, September,
9–11, 2010), 12.
29. Kashmari, 153.
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necessary for such operations;\textsuperscript{31} and the changing nature of conflict, which calls into question the “common understanding of what constitutes an Article 5 attack.”\textsuperscript{32}

So while it is highly probable that NATO will continue to exist as a viable entity, it is clear that its failure to achieve its strategic objective in Afghanistan may constrain its ability and willingness to operate outside its traditional European theatre or play a significant role in future complex crisis scenarios. While an analysis of NATO’s status following this failure could be suggestive of an alliance in decline, operations undertaken in Libya and Turkey\textsuperscript{33} and a stated commitment to Afghanistan’s post-2014 security would indicate that this is not necessarily the case.

With respect to NATO’s role going forward, the argument that it must choose between remaining a purely defensive alliance focused on territorial defence of its traditional European theatre or evolve into a globally focused security manager excludes the potentiality of the Alliance accepting both responsibilities. While constrained resources would presuppose a focus on the defensive role, the complexity of the international security environment and extant threats posed by both state and non-state actors cannot be ignored, and it is likely that it is not a question of if the Alliance will respond to these threats, but how.

This then implicates the issue of Alliance relevance going forward. If it unwilling or unable to respond effectively to these threats, individual nations or coalitions of the willing will address them, and the Alliance may become but one (infrequently used) option in a wider array of security instruments. This recalls the earlier discussion of the temporality of membership and institutional factors and downplays, however, the importance of values and norms which remain the core strength of the Alliance and the most likely factor to influence future Alliance actions.\textsuperscript{34}

\textsuperscript{31} Ibid, 12.
\textsuperscript{32} NATO, \textit{Multiple Futures Project—Navigating Towards 2030: Findings and Recommendations}, 1.
\textsuperscript{33} NATO deployed Patriot missiles to Turkey in 2012 in order to defend it from Syrian air attacks which were occurring as a result of the Syrian civil war.
\textsuperscript{34} Camille Grand, Director of the Foundation for Strategic Research, article in the \textit{New York Times}, 4 April, 2013, accessed 5 September 2013; available from
Conclusion

In order to address the multifaceted and multi-disciplinary nature of this inquiry, the thesis sought answers to the following questions:

- What is the Comprehensive Approach, where did it come from and why was it viewed as a viable strategy to address fragile, failing and failed states?
- Why did NATO choose to adopt the Comprehensive Approach as its primary strategy in Afghanistan?
- What evidence may be identified to argue that the strategy failed?
- If the evidence for failure is compelling, is it possible to understand why the strategy failed in the Afghan setting?
- What are the implications for this failure for the Alliance going forward?

Defining and conceptually situating the Comprehensive Approach was undertaken in the context of a literature review that opted to present and analyse the strategy as both a pure model of exogenous state building and as a formalized strategy adopted by NATO in Afghanistan in order to secure, stabilize, reconstruct and develop the country between approximately 2006 and 2011.

With the end of the Cold War, the balance of threat model dissipated with the expiration of the Soviet empire and previously muted intra-state conflicts emerged in Europe, Africa, Asia and elsewhere. From these, the emergence of fragile, failing and failed states prompted the West, and the US in particular, to adopt an offensive liberalist grand strategy whereby the relatively unrestrained power of the US and its NATO allies could be utilized to enforce compliance in the international security environment by means of direct military intervention in order to force transition towards an acceptable state model in the Western cast. This was the approach undertaken in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, and these two state-building projects epitomized the conceptualization and
manifestation of integrated approaches, that is, the application of instruments of national or alliance power, both military and civilian, to transform an object state into an acceptable member of the international community. While the Comprehensive Approach was deemed highly innovative, various antecedent concepts, including civil-military cooperation, the effects-based approach to operations and counter-insurgency, had previously addressed theoretical and pragmatic aspects of state building.

As a model, the comprehensive approach was reasoned to be the appropriate strategic choice for addressing weaknesses inherent in fragile, failing and failed states, given that it aimed to “promote the external and internal coordination of policy instruments and the coherence of objectives between different actors,”1 including military forces and all other organizations, agencies or actors engaged in an intervention (including the “host nation”), practices which appeared to be lacking in earlier interventions undertaken by NATO and other Western nations. The model called for effective interaction of actors operating at the same tactical, operational or strategic level as well as effective interaction between these levels. While no single, agreed definition of a comprehensive approach was universally adopted, similar language and concepts appeared in national and supranational variants of the model, and it was generally conceded that any conceptual or pragmatic deficiencies in it will and must be overcome; a conclusion not borne out by this thesis.

With respect to NATO’s adoption of the Comprehensive Approach as its primary strategy in Afghanistan, this may be approached from at least three perspectives. First, it may be considered a logical institutional response, which was linked to its decision to accept responsibility for the ISAF mission in the first instance. That decision was the result of a combination of external and internal pressures (including the desire of the US to handoff Afghanistan to a reliable partner such that the evidently more pressing issue of Iraq could be addressed) and the fact that various Alliance members were already engaged in Afghanistan and pressing NATO to bring in additional players in order to spread the leadership burden. Once the decision to accept leadership of ISAF was taken, NATO found itself at the helm of a complex mission to stabilize the country, and by 2006,

Afghanistan had risen to the top of NATO’s priorities. During the Riga Summit of that year, a commitment was made to the Afghan government to support its reconstruction and development objectives as a means of building indigenous Afghan capacity, and these objectives were incorporated into the ISAF campaign design.

Second, the Comprehensive Approach as NATO strategy evolved out of extant state-building theories which built on Alliance and national-level experiences in the former Yugoslavia and elsewhere as well as on earlier concepts and models that the Alliance had adopted formally or informally, particularly civil-military cooperation (for which NATO had developed doctrine) and the effects-based approach to operations (for which NATO was developing doctrine). State-building theory itself rested on assumptions embedded in the West’s extant grand strategy of offensive liberalism which posited that fragile, failing and failed states could be transformed into compliant and acceptable members of the international community if the state could achieve a reasonable level of maturity within its security, governance, economic and social pillars. To the extent an object state could be transformed into one that was based on fundamental liberal principles, it was assumed that this would be sufficient to ensure that it would not countenance conditions that would be harmful to its own population or pose threats to the larger international community. In this sense, NATO’s adoption of the Comprehensive Approach to state building in Afghanistan was entirely consistent with theories which were prevalent and largely accepted in academic, development and policy spheres.

The third perspective was NATO acting on commonly held ideals and norms; the Comprehensive Approach arguably represented the embodiment of those ideals and norms and supported views held by various Alliance members, which perceived the Afghan mission through a humanitarian lens. By the time NATO accepted command of ISAF in 2003, the Taliban threat had all but disappeared, and ISAF was regarded not as a combat mission but as one that stressed the provision of stability such that reconstruction and development action could occur. The PRT model, which combined both civilian and military assets, was already in existence and operating in limited areas of the country, and this model appealed to various Alliance members who saw an opportunity to simultaneously support NATO and “show the national flag” in a positive light. For those
nations which were particularly concerned with the domestic political implications of a potential combat mission (Germany is a prime example), the opportunity to establish PRTs in the relatively benign northern or western sectors of the country represented the perfect balance of participation and risk management.

This idealist explanation for NATO’s willingness to participate in the Afghan state-building project must, however, be tempered with an appreciation that some Alliance members were opposed to the US pursuit of a global war on terror and were reluctant to participate in the Afghan mission, which was ostensibly its first major engagement. Several Alliance members refused to participate in the US coalition of the willing in Iraq and some, like Canada, preferred to support NATO’s Afghan mission not out of national security or humanitarian concerns but rather as a form of national compensation to the US (although this was never offered as an official reason). That said, once engaged, participants supported the mission, taking into consideration their various domestic polities and priorities, and NATO’s increasing level of effort was unanimously supported, at least in public, if not behind every closed door.

The evidence I offered for the failure of the Comprehensive Approach strategy in Afghanistan was based on an analysis of changes in conditions of specific development indicators between 2006 and 2011. These indicators were selected from the ANDS and the ISAF campaign design for Afghanistan and were, to the greatest extent possible, mapped to each other. This process mirrored that of a campaign assessment that would be recognizable to operational analysts in a NATO headquarters, although the assessment undertaken for this thesis had the benefit of capturing historical data; most campaign assessments utilize data sources in real time and are designed to provide forward-looking trends in order to adjust actions or resources in an active campaign.

The results of this assessment highlighted that in virtually all major pillars of development, the indicators did not show any significant improvement over the five-year time frame under study and, further, that the absolute levels of progress remained extremely low. Open source data from a wide variety of organizations and agencies, both public and private, painted a consistent picture of a state that was under constant threat of
failing, and indeed, the most recent evaluation from *Foreign Policy*’s Failed State 2012 Index has Afghanistan declining in overall functionality as compared to 2011.\(^2\) As such, there is no requirement to alter the conclusion of Chapter 4 that Afghanistan may be evaluated as a failing, if not failed, state and that state-building initiatives by NATO failed to achieve their objectives. More specifically, the desired strategic end state of the 2006 ISAF campaign design was not achieved nor were most of the expected outcomes of the ANDS.

Prior to that analysis, I sought to identify how NATO attempted to actualize the Comprehensive Approach at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. This was accomplished by means of an integrated interrogational framework that identified specific NATO initiatives at all three levels in a context of conceptual, institutional and capability gaps. Underlying this investigation was the assumption that the core theory supporting the strategy was the requirement for civilian (particularly NGOs) and military organizations to cooperate and collaborate in order to achieve common development objectives. In order to test this theory, the investigation attempted to identify fundamental characteristics of civilian and military organizations, and it was posited that the engrained nature of these characteristics was such that the desired levels of cooperation and collaboration were not only extremely difficult (if not impossible) to achieve in the Afghan setting, but also may not be achievable in any other. This investigation also led to a conclusion that as evidence for stagnant development in Afghanistan mounted through 2009 onwards, the adoption by the US and NATO forces of counter-insurgency doctrine was undermined by under-resourced force levels and the unwillingness of many Alliance members to retract caveats which further enervated the COIN effort.

The failure to achieve its strategic objective in Afghanistan resulted in a wide-ranging discussion concerning the effect of this failure on the future of the Alliance. Although this failure will not likely presage the break-up of NATO, it will likely cause a period of internal and external evaluation of its status, role and relevance in the evolving international security environment. Going forward, NATO will be faced with a series of

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grand-strategic choices, most notably its willingness to engage globally across the full spectrum of security challenges or revert to its more traditional role as a Euro-Atlantic defensive alliance. The decision will have significant impact on the future international security environment to the extent that no other organization or single nation (including the United States) is in possession of the full range of capacities and capabilities wielded by the Alliance. As both a highly significant institution in the global context and a values-based organization in its own right, a retreat from future complex crises emanating from fragile, failed and failed states puts at risk vulnerable populations and weakens the global community; clearly effects that are not consistent with NATO’s stated values and norms. While NATO’s mission to assist Afghanistan may have been seen as a noble cause in and of itself, state building as strategy clearly failed.
Abbreviations

3D diplomacy, defence and development
9/11 11 September, 2001
7S strategy, structure, systems, shared values, style, staff, skills
ABP Afghan Border Police
ACO Allied Command Operations (NATO)
ACT Allied Command Transformation (NATO)
AFG Afghanistan
AFNORTH Allied Forces North (NATO)
ALNAP Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Human Action
AMDG Afghan Millennium Development Goals
ANA Afghan National Army
ANATC Afghan National Army Training Command
ANCOP Afghan Civil Order Police
ANDS *Afghan National Development Strategy*
ANP Afghan National Police
ANSF Afghan National Security Forces
ASP Afghanistan Stabilisation Program
AQ al Qa’ida
C2 command and control
CA comprehensive approach
CD&E concept development and experimentation
CF Canadian Forces
CFC Civil-Military Fusion Centre (NATO)
*CFOPP* *Canadian Forces Operational Planning Process*
CFPDS Canadian Forces Professional Development System
CIMIC civil-military co-operation
CMCoord civil-military coordination
COIN counter-insurgency
COMISAF  Commander of International Security Assistance Force
COPD  Comprehensive Operational Planning Directive (NATO)
CPAI  Concerted Planning and Action Initiative (NATO)
CPAD  Concerted Planning and Action Directive (NATO)
CSDP  Common Security and Defense Policy (EU)
CQ  cultural intelligence
DABS  Afghan Electrical Power Authority
DND  Department of National Defence (Canada)
DP  decisive point
EBAO  effects-based approach to operations
EBO  effects-based operations
ELRHA  Enhanced Learning and Research for Humanitarian Assistance
EU  European Union
FCCMI  Future Comprehensive Civil-Military Interaction (NATO)
FSI  Failed State Index
FY  fiscal year
GDP  gross domestic product
GSWC  general system of war and conflict
ha  hectare
h/h  household
HDI  Human Development Index
HQ  headquarters
JFCB  Joint Force Command Brunssum (NATO)
IAG  illegally armed group
I-ANDS  Interim Afghan National Development Strategy
IDLG  Independent Directorate of Local Governance
IDP  internally displaced person
IEC  Independent Election Commission
IED  improvised explosive device
IFOR  Implementation Force (NATO)
IO  international organizations
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>international relations</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
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<td>ISIS</td>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq and Syria</td>
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<td>ISS</td>
<td>international security studies</td>
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<td>JALLC</td>
<td>Joint Allied Lessons Learned Center (NATO)</td>
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<td>JDN</td>
<td>joint doctrine note (UK)</td>
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<td>JHQ CENT</td>
<td>Joint Headquarters Central (NATO)</td>
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<td>JIMP</td>
<td>joint, integrated, multinational and public (Canada)</td>
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<td>JOA</td>
<td>joint operational area</td>
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<td>km</td>
<td>kilometers</td>
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<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals (UN)</td>
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<td>MNE</td>
<td>multi-national experiment (NATO)</td>
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<td>MOE</td>
<td>measure of effectiveness</td>
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<td>MoF</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance (Afghanistan)</td>
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<td>MOP</td>
<td>measure of performance</td>
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<td>MW</td>
<td>megawatt</td>
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<td>NAC</td>
<td>North Atlantic Council</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>non-governmental organization</td>
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<td>NMAA</td>
<td>National Military Academy of Afghanistan</td>
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<td>NTM-A</td>
<td>NATO Training Mission - Afghanistan</td>
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<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN)</td>
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<td>OEF</td>
<td>Operation ENDURING FREEDOM</td>
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<td>OPP</td>
<td>operational planning process</td>
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<td>OR</td>
<td>operational research</td>
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<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<td>PC</td>
<td>provincial council</td>
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<td>PDC</td>
<td>provincial development council</td>
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<td>PRT</td>
<td>provincial reconstruction team</td>
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<td>R2P</td>
<td>right to protect</td>
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<td>RC</td>
<td>regional command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RHQ</td>
<td>regional headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHAPE</td>
<td>Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (NATO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSR</td>
<td>security sector reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>to be determined</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDOC</td>
<td>United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNISCI</td>
<td>Research Unit on International Security and Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSCR</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council Resolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMA</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan</td>
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