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Displacing Orientalism: Ottoman Jihad, German Imperialism, and the Armenian Genocide

Rachel MagShamhrán

This chapter examines various discourses involved in German-Turkish relations from the 1890s until the end of the First World War, arguing that they are evidence of a more multidirectional Orientalism than is suggested by Edward Said’s idea of a hegemonic West representing and therefore controlling an essentialized East. Orientalism, these discourses reveal, does not occur along the single trajectory suggested by its name. It is not simply a nonreversible, monodirectional phenomenon radiating out from the West onto a passive Eastern object, but rather, as Sheldon Pollock among others has argued, something that can also emanate from the East, be applied by the East to itself, and even be applied by the West to the West. In short, the dialectics of Orientalism are infinitely more conflicted, complex, decentered, and displaced than Said’s approach indicates.

The image of the “sick old man of Europe” as a passive Eastern pawn in Western imperialist power games is a case in point, failing to do justice to the extent to which the Ottoman Empire was an active participant in the major power plays of the period, all the while serving its own political agendas, which included a hegemonic national project based on ideas of “ethnic-national homogeneity,” or, as John Morrow puts it, “historians have long credited the German government with manipulating the Ottoman government into the war to foster German aims of an empire from Berlin to Baghdad. . . . More recently [however, they] have recognized that the . . . Young Turks had their own aims, and . . . manipulated the Germans.” Only a paradigm that departs quite radically from Saidean Orientalism can adequately account for the intricacies of the relationship between Wilhelmine Germany and Turkey, which cut across traditional East-West cultural cleavages in the service of political and economic interests on both sides, and which required at times that even the most dominant cultural tropes determining difference and affinity be treated in an intriguingly casual fashion. This meant, for instance, that while a traditional and uncritical association of the Orient with Islam still doubtlessly
prevailed at the time (an association with which, incidentally, even post-
Saidean scholarship is still struggling), religious divides that served the
purposes of Othering the Orient were convolutedly downplayed.

Jennifer Jenkins has recently argued for more attention to be paid to
“the centrality of the Ottoman Empire, and its border with Europe, [and] to the various forms taken by German Orientalism,” and sees the need
for a timely “reminder of the profound and long-standing relationship
between Germany and the Ottoman Empire—wiping away the historical
amnesia that surrounds this topic, at least on the German side,” especial-
lly in the context of Turkey’s wish to accede to the EU and the oppo-
sition this has encountered in various quarters. The historical amnesia,
which has allowed Angela Merkel, for instance, to argue that the potential
accession of Turkey to the EU would be a “Katastrophe für die politische
Union Europas,” primarily on the basis of Turkey’s human-rights record,
has been facilitated to a certain extent by Said’s exemption of Germany
from the worst excesses of European Orientalism in his landmark work
of 1978. In the first two-thirds of the nineteenth century, he writes, Ger-
many had no “protracted sustained national interest in the Orient,” and
thus did not engage in Orientalism in the same sense that France and
Britain did. Said therefore considers the German Orient to be “almost
exclusively a scholarly, or at least a classical, Orient: it was made the sub-
ject of lyrics, fantasies, and even novels, but it was never actual, the way
Egypt and Syria were actual for Chateaubriand, Lane, Lamartine, Burton,
Disraeli, or Nerval.”

While Said’s argument largely holds true for most of the nineteenth
century, by the reign of Wilhelm II Germany’s interest in the Orient was
by no means purely scholarly, and the attitude to the Orient, encapsu-
lated in Bismarck’s famous 1878 statement that the Balkans were not
worth “die Knochen eines einzigen pommerschen Grenadiers,” simply
no longer pertained. In fact, what remained of the Ottoman Empire
would soon become what was effectively “a Turkish client state beholden
to [Germany] financially, technically . . . , and militarily.” In a sense,
it was a colony in all but name, and Germany’s political and economic
activity nothing less than an actio in distans colonialism. In the words of
the Protestant theologian Friedrich Naumann, founder of the Christian
socialist Nationalsocialer Verein party and part of Wilhelm II’s entourage
on his second Orient trip of 1898, the plan for Turkey was “das Land
wirtschaftlich von uns abhängig machen, um es später politisch kontroll-
ieren zu können.”

One slightly bizarre manifestation of Germany’s increasingly “actual”
interest in the Orient was Kaiser Wilhelm’s declaration during that self-
same trip of an everlasting friendship between the German emperor and
“His Majesty the Sultan and the three hundred millions of Moslems
who, in whatever corner of the globe they may live, revere in him their
In this speech, given as he stood at the tomb of Saladin in Damascus, he also took the opportunity to chastise Protestantism for its comparative lack of unity and appealed to his German subjects to strive to impress Muslims by their acts of charity, thereby awakening in them a respect for and love of Christianity. Although the German foreign ministry encouraged the belief that the Kaiser was merely visiting the region to make a pilgrimage to the Holy Land, he was actually actively cultivating an alliance between Germany and the Ottoman Empire, for, as he put it to “dear cousin Nikki” in August 1897, “the Mahometans [would be] a tremendous card in our game in case you or I were suddenly confronted by a war with the certain meddlesome Power,” that power being none other, of course, than Britain.

A second, perhaps equally peculiar, manifestation of Germany’s growing imperialist intentions toward the Orient was the Ottoman Empire’s declaration of jihad on the Entente powers in November 1914. A note written by the Kaiser in late July of that year makes it quite clear that this idea of an anti-British jihad was German rather than Turkish in origin: “Unsere Consuln in Türkei und Indien, Agenten etc. müssen die ganze Mohamedanische Welt gegen dieses verhaßte, verlogene, gewissenlose Krämervolk [i.e. the English] zum wilden Aufstand entflammen; denn wenn wir uns verbluten sollen, dann soll England wenigstens Indien verlieren.” Thus, perhaps unsurprisingly, in the proclamation of jihad by the Sheikh-ul-Islam, the enemies identified are not infidels in general, as one might expect, but rather, coincidentally, the enemies of Germany:

Oh, Moslems! Ye who are smitten with happiness and are on the verge of sacrificing your life and your good for the cause of right, and of braving perils, gather now around the Imperial throne, obey the commands of the Almighty, who, in the Koran, promises us bliss in this and in the next world; embrace ye the foot of the Caliph’s throne and know ye that the state is at war with Russia, England, France, and their Allies, and that these are the enemies of Islam. The Chief of the believers, the Caliph, invites you all as Moslems to join in the Holy War.

Despite the call to arms, Henry Morgenthau, the American ambassador to the Ottoman Empire at the time, noted, albeit with the benefit of hindsight and in the patronizing manner of his day and culture, that the entire project was doomed to failure from the start because “the Mohammedans of such countries as India, Egypt, Algiers, and Morocco knew that they were getting far better treatment than they could obtain under any other conceivable conditions” (AMS, 116). And so Morgenthau (evidently oblivious to the irony inherent in his position) saw the declaration of Holy War as little more than “evidence of the fundamental German clumsiness and real ignorance of racial psychology” (AMS, 116).
The New York Times of 7 July 1918 agreed with Morgenthau’s assessment, reiterating his remark that a *jihad* of this kind was impossible, for one thing because “simple minded Mohammedans could not understand why they should prosecute a holy war against Christians with Christian nations, such as Germany and Austria, as their partners.” However, the idea that “230,000,000 Mohammedans [might] have risen as one man and precipitated upon the world the most horrible riot of destruction and massacre that the world has ever recorded” was not initially considered to be quite so unlikely a prospect, if only because the bizarre alliance between Turkey and Germany made such strange things seem perfectly possible. And so “the world for a brief period stood aghast at the possibility of what might occur [if] the Mohammedans met the expectations of the Kaiser and the Caliph and responded as they should have responded according to the tenets of their faith.”

Notoriously anti-British, Kaiser Wilhelm II had long entertained the idea that the British Empire might be undermined by manipulating the forces of burgeoning pan-Islamism, seemingly unaware that the concerns of pan-Islamism might not precisely coincide with those of Germany. For although the Kaiserreich had initially been alarmed by the rapid spread of Islam in the late nineteenth century, particularly in Africa, where it had colonies, the diplomat, archeologist, and Orientalist Max von Oppenheim managed to foster the belief that Islam, which he claimed was by its very nature militant, could readily be harnessed as an effective weapon by the Germans and directed against Britain.

As Kris Manjapra has pointed out, by 1908 “Germany had the second-largest shipping traffic with India, after Great Britain,” giving rise to an intense trade rivalry between the two nations with regard to the subcontinent, not to mention other British overseas possessions. The importance of the Indian Empire to Germany’s economy played a part in the development of Oppenheim’s bafflingly simplistic plan to turn Islam against the British. There were 94 million Muslims in the British Empire, more than half of whom lived in India, and if they could be made to rise up *en masse* at the declaration of *jihad* and crush the infidel British (while sparing the infidel Germans), this would render Britain less of a competitor in the struggle for imperialist influence. The rhetorical arsenal for this project was readily provided by the ethnological discourses of the period, which tended to ascribe mentalities and motives to entire peoples. In the specific case of Islam, since the Crusade of 1096 when the worlds of Christianity and Islam first came into contact in a significant sense, Muslims had been associated in the European imagination with war and the warrior spirit, as in the *chansons de geste*, where the Saracens were depicted as “worthy of respect, a good enemy, [and] difficult to conquer.” And this was a view that Oppenheim certainly shared, characterizing the Muslims, whom he hoped to incite to insurrection, as, among other things, bellicose by nature.
Despite a “zwanzigjährige[r] Aufenthalt im Orient,” Oppenheim had, somewhat bafflingly, failed to recognize, however, that it was in the main Indian Hindus, not Muslims, who were inclined to engage in subversive activity against the British Empire. Moreover, he failed to consider that the declaration of Holy War by an Ottoman Sheikh-ul-Islam might not speak to Muslims worldwide, many of whom simply did not recognize his authority and right to declare *jihad* in the first place.

Oppenheim’s ignorance is all the more baffling when contrasted with the insights of his contemporary, the famous Dutch Orientalist Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje, whose intimate knowledge of Islam had helped the Dutch defeat the native Indonesians in the so-called Aceh War. As Hurgronje pointed out in a publication of 1915, the fragmentation of the Muslim population over different states posed a major, if not insurmountable, impediment to a Holy War of the kind Germany hoped to unleash: “The *jihad*-program assumes that the Mohammedans, just as at their first appearance in the world, continuously form a compact unity under one man’s leadership.” But this, he notes, had long since ceased to be the case, and “by this disintegration the continuance of the world conquest, as it was started in the first century of Islam, is made impossible.” He also noted that the tendency to view the Caliphate as a kind of Muslim papacy was misguided and a dangerous European projection onto the East that doomed projects such as Oppenheim’s to failure: “Certain European writers sometimes have felt induced to represent [the Caliphate] as a kind of religious princes [*sic*] of Islâm, who voluntarily or not had transferred their secular power to the many territorial princes in the wide dominion of Islâm . . . a sort of Mohammedan papacy. . . . ]Here, as elsewhere, the multitude preferred legend to fact.”

Despite the fact that Oppenheim’s assumptions were so fundamentally flawed and at variance with the insights of such established Islamists as Hurgronje, the British in India took the precaution of getting the Nizam of Hyderabad to declare that, although the Sultan of Turkey was nominally head of Islam worldwide, the First World War was a political rather than a religious conflict, and therefore the call to Holy War was invalid and would be ignored by him.

While Oppenheim’s essentializing notions about Islam are pure Orientalism in the sense that Said meant it (a hegemonic discursive act performed by the West on the East, albeit, in this case, with Great Britain as the indirect target), at the time of the so-called “unholy” German-Turkish alliance the Turks were themselves engaging in Orientalism of another kind—an “eastern Orientalism,” to borrow Sheldon Pollock’s term (*DO*, 96). Pollock uses the expression to indicate that “the movement of Orientalist knowledge may be multidirectional. We usually imagine its vector as directed outward—toward the colonization and domination of Asia; . . . we might [however] conceive of
it as potentially directed inward—toward the colonization and domination of Europe itself” (DO, 76–77). In this analysis the expression will be used to indicate that while the Ottoman Empire was no doubt the object and victim of Western Orientalist discourses and policies, it also both encouraged the Western gaze and cultural projections for its own purposes (Turkey was, for example, the passive instigator of the Turko-German alliance of 2 August 1914)\textsuperscript{30} and, all importantly, was engaged in inwardly directed hegemonic discourses of its own, of which more later. This Eastern Orientalism, or Orientalism in, of, and for the East, is not to be confused with the interpellation of the colonized by the colonizer. In other words, although Turkey was certainly to some extent what Kiossev calls a “self-colonizing culture,”\textsuperscript{31} that is to say one that, due to a sense of lack or inadequacy, “willingly” imports and adopts outside values, its participation in hegemonic discourses cannot be reduced to the simple internalization of Western ideas. If Orientalism is simply “a discourse of power that divides the world into ‘betters and lessers’ [facilitating] the domination (or ‘orientalization’ or ‘colonization’) of any group” (DO, 77), indigenous discourses of power in the Ottoman Empire of the period were themselves independently Orientalist. If we fail to recognize this, we find ourselves automatically engaging in the crass form of essentializing Orientalism found in the New York Times article above, reducing German involvement in the Near East in the late eighteen and early nineteen hundreds to a West-to-East Orientalism, whereby dastardly Germans used their financial clout and rhetorical cunning to bamboozle poor “simpleminded” Ottomans into doing their bidding, including declaring Holy War on the enemies of the Vaterland.

In other words, Turkish-German relations of the period cannot for a variety of reasons simply be regarded as what Homi K. Bhabha saw as a necessarily symbiotic relationship or interdependency between European colonial conqueror and Oriental conquered.\textsuperscript{32} When talking about the relationship between Orient and Occident in the case of Wilhelmine Germany and the Ottoman Empire, it is essential to recognize that there are also “Orientalist discourses within nation-states [both East and West] that operate internally and objectify, stigmatize and essentialize a particular geography, ethnicity and culture.”\textsuperscript{33} To call the discursive battlefield “Orientalism” at all, then, is in a way misleading, because focusing on the East-West divide elides the Orientalism that occurs in all cultures vis-à-vis both other cultures and elements within themselves. A good case in point would be the “dhimmitude” of Shari’a states,\textsuperscript{34} or, relatedly, the Tehcir Law of the Ottoman Empire and the ensuing Armenian genocide in which perhaps as many as 1.8 million Armenians were killed in a brutal and systematic campaign of eradication. However, Orientalism, misleading or not, is such a fixed category of modern critical thought that any
discussion of Turkish-German relations cannot just ignore it. But if it cannot be dismissed it must be revalorized so that Eastern acts of “Orientalism” such as the Armenian Aghed arc not forgotten in postcolonialism’s blame game.

To return to German-Ottoman inter-involvement in the Wilhelmine period, another curious by-product of the relationship was “a tradition of German anti-Armenian propaganda that emerged in response to German foreign-policy needs after the 1880s.”35 Despite the fact that the persecuted Armenians, like the Germans, were Christians (notwithstanding the Dvin Council), and despite the deep Christian-Islamic fault line that Oppenheim had hoped to exploit in a jihad, Germany took an anti-Armenian stance during the Turkish suppression of what was cast as Armenian sedition and secessionism. For one thing, Germany needed to ingratiate itself with the Ottomans, upon whom it was now parasitically dependent, and for another, Germany was deeply concerned by pro-Russian Armenian feeling and the risk of growing Russian influence in the Balkans. As a result of its vested interest in Anatolia, a particularly distorted and negative image of “the Armenian” developed in Germany at around this time, an exemplary instance of which can be found in Karl May’s 1897 travelogue Auf fremden Pfaden. His description of an encounter with what he sees as a typical Armenian begins comparatively moderately with a depiction of the man’s long, angular, haggard body and narrow forehead but soon gains momentum when it reaches the bloodless lips, “stark gebo- 
genoe, breitflügelige” hawk nose and “listige,” hooded eyes, basing arguments about the (moral) character of the Armenian people as a whole on these caricatural physiognomic observations:

Die stark entwickelten Kauwerkzeuge und das breit vortretende Kinn liessen auf Egoismus, Rücksichtslosigkeit und überwiegend tierische Affekte schliessen, während die obere Hälfte des Gesichts eine bedeutende, absichtlich verborgene Verschlagenheit verriet. Wenn dieser Mann nicht ein Armenier war, so gab es überhaupt keine Armenier! Ein Jude überlistet zehn Christen; ein Yankee betrügt fünfzig Juden, ein Armenier aber ist hundert Yankees gewachsen; so sagt man, und ich habe gefunden, dass dies zwar übertrieben ausge- drückt ist, aber doch auf Wahrheit beruht. Man bereise den Orient mit offenen Augen, so wird man mir recht geben. Wo irgendeine Heimtücke, eine Verräterei geplant wird, da ist sicher die Habichtsnase eines Armeniers im Spiel.36

This stereotype is eminently recognizable, of course, as an ethno- graphic Wandertopos, applied at other historical junctures mutatis mutan- dis to both Jesuits and Jews. We should, however, note that the image of the cunning Armenian was not entirely a late-nineteenth-century German invention, although it certainly served the country’s political
purposes to revive the topos at that time. It is a more widespread and older trope, used, for instance, in 1826 by the English travel writer and social reformer J. S. Buckingham in a description that, while certainly less negative, also ascribes a fundamental shrewdness to the Armenians, who “dispersed all over Asia . . . exert their natural genius for trade, principally in speculations as money-changers. . . . They are naturally formed for commerce—cunning among those they know, reserved with strangers, temperate from economy or avarice, and humble and accommodating for the sake of interest.”37

It may seem extraordinary that Germany would not object in any meaningful way to the persecution of fellow Christians by Muslim Turks, especially in light of Article 61 of the Congress of Berlin of 1878, in which the European powers pledged to support the Ottoman Armenians. But a passage by the German Orientalist Paul Rohrbach, who began to explore and write about the Ottoman Empire in the late nineteenth century, leaves us in no doubt about Germany’s real priorities: “Der Besitzer Armeniens beherrscht unmittelbar sowohl das Ostliche als auch das obere Mesopotamien. . . . Soll also die Türkei erhalten bleiben, so muss auch Armenien türkisch bleiben, und weil wir die Türkei stützen müssen, so lange eine Möglichkeit dazu besteht, kann nicht zugelassen werden, dass Armenien in die Hände Russlands fällt.”38

The change in foreign policy that saw Christian Germany taking the part of Muslim Turkey against the “cunning and treacherous” Christian Armenians was brought about, like so many changes of the day, by the railway. When the Deutsche Bank was granted a concession by the Ottoman Caliphate in 1888 to build a railway line between the Bosporus at Constantinople and Angora, the first leg of a planned line all the way to Baghdad, Germany suddenly became aware of the potential that the Ottoman Empire held as an extraterritorial economic sphere of influence. Previously the Kaiserreich had seen the crumbling Turkish Empire only as a tub thrown to a whale, a means of distracting France, England, and Russia, thus minimizing their threat to real German interests in Central and Eastern Europe. But with the completion of Baron von Hirsch’s Oriental Railway in 1888, Berlin was now directly linked to Istanbul by rail and would soon be linked to Konya in central Anatolia, and eventually to Baghdad, and with these rail links came economic ties. Germany realized that the collapse of the Ottoman Empire would immediately result in its being carved up by the main European powers, whose involvement would inevitably obstruct Germany’s spreading influence in the region. Ironically, Germany needed to keep the Ottoman Empire intact for as long as possible since it could profit from it more in toto than in part.

Rosa Luxemburg’s so-called Junius Pamphlet of 1915 demonstrates just how far-reaching, and in her view damaging, German involvement was in the Near East on the eve of the First World War, calling Turkey
the “most important field of operations of German imperialism.” In the course of work on the Baghdad railway, a scheme that R. I. Money saw as restoring prosperity to a central Anatolia that had “degenerated” after the breakup of the Seljuk state, Lake Karaviran and the Plain of Konya were drained and irrigated respectively, developments that Luxemburg refuses to see as Western gifts to a primitive Anatolia, arguing instead that:

The reverse of this wonderful work of “peaceful culture” is the “peaceful” and wholesale ruin of the farming population of Asia Minor. The cost of this tremendous undertaking was advanced, of course, by the Deutsche Bank on the security of a widely diversified system of public indebtedness. Turkey will be, to all eternity, the debtor of Messrs. Siemens, Gwinner, Helfferich, etc. . . .

Thus a twofold purpose is accomplished. The farming population of Asia Minor becomes the object of a well organized process of exploitation in the interest of European, in this case German, financial and industrial capital. This again promotes the growth of the German sphere of interest in Turkey and lays the foundation for Turkey’s “political protection.” At the same time the instrument that carries out the exploitation of the farming population, the Turkish Government, becomes the willing tool and vassal of Germany’s foreign policies.

Naturally, Germans rarely stated the nature of their interest in the Ottoman Empire as baldly as this, so as not to alienate the Ottomans or draw too much English, French, and Russian attention to the “actual” nature of Germany’s involvement. Sanitizing, palliating discourses were used instead to make Germany’s intervention both less perturbing to the other Great Powers and more palatable to itself. And so German activity in the region was frequently portrayed in terms of a *mission civilisatrice*, a concept that had long since provided the French and the English with justification for their colonial activities, casting these foreign incursions as a high-minded attempt to share the benefits of European civilization with less fortunate parts and peoples.

One such account of German inroads into Anatolia comes from the editor of the *Deutsche Rundschau* and author of various oriental travelogues, Paul Lindenberg. In an often quoted passage from his *Auf deutschen Pfaden im Orient* of 1902 he traces German participation in the affairs of the Near East back to the Third Crusade, when the Holy Roman Emperor, Barbarossa, led an army across Anatolia in an attempt to take back the Holy Land from Saladin, the selfsame Saladin at whose tomb Wilhelm II had declared his undying loyalty to “three million” Muslims. The passage is worth quoting in full because of the stark counterpoint it offers to Luxemburg’s completely unromantic portrayal of Germany’s real interests and their impact on the Anatolian landscape.
Zu Ostern 1190 war es, als Kaiser Barbarossa, glaubensmutig und thatenfroh, an der Spitze seines erlesenen Kreuzfahrerheeres hier entlangzog, um nach Klein-Asien hinüberzusetzen und, dasselbe durchquerend, gen Jerusalem vorzudringen, ohne daß er das erschnte Ziel erreichen sollte!

Jahrhundert um Jahrhundert verstrich, in Vergessenheit schienen die endlosen Gebiete versunken zu sein, die einst die deutschen Gewappneten auf schweren Rossen durchzogen, hin und wieder, wenn der starke Holzpflug des türkischen Bauern die Erde aufwühlte, kamen die bleichen Überreste eines der heldenmütigen Genossen des Rotbart-Hohenstaufen zum Vorschein, oder ein verwittertes steinernes Kreuz zeigte die Ruhestätte eines manhaftnen Ritters an, der unter heißer Sonne zusammengebrochen oder den Feinden erlegen war. . . .

Und eines Tages hielten die Deutschen selbst ihren Einzug in Anatolien, auf denselben Pfaden, welche die Kreuzritter gezogen, aber nicht wie jene mit trutzigen Waffen und hoch zu Roß mit wehenden Bannern: Werkzeuge und Maschinen aller Art führten sie mit sich und in ihrem Gefolge ein Heer von emsigen Arbeitern, gegraben wurde und gebaut, schwindelnde Abhänge und reißende Ströme wurden überbrückt, Berge durchbohrt und Sümpfe ausgetrocknet, wo bisher auf hindernisreichen Wegen lange Kamel-Karawanen entlanggestapft, da dehnten sich gleißende Schienenstränge aus, auf welchen am Anfang der 90er Jahre pustend und schnaubend die ersten Lokomotiven — “Landdampfer” nannten sie die türkischen Bauern — einherrollten, Leben, Bewegung, Kultur in jene halbvergessenen Gebiete bringend, . . . die nun wieder von Jahr zu Jahr in wirtschaftlicher wie politischer Beziehung ganz erstaunlich an Wichtigkeit gewinnen.

So kämpfen die neuen Deutschen in Klein-Asien, ihr Sieg aber heißt die Anatolische Eisenbahn, mit deutschem Geld von deutschen Ingenieuren erbaut und unter musterhafter deutscher Verwaltung stehend. 42

Lindenberg’s text casts German involvement in the Ottoman Empire as a modern, more civilized version of the Crusades, suggesting that, because of the Crusades, the Germans have a kind of prior and natural claim on the territory involved, if not exactly a god-given right to be there. German financial benefits are portrayed as unintended but welcome by-products of what is primarily a crusade to bring Asia Minor, the birthplace of civilization but a place that time has since forgotten, forward in technological, political, and economic terms. 43 The financial-cum-cultural mission has taken over from the religious one, but the two are nevertheless clearly seen by Lindenberg as forming a logical continuum. It is also interesting that Lindenberg should cast a backward glance at Germany’s participation in a Christian Holy War of
the twelfth century, when some 800 years later Germany was master-
minding an Islamic Holy War against Christendom.

In fact, it is remarkable that Lindenberg’s in-many-ways-convention-
ally-Orientalist description of German involvement in Anatolia makes any
mention whatsoever of the Crusades with their suggestion of inelidable
religious differences between “East” and “West,” especially when Kaiser
Wilhelm had been so careful to avoid the subject in Damascus, despite the
fact that he was speaking at the tomb of the great Salah-ad-Din, nemesis
of the Crusaders. After all, while similarities between the Crusading and
imperialist spirits were certainly not lost on the Ottomans themselves,44
German courtship of Turkey around 1900 required the active downplay-
ing of some longstanding if problematic ideas of Self and Other in West-
ern thought, particularly those that were by-products of what Mary Anne
Perkins refers to as the “Christendom narrative,”45 the totalizing grand
narrative generated by Christian culture that allowed Europeans to take
so many liberties abroad.

This downplaying of dominant narratives in the service of foreign
investment was by no means an easy business. The German position on
the Armenian question, perhaps even more than Oppenheim’s strange
idea of a German-Christian-inspired Muslim-Ottoman jihad against the
Christian Entente states, posed particular problems, and it demonstrates
the logical and rhetorical contortions required by Germany in this period
to escape the clutches of the pervasive and now counterproductive Chris-
tendom narrative. Pastor Friedrich Naumann, who saw Germany’s role in
the Near East as divinely ordained, made an admirable attempt at squar-
ing the circle, advocating that Christian Germans ignore the pogroms
against Christian Armenian because “unser Volk auch dem Christentum
am besten dient, wenn es sich selber im Völkerkampfe stark erhält.”46 In
other words, as the diplomat Alfons Mumm von Schwarzenstein put it
in 1896, it was “nicht die Aufgabe der deutschen Politik . . . sich um die
Christen in der ganzen Welt zu kümmern und einen europäischen Kreuzzug
gegen den Halbmond ins Leben zu rufen.”47 Even though Germany
was endeavoring by remarkable feats of logic to negate a religious divide
that might jeopardize its involvement in Anatolia, it is important to note
here and elsewhere the insistent if unwelcome spectral presence of reli-
gious difference in various legitimizing discourses used by Germany to
establish and preserve its hegemonic power in the territories of the Otto-
man Empire. While Naumann, Schwarzenstein, and Lindenberg all dis-
tance themselves from the traditional Christian-Muslim antagonism that
inspired the Crusades, this antagonism remains something of an elephant
in the room, recurring almost involuntarily in even the most turcophile
discourses of the period. Religion was, after all, one of the legitimizing
discourses underpinning European imperialism itself, and an important
part of the colonial apparatus.48 Since it was impossible to avoid the issue
of religion altogether, therefore, Germany’s cultivation of Turkish friendship required a cunning restating of religious difference and playing down of the colonial uses to which Christianity had been and was still being put. Consequently, while Christianity and its evangelizing mission are not altogether ignored—they cannot be, since for centuries the world had been “haunted by the religious imagination of colonial Christendom”49—they are made subordinate either to questions of national interest (Schwarzenheim and Naumann) or incorporated into the idea of German imperialism as a modernizing and civilizing force (Lindenberg). (It should not be forgotten, of course, that there was simultaneously a return of this repressed religious division, often in grotesque and pointed form. An 1898 political cartoon from the Genevan weekly Le Carillon, for instance, shows Abdul Hamid asking the Kaiser, “Gestattet dir dein Christus, dich für Mohammed zu schlagen?” to which the Kaiser replies “Mein Gott ist mein Säbel!” On the ground at their feet lie the Bible and the Koran.50)

Turkey’s persecution and murder of its Christian Armenian population not only elicited positively byzantine legitimizing discourses from a Germany that wanted to defend its involvement in and with the Ottoman Empire. It also provides evidence of both the omnipresence and omnidirectionality of Orientalism. The genocide happened in two major waves, the first taking place in the 1890s under Sultan Abdülhamid II and coinciding with Germany’s Ottoman railway projects and the concomitant declaration of eternal “friendship” between the Kaiserreich and the Sublime Porte.51 The second, more brutal, wave took place in 1915 under the so-called Three Pashas and coincided with the Gallipoli campaign of the First World War,52 likely taking place at precisely this juncture because the state of war lent itself both to the committing and disguising of these atrocities.53 In any case, there can be no doubt that the Ottoman Empire was convinced that it could get away with this large-scale ethnic cleansing, or, as it was then portrayed, eradication of a dangerous fifth column, and that it was encouraged in this belief by the fact that it has an ally as powerful as Germany. As Baron Calice, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, put it, the Sultan could feel “unter dem schützenden Schild Deutschlands, dem er schon soviel verdankt, mehr denn je frei und sicher.”54

In a perfect example of “Eastern Orientalism,” Enver Pasha, the de facto dictator of the Ottoman Empire from 1913, described the Armenians to the concerned American ambassador in precisely the same “orientalizing” way that Oppenheim had depicted “the Muslims,” namely as a homogenous cultural-cum-religious group that reacts en masse and is a potential source of separatism, fanaticism, and rebellion. (Of course, while Oppenheim had seen this as a good thing, to be exploited in Germany’s interests, Pasha, ironically, felt that any populace with such traits needed to be eradicated for the good of the state.) Whether or not Enver
Pasha’s characterization was a matter of conviction or merely served the purpose of vindicating his anti-Armenian policies to the United States is irrelevant. The discourse engages in the same “Othering” that is at play when Oppenheim describes Muslims, or the “fanatische Heerscharen des Orients” as he calls them,\textsuperscript{55} as “kriegerisch” and “von Hass beseelt.” Like Oppenheim’s Muslims, Pasha’s Armenians are seen as having a religious-cum-racial loyalty that transcends their loyalty to the state to which they belong, preventing them from becoming a “real part of our nation,” and making it likely that they would “attack us [the Ottoman Turks] in the back.” They are, in Pasha’s words, a people with a “revolutionary programme” (\textit{AMS}, 236), a sentiment echoed by his Minister of the Interior, Talaat Bey, who, in a wonderfully convoluted piece of logic, goes on to express surprise at the US ambassador’s worries about the genocide, saying, “You [Morgenthau] are a Jew; these people are Christians. The Mohammedans and the Jews always get on harmoniously. We are treating the Jews here all right. What have you to complain of? Why can’t you let us do with these Christians as we please?” (\textit{AMS}, 208). Perhaps even more so than Pasha’s straightforward essentializing and demonizing description of the Armenians, the uneasy bedfellows in Talaat Bey’s statement neatly demonstrate Pollock’s point that Orientalism does not occur along a neat West-to-East axis but twists and turns and makes quantum and improbable leaps over and back across the seemingly most entrenched divides.

Even Ambassador Morgenthau’s classification of the Turks slightly later in his memoirs as “dull-witted and lazy” (\textit{AMS}, 231), which Rachel Kirby sees as proof positive of a “proclivity toward linguistic distillation of ethnic types in the writings of [Western] diplomats” in the Ottoman Empire,\textsuperscript{56} and which thus seems to fit the Saidean paradigm perfectly, turns out to be more complicated. It was, in fact, an attempt by Morgenthau to demonstrate to Talaat Bey, in an \textit{argumentum ad absurdum}, the insulting implications for the Turkish “national character” of Bey’s own argument that the Armenians’ business acumen was allowing them to “enrich themselves at the expense of the Turks.” This Western reiteration of what turns out to be a preexisting intra-oriental Orientalism reveals again that Saidean Orientalism is too simple a paradigm to account for any of the articulations, to borrow Laclau and Mouffe’s concept, involved in the multilateral struggle for discursive hegemony in the Ottoman Empire of the First World War period.

Yet another instance of a multi- rather than uni-directional “Orientalism” is provided by Hans Barth’s notorious anti-Armenian, pro-Turkish diatribe \textit{Türke, wehre Dich!} of 1898. An extremely Turcophile and anti-Catholic journalist, Barth played on modern German anti-religious sentiment in his criticism of Western efforts to garner support for the Armenians during the pogroms of the late nineteenth century, calling these efforts an eighth Crusade (meant here in an emphatically pejorative
sense), casting those supporting Armenia’s cause as interfering, pro-clerical, and outmodedly religious busybodies and portraying the Turks as the only gentlemen of the Orient. A large part of his work takes direct issue with the efforts of the Pietist missionary Johannes Lepsius to draw the German public’s attention to the plight of the Armenians, for instance in his bestselling *Armenien und Europa: Eine Anklageschrift wider die christlichen Großmächte und ein Aufruf an das christliche Deutschland* of 1896. What is interesting about Barth’s anti-Armenian, anti-Lepsian diatribe is that it adopts Lepsius’s arguments practically wholesale, not demolishing them so much as reproducing them and then inverting or negating them. They survive almost intact in Barth’s work in the form of long quotations that cannot always readily be distinguished from the author’s own text. Barth then merely adds a “not true” to each carefully preserved point, unwittingly demonstrating a strange rhetorical reversibility in this discursive field, where the selfsame arguments serve seemingly diametrically opposed purposes. This phenomenon of reversibility, the bidirectionality of which is at odds with the West-to-East discursive trajectory that Said’s Orientalism implies, can be observed, for instance, when Barth accuses Lepsius of failing to differentiate sufficiently between Kurds and Turks, indiscriminately calling them both Muhammedaner.57 Barth promptly goes on to perform the selfsame maneuver himself, lumping all Armenians into the category of “Reichsfeind, . . . Revolutionär und Anarchisten” (40).

Another dimension of the multidirectionality of Orientalism becomes clear when Barth starts to juggle all the “Others” of his argument at once. He begins by arguing that many of the outrages committed against the Armenians were perpetrated not by Turks proper but by Kurds, who, while they are also Muslims, are *only* Muslim in the sense that the Armenians are Christians (that is, not; presumably, in the case of the latter, because of the schism). Moreover, he continues, the Turks themselves have had to suffer from Kurdish barbarity. However (he then claims, coming full circle now), the perpetrators of the recent violence (presumably both against Armenians and Turks) may not even be Kurdish nomads at all but rather radical Armenian revolutionaries in disguise:

Gewiss hatten ja die tiefer im Innern wohnenden Armenier vielfach unter der Willkür kurdischer Nomaden zu leiden, die das friedfertig-ge setzliche Expropiations-Prinzip ihrer armenisch-indogermanischen Vettern in ihre drastischere Weise, das wucherische Rupfen ins derbe Plündern übersetzt—aber teilten sie dies Schicksal nicht mit der festansässigen türkischen Bevölkerung? Auch der Türke hatte sich ja von jeher mit den Nachkommen der raublustigen alten “Gordyäer” herumzuschlagen, deren “Islam” (viele von ihnen sind überhaupt Christen) kaum mehr wert ist als das “Christentum” der Armenier. . . . Angesichts des grundverschiedenen Charakters von Osmanli
Because it has to negotiate a path for its new prejudices through such a dense and rooted jungle of old ones, the philoturkic, anti-Armenian German Orientalism of this period requires a convoluted logic that can make an Armenian of a Kurd, if need be. Accordingly, our German author defends the Muslim Ottoman Turks to his primarily Western audience by first “Othering” or orientalizing the Muslim Ottoman Kurds, using this orientalizing device as a stepping stone to the Othering or foreignizing of Christian Armenians, whose very Christianity is used to defamiliarize and exoticize them. And while Barth cannot ever fully collapse the religious distinction between Christian Europeans and Muslim Turks, he can claim that Christianity is irrelevant in modern-day, progressive Europe, adding for good measure that Armenian Christianity is not Christianity proper anyhow. Similarly, while he cannot deny that Armenian property has been stolen by the “wrong kind” of Muslim (that is, Kurds not Turks), he de-exoticizes the crimes and the perpetrators by implying that these acts were merely a more open, honest, Islamic version of Armenians’ pernicious, if peaceful and lawful, “theft” of (presumably Turkish) property by means of the financial cunning innate to that people.

In short, Barth’s discourse involves three degrees and directions of orientalization or defamiliarization. He orientalizes the Kurds, using this exoticism (their nomadic, barbaric “Islam”) to set them apart from civilized Muslims, here the Turks, who, by contrast, are automatically familiarized. He then orientalizes or “Others” the Armenians by distinguishing their Christianity (a potentially familiarizing element) from that of Christian Europe and by implying that the un-Turkish excesses of the barbaric Kurds were in fact the deeds of sly Armenians in disguise. Finally, he exot-icizes Lepsius, and other pro-Armenian German or European Christians, casting their philo-Armenian attitude as “unchristliche Wut” (21).

What this demonstrates, aside from the labyrinthine rhetorical tactics required by the German-Turkish alliance in the period of the Armenian massacre, is that Orientalism, in other words the discourses used to legitimize hegemonic behavior, is far more convoluted than suggested by Said’s idea of “[Western] knowledge and power creating ‘the Oriental.’”8 Contrary to its name, the mechanism called Orientalism is at work in any strategic projections of difference or familiarity as a means to specific ends. It is a discursive missile that can be directed as easily at and by a German and a Christian as at and by a Turk and a Muslim.

As scholars such as David Kopf, Bernard Lewis, and Richard G. Fox have suggested, the West-to-East Orientalism identified by Said is problematic for several reasons. Most critically, perhaps, it fails to recognize
its own orientalizing moment (and concomitant shortcomings as a metadiscourse). It also fails sufficiently to take into account the fact that not all European discourse about the Orient involves essentializing Western projections onto the East in the service of hegemony, and that Orientalism (inasmuch as the concept has any value) has at times had a preservative function, for instance when it qua discipline has preserved aspects of another culture for that culture. And, as Pollock noted, a further blindspot of Said’s Orientalism is that it fails to recognize that the West-East cultural axis has no monopoly on exoticizing and marginalizing discourses and, if the term Orientalism is to have any currency, it has to be forced to take account of and “include discursively similar phenomena” (DO, 77).

So, while not denying the reality of colonialist Orientalism, we must recognize the same processes of Othering at work in say National Socialism, the Indian caste system, or the Armenian genocide.

Aspects of the Ottoman-German relationship at the turn of the nineteenth century highlight the inadequacy of the category of Orientalism in its early Saidean form, which still insists on an innate difference between Orient and Occident albeit while critiquing it, and ascribes to Orientalism a strict West-to-East trajectory. To transpose Michael Davidson’s idea slightly, a more appropriate way of representing the complex ways in which hegemony works would seem to be “not . . . the usual East-West trajectory, but tendrils sent out from multiple sites.” And, if first-degree (original pre-Saidean) Orientalism results in a “partial view of Islam” in every sense, and the second-degree (corrective) Orientalism of Said merely replicates the same problems albeit at a critical remove and couched in postcolonial terminology, this third-degree rhizomic recasting of Orientalism hopes that recognizing the Othering or foreignizing role of the concepts of Orient, Occident, Christianity, and Islam in discursive practices of both East and West will allow a fuller picture to emerge.

Notes

1 This basic idea is perhaps most succinctly expressed in his often quoted passage that defines Orientalism as “a western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient.” Edward Said, Orientalism [1978] (London: Penguin, 1984), 3.

2 See Sheldon Pollock, “Deep Orientalism? Notes on Sanskrit and Power beyond the Raj,” in Orientalism and the Postcolonial Predicament: Perspectives on South Asia, ed. Carol Appadurai Breckenridge and Peter van der Veer (Philadelphia: U of Pennsylvania P, 1993), 76–133. Further references to this work are given in the text using the abbreviation DO and the page number. Of course, the idea of “internal colonialism” dates back much further than this. It was employed by Lenin in The Development of Capitalism in Russia and Gramsci in The Southern
*Question* to describe the exploitation of subgroups within a society, and further developed in the 1960s and 1970s, for example by Michael Hechter.


4 The term “Saidean Orientalism” may seem to conflates the critic of Orientalist knowledge and the hegemonic knowledge he was critiquing. However, the term is used here quite deliberately, because Said’s critique is itself still Orientalist, its deconstructions notwithstanding, preserving the spurious central distinction that also underpinned the discourses he is attacking.

5 For Said this blanket association of Islam with the Orient is valid inasmuch as it was “only the Arab and Islamic Orient [that] presented Europe with an unresolved challenge on the political, intellectual, and for a time, economic levels.” Said, *Orientalism*, 74–75.


11 Friedrich Naumann, *Asia: Eine Orientreise über Athen, Konstantinopel, Baalbek, Nazareth, Jerusalem, Kairo, Neapel* (Berlin-Schöneberg: Buchverlag der Hilfe, 1913), 164.


15 Quoted in Henry Morgenthau, *Ambassador Morgenthau’s Story* (Detroit, MI: Wayne State UP, 2003), 112. Further references to this work are given in the text using the abbreviation *AMS* and the page number.


22 For a discussion of the part played by German ethnological discourses in the idea of an anti-British jihad see Manjapra, “The Illusions of Encounter.”


28 McManners, The Oxford History of the British Empire, 231.

29 The expression “unholy alliance” was used by James L. Barton in his article for the New York Times to describe the strange bedfellows of the Turkish-German alliance. See note 18 above.

30 For details of how Enver Pasha used two English-built Ottoman battleships to lure Germany into the alliance, see Philip Mansel, Constantinople: City of the World’s Desire, 1453–1924 (London: Penguin, 1995), 370.


The term “dhimmitude” was coined by Bat Ye’or to describe the special laws governing Christians and Jews (dhimmi) in Islamic states. Bat Ye’or, *Islam and Dhimmitude: Where Civilizations Collide* (Cranbury, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson UP, 2001).


Liebknecht, Luxemburg, and Mehring, *The Crisis in the German Social-Democracy*, 41–43.


Perkins has noted that while progress has been made in the last two centuries in terms of Europe’s irrational fear of “heathens” and “barbarians,” there are two images of Otherness that have proved particularly persistent. The most enduring Others of Europe, she claims, have been Russia and Islam. It is against these that “the Christendom narrative has traditionally sought to define European civilization.” Mary Anne
Perkins, Christendom and European Identity: The Legacy of a Grand Narrative since 1789 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2004), 255.

Naumann, Asia, 141.

Quoted in Norbert Saupp, “Das Deutsche Reich und die Armenische Frage, 1878–1914” (PhD diss., Cologne University, 1990), 112.

Kamakshi Murti has recently noted the need for more attention to be paid to the role played by German missionaries “in actively fostering the . . . colonial agenda.” Kamakshi P. Murti, India: The Seductive and Seduced “other” of German Orientalism (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2000), 8.


Coincidentally or not, just at this time the use of Armenian labor on the railway project was considered. See Paul Müller-Simonis, Durch Armenien, Kurdistan und Mesopotamien: Vom Kaukasus zum persischen Meerbusen (Mainz: Franz Kirchheim, 1897), 168. At any rate, during later waves of persecution, the Baghdad Bahn project afforded its Armenian laborers some measure of protection. The railway company resisted the attempts of the German officer, Böttrich, head of the railway section of the Ottoman general staff, to deport its Armenian workers for ultimate eradication. See Richard G. Hovannisian, Remembrance and Denial: The Case of the Armenian Genocide (Detroit, MI: Wayne State UP, 1999), 92.

Robert Manne has argued somewhat controversially that the two events are not merely contemporaneous but related. He argues that the Ottoman government would not have decided upon the systematic eradication of Ottoman Armenians had they not felt that the tide of war was turning against them. It felt that the empire could not withstand internal dissent at such a critical time, and decided to exterminate what it saw as a dangerous subversive minority. Robert Manne, “A Turkish Tale: Gallipoli and the Armenian Genocide,” The Monthly 20 (2007): 20–28.

This was certainly part of Nazim Bey’s argument in favour of the genocide in early 1915: “It is absolutely necessary to eliminate the Armenian people in its entirety, so that there is no further Armenian on this earth and the very concept of Armenia is extinguished. We are now at war. We shall never have a more suitable opportunity than this.” Quoted in G. S. Graber, Caravans to Oblivion: The Armenian Genocide, 1915 (New York: Wiley, 1996), 87–88.


57 Hans Barth, Türke, wehre dich! (Leipzig: Rengersche Buchhandlung, 1898), 37.

58 Said, Orientalism, 27.


60 Michael Davidson, Guys Like Us: Citing Masculinity in Cold War Poetics (Chicago: Chicago UP, 2003), 78.