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**Kissinger, China, Congress, and the Lost Chance for Cambodia**

Amongst professional historians, Henry A. Kissinger arguably has come under fire as much for his record as a historian as for his record as a diplomat, and when it comes to his role in the tragic tale of Cambodia in the 1970s he has been severely criticized on both scores. This article seeks to re-examine the ultimately doomed U.S.-China attempt to broker a peace settlement in Cambodia in the first half of 1973. Kissinger blamed the failure of this effort on Congress’s imposition of a bombing halt; supporters of the bombing halt contended that such an apportionment of blame was merely designed to deflect attention from Kissinger’s own role in the bombing (both secret and overt) of Cambodia and the rise of the Khmer Rouge as the ultimate victor in Cambodia’s civil war. Few judgements of culpability in the modern historical record could have more import, given the outcome of the Khmer Rouge’s genocidal four-year reign of terror that began in 1975.

As well as examining the question of who, if anyone, was to blame for the failure to arrive at a negotiated settlement of the Cambodia civil war in early 1973, this article also illustrates the distortive effect that the war in Indochina continued to have on the burgeoning United States-People’s Republic of China relationship long after the ink had dried on the Paris Peace Accords that formally ended America’s involvement in Vietnam’s civil war. It highlights the conflicting pressures that came to bear on Sino-American relations as a result of U.S. domestic politics and Kissinger’s own career aspirations, and their connections to domestic Chinese politics.
The signing of the Paris Peace Accords had catapulted Kissinger to global superstardom (driving his boss “mad” in the process), and the conclusion of America’s direct involvement in the Vietnam War had been received with relief and satisfaction in Beijing. China had maintained a conflicting duality in its foreign policy for over three years, as it attempted to pursue a rapprochement with the United States while simultaneously continuing to provide material support for Hanoi’s war. The conflict had become increasingly acute in the wake of U.S. President Richard Nixon’s successful visit to Beijing and the launch of the Vietnamese Spring Offensive. North Vietnam’s attack on South Vietnam had, however, run into the ground, despite Chinese support; Hanoi was not able to win at the negotiating table what it had not won on the battlefield. South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu was going to play a part in the political dispensation in Saigon, at least for the duration of a ‘decent interval’.

Viewed from Beijing, the overall situation at the dawn of 1973 looked promising. Mao had found in Nixon someone who he believed would be a reliable partner in countering the Soviet menace. Nixon’s landslide win in the November 1972 election, surpassing even Lyndon Johnson’s 1964 margin of victory in the popular vote, established him in a powerful position to advance the full normalization of Sino-American relations in his second term. As Zhou Enlai told senior Khmer Rouge official Penn Nouth, Thieu would be “dealt with” in time, after the completion of the American withdrawal. The situation in Laos would also be easily brought under control, given the Pathet Lao’s status as a passive client of Hanoi; and while the Cambodian situation was a more complicated tripartite
arrangement, since all of Washington, Beijing, and Hanoi wanted to see the situation there resolved there was a reasonable expectation that it too would be brought under control. A new era in the international relations of the Indochinese states was about to begin.

**U.S.-China Co-operation on Cambodia**

Zhou Enlai had established a framework in which the U.S. and the People’s Republic of China could, in Mao’s words, “work together to deal with a bastard” – the Soviet Union. As part of this framework the United States had withdrawn its forces from South Vietnam. The North Vietnamese had agreed to orchestrate a ceasefire in Laos through their Laotian communist clients, the Pathet Lao. All that remained to be settled was an agreement on Cambodia, where China held a much stronger hand than in Laos, and where China had long been cultivating deposed Prince Norodom Sihanouk to play a key role.

Ever since the Cambodian Head of State had been overthrown in a ‘coup’ led by General Lon Nol in March 1970 and established his national front (FUNK) and national unity government-in-exile (GRUNK) in alliance with the Khmer Rouge, the Chinese government had invested large amounts of both political prestige and hard cash in promoting Sihanouk’s legitimacy as the head of the Cambodian nation. $10 million in used dollar bills went to the GRUNK each year – half for Sihanouk’s government in Beijing, and half smuggled down the Ho Chi Minh trail into the Cambodian interior for the Khmer Rouge to buy weapons with. In no small part
through the efforts of Zhou and the Chinese Foreign Ministry, by early 1973 Sihanouk’s government was recognized by more than 30 countries. Such was the P.R.C.’s interest in gaining recognition for Sihanouk’s GRUNK that Chinese observers at a non-aligned movement conference even went to the extent of personally removing the literature of Lon Nol’s delegation from the other delegations’ boxes in an effort to prevent it being recognized.\textsuperscript{vi}

Thus, when Henry Kissinger arrived in the Chinese capital in February 1973 for discussions of the post-Paris Agreement situation, the situation in Cambodia, along with the ever-present Soviet threat, dominated. Zhou had outlined to Nixon one year previously his belief that if the war in Indochina was stopped “that is to say a reversion of Cambodia to Prince Sihanouk, then the North Vietnamese will surely withdraw.”\textsuperscript{vii} He had further elaborated to the President’s national security adviser during Kissinger’s visit to China in the summer of 1972 his own vision for post-war Indochina. “If an end can be put to the war, then in Cambodia Sihanouk will ultimately be the head of state. And in Laos the head will be King Vatthana… And in both these countries their characteristic of neutrality will be more pronounced and in South Vietnam at least for a time it will be neutral… And that area will become in a certain sense a kind of buffer.”\textsuperscript{viii} The Premier also voiced approval for a wider zone of neutrality in Southeast Asia, involving Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore and the Philippines, referring to the envisioned Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) proposed by Malaysia in 1971 at a meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in Kuala Lumpur, reversing China’s long-standing hostility to that organisation. ZOPFAN was designed to be, in the words of
Sheldon Smith, “something of a security model for the Association that, if realized, would serve as an alternative to competitive military buildups within Southeast Asia and the countervailing military activities of such external powers as the United States and the Soviet Union.” In Zhou’s mind, while perhaps not a formal member of ZOPFAN, Cambodia too would play a part in this zone of neutrality.

At first glance, this task appeared not easy. Sihanouk’s GRUNK issued a statement on 26 January 1973 reaffirming its stance as contained within the prince’s 23 March 1970 five-point statement. This did not bode well for an American-facilitated negotiation between Lon Nol’s government and the GRUNK. Likewise, Zhou forcefully rejected contact between his own government and that of Lon Nol. He reprimanded Kissinger – “You should also not deal with such a man who carries on subversive activities against the King… we think it not very – it is not fair for you to admit [recognize] Lon Nol.” China’s disdain for Lon Nol was not entirely as a result of affection for Sihanouk, it should be noted. The Soviet Union had recognised Lon Nol’s government; getting rid of him and undermining the Soviet position was a critical factor in Zhou’s calculations.

Undeterred by Zhou’s initial obduracy, Kissinger proposed finding “an interim solution that is acceptable to both sides”. At this stage, however, entering into direct discussions with Sihanouk was not part of his plan. Kissinger worried that if it became known that the U.S. was negotiating with Sihanouk it would cause a collapse of morale within the Lon Nol regime that would prove terminal, and deem futile his intended purpose of the talks: the establishment of a tripartite regime in Phnom Penh, in a similar fashion to that which had just been agreed for South
Vietnam. In his 26 January statement Sihanouk had stated (under declared ‘advice’ from the FUNK’s “friends”) his and the FUNK’s willingness to enter into discussions with the United States, though “without great hopes… because the U.S. government was no more inclined to abandon Lon Nol than Thieu.” This had been reinforced by a statement from the ‘interior’ (i.e. the Khmer Rouge) reiterating that Sihanouk’s 23 March 1970 declaration was the only acceptable basis for resolving the issue of Cambodia. This meant that although he was willing to talk, he was opposed to a Vietnam-type settlement. “Insofar as Cambodia is concerned” he had announced, “I represent the legality while Lon Nol is but a traitor. We cannot accept a solution identical to that which was reached for South Vietnam.”

Aware of Sihanouk and the Khmer Rouge’s recent public declaration to persevere against the Lon Nol government, Zhou expressed his conviction that neither Sihanouk nor the “Khmer resistance in the interior area in Cambodia” would agree to enter into negotiations with Lon Nol, and that Kissinger should drop his refusal to talk directly to Sihanouk. “Well, it doesn’t have to be Lon Nol himself. It could be somebody from that government” volunteered Kissinger. Zhou was clearly interested by this suggestion, and unlike his previous persistent and firm refusals to act as an intermediary between Kissinger and the Vietnamese during the American’s quest to end the war in that country, the Chinese Premier casually stated that “Of course, since Sihanouk is in China we cannot but tell him your opinion in our wording, but of course, we have our own position on this question.” Despite Zhou’s protestations that they still supported Sihanouk’s five point declaration, some form of Chinese mediation was in the offering.
When Kissinger brought up the issue one day later, he was told that Zhou did not have an answer yet for him because the question “is still under consideration.” On the 18th, Zhou returned to the issue, but only to tell his American guest that “[I]t seems this time during this visit it will be difficult to make further progress.” Zhou had been consulting intensively with various interested parties in advance of Kissinger’s arrival, including with Sihanouk’s prime minister, Penn Nouth, North Vietnam’s chief negotiator in Paris, Le Duc Tho, North Vietnamese deputy prime minister, Nguyen Duy Trinh, and senior Khmer Rouge official Ieng Sary, but it appears that Sihanouk refused to meet Zhou Enlai while Kissinger was present in the Chinese capital. This was an unusual turn of events, for when Sihanouk wished to make a premeditated gesture of dissatisfaction with his Chinese hosts he normally departed the Chinese capital for Pyongyang. In all likelihood Sihanouk, or more likely Ieng Sary, did not want a Sihanouk-Zhou meeting at this time to discuss whatever it was Kissinger had to propose in order to dissipate pressure Zhou might have brought to bear to compromise. Zhou did, however, manage to hold talks with Sihanouk, Penn Nouth and Ieng Sary the day after Kissinger’s departure, as well as with representatives of Hanoi. And despite the nervousness, in whichever form Zhou conveyed the essence of his discussions with Kissinger to Sihanouk ‘in his own words’, it grabbed Sihanouk and the Khmer Rouge’s interest.

Similarly, there seems to have been a fairly rapid evolution in Chinese thinking over this period. The previous October Zhou had asked Le Thanh Nghi to encourage the Khmer comrades to take advantage of any possibility for talks. In a rather curious request for intervention, the Chinese Premier had asked the
Vietnamese to encourage the Khmers to negotiate, because China was worried about losing influence there if it did so. “We are not in a position to do so because we have talked with them a lot about fighting and encouraged them to fight. We suggest the Vietnamese Workers’ Party find a suitable moment to tell them.”

In early February Zhou was still concerned that the resolution of the situation in Cambodia be kept separate from the Vietnam issue, and that Beijing, not Hanoi, be the arbiter. Hanoi had begun to restrict the flow of Chinese arms to the Khmer Rouge, in an attempt to force them to negotiate. And while in discussions with Penn Nouth Zhou reminded the GRUNK prime minister that “If there had not been victories on the battlefield, there would not have been gains at the negotiation table”, within this apparent endorsement of continued military action was contained a caution to the contrary: the balance of forces had tilted in their favour it would indeed be appropriate to negotiate. Barely two weeks later Zhou told Kissinger that a coalition government was desirable in Phnom Penh. “Because it is impossible for Cambodia to become completely red now. If that were attempted, it would result in even greater problems” and committed himself to communicating Kissinger’s thinking to Sihanouk. But until he was certain of success and the centrality of a role for China, Zhou did not yet want to risk alienating the Cambodian resistance.

What Zhou meant by the ‘problematic’ nature of attempting to attain a ‘red Cambodia’ was that continued fighting in Cambodia to attain a complete victory would create an even more complicated situation, one in which the American bombing of Cambodia would continue and Nixon would still be distracted from dealing with the Soviet Union elsewhere in the world by his continued travails in
Indochina. Furthermore, China’s influence on the outcome in Cambodia would be greatly reduced by any formula that removed Sihanouk, and there existed every possibility that the Khmer Rouge would cast him aside when his usefulness had expired (as Sihanouk publicly admitted in a newspaper interview). Finally, in early 1973 the full extent and extremes of the platform of the Communist Party of Kampuchea were still not well known. Over the previous two years ‘Viet Khmers’ had been returning from Hanoi to take part in the Cambodian revolution. Their influence on the future direction of the C.P.K.’s own revolution was still unclear; furthermore as the prospect of power grew closer tension between the ‘returnees’ and the Pol Pot faction were likely to intensify. All in all, it was not an auspicious time for the GRUNK to carry on their war in the face of the power of the U.S. Air Force. As Zhou explained to Kissinger, “So if we wish to see Southeast Asia develop along the lines of peace and neutrality and not enter a Soviet Asian security system, then Cambodia would be an exemplar country.”

In late February, less than a week after Kissinger left the Chinese capital and after having consulted with GRUNK leaders and the Vietnamese comrades, Zhou confirmed the intentions of the Chinese government in a note sent to the Americans concerning the upcoming international Paris conference on Vietnam. Zhou stated China’s agreement with the provisions calling for the withdrawal of all foreign military forces from Cambodia and Laos, a point that would later be further emphasized by Zhou in discussions with the head of the U.S. liaison office in Beijing, David Bruce. The February note welcomed the agreement on a ceasefire in Laos, but restated China’s opposition to the Paris conference discussing Laos and
Cambodia: Vietnam was to be the sole topic. Zhou’s fear was that an agreement on Cambodia would be reached in an international conference at which both the Soviets and Vietnamese played a major role - clearly he much preferred a deal in which China was the main broker. To be sure that the message had been understood, referring to the ongoing discussions in Paris between Kissinger and Le Duc Tho on a joint communiqué on implementing the agreement, in his inaugural discussions with David Bruce the Chinese premier insisted that the question of Cambodia could not be solved in Paris. Zhou was making clear that he was the only person that could deliver Sihanouk and the Khmer Rouge. xxiv

Attempts at resolution of the Cambodian issue stalled during March, as Zhou was forced to take two weeks’ leave to undergo treatment for his cancer and Sihanouk disappeared off into the Cambodian jungles to visit the ‘liberated’ areas. Upon his return in early April, at a grand state banquet to mark the occasion hosted by Zhou Enlai, the feisty prince triumphantly showed film footage of his visit to Cambodia. During his speech to mark the occasion he defiantly rejected both ceasefire and compromise: “If the U.S.A. does not stop its interference in Cambodia we will go on fighting.” Zhou reaffirmed the support of the Chinese government for Sihanouk as Cambodian head-of-state, and condemned the American “wanton bombing” of his country. However, Sihanouk also publicly reaffirmed his February offer of talks with the U.S. (which had already been repeated by Xinhua on 23 March). He announced he was willing to discuss “the question of ending U.S. interference in Cambodia”. If the U.S. agreed to stop aiding Lon Nol and enter into talks with Sihanouk, the door to negotiation was open. xxv
On 16 April, Kissinger met with the Chinese representative to the United Nations, Huang Hua, in New York, just a few days after the American side had passed on a note expressing “extreme disappointment” at Zhou’s remarks during the banquet for Prince Sihanouk. Contrary to his claims in his memoirs, it was Kissinger himself who made the running during the meeting with regard to Cambodia. The American National Security Adviser practically offered to give up Lon Nol (“we are not committed to any particular personality”), not in response to Huang Hua’s condemnation of American policy and support for the Phnom Penh government but to pre-empt it, telling Huang that “Our objective in Southeast Asia seems to us not totally dissimilar from yours.” By this, of course, he meant the exclusion of Soviet influence. As his assistant Winston Lord noted, Kissinger had been “fuzzy” on whether “it might be the United States talking to [Sihanouk] rather than the Cambodian Government.”

In his reply, and speaking in a “personal capacity”, Huang Hua reminded Kissinger that “the Chinese position is consistent and has been made public… Last February Premier Zhou Enlai again advised the US side not to intervene in Cambodian internal affairs any longer so that the Cambodian people could resolve the problem by themselves.” He also subtly emphasized the independence of the Khmer Rouge from the Vietnamese by reminding the national security adviser that “the Cambodian People’s Liberation Forces are fighting absolutely alone without the aid of the North Vietnamese troops or of the South Vietnamese National Liberation Forces.” He condemned U.S. policy in Cambodia by noting that Sihanouk was ready to negotiate with the U.S. side, but “[T]he U.S. side has not only refused to negotiate,
but has intensified the bombing of Cambodia… [I]t will only hamper the solution of the Cambodian question, and at the same time will affect adversely Sino-US relations.” However, as Kissinger later noted, Huang Hua’s condemnation was “aimed at an individual and not a structure… [It] left open the prospect discussed in Beijing in February of including other elements of the Phnom Penh government in a coalition without their present chief.” It was a prospect Kissinger was not going to pass up.xxxvii

Kissinger’s flexibility on the issue of the leadership in Phnom Penh did not stem, in the main, from a desire to keep the Soviets out of Cambodia, whatever he told Huang Hua. If there was one thing that historically united France, Vietnam, and America, it was a casual disregard for the fate of Laos and Cambodia when compared to the larger strategic prize of southern Vietnam. In this light, the growing sense of urgency with which Kissinger was addressing the problem of Cambodia was largely fuelled by growing concerns about what a communist takeover of Cambodia would mean for South Vietnam. Uncovering its “entire western flank… would pose a real and psychological threat to the Thieu government which it could not withstand” his deputy, General Al Haig reported back from a trip to Cambodia. This “must lead inevitably to the near term collapse of South Vietnam with all the political, psychological and strategic implications that such a collapse forebodes.” Most worryingly of all, Haig stated: “Without an immediate broadening of the current regime in the Khmer Republic, the viability of the government and the armed forces must be limited to 3 to 6 months”. To most of the leading actors, with the possible notable exception of Pol Pot, the prospect of some degree of co-operation
between the Cambodian and Vietnamese communists seemed likely, if not assured. With this in mind, it was little wonder that Kissinger was so eager to discuss a formula for getting Sihanouk in place and potentially forestalling the fall of – not Cambodia – South Vietnam. However, he was still not yet ready to talk to Sihanouk to make it happen.\textsuperscript{xviii}

Kissinger pursued his theme in a written message passed to Zhou on 24 April, where he expressed the willingness of the United States to contemplate “a settlement which includes all political forces, including those of Prince Sihanouk.” He hoped that the Chinese would follow up the matter with David Bruce when he arrived in Beijing, which Zhou duly did. The Chinese Premier confirmed that the United States and China both sought a Cambodia that would be “more peaceful, neutral, and independent than ever before.”\textsuperscript{xxix} This clearly precluded Vietnamese control, and even in the short-term a total Khmer Rouge victory. Encouraged by Zhou’s words, but growing impatient and increasingly concerned about the prospects for Cambodia, Kissinger finally decided to back down on the U.S. refusal to talk to Sihanouk and made a formal proposal to the Chinese. His hand was being forced; three days before David Bruce met with Zhou Enlai, the House of Representatives, in its first ever vote to restrict military operations in Southeast Asia, had voted for an amendment to prevent funds from an appropriations Bill being used to bomb Cambodia.\textsuperscript{xxx} In a meeting with Huang Hua in New York he told Huang that:

\begin{quote}
We are prepared to stop our bombing in Cambodia, and we are prepared to withdraw the very small advisory group we have there. And we are prepared to arrange for Lon Nol to leave for medical treatment in the United States. In return we would like a
\end{quote}
cease-fire – if necessary, say for ninety days – a negotiation between the Sihanouk group and the remainder of the Lon Nol group; and while this negotiation is going on in Cambodia, we would authorize some discussions between the staff of Ambassador Bruce and Prince Sihanouk in Peking... But it is a process that has to be extended over some time, and it must not be conducted in a way that does not take into account our own necessities.xxxi

In return, Huang Hua had a message for Kissinger from Zhou. It reiterated Zhou’s message to Bruce, re-emphasizing the Chinese Premier’s personal involvement, that “the question of Cambodia could not be solved in Paris. It is imperative that the two sides [North Vietnam and the United States] respect the sovereignty of Cambodia.” This message also emphasized that not only Sihanouk, but also “the resistance forces at home, are willing to conduct negotiations with the U.S. side.” Zhou’s goals were clear: a North Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia; an end to American bombing; and a coalition government with Sihanouk at its head. This was to be the first concrete test of Sino-American co-operation; in exchange for Kissinger ending the bombing and agreeing to the removal of Lon Nol from the scene, Zhou would bring Sihanouk and the Khmer Rouge into a coalition. Once achieved, they could achieve their mutual goal: the withdrawal of North Vietnam from Cambodia.xxxii

China responded speedily to Kissinger’s 27 May proposal. On the afternoon of 4 June, the National Security Adviser hosted Huang Zhen in his White House office.xxxiii Huang, who had just taken his place as the head of the P.R.C. liaison office in Washington, had two messages for Kissinger, the second message of which was of substance and significance. It confirmed that the basic Chinese stance was
that which had been outlined by Zhou in his discussions with David Bruce, and emphasised “respect [for] Cambodia’s sovereignty.” Zhou asserted that while China would convey to Sihanouk Kissinger’s general analysis, Beijing would not negotiate on his behalf and Washington would have to conduct direct talks with the prince. As an indication of the seriousness with which Zhou was taking the American initiative, the message took the unprecedented step of repeating verbatim “the U.S. tentative thinking”, requesting that “If there are any inaccuracies in the above, it is expected that the U.S. side will provide corrections.xxxiv

As Kissinger correctly observed, this was an unmistakable sign that Zhou was personally engaging himself in the resolution of the Cambodian issue on the basis of Kissinger’s proposal. Likewise, Kissinger was also correct in his assessment that “he would not act as an intermediary unless he expected to succeed.”xxxv The message was delivered on the day that Vietnam Workers’ Party General Secretary Le Duan and the North Vietnamese premier, Pham Van Dong, arrived in Beijing for an official visit; this served to emphasize that Zhou would be working both sides of the equation to ensure that all parties concerned should ‘respect Cambodia’s sovereignty’. Nonetheless, Zhou clearly believed that he could deliver Sihanouk and the Khmer Rouge, a ceasefire, and eventually a coalition government in return for America ditching Lon Nol, holding direct talks with the Prince, and ceasing bombing. In fact, the Chinese premier had staked his personal prestige on it.xxxvi

The collapse of the plan
Despite this plan, the situation in Cambodia remained unclear and uncertain for Mao and Zhou as much as Nixon and Kissinger. The Americans believed that Hanoi was pulling at least some of the strings of the Khmer Rouge, and that a victory for Saloth Sar (though Washington was only beginning to become familiar with that name) would mean doom for South Vietnam. Beijing was obviously much more aware that the Vietnamese were not in control of the situation in Cambodia, and the Chinese had banked large assets through the careful cultivation of Sihanouk, but the future direction of C.P.K. policy was impossible to tell. It was as yet too early to gauge the impact of the Cambodian communist ‘returnees’ – Khmer cadres from the Viet Minh days who had regrouped to Hanoi – who were now returning to their homeland in the wake of the Paris Accords. Likewise, it was probably in Hanoi’s calculations that these returning Khmer communists, who accepted Vietnam’s lead role in the Indochinese revolution, would find it easier to make their voice heard in a peaceful environment rather than in a war-zone. So despite their differing perceptions, as Le Duc Tho told Ieng Sary, “China, Vietnam, and the United States all want to solve the Cambodian problem soon.” Unfortunately none of them was in a position to solve it without the acquiescence of an exiled Cambodian Prince and a xenophobic Khmer communist; not for the first time, the vicissitudes of Cambodian politics would test Zhou Enlai’s diplomatic skills to the limit.

For all Zhou and Kissinger’s careful choreography, nothing could happen without the danseur noble, the elusive Prince Sihanouk. The Prince, basking in the glory of his trip to the ‘liberated areas’ of his homeland had set off on an international tour, with the aim of cultivating votes in support of a GRUNK
challenge for Cambodia’s United Nations seat at the annual session of the U.N. general assembly in the autumn. The process was ostensibly paralyzed without him, and it is likely Zhou dared not attempt to communicate confidentially such important matters to him while he was thousands of miles away and, more dangerously, within the earshot of dozens of international journalists and beyond the natural restraints imposed by his residence in the Chinese capital. Kissinger’s opening offer merely indicated that staff of the U.S. liaison office would be willing to meet with Sihanouk, not the Nixon, or Kissinger, or Harriman or Mansfield Sihanouk had hoped for. The chances that the Prince’s wounded ego, at large in the capitals of Africa, would cause him to reject such an offer were high, and Zhou sought to avoid China being publicly named as a mediator in Cambodia.xxxviii

While in Paris, Kissinger took the time to call on the Chinese foreign minister, Ji Pengfei, who was visiting the U.K. and France at the time. Kissinger’s eagerness to implement the steps he had outlined to the Chinese was evident, and he urged Ji to act upon them. Ji pointed out, however, that “There is only one problem, that Samdech Norodom Sihanouk is not now in China and it is difficult to contact him.” Kissinger’s impatience was growing, fuelled by his awareness that the passing of the Case-Church amendment in the Senate (which would cut off all funds for military operations in Indochina) meant that the window of opportunity to close a deal in Cambodia was rapidly shutting. He enquired if Ji knew when the volatile Prince would return to China. “He was supposed to be back by the end of June” laughed the Foreign Minister, “But you know his temper, and he likes to add countries when
he is happy.” “Maybe we should depress him!” interjected Kissinger, only half-

joking. xxxix

Time pressures created by the Congress notwithstanding, Kissinger had reason to feel somewhat optimistic. Zhou Enlai was committed to delivering talks among the Cambodian parties if Kissinger agreed to meet with Sihanouk, and in the three secret protocols agreed to in Paris, Le Duc Tho had committed Hanoi to reaffirming Article 20 of the Paris Agreement. Specifically Tho had affirmed that “foreign troops, military advisers, and military personnel shall be withdrawn as required by Article 20 (b) of the Agreement.” Furthermore, Tho had promised that the D.R.V. would, along with the United States, “exert their best efforts to bring about a peaceful settlement in Cambodia.” xl Despite Kissinger’s belief to the contrary - what he later categorized as “North Vietnam’s imperial ambitions” – Hanoi was in fact interested in achieving a settlement in Cambodia - even if on a temporary basis. xli However, what Zhou Enlai and China could deliver to the Cambodians, and which the Vietnamese could not, was an American bombing halt; whatever his misappraisal of the influence accorded by Vietnamese forces in Cambodia, on this Kissinger was correct.

“We can’t reiterate enough that the key element in Indochina is now Cambodia, and everything else will be easy once that is settled” Kissinger told Huang Zhen back in Washington on June 14th. While perhaps rather over-optimistic that “everything else will be easy”, Kissinger was correct that Cambodia was now key. Nixon’s position was weakening by the day as a result of Watergate, and the threat of U.S. military action to uphold the Paris Agreement becoming less credible.
The only cards that Nixon and Kissinger held were those of Cambodia and reconstruction aid for the D.R.V., and they were a pair: Kissinger needed Congress to at least hold out the possibility of aid for Hanoi in order to secure a Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia; at the same time, successful implementation of article 20 of the Paris Agreement held out the possibility of dollar-induced leverage over Hanoi. Without the pair, Kissinger and Nixon held nothing, and their bluff would surely be called; such a situation would cause Beijing to have to reappraise the P.R.C.’s whole Indochinese strategy. But for a period Kissinger seemed to have overcome this challenge. He was “on the homestretch” to a cease-fire and Sihanouk’s return, just a few steps away from salvaging the situation in Phnom Penh and securing an extra prop under Thieu’s western flank at a time when Watergate was causing others to wobble. xlili

Aside from Sihanouk’s travel plans, the other factor that had the potential to disrupt Zhou and Kissinger’s plan was the U.S. Congress. On May 31st, by a majority of 69 to 19, the Senate had approved the Eagleton amendment, a measure far stricter than that which had been approved by the House of Representatives two weeks earlier. Sen. Eagleton’s measure proposed to cut off all funds “‘heretofore’ used to support military action ‘in, over or from the shores of’ Cambodia or Laos.”xliii Unsurprisingly, Nixon vetoed the bill, but Senate Majority Leader, Mike Mansfield, promised to attach the Eagleton amendment to every bill that came before the Senate until Nixon was forced to sign it into law. Kissinger made a bid for time on two fronts: he appealed to Nixon’s Counsellor for Domestic Affairs to try and make an arrangement with the leadership of the House of Representatives to hold up
the offending amendments in order to allow his Cambodian plans to proceed, but to no avail. To provide further impetus on the Chinese side, on 19 June Kissinger reversed his earlier position and committed himself to meet with Sihanouk during his planned visit to Beijing in early August - not just meetings between their respective representatives - if a ceasefire were in place by the time of his arrival. The prospect would surely be very tempting for the Cambodia’s exiled leader.xliiv

For a period at the end of June, despite the increasing pressure coming from Congress, pronouncements from the Prince indicated that there was still hope of a deal. Speaking in Bucharest on 22 June, the GRUNK leader announced that his “government” (of which the Khmer Rouge was a part) had “formally proposed to the U.S. government to hold bilateral negotiations in the pattern of the ‘Washington-Hanoi’ talks with a view to putting an honourable end to the present war in Cambodia, with no victor or loser.” Nixon, continued the Prince, “refused categorically and definitively our proposal by repeating that we should negotiate with the clique of the puppet and traitor Lon Nol”. The solution was simple, he added. “This problem will be solved and peace will return to Cambodia… once the United States stops giving military aid and air protection to the puppet Lon Nol regime.” While resolute, Sihanouk’s position was not irreconcilable with that which Kissinger was putting forward; though he did not know it yet, his demand for direct meetings had been acceded to, subject to a ceasefire. The issue left at stake was the Indochinese version of the ‘chicken and the egg question’: the sequencing of the talks and the bombing halt/ceasefire. While there was still room for hope, nothing could yet be settled until Sihanouk returned to the Chinese capital. Unfortunately for
Zhou and Kissinger, this left the U.S. Congress with an extra few weeks to settle definitively the vexed issue of which came first.\textsuperscript{xlv}

By the time Sihanouk returned to Beijing the issue had been resolved. Nixon was beset by scandals on several fronts; on June 25\textsuperscript{th}, former White House counsel John Dean began his testimony before the Senate inquiry into the Watergate scandal and directly implicated the President. And if that wasn’t enough to make Nixon feel sick, BREAKFAST, LUNCH, and DINNER were coming back to bother the President. Senator Howard Hughes’s investigations into the 1969 secret bombings of Cambodia were revealing an organised campaign of deception, including the falsification of bombing co-ordinates, designed to keep from Congress the actions being undertaken by the U.S. Air Force. To many members of Congress, legislating a cessation of the bombing of Cambodia was no longer merely about ending what Kissinger described as “bombing the bejesus” out of the Khmer Republic – a tactic that seemed to many members of the Senate pointless and futile; the issue was now totemic “for the balance of power between the Congress and the President – as well as for its effects in cutting off bombing raids in Cambodia.” Ending the bombing of Cambodia was now about far more than Cambodia, it was about wresting constitutional authority to wage war back from an executive that had in many senators’ eyes used lies and subterfuge to appropriate it. Realising that he held no cards to play, the expert poker-player Nixon folded and agreed a cut-off date of 15 August.\textsuperscript{xlvi}

In his efforts to persuade Congress that an end to the bombing was an unwise move and one that undermined the diplomacy of the administration, Kissinger had
been forced to hint at what was in the offing under Zhou’s auspices. Likewise, State Department officials, perhaps overly confident of success, had conducted a little too much of the ‘briefing’ that Chairman Mao had warned Nixon about the previous year, and highlighted the anticipated role of China. Furthermore, articles appeared explicitly linking Kissinger’s planned August visit to Beijing with a negotiated settlement in Phnom Penh; at the same time, however, denials were issued that Kissinger would be meeting with Sihanouk. The sum total effect was that Kissinger over-played his hand. A few days before Sihanouk returned to Beijing, Zhou transmitted a message for Huang Zhen to deliver to the White House. It complained about the stories appearing in the press (originating in Washington) pointing towards a U.S.-Chinese mediated end to the war that had “enraged [Sihanouk] all the more.” Charitably, Beijing put the blame for the circulating stories on the “Lon Nol clique… spreading the rumour that the Phnom Penh authorities will enter into official negotiations with the National United Front of Cambodia very soon, with the United States and the Chinese Communists serving as go-betweens… The Chinese side is of the view that such a turn of events is extremely disadvantageous to seeking a settlement of the Cambodian question and will even cause trouble.” When Sihanouk touched down in Beijing, trouble indeed it had caused.

On arrival, Sihanouk announced that it “is useless to talk to Kissinger. There is no time for talk. Now it is too late. We will continue our armed struggle.” The Prince announced his fear that along with Lon Nol, he too was to be cut out of the agreement. It appears he had gotten wind of the press speculation just before he left Bucharest to return to China, justifying Zhou’s apprehension of attempting to
communicate with him on the matter while he was abroad. Mentioning his Chinese hosts in unusually negative terms, he announced that “Neither Moscow nor Peking nor Paris have [sic] the right to settle our fate in secret.” The next evening, July 6th, he spoke in Beijing, as defiant as ever. He made repeated references to the 15 August bombing cut-off, and was now concerned that the ‘Nixon Doctrine’ meant that the United States would simply transfer responsibility for the bombing of Cambodia to South Vietnam – a prospect that had been raised by official spokesmen for the Saigon government. Sihanouk roundly condemned the “old fox” Nixon and his “genocide” against the Cambodian people in whose name the Prince significantly denounced “the hypocrisy of the U.S. Government which claims that ‘negotiations are under way and yielding results’ concerning the solution of the Cambodian problem.” Zhou and Kissinger’s desired outcome in Phnom Penh, so recently almost within grasp, seemed to be slipping out of reach.

In his own speech Zhou made no mention of the bombing halt; in fact, while offering the standard expression of “firmly support[ing] the just stand of the Cambodian people” Zhou significantly highlighted “Sihanouk’s historic five-point declaration” as “the clear direction for a settlement of the Cambodian question.” Furthermore, he pointed out that Sihanouk and the GRUNK “have again and again demanded that the United States immediately stop its bombing and military intervention in Cambodia.” The clear implication from this was that now that this prospect was imminent, the Cambodian issue should indeed be settled on the basis of Sihanouk’s March 23rd 1970 declaration – up until that point the declared basis for a settlement. By contrast, Sihanouk did not even make reference to this “historic”
statement in his reply; rather he laid out three demands “which constitute and will constitute unalterably the only solution of the Cambodian problem:

-First, complete and final cessation of all military (air and other) interventions by the U.S.A., its satellites in Bangkok and Saigon and other hostile countries.
-Second, complete elimination of the traitorous, illegal, anti-national, anti-popular, fascist and utterly corrupt “Khmer Republic”.
-Third, total, unconditional and irreversible withdrawal of all U.S. and pro-U.S. military personnel and all non-Cambodian personnel serving U.S. imperialism-neo-colonialism from Khmer territory.”

In a similarly defiant vein, he made a call for “arms and particularly ammunition, again ammunition and always ammunition… so as to help them prevent the extermination of the Khmer country and people and regain national independence.” By contrast he again reiterated that China was “our No 1 supporter”.

Through these comments he was clearly taking aim at North Vietnam who had been reducing their arms shipments to the Khmer Rouge since the signing of the Paris Peace Accords. As Le Duan had told the Soviet Ambassador to Hanoi in April, “[O]ur support and help to the Cambodian friends is decreasing and its scale is now insignificant.” It is unclear to what extent Sihanouk was acting on his own initiative in an effort to get out ahead of what he anticipated to be the Khmer Rouge response, or whether he was already acting under pressure from the ‘interior’. If it was a case of Sihanouk predicting which way the political wind was going to blow it
was a good judgement: at some point in July at a C.P.K. Central Committee meeting Pol Pot declared that there would be absolutely no negotiations.\textsuperscript{lvi}

While at this point Zhou had clearly not given up hope of being able to arrange a negotiation, he was manifestly annoyed at the turn of events in Washington and the Congress-imposed bombing halt. Earlier in the day he had met a congressional delegation led by Senator Warren Magnuson, during which Sen. Magnuson had discussed, at length, the situation in Cambodia and the role of Congress in forcing Nixon to end the bombing. While Zhou had offered the standard Chinese condemnation of U.S. actions in Cambodia, Magnuson – a ‘dove’ on Vietnam who had voted for both the Cooper-Church and McGovern-Hatfield amendments – had “stressed the role of Congress in cutting off the bombing and repeatedly urged Zhou to ‘Be patient. It’ll be over soon.’” According to David Bruce, “Zhou had been visibly angered by Magnuson’s attempt to engage him with the Congress against the President.”\textsuperscript{lvii} The timing of the collapse was most inopportune for the Chinese premier.

The C.C.P.’s Tenth Party Congress was an unusual affair, to put it mildly: it had been called early and was cloaked in secrecy.\textsuperscript{lviii} It was almost certainly as a result of this and not, as Kissinger presumed, the failing proposals for Cambodia that Huang Zhen was called back to China at this time.\textsuperscript{lix} Beijing requested a slight delay in the announcement of the date of Kissinger’s visit until such times as Huang had arrived back in the Chinese capital. The soon-to-be nominated secretary of state, however, took fright. He had leaked so much to the press about the expected 6 August visit and the anticipated agreements on Cambodia that the visit would
conclude, that a failure to deliver would deprive Nixon of a hoped-for foreign policy success at a time of great domestic difficulty. Closer to home, Kissinger surely worried, it might even give Nixon cause to reconsider moving Kissinger to take control of the State Department. His insolent response, as he later admitted, was “the defence of the weak.”

He immediately dispatched his National Security deputy, Brent Scowcroft, to express Kissinger’s “surprise” at the delay of the August trip announcement, and warned that as Kissinger was the “sole architect” of U.S.-P.R.C. normalization, if he is embarrassed over the Cambodia issue it could jeopardize the U.S.-P.R.C. reconciliation. What would HAK be able to bring back from Beijing regarding Cambodia?” Kissinger got his reply in the most stark of terms. On 18 July the Chinese delivered a note definitively terminating the proposed intervention; Sihanouk, and more likely Pol Pot, could not be delivered. “[T]he Chinese side holds that it is obviously inappropriate to communicate to Samdech Sihanouk the tentative thinking on the settlement of the Cambodian question as set forth by the U.S. side in late May. The Chinese side wishes to inform the U.S. side of this with frankness.”

Zhou had called time on the proposed intervention in Cambodia because Kissinger had made its successful realisation a prior condition to his arrival in Beijing in early August. To emphasize the point, the following day another message was delivered informing the National Security Adviser that the proposed visit date in early August was now “inconvenient”. The Chinese would, however, welcome Kissinger on 16 August, the day after the bombing halt came into force. There was
little anger expressed in the note, however, unlike that of the previous day referring to Cambodia and in which the Chinese had advised that “If the United States truly desires to settle the Cambodian question, the… demands raised by the Cambodian side should be acceptable to it. It is hoped that the U.S. side will give serious consideration to this and translate it into action.” The two issues were being divorced: Zhou could not deliver on Cambodia by 6 August but Kissinger was still welcome. As with Vietnam before it, Zhou was determined not to let Cambodia interfere with Sino-American relations.\textsuperscript{lxiii}

It is clear though that Zhou’s refusal to pass on Kissinger’s 27 May offer was in many respects as much an admission of China’s own weakness in regards to Cambodia as it was an expression of frustration over the turn of events in both that country and the U.S. Zhou’s inability to manipulate a scenario to the mutual benefit of both China and the United States was frustrating, but was by no means an irrevocable blow to the burgeoning partnership. For that reason the two different Chinese messages separated the issues and vowed to move on irrespective of the failed initiative. In this manner and even at this late stage Zhou did not give up on the prospect of coming to some sort of negotiated settlement in Cambodia: as late as 16 August, the day after the U.S. bombing of Cambodia ended and on which the Chinese had proposed Kissinger arrive in Beijing (serving as a subtle riposte to his ‘insolence’), Zhou was in consultation with Pham Van Dong opining that it would be “unwise” if “these chances [for negotiation] are not exploited.”\textsuperscript{lxiv} By this stage, however, the Khmer Rouge had forced Hanoi’s hand as well as Beijing’s. They had continued their assault on Phnom Penh throughout July and August in the face of the
most intense campaign of aerial bombardment the world had ever seen. By doing so, the K.R. had forced Hanoi to recommence their supply of Pol Pot’s forces. In the latter half of 1973, in recognition of the implacability of the Khmer Rouge military assault, *force majeure* compelled Beijing, just as it had Hanoi, to throw its weight behind the forces of the C.P.K. and their search for an outright military victory in Cambodia. All plans for a negotiated settlement were from that point forward irrelevant.\textsuperscript{lxv}

As this article has shown, while Kissinger often misinterpreted Chinese intentions and meaning in his negotiations with them, and was frequently guilty of (at best) misrepresenting events to colour their historical interpretation, this does not mean, of course, that he always did both, or either. However, in both his interpretation and presentation of the circumstances surrounding the attempt at a negotiated end to the war in Cambodia in June 1973, he was correct. The manner in which his Chinese interlocutors handled this issue singled it out as an area in which, unlike similar aspirations on Kissinger’s part with regard to Vietnam, the Chinese government indicated a clear and concrete interest in acting as an intermediary between the United States and Sihanouk’s government-in-exile, although it did not want this role to be publicized. This, as Kissinger himself pointed out, would not have been attempted without a high degree of confidence on Zhou Enlai’s part that it would be successful. Suddenly, however, the Chinese mediation ended: a sure signal that they had concluded that the other side could not be delivered. So what changed in the
interim? Three factors at play must be assessed: the impact of the bombing halt; Kissinger’s ‘impetuous’ over-reach; and Chinese and Cambodian domestic politics.

While it may be true that the Congressionally-mandated bombing halt was not solely to blame for the collapse of the Chinese mediation, it is similarly inconceivable that in the cat-and-mouse/chicken-and-egg world of ceasefire and negotiation politics it had no effect. This is substantiated by the claim that Pol Pot made his decision to continue the armed struggle to the bitter end in July 1973, after the late June announcement of Nixon’s 15 August compromise. And even if the halt was not solely responsible for the collapse of the ‘peace plan’, it did initiate a chain of events that cumulatively doomed the initiative.

The second factor was Zhou’s and Sihanouk’s anger at the leaks stemming from Kissinger’s office about the impending success of a Chinese mediation, and his attempts to tie his proposed Beijing visit to it. Zhou Enlai made clear that these media stories were an extremely unhelpful intervention, and almost certainly inflamed the volatile Sihanouk and caused embarrassment for the Chinese government. Perhaps, as suggested by Kenton Clymer, this was the key factor in derailing the mediation. However, it cannot be overlooked that the catalyst for the briefings was partly Kissinger’s having to work against the backdrop of a potential bombing halt, forcing him to attempt to forestall one by ‘hinting’ at what was in the offing without being able to discuss it on the record. (Though no doubt, the dreaded prospect of the collapse of Cambodia so close to his own hoped-for nomination as secretary of state raised the level of his ‘impetuosity’ by a notch or two.) It is unlikely though that this was a decisive factor, given Zhou and Mao’s long and
unsatisfactory experience of leaks from their American counterparts, and the relative restraint that accompanied their complaints on this matter.

The final factor is the most problematic: internal Cambodian and Chinese politics. We may never have a historical record for the decision-making processes of the Khmer Rouge in this period, and the Chinese records are still largely off-limits. However, the collapse of this Zhou-Kissinger plan occurred precisely in the same week that Mao Zedong began to voice his concerns about Zhou’s conduct of foreign policy.\textsuperscript{lxvi} There is currently nothing in the literature to suggest that the failure of this initiative was behind Mao’s sudden dissatisfaction with his premier; however, that does not preclude the possibility that Mao himself changed his stance on the issue in the wake of the bombing halt – itself perhaps one of the turns of events that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was criticized for failing to predict. In any case, the failure of Zhou and Kissinger to succeed in this effort marked the zenith of Zhou’s influence in Beijing, influence to no small degree created by the success of his relationship with Kissinger over the previous two-year period, and jealousy over which played a large factor in his fall.

While it may be the case that blaming Congress for the defeat of South Vietnam is indeed “sophistic”, Congress’s role in the premature termination of Cambodia’s only (even if marginal) hope for a negotiated end to its war cannot be dismissed so lightly.\textsuperscript{lxvii} Certainly, Kissinger’s failure until the eleventh hour to offer to meet with Sihanouk (and, in the words of William Shawcross, the “contempt” with which he generally viewed him) meant that Kissinger himself was largely responsible for the
creation of the time pressure to beat the bombing halt. Similarly, Nixon and Kissinger’s opening to China and negotiated end to the American war in Vietnam undermined for many members of the Senate much of the ‘anti-Communist’ rationale for propping up Lon Nol in any case. And, of course, by the summer of 1973 many members of Congress were beginning to view with suspicion the White House’s claims and contentions on many topics.

 Nonetheless, the evidence currently available indicates that for a brief moment in June 1973 there was a real and viable opportunity to bring about a negotiated end to the war in Cambodia, which was snuffed out by the well-intentioned, quite understandable, yet mistimed intervention of Congress. Painfully ironically, the failure of this effort also marked the end of the honeymoon period in relations between the P.R.C. and United States, and of a degree of amity to which they would not return until the end of the decade when both were again drawn together in support of the Khmer Rouge’s ‘Democratic Kampuchea’.

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‡‡ Memcon, Nixon, Zhou, Kissinger et al., February 24, 1972, NPMP/White House Special Files/President's Office Files/box 87/Memoranda for the President Beginning February 20, 1972.


‡‡‡‡‡ Sihanouk’s 23 March ‘Solemn Declaration and Message’ announced the formation of the national unity government and declared the dissolution of the Lon Nol regime as its goal.


‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ Ibid.


‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ Memcon (extract), Zhou Enlai and Le Thanh Nghi, October 8-10, 1973, Westad et al., 77 Conversations, p.190. See ch.4, fn.96 for comments on the date of this conversation.


‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ P.R.C. For. Min., *Zhou waijiao huodong*, pp.662-5.


‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, p.351.


Memcon, Kissinger, Scowcroft et al., July 19, 1973, DNSA/KT00778


Memcon (extract), Zhou Enlai and Pham Van Dong, August 16, 1973 in Westad et al., eds., 77 Conversations, p.189.

Short, Pol Pot, p.251.


Quoted in Clymer, Troubled Relations, p.130.

See e.g. comments by Sen. Mark Hatfield, “The President's veto message uses the word 'Communist' five times in threatening tones. Just who are these Communists? Can they be the Communists so frequently toasted last week and whose flags were officially flown throughout Washington? Can they be the Communists in Peking who strolled with us at the Great Wall? Our bombs are not destroying an ideology; they are killing Cambodians opposing a feeble and corrupt regime kept afloat by US tax dollars.” Russ Witcher, The Debate in the U.S. Senate About the War in South Vietnam and Cambodia, 1973-75, (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2008), pp.41-42.