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ABSTRACT

This thesis is an investigation into the ethics and politics of global poverty. The main focus will be on the multidimensional concept of poverty in relation to global politics and justice in the context of contemporary political thought and philosophical research. The research methodology used in this study is that of philosophic analysis, with the main focus on three key authors: Rawls’s political liberalism, Nussbaum’s capabilities approach and Pogge’s human rights thesis.

This research thesis critically analyses Pogge’s famous stance that global poverty is caused by the harmful international institutional framework. Contra Pogge, this thesis suggests that state and local institutions must not be neglected: a proper understanding of the fundamental role of institutions at both the state and international levels, and the relation between them, can best serve the cause of global justice and poverty alleviation.

One of the major concerns of this thesis is how poverty is impacted by politics. It is argued that institutional political action for poverty alleviation is greatly facilitated by democratic political process. Political parties and civil society at the state and local level can play a crucial role, especially if the politics of poverty is embedded in welfare oriented policies of a democratic state with a clear tilt towards social justice.

The legitimacy of Pogge’s move to shift away from state responsibility to collective or individual responsibility is critically assessed along with the idea of the dispersal of state sovereignty, and more specifically Pogge’s exclusive emphasis on global institutions in isolation from the state’s role in poverty alleviation. By providing empirical evidence and logical arguments, this thesis argues that poverty is largely caused at the local level by state institutions; without remedying the situation at the local and state level no global intervention is likely to succeed.

Poverty eradication policies can only succeed if reformed global institutions coordinate their efforts with political actors and institutions at the state level, enhancing pro-poor institutions and enabling environment for poverty eradication and social justice. Global institutional governance is not likely to achieve much success in poverty eradication unless the role of the state institutions is not fully incorporated.
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Finally, I thank God for the strength and solace during times of difficulty and for His blessings that enabled me to accomplish my goal.
DEDICATION

To My Loving Parents
Chapter One

INTRODUCTION

Poverty alleviation as the key objective has rightfully dominated the recent global development policy as well as the contemporary literature in the relevant research. There is no dearth of statistical data underscoring widespread poverty across the globe. Eminent scholars like Pogge (2008) and Miller (2010) have highlighted the presence of billions of people in the developing countries lacking access to basic amenities of life like food and clean water and sanitation facilities. The lack of effort on the part of those wielding political power nationally and globally is cited as one of the major causes of prevailing poverty.(Green 2012) The damning figures are indeed alarming and remedial measures seem beyond the capacity of institutions operating under individual state systems. Despite a vigorous debate on poverty eradication and social justice continuing for the last fifty years or more, no significant change for the better seems to have been happening(Ravallion,M.(2013 })(139-158). The global consensus, spearheaded by the rich nations of the world recognizes the importance and urgency of the matter leading to such interventions as the MDGs has also failed to make a significant dent in the widespread malaise.

Recent developments in political theory have clearly taken the issue beyond the moral dimension of poverty. The emphasis on moral responsibility of one individual for his poor fellow citizens has grown over time into the idea of social justice. Traditionally, theories of justice concerned themselves largely with the domestic policies concerning just distribution of resources within national boundaries. Thus, as in the case of John Rawls, global justice remains merely a matter of intergovernmental concern. But, in recent years, the global social justice has emerged making a clear distinction between domestic duty of justice and the global duty of justice. In the wake of an economically globalized world, the cosmopolitan philosophers and political thinkers like Pogge have refused to restrict social justice within state boundaries.
Poverty as one of the most critical issues in the contemporary world, the present research aims to encompass a number of issues related to it. Ethical, political, economic and philosophical issues are frequently raised in current literature relevant to the concept. Even more important are the issues relating to equity and justice, welfareism and culture of poverty. When equity and justice are viewed from a political perspective, re-distribution of resources and provision of equal chances become empowerment issues that are highly relevant fields in political philosophy for developing a theory of poverty. The social contract theory, Rawls’ political liberalism, Pogge’s human rights and Nussbaum’s capabilities are all issues of universal generality relevant to a political theory of poverty. Pogge assigns a global dimension to the rights issue and highlights the negative role of the international economic and political system. But, Pogge’s institutional account of human rights needs to be reconsidered as there is a need to distinguish clearly between the harm caused to the cause of the poor by the state institutions on the one hand and that of global institutions on the other. There is logic in the argument that the current relationship between citizen and state in Western liberal societies cannot justify Pogge’s view that citizens are collectively responsible for global justice. It is clear that a cosmopolitan account of global justice hinges on an appeal to the idea of moral equality of people across the world. But, looked from a practical angle, one finds no credible organization exists that can implement global justice by ensuring distributive fairness, reframing rules for global institutions to function in the interest of fairness and justice. For poverty eradication in the context of global justice, an institutional framework will have to be set up, equally acceptable at both the state level and the international level.

**Research Question:**

The key research question that I intend to address in this thesis therefore is: “How the role of institutions at the national and institutional levels and the relation between them can best serve the cause of global justice?” Concomitantly, there are a number of subsidiary questions relating to (i) social justice in the context of Pogge’s idea of poverty as human rights violation; (ii) poverty as the
direct consequence of injustice underscoring the primacy of social injustice for social justice; (iii) systemic injustices in the economic world as related to the distributive inequality prevailing at the international level; (iv) the relationships between the world institutions, state and civil society with poverty and prosperity in different settings, and (v) the society of states paralleling the state society where individual state entities reach a mutual agreement on common interests and interactional and moral norms. However, the role of global institutional framework and state level institutions are of great significance for this study working independently as well in unison.

**Rationale of the Study:**

The study explores the relation between poverty, politics and global justice. It underpins poverty as the key issue in the contemporary political philosophy, economic theory and philosophical research. More specifically, it relates to the moral issues of equity and justice, welfareism and culture of poverty. When equity and justice are viewed from a political perspective, re-distribution of resources and provision of equal chances become empowerment issues that are highly relevant fields in political philosophy for developing a theory of poverty. Conceptualized in the context of fairness and justice, equity, and culture of poverty, the political theory of poverty is formulated in the light of social contract theory, Rawls’s political liberalism, Pogge’s human rights thesis and capabilities approach of Amartya Sen and Nussbaum. Within the socio-economic domain, poverty is related also to unequal access to financial resources, economic deprivation, social exclusion, social choice and distributive justice.

Social exclusion has emerged as an important dimension of poverty. It occurs when someone is left out of mainstream society, deprived of opportunities for participation in economic, social and civic processes and takes us beyond the concept of material deprivation to include in the poverty criteria such deprivations as that of health-care, hygiene, employment, education and social participation. Driven by dynamic, multi-dimensional processes and unequal power relations interacting across economic, political, social and cultural dimensions and at different levels including individual,
household, group, community, country and global levels, it results in a continuum of inclusion/exclusion characterized by unequal access to resources, capabilities and rights. I take issue with the view that social exclusion is residual to mainstream poverty, and argue that not only can social exclusion account for economic and socio-cultural processes of impoverishment, but also that it adds concerns with social inequality to longstanding concerns with poverty. Without incorporating the entire range of poverty indicators, one cannot do justice to the multidimensional concept of poverty. Social exclusion has an extensive relevance to the poverty-related debates, especially concerning equity and equitable access to resources, goods, services and opportunities. Therefore, the space it has appropriated in the contemporary poverty debate is quite justified. The causes of social exclusion are traceable to multiple dimensions of deprivation like social structures, cultural norms, expectations, etc. manifesting itself in the form of inequalities in both the rich and the poor countries. As a social phenomenon, its focus on social reality and social analysis brings in the domain of culture and political economy. Politics is another dimension touched by the social exclusion phenomenon. Political aspects of exclusion include the denial of political rights such as political participation, freedom of expression, equality of opportunity, etc.

When we take up poverty in relation to justice, the concept of injustice becomes greatly significant. Poverty being a key issue for social injustice it acquires pivotal significance for the concept of justice as well. When we look at poverty as direct result of injustice, it emphasizes the primacy of social injustice for the concept of social justice. On the other hand, poverty also perpetuates social injustice as it promotes inequality, maldistribution, exclusion, disempowerment, vulnerability and exploitation thereby hampering one’s ability to pursue social justice. Rawls’s theory here becomes highly relevant as it has set the stage for future academic debate on social justice. For him, it meant distribution of basic rights and duties. It also determined the division of advantages in social life. The Rawlsian distribution of resources is centred around the ‘basic structure of society and is characterized in “the way in which the major social institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties determine the division of advantages from social cooperation.”’ (Rawls 1999, 6).
In the wake of extreme poverty existing at record high level, the most marginalized segments of society are disproportionately affected in the presence of injustice across the world. The issue of distributive justice has an inherent importance in the wake of various forms of distributive injustice like world poverty, hunger and other manifest deprivations. Does distributive justice imply absence of poverty and inequality? In my view, if social justice is construed as a notion in contrast to the injustice in a society, it should value equitable treatment of people and their rights and a fair allocation of available goods and resources without being constrained or facilitated by the considerations of gender, ethnicity, belief, political affiliation, social status, or other individual and social distinctions. The idea of distribution of wealth and services lies at the base of the genesis of equity and equality as the main focus of social justice. Originating with the natural law and culminating in the modern concept of rights, it is a struggle for socially just distribution of goods. It is, therefore, natural to find social justice being increasingly characterized by equating it with the concepts of liberty, equality and equal opportunity in a society. As a consequence, its application in the political and economic domains also denotes realignment of rights and distribution and redistribution of goods and resources from the haves to the have-nots. A fair allocation of resources as the goal of distributive justice, therefore, should take into account the diversity of community members, the total amount of goods available as well as distributional procedures and patterns.

For Rawls, the precondition for distributive justice is the establishment of a democratic society or a well-ordered state where everybody acts justly and presumably without vested interest. Therefore, a thorough analysis of the Rawlsian principles of justice including the difference principle is very much called for. On the other hand, Robert Nozick, a major critic of Rawls asserts that state-mandated compulsory redistribution was incompatible with his principle of liberty. He conceived justice rather as fairness or otherwise of the process that leads to acquisition of goods and benefits. I think both the competing stances leave out the important element of relation between people and the issue of how to get rid of institutionalized oppression. Moreover, we need to look into the social
and cultural aspects – ethnic and gender-based issues and those accruing from disability factors which are important for a comprehensive formulation of the concept of social justice.

I find it to be an interesting contrast as both Rawls and Nozick drew inspiration from Kant and Locke but came out with different results. Both Rawls and Nozick looked back at Kant’s categorical imperative and found individual in the capacity of ‘ends’ rather than as ‘means’. Rawls’s theory of justice found justificatory evidence from Locke’s idea of social contract while Lockean notions of self-ownership and just acquisition provided bricks and mortar for Nozick to construct his ideal state. Their difference, however, stands out prominently in the case of what constitutes distributive justice. Modern liberalism of Rawls persuades him to concentrate on individual freedom in his plan for poverty reduction in a capitalist, democratic state. Nozick, as a libertarian, wanted to protect individual freedom and right to private property and opposed as morally wrong coercive taxation and welfare programs run by the state to aid the poor as violative of personal freedom. Thus, Rawls and Nozick emerge as upholding contrasting positions on what is a just society. The contrast in their stand points are appropriately reflected in their visions of poverty amelioration in their distinctive ideas of a just state. Rawls’s retreat from the idea of a democracy where wealth is widely dispersed to a minimally just democracy where only a social safety net was sufficient as Nozick’s critique brought the former back from his egalitarian stance to a more watered down stand of a philosophically neutral liberalism.

Nozick’s thesis in which he prefers the idea of freedom over poverty did not allow him to fully understand the impact of coercion and domination on the exercise of free, rational choice and how it undermines the exercise of freedom itself. He followed the social contract tradition in formulating his idea of the origin of the state and betrays a certain similarity with Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and even Rawls. But, unlike others, he viewed individual rights as existing prior to any social contract. In this regard, he looked at real life as model for human beings unlike Rawls’s abstract
thought experiment where agents operate in an “original position” and behind a “veil of ignorance” which acted for him as a replacement of “state of nature” in the social contract theory.

Addressing my main research question, I look at accessing justice and eradicating injustices to be an institutional task, both at the state and the global levels. It can be logically argued that state stability and political legitimacy in a democratic dispensation emanate from a realization that pro-poor policies enhance popularity which, in turn, encourages the political elite to focus pro-poor political institutions thus giving more voice and empowerment to the deprived segments of society. Institutional political action, in this regard, is facilitated greatly by the political process, democratic political parties and civil society groups. In this way, politics of poverty is embedded in welfare oriented policies of a democratic state with a clear tilt towards social justice.

It is very much possible to identify political norms and systems, the ruling political discourse and the need to politically represent and empower the poor as the factors that institutionalize poverty. How different forms of poverty and the poor are politically represented impact significantly the modes of understanding how reduction and reproduction of poverty depends upon political decisions and policies. The political process plays a dominant role in alleviation as well as perpetuation of poverty. It can be seen in distribution of power, how state-institutions interact, the role played by the government vis-a-vis different power groups operating in a society, the role of the institutions in conflict resolution among competing groups, etc. In order to afford a genuine opportunity to the poor to gain real political representation, besides the government, the political elite and the power groups can play a crucial role. In order to have a genuine political representation in the sense of empowerment, poverty eradication needs to be relocated and grounded in the broader political project of social justice.

There are a number of key issues that become part of the political project of social justice, viz, inequality and equality of opportunity, justice and injustice, lack of democracy and human rights. If we try to understand injustice as involving unfair distribution of resources and opportunities, social
deprivation and lack of empowerment, these factors constrain and obstruct self-determination on the political plane. It is the duty of state institutions to insure that social justice overcomes these expressions of injustice in a society, particularly when people are deprived not only in material and social sense but also when they are denied political participation. This is the reason why social justice and social injustice becomes politically relevant.

Why do we have widespread injustice in society despite there being rules and institutions to overcome and rectify it? Injustice is generally considered to be the most important cause of poverty. The everyday sense of social injustice encompasses the inhuman and unfair ways of treatment and inaccessibility to resources like food, clothing and shelter. But, when we move to opportunities like freedom, rights and empowerment issues it becomes eminently political. Political injustice leads to violation of individual liberties, rights to freedom of speech as well as voting rights. Unfair state actions perpetrated under political systems result in denial of voice and representation in decision making to the disempowered and the disadvantage. It results in serious equity issues important in both the social and political domains. The state’s legal and political institutions often tend to violate the political, economic, and social rights of the poor segments of the society. It would, therefore, be appropriate to confront political injustice by reforming and reorienting to fair governance institutions like bureaucracy, judiciary, police, etc. So that executive and legislative making is held accountable. Public decision making will only respond to the will of the people if they are empowered and drawn out of the social and political exclusion. Not only that, a culture of political participation can only be nurtured if public at large is encouraged to take active part in the formulation, execution, and monitoring of state policies.

Which type of political dispensation is conducive to upholding norms of justice and for eradicating poverty? The polemic on theory of social justice is linked with the contemporary democratic theory. A just society is judged insofar as shared values and cultural understanding is reflected in the policies, practices and institutions favoured by the modern, egalitarian, democratic societies.
Many contemporary commentators (Barry 2005, for example) have underscored social democratic program as suitable for an egalitarian theory of justice. The political expression values such as equality, fair play and impartiality are supposed to be translated into formation of political institutions like electoral systems and legislative rules. The policies and institutions vouchsafed by democracy are known to uphold freedom and equality and are a testimony to its moral superiority over other forms of government. Rather than looking for the basic moral principles, the political debate concerning justice and injustice seems to focus more on the operative norms democracy which democracy appears to apply only within the ambit of a particular political community.

Without venturing into a theoretical discussion of applied philosophy, I tend to agree broadly with Sen’s (1999) representation of democracy as fundamentally pro-poor in addressing problems of world poverty in terms of consensus building, transparency and good governance. Obviously, funding for public services and income distribution takes place a much larger scale in a democratic dispensation. Although no necessary relation between democracy and poverty alleviation can exclusively be established, among all the diverse ways of governance, democracy has been better able to deliver in empowering the poor in terms of increasing their political capabilities and reduce poverty. Democracy is generally considered to be conducive to community development, not only by cultivating self-confidence, dignity and self-respect of the poor but also by generating collective ideas for effective political action. Apparently, democratic norms and values are better suited to social capital necessary for social justice.

It is possible to apply the ideas of injustice and inequality among individuals of a society to their application to relationships and institutions in the global context. In view of the contemporary realities of global poverty embedded in the recent phenomenon of globalization, the philosophical argument moves logically to a discussion focused on cosmopolitanism and global justice.
The Limits of POGGE on Poverty:

In the backdrop of Rawlsian interpretation of global distributive justice and the moral, political and social dimensions of poverty, a critical analysis of the role of affluent nations in the present unjust global institutional order is undertaken. The argument converges on how Pogge’s ground breaking idea of negative duty not to harm the global poor fares in the face of fair criticism. While undertaking a critical analysis of Pogge’s standpoint, one needs to examine how Pogge could legitimately move from state responsibility to collective or individual responsibility. One needs to examine afresh Pogge’s cosmopolitanism, his Theory of a Minimally Just Global Institutional Order and his human rights thesis and some of the more significant objections raised against him by contemporary critics.

The moral and political cosmopolitanism implies that all human beings everywhere have an equal moral standing. Pogge broadens the idea to visualize a framework that can uphold an individual’s rights and duties irrespective of geographical boundaries. In philosophical language, this moral universalism renders boundaries between states and societies as morally irrelevant and by eliminating the distinction between compatriot and foreigner; it brings all human beings under the same moral standards. The crux of Pogge’s moral cosmopolitanism can be found in his remark: “every human being has a global stature as the ultimate unit of moral concern.” (2010,169). The qualities of individuality, universality and generality characterizing Pogge’s cosmopolitanism, however, are too abstract to be of much practical worth. Defining human rights as moral claims on social institution, Pogge opts for a variant of institutional cosmopolitanism built upon human rights based negative duty refusing to participate in imposing on others the existing unjust institutional order. It is important to note that Pogge’s preference for negative duties is motivated by a libertarian, minimalist conception of rights and justice. Therefore, he makes a distinction between causing poverty and merely failing to reduce it, thus avoiding the positive-negative controversy.
Pogge’s apportioning of responsibility at the individual, collective and state levels is also open to question. Pogge invokes both justice and human rights for the purpose of supporting negative duties. He characterizes severe poverty as a human rights violation. (Pogge 2010, 14-18). At the global level, the responsibility of such violation rests with the states and the citizens in so far as they participate in imposing a flawed institutional order knowing fully well that they can create an order far less harmful to human rights. The rich countries, in collusion with the corrupt elite of the poor countries, utilize the harmful international institutions like the resource privilege and the borrowing privilege to provide incentives to those who oppress the poor through their monetary policies. Pogge’s argument is able to establish, for me, only the collective responsibility of the affluent countries for the global poverty. He is yet to establish the responsibility of the collective as well as individual responsibility of the citizens of such erring states. Only then can he accuse them of violating their negative duties or for that matter causing harm to the poor of the world. He has clearly not been successful in establishing how the citizens are individually or collectively upholding the radical inequality rampant in the poor countries of the world. As far as the imposition of the coercive, unjust social institutions is concerned, he does not clearly explain how the citizens collaborate in economic and political practices of the global institutions. How can Britain’s refusal to vote in the UN against Indian atrocities in Kashmir make a British citizen culpable of violating a negative duty when it is not logically possible for him to violate that duty? Instead of banking on a general principle drawing individual responsibility from a collectively, one needs to furnish specific argument for the claim that we are harming the global poor as well as how this is being done.

Pogge’s reconstitution of the idea of responsibility is linked to how he views global poverty and violation of human rights. It is a philosophically contested account of why global poverty is morally condemnable. By establishing a significant link between the existing international institutional order and the prevailing global poverty, he underscores the most compelling reason for assigning the responsibility for global poverty to the citizens of the affluent countries and citizens of the Western countries. It is their culpability in making a nexus to compel the poor countries to accept a
global institutional order that results in violation of human rights. This culpability of having violated the morally fundamental requirement not to cause severe harm to innocent people for minor gains encourages Pogge to make the Western man responsible for atoning for the crime of causing global poverty.

Pogge’s institutionalized conception of human rights has two separate meanings: (i) There are human rights violations that are carried out by state institutions and their agents, e.g., in the case of harm at the hands of an inefficient or corrupt police officer. (ii) There are human rights demands people can make against each other when they are subject to shared institutions. Confining human rights violation within the purview of shared institutions has often led to atrocities committed against non-members who have suffered exclusion on account of colonialism, genocide, religious and ethnic extremism, etc. I think that the full scope of human rights can only be insured if they are conceived without being first subjected to institutional contingencies. Pre-political, pre-institutional natural rights are said to have emerged from a state of nature via the social contract. Life, liberty and property have always been considered inviolable irrespective of the institutional membership of the people. The humanistic perspective looks at human rights as pre-institutional claims that individuals may have against other individuals as well as against government functionaries. The claims are assigned the status of human rights solely on account of the interests that are characteristic of the common humanity. The philosophical theorization of human rights has all along been dominated by the natural rights model and such influential writers as Amartya Sen, Martha Nussbaum and James Griffin have espoused this line of thought. The underlying moral requirements are said to constrain the pre-institutional situation, pre-date the institutional contingencies and also provides the ground for establishing social and political institutions. It is, therefore, possible to conceive human rights without being first subjected to social and institutional contingencies. It is true that for actual implementation of human rights, legal enactment and political action are very much necessary. But, over and above this, the rights appear to have a reasonably determinate content and character independently of whatever subsequent institutional
specifications they might require. Therefore, moral justification and universality of scope seems to distinguish human rights from those institutionally conceived.

In the history of philosophical thought, the ideas of social contract, justice and human rights originated from within a single society or state. The pre-eminence of the state as the political institution was marked by its territorial integrity, legitimacy and sovereignty. The two world wars were followed by the emergence of the international organizations like the League of the Nations, the World Bank and the United Nations. The concept of global justice got currency in the wake of intensification of contemporary phenomena of globalization and economic integration. In this backdrop, Pogge defined global justice as essentially a matter of redistribution of wealth and resources. Highlighting the harmful impact of the existing global order, he formulated his institutional approach to human rights aimed at illustrating the obligations of the affluent world to alleviate poverty.

Following upon the current focus on globalization, Pogge’s idea of ‘dispersal of sovereignty’ fits well with his institutional conception of human rights. His moral cosmopolitanism needed vertical distribution of power for universality of his rights thesis, for sustaining societal differences, decreasing the struggle for power within and among states and reducing the incidence of war, poverty and injustice. Disowning the idea of a world government as impractical, he proposes greater institutional checks on state sovereignty and establishment of stable democracies. One may add other measures such as global institutional and economic system, global separation of powers and international federalism. The proposal raises serious issues concerning the need of an international regularity authority overseeing and ensuring distributive fairness, reframing rules for the functioning of global institutions and keeping the entire global institutional order attuned to fair play and justice. There are inherent ambiguities in the above plan and it does not make the idea of a state irrelevant in so far as global justice, peace, democratic rule and poverty alleviation are concerned.
The development during last twenty years or so has been critically important for the main research question formulated for this research project. The expanding poverty spectrum necessitates a shift away from means (means of living such as income) towards ends and the freedoms (actual opportunities a person has) to be able to satisfy these ends. Amartya Sen’s capabilities approach draws a clear distinction between actual opportunities, or capabilities, a person has, and his income. He terms the former to be intrinsically important, the latter being merely a means to such opportunities, having only an instrumental and a contingent status (Sen, 2009: p. 233, 253). Sen’s formulation of the capabilities approach is significant for the present study as the global-local mix inherent in its evaluation criteria makes it fit for application across political, economic and cultural boundaries. Its interdisciplinary and humanist formulation has helped in giving birth to ‘human development paradigm’ giving man-centred poverty reduction agenda a global focus. The impact is very much evident from the recently published Human Development Reports. Martha Nussbaum’s list of capabilities, which she terms as entitlements is meant to operationalize the capabilities and links them to a society’s claim to justice. Though Sen’s thesis suffers from a lack of specification while Nussbaum’s is likely to suffer from an inherent bias, the list is worth consideration for incorporation into national constitutional guarantees, international human rights legislation and international development policy. The distinction drawn between capabilities and rights does not preclude a definite link between the two.

One of the chief concerns of this study is Pogge’s human rights approach which clearly globalizes the phenomenon of poverty. In the back drop of abysmal poverty prevailing in Sub-Saharan, Asian and Latin American countries and the affluence and prosperity found in the rich countries, he raises the question about the latter’s instrumental role ‘in harming the global poor by causing them poverty’. He terms the role played by the affluent countries in imposing an unjust global order that causes extreme poverty to the world’s poor as violation of the negative duty not to harm others. He emphasizes that global institutions violate human rights and perpetuate injustice; hence the need to promote institutional reform and devise a minimally just global order. Pogge’s hopes to overcome
maximalist institutional irregularities through a minimalist approach will be critically assessed. It appears implausible to me that, while remaining within the Western liberal tradition, those who have caused such colossal poverty can be obligated to eradicate it. One also needs to look into the possibility where harm, greater than the one by global institutional order, has been caused by international politics and domestic policies of the concerned states. I tend to agree with Pogge that in certain poor countries the state of affairs may not possibly be likely to change for the better from within without the interference of global institutions. This would, of course, impinge upon the governance issues at the state level which can only be resolved with reference to the type of system of government at the state level. There are unresolved problems concerning how pragmatism of the national and regional interests at the global institutional level can be subordinated to philanthropic and charitable ideals. Moral obligation and duty to poverty amelioration may not always be the guiding principal followed by the aid giving agencies.

The fact of the matter is that the entire discussion leads to how institutional intervention, both at the state and the global levels can be instrumental in upholding social justice and eradicating poverty. It is obvious that the turn that the poverty discourse has taken in Pogge’s assigning of global dimension to it leads to the crux of my research question. As the thesis proceeds, it becomes evident that all the issues touched above converges upon my main research question thereby enhancing its significance for the present study.

**Methodology:**

This thesis aims to explore the alternative philosophic explanatory model for the present research. It looks at the epistemological grounds not from an empirical angle but from a conceptual one. Philosophy, in this context, does not aim at proving or disproving the existence of the external world but rather to elucidate the idea of externality. In this way, it deals not only with the intelligibility of reality but also with relation between language and reality. The implication of the latter is that a philosophical treatment of language really is a discourse about what counts as
belonging to the world. Reality is thus presented to us in the form of language as concepts provide us with the form of the experience of the world. Therefore, understanding/reality depends upon the use and meaning of concepts as employed in language. The question about intelligibility of reality, thus, is primarily an epistemological question as it comprises of meaning and understanding and how one captures the sense of something. The task of epistemology is, indeed crucial: how to describe the conditions which need to be satisfied if there is to be any criteria of understanding.

The analysis of poverty as a social phenomenon in contemporary literature moves back and forth from the empirical to the theoretical. All poverty discourse, implicitly or explicitly, hinges on a theoretical framework. The contextually generated framework of the philosophical approach therefore remains closer to the so-called “grounded theory.” The philosophical approach has epistemological implications for the transformation of numerical data, application of validity criteria as well as for conceptualization of poverty as a multi-dimensional phenomenon. The way one looks at the epistemological underpinning of poverty analysis determines the approach one undertakes toward it. Thus, epistemology as the study of nature and claims of knowledge has contributed immensely towards broadening the concept of power from narrow income consumption and basic needs criteria to social inclusion, capabilities and human rights approaches to poverty. An even more significant contribution that philosophy has made to our understanding of poverty, points in particular to the importance of conceptual analysis. It seems pertinent here to quote Locke’s famous ‘under-labourer’ conception of philosophy:

“It is ambition enough to be employed as an under-labourer in clearing the ground a little, and removing some of the rubbish which lies in the way to knowledge. Vague and insignificant Forms of speech, and abuse of language, have so long passed for mysteries of science; and hard and misapplied words, with little or no meaning, have, by prescription, such a right to be mistaken for deep learning and height of speculation, that it will not be easy to persuade either those who speak
or those who hear them, that they are but the covers of ignorance, and hindrance of true knowledge”.

(John Locke An Epistle to his Readers (Essay on Understanding (1634-1704)))

Since scientists as part of social reality are as much vulnerable to confused ideas as the common man, it becomes imperative for the philosopher to rectify linguistic confusions and resolve logical contradictions. The positivistic, empirical understanding of poverty as a social phenomenon cannot be expected to undertake a meaningful analysis and clarification of poverty as a concept. Therefore, a philosophical treatment of the issue not only contributes to a better understanding of the phenomenon as such but also provides us new insights into strategies to eradicate poverty.

This thesis also addresses the poverty debate in moral, political and philosophical perspectives and extends the discussion to include global poverty and global justice. The critical importance of poverty as a concept demands a more comprehensive treatment of its various dimensions. The complexity of the phenomenon based on an interlocking network of multi-disciplinary ethical, political, social, economic and demographic factors is very much reflected in the way the concept of poverty has evolved over the years. The ongoing debate regarding how to account for different facets and dimensions of poverty and the settings of poverty lines have also taken many twists and turns in their historical perspective. It has moved from the early debates in the 1970s on income issues, to minimum standards of living and the concept of ‘social exclusion’ in the 1980s, to the idea of general well-being in the 1990s, and finally to the more recent criteria of deprivation in the global context. Even more important for our present study is the contemporary global debate led by Thomas Pogge. The trans-national reach and relevance of his thesis extends the debate to include global organization and world institutions. The problem of poverty has all along been linked with social justice, responsibility, and obligation in a society. Since the time of the social contract theory of Locke and Rousseau, through Rawls’s liberalism, Pogge’s human rights thesis and Sen’s capabilities approach, issues related to poverty have arisen out of our concern for social justice. The historical perspective demands a logical and an etymological comparison between the concepts of
justice and injustice, since the concepts of social justice and social injustice impinge upon our understanding of inequality, scarcity, suffering, social exclusion, violation of human rights and other poverty related issues. In particular, giving priority to injustice in the social justice debate makes it possible to address some major issues in moral and political philosophy. If one focuses on maldistribution, exclusion and disempowerment, the three parameters of injustice, a more comprehensive treatment of injustice becomes possible. An attempt has, therefore, been made to assess inequality, deprivation, exploitation, disempowerment, social exclusion, and human rights violation in the light of prevailing injustice in society. The above approach has facilitated the study to address poverty as the most critical issue for political philosophy affording it an opportunity to combine some of the most important moral and political issues so as to be understood in their fuller meaning. The norm for associating justice with an egalitarian society will thus incorporate equity and human rights. At the same time it will recognize the equality and dignity of all human beings without any discriminatory criteria.

When equity and equality become the main focus of social justice, distribution of wealth and services becomes important and in the wake of the contemporary idea of rights, the struggle for just distribution of goods is further emphasized. Poverty affects critically the most disadvantaged segments of society and world poverty, hunger and other deprivations implying distributive injustice. The idea of social justice must emphasize equitable treatment of people and their rights as well as fair allocation of resources irrespective of gender, creed, ethnicity and political or social standing. Thus, equating social justice with liberty, equality and equal opportunity, it implies an economic and political domain realigning distribution and redistribution of goods and resources from the advantaged to the disadvantaged segments of society. In this regard, the egalitarian principle of equality as formulated by Rawls, and his idea of agency and responsibility in particular, are critically contrasted with that of Singer. Finally, Rawls’s basic structure of society conceived as constitutional democracy looks at social justice in the shape of social cooperation. This has significant implications for global distributive justice leading this study to it central concern, that of
critical assessment of Pogge’s assertions on the role of global institutions in creating global justice or global injustice.

Pogge’s influential stand on global justice and his argumentation regarding the role of global institutional framework in perpetuation or amelioration of poverty is treated as the point of departure for my contention on poverty, politics and global justice. My main research question regarding the role of state and global institutions at the national and the international levels is also embedded in Pogge’s controversial claim that suffering of the global poor and their amelioration are largely caused by the global institutional order and that the blame should lie exclusively at the door of the international political and economic dispensation. I contest this view and argue instead that state institutions may be equally, or even more, responsible for the malaise and that the critical challenge is how to develop a mechanism where domestic and international institutions can work in unison and in a cooperative manner for the maximum benefit to the disadvantaged people of the world.

The global justice issue demands an extended discussion and analysis of the ideas of how injustice and inequality among the individuals extends and applies to the relationships between individuals and institutions at the global level. The argument is propelled both by the force of philosophical argument and the empirical reality of abject poverty in the global context. Using Rawls’s formulation of global distributive justice as the starting point, and tracing the political, moral and social dimensions of poverty, a critical evaluation is undertaken of how and why the rich nations of the world dominating the existing world institutional order are responsible for the unjust distribution of global resources. In the process, Pogge’s famous idea of negative duty is subjected to serious criticism. Logical cogency of Pogge’s attempt to move from state responsibility to individual or collective responsibility is challenged on philosophical grounds. Drawing upon the insights of Singer, Miller, Beitz and O’Neill, I intend to examine Pogge’s Theory of a Minimally Just Global Institutional order, and while examining the reaction of the contemporary critics, I try
to formulate a more comprehensive view of global justice. Following upon the two World Wars, and with the emergence of global institutions like the League of Nations, the World Bank and the United Nations, the increasing influence of globalization demanded greater cross border social, economic and political integration. The consequent dispersal of state sovereignty fits well with Pogge’s central idea of moral cosmopolitanism. Pogge, unlike Nagel, applies redistributive justice across state boundaries. I would like to explore a more logically tenable perspective by combining both domestic state policies and global considerations on poverty and justice. When Pogge recommends vertical dispersal of territorially defined political authority of the state, he visualizes a reduced incidence of oppression and poverty in the wake of decrease in power struggle within the state. What he fails to appreciate is that the non-state vested interests may be acting beyond the state and its sovereignty, and may be as much responsible for generating poverty as do the nation states that resist United Nation policies on human rights. It is very much likely that the erring state may be doing so under pressure from such groups.

I am in broad agreement with Pogge’s understanding of vertical dispersal of sovereignty in the context of democracy and a multi-layered institutional order; a broader distribution of sovereignty among individual democratic states will, indeed, be a better option. Pogge’s scantily formulated account of dispersal of sovereignty is unable to substantiate how it will be a better guarantee for peace and security than is achievable in the existing state structure. Nevertheless, Pogge’s thesis reflecting the traditional dichotomy of sharing political authority between the world-government and the state does not rule out the idea of state as such, and the need for a state system for the sake of global justice, peace, security and democratic rule remains as significant as ever. It is necessary to devise a global constitutional structure in which state institutions and global government institutions can cooperative and work in accordance with democratic norms. Thus, for the future research in the field, it is imperative to think about reconfiguring political institutions both at the state and global levels, and formulate novel political principles concerning state sovereignty. Since states are presently quite radically divided on the basis of social, political, economic and religious
differences, only a global institutional framework reformulated and reorganized on strictly
democratic principles is likely to deliver.

Pogge’s argument on global institutional order is based on three distinct premises:

- The existing state of affairs in the poor countries is not likely to change from within;
- The most severe poverty could be avoided, despite the corrupt and oppressive regimes
  wielding power in such countries, and
- The global institutional order was designed to eradicate poverty in the poor countries.

Even if Pogge were to be successful in correcting the in-built flaws in the existing international
institutions, the power groups at the state level will continue to vitiate the policies and practices of
international institutions. Even more important is the empirical evidence showing distortion and
decay in the state institutions responsible for dispensing justice and eradicating poverty. There are
parallel rogue institutions operating at state level with little or no control exercised by the weak
leadership.

It is surprising to see that in the presence of such empirical evidence along with social and
historical reality, the crucial role of state level institutions has not been fully realized. The critical
question the present study addresses is about the role the local, state level institutions play in the
wider context of global distributive justice. Pogge’s extensive analysis of global justice in the
institutional context has failed to furnish a clear articulation for institutional framework for global
justice in the existing world order. Cosmopolitan suggestion to shift the emphasis of our moral
attention from the local to the global is fraught with numerous hazards which need to be traversed
carefully. One such hazard is an over-emphasis on globalization and a lack of focus on the state in
the context of social justice and poverty alleviation.

Empirical evidence clearly shows how recent international interventions without taking the local
factors into consideration have boomeranged and the measures have proved counterproductive for
both poverty alleviation and cosmopolitanism. I argue that deeply grounded social and political structures at the state level play a crucial role in perpetuating conflict, insecurity, injustice and poverty and cannot be eliminated by external intervention alone. A gradual process of change through democratization and negotiation with the state institutions can only facilitate the global institutions in their poverty alleviation interventions.

**Approach and Procedures of Study:**

Since the topic of this study falls within the social science discipline, philosophical analysis is used as the main tool of research. Therefore, multi-method qualitative approach to research will adopt the following research procedures:

- Historical;
- Logical (Inductive Inferential);
- Conceptual (Analysis, Meaning), Context of Discovery and Context of Justification;
- Interpretive Understanding.

**Data Collection:**

Extensive, non-numerical narrative data is collected from primary sources (Pogge’s original work, e.g.) and secondary sources (commentaries by eminent writers) in order to gain insights (understanding, comprehension and vision) into problems related to poverty, social justice, etc. By clarifying concepts and by breaking down existing theories, new theoretical data is uncovered. Inferential techniques are employed to determine and discover meaning of factual and theoretical data in specific contexts.

**Data Analysis:**

Data Analysis includes verbal coding, criticism and verbal synthesis. This analysis takes the form of argument/inference in the context of justification of the evolving tentative hypothesis. It will
determine the meanings of terms/facts/concepts etc. and patterns of relationships, classification, description, definition, etc.

**Data Evaluation:**

It will be non-standardized, narrative and on-going. Evaluation will involve external criticism to assess the authenticity of data. Factual and logical authenticity of the received information (Documentary) will be assessed. Internal criticism will evaluate the worth of the data, its accuracy and reliability (stated argument). The criteria of evaluation will be meaning, reliability and justifiability of data.

**Data Interpretation:**

Interpretation will be tentative and reviewed on an on-going basis. Generalizations will be speculative in nature. Interpretation will involve analysis, synthesis and justification and will take the route of recognition, description, application and explanation. The context of interpretation will include ends, values, and meanings for a wider understanding of social, political, economic and moral contexts of poverty and social justice.

**Results:**

Nature and form of results will be:

- Articulation and reformation of concepts.
- The strength of inference based on coherence and rationality.
- Theories formed on the basis of conceptual analysis.
- Generalization based on logically valid reasoning.
- Rejection of competing theories on the basis of logical reasoning and empirical evidence.
• Synthesized results on the basis of the above and formulation of new theories and perspectives.

The above methodological format represents the scientific methodology as the paradigmatic model of knowing and has been adopted by the social sciences (adapted for the qualitative research presently in hand) along with the dominating concepts of objectivity, prediction, certainty, data collection, observation, experimental methods, etc. There is no doubt a huge amount of empirical research that has been undertaken concerning poverty and quantitative research methods have been successfully employed for the purpose. The large scale application of mechanical principles used in explaining human behaviour, as in the case of poverty and social justice, tries to reduce human beings into physical objects. On the other hand, human behaviour is characterized by such fundamental properties as mental processes, freedom and equality, moral purpose, customs and conventions that resist reduction of human behaviour into factual data. Thus, adaptation of positivistic, scientific hypothetico-deductive model could only partially succeed in dealing with complex social phenomena and subjective aspect of human behaviour. It does, indeed, overcome the limitations of applying a purely quantitative method to some extent.
Chapter 1 introduces the topic of the thesis: Poverty, Politics and Global Justice. Highlighting the wide spread prevalence of poverty across the globe, it is asserted that poverty eradication dominates the development policy debate as well as the contemporary research in the field. Increasing globalization and the realization that poverty alleviation and social justice are beyond the capability of state institutions have led political thinkers like Thomas Pogge to assign global dimensions to the problem. The issue, however, needs to be analysed from both the logical and the empirical perspectives. Empirical assessment shows that the cosmopolitan thinkers themselves are sceptical about the capacity of the existing institutional order to deliver in accordance with the norms of equity, fairness and justice. On the logical plane, it transpires that the sole responsibility for the rampant poverty cannot be assigned exclusively to the international institutional frame work. Therefore, the main research question I have posed concerns the role of institutions at the state and global levels and two can best serve the cause of global justice and poverty alleviation. In order to adequately deal with the research question multidimensional concept of poverty has been treated from diverse angles including inequality and equality of opportunity, justice and injustice. The political, social and economic dimensions of the problem demands that constraints on implementing poverty eradication and social justice like lack of democracy and human rights, unfair distribution of resources and opportunities, social deprivation and lack of empowerment are taken into account. Pogge’s emphasis on global institutions requires a critical analysis of his idea of ‘dispersal of sovereignty’. It is argued that violation of political, social and economic rights by the state institutions cannot adequately be addressed by global governance. Instead, a social democratic dispensation at the state level is a better mode of action to overcome political injustice by reforming fair governance institutions at the state level. Since research in hand is spread across a broad spectrum and is fairly complex, I have opted for a qualitative research methodology for the present research.

Chapter 2 gives an extensive review of extant literature spanning more than hundred years on poverty and related issues including economic deprivation, social exclusion, distributive justice,
etc. From Rowntree’s scientific’ definition of poverty as the minimum income level required for physical subsistence in his *Poverty: A Study of Town life* to Townsend’s more recent definition of poverty as “the multiplicity and severity of different types of deprivation” in *What is Poverty? A historical perspective*, the wide range of writings on poverty shows the keen interest in the issue displayed by philosophers, political thinkers and social scientists. In the literature produced during last two decades, however, deprivation indicators have tended to include both the lack of resources and social exclusion. It also reflects a desire to comprehend poverty at a deeper level by taking into account both the conceptual and the empirical aspects of poverty. The focus on social dimension of poverty for the contemporary researcher has also underscored the political dimension of exclusion including the denial of political rights such as empowerment, freedom of expression, and equality of opportunity. An equally important component of recent research is the capability approach with a mix of global-local criteria making it highly suitable for application across, economic, cultural and political frontiers. However, it is Pogge’s writings on global poverty and human rights that a new shift in the relevant literature that seriously considered the obligation of the world’s rich to the global poor. While Pogge’s distinction between negative and positive duties takes him away from the egalitarian distributive justice as well as Peter Singer’s consequentialism, his focus on human rights violations and global justice brings him closer to the idea of a global institutional order and its inextricable link with the world poverty. The dominating concern for the world institutional order seems to have overshadowed the fact that poverty alleviation and social justice are primarily the concerns within the state itself. There is, therefore, a significant gap in the contemporary literature including Pogge’s writings on poverty and social justice. One of the major concerns of the present research is to fill that gap and formulate a comprehensive picture of how poverty is generated through alternative institutional systems operating in tandem with the local state systems and how a reformed global institutional network can alleviate poverty.

Chapter 3 traces the development of poverty debate from an exclusive concern with income based consumption criteria to social exclusion, capabilities approach and Pogge’s human rights thesis.
Moving beyond the subsistence level consumption criteria, the social deprivation model identified the individual as a social being. A marked broadening of poverty as a concept is visible in the social exclusions approach which moves beyond the economic and social domain to the political plane to include the issues concerning political rights and relation between individual, state and society. The shift not only provided a new insight and impetus to the poverty alleviation debate but also underscored the importance of social institutions for development policy analysis. The capabilities approach added a new dimension to poverty by emphasizing economic, social and political opportunities and aimed at creativity, freedom, dignity and respect, etc. The changing connotation of poverty brought about a change in the formulation of poverty alleviation strategies and the human development jargon. The political implications of capabilities approach, thus, brought about a change in social institutions as well as policy options. The human rights dimension of poverty helped to globalize the phenomenon and Pogge highlighted the global obligation for poverty eradication and collective responsibility for human rights violations. By pressing his minimalist thesis about negative duties, he embarks upon the maximalist task of reforming the global institutional order. The advent of the 21st century has seen another shift in the poverty debate and the new focus is Opportunity, Empowerment and Security. The new poverty rhetoric talks in terms of an accountable state that responds effectively to remove all social barriers created by racism, ethnicity and gender discrimination. The most recent definition of poverty is, therefore, vulnerability, risk, powerlessness and lack of voice of the poor and the need of appropriate strategies them.

Chapter 4 underscores poverty as a political issue in so far as it involves in so far as it relates to institutionalized provision justice by eradicating injustice at the state and global levels. Institutionalization of politics of poverty resulting from egalitarianism is marked by a realization that a democratic form of government provides the best framework because on the one hand the pro-poor policies enhance the popularity of the political elite; on the other it empowers the disadvantaged segments of the society. Such an institutionalization takes into account the political
norms and the ensuing discourse as well as the operative modes of representation and empowerment and is crucial for comprehending dynamics of poverty reduction as well as poverty reproduction. I have drawn a parallel between poverty and injustice and have argued that social justice clearly demands that various forms of inequalities are seriously addressed. A detailed analysis of how the natural and social inequalities are construed as individual choices leads one to the conclusion that fairness of people’s genuine choices is problematic. A deeper understanding of equality of opportunity and personal responsibility also allows the possibility of justified inequalities. It is, however, obvious that equality and justice are conceptually linked and that inequality is a matter of injustice. Pogge exclusive emphasis on global institutions is challenged as the state centric institutions have all along played a crucial role in both perpetuation of injustice as well as promotion of justice. There is empirical evidence of traditional social democratic program’s inclination for building pro-poor institutions because an inherent egalitarianism is reflected in its institutions and practices. But, violation of rights of the disadvantaged segments of society may also take place even in the presence of relevant norms and institutions. Only an institution with proper orientation will respond adequately to the will of the empowered people. Hence the contention that only in true democratic governance with genuine popular participation, political voice and representation can the poor have some hope of ameliorating their lot.

Chapter 5 focuses Pogge’s well-known thesis on poverty as human rights violation and global justice and undertakes a philosophical and an empirical analysis of how the extension and application of the ideas of justice and equality among individuals at local level are relevant to the global context. A critical examination of the unjust global institutional order dominated by the rich nations of the world and Pogge’s Theory of a Minimally just Global Institutional Order and the idea of negative duty not to harm the poor of the world, I have identified a number of weak links in Pogge’s argument.
How can his moral institutional cosmopolitanism and institutional conception of human rights logically justify his shift from state responsibility to that of individual citizens and to the collective responsibility? The two-pronged attack launched by Pogge on the global institutional order contends that it is not only harming the global poor but also doing little to rectify the situation. The contention raises a number of other critical issues concerning moral responsibility, distributive inequality in the global economic system, the role of national and transnational institutions and the lack of agreement on how a ‘society of states’ can be formed. There are also philosophical problems in defending the global level as the best location not only for the existence of basic structure but for distributive justice. The highly complex and novel though very popular, Pogge’s stance on global poverty and justice invites a variety of criticism. There is also some difficulty in resolving Pogge’s tendency to mix the normative, empirical and conceptual domains in his discussion. I have tried to fill up the gaps in Pogge’s argument by drawing on writings of Singer, Beitz, Miller and Onora O’Neill. My major concern has, however, been focused on resolving the national/international dichotomy that vitiates the whole discussion on institutional framework, human rights, democracy and the world government.

Chapter 6 argues the case that global poverty and injustice cannot be fully addressed without effective state level capacity, good governance and pro-poor institutions. The considerations of ethical duty and social solidarity entitle the societies existing as communities, nation states and culture a greater role in both the dispensation of justice and eradication of poverty. Territorial integrity and sovereignty contextualizes justice within local domain and legitimizes state action by political institutions for dispensing justice among compatriots. In Pogge’s minimalist thesis about negative duty not to harm the poor, there is a shift of emphasis from the content to the process of how human rights are violated. The continued diffusion of state authority triggered by a sustained globalization in the recent past provides him logical grounds to prefer an institutional conception of human rights. But, the vertical dispersal of sovereignty does not rule out the need for a comprehensive theory of global justice to take into account both the state policies and the global
perspective in order to eradicate world poverty. The inherent tensions in Pogge’s desire to maintain both state autonomy and global input cannot be resolved by his attempt to uphold centralization and decentralization at one and the same time. The ideas of a sovereign world government has failed to find favour with most eminent researchers because of the diversity of state systems and the variety of goals espoused by different states. Instead, greater power and control exercised by the global institutions is considered to be a better alternative. However, the performance of global institutions till to date has suffered from a certain lack of uniformity in their dealing with individual states. Structural reforms, human rights interventions, poverty alleviation measures have widely differed in their impact on different states. This blatant reality demands that poverty alleviation policies and strategies at the global level are designed and implemented in the light of the peculiar circumstances prevailing in each sovereign state.

Chapter 7 concludes the thesis by wrapping up discussion on poverty, politics and global justice. By citing empirical evidence and by providing logical arguments, it has been proved that the global institutional order alone is not responsible for global poverty. The rampant poverty across the globe has often been caused by state policies and institutions. In the wake of recent inclusion of opportunity, empowerment and security in defining criteria of poverty the new development oriented strategies and policies have started to emphasize the need of good governance, accountability and responsiveness of state institutions for poverty alleviation. In the political context, social democratic agenda is found to be most conducive to promoting social justice. In the contemporary world poverty has emerged as the key political issue for the state as well as for the international community. So, the policies and practices aimed at poverty eradication at both the state and the world levels are linked with politics. It is obvious that the lot of the global poor can only be ameliorated if the global institutions operate in coordination with the state institutions to eradicate poverty. One needs to make a clear distinction between poverty and suffering caused by the flawed global institutional order and perpetuated by the state institutions. It will be highly optimistic to expect that state institutions dominated by the entrenched vested interests with a high
degree of corruption would ever allow global institutions to intervene successfully for ameliorating abject poverty. Pogge’s agenda for global institutional reform and poverty eradication can only succeed if the poor countries are enabled to develop robust democracies and are persuaded to use their state legitimacy to overcome prevailing injustice and poverty.
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Chapter Two

LITERATURE REVIEW

Poverty:

Recent literature on poverty puts across the concept as a complex, cross-disciplinary, multi-dimensional concept requiring analysis of problems raised in the domains of ethics, political science, economics and other social science disciplines. At the same time, it has emerged as a critical issue in the contemporary world. The concept itself originates in social ethics considered to be an essential component of political philosophy, economic theory and philosophical research. The essence of the concept lies in poverty being a state where norms of fairness and justice are violated (Asselin & Dauphin 2001). As we move on to more important issues relating to equity and justice, welfareism and culture of poverty we land right in the midst of moral consideration of poverty. (Little 2003, pp. 1-35, McNeill & St. Clair 2009, pp. 30-62). In Miller’s political philosophy, while developing a theory of poverty, political understanding of equity and justice become empowerment issues (2010). Other issues relevant to political theory of poverty are Rawls’ political liberalism (Rawls 1993), Pogge’s human rights thesis (Pogge 2002) and capabilities approach of Sen (2001) and Nussbaum (2003). Socioeconomic perspective is equally important to understand poverty (Sen 2002). Since poverty is inextricably rooted in social and economic conditions, unequal access to financial resources and social services impinge on problems related to economic deprivation, social exclusion, social choice and distributive justice, etc.

Basic Income Criteria:

Income or consumption based poverty standards were developed during the early years of 20th century with a focus on nutrition, shelter, clothing and other physical needs (Rowntree 1901, 1918). The poverty line corresponded directly with the consumption basket containing the basic necessities
of life. “Poverty, at that time, meant unhygienic housing conditions, a stingy diet, insufficient protection from the weather and vulnerability to income shocks.” (Niemietz 2011, p. 24). A broadening of the basic needs thesis redefined poverty as a failure to meet the minimum living standards prevailing in a society. An extended set of basic needs, then, included those provided by society, e.g., health, education, etc. The changing perception of how poverty is visualized and what are the prevalent minimum standards of living impinge upon what measures are adopted for poverty eradication. These are also important indicators to judge the success or otherwise of an economic system and government policies, e.g., when Gross National Product (GNP) per head become a macro-economic indicator of income. Bradshaw et al (2008) defines a minimum standard as one “that social policy should aspire for everyone to meet . . . rooted in social consensus about . . . goods and services . . . having sufficient resources to participate in society and maintain human dignity.” (p.3). While the minimum standard of living gives us a stable, though vague, measure of absolute poverty where a fixed set of resources are not made available to a person, the relative poverty is a changing measure of how well off an individual is in comparison with other members of the society. Poverty is generally defined as the lack of sufficient financial resources to cater to the basic needs like food, shelter, clothing, etc. The minimum income threshold, indeed, varies from country to country.

According to (Niemietz 2011), the relative measure of poverty has played a dominating role in shaping the poverty debate (p. 30). Ruling out the absolute measure of poverty seems valid in the sense that needs are context specific, although one can argue that there is not much difference between relative poverty and inequality or relative deprivation. Relative poverty, however, cannot be synonymously equated with relative deprivation, a term coined by Runciman (1966) to indicate the unmerited income gaps perceived by the less well off in the society. Neither does relative deprivation preclude a high level of inequality as is the case in relative poverty. Against the World Bank (1975) assumption that income inequality decreases as income grows and poverty declines,
separate inequality indicators measurements and conceptual definitions have been developed with region specific distribution.

Trying to establish an absolute ‘minimum standard of living’ on a single measure of absolute income poverty at the world level becomes problematic when applied among diverse cultures of different societies. Such a poverty line or poverty threshold may, indeed, appear adequate in a specific country (Ravallion 1992, p. 25); while it may be significantly higher or lower in more or less developed countries respectively. Ravallion (2002) rightly supports the claim made by Reddy & Pogge (2002) that the rather conservative estimate meant to evaluate income poverty of all persons equally across the globe and on the basis of a single threshold of real consumption was flawed and irrelevant, and was arbitrarily chosen without a clear conception of poverty.

It is, indeed, true that lack of financial resources and non-availability of goods and services have all along been the defining categories of the idea of poverty. But, these are also the factors that diminish the role of the poor to participate in the social domain. Their deprivation is contingent upon their poverty. It was, therefore, in contrast to the absolute concept of poverty that Townsend (1979) adopted the idea of a relative poverty measure. He characteristically defined it by making a distinction between measures based on low income and those on material deprivation: “Poverty can be defined objectively and applied consistently only in terms of the concepts of relative deprivation. . . Individuals, families and groups in the population can be said to be in poverty when they lack the resources to obtain the type of diet, participate in activities and have the living conditions and amenities which are customary, or at least widely encouraged or approved in the societies to which they belong. Their resources are so seriously below those commanded by the average individual or family that they are, in effect, excluded from ordinary living patterns, customs and activities.” (p. 31).

In his more recent writings, Townsend (2006) has put the idea in more precise terms by saying that “the determination of a poverty line cannot be based on an arbitrary selection of a low level of
income. . .” Claiming that “the multiplicity and severity of different types of deprivation” can furnish the criteria for where the poverty line could be drawn, he asserts that “the key is to define a threshold of income below which people are found to be thus deprived.” (p. 5). Tracing the concept of poverty back to 1880s, he underscores the ideas of subsistence, basic needs and relative deprivation that underlay its evolution at the international level. The idea of subsistence that ruled the poverty debate both in the UK and the US for a century, thus, lost its hold with the realization that more than a physical organism, man is a social being that is expected to play certain social roles.

**Material Deprivation, Social Exclusion:**

Exclusion is a concept that refers to dynamic, multi-dimensional processes driven by unequal power relationships interacting across economic, political, social and cultural dimensions and at different levels including individual, household, group, community, country and global levels. It results in a continuum of inclusion/exclusion characterized by unequal access to resources, capabilities and rights. Developed in France, it has been defined as "the process through which individuals or groups are wholly or partially excluded from the society in which they live". Da Haan & Maxwell (1996). Hickey & du Toit (2007) have criticized the exclusion discourse for being residual rather than relational aspects of poverty, “thus detaching poverty analysis from an understanding of how power relations within society underpin poverty. Some have argued that the concept of social exclusion is starting to displace that of exploitation in explanations of how people are impoverished, or “actively underdeveloped.” (p.5). It is, however, a contested criticism and it can as well be argued that not only can social exclusion account for economic and socio-cultural processes of impoverishment, but also that it adds concerns with social inequality to longstanding concerns with poverty.

In a state of material deprivation, an individual or a household is denied access to material goods that are typically available to other members of the society. There is a general agreement that being
poor does not merely imply a lack of sufficient monetary resources. It is also a reflection on exclusion of an individual from regular standard of living of the society he belongs to due to lack of monetary and non-monetary resources (Townsend 1979). It is not simply the collective lack of material possessions such as housing, durables and the capacity to afford basic requirements of life like health care, hygiene, employment, education and social participation are the other dimensions of the social exclusion phenomenon. (Berthoud & Bryan 2011, p. 137) have rightly pointed out that calibrating an income poverty line on the basis of material deprivation is relatively less problematic. However, a strong set of assumptions covering the whole range of a variety of consumptions is made a precondition to arrive at the actual measure of poverty. The prerequisite is essential to ensure an adequate measure of societal income standards for material deprivation criteria. This is what Hick (2012) demands when he advocates for consideration of a wider range of dimensions in this regard. It is obvious that contemporary debate is moving towards an analysis of poverty as a multi-dimensional phenomenon (Nolan & Whelan 2011).

Nolan and Whelan’s (1996) reformulation of Townsend’s definition of poverty is of interest here. By redefining poverty as “exclusion from the life of the society owing to a lack of resources” (pp. 2,115), they seem to imply that the poor are to be identified by using a dual consumption/deprivation and an income criterion. “. . . exclusion is to be measured directly, together with an income criterion to exclude those who have a low standard of living for reasons other than low income” (Nolan & Whelan 1996, p. 115-116). Perry (2002) and others reframed the definition to characterize the poor as not having adequate resources to lead a minimum acceptable life in the country in question, i.e., lacking the necessities which society regards as essential. The material deprivation indicators referring to both the lack of resources and social exclusion, when understood at a deeper level, takes account of both the conceptual and the empirical aspects of poverty. However, most studies have argued that populations identified as income poor or materially deprived do not perfectly overlap (Perry 2002, Bradshaw & Finch 2003). Differing
degrees of poverty shown by different measures make the overlap problematic needing further research to analyze the factors underlying the relationship between them.

French writer Rene Lenoir (Les exclus 1974) used the concept ‘social exclusion’ for the first time. Considered to be the real European innovation, many European organizations and social scientists have developed social political bench marks to track progress against exclusion (Silver & Miller, 2003, p.3). In due course of time, it has extended its reach and is being increasingly used in Latin America, Asia and Africa and forms part of the programs of such world organizations as the ILO, United Nations, UNESCO, World Bank, and European Union. It is, therefore, understandable that diverse shades of meaning and connotations are attached to the concept “social exclusion” in different cultural settings and policy frameworks. Hence, there is diversity in ‘social exclusion talk’ and policy debates across industrialized countries and developing countries (du Toit 2004). For example, exclusion of minority groups from mainstream of society is to be perceived differently where poverty is the mainstream denying rights of citizenship to the majority of the people. In the developed countries, on the other hand, it touches the domains of social welfare and social justice. As pointed out by Room (1997): “The conceptual terrain on which European poverty studies are now operating has changed significantly in recent years, and it is now becoming more connected with wider discussions of social welfare in Europe.” (p. 8).

Shaffer (2008) looks at the social exclusion approach as a shift in the poverty debate from the physiological to the social (p. 196). He explains his contention further: “The social exclusion approach connects closely with issues of citizenship and social integration and their associated resource requirements.” (p. 197). Social exclusion results from violation of the demands of social justice in two ways: (i) it conflicts with equality of opportunity and (ii) the inability to participate effectively in the political and social life. In this way, social solidarity is also undermined. Hickey & du Toit (2007) have aptly remarked that the idea of social exclusion “can help contextualize poverty in social systems and structures. The social exclusion approach insists that poverty should
be understood as a social phenomenon.” (p.2). The focus on social reality and social analysis brings in the domain of culture and political economy. Politics is another dimension touched by the social exclusion phenomenon. Political aspects of exclusion include the denial of political rights such as political participation, freedom of expression, equality of opportunity, etc.

**Poverty as Capability Deprivation:**

In *Development as Freedom* in his chapter “Poverty as Capability Deprivation” Sen (1999) refuses to narrow poverty to a combination of welfare measures and threshold poverty lines alone. “Poverty can be sensibly identified in terms of capability deprivation; the approach concentrates on deprivations that are intrinsically important.”(p. 87). Shifting the emphasis away from means towards ends, he asserts that: “What the capability perspective does in poverty analysis is to enhance the understanding of the nature and causes of poverty and deprivation by shifting primary attention away from *means* (and one particular means that is usually given exclusive attention, viz., income) to *ends* that people have reason to pursue, and, correspondingly, to the freedoms to be able to satisfy these ends“(p. 90). Individually, we are “inescapably qualified and constrained by the social, political and economic opportunities that are available to us.” (pp. xi-xii). So, the focus has to be on what people can or cannot do as opposed to what they have. . Poverty severely constrains one’s ability to exercise one’s capabilities. In his later writings also, Sen (2009) remains convinced that we should shift our focus from ‘the means of living’, such as income, to the ‘actual opportunities a person has’, namely their functioning’s and capabilities (p. 253). Drawing a clear distinction between the actual opportunities, or capabilities, a person has, and his income, he terms the former to be intrinsically important, the latter being merely a means to such opportunities, having only an instrumental and a contingent status (Sen, 2009: p. 233)

In the literature produced during last twenty years or so, the novel capability approach adumbrated by Sen has emerged as the leading alternative to the ongoing poverty debate. Stressing the suitability of wellbeing as a general concept, he rejects utilitarianism based on economic
welfareism and Rawls’ primary goods as well as utility, liberty and commodities. The idea of wellbeing or how well a life is going encompasses the idea of what people are actually able to be and do. Functionings or ‘states of being or doing’ are not the same as the commodities employed to achieve them. Capabilities are valuable functionings that one has the freedom to access and choose. The global-local mix inherent in Sen’s evaluation criteria of the capability approach makes it highly suitable for application across political, economic, and cultural boundaries.

Sen’s interdisciplinary and humanist formulation of capabilities approach has led to the emergence of human development paradigm giving man centered poverty reduction agenda a global focus. The impact is very much reflected in the annual Human Development Reports showing a new development perspective by increasing human freedom and measuring poverty “not by the yardstick of income alone but by a more comprehensive index… the human development index-reflecting life expectancy, literacy, command over the resources to enjoy a decent standard of living…for capturing the many dimensions of human choices” (UNDP 1990). As pointed out by Alkire (2005), it gives a “considerable reach and depth” to the new understanding of poverty. (p. 125). “Poverty as Capability Deprivation” also became coherent theoretical formulation to be incorporated in UNDP policy so as to enhance contextual understandings of poverty from the main perspective of freedom (Gasper 2002; UNDP 2011).

Within the academic community too, Sen’s capability approach has attracted a lot of attention of philosophers seeking to redress vagueness and under-elaboration in his theoretical formulations. Alkire’s Participatory Approach to Evaluating Capability Expansion, Anderson’s Justice as Equal Capability of Democratic Citizenship and Alexander’s Capability as Freedom from Domination are some of the significant attempts to elaborate and add to some of the important dimensions of Sen’s capability approach. However, the most well-known and influential of such attempts had been the one made by the feminist philosopher, Martha Nussbaum. As against Sen’s emphasis on freedom, her account is motivated by a concept of human dignity with the minimum requirements of justice.
threshold so that everyone must be entitled to each capability at least to this degree by their
governments and relevant international institutions. While agreeing generally with Sen’s
arguments for capability approach, she asserts that “they do not take us very far in thinking about
social justice.” (Nussbaum 2003). She explains: “They give us a general sense of what societies
ought to be striving to achieve, but because of Sen’s reluctance to make commitments about
substance (which capabilities a society ought most centrally to pursue), even that guidance remains
but an outline. And they give us no sense of what a minimum level of capability for a just society
might be. The use of capabilities in development is typically comparative merely, as in the Human
Development Reports of the UNDP. Thus, nations are compared in areas such as health and
educational attainment. But concerning what level of health service, or what level of educational
provision, a just society would deliver as a fundamental entitlement of all its citizens; the view is
suggestive, but basically silent.” (p. 35).

Nussbaum is of the firm belief that in order to operationalize the capability approach we need to
formulate “a definite list of the most central capabilities . . . a set of basic entitlements without
which no society can lay claim to justice.” (p. 36). These entitlements have been listed in an earlier
work by Nussbaum (1999, 2000) as bodily health; bodily integrity; senses, imagination and
thought; emotions; practical reason; affiliation; other species; play; and control over one’s
environment. While Sen advocates the capability approaches as a tool to evaluate how people are
doing, he suggests that the list along with the precisely located threshold should be debated and
incorporated into national constitutional guarantees, international human rights legislation and
international development policy.

Before taking such a consequential decision, one must address the inherent vagueness in the
definitions of the entitlements so that they can be clearly specified for particular political societies
for their unique circumstances. For Sen, the capability approach as such was (deliberately) too
underspecified to endorse just one single list. But, Nussbaum’s position also suffers from a number
of weaknesses. There is always the risk of some bias creeping into the selection of particular
capabilities or entitlements. When capability approach is incorporated into policy at the national
and international levels (as Nussbaum seems to demand), value of capability will be decided by the
people who will ultimately be affected by the policies. Thus, to be successfully operational, the
capability approach will have to be grounded in relevant social and political theories. Even if
Nussbaum’s list of entitlements is taken to be highly abstract, general and universal in nature, her
list is sensitive to culture and context, it will have to be translated into more specific lists according
to the demands of the contexts. One must, however, give credit to Nussbaum for making a clear
distinction between the justification and implementation aspects of his theory, conceding the latter
as subject to democratic deliberation and decision by those concerned (Nussbaum 2004).

Nussbaum (2003) has been quite categorical in claiming that “both Sen and I connect the
capabilities approach closely to the idea of human rights.” (p. 36). Sen (2005) is, however, of the
view that: “The concepts of human rights and human capabilities have something of a common
motivation, but they differ in many distinct ways (p.151) and concludes that “human rights and
capabilities — go well with each other, so long as we do not try to subsume either entirely within
the other. (p.163). Sen’s reluctance to identify capabilities essentially required for a just society,
however, is for Nussbaum a hurdle in taking a clear stance on social justice. Drawing a parallel
between the debate on capabilities and the human rights discourse both as political and civil
liberties as well as economic and social rights, Nussbaum (2003) very succinctly gives her reasons
for preferring the idea of capabilities over that of rights: “Capabilities, I would argue are very
closely linked to rights, but the language of capabilities gives important precision and
supplementation to the language of rights. The idea of human rights is by no means a crystal clear
idea. Rights have been understood in many different ways, and difficult theoretical questions are
frequently obscured by the use of rights language, which can give the illusion of agreement where
there is deep philosophical disagreement. People differ about what the basis of a rights claim is. . .
They differ, too, about whether rights are pre political or artifacts of laws and institutions. They
differ about whether rights belong only to individual persons, or also to groups. They differ about whether rights are to be regarded as side-constraints on goal-promoting action, or rather as one part of the social goal that is being promoted. They differ, again, about the relationship between rights and duties.” (p. 37).

Sen (2005) seems to have banked upon a similar line of argument when he asserted that “despite the tremendous appeal of the idea of human rights, it is also seen by many as being intellectually frail — lacking in foundation and perhaps even in coherence and cogency.” (p. 151). However, while enumerating the advantages of capabilities language, a Nussbaum (2003) makes an even more consequential claim that “it is not strongly linked to one particular cultural and historical tradition, as the language of rights is believed to be.” (p. 39).

**Pogge on Global Poverty and Human Rights Violation:**

Literature on poverty takes a different turn with the impact created by Pogge on the poverty scene. There is no doubt about the fact that poverty is one of the greatest hurdles in fulfillment of human rights in the world. In this perspective, poverty implies the absence of an individual’s right to a basic set of capabilities like good food and health as well as participation in social, cultural and political life of the community. In a state of poverty these basic human rights remain unrealized. In spite of tremendous progress in economic and technological spheres in recent years and enormous affluence in the enlightened West, rapidly increasing number of people in the Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, East Asia and Pacific and in Latin America and the Caribbean continue to suffer from extreme poverty. The impact Pogge made on current literature on poverty was to create general acceptance that the globally rich have an obligation to the world’s poor. Such an obligation, in the normative sense, is more strictly applied when it relates to harming others than benefitting those who have not been harmed by us. The critical question that emerges in this context is: “Are the affluent of the world, individually or collectively, instrumental in harming the global poor by causing them poverty?” An ethically less significant question is about the distinction between
harming and failing/refusing to help those who suffer from extreme poverty or who are worse off than us. In the backdrop of theories of distributive justice adumbrated by John Rawls and Robert Nozick, Thomas Pogge incisively queries the dilemmatic situation: “How can severe poverty of half of humankind continue despite enormous economic and technological progress and despite the enlightened moral norms and values of our heavily dominated Western Civilization? Why do we, the citizens of the affluent Western states not find it morally troubling, at least, that a world heavily dominated by us and our values gives such very deficient and inferior starting positions and opportunities to so many people?” (2003, p. 3).

Pogge has consistently held the view that global poverty is to be understood in the context of human rights violation by the rich countries of the world. (Pogge, 2002, 2005a, 2005b & 2007). He dilates upon it further and asserts that “by shaping and enforcing the social conditions that foreseeably and avoidably cause the monumental suffering of global poverty, we are harming the global poor – or to put it more descriptively, we are active participants in the largest, though not the gravest, crime against humanity ever committed.” (Pogge 2005a, p. 33).

The crux of Pogge’s argument lies in his assertion that we must shun the tendency to think about global poverty in terms of helping the poor and concentrate more on how the affluent and their governments impose a global order that causes extreme poverty. His thesis, therefore, does not aim at justifying general obligation to the poor of the world either in the meaning contained in egalitarian distributive justice nor in terms of Peter Singer’s consequentialism as reflected in his “Famine, Affluence and Morality.” (1972). Pogge has rejected the rather controversial moral bindingness of positive duties to eradicate poverty in favour of negative duties not to harm and cause severe life-threatening poverty because the latter is moderate, less demanding and widely shared conception of justice. The positive duties of helping the global poor, for him, are contingent upon the negative duties not to cause global poverty by directly contributing to the injustices the poor are being subjected to. Thus, the negative duty is defined by Pogge as a duty to ensure that
others are not unduly harmed through one’s conduct and distinguishes it from the positive duty to benefit the poor and save them from harm.

The negative duties argument brings together in Pogge’s thesis his ideas regarding world institutional order, human rights violations and global justice. For him, the enforcement of harmful institutional rules violates human rights and serves to perpetuate injustice and extreme poverty. In this regard, he makes a statement that tries to link causally the global institutional order with the massive poverty in the world: “Dominant Western countries are designing and upholding global institutional arrangements, geared to their domestic elites that foreseeably and avoidably produce massive deprivations in most of the much poorer regions of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.” (Pogge 2002, p. 23).

While taking note of the human rights deficit as a result of the ruling global order, the harm it has done is defined in a rather restrictive manner: “First, we are harming the global poor only if our conduct sets back their most basic interests – the standard of social justice I employ is sensitive only to human rights deficits. Second, I am focusing on human rights deficits that are causally traceable to social institution”. (Pogge 2002, p. 26.)

This provides Pogge the ground to emphasize our responsibility to promote institutional reform and to formulate his idea of a minimally just alternative global order. These remedial duties in Pogge’s institutional framework can incorporate this minimalist constraint of human rights, not to harm without disqualifying social and economic human rights: “Given the minimalist constraint, such human rights give you claims not against all other human beings, but specifically against those who impose a coercive institutional order upon you. Such a coercive order must not avoidably restrict the freedom of some so as to render their access to basic necessities insecure – especially through official denial or deprivation. If it does, then all human agents have a negative duty correlative to the postulated social and economic human rights, not to cooperate in upholding it unless they compensate for their co-operation by protecting its victims or by working for its reforms. Those
violating this duty share responsibility for the harms (insecure access to basic necessities) produced by the unjust institutional order in question.” (Pogge 2002, p. 73).

An important outcome of Pogge’s view is that collective responsibility of the policies of the developed world for violating negative duties makes every citizen responsible to compensate for the harm caused. The causal relation between the global institutions and poverty in the world imply a proportion between the harm caused and the extent of duty to the global poor. In continuation of this stand, he formulates he minimalist normative position by assuming that human rights and justice involve only “specific minimal constraints - more minimal in the case of human rights - on what harms persons may inflict upon others” (2002a: 13).

Pogge’s position invites a few cogent objections which the present study with take up in detail. A number of research studies deeply critical of Pogge’s “Leap from State to Individual Responsibility” have appeared in recent years. (Steinhoff 2012 & Montero 2010). Quite a few objections to his concept of collective responsibility appear to be quite valid. One major criticism of Pogge’s position centers on his failure to distinguish between harm caused by the global institutions and the harm caused by other aspects of international politics and the domestic policies of particular states. There is merit in Reitberger’s (2008) claim that Pogge’s one dimensional analysis fails to “distinguish between cases in which global institutions contribute to poverty and cases in which global institutions have no particular effect on poverty or possibly even reduce the incidence of poverty, but fail to eliminate it.” (p. 381). The world institutional order is a form of governance based on negotiated compromises with weak implementation mechanisms that may not be very effective in the face of authoritative decisions by tyrannical states. There may be powerful actors operating at the individual state levels to exploit and manipulate the world institutional order for purposes harmful to poverty amelioration. It is, indeed, also true that explaining a complex phenomenon on the basis of one or two factors is an oversimplification. The history of political thought, however, is witness to the fact that justice has always been a local concern within a state.
The rights debates which originated with the classical concept of justice and social contract also remained largely focused on the question of distribution of justice within a single society.

The gap in the existing in the current literature including the writings of Pogge is quite prominent when we look at the role of institutions at the state and the world level. Pogge was, indeed, well aware of the fact that much poverty results from state action, particularly by bad governance. He accepts the fact that “most severe poverty would be avoided . . . if the national government and elites of the poor countries were genuinely committed to good governance and poverty eradication.” (2007, p.460). Since he is pretty sure that the prevailing state of affairs in the poor countries is not likely to change for the better from within, he proclaims “that most severe poverty would be avoided despite the corrupt and oppressive regimes holding sway in so many poor countries, if the global institutional order were designed to achieve this purpose.” (2007, p. 46). He does not specify how he intends to neutralize the power of the vested interest in his new global world order and their potential to vitiate the new scheme proposed by Pogge. One needs to realize fully the depth and range of poverty causing factors locally operating in the form of networks of alternative institutional systems running parallel with the state government systems. With local institutions in an advanced state of decay in many developing countries, and without a just, responsible and representative leadership, how can Pogge hope for an easy passage and implementation of his international institutional reform initiative?
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Chapter Three

THE POVERTY DEBATE

Since the appearance of Rowntree’s classic work early in the 20th century (1901, 1918), the poverty debate has witnessed a progressive broadening of the concept from an exclusive concern for income and consumption to social exclusion. The social deprivation focus subsequently led to an emphasis on vulnerability and inequality. Peter Townsend’s relative deprivation idea underscores participatory inclusion in social activities as per a citizen’s resource requirement. Capability approach adds a new dimension to the debate by emphasizing freedom to achieve valued ‘functionings.” The realization that poverty is the negation of an entitlement led to Thomas Pogge’s well known expansive thesis that poverty is a human rights violation. With Pogge and Singer, the poverty debate has taken a decisive turn towards global poverty with the former characteristically laying the blame at the global institutional order and a collective responsibility for human rights violation. It also makes social justice an inseparable part of the poverty debate.

Income Consumption and Basic Human Needs:

Traditionally, poverty has been linked with income and economic resources. Using the income and consumption measures, the poverty criteria is anchored on the capacity of a person to consume. Thus, the physiological deprivation model conceives poverty as non-fulfilment of basic needs. Income Consumption approach is very succinctly explained by Lipton (1997):

‘A person is poor in any period if, and only if, her or his access to economic resources is insufficient … [to] acquire enough commodities to meet basic material needs adequately’. (Lipton 1997, 127).

The poverty line is widely used in developing countries either by dietary energy (calorie consumption) method or by estimating the cost of the food basket needed for minimum food energy
needs. Basic needs, were “interpreted in terms of minimum specified quantities of such things as food, clothing, shelter, water and sanitation that are necessary to prevent ill health, undernourishment and the like … (Streeten et. al. 1981, 25). Later, extended basic needs criteria also included health and education. The basic needs thesis differs from income/consumption model in so far as the latter visualizes a complete basket of goods and services, includes the idea of well-being other than income consumption and also establishes an adequacy level other than food energy criteria. The changing conception of poverty also meant a change in poverty eradication measures as these are formulated by an economic system and government policies. Both the national and the international development policy adopted the basic needs as their main objective endorsed by both the workers and the governments. Consumption oriented policies, however, have largely striven only to take the society above the poverty line aiming only at subsistence rather than fairness. However, there was a realization that interaction between poverty alleviation policies is important as for example since improvement in health meant a higher potential for earning income.

**Social Deprivation:**

The shift from physiological deprivation to social deprivation introduced in the poverty debate a number of new ideas: the UNDP focus on human poverty, the social exclusion as marginalization and the participatory approach (Chambers 1995). The shift of focus to social aspect of deprivation refused to accept the idea of well-being in terms of income consumption or acquisition of basic needs. Identifying individuals as social beings rather than repositories of utility only, it reflected the inadequacy of need based income consumption model to truly reflect the essence of deprivation because its non-physiological components often tends to preclude it. Social exclusion approach also tends to underscore the dynamism and multidimensionality of poverty as a concept. The Human Poverty Approach variation of the social deprivation model has been reflected in recent years in UNDP Reports 1996, 1997. It is largely based on the conceptual framework provided in Amartya Sen’s capabilities approach which will be taken up in greater detail in the following section.
against physical needs, the emphasis here is on leading “a long, healthy, creative life and to enjoy a
decent standard of living, freedom, dignity self-respect and the respect of others” (UNDP 1997, 15).

The credit for coining the term ‘social exclusion’ is given to René Lenoir who as Secrète d’Etat a
l’Action Sociale of the Government of France, spoke of the one-tenth of French population as
socially excluded: “mentally and physically handicapped, suicidal people, aged invalids, abused
children, substance abusers, delinquents, single parents, multi-problem households, marginal,
asocial persons, and other social ‘misfits’”.

My main concern however is not really centred on the expanding list of the “socially excluded”
(Silver 1995, 60). Indiscriminate listing of social deprivation cases does not indeed reflect the true
merit of the social exclusion approach. What is more important is that it relates poverty to matters
connected with standards of citizenship and norms of social integration. In line with Townsend’s
(1993, 36) articulation of relative deprivation, poverty here is explained in terms of ‘failure to
follow customary behaviour’ on account a lack of resources necessary for achieving minimum
standards of living by participating in activities considered to be a norm in a society.

Social exclusion is a multidimensional process of progressive social rupture, detaching groups and
individuals from social relations and institutions and preventing them from full participation in the
normal, normatively prescribed activities of the society in which they live.(Silver 2007)

What is more important, however, is the fact that the social exclusion approach clearly takes the
poverty debate beyond the economic and even the social aspects to a political level encompassing
the ideas of citizenship and political rights, the relation between the state and the individual as well
as individual and society. In this way, a link between poverty, employment and social integration is
established. It is true that social exclusion approach has all along been subject to multiple
interpretations. Social exclusion at the individual level is termed as marginalization when one is
excluded from a meaningful participation in a society. Such exclusion is exemplified in certain
societies as is the case with single mothers before the idea of welfare state took roots or in case of
women in Europe before the feminist movement or those with disabilities and lesbian-gay bisexual-transgender people even now. Similar exclusion may be experienced by communities, for example, black in America, the untouchables in India, the Aborigines in Australia and many other minorities living in various parts of the world.

How does the idea of social exclusion contribute to an analysis of the concept of poverty?

Faria (1995) points out how it can integrate “loosely connected notions such as poverty, deprivation, lack of access to goods, services and assets, precariousness of social rights, and of providing a general framework” (127). Yepez (1994) emphasized how social exclusion literature in Europe underscores "(i) the stress placed on employment . . . as a central element of social exclusion; and (ii) the importance placed on the spatial dimension, as the locus of both social differentiation and the articulation between different social actors." She considers social exclusion as a concept that “aims less to identify the contours of empirically observed reality than to highlight the relationships between processes, between micro and macro mechanisms, between individual and collective dimensions" (Yepez 1994, p. 15). In the context of policy analysis, social exclusion when it looks at poverty as relative deprivation, it provides gainful insights for a poverty debate. Such a definition of poverty need not remain confined to European societies and appear quite relevant at the global level as well. Furthermore, social exclusion approach has a substantial role to play in the development focused poverty alleviation debate as it fundamentally deals with the incomplete citizenship of the socially excluded. Even more important for our present study is the importance it assigns to social institutions as the primary concern for development policy analysis.

While both Rawls’s welfare oriented view of social disadvantage and Sen’s capabilities approach remain fundamentally individualistic, the right to membership of a society emerges as basic to social exclusion approach. Obviously, social justice assumes the presence of a society where rights are exercised, resources are shared and social inclusion is recognized. Social exclusion, therefore, becomes a greater claimant to social justice as it focuses both the distributive and relational aspects
of social justice. In the global justice perspective, it demands a re-conceptualization of what is meant by the term ‘social disadvantage.’

**Capabilities Approach to Poverty:**

In the development discourse, Amartya Sen’s is a shift from consumption to capabilities. In his book Development and Freedom (1999), he emphasizes capability deprivation as intrinsically important. Shifting away from income as a means to end poverty, he talks about the need and freedom to achieve those ends. In a socially, economically and politically determined world of available opportunities, our capabilities are severely constrained by poverty. As an alternative to the existing poverty debate, the end that Sen visualizes is the idea of what people are actually able to be and do; the valuable functioning is the freedom to access and choose where the well-being lies rather than in accessing commodities as means.

Sen’s humanist formulation of capabilities approach betraying a global – local mix quickly found favour for application across cultural, economic and political frontiers. The global focus of his poverty alleviation agenda provided a new focus to the Human Development Reports which banked heavily on the conceptual framework furnished by Amartya Sen. The 1997 UNDP report specifically lays down the capabilities as to ‘lead a long, healthy, creative life and to enjoy a decent standard of living, freedom, dignity, self-respect and the respect of others’ (UNDP 1997, 15). It goes on to state that: It is in the deprivation of the lives that people can lead that poverty manifests itself. Poverty can involve not only the lack of the necessities of material wellbeing, but the denial of opportunities for living a tolerable life. Life can be prematurely shortened. It can be made difficult, painful or hazardous … deprived of knowledge and communication … robbed of dignity, confidence and self-respect… All are aspects of poverty that limit and blight the lives of many millions in the world today (UNDP 1997, 15)

Such an external valuation of good life clearly deviates from the liberalist thesis exemplified in Rawls’s political conception of justice and his utilitarianism based on economic welfarism. Sen’s
individualistic rendering of the capabilities approach has also been subjected to criticism. To me, however, one major weak point in formulation is the lack of a consolidated list of capabilities that has made it difficult to devise a thoroughly worked out theory of justice. It is true that Sen deliberately refused to specify a list of capabilities. Nevertheless, the theoretical structure of his capability approach is marred by a certain amount of under-elaboration and vagueness and a deliberate lack of specification. Some of the academicians like Alkire (2005), John Alexander (2008) and Anderson (1999) have tried to make up for the deficiency in Sen’s capability approach. However, Martha Nussbaum’s attempt remains the most systematic, extensive and influential to date.

Sen’s refusal to list capabilities is considered by Nussbaum to be a hurdle in formulating a clear stand on social justice. She furnishes a list of ten fundamental capabilities and a threshold. (Nussbaum 2011). But this clearly specified list of entitlements will have first to be incorporated into the policy so that their value may be determined by the people who are affected by such policies. However, the relevance of culture and context might as well demand further specification of Nussbaum’s list. Sen and Nussbaum seem to be kindred spirits in so far as they treat the capabilities approach as an alternative framework for well-being and justice where functionings rather than means become important. Sen, however, also distinguished between agency goals and well-being thus narrowing down the latter concept to one of standard of living. While Sen’s work lies closer to quantitative empirical application based on economic reasoning, Nussbaum’s argument stems more from an angle of political philosophy recommending incorporation of capabilities in all constitutions. Notwithstanding the differences found in their respective treatment of capabilities, the capabilities approach has vastly influenced human development theories and indices.

International organizations including the United Nations have been using key development indicators based on capabilities theoretical perspective such as Gender related Development Index,
Gender Empowerment Measure and Gender Inequality Measure. The well-known Human Development Index jointly created by Sen and Dr. Mahbub-ul-Haq rivalled the traditional measures of GDP and GNP and highlighted inequality, poverty and other capability deprivations in spite of high levels of GDP growth.

Primarily an ethical value theory, the capability approach also has political implications that impinge upon working of institutions as well as policy options. Though Sen rules out any substantial role for it in the social justice debate, relation between rights and capabilities have been the subject of much scholarly discussion (Gorman 2003 & Griffin 2008). While noting the role played by rights in the contemporary political discourse, Nussbaum has pointed out a certain conceptual ambiguity the language of rights though finds a reasonable scope of reinforcement between capabilities approach and rights thesis. It is quite obvious that choosing certain levels of functioning freely can serve as an important addition to a theory of justice. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) advocates global justice in the wake of rights securing our capabilities to function. With capabilities approach emphasizing freedom and well being, a theory of justice incorporates politically significant moral entitlements. I do not mean to take away the central role played by rights in conceptualizing justice. Moreover, it is rather vague how capabilities approach can contribute to generating political principles relevant to problems of global justice and ongoing research may be useful to explore its role further.

**Global Poverty and Human Rights:**

As the poverty debate moves beyond income consumption and basic human needs, the conceptual spectrum of the concept broadens to include a wide variety of economic, social, cultural and political aspects of the phenomenon. Even more than deprivation of material and economic resources, poverty implies lack of access to adequate housing, clean drinking water, health facilities, sanitation, education, and a myriad of social and political entitlements without which the contemporary human being cannot enjoy a dignified living. The fundamental change in the poverty
debate also saw a change in the approach to and nature of poverty alleviation strategies. The language of rights that emerged in the wake of The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and two Covenants came up with a broader conceptualization of poverty seen as a denial of an entitlement, as an unfulfilled right. It gives a more comprehensive representation to the multidimensionality of the concept by including beside monetary resources, social choices, capabilities, political participation and security needs required for an adequate standard of living. It was a step forward, as against social deprivation and capability deprivation because replacing needs and preferences by rights implied a preferred claim as well as a duty that needs to be fulfilled. Consequently, the tools and initiatives devised for eradicating poverty as human rights violation also changed.

When Pogge (2010) came up with the claim about global obligation for poverty alleviation, he argued for collective responsibility for human rights violations. Identifying global poverty as a consequence of an unjust global institutional order, he lays the blame on the latter for perpetuating foreseeable, predictable and avoidable human rights deficits. Since the global institutional order is dominated by the rich countries of the world, he makes the affluent of the world individually and collectively responsible for the harm done to the global poor. Pogge view is readily accepted by the global poor who already believe that global institutions like the International Monetary Fund, The World Bank and other international organizations have been instrumental in generating poverty in the poor countries of the world. Widespread poverty at the global level implies that social relations as they exist are radically unjust and some remedial measures are indeed called for. Resources and opportunities are unjustly distributed and the demand for application of social justice is substantially justified.

The harmful ramifications of the international institutional framework are further vitiated by the weak bargaining position that the poorer states wield at the global prevent them from negotiating favourable terms at the world economic forums dominated by powerful countries.
Pogge’s use of the terms ‘responsibility’ and violation’ suffer from a certain amount of confusion and I will try to clarify these in Chapter IV on Thomas Pogge: Poverty and Human Rights Violation. However, by emphasizing the international perspective of poverty as human rights violation, Pogge effectively globalized the poverty debate in the contemporary era. By consistently and persistently describing global poverty in terms of human rights violation by world’s rich countries he squarely lays the blame for harming the global poor on the rich and powerful nations of the world. In the contemporary debate on global poverty as human rights violation, Pogge’s theory characteristically identifies “severe poverty as a violation of negative duties”.

Refusing to correlate his position with the possibility of basic positive duties, he brackets his minimalist thesis with negative duties alone on the grounds that treating positive duties as duties of assistance is an implausible thesis.

If citizens in the affluent countries were minimally decent and humane, they would respond to these appeals, and would do their bit to eradicate world poverty. If they did this, my argument would be of much less interest and importance. (2005a, 35)

By negating the positive duty to help the disadvantaged he wanted to emphasize the role global institutional order in causing extreme poverty. In this way he tries to circumvent the obligation of the rich to the global poor as contained in the egalitarian view of global justice or one found in Peter Singer’s consequentialism. (1972)

Pogge’s one dimensional account of global poverty has come under severe criticism in a number of recent research studies (Steinhoff 2012, Montero 2010). ‘Pogge’s Leap from State to Individual Responsibility’ as well as his minimalist thesis has been critically analysed in the later chapters. Reforming the existing global institutional order, laying down an institutional understanding of negative duties, and interactional duty not to harm the poor of the world are sufficiently extensive tasks to deserve a minimalist treatment. He was well aware of the role of the state level institutions in perpetuating poverty when he claimed that “most severe poverty would be avoided . . . if the
national government and elites of the poor countries were genuinely committed to good governance and poverty eradication.” (2007, p.460) Why did he exclusively emphasize global institutional order is indeed surprising (2007, 240). Furthermore, the debate about rights has originated with and remained a state concern for distributive justice within a single society.

Defining Poverty in the 21st Century:

Over a period of time, the global perception of poverty has undergone a definite change. Instead of treating it as a ‘human condition’ it is being conceived as a problem that can be dispensed with. With the material conditions being made available the discourse on eradicating poverty is being linked with human development. The United Nations Development Program’s Human Development Index has focused on longevity, literacy and living standards as human deprivation indicators. Though the report’s bias towards egalitarianism, exclusivity of Western model of development and the arbitrary weightage assigned to each indicator, invites criticism, it marks a definite shift in poverty debate. Acclaimed as “better and more comprehensive measure of socio-economic welfare than GDP” (Crafts 1996, 1), and coupled with the recent World Bank Reports (2000, 2001), we have both a broadening of the definition of poverty as well as change in poverty reduction strategies.

The new thinking on poverty goes beyond the earlier emphasis on vulnerability, inequality and human rights to the more recent concern for Opportunity, Empowerment and Security.

Moving beyond the financial well being of people, the poverty rhetoric talked more about the accountability and responsiveness of state institutions. Highlighting the role of the state in ensuring poor people’s participation in the political process and decision making it argues for eliminating all racial, ethnic and gender distinctions that are instrumental in creating social barriers. Facilitating security meant reducing poor people's vulnerability to ill health, economic shocks, policy-induced dislocations, natural disasters, and violence, as well as helping them cope with adverse shocks (World Development Report 2000). Poverty is now apt to be defined in terms of vulnerability, risk,
powerlessness and lack of voice. The language of opportunity, empowerment and security has increased in currency during last couple of decades and has brought about a significant change in the poverty rhetoric. How poverty is defined and measured ultimately determines what policies and strategies are to be designed and implemented for poverty reduction. Since a broader definition means a deeper understanding of poverty, a greater number and variety of policies and strategies are naturally forthcoming to fight the menace of poverty. For example, when we move beyond basic income to education or empowerment, we need to introduce a new set of policy instruments. Even more important is to realize how different aspects of poverty interact. For example increasing education may very well lead to better health prospects and improving health may improve productivity and potential for earning more income.

How we define poverty is critical to political, policy and academic debates about the concept. It is bound up with explanations and has implications for solutions. Value judgments are involved. Definition, thus, has to be understood as a political as well as a social scientific act and as such has often been the source of controversy. There is no single ‘correct’ definition. However, as we shall see, most researchers now accept that any definition has to be understood, at least in part, in relation to particular social, cultural and historical contexts. Look at the institutionalization of poverty within social and political norms and systems, its legitimization within political discourse and by the political elite, and the failure of the poorest of the poor to gain political representation. The different ways in which extreme forms of poverty and the extremely poor are represented on political bodies contributes significantly to understanding the dynamics of poverty reduction as well as poverty reproduction.

Defining poverty is important, because from these definitions follow the policies, mechanisms and actions to help the poor. During the last 100 years or so, the research on poverty has touched upon a wide range of subjects including absolute and relative poverty, income thresholds, income inequality and deprivation, social exclusion, capability deprivation and the role institutional world
order as a cause of severe poverty and violation of human rights. By its very spread, the poverty debate reflects the wide range of dimensions and variety of subject areas one needs to cover in order to arrive at a comprehensive definition of poverty. Income and basic needs criteria, social exclusion, capabilities deprivation, human rights violation and the institutional approach to poverty eradication are the salient features of how poverty has been understood as a concept and what measures are considered essential for its amelioration. The moral, the social and political contexts of the phenomenon has made it imperative to discuss with reference to human rights, social justice and global transnational institutions.

Over the years the issue of poverty has grown in complexity and consequently it is becoming more and more difficult to find appropriate solutions. It is no longer a straightforward condition of lack of resources, low income and destitution. There are no easy to identify parameters readymade to measure poverty of a group or a community. Poverty is now embedded in a thick description of diverse social, historical and political phenomena which culminates in what may be called a culture of poverty. The questions now being asked involve: who are the poor, why are they poor, why the poor lack the will to work, should they be treated merely as passive recipients of aid, what should be a proper response to the perennial problem of poverty. A multi-disciplinary, close appraisal of the phenomenon of poverty gives an insight into a multi-variate origin and growth of poverty across the globe. The experience of being poor has grown out a multiplicity of possible lacks and shortcomings ---- material, moral, social and metaphorical---defined against what constitutes prosperity and success. Poverty is produced through processes of social differentiation and shaped by the politics of wealth and power, both globally and locally. In other words, while the end results of poverty-producing processes are scarcity, suffering and social exclusion - poverty is formed within cultural frameworks and has to be examined in its proper social and historical context.

A comprehensive definition of poverty cannot ignore the economic, the social and the human rights aspects of the concept. When we intend to grapple with the issue of poverty eradication, the issue
needs to be placed in its true historical, political and social context. The globalism that has emerged in the early 21st century demands reliable answers to the following critical questions:

- How do the relationships between the world institutions, state and civil society relate to poverty and prosperity in different settings?
- What are the constraints and alternatives for reducing poverty?
- How has our knowledge about poverty changed over time, and how have these different perceptions influenced policy?

It will need an in-depth critical analysis to investigate the specific ways in which global poverty has developed and how is it represented on the social plane. The role of state agencies, the NGOs, the other transactional agencies and international institutions along with their poverty reduction strategies and agendas will have to be evaluated within the context of poverty reduction. The diverse and dissimilar poverty producing structures in countries like, for example, Guatemala, Uganda and Pakistan can only be understood when we study their peculiar relationships between the elite classes and the poor, their cultural constructs, and how they relate conventions with modernity.

A new dimension in defining poverty needs to be focused. What poverty is taken to mean fundamentally depends on who asks the question, how it is comprehended, and who responds to it. Most of the poverty debate is spearheaded by the non-poor, the empowered and the socially included. It is imperative to see what the poor, the deprived and the dis-empowered themselves say about their poverty, how they perceive their exclusion from society and how they feel about the affluent. It is high time that their perception of reality is allowed to be counted and become an important segment of the poverty debate.
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Chapter Four

POVERTY, POLITICS AND GLOBAL JUSTICE

This chapter argues that poverty is essentially a political issue and access to justice by eradicating injustices is largely an institutional matter both at the state and the global levels. Individual deprivation of resources and other disadvantages is inextricably linked to the extent to which he or she has access to justice at social, economic and political levels. Poverty perpetuates social injustice as it promotes inequality, maldistribution, exclusion, disempowerment, vulnerability and exploitation, and it hampers an individual’s ability to pursue social justice. This vicious cycle can only be broken if social and political institutions are geared towards eradicating poverty.

The last couple of decades have seen the concept of poverty acquiring its rightful place in state politics and among global institutions. Matters related to fairness and equity are now perceived as closely linked to welfare oriented state policies. Thus, egalitarianism promoting social justice is now perceived as playing a critical role in institutionalizing politics of poverty. State stability and political legitimacy in a democratic dispensation emanate from a realization that pro-poor policies enhance popularity which, in turn, encourages the political elite to focus pro-poor political institutions, thus giving more voice and empowerment to the deprived segments of society. Institutional political action, in this regard, is facilitated greatly by the political process, democratic political parties and civil society groups. In this way, politics of poverty is intertwined with welfare oriented policies of a democratic state with a clear tilt towards social justice.

Poverty is a multidimensional problem and its diversity and complexity has been understood in different ways at different times. Spicker (2007) assigned as many as twelve clusters of meaning to the concept. In recent years, 1$ or 2$ a day measure of poverty has given way to more inclusive formulation encompassing such diverse elements as deprivation, insecurity, vulnerability, lack of welfare, social exclusion, disempowerment, lack of participation, etc. treating poverty in holistic
terms with a dynamic focus on social deprivation such as self-esteem, respect, power and vulnerability. The new stance has brought into bold relief the relevance of subjective experiences of poverty and the processes that generate such experiences. The new focus has overshadowed the old and exclusive concern for poverty conceived in material and objective terms. The new framework encompassing the subjective aspect and the dynamic nature of the concept of poverty brings into play ethnographic and qualitative approaches and methods with a simultaneous diminishing of focus on an exclusively quantitative approach.

**Political Dimensions of Poverty:**

It is difficult to define poverty without referring to attending political ramifications relevant not only for developmental policies but for academic debate as well. When I conceptualize poverty, it depends upon how the issue is framed. Framing involves dispositional factors, and the role of contextual and circumstantial forces. Since ensuing explanations are reflective of a priori assumptions likely to be made by the one who undertakes the task, there are important consequences for the formulation of such definitions as well as for solutions in the practical field. The definition of poverty, therefore, has to be construed as a political cum social scientific construct and is often likely to become the subject of controversy. The fact that political biases are likely to colour relevant research in the field, led O’Connor (2001) to remark:

“It is this disparity of status and interest that make poverty research an inescapably political act: it is an exercise of power, in this case of an educated elite to categorize, stigmatize, but above all to neutralize the poor and disadvantaged through analysis that obscures the political nature of social and economic inequality.” (p. 12). My contention is supported by Bradshaw (2006) who amplified the issue by indicating that both the definition and the choice of theory of poverty have been overwhelmingly influenced by respective political agendas. He claims that: “Powerful interests manage how poverty is discussed and what is being done about it.” (p. 5)
It can be safely inferred from the above that poverty as a critical issue in the contemporary world demonstrates a distinctly political dimension. The institutionalization of poverty reflects inherent political norms and systems, a dominating political discourse and a need of political representation and empowerment of the poor. The above conclusion is further supported by Hickey & Bracking (2005) who point out the ways in which various forms of poverty and the poor are politically “represented” has contributed substantially to modes of understanding how reduction and reproduction of poverty hinges upon political decisions. Although Hickey & Bracking (2005) advocate relocation of poverty reduction in the broader political context of justice, I think the overall focus remains on how politics affects poverty dynamics.

Our analysis and reconstruction of the idea of poverty here needs to be focused on how it is impacted by politics. Let us, therefore, identify what role the political process plays in poverty alleviation or otherwise in a society. There has, indeed, been a lot of interest shown in how the phenomenon of poverty has been influenced by political processes like distribution of power, the role of government vis-a-vis different groups operating in a society, the role of institutions in conflict resolution among competing interests, etc. Since poverty has become the central issue of world politics, it is but natural to expect it to become part of a political theory. It is all the more called for in view of the resurgence that political philosophy has witnessed during last fifty years or so.

A plethora of political theories have already become subject of scholarly interest in the discipline of political science. To name a few, these include normative theory, institutional approaches, Marxist theory, critical theory, discourse theory, feminist perspective, rational choice theory, behavioral analysis, qualitative analysis, comparative approaches, etc. (Marsh & Stoker 1995). While most of the political theorists take economic perspective into account, the discourse remains largely oblivious of the direct relation that holds between politics and poverty. It is of critical concern for the contemporary political philosophy, particularly in view of its inextricable link with the problem
of social justice that political philosophy focuses on a theoretical account of poverty. There is, indeed, a possibility to draw new conclusions if empirical inquiry into demographics of the poor is carefully carried out. (Shapiro 2007)

While political theorists have tended to avoid the main issue, political importance of poverty has continued to increase. Poverty has, now, become an important dimension in global politics and theorists should have elevated it to the philosophical level. Hence, a shift in formulation of political theory is very much called for. Since the political theorists and the social scientists share many of their research concerns and inquiry tools (hypothesis, literature review, case studies, etc.) and since the latter have a substantial focus on the culture of poverty and ethnicity of the poor (Pritchard 1993, p. 42), one might well look up to them for the sources of an adequate theory of poverty.

A deeper and a more comprehensive account of poverty can be constructed if we look beyond personalities and politics of the temporary issues and address what is fundamental and universal. It is more like what Plato, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and Marx did in the social science domain. They have seriously focused on “causes, effects, and solutions to the problem of poverty and how their treatment of poverty relates to the idea of a just society.” (Vaughan 2007, p. 235). It is regrettable that Vaughan fails to treat the issue of poverty and justice in a more direct manner. It is obvious that the demands of justice necessarily entail that the political theorist engage with the problem of poverty with the goal being to suggest some reasonable approach to the problem.

**Politics of Poverty and Social Justice:**

It was in the 17th century that Locke, tried to link justice as natural law with individual rights. God given laws of nature lay down the fundamental principles that “being equal and independent, nobody ought to harm another in his Life, Liberty or Possessions” and “The labor of his body and work of his hands, we may say, are properly his.” (Locke 1960, p.12) He thought that poverty was the result of bad judgment about what is in one’s best interest. His views on freedom and equality are still relevant in the contemporary world confronting the issues of human rights and equal
opportunities for all. Rousseau and Adam Smith defended the hardworking poor against the wasteful rich while Marx out rightly demanded fair treatment for the poor and for an end to their exploitation. Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau are social contract theorists and are associated with liberalism. They were concerned with the origin, purpose and justification of civil society and looked back at the state of nature as a point of reference. In the present context, however, we need to proceed further and see how norms of justice are grounded in political thought.

The concept of poverty is embedded in social ethics which forms a part of political philosophy. Poverty refers to the human situation judged as unfair and unjust in a given society. The normative consideration of equity makes the theory of justice the most relevant field in political philosophy for developing a theory of poverty. The search for an equitable society reflects a social arrangement for the equality of all the members of this society. Equality of individuals can be viewed from various angles, viz., resources accessed, freedoms exercised and achievements earned. Obviously, the meaning of equality is to be determined in the light of the basic heterogeneity and diversity of the human individual. Philosophical articulations of social justice on these grounds have thrown up some important schools of thought. For example, utilitarianism emerged as welfareism and saw value ultimately only in individual utility such as pleasure, desire etc. A pragmatic and humanitarian reaction to utilitarianism focused on the basic needs approach and the capability approach. But the specific social contract theory of justice as fairness impacted all these theoretical formulations.

Rawls is often credited with providing normative arguments for why we should care about poverty and distribution of justice in his social choice theory. Rawls idea of justice is articulated in terms of fairness. What is fair is whatever contract is negotiated by individuals in the backdrop of the “original position” reminiscent of the classical social contract theory where all would aim at maximizing the prospects of the least well off. (Rawls 1971, p.12). The original position is like an appropriate status quo, and thus the fundamental agreements reached in it are fair. It is mainly
characterized by equality using the “veil of ignorance” as an imaginative device against bias. The state of equality here corresponds to the state of nature in the traditional theory of the social contract. In the face of criticism leveled against his theory of justice, Rawls modified his stand in 1993 when he wrote *Political Liberalism* and tried to refine his standpoint as presented in the earlier works. Here, he claims that his concerns are political rather than metaphysical. He, now, argues that in a constitutional democratic dispensation, people holding opposing, even irreconcilable view of the good can find a shared basis of reasonable political agreement through “an overlapping consensus” on the concept of justice. He articulates a four-stage sequence to incorporate the principles of justice in the structure of a constitutional democracy: (I) the original position, (ii) constitution, (iii) legislature and (iv) judicial system. Specific difficulties can easily be identified in Rawls’ agenda to implement the theory at all the four stages. However, the common defect of a constitutional democracy in this regard is that it may allow a higher ratio of disparity in the distribution of wealth and prosperity than is compatible with Rawls’ idea of equal opportunity for all citizens. Furthermore, it often allows accumulation of political power in few hands. As a safeguard against this eventuality, Rawls recommends the necessity to guarantee constitutionally equal rights of participation for all in the political process. This guarantee has often been seen to be ineffective in practical politics. Apparently, external measures to ensure equality of individuals may not ensure an equitable distribution of political power.

Should we, then, try to find solution to the problem of poverty from within the realm of politics? When we look for the solution in the institutionalization of poverty within social and political norms and systems, we encounter the problem of its legitimization within political discourse and by the political elite, and the failure of the poorest of the poor to gain political representation. The different ways in which extreme forms of poverty and the extremely poor are represented on political bodies contributes significantly to understanding the dynamics of poverty reduction as well as poverty reproduction. Is there hope within this politics of representation for the poor to gain
voice and attain material progress? One may, however, look for poverty reduction by relocating it within a broader political project of justice.

**Poverty and Injustice:**

When we look at politics as the ‘driver of change’ and as the cause of people’s access to justice, distribution of goods, social inclusion and empowerment of people or the lack of these, the issue of injustice becomes focused. Bufacchi (2012 pp. 9-10) quite appropriately includes maldistribution, social exclusion and disempowerment in his three dimensional definition of injustice. Based on this definition, social injustice involves unfair distribution of resources and opportunities, social deprivation and lack of empowerment that prevents people from exercising any form of self-determination. Social justice, indeed, strives to overcome these expressions of injustice in a society, particularly when people are deprived not only in material and social sense but also when they are denied political participation. This is the reason why social justice and social injustice becomes politically relevant (Barry 2005). In an earlier work, Barry (1965) also provides us critical analyses of the concepts centrally relevant to moral and political philosophy, especially about injustice, inequity, inequality, and lack of democracy, freedom and human rights.

Bufacchi (2012) sums up the three main goals of political philosophy as: “…to identify the nature of social and political problems inflicting our societies, especially the problem of social injustice; to set the agenda for future social policies; and to indicate solutions to these problems.” (p. 27). In this context he points out how Barry takes injustice essentially in the sense of inequality, draws a parallel with poverty and identifies an intrinsic connection between relative and absolute poverty (p. 24). Poverty is, therefore, not merely a matter of physical deprivation; it is also one of inequality. Poverty promotes inequality by undermining equality of opportunity under the garb of personal responsibility and meritocracy and legitimizes the perpetuation of inequality. (Barry 2005, p. 40) For Barry, inequality of opportunity is often inherited at the time of birth as “morally
For Barry, tackling inequality in society is as important as eradication of poverty. When Rawls builds his thesis about the social and natural inequalities, he emphasizes society’s prerogative to provide means for their eradication. Barry, however, while assuming arbitrariness of natural endowments, does not necessarily link natural inequalities with justice as fairness. He rules out the issue of fairness in case inequalities are accepted as the genuine choices of the people. (Barry 1988, pp. 34, 41-42) For example, if one finds lesser number of female entrants in the professions related to science and technology, one may not necessarily ascribe it to gender discrimination because it may vary, be a consequence of socialization and hence a genuine choice of women themselves. A similar stand can be taken about natural inequalities. (p. 43) One can, thus, conclude with Barry that if natural and social inequalities are accepted by people as their genuine choices and they may not be said to have been treated unjustly. It is, however, difficult to understand how people’s identification with natural and social inequalities as their genuine choices can be construed as fair choices. There is always a chance that they are not cognizant of all the possible choices available in the given circumstances. The situation may be even worse in the case of closed societies where people may never be able to know what alternate choices are available if these are available at all. In Barry’s own words on the issue are also supportive of this interpretation: “These remarks are no more than, I should emphasize, no more than suggestive. I do not claim that. I yet have a general way of sorting out which characteristics should count as ‘morally arbitrary’ and which should be regarded as morally relevant.” (Barry 1988, p. 41) Barry seems to agree to the contention that it may not be possible to clearly identify which genuine choices can be termed as morally relevant or morally arbitrary. It can, therefore, be safely asserted that argument about the fairness of people’s genuine choices is problematic to say the least. In this context, Barry takes up the issues of equality of opportunity and personal responsibility. He draws out a strong argument in favor of equal distribution as a prerequisite of social justice except in cases where inequality results from arbitrary inequalities begin before conception, since the health and nutritional status of the mother at the time of conception is critical.” (Barry 2005, p.14)
voluntary choices from the very beginning when everyone is supposed to have equal opportunities. Later, Barry (2005) confirms that individuals should take responsibility for the outcomes of their own choices. His argument, therefore, has room for justified inequalities, though their number is small since a majority of such choices are made under constraints like unequal resources or inadequate information. In an earlier cited work, Barry (1988) seems to have reconstructed Rawls’ view of equal opportunity and difference principle and makes a differentiation between ‘formal equality’ and ‘substantial equality.’

Formal discrimination on the basis of gender, race and ethnicity is ruled out on a ‘formal’ understanding of equality of opportunity. A general concern for a lack of formal equality of opportunity in a society reflects the idea that selection of gender, race and ethnicity does not fall within the domain of an individual’s own choice and a discriminatory economic inequality on this basis is unfair. The inequality that issues forth as a matter of luck was dubbed as “natural lottery” by Rawls and hence its negative consequences for people’s lives should be treated as immoral. Limited to a minimal standard and described in a basic and narrow, non-discriminatory sense (Bevir 2010, pp. 1-2), it has been referred to as equality of access. (Cashmore, 1996). Here the criterion of fairness and unfairness is pre-determined with no unequal, superior opportunity afforded to one individual over the other. Substantial equality of opportunity, also called ‘fair equality of opportunity, is a relatively wider term referring to greater inequality of wealth at the initial stage. Some people in a society may be viewed as clearly better placed to take advantage of opportunity. It is exemplified in a situation where, in a fair competition, a rich child has more chances of faring well in life than the one born in a poor family. How to achieve greater equality in this context also involves greater chances of disagreement as well as some political ramifications.

For Barry (as well as for Rawls) the idea of equality of opportunity is basic to social justice. Substantive equality of opportunity demands that in matters related to ideals of equality before the law and “careers open to talent” (Barry 1989, sec. 26-28), people are not discriminated against on
account of their inherited resources, colour of skin and gender. Existing norms of wealth and power subvert fair availability of equality of opportunity and need state intervention in available career choices and market choices.

In order to achieve equality of education, health and autonomy, Barry recommends economically feasible steps to achieve a society where inequalities of power and wealth can be limited within a narrow range. One needs to explore the political options to that end. Egalitarianism, for the sake of economic equality, tends to allow market choices to be regulated leading to political expression of equality (Beitz 1989, Ch. 9) The implication is that in the name of the political values of liberty and equality it is possible to make room for choices to be regulated. Barry’s ‘strong equality of opportunity’ thesis requires everyone to be made equal as far as rights, opportunities and resources are concerned except where informed choices arising from initial equality lead to inequalities.

**Institutional Grounds of Injustice:**

Global institutions like the League of Nations, the World Bank and the United Nations emerged in the wake of the two world wars followed by an intensification of contemporary phenomena like globalization and economic integration. Large scale immigration across the continents, the need to intervene in other states for humanitarian causes and to overcome genocide and terrorism have brought into bold relief the need to address justice in relations between states, and between individuals across state borders. Thus, the idea of global justice emerged as a phenomenon over and above state-interests and the need to look for its moral relevance in the international arena.

Pogge regards global justice as essentially a matter of redistribution of wealth or resources on a global scale. He contends that rich and powerful countries are involved in the production of poverty through the imposition of global economic order. He looks at poverty as a challenge to the moral dimensions of global justice. Some important philosophers have, however, differed with Pogge on this point. Nagel (2005), for example, has argued in favor of a political conception of justice as opposed to the cosmopolitan conception claiming that the standards of justice apply only within the
boundaries of a sovereign state. There is, however, no sufficient cause to warrant rejection of redistributive justice claim that citizens of economically advanced countries are responsible for the worsening conditions of poverty in other countries. A more comprehensive theory of global redistributive justice will, therefore, have to take into account both the national policies and the international perspective to reduce global poverty.

John Rawls’s *Law of Peoples*, a highly significant work, stimulated thinking about different models of global justice (Rawls 1999). Refusing to accept distributive justice as a principle at the global level, Rawls argues that because the basic structure, made up by social and political institutions, deeply affects the lives of individuals, it must be considered the primary subject of justice. Rawls’s normative claim that the basic structure is available at the state level (not at the global level) and should be the subject of justice is difficult to reject. For him, basic transnational conditions are deeply influenced by this basic structure. Like the state structure, the basic global structure is systematically coercive. But, the state structure is also interactionally coercive. The needs of global basic structure are different. International cooperation at state level cannot be compared with global cooperation among states. Global interaction needs distributional autonomy of states. Financial transactions, property rights, and human rights, though existing at the global level are, nevertheless, implemented by the respective states. Individual states might well be forced into a system of high interest loans. It still depends on the state concerned to decide how to tackle the ensuing strikes and trade union action.

Iris Young formulated a modified form of Rawls’s concept of the basic structure. It argues for a dual level of understanding of individual action – the structural and the individual, where the structural is governed by a shared responsibility. This is grounded neither in group membership nor in cosmopolitan duty. What is basic here is the social connection; injustice being produced as one participates actively through one’s position in structures. The concept of structural injustice conceived here is meant to suggest that vulnerability to deprivation may be comprehended by a
social structural position resulting from the aggregative effect of different global and national actions, norms and institutions. (Young 2011)

The injustice that the disadvantaged suffer in Young’s structural position is not the result only of the imposition of a regime of coercive institutional order but is due to a variety of actions, policies, trends, practices and laws. The cross-border implication of this social structure implicates agents across the world and makes them responsible for injustice, either directly or indirectly, through participation in norms, practices and institutions. At the global justice level too, the need for some agency is felt by many philosophers so that duties can be assigned. Since Young’s social connection model of global structural injustice entails political responsibility rather than moral responsibility, it stops short of blaming the responsible agents of any wrong-doing. A more forthright distinction between political and moral responsibility encourages me to interpret Young’s stand as not making the agent responsible for intent to cause harm. Thus, her “liability model” does not become functional here. Having caused only an inadvertent structural injustice, the agent’s responsibility remains limited to participation in collective action for change.

Pogge’s take on Rawlsian basic structure of society as the primary subject of justice is significantly different from that of Young’s. What Pogge concludes against Rawls’s stated standpoint is that the morally problematic relation in which the global poor and the citizens of the affluent countries stand with each other is essentially an institutional one. For him, it is the institutional global order that largely contributes to their deprivation. The natural corollary of this stand can be seen in his assigning less importance to interactional morality. On the other hand, we generally think of justice more in terms of interaction than institutions. Emotionally, our moral involvement is more pronounced and directed against the injustices perpetrated by individuals. Even in the case of institutions, our resentment is more often mobilized against individual public officials. Rawls, on the other hand, has argued that “justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought.” (Rawls 1971, 3). Such statements have led to a false impression that Rawls theory of
justice was meant to be applied at the global level. The impression seems to have been in his later works: “a political conception of justice . . . is expressed in terms of certain fundamental ideas seen as implicit in the public political culture of a democratic society. This public culture comprises the political institutions of a constitutional regime and the public traditions of their interpretations . . . as well as historic texts and documents that are common knowledge”. (Rawls 1996, 13-14)

The state-centric identification of institutions effectively eliminates the impression that justice is to be formulated in the global context. The core political ideals and practices allow people to make decisions within the domestic basic structure of an internally just democratic state. Rawls tends to exclude the free and equal citizens of liberal, democratic societies honouring ‘the law of peoples’ from the domain of a global society looking for a global basic structure encompassing political equality and international cooperation between states, and human rights etc.

In Why Social Justice Matters? Barry (2005) enters the analytical domain of political philosophy which was earlier focused in his doctoral thesis published as Political Argument (1965). Here, he exhibits a clear predilection for the traditional social democratic program. Thus, in a free market economy with redistributive state policy regulations can bring about considerably just outcomes. The social democratic agenda tends to opt for regularity measures for market organization as a vehicle for social justice under a democratic dispensation. Given the relevant empirical facts, the program is said to follow the fundamentals of an egalitarian theory of justice. In this way, he combines the contemporary polemic on democratic theory with theories of social justice. This close conceptual link between equality and justice reflects how and why inequality is a matter of injustice. If democracy is considered to be a political expression of freedom and equality (the two values most cited for the moral superiority of democracy), a system upholding social justice should reside in what is known as democracy. In this way, the debate about inequality as injustice will become directly relevant to the policies and institutions vouchsafed by democracy.

A prominent aspect of contemporary political theory looks at deprived people within society as
deeply vulnerable to manipulation and coercion and hence seriously constrained in exercising their right to political participation. Political inequality generates inequalities of opportunity, power, influence, and the capacity to lay down one’s goals as well as to achieve them. Political inequality does not only operate at the individual level but at the organizational level too. Political parties with more wealth and influence and resulting political clout may suppress rival ideas and curtail individual choices from a political angle by using finances, media exposure and political competition. Therefore, an institutional theory of equality may need to have egalitarian prerequisites in order to explain the emergence and persistence of democracies.

Rawls has argued that the term equality can only be applied directly in the context of social justice and not that of institutions. On the other hand, social justice is not a matter of individual fairness or personal ethics but rather a broader understanding of broader social and political issues. As suggested by Marion Young (1990), social justice impinges upon how society promotes institutional focus on creating conditions required for living a good life. Like Amartya Sen, Young also, emphasizes individual action, capacity and participation geared to creating the required conditions. Social justice must acknowledge the fact that some societies have clearly distinguished groups: those who are advantaged and those who are disadvantaged. It is, therefore, personal responsibility of individuals to strive to improve the working of institutions as tools of social development to achieve equality of opportunity.

As argued by McGann, liberal political equality furnishes “the most obvious kind of equality to political institutions, especially in countries with a long tradition of democracy. However, a great deal of literature on political justice draws on group perception of fairness rather than on individualist conception. . . When we consider the rights of individual citizens in a liberal democratic state, it is extremely hard to escape the conclusion that fairness implies equality” (2006, pp. 12-13). After a detailed analysis of why concepts like equality, fairness and impartiality should or should not apply to arguments and institutions, McGann comes to the conclusion that liberal
equality is directly applicable to political institutions like electoral systems and legislative rules. (pp. 14-15). However, there is worth in the Rawlsian thesis as well which advocates a constructivist stance advocating applicability of equality and fairness to hypothetical decision situations. Beitz (1989) has also rejected such an application of concepts of equality and fairness. Unlike Rawls, however, Beitz employs Scanlon’s (1982) mode of construction of the norm (also accepted by Barry) on the basis of a “system of rules for general regulation of behaviour which no one could reasonably reject” (p. 110).

A just society is judged in so far as shared values and cultural understanding are reflected in the practices and institutions and is underscored by the egalitarianism of modern democratic societies. But, in this case, one needs to assume like Walzer (1983) and Locke (1690) that such norms entitle one to equal moral entitlement in all circumstances. As mentioned above, what constitutes morally right and wrong action is set by the principles that no one could reasonably reject follows from Scanlon’s thesis that people in all circumstances have the moral right to be treated according to the outcome of a procedure (Scanlon 1998). But, the question about different formulations of egalitarian norm still remains un-answered. If it is formulated as a fundamental moral principle, it may state a single norm or a set of norms to which individual and institutional conduct is supposed to conform; it may not, for a variety of reasons, be suitable for application in a particular society as such.

As pointed out by Arneson (2007), Barry “defends the social democratic program by working to show that it follows from basic moral principles, given a specification of relevant empirical facts concerning current circumstances. The basic moral principles, as Barry presents them, consist of an egalitarian theory of social justice, a doctrine of equality of opportunity. But while venturing into applied political philosophy, he also intends to take “the normative public policy analysis to a higher level by going back to first principles of justice and working out what follows from those principles given the empirical facts that obtain in our world today.” Bufacchi (2012) remarks that
Barry did not want to engage in theoretical political philosophy as an academic discipline, and assert that: “The point of political philosophy is not merely to create an arena where professional academics and students can play an increasingly sophisticated intellectual game, which is as highly stimulating as it is increasingly insignificant. Instead, political philosophy ought to strive for three main goals: to identify the nature of the social and political problems inflicting our societies, especially the problem of social injustice: to set the agenda for future social policies; and to indicate solutions to these problems.” (p. 27)

Political debate concerning justice and injustice also refers to norms operative in different political communities. In political life, however, the way the justice of such norms and institutions is measured is looked up with suspicion by many moral and political philosophers probably because there are no determinate standards available for such measurement. Since justice is often visualized as a set of primary principles and rules, they are deemed as regulating the advantages and disadvantages within a community. Hence, Shklar’s apt description of it as “the normal model of justice” (1990, P. 17). It will be but natural that the indeterminate nature of the standards of judgment is seen as a threat to justice itself.

Social and Political Institutions:

Philosophers who subscribe to the “normal model of justice,” take a line of thought as if there is an implicit consensus on a society’s basic rules and principles. Thus, the crucial task, as is the case with Rawls, merely to identify the body of general rules and principles that a community should use to the justice of familiar practices and institutions. (Rawls, 1972. p. 5) But, for Shklar the main problem with normal models is that they treat injustice only as a departure from norms of justice, thus constricting our ability to recognize injustice which would ultimately be contingent upon a prior, consensual understanding of justice by society.

Characterizing perfectly just societies having perfect institutions has dominated the philosophers dealing with political theory and thus ways to reduce injustice and enhance justice have suffered a
relative neglect: “A theory of justice that can serve as the basis of practical reasoning must include ways of judging how to reduce injustice and advance justice, rather than aiming only at the characterization of perfectly just societies – an exercise that is such a dominant feature of many theories of justice in political philosophy today” (Sen 2009, p. ix). The lament that occurrence of widespread injustices takes place despite there being rules and institutions reflect the failure on the part of political theorists to adequately address the issue. In the same vein, Shklar (1990) criticizes the tendency to try to reduce injustice to “a prelude or to a rejection or breakdown of justice, as if injustice were a surprising abnormality” (p. 17). She attacks the “normal model of justice” for its “complacent view of injustice and its confidence in the ability of the institutions that it underwrites really to cope with iniquity” (1990: 18) because she finds most of the injustice occurring in spite of our institutional structures and political frameworks. I have all along been arguing that the everyday sense of social injustice encompasses the inhuman and unfair ways of treatment and inaccessibility to resources like food, clothing and shelter. But, when we move to opportunities like freedom, rights and empowerment issues it becomes eminently political. Political injustice leads to violation of individual liberties, rights to freedom of speech as well as voting rights. Unfair state actions perpetrated under certain operative political systems. As a consequence, the disempowered and the disadvantaged are denied voice and representation in the decision making process. The resulting equity issues are important for both the social and political domains. The state’s legal and political institutions often tend to violate the political, economic, and social rights of the disadvantaged groups in a society. It would, therefore, be appropriate to confront political injustice by reforming and reorienting to fair governance institutions like bureaucracy, judiciary, police, etc. so that executive and legislative making is held accountable. Public decision making will only respond to the will of the people if they are empowered and drawn out of the social and political exclusion. Not only that, a culture of political participation can only be nurtured if public at large is encouraged to take active part in in the formulation, execution, and monitoring of state policies.
Injustice is generally considered to be the most important cause of poverty. As has already been discussed in earlier chapters, poverty does not refer to economic deprivation alone. Its social aspect has serious ramifications such as lack of empowerment, denial of rights, dignity and self-esteem and attendant feelings of humiliation, disrespect, stigma and shame. This exemplifies what Nancy Fraser terms as symbolic injustice “rooted in social patterns of representation, interpretation and communication.” (1997, p. 14). As pointed out by Ruth Lister “. . . they stem from people in poverty’s everyday interaction with the wider society and with the way they are talked about and treated by politicians, officials, the media and other influential bodies.” (2004, p. 7). Equality of opportunity thesis in the context of social justice requires something more than well-meaning policies. It requires empowerment and mobilization of those who are deprived and disadvantaged so as to enable them to influence the policies. As Hickey & Bracking (2005) rightly point out: “The continuation of poverty over time – or chronic poverty is an inherently political problem, both in terms of its reproduction and reduction. Its persistence over time reflects its institutionalization within social and political norms and systems and its legitimation within political discourse. People who live in poverty over extended periods of time are the least likely to gain political representation and have few immediate or natural allies in either civil or political society.” (p. 851).

The political elite and the power groups as well as the government can help the poor gain real political representation. The way the poor are allowed to be politically represented highlights the fact that politics can reduce as well reproduce poverty. In order to have a genuine political representation in the sense of empowerment, poverty eradication needs to be relocated and grounded in the broader political project of social justice.

**Poverty and Democracy:**

Democracy is believed by many social scientists to be a necessary prerequisite for poverty reduction and poverty eradication. (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003, Franco, Alvarez-Dardet, and Ruiz 2004; Lake and Baum 2001; McGuire 2006) Amartya Sen (1999) in particular has represented democracy
as fundamentally pro-poor in addressing problems of world poverty in terms of consensus-building, transparency and good governance. The underlying suggestion is that more income distribution takes place under a democratic dispensation resulting in more public good. McGuire (2006) as well as Stasavage (2005) and Brown, and Hunter (2005) agree that funding of public services under democratic governments tend to be considerably greater than is done under non-democracies. Ross (2006), on the contrary, argues that the claims that democracy benefits the poor are misplaced. (p. 860)

It is true that state mechanisms are primarily designed to create and shape the political opportunities for the poor. Among all the diverse ways of governance democracy has, indeed been better geared to empower the poor in terms of increasing their political capabilities and reduce poverty. Democracy is generally considered to be conducive to community development, not only by cultivating self-confidence, dignity and self-respect of the poor but also by generating collective ideas for effective political action. Apparently, democratic norms and values seem to be better suited to social capital necessary for social justice.

Democracy does indeed provide greater voice and influence to the poor than most non-democratic systems. In terms of economic prosperity as well a democratic system is considered to be necessary. But, there is no proof of a necessary and a consistent relation between formal electoral democracy and the extent to which it influences poverty in a substantial way. The last three decades have witnessed the shift away from communism among many Asian and East European countries and the move has always been guided by the desire better economic prospects. Unfortunately, this does not furnish clear evidence to link democracy and good performance in poverty reduction. By virtue of their political ideology, the former socialist states, though undemocratic by prevailing criteria, had a greater focus on mass welfare leading to poverty reduction. The impact of these pro-poor policies is still evident in case of Vietnam and China. Another interesting comparison concerning poverty reduction can be drawn between the
democracies practiced in developing countries of the so-called third-world and countries having authoritarian regimes. While denying any consistent relation between democracy and pro-poor policies, Kimberly Niles (1999) and Mick Moore et al. (1999) concede that democracies may not be among the worst in the field of poverty eradication. On the other hand, there are examples where the best record in poverty reduction may go to 35 year long un-democratic regime in Indonesia as compared to democratic Philippines. South Korea and Taiwan, who until recently have been authoritarian regimes, have acted positively to reduce poverty ostensibly in order to gain and maintain legitimacy for their rule. Varshney (1999) asserts about such poor democracies: “. . . Poor democracies recognized as long-lasting or stable in democratic theory - India, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Costa Rica, Venezuela, Botswana, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, the Philippines (democratic for much of its independence) - still, on the whole, have a substantial proportion of their populations stuck below the poverty line.” (p. 3)

Here, a question arises about whether democracies by themselves can eradicate poverty or whether particular economic strategies play the crucial role. It can be argued that the political elite play a crucial role in any form of government, i.e., to what extent they push the institutions towards pro-poor public policy and its implementation. It is claimed that as opposed to an authoritarian regime, in a democratic dispensation the poor have a voice and can influence the government policies by political mobilization. The response to such pressure also varies from democracy to democracy.

The wide range of varying shades and hues of democracies mark the countries of the third world betraying how flexible the term “democratic” is. Many countries claim the nomenclature irrespective of their diverging policies, practices and institutional arrangement. Notwithstanding the complexity of the criteria on which a country can be considered a democracy, Spicker, for practical purposes, lays down three broad facets: “Some views of democracy are normative; they are based in democracy as a principle, such as rule by the people, the popular will, government by consent, or republican government. Some views are based in prescriptions for governance, such as
accountability, participation, the representation of interests or the primacy of laws. And other views of democracy are institutional, based in the mechanisms and structures of government – the elected legislature, the separation of powers, contested elections, the political parties, the media.” (2012, pp. 8-9)

The above, indeed, gives good criteria to judge what can be called a true democracy. There is, however, widespread skepticism about how many ‘democracies’ among the developing countries could come up to the standards laid down by Spicker. One may very well add more qualities to what can be called a perfect democracy. Cohen’s ‘deliberative’ democracy, based on discussion, co-operation, equality and social inclusion May’s ‘responsive government’ adjusting to the demands of people and accommodating their needs and concerns are two important features of a real democracy. Spicker’s argument may allow a high degree of variation as the true democratic spirit will only be safeguarded if the key players really wish to make them part of the political process by formulating and implementing pro-poor policies. There are important differences in how different democracies go about formulating their policies and how the same are implemented. Moreover, different countries have different levels of commitment to poverty eradication also.

I do not intend to rule out the prospect of democracies doing well in the third world by improving the quality of political and civil organizations and empowering the poor to have a voice and a share in governance. To that end, political organizations, political parties in particular, are said to play the most crucial role in formulating and conducting public policy within a democratic system. If these organizations are stable networks of committed workers operating through a democratic institutional structure with clearly defined programs and ideologies, the poor can be represented more effectively. On the other hand, democracies with political parties built around regional, ethnic or religious affiliations or temporary alliances of power seekers as in Pakistan, the poor can neither hope to have voice nor their amelioration can have a priority in policy formulation. Is it because Pakistan, in its 65 years history, has always remained and is rightly dubbed as a nascent democracy
as is done by Parnini (2015): “In South Asia, particularly in Pakistan and Bangladesh, democracy as an institution is new and still fragile. Democracy is vibrant in India compared to other countries in the region.” (p. 28)

It is convenient to link ‘the poverty of democracy’ in such countries to rampant economic poverty and social deprivation. The Pearson (2010) document claims: “South Asia is home to 47% of world’s poor living on less than 1$ a day. India has reduced its poverty rate by 5-10 percent since 1990, most other countries registered reduction in poverty over the period, except for Pakistan, where poverty has stagnated at around 33 percent.” (p. 43).

It is interesting to note that Pakistan is a country where economic growth fails to have a wholesome effect on poverty reduction. This has been stringently underscored by Dennis Mueller (2009): “Despite reasonable economic growth recently, poverty in Pakistan has actually been increasing, unlike the other Asian countries.” (pp. 308-309).

An authentic democratic set up promotes a political culture that ensures institutional checks on the exercise of personal power by political leaders. As pointed out by Mosley (2012): “Poverty reduction . . . will not happen simply if the economy is growing . . . pro-poor policies will only occur if the dominant political structures and processes favor their introduction.” (p. 3). The persistent political chaos marked by corruption scandals, incompetent governance, tainted judiciary and media has resulted in a popular perception that democracy has collapsed in Pakistan. Similar circumstance earlier led Diamond (1999) to dub this experience as “hollow democracy, rife with semi loyal and disloyal behavior on the part of important political actors.” (p. 73). Haynes (2001) quite cogently finds the cause in Pakistan’s political system becoming more and more personalistic rather than institutional wielding of power. Failure to develop workable democratic institutions reflects the greater political significance of structural conditions leading to authoritarian rule than the factors more conducive to democratization. While people’s disenchantment with artificially
constructed political parties is reflected in low voter turn-outs, the so-called elected political elite shows a clear disconnect with policies of poverty eradication.

Poorly disciplined and fragmented political parties, in search of power, are constrained to make adjustments and re-adjustments and look for new allies and seek votes from even among terrorist groups. Democracy for them is merely a buzz word. They pay only lip service to the rule of law, social justice, and freedom of thought, pluralism and equality opportunity. This brand of a democratic system would most likely produce governments with low commitments to the poor.

In such democracies, the groups of civil society activists that otherwise are known to have contributed towards mobilization and advocacy of the poor segments among people tend to degenerate as did the 2007 Lawyers Movement in Pakistan. In the true sense of the term, the Civil Society should have a broad base of associations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) made up of a wide range of identities including income, class, gender, etc. often growing out of deprived communities and focused on their concerns. Serving as the link between the poor and the government, such broad-based social movements can, at best, act as pressure groups but in the formulation of public policy their role cannot be as effective as is performed by the well-established democratic political parties. One may like to look up to civil society, citizens' movements and NGOs, as the alternatives to failing states. This is a mythical hope as far as pro-poor movements are concerned because in tottering democracies they are often reduced to self-seeking groups of opportunists working ruthlessly for their vested interests. It is, most of the time, the space provided by democracy for the poor to organize within civil society that can positively contribute to poverty reduction. And, this can only happen under the aegis of a liberal, truly representative democracy in which the power of decision making is willingly constrained by the rule of law (with a system of adjudication, enforcement and redress) and the constitution and the rights and freedoms of all individuals including minorities are protected without discrimination. Here, the question arises: How can liberal representative democracies take up the challenge of poverty eradication?
As compared to the third world countries, the affluent Western representative democracies with capitalist economies, calling for the necessary conditions of equality, take pride in providing effective welfare states: prosperity as well as social justice. A welfare state provides an institutionalized program in the form of state assistance as well as social insurance aimed at ensuring citizens’ welfare in the face of risks and contingencies of life in a modern society (loss of a job, for example). It makes substantial efforts to mitigate socioeconomic and political inequalities resulting from flaws in primary income distribution by regulating redistribution. And finally, welfare states institutionalize equality. Such societies are said to have a generous egalitarian agenda favoring the disadvantaged segments through a complex web of social policies and programs that are actually built into the political process.

In the context of the theory of poverty of David Brady, the Duke University sociologist, raises a question of substantial importance, i.e., about the significant variations of poverty found across the affluent democracies. (2009, p. 5). The question is: why the U.S. welfare system is able to achieve far less than other wealthy democracies? With nearly 17% of Americans (as many as 50 million) suffering from deprivation, the United States has double the ratio of the poor as compared to the neighboring Canada and thrice that of some of the West European nations. Scandinavian countries steal a clear lead in their efforts to reduce poverty. Ellen Reese (2011) gives a synoptic picture of the wide gulf that exists between the US and Europe in this regard (2011, p. 3).

Contemporary research is increasingly inclined to suggest that greater welfare state generosity is the most effective way to reduce poverty. (Lohmann 2009 & Brady et al 2010) Cross national variation in the magnitude of poverty is equally evidenced among the European countries at one point in time as well as during different periods these were governed by political parties of diverse orientation towards state welfare strategies. Brady (2009) has tried to explain this phenomenon by referring to the famous Esping-Andersen (1990) tripartite typology of states as Liberal Welfare (United State, Canada and Australia), Conservative-Corporate Welfare (Austria, France, Germany and Italy) and
Social Democrat Welfare (the Scandinavian countries). He, however, warns that: “It is misleading to compare welfare states as merely ‘more’ or ‘less’ egalitarian. We discover, instead, entirely different logics of social stratification embedded in welfare-state construction.” (Esping-Andersen 1990, pp.76-77). Notwithstanding the ideal-type categories of these macro-typologies, Brady eulogizes the Social Welfare Regime as its “universal welfare programs guaranteed to all citizens, extensive public employment systems, and generous families leave policies. With their high unionization and female labor force participation, socialist regimes are uniquely collectivist and egalitarian.” (2009, p. 76). Labor market polarization in the liberal market economies of Liberal Welfare States like the US have been more severely affected as compared to Denmark, for example, where because of centralized collective bargaining and strong minimum wage laws have been able to keep labor market institutions’ polarization to the minimum.

How the collective responsibility of the welfare state according to Brady becomes the most crucial factor for poverty eradication in the affluent democratic context: “Welfare states also create constituencies of beneficiaries that feed back into the political process that supports welfare states’ existence and form. Welfare states reflect political struggle, but they also guide subsequent political struggle. Thus, welfare states contribute to the formation of citizens’ interests and ideologies in the maintenance or expansion of welfare state programs. Through these interests and ideologies, societies collectivize and socialize the responsibility of averting poverty from their citizens.” (2009, p. 73).

According to Brady, the constituencies of beneficiaries are supported by ideologically driven “latent coalitions of egalitarianism” committed to ‘alleviating poverty and establishing social equality.’ (2009, p. 10). These coalitions provide latent and manifest support to the Leftist political actors struggling for welfare generosity aimed at poverty alleviation in the formal political arena. These concepts refer to diverse citizen groups who come forward to support redistributive welfare policies, becoming visible as the political actors push for their reform agenda. By transforming
power resources theory into institutionalized power relations theory, Brady is able to include ideological aspect into the former’s exclusive emphasis on materialist interest-based rational choice explanation. As pointed out by Wagle (2013): “While these modifications take power resources to the actual process of policymaking including political games, struggles and contestations playing out for or against egalitarian policy outcomes, they place the role of politics and political coalitions often led by labor unions and left parties at the center of welfare state development and changes.” (p. 111).

How the interests of the poor are translated directly into Leftists politics, however, is not fully explained. Most probably ideology, here, is presumed to play a crucial role to account for the political support forthcoming for a generous egalitarian welfare state to reduce inequality. (Steensland 2006). It is true that class-based voting patterns exist: the poor, low income prefer to vote Left while the high income groups vote Right. But as Brady & Sosnaud (2010) argue: “The relationship is far from deterministic. The working class and poor often do not vote even though doing so is in their interest. When they vote, sizeable minority vote for parties opposed to welfare generosity.” (p. 524). Similarly, affluent professionals also tend to vote for the Leftist parties although it may not be in their economic interest. Notwithstanding these divergences, Brady’s thesis commands much support in so far as he contends that organize labor movements are linked to higher wages, bigger benefits, and improved working conditions. (Jackson 2010). Raphael confirms the contention that on the international level “nations with stronger labor movements have stronger welfare states, lower rates of poverty, and generally better health and quality-of-life profiles.” (p.449)

Brady (2009) begins by characterizing poverty as “ultimately a political problem” and claims that “politics matters most for poverty when it occurs in a formal political system.” (pp. 9, 11). He further relates ‘politics of poverty’ with ‘politics of welfare’ in the context of ‘constituencies of welfare beneficiaries’ and ‘class politics.’ (p. 99). Political parties, for Brady, play an equally
important role in so far as institutional political action is concerned. (p. 100). Thus, for him, the latent coalitions for egalitarianism helped by the disadvantaged poor people along with the Leftist political parties and the electoral process help, in the long run, to institutionalize politics of poverty and create an irreversible trend in favour of a welfare state and social justice. (pp. 103-104). He concludes by claiming that “poverty is truly a political problem.” (p. 181). He repeatedly affirms the need to institutionalize egalitarianism, welfare state and poverty politics because a formal political system has an institutional framework and poverty can best be tackled on an institutional plane. Thus, the political system that institutionalizes equality, inequality will be low; hence the failure to institutionalize equality, inequality and poverty will be widespread.

Is welfare state a luxury – unaffordable and outmoded? In the 20th Century affluent west, the welfare state is considered to be a distinct combination of democracy, welfare, and capitalism. The above discussion highlights the paradox of liberal democratic free market capitalism breeding affluence and income insecurity at the same time while politics of social welfare democracy is known to have promoted income security. Hick’s (1999) broadly sums up the above line of thinking as he concludes: “... the political organization and organizational politics of employees – of workers into parties and unions, of parties into governing coalitions, and of unions into participation in those centralized national labor markets often dubbed as “neo-corporatist” are the most persistently powerful forces operating to advance income security policy. A more refined conclusion is that labor organizations and their politics built the welfare state by exploiting – sometimes quite fortuitously, sometimes most deliberately – the political opportunities offered to them.” (P. x) In recent years, the idea of welfare state in the affluent democracies has been challenged from economic, social and demographic angles. The conflict between the opponents and supporters of the post-war social contract is being seen in the context of global politics of social policy. It came under a lot of pressure as a result of 1970 oil crisis, economic recession and decline of industry.
I have good grounds to support Pierson (2001) who argues, there has not been much evidence of a critical threat of immediate nature to welfare state nor is there a likelihood of a shift towards neo liberal orthodoxy. What have actually happened are stricter controls on eligibility criteria and provision of more incentive to work. The globalization of the 1990s, spending constraint and changes in labor markets have led to re-thinking on sustainability of state-focused welfare schemes followed by demands for global governance of poverty and social justice. (This will be taken up in the next chapter).

We have already analyzed the tenuous link between democracy and the working of the welfare state in the West and how social welfare improvements are connected to democratic reform processes. The universal provision of income security and economic opportunity still remains the exclusive domain of the developed Western democracies led by the Scandinavian welfare states (Bar 2004). They have, to a large extent, been able to bring down both relative and absolute poverty. (Bradley et al 2005). A more important development in recent years has been the emergence of new democracies on the world map. If democratic approaches and methods are a prerequisite for alleviation of poverty and injustice, can states with institutionalized poverty and perpetuation of injustice be termed as democracies? For these democracies Bufacchi (2012) caustically remarks: “Democracy is often promoted, if not imposed, as a cure for the social injustice of oppressive regimes, and yet in young democracies this ideal is often used as nothing more than a rhetorical device, and in some cases even as a convenient façade to hide the worst kind of social injustice.” (p. 152). It is, indeed, true that many such democracies lack basic democratic features of multi-party elections, freedom of speech and respect for human rights. Exploitative tendencies and failure to reduce poverty may be due to structural reasons, weak processes and institutions or cultural factors like mindset and disrespect for democratic attitudes that may offset attempts at governance conducive to such development. The prerequisites of a democratic state are completely democratic and accountable core institutions and pro-poor development policies promoting democratic norms and human rights.
The changed global democratic landscape should, however, allow the international community to play a vital role in delivering development and democracy. International institutions should be able to play a role in eradication of authoritarianism, injustice and poverty, although the crucial role in this respect should remain with the state institutions. The international donor may, indeed, focus on reinforcing state institutional structures. Promoting, reforming the old institutions and building new democratic institutional infrastructures should be one of the major priorities of global organization so as to overcome the problem about deliberate violation of rights of the people. In recent years, social scientists have emphasized the need to contextualize research around institutions and social relations that generate inequality and injustice. In this regard, a more rigorous analysis of the concept ‘pro-poor institutions’ is called for which could uncover some of the underlying assumptions of politics of poverty particularly “the link between aid and institutions.” (Mosley, 2012, p. 244)
REFERENCES


Chapter Five

THOMAS POGGE: POVERTY AS HUMAN RIGHTS’ VIOLATION

This Chapter extends and applies the ideas of injustice and inequality among individuals of a society to their application to relationships and institutions in the global context. The discussion follows not only from the force of the philosophical argument but also in the wake of the contemporary realities of global poverty embedded in the recent phenomenon of globalization. In the backdrop of Rawlsian interpretation of global distributive justice and the moral, political and social dimensions of poverty, it will critically examine the role of affluent nations in the present unjust global institutional order converging on how Pogge’s ground breaking idea of negative duty not to harm the global poor fares in the face of fair criticism. Of greater interest to me will be how Pogge can logically move in this regard from state responsibility to collective or individual responsibility. It also examines Pogge’s Theory of a Minimally Just Global Institutional Order and some of the more significant objections raised against it by contemporary critics. In order to develop a more comprehensive thesis on global justice, in view of Pogge’s stand on human rights in particular, I will substantially draw on the writings of Singer, Beitz, Miller and Onora O’Neill.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR Article 22) asserts: “Everyone ... is entitled to realization ... of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his [or her] dignity.”

When human right to be free from poverty is violated, not only human dignity is jeopardized, it also undermines the right to adequate food, housing, sanitation as well as an honourable living. Consequently, people living in poverty have the least access to power to shape the policies of poverty and are frequently denied effective remedies for violations of their rights. Let’s evaluates how Pogge’s human rights thesis builds upon Articles 25 and 28 of the UDHR and make a close
assessment of his argument for a moral claim of people to protective action from not just their own government but also from other governments and citizens. In *World of Poverty and Human Rights* Pogge advocates “moral institutional cosmopolitanism” which interestingly recommends the negative duty of the governments and citizens of the affluent democracies of the world not to uphold the global structure that violates human rights. He assigns every human being a global status as an ultimate unit of moral concern. By going beyond interactional conception of human rights to uphold the institutional one, he has challenged the way the affluent population of the world wishes to see them as morally disconnected from the poor in the developing countries. Rights in the institutional context are moral claims on the organization of one’s society; hence it requires institutions and individuals to observe the negative right not to harm correlate with expanding people’s access to basic necessities. Individuals must avoid participation in unjust social institutions and strive to reform them to compensate their victims.

Pogge lays the blame for the suffering of the global poor on international institutions not only because they are doing too little to rectify the situation but also because the existing global system of economic and political dispensation is actively harming the poor. This stand immediately raises some critical questions:

- Are there objective moral norms irrespective of nationality, culture, religion and other distinguishing criteria?
- How the systemic injustices in the economic world order are related to the distributive inequality prevailing at the international level?
- How the role of state institutions at the national and transnational levels and relation between them can best serve the cause of global justice?
- Can there be an agreement on a “Society of States” paralleling the state society where individual state entities reach a mutual agreement on common interests and interactional and moral norms?
Cosmopolitanism:

In a characteristically Rawlsian fashion, Pogge takes an institutional approach to social justice in which principles of justice are only applicable to the basic structure of a society consisting of “the most important institutional features of any self-contained or all-inclusive social system.” (Pogge 1989, 22). The profound and pervasive features of this closed system are the political constitution, the legally recognized forms of property, the organization of the economy, and the nature of the family. The basic structure, for him, consists of institutions that are concerned with “[a] society’s basic mode of economic organization;[b] the procedures for making social choices through the conduct of, or interactions among, individuals and groups, and limitations upon such choices; [c] the more important practices regulating civil (noneconomic and nonpolitical) interactions, such as the family or the education system; [d] and the procedures for interpreting and enforcing the rules of the scheme” (Pogge, 1989, 22–23).

When one goes back to Rawls’s imagined “Original Position” thesis, one finds him in his The Laws of Peoples, justifying a global regime chosen by Peoples’ representatives from behind the “Veil of Ignorance.” Ignorance ensures fairness on account of lack of bias. Rawls, however, refused to extend redistributive, egalitarian liberalism at the global level: “. . . in the basic structure of the Society of Peoples, once the duty of assistance is satisfied and all peoples have a working liberal or decent government, there is again no reason to narrow the gap between the average wealth of different peoples.” (Rawls 1999, p. 114)

Rawls idea of basic structure of society was conceived as a ‘state centric’ constitutional democracy and viewed distributive justice as issuing forth in the joint relationship of social cooperation. But, his idea of democracy as a closed system of society fails to cohere with his espousal of democratic principles: A democratic society. . . is to be viewed as a complete and closed social system. It is complete in that it is self-sufficient and has a place for all the main purposes of human life. It is also closed ... in that entry into it is only by birth and exit from it is only by death.... Thus, we are not
seen as joining society at the age of reason, as we might join an association, but as being born into a society where we will lead a complete life. (Rawls, 1996, p. 40-41)

Rawls does not clarify how he wishes to use the term “closed” as a social, system. In whatever context is it to be understood, it cannot cohere with Rawls’ principles of liberalism. The capacity of the moral agent to pursue good, to conceive justice and to cooperate with others brings him in direct conflict with a democratic society conceived as a “closed and complete system.” The language used itself is incompatible with the liberal vision of an individual and his liberties. This is what, indeed, reflects on how he views the role of distributive justice in the global context.

The original position, acting as a non-historical, heuristic device, is intended to uncover fundamental ideas (latent in common sense) of freedom and equality, of ideal social cooperation and of the person in search of a deep basis of agreement among people like us to how our society should be organized (Rawls 1980, p. 519). If the device is to be used every time a good is to be divided, the parties to the original position will be limited to those subject to the coercive control of the political power of the state because a respectable treatment will be contingent upon whether the individuals share a coercive or a cooperative structure. Simultaneously with this and distinct from his concept of political justice in his Theory of Justice, Rawls explains political power in conjunction with the well-known “liberal principle of legitimacy”, claiming it to be “fully proper only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to their common human reason” (Rawls 1996, pp. 136-137). His heavy dependence, in his later writings, on the notion of “reasons that all can accept” is quite remarkable: “our exercise of political power is proper only when we … reasonably think that other citizens might also reasonably accept those reasons.” (Rawls 1999a, p. 579) The principle of legitimacy as part of Rawls’ account of public reason in pluralist societies has a limited though controversial purpose of answering the question of reasonable pluralism: how can we reason with one another in political
society so as to set priorities and make political decisions. The ultimate goal in *Political Liberalism*, however, remains the same as in the earlier *Theory of Justice*, i.e. finding grounds for a stable and just political liberalism as a permanent condition of democracy.

Rawls’s account of the basic structure of society, conceived as a constitutional democracy has significant implications for global distributive justice. *Political Liberalism* expanded on justice as fairness thesis presented in *the Theory of Justice* but fundamentally changed its philosophical interpretation by asking how a just society of equal citizens can live when divided by reasonable but incompatible religious, moral and philosophical doctrines. Now his “well ordered society” is no longer conceived as united in its basic moral beliefs but in its political conception of justice. Therefore, “justice as fairness” is now to be understood in the context of an overlapping consensus representing the sort of unifying principle available in a constitutional democracy. The revision results in downplaying the difference principle in the face of “reasonable pluralism” but it is justified for the sake of the goals of legitimacy and stability within a liberal society. The shift found in the *Law of the People* is even more radical though he seems to be talking about “the fact of reasonable pluralism” as an analogue or an extension of his domestic policy for the international dispensation. Indeed, Rawls takes up the issue of International justice here; but this is not an extension of views elaborated in his others works. Instead of globalizing the principles of justice, he formulates a theory of just foreign policy of liberal people. Gradually, he goes on to admit in the ambit of international justice conservative rules and controversial rights and principles, and shifts from liberal to decent non-democratic institutions and societies.

This difference in Rawls’ treatment of distributive justice between the domestic and the international context was immediately noticed by many philosophers including Beitz and Pogge whose proposed and developed global resource dividend respectively and which was brusquely though justifiably dismissed by Rawls. There were, however, serious reasons for criticism, e.g. the contradiction between the universalism of Rawls moral theory and how it was proposed to be
applied. The universal guarantee of aversion to inherited privileges cannot logically be applied only within the local context of nation states. If the inconsistency is to be avoided, and the income inequality above that permitted by the difference principle is to be regarded as unjust, Rawls should go all the way long and condemn the inequalities between the advantaged and the `disadvantaged across the globe. (See, for detailed discussion, Charles Beitz 1973, 1979a, 1983 and Thomas Pogge 1989, 1992a, 1994). Beitz and Pogge argued that there is a global basic structure parallel with domestic basic structure that linked people of different countries in a system of global cooperation. This called for a direct transposition of “justice as fairness” for all the citizens of the world and a fair distribution of benefits and burdens in a just global society. It was an extension of the ideals of liberty and equality irrespective of poverty or affluence of respective countries of the world. One finds no such principles in Rawls that demand a narrowing of inequalities between rich and poor countries, neither any institutional framework proposed that may promote a redistributive or egalitarian system for the world.

The global basic structure will have to meet the basic criteria of legitimacy while at the same time allow global institutions to be coercive. Beitz and Pogge argued that there is a global basic structure parallel with domestic basic structure that linked people of different countries in a system of global cooperation. This called for a direct transposition of “justice as fairness” for all the citizens of the world and a fair distribution of benefits and burdens in a just global society. It was an extension of the ideals of liberty and equality irrespective of poverty or affluence of respective countries of the world. One finds no such principles in Rawls that demand a narrowing of inequalities between rich and poor countries, neither any institutional framework proposed that may promote a redistributive or egalitarian system for the world. It is, therefore, become problematic to call him a cosmopolitan. A decisive argument in favor of Rawls abandoning cosmopolitan egalitarianism also appears in his *Political Liberalism*. Here, the conflict between his earlier theses of universalistic political liberalism is clearly overtaken by his later particularistic interpretation in *the Law of the Peoples:* The basic premise of Pogge centres on globalizing justice. Challenging Rawls’s ‘state centric’
conception of justice, he not only emphasizes the existence of basic structure at the global level but also underscores it as the most appropriate location for distributive justice (for which he employs the criterion of human rights). As is the case in the contemporary liberal debate, the central issue is how to transform requirements of justice from the domestic to the global level. Rawls has indeed been the main inspiration for many philosophers in their discussion on justice. Pogge and Beitz, in particular, argued in favour of globalizing Rawls and extend his concept of justice as fairness to the world at large. The argument leads them to articulate the ideas on global difference principle and universal human rights. On the other hand, Rawls’s reluctance to censure the inequalities between the rich and the poor nations at the international level triggered the contemporary debate on global justice (Pogge 1989, 1992, 1994; Beitz 1973, 1979, 1983, Onora O’Neill 2003 and Peter Singer 2002). They have raised the core issue of how the domestic dimensions of the requirements of justice can be applied on the global plane. Miller’s distinction between “compatriots and foreigners,” arguing for what he calls extrapolation of political duties to help the poor from one’s compatriots to the world at large clearly hints at what in contemporary debate is called ‘cosmopolitanism.’ He refuses to confine his argument only to the realms of political rights and economic interdependence, his characterization of the fair equality of opportunity is clearly reminiscent of Rawls’ ‘difference principle:’ “The extrapolators insist that the terms of justice towards everyone in the worldwide system of interdependence are determined by the choice of a standard for all to uphold everywhere made in the light of consequences for people throughout the world and in ignorance of one’s actual situation in the world. . . In our actual global situation, it is still possible to establish a vast unmet transnational responsibility and to reverse the priorities for compatriots but only because of the moral importance of ties . . .” (Miller 2010, 33-34).

The current debate in liberal politics is, indeed, centered on global justice and seeks to transform justice from the domestic to the international plane. Goodin (1988), for example, argues for ruling out nationality as of special significance in our duties to others. The so-called special duties towards certain individuals are attributable to the special relations that we hold towards our “families and
friends, our pupils, our patients”. In certain cases, there may be a greater emphasis on the duties towards foreigners as in the case of protecting private property and drafting them into the army. Goodin concludes by claiming that “some of our general duties to those beyond our borders are at least sometimes more compelling, morally speaking, than at least some of our special duties to our fellow countrymen.” (Goodin 1988, 663).

The variety of ways cosmopolitanism is conceptualized throws up two major strands: (i) moral cosmopolitanism upholds respect for human rights and justice and insists on helping the global poor on the pattern of a moral commitment to helping the disadvantaged compatriots; and (ii) political cosmopolitanism conceptualizes the global community in terms of political and economic institutions to be shared by all. Whether the cosmopolitans like Singer anchor their views to utilitarian assumptions or to Kantian assumptions as in the case of O’Neill, their thesis remains hinged on their moral theory.

The recent philosophical debate on cosmopolitanism argues that social justice transcends geographical boundaries and duties and responsibilities cannot be confined to compatriots alone. Ranging from the fundamental equality of individuals to more equal distribution of wealth, resources and opportunities aimed at alleviating poverty and meeting the basic needs of the people to develop their capabilities, the cosmopolitan thinkers have broadened the spectrum to bring social justice to be relevant at the global level. Various cosmopolitan approaches have led to demands for aid to the global poor, new redistributive schemes at the international level and greater emphasis on developmental assistance across the world. The redistribution and development at the global scale underscore the need for the introduction of a new world order and a new institutional framework. Thus, Singer’s calls for the rich to donate massively for poverty alleviation, Beitz’s (1979) recommendation to institutionally implement the global difference principle and Pogge’s (2002) idea of a global resource dividend, reflect the common cosmopolitan concern for social justice at the global level.
**Moral Cosmopolitanism:**

In the recent past, the focus of political theory has notably shifted to global justice and the universalistic moral theory emphasizing the rights of the entire humanity has emerged as the central idea espousing humanitarian moral responsibility across the globe. (Vernon 2010). The moral and political cosmopolitanism can be traced back to Kant’s idea of a civil society which can administer justice universally. It proposes the formation of a global moral community based on universal rights and duties. The implication is that all human beings everywhere have an equal moral standing. In terms of a broad institutional cosmopolitanism, the idea is extended so that a global framework can be visualized as responsible to uphold an individual rights and duties irrespective of national boundaries. In the philosophical jargon, this position can be termed as moral universalism that renders frontiers between nations, states and societies as morally irrelevant. Since the moral standing of an individual depends of certain morally significant characteristics, all human beings fall under the same moral standards. They, therefore fall under the scope of justice irrespective of their status as compatriots or foreigners.

Peter Singer, a prominent contemporary cosmopolitan thinker remarks: “From the moral point of view, the development of the world into a ‘global village’ has made an important . . . difference to our moral situation.” (Singer 1972, 232). He argues that the consequences of actions and institutions are the proper standard of moral judgment. Welfare of human beings being the true criteria, the shared basis for moral standing is to be found in the capacity to experience welfare and suffering. The moral demand for helping the poor is caused by the fact that some people are suffering deprivations of welfare. There is no moral relevance of the fact that the rich and the poor live in distant lands with geographical boundaries and with distinct citizenship. He also indicates that this is the morally correct response to have. Singer also posits what he calls an uncontroversial principle for helping the deprived of the world: “if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought
morally to do it.” (Singer 1972, 231). The uncontroversial formulation of the principle is, however, deceptive. How can the massive poverty and deprivation already prevailing in the world be eradicated without a massive intervention. Furthermore, the mere fact of globalization may not be a sufficient reason to obliterate the special obligation assigned to our compatriots. Both meta-ethical particularism and cultural perfectionism argue that our obligation to help the distant poor cannot override the one to the disadvantaged within the national community. Singer goes on to give a stronger twist to his principle: “. . . we ought to give until we reach the level of marginal utility---that is, the level at which, by giving more, I would cause as much suffering to myself or my dependents as I would relieve by my gift.” (1972, 241).

As a utilitarian, Singer must perforce opt for an empirical evaluation of the opted course of action and the scope of its maximum utility. Miller has rightly pointed out that “interaction with the needy will turn out to be a necessary ingredient in any genuinely demanding obligation to help the global poor.” (2010, 12).

The cosmopolitanism espoused by Beitz and Pogge differs from what is implied by Singer’s beneficent principle of sacrifice. The extrapolation here is focused more on transnational interactions than beneficent consequences. Economic justice and political action become as much part of global justice as the individual moral action. Beitz is, of course, in general agreement with the thesis that the morality of states in the “society of states” implies that states like individuals bear the burden of rights and obligations, follow a system of norms and treat each other as equal moral persons. (Beitz 2005, 16). For Beitz, the crux of moral cosmopolitanism is to be found in individualistic and inclusive concerns of Pogge’s phrase that “every human being has a global stature as the ultimate unit of moral concern.” (Pogge 2002, 169). Beitz is, very much conscious of the fact that the justifications and implications of the phrase indeed need to be specified carefully involving moral reasoning for the individual and for the social institutions.
The above phrase by Pogge is applied by Beitz to his own brand of moral cosmopolitanism which draws a parallel between the basic structure of international relations and the basic structure of domestic society in terms of the requirements of distributive justice. For Beitz, it is a maxim which is applicable to the entire world in so far as policies are preferred and chosen and institutions are established in accordance with the claims of each person who is likely to be affected. The justification and criticism of policies and institutions are also supposed to be grounded in moral cosmopolitanism. For him, this poses a challenge to theories that assign special responsibility to state or community as distinct from global responsibility. In contrast with morality as situated within a community, Beitz points out the global origins of poverty and deprivation and the fact that justice cannot be confined within the national boundaries. (1999, 524-527). What is, however, problematic in Beitz position, as pointed by Brian Barry, is his argument for global redistribution of income from within the confines of Rawlsian difference principle. (Barry 2008, 191)

**Pogge’s Negative Duties:**

Pogge advocates moral cosmopolitanism. Grounded in the sense of moral universalism and recognizing equal moral status of human beings as persons, it is marked by a tripartite characterization by Pogge in his *World Poverty and Human Rights* (2010, 175): (i) Individualism is the fact that the basic units of moral concern are individual human beings; (ii) Universality refers to the status of every human being as of equal concern; and Generality, i.e., the status of human beings is global – all human beings are units of ultimate concern for everyone. The first of the three principles seems to give a different emphasis on the general understanding of cosmopolitanism, particularly Pogge’s institutional one. The three principles indeed represent a correct rendition of moral cosmopolitanism. Nonetheless, they remain, in Pogge’s account, too abstract to be of much additional significance. Moreover, one might as well include a fourth fundamental element in the form of impartiality. In the case of moral obligation, in particular, the moral cosmopolitanism finds it morally questionable to include extrinsic factors like partiality stemming from allegiance and loyalty.
As already pointed out above, it is of much greater interest to Pogge to apply human rights standard to existing global institutional order. By defining human rights in terms of moral claims on social institutions, he opts for a variant of institutional moral cosmopolitanism built upon human rights based negative duty refusing to participate in imposing on others the existing unjust institutional order. Pogge unequivocally declares that most residents of the affluent, advanced countries violate: “A negative responsibility based on the fact that we participate in, and profit from, the unjust and coercive imposition of severe poverty . . . a negative responsibility according to which most of us do not merely let people starve, but also participate actively in starving them.” (Pogge 1998.502).

Pogge’s argument runs like this: “the responsibility of persons is . . . a shared responsibility for the justice of any practices one helps to impose: one ought not to cooperate in the imposition of a coercive institutional order that avoidably leaves human rights unfulfilled without making reasonable efforts to protect its victims and to promote institutional reform.” (Pogge 2010, 176).

Building his thesis on the view that justice and injustice are directly caused by the institutional design, he lays the blame for massive global poverty on policies and practices of international institutions that are dominated by the rich countries of the world. The responsibility for injustice, for Pogge, falls squarely on those participating in the institutional framework constituting the prevailing unjust social system. One might conceivably avoid this responsibility by withdrawing such participation. It may not, indeed, be possible in the world of reality. Therefore, for Pogge, the best solution is to strive to reduce the injustice of global institutions by ceasing to cause any further harm to the global poor and repair damage already caused: “. . . the global moral force of human rights is activated only through the emergence of a global institutional order, which triggers obligations to promote any feasible reforms of this order that would enhance the fulfilment of human rights.” (Pogge 2010, 177).

The fact Pogge wishes to point out is that by our participation in the global order, the human rights become the concern of all human beings. By opting for institutional cosmopolitanism, Pogge also
hopes to show that it makes the institutional view primary and leads to “a more plausible and more pertinent overall morality.” (Pogge 2010, 176)

Critics have identified a number of flaws in Pogge’s rights based approach to global justice. For example, Kok-Chor Tan has argued that restricting human rights claims to only those who while sharing an institutional order fail to take account of moral claims made by individuals against each other. He has developed a well-argued case where non-members, as in the event of genocide, are totally excluded from an institutional order, thus removing the most vulnerable from the ambit of social justice. (Tan 2010, 50-51). The criticism seems to be an off-shoot of the impression that “Pogge sidesteps the philosophical debate over whether there are also positive duties of justice beyond negative duties. (Tan 2010, 47). The fact of the matter is that Pogge is indeed aware of the positive duties but for him negative duty not to uphold injustice is more relevant to the existing severe global poverty. He says: “I do not assert that there are no positive duties . . . or that such duties are feeble. Rather I avoid claims about positive duties so as to make clear that my case does not depend on such claims. (Pogge 2005, 34). He further elaborates: “One great challenge to any morally sensitive person today is the extent and severity of global poverty. There are two ways of conceiving such poverty as a moral challenge to us: we may be failing to fulfil our positive duty to help persons in acute distress; and we may be failing to fulfil our more stringent negative duty not to uphold injustice, not to contribute to or to profit from the unjust impoverishment of others.” (Pogge 2008, 440).

The project at hand with Pogge happens to be to establish that there is a factual phenomenon, that of the global affluent harming the poor and violating their moral duty to refrain from it, he appears to concentrate exclusively on negative duties. Since he finds global institutions to be culpable for the global poverty, his focus remains largely on the institutional order rather than the individuals committing injustice against their fellow human beings.
What is unique about Pogge’s position on poverty is his focus on negative duties and their relation with global justice. The advantage he was looking for was a watered down conception of justice and an escape from the controversy about positive duties being applicable to both causing poverty and not being able to reduce it. It is indeed true that negative duties are crucial to Pogge’s thesis about global justice. But, the question is: Can positive duties be totally disregarded in any project related poverty eradication at the global level? Shouldn’t the global rich be considered responsible also for eliminating poverty even if they are not found culpable for the misery of the poor? Obviously, Pogge opts for a libertarian minimal conception of human rights and justice as involving negative duties alone. His focus is on “specific minimal constraints . . . on conduct that worsens the situation of other.” Thus, Pogge, in his thesis on global poverty, clearly makes a distinction between “causing poverty and merely failing to reduce it,” thereby avoiding the basic positive duty postulate. (Pogge 2010, 15).

Pogge refuses to allow that responsibility of global poverty primarily lies with the poor themselves. He, however, allows that corruption of the ruling elite of the poor countries have a role to play in the burgeoning poverty and injustice: “We the citizens and governments of the affluent societies, in collusion with the ruling elites of many poor countries, are harming the global poor by imposing an unjust institutional order upon them.” (Pogge 2005, 59). A lack of liberal culture and issues relating to capacity and competence add to the misdoings of the corrupt elite. The presence of certain global economic frameworks mentioned by Pogge, e.g., international resource privilege and international borrowing privilege are helping the corrupt despotic regimes to plunder the national resources. The power structure of international organizations like is also accused of favouring the global rich. Pogge has made a good case for the responsibility for the global poverty being securely laid at the door steps of the global rich. But, is this a fool proof case? Allen Patten (2005) does not think so. The indigenous factors operating within different national boundaries strongly emphasize that there are causal factors other than global institutional order as well contributing to the global poverty. (The issue will be analysed in detail in the next chapter). Such a scenario demands that harming the
global poor may be replaced by a wider notion of failing to bring about a possible improvement in their existing condition. But, such a move will be construed as bringing back the positive duties in the garb of inflated negative duties. This extended conception of negative duties will also require Pogge to give up the libertarian minimalist conception of global justice.

What is wrong with the rights approach to world poverty, according to Onora O’Neill, is that no individual human being can claim his need-based right against another individual. She argues that this contingent relationship between one person’s rights against another’s duty is very much required to make it a genuine human right. O’Neill, true to the Kantian tradition, uses categorical imperative as the criteria of universalizability, lays more emphasis on obligation than on rights. She terms his approach as “the maverick version of Kantian ethical reasoning.” (O’Neill 1986, 131). She prefers obligation rather than rights as the primary concept while approaching problems of poverty and hunger. “We can be obligated to contribute to the relief of hunger and poverty even though the obligation of any particular person is not owed to any particular other.” (Valls 2000, 182). Such an obligation to an unspecified other is termed as ‘imperfect obligation’ not in the sense of a conceptual deficiency but one that is not owed to any specific individual. It is as imperative as the perfect obligation. There is an implicit acceptance on the part of O’Neill that unspecified obligation make sense while the same is not the case with rights. It does not imply, on O’Neill’s part that substituting claims of right by beneficent obligation is meant to reduce the seriousness of the moral responsibility of the global rich for the world poverty. It remains a strictly enforceable moral obligation for meeting people’s basic needs. The so-called universal imperfect duties lacking counterpart rights are “enact able by all but not for all; a fortiori they cannot be claimed by each from all.” (O’Neill 1996, 148). It may, however, be pointed out that O’Neill’s explanation of obligation is not derived from and are independent of rights claim since for her the theory of fundamental rights is narrow.
Pogge thinks that O’Neill’s contention on right-based and duty-based approach to morality is not important. He draws a parallel between rights and obligations in the context of formulation of a normative redistribution principle and compares the obligation based reasoning mode with the right based one:

(i) **Obligation based reasoning:**

> “Any person, A, has the duty to help any other person, B, just in case B is destitute and A is affluent and A is not already doing enough for other destitute persons.” (Pogge 1992a, 240).

(ii) **Rights-based reasoning:**

> “Any person, B, has a right to be helped by any other person, A, just in case B is destitute and A is affluent and A is not already doing enough for other destitute persons.” (Pogge 1992a, 241)

The two alternating principles have, for Pogge, a similarity in so far as they have a potential for normative action and it is the context that will decide which alternative may be used. It leads him to say that “these human rights and duties may be conceived as coeval: two sides of the same coin, neither more basic than, or grounded in, the other. (Pogge 1992a, 247). As against O’Neill, Pogge argues quite cogently that a rights claim can also be context-specific. But, the question still remains: why should, in terms of basic needs, obligations should have more appeal than rights. The agent’s capacity to do as specified by the obligation is logically bound up with the concept ‘obligation.’ The obligation asserts the potential of the agent. On the other hand, the agency and capacity are not so obviously linked in rights claims in the case of rights not directed specifically at any particular individual. As imperfect rights, such rights may refer to a number of agents unlike obligations that indicate only the capacity of a single agent. Obviously, including the condition of capacity to respond to such rights becomes a difficult proposition. It is, in essence a matter of moving from being a recipient of an obligation to its agent thus making O’Neill’s distinction
relevant again: “. . . the two perspectives of agency and of recipience are not equivalent beyond the domain of law and of comparably well-defined institutional relationships, we must choose between them.” (O’Neill 1996, 146). However, it is problematic situation where we want to shift from recipience to agency. It is because agency and obligations are derivations from recipience. It is a fact that a normative framework is initiated from the perspective and interests of individual human beings and this is the source from which principles of justice are derived. The purpose of duty is explained in relation with needs (interests) which are expressed in the form of rights. Therefore, interests, needs and rights have a priority over obligations and provide the necessary explanatory wherewithal.

**Human Rights, Poverty and The Unjust Institutional Global Order:**

The stringent negative duty not to harm the global poor stressed by Pogge underscores the economic, political and moral dimensions of injustice and poverty that prevails in the world. The phenomenon led Nagel, a prominent political philosopher to make what he called the most uncontroversial claim that “we do not live in a just world.” (Nagel 2005, 113). Indeed, the issue he was centrally concerned with was related to the practical questions about global governance that naturally take one to the establishment of global institutions, the issue is also crucial to Pogge’s idea of global justice. But Pogge invokes both justice and human rights for the purpose of supporting negative duties. He characterizes severe poverty as a human rights violation. (Pogge 2010, 14-18). At the global level, the responsibility of such violation rests with the states and the citizens in so far as they participate in imposing a flawed institutional order knowing full well that they can create an order far less harmful to human rights. “By shaping and enforcing the social conditions that foreseeable and avoidably cause the monumental suffering of global poverty, we are harming the global poor or, to put it more descriptively, we are active participants in the largest, though not the gravest, crime against humanity ever committed.” (Pogge 2005, 33). Let us see how far Pogge is correct in extending the responsibility of the affluent states to its citizens in terms of collective responsibility and enforcement of human rights.
Pogge begins by showing “that our world is pervaded by ... ‘radical inequality’” and rightly argues that “the better-off can improve the circumstances of the worse-off without becoming badly off themselves.” (2005, 37). Referring to the effects of shared social institutions, he offers “in parallel three second steps of the argument, each of which shows in a different way that the existing radical inequality involves us in harming the global poor.” (2005, 37). The rich countries, in collusion with the corrupt elite of the poor countries, utilize the harmful international institutions like the resource privilege and the borrowing privilege to “provide strong incentives to potential predators (military officers, most frequently) to take power by force” while oppressing their people and diverting state revenues into their personal kitty (2005, 49). The tax laws enacted by the rich countries help these corrupt elites by upholding “continued and asymmetrical protections of their markets through tariffs, quotas, anti-dumping duties, export credits, and subsidies to domestic producers, greatly impairing the export opportunities of even the very poorest countries ... these protections certainly account for a sizeable fraction of the 270 million poverty deaths since 1989.” (2005, 50).

To me, Pogge seems to have only established the collective responsibility of the affluent countries for the global poverty. He is yet to establish the responsibility of the collective as well as individual responsibility of the citizens of such erring states. Only then can he accuse them of violating their negative duties or for that matter causing harm to the poor of the world. He has clearly not been successful in establishing how the citizens are individually or collectively upholding the radical inequality rampant in the poor countries of the world. As far as the imposition of the coercive, unjust social institutions is concerned, he does not clearly explain how the citizens collaborate in economic and political practices (taxes and trade regulations, etc.) of the global institutions. How can Britain’s refusal to vote in the UN against Indian atrocities in Kashmir make a British citizen culpable of violating a negative duty when it is not logically possible for him to violate that duty? Instead of banking on a general principle drawing individual responsibility from a collectivity, one needs to furnish specific argument for the claim that we are harming the global poor as well as how this is being done. Following is a rare passage in Pogge that tries to explain how the citizens of rich
countries violate their negative duties towards the global poor: “I must not help uphold and impose upon [others] coercive social institutions under which they do not have secure access to the objects of their human rights. I would be violating this duty if, through my participation, I helped sustain a social order in which such access is not secure, in which blacks are enslaved, women disenfranchised, or servants mistreated, for example. Even if I owned no slave or employed no servants myself, I would still share responsibility: by contributing my labour to the society’s economy, my taxes to its governments, and so forth. I might honour my negative duty, perhaps, through becoming a hermit or an emigrant, but I could honour it more plausibly by working with others toward shielding the victims of injustice from the harms I help produce or, if this is possible, toward establishing secure access through institutional reform.” (2010, 72)

The argument offered in the above passage invites criticism on various counts. For example, merely by making economic contributions to a society cannot establish a share in responsibility of sharing a coercive social order. How can this be construed as harming the poor of the world and a violation of negative duties? This line of argument is not enough to establish such an individual responsibility; neither can it help us establish the violation of negative duties on this count. Pogge also offers an explanation in a different piece of writing referring to two upstream factories releasing chemicals into a river:

“The chemicals of each factory would cause little harm by themselves. But the mixture of chemicals from both plants causes huge harm downstream. In this sort of case, we must not hold each factory owner responsible for only the small harm he would be causing if the other did not pollute. This would leave unaccounted-for most of the harm they produce together and would thus be quite implausible. Provided each factory owner knows about the effluent released by the other and can foresee the harmful effect they together produce, each owner bears responsibility for his marginal contribution, that is, for as much of the harm as would be avoided if he alone were not discharging his chemicals. Each factory owner is then responsible for most of the harm they jointly
produce.” (2005, 48). Does this line of argument really help Pogge’s idea of collective responsibility? One may very well assume, in this regard, that the small amount of harm the individual citizen of an affluent state causes by his participation in the global institutional system will be offset by the development aid given by such a country. Suppose the citizen of the erring state reacts to unjust policies of such a state by refusing to pay taxes, the state might react by cutting developmental aid causing even more harm to the global poor. In the final analysis, it seems that if one’s hard work and payment of taxes to the government of a rich country imposing an unjust, coercive institutional order on the global poor amounts to violation of some negative duties, the recourse left to fulfil these duties is to become a hermit. On the other hand, can we recommend a similar way out for the local inhabitants of the poor states who by working for transnational companies, are also contributing to the unjust global order? If they are not required to live the life of a hermit because they may be contributing to their own well-being and even that of the poor country they inhabit, how can the citizens of rich countries be asked to do so?

An important question that needs to be explored is whether there is any justification in the assumption that the main task of the global institutional order is to protect universal human rights and the failure to do may be termed as harming the global poor. How can we construe it to be unjust on account of its failure to prevent human rights violation? It is important to make a clear distinction between the following two claims:

   (i) That reforming the global institutional order is needed in order that basic human rights may be protected in a better way;

   (ii) The participation in the global institutional order should be considered as unjust if it fails to protect basic human rights.

The first claim does not necessarily mean that supporting the existing institutional order implies a violation of negative duties. The role of the institutional order seems to be neutral in so far as helping protect or helping violate the basic human rights. It is obvious that participation in the
existing institutional order does not necessarily obstruct the development of a better institutional order. The above argument, indeed, reflects negatively on the thesis that participation in an institutional order has much to do with violation of negative duties. What one expects from Pogge is a more thorough and strong argument linking human rights violations with the coercive institutional order. The whole issue may more beneficially be assessed from an interactional angle, but this is not our main concern here.

Pogge’s idea of global poverty as a human rights violation is inextricably linked with what was described as moral cosmopolitanism earlier in the chapter. While citing the example of much acclaimed moral maturity and civilizational enlightenment of the affluent West, the glaring indifference towards rampant poverty in the third world countries, Pogge raises doubts about the prevailing criteria of global justice and forcefully poses two questions about the juxtaposition of great progress in our moral norms and conduct with a rather catastrophic moral situation:

(i) “How can the severe poverty for half of humanity continue despite enormous economic and technological progress and despite the enlightened norms and values of our heavily dominated Western civilization”? 
(ii) “Why do we the citizens of the affluent Western states not find it morally troubling, at least, that a world heavily dominated by us burdens so many people with such deficient and inferior starting positions.” (Pogge 2010, 3).

These are, indeed, morally troubling questions? And his answer is equally caustic: “because we do not find its {poverty’s} eradication morally compelling” due to the reason that we do not “find its persistence and the relentless rise in global inequality troubling enough to warrant serious moral reflection.” Many of the Western citizens happen to know only the bare outlines of the issue “because those who do know more – economists and other academics, journalists, politicians – do not find it morally disturbing enough to highlight, publicize, and discuss” since “they do not see global poverty and inequality as morally important issues” for them. (2010, 3). Pogge undertakes a
lengthy discussion about the causal factors that influence a person’s idea of justice and morality. He rejects the typical Western man’s assumptions that persuade him to neglect global poverty. Further, he criticizes what are dubbed as ‘skillful’ defences in passively consenting to world poverty. He concludes by rejecting what he called “explanatory nationalism” and “purely domestic poverty thesis” emphasizing that the global institutional order played an over-arching role in regard to global poverty.

It may be easy to attribute violation of human rights in poor countries to moral and practical failure of the citizens, leaders and governments of such countries. What is philosophically original in Pogge’s thesis is that he completely reconstitutes the notion of responsibility for global poverty and violation of human rights. He presents a contested philosophical account of why global poverty is morally condemnable as well as of the moral responsibility of this poverty. Thus, by establishing a significant link between the existing international institutional order and the prevailing global poverty, he underscores the most compelling reason for assigning the responsibility for global poverty to the citizens of the affluent countries and citizens of the Western countries. It is their culpability in making a nexus to compel the poor countries to accept a global institutional order that results violation of human rights. This culpability of having violated the morally fundamental requirement not to cause severe harm to innocent people for minor gains encourages Pogge to make the Western man responsible for atoning for the crime of causing global poverty.

When Pogge speaks about the duty of the affluent towards the global poor he does that in terms of making amends for the injustice done to them, the duty of justice. But, the injustices that are done to the poor in Pogge’s scheme of things are institutionally generated and can be eliminated by reforming the erring institutional setup or by replacing the existing institutional mechanism by a new one, a better one. The corrective steps, however, are derived from fundamental uncontroversial moral principles that underlie the duty of justice not to harm others. Interestingly enough, Pogge hopes to transcend and come out on the other side of the libertarian and maximalist of human
As already pointed out above, there are philosophical gaps in Pogge’s attempt to focus negative duties in isolation from positive duties. This institutionalized conception of human rights can be understood from two separate angles:

i. There are human rights violations that are carried out by state institutions and their agents, e.g., in the case of harm at the hands of an inefficient or corrupt police officer.

ii. There are human rights demands people can make against each other when they are subject to a shared institutional order. (This is the angle relevant to our present discussion.) Pogge has a following stand on the issue of human rights in a common institutional scheme of thing: “Responsibility for a person’s human rights falls on all and only those who participate with this person in the same social system. It is their responsibility, collectively, to structure this system so that all its participants have secure access to the objects of their human rights. In our world, national societies are the paradigmatic example of relevant social systems, and the responsibility of your human rights falls then upon your government and your fellow citizens. The institutional understanding thus occupies an appealing middle ground: it goes beyond (minimalist interactional) libertarianism, which disconnects us from any deprivations we do not directly bring about, without falling into a (maximalist interactional) utilitarianism of rights, which holds each of us responsible for all deprivations, regardless of the nature of our causal relations to them." (Pogge 2010, 72).

The negative claim which the above passage begins excluding those who do not participate in the same social order is further emphasized by Pogge while accepting the minimalistic Libertarian constraint: “Given the minimalist constraint, such human rights give you claims not against all other human beings, but specifically against those who impose a coercive institutional order upon you.” (Pogge 2010, 73).

Pogge’s minimalist thesis may not be construed as restricting and confining the human rights jurisdiction only to a selected part of humanity. The point Pogge is trying to make concerns the
relationship between rights and duties. Who has a duty to provide rights to others? Pogge is saying that ‘those who impose a coercive institutional order’ are under that duty or obligation, which according to him, because of our negative duties, is almost everyone in the western world. He is not saying that only some people have rights.

Human rights, after all, are meant to protect all those who are disadvantaged and vulnerable and “to provide some minimal protection against utter helplessness to those too weak to protect themselves. (Shue 1996, 18). Alternatively, history is witness to the most atrocious kind of human rights violations being committed to the persons who were excluded on ethnic, religious grounds from the social set up and were condemned as non-members or outcasts or aliens. This has been quite a common experience where colonialism, genocide, religious extremism, etc. have held sway and conveniently excluded the so-called non-members from the purview of human rights otherwise available for the members of a social order. Such outsiders cannot make a claim that their human rights are being violated. For example, the indigenous Americans against the European invaders or the Indian Muslims against the British occupiers could not have invoked the language of human rights failing even the minimalist test of such a conception of human rights. Such a conception of human right cannot, of course, be acceptable on moral grounds.

I think that the full scope of human rights can only be insured if they are conceived without being first subjected to institutional contingencies. Pre-political, pre-institutional natural rights are said to have emerged from a state of nature via the social contract. In Locke, for example, the moral inviolability of the rights to “life, health, liberty, possession” (1988, ii: 6), irrespective of the institutional membership of the people. The philosophical theorization of human rights has all along been dominated by the natural rights model and such influential writers as Amartya Sen, Martha Nussbaum and James Griffin have espoused this line of thought. The underlying moral requirements are said to constrain the pre-institutional situation, pre-date the institutional contingencies and also provides the ground for establishing social and political institutions. It is,
therefore, possible to conceive human rights without being first subjected to social and institutional contingencies.

Beitz (2009) has classified rights into first order and second order categories (55-56). A sufficiently comprehensive conception, though couched in a rather abstract terminology, and an adequately rich content and formulation of the so-called first-order rights could provide a framework co-extensive with the second-order rights enshrined in the contemporary global rights doctrine. It is, indeed, true that a broadening of the spectrum of the normative core-content of the first-order rights free of institutional contingencies may be deemed as a pressing need for an extensive derivation of second-order rights in the contemporary human situation. One may, however, be ready to concede that the global conception of human rights, though it partakes of the seminal normative content of the natural rights, nevertheless, has a wider spectrum as it reacts to the changing social and political conditions of our life.

As against human rights in the political perspective staking individual claims against institutional structures, the humanistic perspective looks at human rights as pre-institutional claims that individuals may have against other individuals as well as against other agents including the government. The claims are assigned the status of human rights solely on account of the interests that are characteristic of the common humanity they belong to. Does this allow one to argue beyond the well-known distinction between the political and naturalistic dimensions and explore human rights as a moral category? It is, indeed, true that human rights, in the contemporary world, are implemented within an institutional framework. But, their existence and validation largely depend upon moral reasoning. Thomas Nagel’s distinction between the normative and the institutional clearly highlights this aspect of human rights;

“The existence of moral rights does not depend on their political recognition or enforcement but rather on the moral question whether there is a decisive justification for including these forms of inviolability in the status of every member of a moral community. The reality of the moral rights is
purely normative rather than institutional – though of course institutions may be designed to enforce them.” (Nagel 2002, 33).

The philosophers’ overriding interest in the meaning of the term ‘human rights’ takes us back to the view that human rights are rights by virtue of being claims of individuals as human beings irrespective of his religious inclination, his ethnic background, and social circumstances. It centres on one’s conception of what is worthwhile in life. The universality of the conceptual scope of human rights is thus upheld by conceiving human rights independently of their status, in law, morality, culture or practice. The idea transcends the view that grounds human rights in human moralities divided by geographical boundaries. Thus, all human moralities tend to condemn murder and value human right to life. This moral consensus also furnishes us with justification and reason for upholding rights to liberty, possession, etc. It is true that for actual implementation of human rights, legal enactment and political action are very much necessary. But, over and above this, the rights appear to have a reasonably determinate content and character independently of whatever subsequent institutional specifications they might require. Therefore, moral justification and universality of scope seems to distinguish human rights from those institutionally conceived.

In his defence of a similar criticism made by Tan (2010, 47-55), Pogge claims to have preserved the ‘universality of human rights’ from a terminological and a linguistic point of view. He stresses that “our human rights based obligations are indeed limited in scope to those relevantly affected by institutional arrangements we contribute to upholding. But our human rights-based duties are universal (2010, 196). But, if human rights are to be conceived as Tan assumes, as the fundamental moral rights that individuals have qua human rights, then we must extend negative rights to include all basic rights. Pogge also seems to make such a concession when he asserts: “On the institutional understanding, the language of human rights applies, in the first instance, to social institutions. But the responsibility for ensuring that social institutions realize human rights falls of course upon human agents, both individual and collective. This responsibility has a negative and a positive
component . . .” (Pogge 2010, 199). It appears that Pogge, while transcending the traditional debate tends to draw fairly maximalist inferences from minimalist premises as he tried to amalgamate the libertarian normative principles with the requirements of moral cosmopolitanism thus merging the stringent obligations of the affluent to avoid harming the poor with the rather extensive obligation of the people in the affluent world towards the global poor.

**Human Rights as Moral Claims on Society’s Organization:**

In the paper on “Recognized and Violated by International Law: the Human Rights of the Global Poor” (2005), Pogge further elaborates on “How should human rights be conceived?” in the 2002 edition of the world famous *World Poverty and Human Rights* providing moral mandate to a more just economic system in the international context. He was, then, formulating an institutional conception as against an interactional one and asserted: Human rights are . . . moral claims on the organization of one’s society. However, since citizens are collectively responsible for their society’s organization and its resulting human-rights record, human rights ultimately make demands upon (especially the more influential) citizens.” (2010,70).

In the backdrop of tensions found in his earlier conception of collective responsibility (already mentioned earlier), the same idea is echoed in his Paper when Pogge remarks: “Citizens are collectively responsible for the organization of their society.” He extends the responsibility of not violating this duty to all citizens actively creating institutional structures that secure human rights. (Pogge, 2005, 4). If human rights are conceived as moral claims against the organization of a society, how can the organizers of the society escape such claims? This is particularly applicable to the influential organizers who also happen to be the citizens themselves. The critical question that arises here is whether such a conception of citizens organizing a society’s organization truly represents the relationship that currently holds between citizens and the state in the modern liberal modern Western democracies? Furthermore, while disregarding intention and in conditions that are cannot strictly be said to be in the control of an individual, governments and other organizations
exercising authority should be more liable to be apportioned moral blame or praise. Interestingly, beginning with a markedly modern Western liberal tradition, he tends to continue, on the one hand, with common moral sense while on the other hand seems to be moving on a more radical path: “The most remarkable feature of this institutional understanding is that it can go well beyond minimalist libertarianism without denying its central tenet: that human rights entail only negative duties. The normative force of others human rights for me is that I must not help uphold and impose upon them coercive social institutions under which they do not have secure access to the objects of their human rights. I would be violating this duty if, through my participation, I helped sustain a social order in which such access is not secure, in which black are enslaved, women disenfranchised, or servants mistreated, for example. Even I owned no slaves or employed no servants myself, I would still share responsibility: by contributing my labour to the society’s economy, my taxes to its government, and so forth.” (2010, 72).

Pogge refuses to disqualify social and economic human rights under the libertarian insistence on minimalist constraints. When negative duties are construed as including the duty of upholding the just institutions as well, the demand on moral agents is, indeed expanded. Pogge considers the situation still a minimalist one because the requirement still consists of negative duties; so the agents do not consider themselves as doing anything morally more.

Does Pogge’s assertion “Human rights are . . . moral claims on the organization of one’s society” entitle us to ascribe to him a state-centric view of human rights? His institutional conception of human rights, of course, does not endorse such a conception in the light of his other statements like “human rights are moral claims on any coercively imposed institutional order, national or international.” (Pogge, 2000). It seems more reasonable to give greater credibility to his following definition of human rights which is also elaborated by him elsewhere: “I thus propose to explain this concept so that the postulate of a human right to X entails the demand that, insofar as reasonably possible, any coercive social institutions be so designed that all human beings affected
by them have secure access to X. A human right is a moral claim on any coercive social institutions imposed upon oneself and therefore a moral claim against anyone involved in their design or imposition” (2010, 52).

It is, indeed, evident that Pogge’s definition of human rights involves a moral claim on society’s organization. But, another salient feature of his thesis is that he does not confine protection of human rights to the legal realm alone: “The institutional understanding I have in mind diverges from a familiar one that conceives a human right to X as a kind of meta-right: a moral right to an effective legal right to X. So understood, human rights require their own juridification: each society’s government and citizens ought to ensure that all human rights are incorporated into its fundamental legal texts and are, within its jurisdiction, observed and enforced through an effective judicial system.” (2010, 51).

Having corresponding legal rights in addition to the moral ones are, indeed, good for Pogge but “not so important that this additional demand would need to be incorporated into the concept of a human right.” (2010, 51). He seems more inclined to opt for the diversity of ways human rights can be practically implemented in different societies. Hence, the idea of a necessary link between legal and moral rights does not find much favour with Pogge. However, he seems to have diverged from his stand when he called for a degree of constitutional guarantee for democracy to which we will turn shortly.

What is more important is the fact that rather than looking at the significance of whether norms of human rights can be transformed into law, one must see the reason why it must be so transformed. Pogge’s rejection of the idea of individual legal rights is contextualized in his suggestion of universal acceptability of moral norms as embodied in human rights. This is possible if juridification is ruled out. Therefore, most theorists who, like Pogge, tend to define human rights as morally valid claims consider it unnecessary to include the legal dimensions for establishing the meaning of human rights. Notwithstanding the fact that in most Western constitutional
democracies, human rights have come to find secure roots by using the instrument of legal rights.
Pogge’s stand on human rights as “moral claims upon the organization of one’s society” allows him
to maintain that it is more important than using legal mean to hold that a society ensures “secure
access” to objects of human rights.

In the Introduction to his *World Poverty and Human Rights*, Pogge quotes from the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights: “Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the
health and wellbeing of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing, and medical
care. Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set
forth in this Declaration can be fully realized.”

This appears to be an essential prerequisite for Pogge to stake the claim that severe poverty is a
violation of human rights. In order for the violation of a human right to occur, it is necessary that it
is first recognized as a human right. The insinuation is that the right to be free from severe poverty
is “recognized and violated by international law.” (Pogge 2005a). The UN recognition of the fact
that people should have access to the basic necessities of life is blocked by global institutions like
the World Bank, the World Trade Organization and the International Monetary Fund. The global
justice enforced by the global order is thwarted by its own institutions. In other words, the Western
normative political thought itself condemns global poverty as a grievous injustice but is upheld by
the institutional order that prevails.

Pogge’s minimalist interpretation of human rights, while retaining its egalitarian character, avoids
the rather utopian view of other approaches, and hence its practical nature provides us a more
workable route to global justice. Such an approach also allows space for state level, diverse
communities within the larger picture of a global commitment. Human rights are, as already
pointed out, not to be conceived primarily as legal claims against others. Their legal dimension is
derived from their social and moral dimensions. It is the interpersonal life of interdependence that
these social and moral claims are made on all others in meeting fundamental needs. This
universality in principle is circumscribed when these needs are satisfied via the route of economic, social and political institutions of the state as well as at the global level. This multi-layered approach to human rights application seems tailor made for the emerging transnational communities, and global governance institutions in the contemporary growth of globalization.

**Human Rights and Global Justice:**

Pogge has taken the contemporary debate of political philosophy on social justice beyond the national boundaries and connected it to the moral issues of global poverty and global justice. His exposition of moral cosmopolitanism and stringent duties of the affluent towards the global poor because they have violated their negative duty is set in the context of unjust global institutional order depriving the poor of their basic socio-economic human rights. Since these social institutions have an impact on the basic human rights, they need to be morally assessed in the light of the sound principles of justice. Therefore, Pogge formulated an extended conception of justice:

“A conception of justice may affect what we ought to do in at least three ways: we ought to help reform existing social institutions so as to render them more just; we ought to mitigate and alleviate the plight of those deprived and disadvantaged by existing unjust institutions; and we ought to accept certain constraints on our conduct and policies that anticipate the ideal of just ground rules towards which we are striving.” (Pogge 1989, 8).

Such a conception of justice can neither accept the devastating poverty that plague the poor countries of the world nor can it allow the stark disparity and injustice that prevails between the global rich and the global poor. This violation of the basic human rights demands corrective measure in line with the principles of global justice.

Pogge rejects Rawls’s attempt to confine the concept of justice to the basic structure of ‘self-contained’ closed system of a society. Since such a basic structure is not available at the global level, in *the Law of the Peoples*, Rawls thinks the principle of distributive justice cannot be
extended to the international realm. Such a conception, Pogge thinks, will result in a global justice system limiting the obligation of the rich countries only to a duty of assistance. The reason he gives for not accepting such a limited concept of justice is that the affluent countries “are not merely helping too little; but also harming too much.” (Pogge 2006, 223). The objection that the global justice system requires a global government or a global basic structure is ruled out on the grounds that trade and diplomatic relations are sufficient to provide the basic relations between the states. (Pogge 1989, 262-263). Similarly, Beitz finds economic interdependence of states as sufficient grounds for having a global justice system. For him, global interdependence:

“Involves a pattern of transactions that produce substantial benefits and costs; their increased volume and significance have led to the development of a global regulative structure. (…) Taken together, these institutions and practices can be considered as the constitutional structure of the world economy: their activities have important distributional implications”. (Beitz 1999, 148f).

Cosmopolitan egalitarianism supported by Peter Singer and Kok-Chor Tan would tend to be sympathetic to Beitz view as they seems to regard egalitarianism as basic to both domestic and global conception of justice. An egalitarian sensibility is obvious throughout Pogge’s work and also when he looks at the contemporary world order as generating “international social and economic inequalities that are not the maximum benefit of the world’s worst-off persons” in the presence of “the significant political and economic interdependencies that exist today and will in all likelihood persist into the indefinite future.” (Pogge 1994, 196). It seems that the cosmopolitan moral equality postulate rightly underpins the Kymlicka claim that plausible political theories postulate an “egalitarian plateau.” (Kymlicka 2002, 4).

In this context, Pogge’s minimalist thesis loses much of a philosophical substance when he asserts that “you harm others in so far as you make an uncompensated contribution to imposing on them {the global poor} an institutional order that foreseeably produces avoidable human rights deficit.” (Pogge 2005a, 61). Here, wilfully failing to satisfy equal moral claims is treated as human rights
violation. Instead of construing human rights deficit narrowly, Pogge’s identification of harm is an extended one, keeping him securely ensconced within the egalitarian parameters. Pogge is also sceptical about pushing the egalitarian conception of justice at the domestic level taking the form of humanitarian duty of assistance at the international level because the two levels, for him, are asymmetrical. Still, the way Pogge puts across the political and economic interdependencies; humanitarian duty of assistance seems to push the egalitarian principle of justice in the background. Notwithstanding the need for strong egalitarianism to counter asymmetries betrayed by the domestic and international levels of justice, Kelly & McPherson forcefully argue that “egalitarianism writ globally risks conflicting with autonomy, toleration and respect across societies.” (2010, 105).

The global justice debate, thus, shifts to concern for redistribution as per cosmopolitan egalitarianism at the global level versus one in national political societies. It raises the question of priority to be assigned either to the global person or the nation-state compatriot in matters relating to redistribution. There is also the fact of increasing social, economic and political interconnectedness in the wake of increasing globalization providing novel grounds for transnational responsibilities of justice. The two options can be seen as exemplified in Marion Young’s (2006) social connection model and in Thomas Nagel’s dependence on systems of reciprocity as sources of obligation. (2005).

The innovative and original stance taken by Pogge on global poverty and related issues is highly complex as well as popular and has invited a variety of criticism. He has placed the questions of responsibility of poverty, violation of human rights and global justice in an entirely new perspective. His philosophical analysis of the moral grounds of these questions has been variously challenged and criticized. The political thinking generated by Pogge suffers from a difficulty to resolve amalgam of normative, empirical and conceptual jargon that has attracted a large number of critics and commentators. An overriding issue for me is the national/international dichotomy that
needs to be clarified in the backdrop of global poverty and justice. It impacts the entire discussion about the global institutional order, the world government, democracy in the context of Pogge’s stand on human rights, moral responsibility (individual and collective), and other issues. (The next chapter, will, hopefully try to examine some of these issues in the context of contemporary political theory.)
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Chapter six

POGGE REVISITED

The history of political thought is witness to the fact that justice has always been a local concern within a state. The rights debates which originated with the classical concept of justice and social contract also remained largely focused on the question of distribution of justice within a single society. Over the years, a vast amount of philosophical literature has accumulated focusing on the issues of injustice and poverty as well as rights in context of state institutions. The political debate during the modern period has remained largely focused on domestic institutions, e.g. tribal uprisings against the state, local communities rebelling against the monarchies and nation-states resisting the policies of the United Nations. The pre-eminence of the state as the political institution was marked by its territorial integrity, legitimacy and sovereignty. It was, therefore, natural for the political philosophers to contextualize justice within the realm of domestic problems.

John Rawls, in his ‘A Theory of Justice’, categorically argues that his theory of justice is meant to be applied to ‘self-contained national communities. He explains it further: “The relevant systems here, of course, are the basic structures of the well-ordered societies corresponding to the different conceptions of justice. We are concerned with this complex of political, economic, and social institutions when it satisfies, and is publicly known by those engaged in it to satisfy, the appropriate principles of justice. We must try to assess the relative stability of these systems. Now I assume that the boundaries of these schemes are given by the notion of a self-contained national community”. (Rawls 2009, 400-1). David Miller seems to be in a broad agreement when he designates obligations as only applying to those living together as part of the same nation. He views the nation state as the replica of social solidarity that inheres in state level local communities. Arguing for a stronger ethical duty towards compatriots as compared to the foreign nationals, he asserts that “nations are ethical communities ... The duties we owe to our fellow-nationals are different from, and more extensive than, the duties we owe to humans as such”. (Miller 2000, 27). But, the
question that remains to be addressed is why specific relations, with particular individuals and in peculiar cultural contexts are so critical in the lives of human beings?

Iris Marion young seemed to have Rawls in mind when she echoed the prevailing idea of nationality as determining the scope of obligations of justice: "A widely accepted philosophical view continues to hold that the scope of obligations of justice is defined by membership in a common political community. On this account, people have obligations of justice only to other people with whom they live together under a common constitution, or whom they recognize as belonging to the same nation as themselves." (Young 2005, 709)

But, unlike Miller, Young was critical of the pre-eminence of nation state as the subject of ethical analysis and also wanted to extend the purview of ‘solidarity’ beyond the idea of the ‘state.’ On the one hand, she questions how there can be a greater ethical obligation on account of being compatriots when states are not equally well-placed to cater for the needs and rights of their citizens. The empirical evidence clearly shows an uneven distribution of resources between the states, which, form Young, reflects moral arbitrariness (2000). On the other hand, she distances herself from Rawls, claiming that he “thinks about structure in the wrong way.” (2011, 70). Neither the Rawlsian view of justice as applied to closed societies nor its placement in the context of shared institutions is wholly acceptable to Young, who rejects such an idea of state on two counts:

i. “It is arbitrary to consider state membership as the source of obligations of justice,” and states “have evolved in contingent and arbitrary ways more connected to power than moral rights.” (2010, 160-161).

ii. By establishing the moral priority of the social connection over the political institutions, the social connection for Young no longer remains contingent upon the existence of the state.

I do not think the above discussion rules out the fact that nations, cultures and communities are complex entities that play a role not only in dispensation of justice but also in perpetuation of
injustice. Both Millar (1995) and Kymlicka (1995) underscore the need to prefer the good of the local community over that of the foreign citizens. Even if one accepts the global justice thesis, the nation-state will still be left at least with some moral relevance within the broader scheme of things. One may also look into the possibility hinted at by Miller (2012), that the principles of distributive justice known to have inhere within the state may not necessarily be considered appropriate at the global level. I intend to argue that without there being an effective state, elimination of injustice and poverty reduction are impossible. The state capacity, adequate governance and pro-poor institutions are the prerequisites for an equal distribution of resources.

**Institutional Approach to Human Rights:**

Pogge’s institutional approach to human rights was aimed at illustrating the obligations of the affluent world to alleviate poverty, and his main focus was on negative rights and the relieving harm caused by the rich countries to the global poor. His minimalist account construes injustice committed by the global institutional order against the poor of the world as violation of the negative duty of justice not to harm. The negative duty of justice is said to generate a variety of corrective measures like alleviating the harm done, reforming the flawed order, and replacing it with an improved one. But, this entails the well-known debate about the positive and negative duties of justice which Pogge sidesteps by his radical departure away from the content and source of human rights duties and a shift to the process of how the duties are violated. When Pogge’s model of human rights makes a distinction between the institutional and the interactional, the focus of the emphasis moves to the manner in which human rights are understood rather than on their content. The institutional account of human rights is by definition a limiting concept. Those who have a claim to human rights are limited in their scope because they are confined to sharing a specific social order. How can this formulation fulfil the basic goal of the idea of human rights, i.e., the enfranchisement of the disadvantaged and the dispossessed?
Here, one needs to distinguish between the moral and the political grounds of human rights. Emphasizing the normative rather than the institutional reality of moral rights, Nagel denies their existence on the basis of political recognition and enforcement and asserts that it depends “rather on the moral question whether there is a decisive justification for including these forms of inviolability in the status of every member of the moral community.” (Nagel 2002, 33). So, the existence of human rights depends on moral reasoning, although institutional mechanisms may play a very vital role in their enforcement. The corollary of Nagel’s argument is the acceptance of certain pre-political (over and above the shared political order) human rights (security, subsistence, e.g.) applicable without political membership of a community. These happen to be interactional rights that also generate positive rights claimed by individuals against other individuals. In Pogge’s account of institutional human rights, on the other hand, human rights are only negative, are institutionally derived and there is no scope for pre-political rights. Pogge’s theory disregards intention and locates moral praise or blame in circumstances that are often out of the individual’s control and the onus should rightly be placed on governments and other official governing bodies.

Rights understood in the institutional way impose constraints, in the first instance, upon shared practices. They are ‘moral claims on the organization of one’s society, assuming that institutions that perpetuate situations in which people suffer dire need can be said to harm people, we can understand why simply asking institutions to observe the negative right not to harm will correlate with asking them to expand people’s access to basic necessities. Human rights should, therefore, not allow unjust coercive institutions under which people do not have secure access to the objects of their human rights. An institution is considered unjust in so far as it perpetuates a state of affairs where people suffer dire need, even if the institution is also able to do some good. Indeed, institutions exist or act only because of what individuals do. Responsibility for official disrespect of human rights within any coercive institutional order is shared, according to Pogge, by all individuals because they are involved in upholding it. Thus, in imposing constraints on institutions, institutional rights also derivatively constrain individuals. For example, the individuals are
constrained not to support unjust social institutions to the extent of not even paying taxes to the unjust states. In short, individuals must avoid participation in unjust social institutions and when participation is not reasonably avoidable, they must work to reform the institutions and/or compensate their victims.

**Dispersal of Sovereignty:**

Pogge’s declared intention to prefer an institutional conception of human rights seems logical in light of sustained diffusion of state authority in the global perspective. Along with his idea of moral cosmopolitanism, he looks for vertical distribution of power so as to maintain the universality of the politically enshrined human rights as well as to sustain societal differences. By dispersing political authority over closely defined territorial units, he hopes to “decrease the intensity of the struggle for power and wealth within and among states, thereby reducing the incidence of war, poverty, and oppression.” (Pogge 2010, 174). Refusing to support the idea of a world-government on account of its impracticality, he proposes a broader distribution of sovereignty amongst individual democratic states: “. . . I am proposing . . . not the idea of a centralized world state, which is really a variant of the Pre-eminent-state idea. Rather, the proposal is that governmental authority – or sovereignty – be widely dispersed in the vertical dimension. What we need is both centralization and decentralization – a kind of second-order decentralization away from the now dominant level of the state.” (Pogge 2010, 184).

While listing the major reasons needed for such a vertical dispersal of sovereignty, Pogge mentions ‘democracy’ as critical for his proposed, new, multi-layered institutional order: “. . . persons have a right to an institutional order under which those significantly and legitimately affected by a political decision have a roughly equal opportunity to influence the making of this decision – directly or through elected delegates or representatives. Such a human right to equal opportunity for political participation also supports greater local autonomy in matters of purely local concern than exists in most current states or would exist in a world state, however democratic.” (Pogge 2010, 290).
Pogge gives only a very brief account of how dispersal of sovereignty will lead to greater peace and security than in the existing state structure. It is in light of objections raised by Kant and O’Neill against a world-state that Pogge makes a distinction between sovereignty and absolute sovereignty and manages to avoid the real issue. Supposing Pogge is trying to develop new forms of decision-making in order to address the ever increasing global interdependence, can we say that his concepts of centralization and decentralization are conducive to his cosmopolitan ends and provide a successful replacement for the idea of global government? It appears to be an attempt to secure for the individual human beings domestic state autonomy and global input and accountability at one and the same time. Pogge is, indeed, interested in seeing greater global institutional checks on state sovereignty rights. But, he is also convinced that such limits can be applied only when the majority of states happen to be stable democracies. Instead of a global central government Pogge seems to have opted for an “intermediate solution that provides for some central organs of world government without, however, investing them with ‘ultimate sovereign power and authority’” (Pogge 1988, 285). The states retaining some ultimate political authority in the “multi-layered scheme in which ultimate political authority is vertically dispersed” would function in close liaison with an international central coercive mechanism of law enforcement having ultimate political authority in other areas (Pogge 2009, 205–6). Debra Satz rejects the dilemma of world-state and existing state as false claiming “the contrast between a system of sovereign states and a centralized world-state is too crude. There are many other possibilities, including a state system restrained by international and intergovernmental institutions, a non-state-based economic system, a global separation-of-powers scheme, international federalism, and regional political-economic structures . . .” (1999, 77–8)

The above proposal that stops short of a world government offers a number of possibilities but does not rule out the idea of the state as redundant as far as global justice, peace, security and democratic rule are concerned. Its merit lies in the fact that it encourages us to think innovatively about a global constitutional structure without tinkering with the idea of a unitary form of a world-state or
that of external sovereignty. It provides us with a way to think about global constitutional mechanism that allows a democratic dispensation guaranteeing a workable cooperation between state institutions and international governmental institutions. The role of civil society, non-government institutions and citizen bodies operating at the state and the global level needs to be explored so that a smooth coordination can be worked out. A reconfiguration of the existing political institutions demands formulation of novel political principles governing the existing state sovereignty so as to realize the ideal of global justice. In this regard, Young’s idea of ‘global regulatory regimes (2000, 237) as the “post-sovereign alternative to the existing states system” (2000, 238), may not prove successful as the threatening stance of external regulation will be perceived as coercive and may lead to a clash with the basic character of the existing state structure. A collective system of regulation and organization strictly based on democratic principles may only work in the existing scenario where the states are divided radically on grounds of social, economic, political and religious differences.

The role of sovereignty is critical in the debate about global justice. If the reasons given by Pogge for “a vertical dispersal of sovereignty” (Pogge 2010, pp. 187-201) are accepted even at face value, a case can be made for addressing the issues discussed above in the context of Pogge’s central idea of moral cosmopolitanism. As pointed out by Risse (2005), such a view is justified on the grounds that “our world is politically and economically interconnected, a continuous global society based on local territorial sovereignty, whose fate is shaped not merely by states, but also by transnational and Trans governmental networks, structures aptly called the global political and economic order. Since there is such an order, the radically unequal distribution of advantage may not be an aggregative phenomenon arising from many disconnected causes. Instead, we must explore whether there is a sense in which that order itself actually harms the least advantaged, the global poor, in a way that implies an injustice.” (Risse 2005, 350). Identifying the global order with global governance, i.e., the rule of a network of global organizations, he further asserts: “At the political level, the state system is governed by a set of rules, the most significant of which are codified by the UN Charter.
Our current global society has arisen from developments that began in the fifteenth century through the spread of European control, and continued with the subsequent formation of new states through wars of independence and decolonization. At the economic level, the so-called Breton Woods institutions (International Monetary Fund, World Bank, later the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs/World Trade Organization) provide a co-operative network intended to prevent wars and foster worldwide economic betterment. These institutions, together with the more powerful states acting alone or in concert, shape the economic order.” (Risse 2005, p. 251). Since this global order includes but cannot be reduced to the actions of the states, significant questions of political nature emerge: i) Does the global order harm the poor? And (ii) Is the global order just? The global framework harms the poor because of two reasons: (i) unequal distribution of world resources, and (ii) imposition of harmful institutional structure, although better alternatives are available. In a sense growth and prosperity also depend on the quality of institutions, such as stable property rights, rule of law, bureaucratic capacity, appropriate regulatory structures to curtail at least the worst forms of fraud, independence of courts, but also cohesiveness of society, existence of trust and social cooperation, and thus overall quality of civil society. Other factors may include geographical location, natural resources, agricultural and industrial production, human resource as well as integration in the world market.

Risse (2005) considers “harm” and “justice” in the context of violation of rights as there being a right not to be wronged in the sense of “falling short either of having her interests satisfied, or of having what she is entitled to have.” (p. 353). In this regard, he evaluates Pogge’s three grounds of injustice: (i) Uncompensated exclusion from the use of natural resources, (ii) The effects of shared social institutions and (iii) The effects of common and violent history (2010, pp. 205-210). The first point is purported to show how the global order wrongs the poor while the second point blocks the upholding of the interests of the poor. The violent history as the starting point of the worse off is also intended to show that the global order is actually unjust. Since (ii) and (iii) are mainly the effects which converge to cause the uncompensated exclusion, it needs to be closely analyzed.
While generally agreeing with Pogge’s thesis about the role the affluent countries play in global poverty, Debra Satz strongly differs with him on empirical and philosophical grounds.

“Empirically, it is extremely difficult to determine the main causes of global poverty as well as dubious that most world poverty is the effect of global institutions. Philosophically, even if the principle were true, the extent of “our” responsibility for global poverty is complicated by our diverse agency relationships to institutions.” (2005, 48).

It is, indeed, true that there is no point in talking about universal human rights without addressing the question of agency. But, as pointed out by Risse, violation of rights of the poor on account of the global order can only be upheld if the world’s natural resource base is taken to belong to mankind collectively. Therefore, an egalitarian view of common ownership of resources alone can justify Pogge’s claim of rights violation when the poor are harmed. (2005, 364). When Pogge includes individual and institutional responsibilities for social injustices in his account of human rights, he tends to withdraw from his earlier global egalitarian perspective (Pogge 1994). More recently, he does not even refrain from partaking from insights of such anti-egalitarian theorists of justice as Nussbaum, while making pragmatic choice in favour of a “thin conception of human flourishing” with attainment of a “standard of living” as a criterion of justice (Pogge 2010, pp. 34, 44-45). Citing US society as an example, Pogge declares that: “Social institutions cannot be so designed that everyone affected by them has absolutely secure access to all goods that he needs.” He elaborates the point further: “When social institutions work so that each person affected by them has secure access – understood always as reasonably rather than absolutely secure access – to minimally adequate shares of all basic goods then they are, according to my proposed criterion of basic justice, fully just” (2010, p. 44- emphasis added).

Is Pogge’s reducing access to the minimal level of basic goods a theoretical shift in his conception of global justice? In An Egalitarian Law of peoples, he denies any renunciation of egalitarian requirements of justice on pragmatic grounds. But, Veronique Zanetti raises a pertinent question
here: “What reason can we give to the least advantaged for choosing, on the domestic level, a principle of justice oriented to the poorest, even if the poorest people in our country have a standard of living far higher than the minimum standard with which we expect the poorest of other countries to be content?” (2005, 209). But, accepting the minimal standards on account of practical considerations need not imply rejection of the principle of equality as the basic principle. The fact remains that our global institutional scheme is unjust and many persons are wronged by it. If, on the other hand, Pogge’s minimalism is meant to accommodate all those who are not ready to endorse the ideal of global liberalism, then as Zanetti points out “this pragmatic concession is not compatible with Pogge’s individual egalitarianism” (Zanetti, 2005, pp. 210-211). On the other hand, Debra Satz assigns him the “normative premise typically associated with libertarianism—that we have strong duties not to harm but only weak duties to benefit people we have not harmed—and conjoin it with an empirical claim to generate an argument for radical global redistribution.” (2005, 47). The fact of the matter is that Pogge derives his redistributive principle from need of reforming the unjust institutions rather than from egalitarian requirements. Hence, redistribution for him is driven by corrective justice. It is not the misery of the miserable that attracts moral obligation but the felt responsibility for its appearance and continuation. We are responsible for the violation of rights of the poor because we are significant participants in establishing and maintaining the unjust world order.

Jan Narveson, in a devastating critique of egalitarianism, turns the argument for the violation of rights of the poor on its head. He refuses to accept that “each of us could do vastly more than we do to help the needy. . . That we don’t is a serious moral failing”. (2004, 305). Assigning the present state of poverty in the global context to the biological and geographical factors, he claims that the responsibility of the abject poverty certain people suffer today lies squarely with their governments. Contesting the claim that resources have been transferred from the poor to the rich countries, he cites the example of the prosperity of Hong Kong and Holland who have virtually no resources and concludes that it is the kind of work that people do that fundamentally create wealth. He sees no
hope for poverty alleviation in the form of foreign aid. He explains that giving him a fish will take care of his onetime meal, while provision of fishing equipment will enable him and his family to eat indefinitely. Using the parable of the hungry fisherman, he suggests a simple remedy to cure poverty:

‘The poor are not disabled, they are not incompetent, they are not stupid. They are, in part, unfortunate, in being born into a part of the world that is much less economically developed than others. But this is a remediable misfortune, the remedy for which is the usual one for the problems of human life: namely, intelligent work, work well applied to one’s situation’. (Narveson 2004, 347-348).

In the light of Narveson’s assessment, neither Singer’s (1972) solution to contribute massively to international relief agencies nor Pogge’s (2010) redistribution of money through Global Resource Dividend can hope to have much success in ameliorating the lot of the poor. Such interventions, as Julio Montero (2010) anticipates, may even be counterproductive: “Not only can important transfers of financial resources into an economy cause inflation and reduce the purchasing power of the very poor, but they can also be detrimental for local production, employment, and ongoing industrialization processes, by fostering a massive importation of foreign goods. Even if this type of international tax succeeded in alleviating the situation of the least advantaged, it may distort the international economy and lead to the emergence of new poor people in already developed countries or among the middle classes of developing ones.” (p. 32).

Another serious issue is the need of an international regulatory authority to oversee and ensure distributive fairness, reframing of rules on how global institutions will function and keep the entire network attuned to fair play and justice. An authoritative body with moral and political powers, equally acceptable to the donor and the recipient alone will be able to make decisions and pronouncements having sufficient binding force to be effective in the global perspective. Presently, no such institutional structure exists in the world.
In light of the above, one can be highly sceptical about the fate of Pogge’s institutional account of human rights. One objection is raised by Magnus Reitberger who claims that Pogge’s argument fails to distinguish between harms caused by the global institutions themselves and harms caused by the domestic policies of particular states and collective action problems for which collective responsibility cannot be assigned (2008). Pogge was, indeed well aware of the fact that much poverty results from state action, particularly by bad governance. He accepts the fact that “most severe poverty would be avoided . . . if the national government and elites of the poor countries were genuinely committed to good governance and poverty eradication” (2007, 46). Since he is pretty sure that the prevailing state of affairs in the poor countries is not likely to change for the better from within, he proclaims “that most severe poverty would be avoided, despite the corrupt and oppressive regimes holding sway in so many poor countries, if the global institutional order were designed to achieve this purpose” (2007, 46). Pogge fails to realize the power of the vested interests at the global level and their potential to vitiate the scheme proposed by Pogge. The impact on both the donor and recipient countries may be unpalatable. Pogge also fails to realize fully the depth and range of the poverty causing factors locally operating in the form of a network of an alternative institutional system. With local institutions in an advanced stage of distortion and without a just and responsible leadership, how can Pogge hope for an easy passage and implementation of international institutional reform initiatives?

But, then, should we stop thinking about poverty in terms of helping the poor? In his article in response to World Poverty and Human Rights, Allan Patten (2005) poses the question: Should we accept the Lifeboat Earth analogy so passionately rejected (from a Kantian perspective) by Onora Nell (1975)? Onora Nell’s view stands in stark contrast with the Singer (1972)-Unger (1996) thesis that affluent people of the world should give away their entire surplus for poverty alleviation. Notwithstanding the moral dimensions of the contrary views, or in the case of middle of the road Fishkin (1982) in his minimal altruism (p. 3), no one can deny that “the importance of the kind of life we have set out to live is greater than the amount of suffering preventable by depriving
ourselves of the means to live it.” (Fishkin 1982, 77). So, it may not be a surprise if for some of us “Giving becomes a vice”! (Neera Badhwar, 2006). Jennifer Trusted may be right in asserting that “in this context actions speak louder than words” (1995, 296-297), but ethical dimension remains equally important. One may have a stronger feeling of compassion and benevolence for one’s near and dear ones. But, moral duty to help others in need is more a matter of responsibility and obligation. The moral worth of an action lies in acting according to the principle of duty, though it may have causes and consequences. But, when this duty and responsibility are exercised at the institutional level, or by states, charitable ideals are subordinated to the more pragmatic goals relating to national and regional interests. Thus, aid giving agencies are motivated by a variety of complex reasons to help the poor and they may have other motives than those purely guided by moral obligation and duty.

Over the years the issue of poverty has grown in complexity and consequently it is becoming more and more difficult to find appropriate solutions. It is no longer a straightforward condition of lack of resources, low income and destitution. There are no easy to identify parameters ready- made to measure the poverty of a group or a community. Poverty is now embedded in a thick description of diverse social, historical and political phenomena which culminates in what may be called a culture of poverty. The questions now being asked are: who are the poor, why are they poor, why the poor lack the will to work, should they be treated merely as passive recipients of aid, what should be a proper response to the perennial problem of poverty? A multi-disciplinary, close appraisal of the phenomenon of poverty gives an insight into a multi-variate origin and growth of poverty across the globe. The experience of being poor has grown out a multiplicity of possible lacks and shortcomings ---- material, moral, social and metaphorical---defined against what constitutes prosperity and success. Poverty is produced through processes of social differentiation and shaped by the politics of wealth and power, both globally and locally. In other words, while the end results of poverty-producing processes are scarcity, suffering and social exclusion - poverty is formed within cultural frameworks and has to be examined in its proper social and historical context.
The Need to Focus on The State:

The proper social and historical context demands that the role of the state in the global institutional approach to poverty evaluation is re-assessed. If we sincerely wish to grapple with the issue of poverty in its true historical, political and social context, we should make genuine efforts to search and find reliable answers to the question of relation of the state with the global institutional order. Even after making a detailed analysis of global justice in the institutional context by Pogge, one fails to find a comprehensive definition of a global institution. Neither do we come across a clear delineation of an institutional framework for global justice in the existing political and economic world order. It is, indeed, true that he refers to non-domestic social institutions, including global rules of governance, trade, and diplomacy. However, Pogge is bound to face the larger issues concerning state sovereignty, nationalism and globalization. Cosmopolitanism suggests that we should shift our moral attention from the local to the global, adopting a wider realm of responsibility to ensure the wellbeing of all the world's citizens. The present day world is beset with bigger issue that cannot be tackled without concerted action at the international level. How states could be persuaded to give up part of their sovereignty and their right to rule within their borders? How will it be possible to reverse the view that national interests override an individual’s well-being? How can the pragmatically driven global politics and global action on the part of the non-government networks of power across the world be diverted in favour of the project of an ethical cosmopolitanism? It is, therefore, imperative for an account of cosmopolitan justice to move carefully past all these hazards. Neither an idealized account of justice nor making too many concessions to the existing institutional network can fully succeed. The question is: Is a world government a solution in the cosmopolitan perspective? Or, more reasonably, is a concerted effort to reform the international institutions in favour of poverty eradication likely to succeed? In any case a reformed institutional framework for global justice is very much called for.
Pogge presents his idea of “a vertical dispersal of sovereignty” in the backdrop of a sustained diffusion of state authority in the global perspective. Such a stand point is quite justified in the interconnected global political and economic order dominated by transnational and trans-governmental networks that is alleged to harm the least advantaged, global poor unjustly. However, when we evaluate Pogge’s delineation of its specific grounds, it appears difficult empirically and philosophically to determine exactly the connection and responsibility of institutions and poverty. It is not possible for Pogge to do justice to his view because he tends to shy away from the egalitarian view of common ownership of resources. Moreover, it betrays a theoretical shift in his concept of global justice when he confines the access of the poor to the minimal level of basic goods. Again, asking the poor of the countries with a higher standard of living to opt for the minimal access cannot be justified. Though the minimal standard is as the basic principle of equality, Pogge tends to vacillate between global liberalism and libertarianism linked with radical global redistribution. Obviously, his redistribution is driven by corrective justice and not by egalitarian requirements. It cannot, therefore, be said with certainty if Pogge’s redistribution through Global Resource Dividend can be successful. There are other constraints like the tension between state institutions and global institutions, the power of the vested interests and the need of an international regulatory authority – issues not fully considered by Pogge.

Pogge’s contribution to the scholarly debate on global poverty is, no doubt, enormous. But, the question I would like to pose is whether reforming global institutional order is sufficient to address global poverty without taking into account the potential and actual relevance of state level local institutions? Can we dispense with the long standing role of the state in perpetuating or alleviating rampant poverty? Can we adequately deal with matters relating to distributive justice and moral responsibility by institutionalizing human rights within the given scheme of institutional cosmopolitanism and in isolation from the domestic conditions prevailing in a state? In order to realize basic human rights, the restructuring and reformulation of human rights based global institutions are considered sufficient. The institutional capacity for resource distribution is supposed
to take care of individual human rights. Hence, little attention is paid to the institutional context at the nation-state level. The redesigning of the reformed and improved institutional arrangement include such measures as institutional global resource dividend and restricted global borrowing privileges that will also only marginally involve the domestic state circumstances. Corruption, of course, has been recognized as one of the local causes of underdevelopment. Notwithstanding the impact of globalization, the realistic picture of domestic social and political conditions confirms a critical influence on development in diverse ways.

The recent experience with global institutional interventions clearly shows that local factors have a profound impact, both in the positive and negative directions, on the poverty alleviation goals set by institutional cosmopolitanism itself. Political dynamics in a number of countries (especially the third world countries) are known to have been inflicted by despotic rule, internecine wars, sectarian and ethnic feuds and terrorism that have diversely obstructed global institutional interventions aimed at overcoming poverty through development. The contemporary world is witness to widespread conflict situation within and among state. This has often led to a general breakdown of government, as well as economic privation and civil strife. Bad governance is a form of injustice that needs to be rectified. State level reform and democratization are generally considered the factors that may lead to social structural change that may remedy the situation. More than reorganizing the systems of administration and resource allocation, the change in the social structure should be able to achieve development through governance that fosters a democratic system of people’s participation and rule of law for achieving non-violent and just resolution of problems. (Bachlor 2001). In such circumstances, the only remedy lies in helping the growth of robust state level democratic institutions with local legitimacy that can play an effective political/social role to eradicate poverty.

The civil conflict-poverty nexus is known to have stalled development in many of the world’s poor states. The vicious cycle is triggered by the fact that these societies suffer from deep rooted ethnic
and sectarian divides and generally lack social cohesion. The firmly grounded social structures cannot possibly be rooted out by external intervention alone which may on the contrary enhance the existing civil conflict. The state level local political and social structures have all along been playing a crucial role perpetuating the conflict situation leading to peculiar modes of insecurity, injustice and poverty. Global institutional interventions have been known to have boomeranged in many instances leading to further extenuation of civil conflicts. It is only through the gradual process of democratization that negotiated resolution of conflicts may become a normal process in the affected state. The process may indeed be facilitated by the concerned global institutions and play a role in facilitating poverty eradication measures.

Pogge, agrees that domestic factors matter immensely. His standpoint, however, does not consider the local and international causes as distinct but rather as conditioned by the global ones. The ground reality, on the other hand, informs us that matters of insecurity, injustice and conflict are rooted in the local socio-political context and may only be accentuated or attenuated under the impact of actions and decisions that emerge from within the context. Thus, the success of the contribution made by the global institutional order to ameliorate the situation is conditioned by the local circumstances. It is, therefore, necessary for institutional cosmopolitanism to fully articulate the state level institutional mechanism and link it with Pogge’s proposed new global institutional order. The success of the project to address global injustice and poverty is contingent upon a comprehensive mutual engagement between the state and global institutions to improve and expand the capacity of both to deliver benefits in the cause of poverty eradication.

Global governance, involves political interaction among transnational agents, but the problems it intends to address are state specific and implementation takes place in that particular setting. Globalization implies regulating human societies on a neutralized scale. However, traditional mode of governance involves political authority and institutions, decision making, enforcement and social relations that take place at the state level and involves civil societies, NGOs, social organizations,
etc. One may very well speak of the development of ‘global public policy,’ (Stone 2008), but implementation mechanism involves besides intergovernmental organizations, the state authorities, NGOs, other private sector entities and civil society actors. Obviously, it is an impossible task providing homogenized political and social conditions in isolation of the state and regional level settings.

Political systems consist of political processes, both formal and informal, that provide the bases for decision making in a society for using, producing and distributing resources. Institutional determination of how the leaders are elected, executive and legislature play their roles, political representation is organized and accountability of the state actions is carried out according to the political system already in place. There is no doubt about the fact that evolution of political systems and the nature of their operational characteristics crucially impact the scope of participation of the poor in decision making and the possibility of poverty eradication in a particular society. In the last analysis, the role of global governance and the success of donor agencies are critically influenced by the prevailing political system of a state.

It is often agreed that democratic dispensation at the state level is a precondition for successful global governance. (Diamond 2004). But, it is rather difficult to characterize clearly what political system is in place in a country. In the Third World, in particular, there are countries with hybrid regimes, somewhere between the authoritarianism and modern liberal democracy. (Rocha Menocal et al 2007). Since the rules and procedures for the global governance are predominantly framed by the representatives of the liberal democracies of the donor countries, these may not be entirely suited to the peculiar political reality of the third world countries. If one were to agree with the contested view that a democratic state set up is more suitable for development and hence for poverty eradication, should global agencies start supporting the emergence of true liberal democracies in the target countries. (Halperine et al 2010).
Besides the state level political institutions, the pattern of informal and customary political entities also tend to influence the efficacy of global governance in particular regions of the world. These informal groups and organizations also influence the reactions of the civil society to the international interventions for development and poverty eradication. Feudal culture, pressure exerted by the religious and sectarian groups and elitist politics cut across participatory democratic politics in many third world countries and are instrumental in perpetuating discrimination on the basis gender, belief, sect, caste and race differences. Their interaction with and influence on the formal political structures may also block pro-poor development work initiate by donor agencies. Brinkerhoff & Goldsmith (2002) have substantiated the view that liberalization, democratization, decentralization and civil service reform lead to good governance.

To that end, the role of NGOs representing civil society for development and poverty eradication has been highly praised as the development alternative by Banks & Hulme (2013). Various researches have tended to assign it the crucial role of accountability in global regulatory arrangements. (Scholte 2003). If civil society is to be defined as the public space between the state, the market and the realm of family relations; it is an associational realm within society, based on voluntary and non-profit affiliation. In this context, civil society turns out to be necessary for making democracy work because at the national level it is partly determined by what happens at the grassroots level. A functioning society not only needs a strong civil society but also a strongly politicized society that can interact with state through participation in decision making process. But, "it is the articulation of goals, power of ideas and efficacy of organizations that will determine [their] political purposes" (Putzel, 1997).

It is obvious that in order for global governance to be really effective in achieving development and poverty eradication goals at a significant level, interdependence between civil society, the state and international institutions must be ensured both at the conceptual and the practical levels. Rethinking of globalization will mean globalization of democracy both at the state and the governance levels.
Democratization of decision making and Global governance through global civil society will ultimately lead to joint governance by all the stakeholders.
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CONCLUSION

This study has explored the relation between poverty, politics and global justice. The focus has been on one of the critical issues of the contemporary world: the ethical, political, economic and social dimensions of poverty. Originating in social ethics, poverty is considered to be an essential component of political philosophy, economic theory and philosophical research. It is, indeed, treated as unjust and evil. However, more important issues relating to equity and justice, welfareism and culture of poverty bring us right in the midst of moral considerations. When equity and justice are viewed from a political perspective, re-distribution of resources and provision of equal chances become empowerment issues that are highly relevant for developing a political theory of poverty. Conceptualized in the context of fairness and justice, equity, and culture of poverty, the political theory of poverty has been formulated in the light of social contract theory, Rawls’s political liberalism, Pogge’s human rights thesis, and the capabilities approach of Amartya Sen and Nussbaum. Within the socio-economic domain, poverty has also been related to unequal access to financial resources, economic deprivation, social exclusion, social choice and distributive justice.

The present thesis takes into account poverty as the critical issue in its multi-dimensional context. Moving beyond the moral responsibility of an individual towards his disadvantaged compatriots, the analysis takes into account the concept of social justice both at the state and global levels. The emerging political theory of poverty views justice as encompassing not only redistribution of resources but also impinging upon empowerment issues by looking at the fundamental equality of human beings in the local and international domains. While Rawls’s political liberalism and Nussbaum’s capabilities approach have made significant contribution to the contemporary literature on poverty, Pogge’s stand on poverty as human rights violation has emerged as the most influential in recent years. However, his claim that the suffering of the global poor is caused entirely by the global institutional order has been contested on empirical and logical grounds. I have argued that state institutions have been equally responsible for the rampant poverty in many places across the
globe, in fact it is imperative to work out a mechanism for coordination between the domestic institutions and the global institutional framework for ameliorating the lot of the global poor.

The concept ‘poverty’ has evolved over the years and the expanding connotation of the term has also broadened the conceptual spectrum to include economic, social, cultural and political aspects of the phenomenon. Pogge’s novel stand on poverty as human rights violation has emerged as a marked advance over material and social deprivation theses as the former encompassed a variety of social and political entitlements that have become a part and parcel of the life of the contemporary human being. Thus, the multidimensionality of the concept now allows us to include monetary resources, social choices, capabilities, political participation and security needs as the necessary requirements for an adequate standard of living. The complexity of the phenomenon, therefore, also demands a new approach to poverty alleviation strategies.

Pogge’s claim about global obligation for poverty alleviation depends upon his argument that the unjust global institutional order dominated by the rich states is responsible for perpetuating foreseeable, predictable and avoidable harm to the global poor and that they are individually and collectively responsible for this. His jump from collective to individual responsibility seems untenable. Similarly, his exclusive concern with the global institutional order tends to believe his own assertion that “most severe poverty would be avoided . . if the national government and elites of the poor countries were genuinely committed to good governance and poverty eradication.” (2007, p.460).

With the most recent shift from vulnerability, inequality and human rights to opportunity, empowerment and security, the development oriented poverty eradication strategies concentrate more on accountability and responsiveness of state institutions. It is the state that can promote people’s participation in the political process and decision making and eliminate social barriers generated by racial, ethnic and gender discrimination. Since poverty now tends to be defined in
terms of vulnerability, risk, powerlessness and lack of voice, the role of the state in poverty eradication has increased manifold.

One of the central premises of the thesis is that poverty as a political issue implies eradication of injustice by both state and global institutions. Social injustice perpetuated by poverty leads to promotion of inequality, maldistribution, exclusion, disempowerment, vulnerability and exploitation. It is argued that welfare oriented democratic dispensation of policies and practices promote institutional politics geared to promote social justice. As a political and a social construct, poverty is conceptualized and framed and a theory of poverty is formulated in the wake of relevant political agendas. It is obvious that in the contemporary world, poverty has become the central issue of world politics and its eradication as well as poverty reproduction is inextricably linked with political decisions and policy preferences and politics in general influences poverty dynamics.

The dichotomy between social justice and injustice provides an opportunity to critically analyse some of the centrally important concepts like injustice, inequity, inequality, and lack of democracy, freedom and human rights which are relevant to moral and political philosophy. The political relevance of this dichotomy is found in the ground breaking argument by Brian Barry (2005) that conclusively establishes the harmful consequences of lack of political participation. However, I tend to disagree with Barry that natural and social inequalities inherited or chosen by people themselves can be termed as their genuine choices and fall outside the purview of social injustice (Barry 1988, pp. 34, 41-42). Such choices cannot be construed as fair choices as they may either be made under circumstantial compulsions or based on a lack of full knowledge about the available choices. Since there is no possibility of determining the moral relevance or moral arbitrariness of such choices, the contention about their fairness becomes problematic. It is, therefore, argued that in order to achieve substantial equality of opportunity both economic and political interventions are justified.
The idea of global justice emerged as a result of globalization and the contemporary need for economic integration. The moral relevance of global justice became the chief concern of political philosophy as the need was felt for addressing justice between the states and the individuals beyond the state boundaries. In this regard, Pogge’s demand for redistribution of resources on a global scale seems perfectly all right. However, as Nagel (2005) argues, the political conception of justice requires that the norms of justice can only be applied within state boundaries. My contention is supported by both Rawls (1999) in his discussion of the basic structure and Iris Young (2011) in her idea of social relations. Empirical evidence confirms that the state level political institutions can be designed so as to create political opportunities for the poor to grow out of their poverty.

One of the major concerns of this study is Pogge’s human rights approach which clearly globalizes the phenomenon of poverty. In the backdrop of abysmal poverty prevailing in Sub-Saharan, Asian and Latin American countries, and the affluence and prosperity found in the rich countries, he raises the question about the latter’s instrumental role ‘in harming the global poor by causing them poverty’. He refers to the role played by the affluent countries in imposing an unjust global order that causes extreme poverty to the world’s poor as a violation of the negative duty not to harm others. He emphasizes that global institutions violate human rights and perpetuate injustice; hence the need to promote institutional reform and devise a minimally just global order.

How Pogge hopes to overcome maximalist institutional irregularities through a minimalist approach is hard to understand. It appears implausible to me that, while remaining within the Western liberal tradition, those who have caused such colossal poverty can be obligated to eradicate it. One also needs to look into the possibility where harm, greater than the one by global institutional order, has been caused by international politics and domestic policies of the concerned states. I tend to agree with Pogge that in certain poor countries the state of affairs may not possibly be likely to change for the better from within without the interference of global institutions. This would, of course, impinge upon the governance issues at the state level which can only be resolved.
with reference to the type of system of government at the state level. There are unresolved problems concerning how pragmatism of the national and regional interests at the global institutional level can be subordinated to philanthropic and charitable ideals. Moral obligation and duty to poverty amelioration may not always be the guiding principal followed by the aid giving agencies.

The Chapter on Poverty and Politics argues that poverty is predominantly a political issue. Accessing justice and eradicating injustices is deemed to be an institutional task, both at the state and the global levels. It has been claimed, on logical grounds that state stability and political legitimacy in a democratic dispensation emanate from a realization that pro-poor policies enhance popularity which, in turn, encourages the political elite to focus pro-poor political institutions thus giving more voice and empowerment to the deprived segments of society. Institutional political action, in this regard, is facilitated greatly by the political process, democratic political parties and civil society groups. In this way, politics of poverty is embedded in welfare oriented policies of a democratic state with a clear tilt towards social justice.

I have identified political norms and systems, the ruling political discourse and the need to politically represent and empower the poor as the factors that institutionalize poverty. How different forms of poverty and the poor are politically represented impact significantly the modes of understanding how reduction and reproduction of poverty depends upon political decisions and policies. The political process plays a dominant role in alleviation as well as perpetuation of poverty. It can be seen in distribution of power, how state-institutions interact, the role played by the government viz- a- viz different power groups operating in a society, the role of the institutions in conflict resolution among competing groups, etc. In order to afford a genuine opportunity to the poor to gain real political representation, besides the government, the political elite and the power groups can play a crucial role. In order to have a genuine political representation in the sense of
empowerment, poverty eradication needs to be relocated and grounded in the broader political project of social justice.

There are a number of key issues that become part of the political project of social justice like inequality and equality of opportunity, justice and injustice, lack of democracy, and human rights. Based on Bufacchi’s three dimensional definition of poverty (2010, 9-10), we can understand injustice as involving unfair distribution of resources and opportunities, social deprivation and disempowerment. On political terms, these factors constrain and obstruct self-determination. It is the duty of state institutions to insure that social justice overcomes these expressions of injustice in a society, particularly when people are deprived not only in material and social sense but also when they are denied political participation. This is the reason why social justice and social injustice becomes politically relevant.

My concern here is also to look into the widespread injustice in society despite there being rules and institutions to overcome and rectify it. Injustice is generally considered to be the most important cause of poverty. The focus here is on the significance of political injustice. The everyday sense of social injustice encompasses the inhuman and unfair ways of treatment and inaccessibility to basic resources like food, clothing and shelter. But, when we move to opportunities like freedom, rights and empowerment issues, it becomes eminently political. Political injustice leads to violation of individual liberties, rights to freedom of speech as well as voting rights. Unfair state actions perpetrated under political systems result in denial of voice and representation in decision making to the disempowered and the disadvantage. It results in serious equity issues important in both the social and political domains. The state’s legal and political institutions often tend to violate the political, economic, and social rights of the poor segments of society. It would, therefore, be appropriate to confront political injustice by reforming and reorienting fair governance institutions like bureaucracy, judiciary, police, etc. so that executive and legislative making is held accountable. Public decision making will only respond to the will of
the people if they are empowered and drawn out of social and political exclusion. Not only that, a culture of political participation can only be nurtured if the public at large is encouraged to take active part in the formulation, execution, and monitoring of state policies.

Contemporary political scene affirms that a democratic system provides greater voice and influence to the poor than most others. In terms of economic prosperity as well, a democratic system is necessary. But, there is no proof of a necessary and consistent relation between formal electoral democracy and the extent to which it influences poverty alleviation. The last three decades have witnessed the shift away from communism among many Asian and East European countries, and the move has always been guided by the desire for better economic prospects. Unfortunately, this does not furnish clear evidence to link democracy and good performance in poverty reduction. By virtue of their political ideology, the former socialist states, though undemocratic by prevailing criteria, had a greater focus on mass welfare leading to poverty reduction. Furthermore, in Indonesia the thirty five year undemocratic rule has a better record in poverty reduction compared to democratic Philippines and South Korea. This has highlighted the fact that whatever the political system, the role of the political elite is crucial as long as it commits to pushing the economic and social institutions towards pro-poor policies and their implementation.

While working within the broad definition of democratic theory, democracy in practice betrays a wide range of shades and hues. This has been the case among the third world countries as well as the advanced Western countries. Many countries apply the nomenclature of ‘democracy’ while widely diverging in their policies, practices and institutional arrangements. One example is that of the nascent democracy in Pakistan and Bangladesh and the long established one in India. Similarly, a democratic United States of America happens to have a much higher ratio of poverty as compared to the Scandinavian countries. The wide variety of ‘democratic’ governments in place across the world encourages me to reproduce the broad facets of democracy as laid down by Spicker: “Some views of democracy are normative; they are based in democracy as a principle, such as rule by the
people, the popular will, government by consent, or republican government. Some views are based in prescriptions for governance, such as accountability, participation, the representation of interests or the primacy of laws. And other views of democracy are institutional, based in the mechanisms and structures of government - the elected legislature, the separation of powers, contested elections, the political parties, the media.” (2012, pp. 8-9).

This is an excellent criteria for judging what may be called a genuine democracy. There may be other criteria also. For example, I think that such criteria may exclude the countries from the ambit of democracy where the states’ legal and political institutions often tend to violate the political, economic and social rights of the disadvantaged groups in a society. The accountability of governance institutions like bureaucracy, judiciary, police etc. is another factor. The democracy tag should only be allowed to be worn if public decision making respond to the popular will, if the people are empowered and drawn out of the social and political exclusion, and are encouraged to take an active part in the formation, execution, and monitoring of state policies. The failure of many third world countries to come up to this standard does not preclude the possibility of democracies doing well in the third world by improving the quality of political and civil organizations and empowering the poor to have a voice and a share in governance. What is needed is that the political organizations, political parties in particular, play their due role in formulating and conducting public policy within a democratic system. If these organizations are so designed as to create a network of committed workers operating through a democratic institutional structure with clearly defined programs and ideologies, the poor can be represented more effectively. On the other hand, in democracies with political parties built around regional, ethnic or religious affiliations or temporary alliances of power-seekers, as in Pakistan and some other developing countries, the poor can neither hope to have voice nor their amelioration can have a priority in policy formulation. I have tried to argue for the institutionalization of egalitarianism so as to create an irreversible trend in favour of a welfare state and social justice. As compared to the USA, the success of the Scandinavian welfare states in poverty eradication is credited to a combination of democracy,
welfare and capitalism. I understand that economic constraints have led to a re-thinking on sustainability of state-led welfare schemes, but there does not appear to be a critical threat to welfare schemes, at least not in the near future. Social welfare schemes are inextricably connected to democratic processes and have played a substantial role in bringing down poverty, both in relative and absolute terms. The successful welfare experiment needs to be replicated in the third world counties, and international institutions can play a crucial role in the eradication of authoritarianism, injustice, poverty, and violation of human rights across the world.

Chapter IV extends and applies the ideas of injustice and inequality among individuals of a society to their application to relationships and institutions in the global context. In view of the contemporary realities of global poverty embedded in the recent phenomenon of globalization, the philosophical argument moves logically to a discussion focused on cosmopolitanism and global justice.

Pogge’s institutionalized conception of human rights has two separate meanings:

(i) Human rights violations that are carried out by state institutions and their agents, e.g., in the case of harm at the hands of an inefficient or corrupt police officer.

(ii) Human rights demands people can make against each other when they are subjected to shared institutions.

Confining human rights violation within the purview of shared institutions has often led to atrocities committed against non-members who have suffered exclusion on account of colonialism, genocide, religious and ethnic extremism, etc. I think that the full scope of human rights can only be insured if they are conceived without being first subjected to institutional contingencies. Pre-political, pre-institutional natural rights are said to have emerged from a state of nature via the social contract. Life, liberty and property have always been considered inviolable irrespective of the institutional membership of the people. The humanistic perspective looks at human rights as pre-
institutional claims that individuals may have against other individuals as well as against
government functionaries. The claims are assigned the status of human rights solely on account of
the interests that are characteristic of our common humanity. The philosophical theorization of
human rights has all along been dominated by the natural rights model, and such influential writers
as Amartya Sen, Martha Nussbaum and James Griffin have espoused this line of thought. The
underlying moral requirements are said to constrain the pre-institutional situation, pre-date the
institutional contingencies and also provides the ground for establishing social and political
institutions. It is, therefore, possible to conceive human rights without being first subjected to social
and institutional contingencies. It is true that for actual implementation of human rights, legal
enactment and political action are very much necessary. But, over and above this, the rights appear
to have a reasonably determinate content and character independently of whatever subsequent
institutional specifications they might require. Therefore, moral justification and universality of
scope seems to distinguish human rights from those institutionally conceived.

Pogge’s account of the global institutional network does not make any distinction between the
harms caused by the global institutions and the ones caused by the domestic policies of the states.
He seems fully convinced that no change for the better is going to come from within the state set
up, in fact a just global order will achieve the goal of poverty amelioration notwithstanding the
political conditions on the ground. This is a highly optimistic view when practical experience
shows how vested interests at the global and domestic level operate to vitiate such a scheme.
Countries most in need of global intervention happen to be the ones where fully entrenched
institutional mechanisms are operating to perpetuate poverty. In a society corrupted to the core,
with irresponsible leaders and local institutions at an advanced state of degeneration and distortion,
there is little hope of a successful implementation of Pogge’s global institutional reform agenda.
The heavy baggage of unanswered questions serious vitiates Pogge’s reform agenda for global
institutional order.
Some of these are:

- How a state could be persuaded to give up part of their sovereignty and their right to rule within their borders?
- How will it be possible to reverse the view that national interests override an individual’s well-being?
- Is any effort to reform the global institutional order likely to succeed in eradicating poverty while working in isolation from state institutions?

It is my considered opinion that any attempt to reform global institutional order is not going to succeed in addressing global poverty unless we take into account the potential and actual relevance of state level local institutions. The long standing, historical role played by the state in perpetuating or alleviating poverty cannot be disregarded. It is simply not enough to deal with matters relating to distributive justice and moral responsibility by institutionalizing human rights within the given scheme of institutional cosmopolitanism and in isolation from the domestic conditions prevailing in a state.

Pogge does not deny the relevance of domestic factors in poverty alleviation. However, he refuses to treat them as distinct from global causes. Local causes for him are conditioned by global causes. But the ground reality tells a different story. Global institutional interventions, in the recent past, have either failed or succeeded because of domestic circumstances and state policies. The success of global institutional policies at the state level is contingent upon a conducive developmental environment. Political dynamics in a number of third world countries are marred by despotic rule, civil strife, ethnic and sectarian feud. The resulting breakdown of government promotes injustice and perpetuates poverty. Bad governance, in fact, is a form of injustice. State level democratization and reform are considered to be the remedial measures most likely to succeed. More than reorganizing the systems of administration and resource allocation, the change in the social structure should be able to achieve development through governance that fosters a democratic
system of people’s participation and rule of law for achieving non-violent and just resolution of problems. Rather than trying to impose transnational institutional remedies, it would be better to help states to develop robust democratic institutions that can employ their local legitimacy to root out poverty and injustice.

Why is the civil strife - poverty nexus so effective in stalling development in poor countries? It is a common experience that countries suffering from deep-rooted ethnic and sectarian divide experience diminishing social cohesion. Wherever and whenever an attempt is made to uproot these adverse social structures by outside intervention it leads to intensification of civil strife. Having a long history of exploitation and perpetuation of conflict situation, such social and political structures create insecurity, injustice and poverty. Whenever global institutions have intervened, it has led to aggravation of the existing strife. It implies that the solution to these state level problems will have to emerge from within the socio-political context. Negotiated conflict resolution through a process of democratization is a gradual process which can only take place within the socio-political context of the state. The global institutions may, indeed, play their due role in facilitating the process and thus contribute to the measures necessary for eradicating poverty and injustice. The success or otherwise of the global institutional order to ameliorate the situation is, therefore, conditioned by the local circumstances and not the other way round.

Since the adoption of the MDGs by the UN (2000), the poverty discourse has been dominated by the role of the global governance for poverty eradication. But, the multi-dimensional nature of the idea of poverty and its ever expanding implications has underscored the relevance of partnership and coordination, decentralization, political commitment and democratic governance as implementation denominators. It is being progressively realized that achieving MDGs by implementing poverty reduction strategies are contingent upon peculiar social and political circumstances prevailing in a particular state and the nature and role of the civil society in the specific social settings. (Bonfiglioli (2004).
Global governance, indeed, involves political interaction among transnational agents, but the problems it intends to address are state specific and implementation takes place in that particular setting. Globalization implies regulating human societies on a neutralized scale. However, traditional mode of governance involves political authority and institutions, decision making, enforcement and social relations that take place at the state level and involves civil societies, NGOs, social organizations, etc. One may very well speak of the development of ‘global public policy,’ (Stone 2008), but apart from intergovernmental organizations, implementation mechanism involves state authorities, NGOs, other private sector entities and civil society actors. Obviously, it is an impossible task providing homogenized political and social conditions in isolation of the state and regional level settings.

Political systems consist of political processes, both formal and informal, that provide the bases for decision making in a society for using, producing and distributing resources.. There is no doubt about the fact that evolution of political systems and the nature of their operational characteristics crucially impact on the scope of participation of the poor in decision making and the possibility of poverty eradication in a particular society. In the ultimate analysis, the role of global governance and the success of donor agencies are critically influenced by the prevailing political system of a state.

It is often agreed that democratic dispensation at the state level is a precondition for successful global governance. (Diamond 2004). But, it is rather difficult to characterize clearly what political system is in place in a country. In the Third World, in particular, there are countries with hybrid regimes, somewhere between the authoritarianism and modern liberal democracy. (Rocha Menocal et al 2007). Since the rules and procedures for the global governance are predominantly framed by the representatives of liberal democracies, these may not be entirely suited to the peculiar political reality of the Third World. If one were to agree with the contested view that a democratic state set
up is more suitable for development and hence for poverty eradication, should global agencies start supporting the emergence of true liberal democracies in the target countries? (Halperine et al 2010).

Besides the state level political institutions, the pattern of informal and customary political entities also tend to influence the efficacy of global governance in particular regions of the world. These informal groups and organizations also influence the reactions of civil society to the international interventions for development and poverty eradication. Feudal culture, pressure exerted by the religious and sectarian groups and elitist politics cut across participatory democratic politics in many developing countries, perpetuating discrimination on the basis gender, religious belief, sect, caste and race differences. Their interaction with and influence on the formal political structures may also block pro-poor development work initiate by donor agencies. Brinkerhoff & Goldsmith (2002) have substantiated the view that liberalization, democratization, decentralization and civil service reform lead to good governance.

To that end, the role of NGOs representing civil society for development and poverty eradication has been highly praised as the development alternative. Various researches have tended to assign it the crucial role of accountability in global regulatory arrangements. (Scholte 2003). Perhaps civil society should be defined as the public space between the state, the market and the realm of family relations; it is an associational realm within society, based on voluntary and non-profit affiliation. In this context, civil society turns out to be necessary for making democracy work because at the national level it is partly determined by what happens at the grassroots level. A functioning society not only needs a strong civil society but also a strongly politicized society that can interact with state through participation in decision making process. But their political purposes will be determined by the articulation of goals and the power of ideas and good organization.

It is obvious that in order for global governance to be really effective in achieving development and poverty eradication goals at a significant level an interdependence between the civil society, the state and the international institutions must be ensured both at the conceptual and the practical
levels. It is necessary to rethink of globalization in terms of globalization of democracy both at the state and at the global governance levels. Democratization of decision making and global governance through global civil society will ultimately lead to joint governance by all the stakeholders.
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