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The People's Republic of China and European Union Security Cooperation in Africa: Sino-EU Security Cooperation in Mali and the Gulf of Aden

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Abstract

The United States' pivot toward Asia has fuelled a new round of debates about the role of key Asian actors such as the People's Republic of China (China) and traditional actors such as the European Union (EU) in global security. Using role theory, this paper examines EU-China security cooperation. The paper presents two case studies: Sino-EU maritime security cooperation in the Gulf of Aden and Sino-EU peacekeeping cooperation in Mali. These case studies examine the EU's and China's roles as security actors and as normative actors within non-traditional security challenges. The paper illustrates the kind of role the EU could play in the world in terms of security issues, as well as the norms and values that global security responses could create. The paper also gives a greater insight into the role a rising China could play in global security governance.

Keywords: *Normative actor, role theory, Sino-EU relations, UN peacekeeping*

1. Introduction

It has been more than a decade since David Shambaugh (2004) suggested that China and Europe were forming an emerging axis in international relations. As Sino-European economic interdependencies are constantly increasing, the emergence of a Sino-European axis in terms of economic cooperation has occurred (European Commission, 2013). The People's Republic of China (China) and the European Union (EU) cooperate in global economic governance bodies. However, Shambaugh's claim of an emerging axis in the field of global security governance seems highly unlikely and is presented as rhetoric (Biedermann, 2009). The presence of an EU arms embargo on China, conceptual gaps in human rights and sovereignty, and increasing levels of competition for natural resources are all barriers to the development of

this axis (Pan, 2012). However, China's role in global security has changed dramatically, though incrementally, over the past decade, and the nation has attempted to develop the role of a responsible great power (Zhu, 2010). In line with this new role, China has increased its multilateral engagement – most notably, its part in the six-party talks on North Korea (Horowitz and Min, 2006). The EU's role in global security governance has also evolved over the past decade. With the strengthening of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the EU has become more active in international security, developing a common role in security issues. As both China and the EU have become more proactive actors in global security matters, the question of a possible axis between the two actors re-emerges. African security governance has emerged as an area of common interest between China and the EU and as a possible area of cooperation.

This paper argues that China and the EU will increase their cooperation in global security issues, particularly in regard to Africa. The paper argues that both actors have a historical conception of their role as great powers within global security affairs, which pushes them toward cooperation. To accomplish this paper's goals, evidence regarding China's and the EU's identities and behaviours in global security is examined qualitatively. Two case studies of Sino-EU security cooperation in Africa – the Gulf of Aden and Mali – will be examined to demonstrate that their role conceptions result in a repeated pattern of role behaviour.

2. Role Theory Framework

Role theory is a theoretical framework that is committed to the study of behaviour using the notion of "role". This study falls within the constructivist international relations (IR) framework of role theory (Harnisch, 2001; Maull, 1990). This paper employs process-tracing techniques outlined by Krotz and Sperling (2011) and Gottwald and Duggan (2011) to track core elements of role expectations. Taking a single role assumption, this paper will understand a role expectation to be a balance of the domestic expectations (ego expectations) and the implicit or explicit demands of others (alter expectations). In terms of alter expectations, it is important to note that not all "others" carry the same weight (Shih, 2013). This is clearly outlined by Wendt, who stated that "not all others are equally significant ... so power and dependency relations play important roles in the story" (1999: 327). There are tangible and intangible reasons for the selection of significant others: the tangible reasons are an actor's resources, while the intangible reasons are notions of the state's identity and the "needs" that derive from that identity (Wendt, 1999: 328). Therefore, the selection or appearance of significant others in international relations does not happen randomly. The

choice or constitution of a significant other is based on past experiences by the role beholder (Harnisch, 2011: 12). Foreign policy makers create domestic expectations from the perception of the outlook of internal actors such as economic elites or other key state supporters among the general population. The influence of public opinion on foreign policy issues (Cantir and Kaarbo, 2012), as well as a state's historical self (Harnisch, 2015), is key to determining domestic expectations. The current self stabilizes both relevant to a current significant other and to its historical self (McCourt, 2012). Both the historical self and the current self are conceptual through "ontological security" (Zarakol, 2010), which can be defined as the situation in which "an actor has a consistent sense of 'self' by performing actions in order to underwrite his/her notion of 'who they are'" (ibid: 3). A state seeks ontological security because it wants to maintain a consistent self-identity. That "self" is constituted and maintained through a historical narrative that gives life to routinized foreign policy actions (Steele, 2008: 2-3). Maintaining those foreign policy action routines, which maintain a state's historical narrative, allows the state to protect its historical self. Mitzen (2006) argues that a state values those routines as they underwrite the state's sense of self and that a state might privilege routine over other values, even when physical cost is involved. Therefore, roles are created by the combination of an actor's subjective understandings of what its behaviour should be – that is, its role conceptions – and international and domestic society's demands – that is, its role expectations – combined with the particular context in which the role is being acted out (Elgström and Smith, 2006: 5, Holsti, 1970: 239). Roles are neither deterministic nor infinitely elastic (Chafetz, Abramson and Grillot, 1996: 733). They are the categories of behaviour that states, like individuals, rely on to simplify and to help guide them through a complex world. Roles provide individual states with a stable sense of identity (Bloom, 1991). As an approach to the study of international relations, role theory offers a thick description and does not codify abstract regularities (Walker, 1987: 255), and the inclusion of role perception in this paper is the acceptance that roles are institutionalized in social structures (Wendt, 1999: 227). Thus, this paper adopts a particular epistemological and ontological position. Carlsnæs (2002: 241) outlines the epistemological position of role theory as an interpretative perspective – that is, that role theory produces interpretative knowledge that offers a thick description rather than causal explanations (Walker, 1987). For Carlsnæs (2002: 241), the ontological positions of role theory focus on "the reasoning of individual national foreign policy makers". In foreign policy analysis, role theory exemplifies the bottom-up individualist interpretative approach, which is concerned with understanding "decisions from the standpoint of the decision makers by reconstructing their reasons" (Hollis and Smith, 1990: 74). However, this position does not deal with the

intersubjective ideas that come into consideration with the involvement of role perceptions. Therefore, by including role perception, this paper takes a holistic approach.

3. The EU's Role

The EU's role in global security governance is mixed. Seeking to play a more active role in global affairs, the EU has developed a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). In many foreign policy security issues – particularly softer security issues – the twenty-eight EU member states have a powerful collective influence. On the other hand, some critics – including significant others, such as the United States, Russia and China – assert that, on the whole, the EU remains an economic power only and that its foreign and security policies have little global impact (Dai and Zhang, 2007). Past institutional arrangements that developed to give the EU a security function have often failed to coordinate the EU's full range of resources, most notably the conflict after the breakup of Yugoslavia. The inherent difficulties of reaching a complete consensus among the member states and the conflicting global security role key members such as France and the United Kingdom play set limits on the EU's external policies (Koenig, 2014).

The EU has conducted thirty operations under its CSDP (EEAS, 2014). To develop a stronger CSDP that would have a greater impact in global security issues, EU member states have been attempting to increase their military capabilities and promote greater defence integration. Outside non-traditional security issues and civilian missions, these efforts have met with limited success thus far. Civilian missions and capabilities, however, are also central components of the CSDP (Tonra, 2003). The majority of CSDP missions have been civilian operations in areas such as police training and rule of law. The EU has been far more active in soft areas of global security (Lasheras, Pohlmann, Katsioulis and Liberti, 2009). It has been a strong actor in areas such as trade, humanitarian aid, development assistance, and food and energy security using soft tools such as enlargement and neighbourhood policy to encourage peace within the region (Orbie, 2009). This fits with the typology of the EU as a “civilian power” during the Cold War (Duchêne, 1972), as a “normative actor” in the 1990s (Tocci, 2008) or, since 2000, as a “Minervian Actor” (Manners, 2013). All these typologies have a common underlying role: as outlined by Karen Smith (2003: 111), “the EU still clearly prefers positive civilian to coercive military measures. The emphasis is on the panoply of civilian instruments that the EU ... has at its disposal, and that puts it in the unique position of being able both to contribute to prevent conflict from erupting and to manage the aftermath of conflict” (Sjursen,

2006: 237). It seems clear that in global security governance, the EU's role is as a normative civilian power focusing on conflict prevention through its use of economic power within the system to prevent conflict from occurring or to reconstruct governance institutions after conflicts have been resolved. However, the EU's historical self has an effect on this role in global security given the particular context of a security event. A number of EU powers have a long history of playing a major power role in global security – most notably France and the UK. These historical roles as great powers still have an influence on the historical self and, therefore, of the construction of the current role of the former great powers. Within the national role conception (NRC) of actors such as France and the UK, the role of a great power is still present in their role construction. Both the UK and France have played a strong role in global security over the past few decades. It is clear that they also plan to continue this role. In the UK's 2010 National Security Strategy, for example, it is clear that the UK still sees itself as having a major role in international security:

This strategy for maintaining British security and influence in the world is characterised by the new National Security Council. We will tie in the efforts of all government departments to address threats to our security and interests and to seek new opportunities for Britain. The National Security Council has reached a clear conclusion that Britain's national interest requires us to reject any notion of the shrinkage of our influence. (H.M. Government, 2010)

The historical self of France and the UK as great powers has a strong influence on the EU's role in global security. The UK promotes its role as a great power within the framework of NATO, while France attempts to develop an independent EU role in security matters under the Petersberg tasks. *Le livre blanc sur la défense et la sécurité nationale* (Défense et Sécurité nationale, 2013: 64) highlights this clearly:

France shares with its European partners most threats and the risks it is confronted with: The most pragmatic approach to this problem is that we are more effective if we are able to face the problem together. That is why, as part of its national defence and security, France considers the development of a common European defence and security a priority. This is driven by the belief that a European response would be greater than the sum of national responses.

These contradictory paths to playing out their roles of great powers within a European framework prevent the EU from playing a role in harder security issues. Instead, the EU often plays a supporting role to NATO. Nicole Koenig (2014) highlighted this conflict of roles during the 2011 Libyan crisis, where different views of the EU's role in the crisis led to an inability of the EU to go beyond that of a civilian power, leaving the hard security role to NATO.

4. China's Role

China's rise and the 2008 global financial crisis have fuelled a new round of debates concerning the sustainability of the norms and institutions that have dominated global governance, including global security governance. China is often seen as a threat to global security. Significant others – including the United States, Japan and the ASEAN nations – have seen China's role as that of an aggressive actor. The key concept to this altercasting has been the China threat theory, which states that China, as a rising power, will come into conflict with the United States, the current hegemonic power. This conflict will result in the US and its allies attempting to prevent China's rise within international relations. China's peaceful rise was a direct response to the China threat theory, which developed from the realist understanding of the balance of power theory. China's peaceful rise was an attempt to display a different view of China's future role within international relations and to present China as a responsible great power that works to maintain a stable global system. China can be said to be playing the roles both of an aggressive actor/revisionist state and of a responsible actor/status quo state, conforming to both China's threat theory and China's peaceful development theory. China's aggressive policy in the South and East China Seas over disputed territories, as well as assertive behaviour in the Indian Ocean (Bersick and Duggan, 2013), is the role behaviour of an aggressive actor. However, China's increased involvement in areas such as UN peacekeeping, antiterrorism and non-traditional security fulfil its responsible actor role. The fact that China plays both roles can be explained by the development of its historical self and by domestic expectations of China's role in the world.

China's historical self has both a modern and an ancient influence. Historically, China held a position at the centre of a regional power structure referred to in the West as the "Tributary System". Song Nianshen highlighted that the system was far more than an interstate system; it was a multilateral and multi-layered system of international relations. According to Song, the state-to-state relationships within the Tributary System were "woven into a complex, multilevel power nexus composed of interconnections among multiple political, economic, ideological, and science and technological cores and peripheries" (Song, 2012: 167). This conception of China's position at the centre of a complex, multilevel power nexus has a profound effect on China's ontological understanding of its role within international relations and on states' management of their interactions. It means that within the development of China's contemporary role, the historical self conceptualizes China as a central power or "civilization-state" (Pye, 1990), pushing China toward creating a role that has a great power or central power foundation (Connolly and Gottwald, 2013). This can be seen in a number of contemporary foreign

policy documents, such as China's Peaceful Development, China-Japan-ROK Cooperation (1999-2012), China's Foreign Aid, and Diaoyu Dao: An Inherent Territory of China (State Council, 2011b; 2012a; 2011a; 2012b), which highlight China's position as a historical major power. This historical self also links previous incarnations of China with the contemporary state in terms of the territories that are understood to comprise China, and it creates a very strict understanding of the limits of those territories (Schneider, 2014). The modern influence on China's historical self is from China's period of semi-colonisation by Western powers (1839-1949), known as the "century of humiliation". This contributed to the fall of the Qing Empire and the rise to power of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). After the foundation of the People's Republic of China, the country played two roles in international relations: a new type of socialist great power and a developing great power (Men, 2013a). The century of humiliation helped to create an anti-imperialist, prodeveloping-states role for China in the period after World War II. The colonial question, which concerned the peoples of Africa and Asia that convened in Bandung (Indonesia) in 1955, accelerated the PRC's involvement with the developing world. The Bandung Conference laid the ideological and philosophical foundation for South-South Cooperation. Following the Bandung Conference, China began to support wars of national liberation in the developing world, particularly in Africa. This can be seen as an attempt by the PRC to shed its historical victimhood of the semi-colonial period of Chinese history through the promotion of decolonization within Africa. This attempt continued through the 1950s, and by the early 1960s, the PRC had established relations with a number of left-leaning or radical states (Larkin, 1971: 39). A focus on the needs of the developing world is contained in China's contemporary role in global security governance. Chinese pressure within the G20 to increase the forum's focus on developing nations' food security has already created some reforms within global food security governance (Duggan and Naarajarvi, 2015).

The influence of China's historical self has created a role for China that can often be contradictory. While China is playing the role of a great power within Asia and defending its historical territory, it also plays the role of leader/defender of the developing world outside the Asian region, in line with its anti-imperialist, prodeveloping-states role. This may be, in part, due to the geographical context in which China has adopted its roles (Shih and Yin, 2013). For example, China does not cooperate in terms of security governance with Japan within Asia. However, it is willing to cooperate with other power actors. For example, it cooperates with Russia in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Yet China is willing to cooperate with Japan outside the Asian region, as in the case of maritime security cooperation in the Gulf of Aden.

Chinese domestic expectations, which are also shaped by China's historical self, contribute to the contradictory role China plays in global security. As Christensen and Li (2013) identified, several domestic phenomena have affected China's international role: growing domestic divisions in the understanding of security in China; demonstrating nationalist, internationalist, realistic or liberal attitudes; and growing importance of various interests stemming from political, economic and social spheres of society. Christensen and Li (2013) thus argue that China's self-perception of its domestic security situation has both a conventional aspect as well as an unconventional aspect. The latter is backed by a 2012 survey on the Chinese public's security perceptions, which identified that the top security concerns for the majority of Chinese are not economic and military threats from the outside but internal energy shortages (Jung, 2012). China's role as an anti-imperialist, prodeveloping-states actor is also present in China's discourse on its role in global security governance (Zhao, 2010; Men, 2013b). As outlined by Noesselt (2013: 17), in creating a role conception, "the Chinese government is ... faced with the difficult task of trying to balance domestic and global expectations, as well as old and new role conceptions". In terms of the creation of China's role conception in the area of global security governance, it is clear that China's role can vary greatly, depending on geographical location, the partners involved in governance and the issue. However, China attempts to play some form of great power role.

5. China-EU Security Cooperation

The EU-China Strategic Partnership, which is based on the 1985 EU-China Trade and Cooperation Agreement, has grown to include security matters. The issues that the EU and China discuss during their regular meetings are organized into three pillars: political dialogue, economic and sectoral dialogue, and people-to-people dialogue. There are annual summits, regular high-level dialogues and more than fifty sectoral dialogues on topics including security cooperation. Despite the presence of security cooperation in the sectoral dialogues of the EU-China Strategic Partnership, it is unclear what each actor's role expectation is of the other.

As highlighted by Stumbaum (2011: 15), for decades the EU considered China "just too far away and too weak to matter to the Europeans in security aspects", while today the EU considers China to be a key player in global security governance. For its part, China sees the EU as a peaceful power (Zhang, 2011: 24) and an important part of the development of a multipolar world. However, there is a clear understanding that, as a security actor, the EU is a secondary significant other compared with the US and Russia in matters of traditional security, and it is expected to support the position of

the US (Xu, 2009). In terms of non-traditional security matters, however, China sees the EU as a significant other. As outlined by Zhu (2007), in China, the EU's concept of security has been seen to gradually shift from an emphasis on political and military security, sovereignty, and development to an emphasis on safety, the safety of human society, and a comprehensive and integrated security. In terms of China's security concept, in order to become a responsible great power, China must move toward more comprehensive, integrated security (Breslin, 2014), and the EU is seen as a key partner in that movement (Wenwen, 2015). As China does not see the EU as having a strong military role in Asia, it is therefore not seen as a threat to China's national cores interests (Zhu, 2007). China's expectation of the EU's role in global security can be clearly seen in the 2014 China's Policy Paper on the EU, which focuses on non-traditional security matters like water and energy security rather than more traditional security issues (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014). The EU's role expectation of China is that it becomes a more responsible global power (Barroso, 2012). In terms of global security governance, it is clear that the EU sees itself as a partner for China. Catherine Ashton, high representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, has outlined that the EU is willing to strengthen pragmatic cooperation with China in high-level dialogue, antipiracy, peacekeeping, international and regional security (Ministry of National Defense, 2013), and the Guidelines on the EU's Foreign and Security Policy in East Asia also clearly sees China as a partner in global security, as well as regional security in Asia (Council of the European Union, 2012). The EU has also engaged with China in the Iranian nuclear proliferation issue, as well as the conflict in Libya (Godement, 2010) and the ongoing conflict in Syria, but success has been limited. In the area of Sino-EU security cooperation, the EU sees China as a rising power that needs to be engaged and encouraged to become a responsible power, helping to maintain the current system of international relations. Socialising China within that system is part of the EU's role as a normative power (Odgaard and Biscop, 2006). As both China and the EU are major investors and trading partners with Africa, supporting the continent's security is a matter of common interest (Duggan, 2014). Both actors support the development of African security architecture. This is achieved in a number of ways, including supporting the security capacity of African regional and sub-regional bodies, providing support for peacekeeping missions, and helping to deal with many of the underlying issues that led to conflict (Van Hoeymissen, 2010; EEAS, 2015a; Brosig, 2014). Both actors offer Africa different models of peacekeeping (Sicurelli, 2010). However, as China has adopted some Western norms in terms of peacekeeping (Alden and Large, 2015), cooperation in peacekeeping in Africa is still an area of cooperation between the EU and China (Liu, 2011).

It is clear that China is attempting to perform actions in order to underwrite its notion of itself as a responsible great power. The EU is also trying to underwrite its historical self by attempting to act as a normative power, socialising China within the global security governance system. If both actors' roles in global security governance are, in part, an attempt to underwrite their historical selves as great powers, this should be evident in their role behaviour. Africa's security issues offer both actors an opportunity to fulfil these roles, as well as an opportunity for cooperation. This paper examines two cases of China-EU cooperation in African security architecture.

6. Gulf of Aden

Between 2000 and 2009, pirates attacked 538 commercial shipping vessels and vessels carrying humanitarian aid off the coast of Somalia, mainly in the Gulf of Aden (UNODC, 2009: 193). Poverty, lack of economic development, and threats to environmental, energy and food security driven by commercial overfishing and by Somalia's civil war has forced Somalia's fishermen into piracy. The high level of piracy in one of the world's most strategic shipping lanes has led to a number of international security responses. However, rather than a single response, a number of states and bodies have launched their own security missions in order to deal with the issue. More than a dozen nations have sent ships on antipiracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden. A number of these are participating in Combined Task Forces 150 and 151 under the multinational Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) (CMF, 2014). The Europeans launched EU Naval Force Operation Atalanta in 2008. It was the EU's first naval operation under the framework of the Common Security and Defence Policy. Forces participating in Operation Atalanta have been tasked with providing protection for vessels of the World Food Program and the African Union's military mission to Somalia (AMISOM), as well as fishing and merchant vessels in the region (EEAS, 2014). The EU forces are authorised to "employ the necessary means, including the use of force, to deter, prevent and intervene in order to bring to an end to acts of piracy and armed robbery, which may be committed in the areas where they are present" (European Union Council Secretariat, 2009). Although this EU mission is not part of the CMF, it does coordinate with the CMF. A number of other nations – including Russia, China, India and Malaysia – have sent their own national naval forces to the region to protect their vessels and crews from pirates. These naval forces operate independently of the EU mission. China has not joined any coalition, and as outlined by Ma Luping, director of the Navy Bureau of Operations of the People's Liberation Army, the primary goal in the PLA Navy mission (PLA-N) was to "provide security for Chinese vessels passing through the Gulf of Aden" (Xinhua, 2008). The Chinese mission

was depicted in the Chinese media as a sign of China's rise as a responsible global power (Yang, 2008). However, after the PLA-N failed to deal with the hijacking of a Chinese ship, the *De Xin Hai*, on 19th October 2009 by Somali pirates, the need for security cooperation became clear (Christoffersen, 2010: 16). Although China has not joined a coalition, the PLA-N did seek to cooperate with other actors in the region. Ministry of Defence spokesman Col. Geng Yansheng outlined that "the Chinese naval escort vessel actively participated in an international escort cooperation with relevant countries and organizations, including the exchange of intelligence information, joint escorts and joint exercises" (news.163, 2011). The failure of the PLA-N to protect the *De Xin Hai* made China aware of its shortcomings in internal security and of the advantages of cooperation. This became a catalyst for China's attempt to develop an institutional response to the piracy problem in the Gulf of Aden and is a sign of China's responsible power role. On 5th November 2009, the Chinese Foreign Ministry announced that China would host an international conference that would include the EU, NATO, Russia and Japan to better coordinate anti-piracy naval escorts in the Gulf of Aden. At that meeting, the Chinese proposed that China take a more active role in Shared Awareness and Deployment (SHADE) meetings and that, in fact, China should be allowed to lead or co-chair a future SHADE meeting. SHADE coordinates NATO, the EU and CTF-151 naval forces (Christoffersen, 2010: 18). Cooperation would take place on "the basis of a UN resolution" (Xinhua, 2008). The UN takes a comprehensive security approach to Somalian piracy in the Gulf of Aden, and China's official policy on Somalian piracy closely parallels the UN's position and reflects an emphasis on comprehensive security instead of the use of warships, therefore putting a greater focus on non-traditional security issues (Chu, 2004). The EU, as a civilian power, is seen by China as a natural partner for this cooperation, and China targets the EU for this aspect of the response to the piracy problem (Zhou, 2011). The EU's role as a normative power comes into play as it replies to China's attempt to create an institutional response and to develop further global security cooperation to deal with the problem of piracy. Under this role, the EU hopes that Chinese cooperation on antipiracy will spillover into other areas of security cooperation (Christoffersen, 2010: 18). It seems that this spillover effect has taken place. According to the Organization for the Prevention of Chemical Weapons, a Chinese Task Force would enter the Mediterranean to join Russia in escorting chemical weapons out of Syria to a US ship and monitor them to be demolished at sea (Zhou, 2013). However, the EU's role as a civilian power or a non-traditional security actor – rather than a traditional security actor – is cemented here, as the EU is not part of this naval mission, which deals with more traditional security.

7. Chinese Peacekeeping in Mali

The National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) declared the independence of Azawad in April 2012, and took control of much of the north of Mali within a short period of time. Like previous Tuareg rebellions, this group was bound together by ethnic and clan loyalties (Boukhars, 2013). However, unlike previous rebellions in the north of Mali, this revolt also had a hard-line jihadist element (Soares, 2005). The combination of these groups led to a rapid expansion of the areas under their control. The first attempt to deal with the conflict in Mali was a peacekeeping operation by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). ECOWAS developed a contingency plan for an intervention, which called for an ECOWAS force to deploy into Mali with backup from the international community. The EU's response to the conflict in Mali was to provide training and financial support to the Malian state. The European Union Training Mission (EUTM) in Mali had a mandate to train about 2,500 Malian soldiers to retake Northern Mali with the support of a mainly ECOWAS contingent, but it had a non-combat mission (EEAS, 2015a). However, the speed of the jihadist militant groups' advance took ECOWAS by surprise. ECOWAS forces were unprepared and underequipped to engage the jihadist militant groups. While the United Nations had placed the onus on resolving the crisis on the Malian government, it was clear that neither the UN nor the Malian government were in a position to respond to the crisis (United Nations Security Council, 2012). The French intervention in Mali, named *Opération Serval*, was launched on 11th January 2013. French and African troops quickly pushed the rebels back, recapturing key towns in Northern Mali before the end of the month (Ministère de la Défense, 2013). The French force remained at the forefront of the peace operation, launching *Opération Hydre* in October 2013, which carried out actions between Timbuktu and the northern city of Gao. In August 2014, the French launched *Opération Barkhane*, a partnership between the key countries of the Sahel-Saharan Strip (BSS): Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad and Burkina Faso (Ministère de la Défense, 2014). The mandate of *Opération Barkhane* was to support the armed forces of the BSS partner countries in their actions against terrorist armed groups and to help prevent the reconstitution of terrorist sanctuaries in the region. While France took the lead in terms of military intervention, the EU took the lead in terms of peace building. On 18th February 2013, the EU launched a training mission for Malian armed forces, EUTM Mali, with twenty-two member states contributing. The mandate of the mission was to restore democratic order, to help the Malian authorities exercise their sovereignty, and to neutralize organized crime and terrorist threats (EEAS, 2015c). The EU adopted a comprehensive approach to the conflict, offering a number of non-combatant aspects to the mission, including

523 million euros to fund a project targeting the underlying causes of the conflict, such as food insecurity (EEAS, 2015b). On 15th April 2014, the EU also established a civilian mission under CSDP to support the internal security forces in Mali (EEAS, 2015d). As part of this mission, a 15 million euro fund to combat food insecurity in the area was created using the framework of the Programme d'Appui à la Sécurité Alimentaire (EEAS, 2015e). The European involvement in Mali is a reflection of the EU's dual role in the world. The military involvement of France is a reflection of the great power role played by the EU's member states, while the peace building role played by the EU is a reflection of the EU's civilian power role.

A peace agreement was signed in June 2013 (British Broadcasting Corporation, 2013). Following the creation of a peace deal between the MNLA and the central government, in April 2013 under UN Security Council Resolution 2100 (2013) (United Nations Security Council, 2013), the UN authorized the formation of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (United Nations Security Council, 2013). The mission of MINUSMA was the re-establishment of Malian state authority and the protection of civilians and historical sites (United Nations Security Council, 2013). The authorised strength of MINUSMA was 12,680, and by the 30th of June, 15,209 peacekeepers had been committed (United Nations, 2017). These peacekeepers come from fifty-two countries, including China and EU member states. Beijing dispatched troops to Mali in what Foreign Minister Wang Yi described as a "comprehensive security force" (Hille, 2013). China first dispatched a 170-member peacekeeping guard detachment to the Mali mission area in West Africa at the request of the United Nations to guard the UN headquarters in Gao (Ministry for Defence, 2014a). In total, China dispatched 395 officers and soldiers, including 170 members in guard detachment, 155 in engineer detachment and 70 in medical detachment (Ministry for Defence, 2015a). The Chinese troops who were dispatched as peacekeepers had both a guard and support function. The troops understood that this was not just a peacekeeping operation but also a reflection of China's attempt to adopt a responsible great power role. This is clear from a statement of Vice Captain Zhao Guangyu: "We have confidence ... that we will fulfil our mandate in accordance with the relevant requirements of the UN peacekeeping operations, showing China's role as a protector of international peace and a responsible great power" (Hu, 2014). By the end of September 2014, the guards had carried out 600 patrol tasks and more than two hundred escort tasks in the area of responsibility of the MINUSMA (Ministry for Defence, 2014b). The Chinese engineer detachment had successively completed multiple tasks (Ministry for Defence, 2015a), including 100 construction and support tasks, such as constructing roads, erecting bridges and building makeshift housing (ibid). The medical detachment had treated 1,281 people and hospitalized 84

patients (Ministry for Defence, 2015a). The combination of troops and their activities was a reflection of China's attempt to develop a comprehensive security force that would allow China to contribute to peace building.

The Chinese comprehensive security approach also targeted Malian food and water insecurity, which had been the main driving force of the current and previous conflicts in Northern Mali. Under the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 2013-2017 Country Programming Framework, a South-South Cooperation project was set up to enhance Mali's agricultural production through the provision of Chinese technical assistance (FAO, 2014). It is clear that in Mali, China is taking a wider approach to dealing with many of the non-traditional security threats that are the underlying causes for much of the conflict. This, combined with a contribution of peacekeeping troops, including combat troops, is a reflection of China's attempt to adopt a comprehensive security approach to international peacekeeping. It is also a reflection of China's desire to play a responsible great power role in international relations.

As highlighted by Richard Gowan (2014), an associate fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, African security is one of the few bright spots for Sino-European cooperation, and the case of Mali is one of the best examples of Sino-EU cooperation in peacekeeping on the continent. Both China and the EU took a comprehensive security approach to the mission, dealing not only with the military threat but also with the underlying causes of the conflict, such as food insecurity. The UN mission in Mali marked the first occasion when China sent troops on full combat mandates. However, China is also playing a strong role in the mission in more traditional areas, such as diplomacy and development. As China added a military element to its peacekeeping mission, it is interesting to note that Chinese troops in Mali were stationed in a base alongside Dutch troops (Nederlandse Vertegenwoordiging in China, 2015). The Chinese have noted that the Dutch 3D approach – which integrates diplomacy, defence and development – is seen as a very effective approach toward peace building. It is clear that China sees the EU and EU member states as partners for the development of a comprehensive approach to peacekeeping. It is also clear that cooperation with China in these missions offer the EU an opportunity to shape China's norms in terms of peacekeeping.

8. Conclusion

Historically, both China and Europe have played major roles in determining global security and have helped develop the current system of global security governance. Europe has had a major role in global affairs, and particular security issues are clearly part of the EU's self-identity. This can be seen

by the development of the CSDP but also by role behaviour, such as the formation of an EU mission in the Gulf of Aden outside the umbrella of NATO and the EU's role in the UN's mission in Mali. These are the results of the EU meeting its domestic expectations to play a greater role in security affairs. This expectation has developed from the EU's historical self, which is built on Europe's historical role as a major power in global security affairs. However, in terms of security governance, the EU is a normative actor. This is due to the internal role conflict that prevents the EU from moving beyond its function as a civilian power and to the fact that external powers view the EU's role as acting within the realm of non-traditional security issues. Brexit (British exit from the EU) may in fact reinforce this role, as the EU will lose one of its strongest traditional security actors.

In terms of Sino-EU security cooperation, it is clear that China sees the EU as an important actor but considers its role as one of a non-traditional security actor. This is apparent from China's role behaviour. In the Gulf of Aden and in Mali, China has attempted to encourage the EU to adopt a comprehensive approach to non-traditional security issues. However, it did not attempt to cooperate with the EU in traditional security issues of escorting chemical weapons out of Syria to a US ship and monitoring their destruction or the French-led military intervention in Northern Mali. This will be left to the US, Russia, NATO and, to a lesser extent, France, which China perceives as having a traditional security role.

China is attempting to play the role of a responsible great power in global security governance. This can be seen by its increased activity in global security responses. There is a domestic expectation that China should play a greater role in global affairs, and the positive response to the PLA-N mission in the Gulf of Aden and the PLA's mission in Mali is an indication that China is playing this role. There is an external expectation that China should become a responsible great power and assume some of the burden of ensuring global peace and security. We can see from China's actions in the Gulf of Aden and in Mali that it has engaged in and attempted to lead a global response to security issues. It has executed this action to benefit its own interests but also to protect global trade and regional stability. This is the hallmark of a responsible great power. We can see from the case of Sino-EU cooperation in the Gulf of Aden and in Mali that, in many ways, China and the EU have developed complementary roles. The EU is able to play a role as a normative actor. It achieves this by bringing China into the current system of global security governance. Here, China is able to fulfil its role as a responsible great power by engaging in and developing comprehensive security responses to global security issues. China can do this with the support and cooperation of the EU as a key actor in the non-traditional security aspects of the comprehensive security approach. This means that there is room for the EU

to play a role as a normative actor attempting to push China into a responsible great power role in Africa. The EU is doing this by providing institutional space for China to create coordinated responses to regional security issues with actors in the region. However, Chinese actions in the South China Sea in terms of the installation and expansion of military structures in disputed territories is clearly a fresh barrier to China fully adopting the responsible great power role and therefore a barrier to Sino-EU security cooperation.

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