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<td>Author(s)</td>
<td>Strydom, Piet</td>
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<td>Publication date</td>
<td>2012-11-01</td>
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<td>Type of publication</td>
<td>Article (peer-reviewed)</td>
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| Link to publisher's version | https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.7227/IJS.20.2.3  
http://dx.doi.org/10.7227/ijs.20.2.3  
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Toward a global cosmopolis?
On the formation of a cosmopolitan cultural model

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Abstract
This article offers a critical assessment of the prospects of the emergence of a global cosmopolitan society. For this purpose, it presents an analysis of the different interrelated types of structure formation in the process of cosmopolitisation and the mechanisms sustaining each. It deals with both the generation of a variety of actor-based models of world openness at the micro and meso level and with the reflexive meta-principle of cosmopolitanism forming part of the cognitive order of society at the macro level. But the focus is on the formation of an intermediate, substantive, situational, cultural model of cosmopolitanism which is on the one hand guided by the abstract principle of cosmopolitanism and on the other selectively brings together the actor models. Central to this analysis of cultural model formation is the threefold or triple contingency structure of the communication involved. The diagnosis, which takes a variety of conditions into account, is that the vital central moment of the formation of a substantive cultural model that would frame the organisation of a normative social order is deficient, which implies that the societal learning process supposed to engender it is being diverted, impeded or blocked. An explanation along the lines of critical social theory is proposed with reference to socio-structural and sociocultural causal factors.

Key words: cognitive order, communication, cosmopolitanism, critical social theory, culture, mechanisms, reflexivity, social learning processes, structure formation, triple contingency

Introduction
On the agenda today is an entirely different sense of cosmopolis from what Stephen Toulmin had in mind in the early 1990s when he published his well-known book of that title. What he wrote about was the emergence in the seventeenth century of the set of shared presuppositions or comprehensive system of ideas underpinning the modern outlook – what he called ‘the framework of Modernity’ or ‘the scaffolding of Modernity’ (1992: 116-17). It embraced ideas relating to both nature and society that were, according to his account, canonically formulated by philosophers and scientists and then appropriated and practically applied by those who manned and legitimated the state. It is precisely this nexus of nature and society that Toulmin called ‘cosmopolis’, ‘the new cosmopolis’ or ‘the modern cosmopolis’ (1992: 105-115).

The new or twenty-first century cosmopolis that is being anticipated in our time, by contrast, still encompasses ideas of both nature and society, both earth and world, but what is envisaged now is a global cosmopolitan form of life in a cared-for planetary biosocial ecosphere (Strydom 2011b). On the latter ecological aspect, some progress has been made since the emergence of the ecology movement in the 1960 and official recognition by the United Nations and the Brundtland Commission in the 1970s and 1980s respectively (Strydom 2002, 2008), although the abortive conferences of the past few years attest to the continuing existence of serious obstacles in this field. By comparison, the global cosmopolitan strand, which took off only in the wake of the European Revolution of 1989, the end of the Cold War, the fall of Apartheid and so forth, lags considerably behind. It is this vexatious quality of the process of cosmopolitisation which receives little attention in the literature that prompts the question of where we are regarding a global cosmopolis. In this article, I propose to focus on this particular question. But, in contrast to Toulmin, cosmopolis is here understood in the sense the concept acquired in the cosmopolitan tradition from the Stoics via Kant
to the present. It is indicated by the etymological origin of the word in the fusion of ‘cosmos’ and ‘polis’: a human social mode of existence or form of life that manifests openness toward others and toward the world not only globally, but simultaneously also locally. The leading question could thus be reformulated as: Are we on the way to a locally rooted cosmopolitan world or global society?

In order to unfold this question and its implications, I propose to focus on the process of cosmopolitisation and to draw attention in particular to the variety of sociocultural structures formed in its course which serve as necessary supports or vehicles of cosmopolitanism in its different manifestations. In the case of each of the different types of structure, the corresponding mechanism responsible for it is also specified. The argument is that while certain necessary structures are in evidence to a certain degree, a vital moment of structure formation, and hence the adequate operation of its sustaining mechanism, is as yet largely lacking. The core component of the argument, therefore, is the analysis of the problem of the formation of the kind of cultural model of cosmopolitanism and the corresponding mode of societal learning that would allow institutionalisation of a cosmopolitan infrastructure and the complementary organisation of society. Sociologically, the account of the process of cosmopolitisation, structure formation and operative mechanisms cannot afford to ignore the conditions under which all this takes place – theoretically crucial, not only external conditions but especially internal ones. Awareness of these conditions finally provides a foothold for the diagnosis of the lagging structure formation and learning as well as for an explanation of the obstacles and blockages impeding the emergence of the required structure formation. This diagnosis and explanation offer a starting point for the exercise of the critical function of sociology in the service of stimulating the learning processes making the construction of the lacking cultural model possible.

**Conditions of cosmopolitisation**

The process of cosmopolitisation, which is the contemporary manifestation of the more general process of the development of society, takes place under a configuration of conditions that both facilitate and limit its progress. A first glance at these conditions reveals what must be considered an unpromising global geopolitical situation which, by the way, is typically ignored in the literature on cosmopolitanism. Currently, the global order is a hierarchical one of structural and class dependencies which exhibits signs of deep divisions marked by pronounced asymmetrical power relations (Senghaas 2012). The coordinated centre of gravity is occupied by the OECD countries where a stable peace prevails since the mid-twentieth century. Together with the Southeast Asian states, it represents only 16 per cent of the world population. The remaining 84 per cent divides among two internally fractured macro-states, China and India, with 37 per cent, 140 countries under limited state structures representing another 37 per cent, and finally a number of failing states accounting for 10 per cent of the world population. This set of relations obviously poses a formidable obstacle to the development of a global cosmopolis. It seems to entail that if a cosmopolitan condition were attained, it would for a considerable period be confined to a relatively small proportion of the world population. It is difficult to see how the conditions and causes of the peace achieved in the OECD world, for example, could be emulated in much of the rest of world. This by no means implies, however, that orientations and certain norms of openness toward others are not present in the latter or could not be developed there, but the cosmopolitan organisation of society implicit in the notion of a cosmopolis is of an entirely different order. What is virtually certain, it would seem, is that the attainment of a global cosmopolis would not only be very difficult, but it would require much time, probably of the order of a number of generations.

Scenarios such as this one are usually associated with so-called ‘realism’ in international relations. However discouragingly true they may seem at times, history has often proved such realist scenarios
wrong. Very recently, the Berlin Wall fell in a way no-one foresaw and Apartheid collapsed with only a whimper. What this reveals is that such scenarios are descriptions of actuality rather than strictly realist, since the latter concerns the mechanisms operating inside or below the level of actuality in a way that gives rise to actuality in the first place and intermittently transforms it. This means that if there is no room for an over-optimistic embrace of a global cosmopolis, similarly there is absolutely no reason to resign oneself to an over-pessimistic stance either. In fact, beyond optimism and pessimism, a general cosmopolitan condition could be attained only if, on the basis of the rapidly increasing intensification of connections and relations, a sufficiently large number of people see themselves, qua members of a series of human generations, as being compelled by a moral demand to conceive of a hypothetical and thus fallible yet actually possible advancement in history, and to conduct themselves in a way that contributes to its realisation to the extent possible under given conditions (Apel 1997). That this is already the case, in fact, is attested by two considerations. Recently presented evidence ¹ suggests that the idea of cosmopolitanism is alive not just the Western world, but also in such contexts as Southeast Asia, Latin America, China, India, Japan and Africa as well as in Jewish and Islamic culture. Moreover, an assessment of the response in the global public sphere to the historic events of the recent past shows there is reason to believe that the public is acquiring both an intuition and sensitivity to the cosmopolitan demand.

Considering the current global situation a little more closely, it becomes apparent that the process of globalisation has significantly contributed to providing the conditions for both its emergence and the currently continuing realignment of its different constituent units – particularly, the United States, Europe, Japan, China, India, Russia, and Brazil – as well as its partial shaping in a cosmopolitan direction. Globalisation, however, is not simply a process of accumulation, differentiation and evolution which leads to the extension, expansion and enlargement of the economic, political, civil societal and cultural forms of society, as it is typically conceived. It is at one and the same time a process of functional globalisation and of communicative globalisation or mondialisation between which discourse plays a central role (Strydom 2009: 263-66). Considering the current scene, the agents spearheading and carrying functional globalisation include corporations, states and international organisations, while communicative globalisation is advanced and defended by actors rooted in civil society such as voluntary groups, non-governmental organisations and social movements. Whereas the former involves the forging of ever-expanding functional connections making system integration possible, the latter is focused on the achievement of a socially integrated, well-ordered, interpersonal human world – which is why the two sides are engaged in competition, contestation and conflict.

It is in this divided context of functional and communicative globalisation, which is interconnected and mediated in and through the medium of discourse on a series of relevant issue, that the process of cosmopolitisation is embedded.

Cosmopolitisation, structure formation and operative mechanisms

The conceptualisation of globalisation as a matter of both functional and communicative expansion allows for a quite good understanding of the process of cosmopolitisation in general, but by identifying the principle moments of structure formation occurring in its course it is possible to circumscribe it more precisely still.

Cosmopolitisation as objective and subjective-intersubjective process

Considered from an external observer’s perspective with the focus on globalisation as an expansive development captured by such process terms as accumulation, differentiation and evolution,
cosmopolitisation can on the one hand be seen as related objective changes which impact on social relations in a way that compels the opening up of the social world. If, on the other hand, one adopts an internal interpreting participant’s perspective and shifts the focus to the social learning processes of those who experience such changes and opening up, however, then the very same process appears in quite a different light.

From this angle, cosmopolitisation presents itself as a matter of the subjective-intersubjective processing of objective developments and changes. It proceeds by experience and reflection on assumptions and reconsideration of values and norms, while taking into account both other actors and the public – all of which feed into learning processes. If successful, learning leads to awareness of openness toward others, the emerging world society, the need for a reconfigured cultural model accommodating cosmopolitanism and adoption of some version or other of such a model. This whole sequence implies self-transformation, subject-formation as well as social and institutional transformation without which the former would not remain viable for long.

The cosmopolitisation process thus embraces both objective developments that open up the social world and subjective-intersubjective learning processes that reflexively rework the concomitant experiences in the direction of world openness.

Threefold structural punctuation of cosmopolitisation

As regards structure formation marking different points in the process of cosmopolitisation, three moments need to be identified and described (see Figure 1). At one extreme on the micro and meso level, a variety of structures are constructed which take the form of collective actor-based cosmopolitan models or models of world openness. At the other extreme on the macro level, a cultural structure is constructively universalised which assumes the form of the very idea of cosmopolitanism transcending the concrete context or situation. In an intermediate position flanked by these extremes, there emerges in the context a cultural model of cosmopolitanism which is directly relevant to the concrete situation.

(i) Generation of variety

First, the construction of collective actor cosmopolitan models or models of world openness depends on the exercise of a range of human cognitive competences and latent capacities, but it proceeds on the basis of the introduction of innovations, articulation of new ideas, devising of new formats and making of claims. These are the sources of the generation of the variety that impels the process of cosmopolitisation. They could be of an intellectual-instrumental, a moral-practical or an aesthetic practical kind. The variety generated by such cognitive sources is complemented by the formation of social relations as manifested in groups, associations, corporate entities and organisations. These social phenomena are the forms of the collective actors who construct and propagate their respective cognitive frames. In the case of the process of cosmopolitisation, these cognitive frames appear as the variety of actor cosmopolitan models, each of which is a version of the unique kind of open world desired, envisaged and worked for by a particular actor.

Two different types of mechanisms operate in the production of the variety of cognitive frames and social forms. The construction of cognitive frames taking the form of different actor cosmopolitan models is made possible by generative mechanisms covering virtually the whole range of human competences allowing and shaping new ideas, normative and other innovations, different formats, ethical and moral claims, and so forth. Social forms, in turn, are engendered by a relational mechanism which is mediated by communication and makes possible opportunity creating and exploiting networks, solidarity building associations and identity consolidating communities. This relational mechanism is complemented by a learning mechanism which could operate as aggregative learning in the case of individual or legal persons, as institutional learning in the case of institutions
or organisations, or associational learning in the case of the formation of voluntary groups and social movements as collective actors.

When one considers the actors effectively engaged in the process of cosmopolitisation and the competences and types of learning processes on which they depend, light is shed on the variety of structural outcomes generated at the micro and meso level sector of the cosmopolitisation process. First, individuals (e.g. business executives, bureaucrats, lawyers) and institutions or organisations (e.g. corporations, states, law firms) who depend on aggregative learning in seeking to pursue their own interests more effectively construct a cosmopolitan model or model of world openness that approximates an *elitist corporate, bureaucratic and professional type of cosmopolitanism* in an economic, political or legal guise. Second, institutions or organizations that seek to fulfil their particular missions to their clients, customers or citizens on the basis of *institutional learning* adopt a form of *corporate or institutional cosmopolitanism* which is articulated through models couched in economic, political, legal or moral terms. Third, the voluntary groups and social movements who through *associational learning* constitute themselves as collective actors engaged in the advancement and defence of civil society and its institutional infrastructure employ varying conceptions of civil society to articulate a *civic cosmopolitanism*.

The crucial importance of the variety generated at the micro and meso level for the continuation of the process of cosmopolitisation and for furthering more complex structure formation will become clear in due course.

**(iii) Cognitive order of society**

At the other extreme of the process of cosmopolitisation on the macro level, a cultural structure becomes constructively idealised and universalised and, transcending the concrete context or situation, is established as a component of the cognitive order of society. This universalising thrust toward a meta-position occurs in and through the medium of reflexivity. Once the actor cosmopolitan models enter the public domain, visible and audible to each other and to the observing public, a process of reflexivity takes off. This is due to each becoming aware of others, being confronted by the presence of a variety of different positions and thus having to recognise the availability of a range of alternatives which cannot be ignored or denied. The movement of reflexivity leads, even compels, those involved to acknowledge what is commonly presupposed and expected by all, even though they may be competing, contesting each other’s positions and conflicting with one another.

In the case of the process of cosmopolitisation, all those who are constructing models of world openness, however much they may differ from one another and however antagonistic their models may be, all of them entertain presuppositions and cultivate expectations about one and the same thing – namely cosmopolitanism. It is this commonality, this commonly held cognitive idea of cosmopolitanism, that transcends all the actors and their situation from within that very situation. Rather than simply a behavioural expectation, it is constructively idealised and universalised into a reflexive expectation occupying a meta-structural location, a structural level of expectations or a system of classification beyond the situation. Cosmopolitanism thus becomes established as an element of the cognitive order of society. It is a counterfactual idea, one that has not been realised but rather calls out to be activated and realised, and as such it obtains both a structuring and a regulative force. On the one hand, it recursively impacts on and structures presuppositions, expectations, orientations, actions, interactions, practices and discourse and, on the other, it recursively regulates in the sense of directing and guiding the very process of their continued implementation and unfolding.
Historically, this is precisely how the idea of cosmopolitanism became part of the set of shared presuppositions or comprehensive system of ideas of modernity. In the 1790s when Kant canonically formulated cosmopolitanism as one of the meta-rules of modern culture, he was able to do so since it had started to emerge reflexively from the early modern conflicts and associated debates – from the voyages of discovery which confronted Europeans with having to recognise the claim to a ‘rightful condition’ of the ‘multitude of peoples [on] the earth’s surface’ (1996: 89), to the Wars of Religion and the struggle against absolutism, which demanded the development of a competence to recognise others and to be open toward them. Since then, the idea of cosmopolitanism languished in the doldrums until the late twentieth century. It was once again enthusiastically infused with meaning and significance to become the burning issue it is today in the conflict over its practical realisation only due to the pressures emanating from globalisation and objective cosmopolitisation toward the subjective and intersubjective processing of the experience of an opening-up world and learning. Only after the end of the Cold War, especially since 1995, the year of the multiple anniversaries of Kant’s proposal for perpetual peace, the end of World War II and the establishment of the United Nation’s charter, did appreciation for the potential of this context-transcendent, counterfactual meta-rule belonging to the cognitive order of modernity really start to grow again.

Cosmopolitanism, however, is only one element among a wide and in all probability unspecifiable number of components of the cognitive order. The cognitive order of modernity arose over a period of approximately three centuries on a socio-structural and socio-cultural basis that was made available by a series of long-term processes of development which led to the establishment of modern society’s core institutional components. Political, economic, legal, social and cultural developments, for example, were through concurrent reflexivity accompanied by the emergence of such cognitive ideas or counterfactual principles as sovereignty, efficiency, legality and legitimacy, freedom, equality and solidarity, and truth, rightness and truthfulness, which were authoritatively articulated by Bodin, Smith, Hobbes, Paine and Sièyes, Locke, Montesquieu and Rousseau, and by Kant respectively. Since then, the components of modernity’s cognitive order have structured and regulated the orientations and practices producing and reproducing it, while stimulating the actualisation, realisation and expansion of its multilevel potentialities. Being only one among a number of components of the cognitive order, cosmopolitanism never appears on its own when it enters social life in its capacity as structuring and regulating principle, but always in combination with a selection of other principles – as will become apparent later on (see Figure 1).

Two main mechanisms responsible for the emergence of the cognitive idea of cosmopolitanism and its incorporation in the cognitive order can be identified. Earlier the role of reflexivity in the emergence of the commonly presupposed idea of cosmopolitanism was stressed, but it should be kept in mind that it forms only part of the learning mechanism whereby the constructive idealisation and universalization of the idea is attained. In this case, a type of social learning beyond the previously discussed aggregative, institutional and associational learning takes place. It is a partial form of societal learning, a communicative form of learning involving not only the actors but also the public, which facilitates not the full-scale cognitive and normative institutionalisation of the idea of cosmopolitanism but rather its cognitive institutionalisation at the meta-level alone. Such cognitive institutionalisation is itself dependent on a stabilisation mechanism. It takes the form of a self-organising cultural selection which draws on the wide-ranging contributions speakers and authors make to cultural debate as well as the reactions of the public. Once stabilised as part of the cognitive order, the idea of cosmopolitanism itself then acquires the function of a structuring and regulating mechanism.

(iii) Cultural model of cosmopolitanism

Thus far the argument was that, like the variety generated at the micro and meso level, the macro level structuring and regulative effect of the cognitive order on social life, particularly the effect of
the counterfactual meta-rule of cosmopolitanism, is of the utmost importance for the full development and articulation of structure formation in the course of the process of cosmopolitisation. Beyond these essential developments, however, the third moment of intermediate structure formation in the process of cosmopolitisation now calls for attention – that is, a substantive cultural model of cosmopolitanism that emerges in the context and is of direct relevance to the concrete situation. As anticipated in the introduction, the consideration of the construction and formation of this kind of model, together with its corresponding mode of societal learning, represents the core component of the argument of the present chapter. For this reason, an independent section rather than just a subsection is thus devoted to this vital moment in the process of cosmopolitisation.

**Epi-level cultural model formation engendered by societal learning**

Required at this stage in the argument is an analysis of the problem of the formation of the kind of cultural model of cosmopolitanism intermediate between the actor models of world openness and the cognitive idea of cosmopolitanism that would allow the full normative institutionalisation of a cosmopolitan infrastructure and the complementary organisation of society.7

**Between models of world openness and the idea of cosmopolitanism**

The availability of a variety of models of world openness constructed by actors on the basis of their different learning processes is insufficient for a society to become cosmopolitan. Likewise, the reflexive presence of the idea of cosmopolitanism at the meta-level cognitive order on its own cannot bring about the transformation necessary for the emergence of a cosmopolis. Indeed, actor models of world openness provide the requisite variety for such an eventuality and the counterfactual principle of cosmopolitanism incursively brings its concretisation imperative to bear on social life by demanding realisation of its potential. Yet the requirements for the transformation of society into a cosmopolis are still more complex. What is needed is a bridging of the gap between the models of world openness and the cognitive order and, thus, the assuaging of the tension and even conflict between immanent orientations and practices and the demands of the unfulfilled potentials emanating from the transcendent order.

That this problem of an appropriate interface is not easily resolved is borne out by cosmopolitan developments in both the early modern and contemporary periods. Thanks to developments of the time that both opened up the world and stimulated an individual and social sense of openness, Kant was able to codify the idea of cosmopolitanism toward the end of the eighteenth century. Instead of the potential of the idea being realised in the following century, however, it entered an extended period in which it was practically forgotten. It took another two hundred years before we ourselves witnessed the renewal of the idea of cosmopolitanism as a component of the cognitive order of modernity, followed by a quite vigorous construction and proliferation of actor models of world openness. Yet today still there is little evidence that would sustain the claim that a cosmopolis has substantively begun to emerge. Still lacking between the counterfactual cosmopolitan idea and the different actor cosmopolitan models is an intervening or mediating moment.

The central question thus becomes what precisely such a mediating mode of structure formation and its structural outcome would amount to. Earlier mention was made of a construction, formation or interface capable of bridging the gap between immanent practical constructions and transcendent principles and thus resolving for the time being at least the endemic tension it harbours. Such a mechanism or interface would have to allow, on the one hand, the structuring effect of the context-transcendent idea of cosmopolitanism to be brought to bear on the immanent situation and, on the other, the bringing together of the different actor models in a selective yet
collectively constructive way which is guided by that very idea. What is needed, therefore, is
twofold: both a mechanism making possible the emergence and establishment of an interface and a
structural achievement representing the interface itself. Societal learning is the mechanism in
question and the interfacial structure formed by such a process is represented by a substantive
cultural model of cosmopolitanism admitting institutionalisation.

**Societal or triple contingency learning**

For a society or a number of societies interconnected by a common cognitive order to be
transformed into a cosmopolis, a societal learning process is required that makes possible the
construction, formation and institutionalisation of a cultural model. For this purpose, it has to enable
a number of different yet interrelated operations and achievements, which is possible only to the
extent that it is embedded in the medium of communication or, more specifically, of discourse. In its
first phase, the societal learning process has to allow the mobilisation and interrelation of variety,
the playing of different models of world openness off against one another, the emergence of viable
aspects from the different models and their coordination so as to facilitate the development of a
clearly perceptible range of scenarios, options or paths of possible further development. In its
second phase, it is crucial that the learning process makes possible a coordinated selection and,
eventually, the institutionalisation of a specific developmental path in a way that is justifiable,
collectively acceptable and thus legitimate. This conception of societal learning hinges on the
concept of triple contingency and its application to sociological learning theory.

The concept of triple contingency signals the recognition of the fact that in contemporary
communication society communication processes relevant to the creation and organisation of
society take on a highly contingent form. Rather than single communicative contingency where
someone more or less arbitrarily selects a message and communicates it to another, or double
communicative contingency where a speaker and an addressee mutually determine the meaning
of a message, contemporary social life is pervaded by triple communicative contingency. It is
abundantly evident in public communication, particularly in morally and politically relevant
discourses. In such cases, an empirically determinable number of collective actors appear on the
virtual stage of the public sphere focused from competing, contending or conflicting perspectives on
a common issue. At the same time, the public is present who observes, evaluates, judges, comments
on and thus monitors what is happening on the stage. Over and above the double contingency
relation in which the actors stand to one another, the perspective of the public interest represented
by the public, however diverse it might seem empirically, imposes another level of contingency on
the situation which has an overall social shaping effect on it. In fact, this third point of view borne by
the public is a conduit for the incursive structuring and recursive regulative effect of the cognitive
order, including the counterfactual idea of cosmopolitanism, on the contending actors and more
broadly on immanent social life. It is on the basis of such a significance effect that the public is
absolutely crucial to the laying down of the parameters within which selection, decision-making,
institutionalisation and the organisation of society become possible. From this tripartite relationship
follows the conclusion that triple contingency learning involves a process in and through which those
on the virtual stage learn to reconfigure their cognitive models relative to the issue at stake by
relating to each other via a reference to the public interest as embodied by the empirically diverse
public, while the public in turn learns from the arguments, justifications, actions and mistakes of
those on the stage.

**Cultural model of cosmopolitanism**

In the course of elaborating on the question of what intermediate structure formation amounts
to, societal or triple contingency learning was identified as the mechanism making possible
the emergence and establishment of an interface between models of world openness and the
idea of cosmopolitanism. What now needs attention is the structural outcome of this process that can assume the function of a mediating interface. At issue here is a cultural model which is able to translate, refract and embody the idea of cosmopolitanism in the concrete situation in such a way that it simultaneously selectively reconciles the differences between the actor models of world openness in a collectively constructive direction. In the absence of such a substantive cultural model of cosmopolitanism there is no possibility whatsoever of the kind of institutionalisation and organisational achievements demanded by a cosmopolitan society. By contrast with the purely abstract, anaemic, counterfactual, cognitive idea of cosmopolitanism, only such a substantive model is suitable to serve as an effective, embodied, concrete, situationally relevant focus imaginarius or idée directrice for the organisation of society.

As regards the problem of structure formation in question here, the concept of triple contingency captures that intervening or mediating moment at the core of the process of the constitution and organisation of society – in this case, the process of cosmopolitisation. This is a moment when a temporary short-term window becomes available and allows the mobilisation of variety, selection and decision-making which both confirms the emergence of a cultural model and fixes it. Such an achievement is presupposed by the institutionalisation of certain ideas and practices which, in turn, makes possible the organisation of society. To understand the make-up or structure of the emergent cultural model, therefore, it is essential to keep in mind the relation of triple contingency among the contending actors on the virtual stage and the observing, evaluating, judging, commenting and thus monitoring public representing the third point of view. This methodological stipulation is observed in the following analysis of the construction, formation and institutionalisation of a cultural model of cosmopolitanism (see Figure 1).
(i) Mobilisation of the variety
The first condition for the emergence of a substantive cultural model is the mobilisation of variety which is possible only in and through the communication medium. Social interaction is essential for aggregative, institutional and associational learning processes, while discourse renders an issue public by drawing in a plurality of different actors and focusing their attention on something common. Since the 1990s, cosmopolitanism was shaped into an issue by a conjunction of external and internal conditions, both globalisation and learning processes, which stimulated the cosmopolitisiation process. Its first outcome was the constructive universalisation of the idea of cosmopolitanism to the level of the cognitive order. The ensuing discourse guided by this leading idea, like any discourse, follows the logic of drawing in a plurality of participants and then simultaneously dividing and coordinating them (Strydom 2000).

On the one hand, the participants are divided in so far as they are stimulated and even compelled to develop and articulate their respective positions and models of world openness as clearly as possible in opposition to one another. On the other, they are coordinated in so far as they are able to participate in the discourse at all only to the extent that they allow themselves to be led by the shared guiding idea of cosmopolitanism. While being divided and coordinated, the participants, depending on who they are, draw on different power-enhancing resources such as wealth, political mandate or moral concern and outrage. Simultaneously, they also make reference to features of the situation and the wider context, including physical and social objects to which meanings are imputed and which, significantly, serve them as cognitive supports — for example, promises of expanding opportunities and an increasing standard of living with reference to investments, propagating visions of democratic equality, fairness and regulation while invoking governance achievements, or pointing to the suffering of a particular group of discriminated and excluded people, and so forth.

Besides the actors, the presence of the monitoring public introduces a difference into this set of relations to the extent that it mediates between the participants and the cognitive order. What the public in effect accomplishes via its embodiment of the public interest is the translation and refraction of the abstract counterfactual idea of cosmopolitanism into a situationally relevant form. This particular significance effect of the public may be rather minimal at the outset of a discourse, but it could increase appreciably and even exponentially as the coordination impact of the discourse grows through the incursive force of the counterfactual cosmopolitan idea.

(ii) Selective formation of a cultural model
Once variety has been mobilised and consolidated through the discursive interchange among the contending actors on the virtual stage as well as between them and the monitoring public, the process of cosmopolitisisation reaches a new stage.14

First, a whole range of distinct actor-based cosmopolitan models or models of world openness depending on aggregative, institutional and associational learning is now available. As indicated earlier, these models include competing types of cosmopolitanism: an elitist corporate, bureaucratic and professional type advanced in an economic, political or legal guise; a corporate or institutional type articulated in economic, political, legal or moral terms; and a civic type of cosmopolitanism put forward through different conceptions of civil society. Secondly, the effect of the public’s third point of view on the contending actors shows in the interrelation, coordination and consolidation of the competing models of world openness. Rather than arbitrarily competing, mutually contested and even conflicting models, these actor-based cognitive frames are smoothed out, reformatted, aligned with one another and integrated into a range of more or less clearly perceptible options. Depending on the logic of discourse which feeds on the contending actors’ individual contributions and the public’s structuring and regulative effect yet transpires over and above their heads, this formation of options is a discursive achievement. More formally, the range of options can be conceived as a
temporary, epi-level, developmental cultural model which specifies a number of different possible paths for future development. Epi-level, since it forms an immediate penumbra of substantive options around the situation from which a selection could be made rather than occupying the meta-level, as does the abstract situation-transcendent cognitive order of society.\textsuperscript{15} Temporal, since it is available only for a relatively short period, due to disappear irrespective of whether it has been drawn upon for future development or not. Effectively, the consolidation of the available variety in a developmental model makes discursively available a new context for decision-making and action. The conditions are in place for a selection from among the options which would provide the basis for the institutionalisation and organisation of society according to the requirements and demands represented by the counterfactual idea of cosmopolitanism.

The developmental cultural model sporting the range of options lays down broad parameters within which selection is possible, but the parameters are further refined through the discursive articulation of selective pressures. In addition to the public’s representation of the public interest which continues to be effective, these pressures emanate from corporate public relations, governing politicians, political parties, and representatives of civil society, including intellectuals, academics, writers, the churches, social movements, the excluded and so forth. Contributors such as these participate indirectly in the selection process. Since they command not only different resources such as power, mandate, reputation and moral authority, but also different effective quantities of such resources, they could make an appreciable difference to the outcome of the final selection made from among the available options.

If the construction of the temporary developmental model is successful and the discursive selection process has sufficiently matured, then one can expect the emergence of a proper cultural model of cosmopolitanism. The actual emergence of such a model would represent the cognitive institutionalisation of cosmopolitanism within the situation. Whereas the temporary short-term developmental cultural model from which the selection is made is the product of a process of weak emergence, the cultural cosmopolitan model proper is a more enduring emergent formation, being the product of a stronger process of emergence.\textsuperscript{16} Like the developmental model, however, the stronger model also occupies the epi-level - a characteristic distinguishing it from the situation-transcendent meta-level cognitive order. While this more durable cultural model is selectively constructed from the variety of available options and thus arises within the situation, it is simultaneously the situational translation and refraction of cognitive ideas possessing structuring and regulative force due to their forming part of the cognitive order. First among them, of course, is the idea of cosmopolitanism as mediated by the public, but this core component is selectively combined with other ideas drawn from the cognitive order, such as truth, efficiency, rightness, legality, legitimacy, freedom, equality, solidarity and truthfulness, depending on the situationally stressed values and norms in terms of which they are appropriated. This substantive translation and refraction of the abstract and anaemic idea of cosmopolitanism prepares the ground for the situational embodiment and normative institutionalisation of cosmopolitanism.

(iii) Normative institutionalisation of cosmopolitanism
The formal ratification of the selection and thus of the cultural model of cosmopolitanism is executed through decision making which is the prerogative of those charged with political and organisational responsibility. Accordingly, the selection and the model are confirmed by the formulation of norms and rules, the issuing of recommendations and guidelines, and the offering of justifications aimed at securing its legitimacy. These procedures are all steps toward the institutionalisation of cosmopolitanism, more specifically, toward its normative institutionalisation. Their incorporation in documents of various kinds, especially through formal acts of legislation, ultimately secures such institutionalisation. A formal institutional procedure of this kind, important to note, is the societal version and hence the fixing of the triply contingent third point of view.
originally represented by the public. This means that cosmopolitanism is established in a more or less durable form which anchors a particular combination of cognitive ideas, with cosmopolitanism at its centre, in the values and norms, some of which are sanctionable, which prevail in the context concerned. While the emergence of a durable cultural model in the sense of being cognitively institutionalised is the presupposition of its politically and socially effective or normative institutionalisation, the latter is in turn a necessary condition of the organisation of society in terms of the requirements and demands of the leading idea of cosmopolitanism. The achievement of a global cosmopolis, in other words, requires the reasonably adequate fulfilment of a series of demanding, if not improbable, requirements – the most demanding being the intimately related generation of a temporary developmental cultural model and the selective abstraction and institutionalisation of a more enduring cultural model of cosmopolitanism which allows a corresponding organisation of society.

As emphasised earlier, triple contingency learning in the sense of a form of discursively mediated societal learning is the central mechanism operative at the intermediate dimension of the cosmopolitisation process. This type of learning is what makes the construction of a developmental model possible and it also lies behind the selection and institutional fixing of the stronger emergent cultural model of cosmopolitanism. While such a spurt of triple contingency learning is an absolute necessity for the attainment of a global cosmopolis, it is of course by no means inevitable. On the contrary, it is an improbable – although quite possible – eventuality and could therefore easily fail. This, after all, is what lends it its central sociological interest. Failure is typically due to power-laden socio-structural or sociocultural interferences which it is the task of critical social theory to diagnose, explain and criticise.

**Diagnosis: a global cosmopolis?**

At the outset of the analysis in this chapter, it was indicated that the geopolitical conditions for the attainment of a global cosmopolis appear rather unpromising. Considering that there are various mechanisms operative below the surface which not only generate actuality but also sustain and transform it, it was nevertheless countered that there is no reason therefore to capitulate before the tempting conclusion that resignation is the only alternative. This of course does not imply a licence for optimism either. The only reasonable position to take is a sober, balanced assessment of the prospects of our being on the way toward a locally rooted global cosmopolitan society. Such an assessment requires a consideration of the structures formed in the course of the process of cosmopolitisation with reference to the mechanisms generating, sustaining and transforming them. The analysis presented above was designed precisely for this purpose. The exploration offered of the different cosmopolitan structures formed and the corresponding operative mechanisms driving the process of cosmopolitisation thus provides a sufficient basis for present purposes. What it allows is a diagnostic assessment of the actual situation.

To begin with, all evidence points to a cosmopolitisation process that is well under way in the contemporary period. The process received its first impetus from the promulgation of crimes against humanity for the purposes of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the ratification of the United Nations’ Charter (e.g. Farer and Carr 2000), while the process of globalisation since the 1970s provided stimulating conditions. But especially since the events and initiatives taken after the 1989-92 rupture, productive contributions impelling the process have proliferated. The result of these developments is not only that the formation of cosmopolitan structures at different levels has benefited, but also that the concurrent stream of reflexivity, linking up with the outcomes of eighteenth- and mid-twentieth-century learning processes, intensified considerably.
The re-articulation of the counterfactual idea of cosmopolitanism and its unequivocal re-assertion as an inherent part of the cognitive order of modernity occupying the meta-level was a major positive achievement of structure formation in the medium of reflexivity. This is not just the case for the original modern world, but apparently also for other modernities around the globe. The United Nation was and still is the leading advocate of cosmopolitanism, thus kindling, energising and intensifying reflexivity and appropriate learning processes. The response in the global public domain to a series of historic events of the recent past underlines, moreover, that there is reason to believe that a significant portion of the public has gained in reflexivity and hence a sense of the reflexive expectation of cosmopolitanism.

A second essential instance of structure formation concerns the actor-based variety of cosmopolitan models or models of world openness. This variety, which depends first of all on human cognitive capacities and competences, was initially strengthened by the actors’ occupation of different sociocultural positions and then channelled by emergent conditions such as the globalisation and cosmopolitisation processes. Once the idea of cosmopolitanism was re-articulated and re-asserted, with the result that it started exerting a structuring force, the initially still relatively ill-defined variety of models of world openness became more distinctly circumscribed, thus opening a process of refining that continued as the idea of cosmopolitanism recursively regulated the formation of those cognitive frames. On the actor level, distinct competing, mutually contested and even conflicting types of cosmopolitanism which are practically pursued now became clearly visible. At the moment when the interrelation of generated variety and structuring regulation is experienced as a tension, contradiction, conflict or problem that needs to be resolved by those involved and implicated, cosmopolitan structure formation shifts to another level. It is here at this point that the process of cosmopolitisation runs up against its limits and thus marks the conjuncture where sociology’s critical diagnostic task looms large.

Beginning in the 1990s, there are indications in various different contexts of this intricate third moment of structure formation in the process of cosmopolitisation in which the generated variety of actor models and the idea of cosmopolitanism are mediated, with the potential of their successful fusion in a substantive, situationally relevant, cultural model of cosmopolitanism which could lead to a new cosmopolitan normative order. Perhaps the first context in which the discursive formation of a temporary developmental model making available different options for the establishment of a durable model could be observed was the debate instigated by the International Law Commission (1997) during the UN Decade of International Law, 1989-99. More or less closely related debates on human rights, international relations and global governance to varying degrees exhibited the same potential. Some reinforcement emanated also from debates about war and peace as well as humanitarian disasters of the recent past. In the European Union, issues such as the internal opening of the bloc, a rights charter and constitutionalisation all stimulated debates in which different actors with competing conceptions of an open world drew on the idea of cosmopolitanism and thus contributed to the articulation of a range of options or paths of possible future development. Even if only in small flashes, comparable concerns were in evidence in national contexts, such as the French headscarf affair and the Irish referendum item on citizenship as a birth right affecting children born to non-EU parents.

In cases such as the above, all of which exhibit the triple contingency structure of communicative relations among contending actors and the public, there are to varying degrees signs of the potential formation of a cultural model of cosmopolitanism or even steps toward it. In none of them, however, did it come to a full-scale discursive selection process that could lead to the emergence of a durable cultural model and its institutionalisation. This implies that the triple contingency or societal learning process had gone some way yet did not come to fruition. In the best case scenario, the European Union, certain aspects of a normatively interpreted cosmopolitanism were indeed
formalised in documents such as charters and legislation (e.g. European Union 2000), yet in practice they are exploited one-sidedly, left unrealised or effectively rendered inoperative by contrary arrangements. At different points in the referenced cases, then, the process of the formation of a cultural model and the concurrent mechanism spearheading it became diverted, ran into obstacles or were blocked in some way.

The possibility that such failures in structure formation and societal learning are attributable to the immaturity of the process of cosmopolitisation can by no means be ruled out. Historical evidence teaches that it can take time for societal learning processes to take off and to deliver positive outcomes, while we are here concerned with a period of hardly two decades. Despite the fact that with the passage of time reflexivity has intensified and learning processes have accelerated, one cannot ignore the time requirement involved in such processes. On the other hand, in so far as sociology includes a critical orientation in its self-understanding it cannot content itself fully with such a quiescent qualification. Given the diagnosis of a problem, it has to search for possible causal contextual mechanisms responsible for the debilitating interventions in societal learning and structure formation processes in order to explain divergences, obstacles and blockages. Chief among the mechanisms are socio-structural and sociocultural ones which could operate either singly or in tandem. Economic and/or political forces are at times combined with or supported by manipulated or fossilised cultural forms of a symbolic and/or cognitive kind. For instance, in the European case, despite having incorporated a much broader version into its charter of fundamental rights, the neoliberal reinforced elitist institutional model of world openness is the type favoured in the official selection process at the expense of the civic type. In the French case, by contrast, it is less a socio-structural mechanisms than a fossilised republican cultural model that blocks a broadening which would allow the incorporation of cosmopolitan norms (e.g. Benhabib 2008). Accordingly, it is quite possible through appropriate research to make causal connections along the suggested lines with the failures in the referenced cases to give rise to a cultural model of cosmopolitanism. Only on the basis of such explanations is critique possible at all and, by the same token, the kind of contribution to the easing of essential societal processes that sociology is equipped to deliver.

There cannot be any doubt about the fact that a global cosmopolis is a distant reality, if ever it comes to pass. It will not be achieved by advocacy of cosmopolitanism which became codified on the basis of only a partial form of societal learning leading to the meta-level cognitive institutionalisation of the idea. Nor will it come about by the continued or even intensified generation of individual and collective actor models of world openness on the basis of aggregative, institutional and associational learning processes. The mechanism responsible for the formation of a cultural model of cosmopolitanism, namely societal learning, must be potentiated and intensified. If societies do not learn, individuals could not learn nor could a global cosmopolitan society be approximated. First, the mitigation or removal of obstacles and blockages could lead to the formation of locally rooted, substantive cultural models of cosmopolitanism in national societies. Second, the generation of variety guided by the idea of cosmopolitanism needs to be lifted to the next higher level of interaction and discourse among national societies and, by extension, also among regional blocs so as to intensify societal learning processes in local and national contexts and to broaden them via regional contexts to the global context. The development and institutionalisation of cultural models of cosmopolitanism at these different levels and in these different contexts is the key to the emergence of a global cosmopolis.

Such an eventuality, to be sure, would not come about unless passionate effort is invested in it. This is the prerogative of the members of societies everywhere or citizens of the world – that is, each and every individual (including the sociologist) who, rather than only states, is now recognised in international law as a member of the international community (Lukashuk 1997) and, therefore, has the duty to contribute to and monitor the emergence of a global society of cosmopolitan rights,
Published in Irish Journal of Sociology 20(2), 2012, special issue on ‘Engaging the Cosmopolitan: Contemporary Approaches’, edited by Tracey Skillington and Patrick O’Mahony, pp. 28-50. DOI: 10.7227/IJS.20.2.3

democracy and peace within the framework of a responsibly sustained global life support system. Today, this is the lodestar – to invoke Max Weber’s (1973: 214) memorable phrase – that gives critical social scientific work its meaning and direction.

References


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1 See the contributions in Delanty (2012).
2 This is how Beck (2011) understands the process of cosmolopolitis.
3 This conceptualisation of the cosmolopolitis process is based on the key concept of critical social theory, namely ‘immanent transcendence’ (Strydom 2011a), which stresses the tension or dialectical contradiction between the immanent context and what, through the assuaging of such tension or contradiction, emerges from out of the context, thus transcending it while nevertheless remaining rooted in it. Although Luhmann’s (1995) distinction between ‘system and environment’ or ‘world’ and Boltanski’s (2011) between ‘reality and world’ may seem to correspond to it, they proceed from premises which distinguish them sharply from the position taken here.
4 For a general classification of mechanisms on which the following account draws, see Strydom (2011a).
5 For a more comprehensive treatment of the cognitive order of modernity, see Strydom (2000, 2012, forthcoming a, forthcoming b). While Boltanski and Thévenot’s (1991) ‘orders of worth’ (les formes de la grandeur) might seem to correspond to the cognitive order of society, they are actually at the lower level of cultural models. This is confirmed by the authors’ treatment of them as conventional rather than as meta-convention.
6 Eder (1996) makes the distinction between cognitive and normative institutionalisation.
Normative institutionalisation is effectively the central concern of both Honneth (2011) in his latest book and of the recently established excellence cluster entitled ‘The formation of normative orders’ at the University of Frankfurt which brings together an extensive network of German research institutions in the human and social sciences, on which see Forst and Günther (2011).

Although not analysed in detail as in the following paragraphs in this chapter, Honneth (2011: 358) in his discussion of the normative embedding of the capitalist market economy seems to pursue a comparable line when he presents the realisation of the ‘regulative idea’ of solidarity as requiring the ‘institutional mechanisms’ of the ‘discursive coordination of interests’ and the ‘legal anchoring of equal opportunities’.

The concept of triple contingency was originally introduced in Strydom (1999), while Trenz and Eder (2004) subsequently linked it to social learning processes. Both the concepts of triple contingency and social learning processes are further explored in Strydom (2009, 2011c, forthcoming c).

The concept of double contingency is central to neo-classical social theory. Parsons (Parsons and Shils 1951) first formulated the concept and it is absolutely basic to the social theories of both Habermas (1996) and Luhmann (1995). For a critical analysis, see Strydom (1999, 2001, 2009).

Russill (2004) who applied the concept of triple contingency to John Dewey’s communication theory and Craig (2006), doyen of American communication theory, who, inspired by Russill, adopted the concept into his discipline, both understand it as a third level of communicative contingency as distinct from single and double communicative contingency.

After having confirmed the relevance of the triple contingency concept in a letter to the author in mid-1999, Habermas (2006) was later explicit about this threefold communicative structure, making a distinction between ‘the actors on the virtual stage’ and ‘anonymous audiences’ or the public. Eder (2007) employs the same distinction.

In the course of formalising the concept of triple contingency, Leydesdorff (2009) added clarity by stressing the temporary short-term window for selection, decision-making and organisation.

For reasons of space, clarity and simplicity, I do not go into the coding problem which would require considering also the symbolic dimension in its relation to the cognitive one. Since my aim is to advance critical cognitive sociological analysis, moreover, I confine the account to the latter dimension. Ideally, of course, both should be included.

The conception of an epi-level developmental cultural model is inspired by the role of epigenetic development in evolutionary theory on which I drew in previous work (e.g. Strydom 1992, 2009). The distinction between the epi- and meta-levels reflects the distinction between epigenetics and genomics in information theory and cognitive biology. Leydesdorff (2008) once again drew my attention to the relevance of the epi-level idea.

Bouvier (2011) makes a distinction between weak and strong emergence which is here employed on premises differing from his methodological individualist position.

Boltanski (2011: 74-5) identifies ‘the institution’ with a disembodied ‘third party’ perspective, such as that of a judge, but he does not exhibit appreciation for its generation though a process to which the public as bearer of the third point of view is central.

For a detailed methodological account of this social scientific task, see Strydom (2011a).

This is an instance of a socio-structural causal mechanism, what has come to be called ‘class specific selectivity’ (e.g. Honneth 2011: 573).