<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Title</strong></th>
<th>Hawking the historical method in organised crime and terrorism studies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Author(s)</strong></td>
<td>Windle, James; Morrison, John F.; Winter, Aaron; Silke, Andrew</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Editor(s)** | Windle, James  
Morrison, John F.  
Winter, Aaron  
Silke, Andrew |
| **Publication date** | 2018-03 |
| **Type of publication** | Book chapter |
| **Link to publisher's version** | [http://www.routledge.com/9781315624099](http://www.routledge.com/9781315624099)  
Access to the full text of the published version may require a subscription. |
| **Rights** | © 2018 selection and editorial matter, James Windle, John F. Morrison, Aaron Winter and Andrew Silke; individual chapters, the contributors. This is an Accepted Manuscript of a book chapter published by Routledge in Historical Perspectives on Organized Crime and Terrorism, on March 1, 2018, available online: [http://www.routledge.com/9781315624099](http://www.routledge.com/9781315624099) |
| **Item downloaded from** | [http://hdl.handle.net/10468/7645](http://hdl.handle.net/10468/7645) |

Downloaded on 2019-08-03T19:14:04Z
INTRODUCTION: HAWKING THE HISTORICAL METHOD IN ORGANISED CRIME AND TERRORISM STUDIES

James Windle, John F. Morrison, Aaron Winter and Andrew Silke

Terrorism and organised crime have existed ‘in some form and to some degree … as long as organised society’.1 The Sicarii, for example, used terrorism in an effort to expel the Roman Empire from Judea while gangs of bandits routinely robbed and extorted Roman citizens.2 There were elite sponsored pirates in Medieval China,3 organised professional thieves and blackmailing thief-takers in seventeenth century London,4 Shishi terrorists and Bakuto organised crime


2 See Hopwood, Organised Crime in Antiquity; Law, Terrorism.


4 J.L. McMullan, ‘Criminal organization in sixteenth and seventeenth century London’, Social Problems, 29(3), 1982, 311-323. Thief-takers were a form of
The ever growing academic literature on organised crime and terrorism has, however, focused primarily on current phenomena. Within the study of both terrorism and organised crime there is an abundance of social scientific methodologies utilised. This is in stark contrast to the relative scarcity of quality historical studies. This has been identified as a significant gap in the academic literature. Duyvesteyn has called terrorism ‘a subject with no history’⁷ while Silke’s review of terrorism research found just 3.9 per cent of articles published

private police paid to capture criminals and/or return stolen goods. Some stole goods so that they could collect the reward and/or blackmail thieves to avoid prosecution.


in the top terrorism specific journals between 1990 and 2006 analysed pre-9/11 conflicts, concluding that:

… this wider [historical] context is almost entirely ignored as terrorism research is increasingly driven by a need to provide a short-term, immediate assessment of current groups and threats. Efforts to establish more contextualised and stable guiding principles have been almost entirely side-lined. This is a serious cause for concern and the dramatic decline in historical research since 9/11 is deeply troubling.  

While there has been somewhat of an upsurge in historical work since Silke’s assessment of terrorism studies, Winter has more recently suggested that 9/11 ‘overwrote, if not erased, the collective and institutional memory of pre-9/11 terrorism’. Fijnaut has been equally critical of organised crime studies. He notes not only the relative scarcity of historical case studies, but an overreliance

---


This said, some conflicts (e.g. Ireland), crimes (e.g. the drug trade, piracy, slavery) and groups (e.g. Irish Republicans, Southern Italian mafia) have traditionally enjoyed relatively wide attention. This is likely due to the relative ease of access to human and archival sources, and maybe the high profile of these crimes or groups. The historical method does, however, remain more or less of a niche area of organised crime and terrorism studies: side-lined by more mainstream social science methods.

The papers in this volume will hopefully demonstrate the importance of historical research to scholarship but also policy and practice. The editors of this volume have all trawled archives or interviewed individuals about the past in order to write historical studies of organised crime or terrorism. We are not, however, historians. We do not conduct historical research for the advancement of the discipline, but rather to answer questions which seek to inform issues of contemporary relevance. The contributors are drawn from a range of academic disciplines: Some are historians, others are psychologists, sociological

criminologists or political scientists. All contributors, however, share an interest in organised crime and/or terrorism, and belief in the usefulness of historical research to inform contemporary policy, practice and understanding. As such, the key objective of this volume is to show that, while there are inherent difficulties in transferring experiences across time and space, historical accounts of organised crime and terrorism offer important lessons for understanding and responding to contemporary phenomena.

Organised crime and terrorism: Definitions, similarities and differences

While some may take issue with the inclusion of terrorism and organised crime together in one volume, the two phenomenon share many similarities. Moreover, studying them together can produce illuminating insights and overlaps which may be missed by concentrating on just organised crime or just terrorism.

This volume employs inclusive definitions of terrorism and organised crime in order to facilitate discussion on a wide range of activities and groups.\textsuperscript{11}

Terrorism is defined as:

... the employment of violence or the threat of repeated violence by the individual or group intent on bringing about a social or political effect. The aim of this action is to bring about a state of fear in a wider audience beyond the initial act or threat of violence.\textsuperscript{12}

Organised crime is defined as:

... a continuing criminal enterprise that rationally works to profit from illicit activities that are often in great public demand. Its continuing existence is maintained through the use of force, threats, monopoly control, and/or the corruption of public officials.\textsuperscript{13}


We are sympathetic to Varese’s argument that organised crime should be split into three categories (enterprise crime, organised crime groups and mafias) based upon governance of markets. The strength of Albanese’s definition is, however, that it ‘covers many definitions of organized crime proposed in the past and present’ and many phenomena currently identified as falling under the rubric of organised crime, whilst paralleling the definition of an organised crime
Breaking these two definitions down into their constituent elements illustrate the key differences between terrorism and organised crime. They have divergent end goals: The model terrorist (altruistically) seeks social or political change while the model criminal (selfishly) seeks personal profit. Consequently, the terrorist courts publicity to further their cause, while most criminals avoid the limelight. Finally, while violence or threats of violence are necessary for an act to be defined as terrorism, organised crime can be conducted without recourse to violence, and the terrorists use of violence is often, although not always, less

---


discriminate. Although, as will be discussed below, criminals and terrorists do not always act as their definitions suggest they should: History is littered with criminals who have embraced the limelight, used violence indescribably and acted altruistically.

The two phenomena share similarities. They are both classified as amongst the most serious forms of criminality. They are often (although not always) better organised and planned than more routine offences, and the planning will often be a long-term process. They both comprise mostly rational, as opposed to mostly emotional, offences and often use similar tactics based upon violence, corruption and/or deceit to further their goals and evade counter-measures.\(^{16}\)

Moreover, terrorists and organised criminals all occupy the underworld\(^ {17}\) and attempt to achieve normal goals by maladaptive practices. That is, if terrorists


are political actors by other means then criminals are entrepreneurs by other means.\textsuperscript{18}

The relationship between terrorism and organised crime is complex, and dependent on local context and actors, organisational structures and objectives. Terrorists (and legitimate political actors) have hired criminal labour, entered into alliances with criminals and developed ‘in-house’ illicit enterprises. Criminals have hired or partnered with terrorists (and legitimate political actors) and employed terror tactics. There are also a limited number of cases of convergence: Where groups exhibit the characteristics and motivations of both organised crime and terrorism.\textsuperscript{19}

There are numerous historical examples of organised criminals employing terror tactics, often to intimidate and discourage state interference, or to increase legitimacy within their community. For example, the Sicilian Mafia bombed L’Ora newspaper in the 1940s and 1950s to deter the media from running stories on their activities; while their sustained attacks on civilian and criminal

\textsuperscript{18} Windle, ‘Fundraising’.


Justice targets during the early-1990s were not designed to affect political change, but to ‘degrade the morale of the state’ whilst reducing law enforcement capacity. Furthermore, while criminals are supposed to shy away from the limelight, many an organised crime figures has come unstuck by vociferously raising their head above the parapet. Indeed, Al Capone, the Krays twins and Pablo Escobar’s courtship of the media contributed to their eventual demise.

Terrorists have developed in-house criminal enterprises in order to raise funds or resources, move goods or people and build political capital. For example, the early Bolshevik’s used violent armed robbery - or as they preferred the ‘expropriation of private property’ - as a tactic of both fundraising and political communication. Not only did Joseph Stalin and other leading revolutionaries

---


21 For discussions on the media’s role in countering organised crime, see Densley, Gingeras and Lombardo, this volume.

begin their revolutionary life as bank robbers, but Stalin symbolically took the name Koba: A famous Georgian brigand.

The anarchists of early twentieth century Russia also robbed banks and conducted kidnap for ransom, alongside bombings and assassinations. Indeed, Michael Bakunin, the Russian anarchist who Lacqueur calls the ‘third great nineteenth-century theoretician of terrorism’, advised in *Principles of Revolution* (1869) that revolutionaries should recruit robbers and brigands to the cause. Another example of terrorists in-house criminal activity come from the *Sicarii* who looted the property of pro-Roman landowners while using kidnap for ransom as a means of both terrorising the population and raising funds.

The Thuggee of India may provide an historical example of convergence from at least the seventh century. While commonly identified as bands of violent robbers, Rapoport recognises them as terrorists motivated by a religious utilitarian belief that their victims needed to suffer a slow death as a sacrifice to prevent the god Kali from destroying the earth, and the profits from robberies

---


24 Law, *Terrorism*.


were used to buy political sanctuary rather than line individual pockets.\(^{27}\) Aside from being an example of convergence, the case of the Thuggee highlights the need for constant re-evaluation and revision of historical events (see Gingeras, this volume): The Thuggee’s religious motivation has been challenged by some who see them as primarily bandits\(^{28}\) or even a British fiction designed to demonise traditional Indian culture.\(^{29}\)

Crime-terror convergence has allowed governments to target organisations using a two-pronged approach focusing on both terrorism and organised criminal activity. This includes the Thuggee who were eventually suppressed when the British employed anti-piracy laws against them.\(^{30}\) Similarly, the Ku Klux Klan were weakened in the 1960s by FBI investigations and House of Representatives Subcommittee of the Committee on Un-American Activities hearings into their criminal activities (Winter, this volume).


\(^{30}\) Rapoport, ‘Fear and trembling’.
Criminals also engage in more mainstream politics. Eiko Siniawer provides multiple instances of bakuto and yakuza involvement in Japanese politics between 1860 and 1960, and highlights the complexity of distinguishing between political and economic motivation. Some bakuto and yakuza were hired by political actors while others became key players in political movements: Organising violent and non-violent political activities, setting agendas and even holding political office. Indeed, Siniawer concludes a discussion of yakuza involvement in union strikebreaking with one of the more nuanced interpretations of criminal involvement in politics:

They were not just mafias seeking to make money. This is not to say they were unconcerned with profit, but it should not be assumed that financial and political concerns were mutually exclusive. Their activities were unquestionable ideological in their influence, even if varied in their motivations.31

Criminal involvement in politics is not limited to Japan. Nineteenth century Sicilian Mafioso and bandits were employed by, or partnered with, landowners to suppress political protest.32 Green Gang triads massacred hundreds of

31 Siniawer, Ruffians, Yakuza, Nationalists, p.137.

Fidel Castro accused the US of supporting international terrorism after the American Cosa Nostra attempted to spark an uprising through a bombing campaign aimed at destabilising the Cuban economy. While McCoy’s account of US support for drug traffickers and insurgents throughout Southeast and South Asia is important for both content and the CIA’s attempt to block its publication.


34 Cockayne, Hidden Power.


Some internal CIA documents have recently been published online, including the CIA’s letter to persuade McCoy’s publisher that his findings were exaggerated and an internal document reporting on Senator McGee’s attempt to besmirch McCoy by accusing him of McCarthyism at a Senate hearing: CIA, ‘The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia’, Headquarters Employee Bulletin, 10 August 1972. Online. Available: https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP84-00499R000100040005-7.pdf (accessed 10 May 2017); CIA, Memorandum for the Record, OLC 72-0669m 2 June 1972. Online. Available:
Criminals and terrorists also learn from one another. The car bomb – or horse drawn wagon bomb – may have been first used by anarchist terrorists in the 1920 Wall Street bombing, but the technique, albeit with a motor car, was soon taken up by Al Capone in Chicago. Since then the technique has been used by groups ranging from PIRA to Costa Nostra, Al Qaeda to the Medellin Cartel.

None of this should be read as suggesting that terrorists and criminals will always work together. As both can be predatory, conflicts can and have occurred. In the Republic of Ireland, for example, violent conflicts have arisen when local criminals have refused to pay paramilitary taxes.


Historical approaches to the study of terrorism and organised crime

Another similarity could be added to those mentioned above: Researching terrorism and organised crime present similar methodological challenges. Not only do the lack of agreed definitions limit comparative analyses but contemporary official data is often difficult to access, and may not always provide a balanced picture; especially data intended for public consumption. Infiltration of groups or recruitment of willing participants can be complicated, and direct observation can be risky. Few terrorists and organised criminals are willing to participate in self-report surveys, one of the mainstays of criminological research and, even if they were, it is challenging to identify actors who by their very nature want to remain hidden.

As such, it is surprising that more researchers do not conduct historical research. Archival sources are relatively simple to access and data collection is becoming even more time and cost effective as more archives migrate online. There is a wealth of historical sources on organised crime and terrorism, providing both qualitative and quantitative data, including:

- Documents created by government bodies, such as: police, court and prison records, intelligence reports, parliamentary files and diaries,

- political and diplomatic correspondence (see Collins, Densley, Gingeras, Winter, this volume);
- Documents created by terrorist groups and affiliated political parties, and criminal groups, such as: official records of meetings, financial and resource inventories, propaganda, internal communications (see Morrison, this volume);
- Memoirs of those involved in orchestrating, implementing, observing or countering terrorism and criminal activity (see Gingeras, Morrison, Lombardo, Windle, this volume);
- Cultural artefacts, such as: cant dictionaries, fictional accounts, photographs, paintings or music, such as: Irish rebel songs, outlaw ballads, narco-corridos;
- Oral testimony of those involved in either terrorism or crime, or countering terrorism or crime (see Morrison, this volume);
- News media reports (see Densley, Gingeras, Lombardo, Silke this volume).

Of course, the normal caveats on official qualitative and quantitative data apply, while researchers must appreciate that both political and criminal actors

---


have reason to distort the truth. Although, as with social science research, triangulation of different sources often allows us to identify something approaching the truth (see Gingeras, Morrison, Windle, this volume).

Once the data has been identified and analysed, historical research can provide context for current debates (all chapters, this volume) and, correct entrenched misconceptions about the past and the present (see Lombardo, Gingeras, this volume). It can allow researchers to map and analyse structural change and


Introduction: Hawking the historical method in organized crime and terrorism studies. 


continuity, and test or develop sociological, political or psychological theory (see Lombardo, this volume).

A grasp of history facilitates a deeper understanding of the codes, norms or values bonding criminal or terrorist groups whilst evaluating how such groups and networks are structured and operate (Gingeras, this volume), and how and why structures and tactics change (Windle, this volume).

Historical research can also facilitate evaluation of patterns, mistakes and failures in policy and practice (all chapters, this volume).

---


46 Also, A. Winter, ‘Counter-terrorism’; Inciardi, Block and Hallowell, Historical Approaches; Morrison, The Origins and Rise; Silke, ‘Honour and expulsion’; Windle, Suppressing Illicit Opium; Windle, ‘Insights for contemporary drug’. 
Historical work also allows us to challenge official histories and, collective memory and representations of the past. For example, it helps us avoid, or at least reflect upon, ’good old days’ thinking. That is, historical accounts prevent us from falling into a trap of looking back to a golden age when the streets were safe, the terrorists were principled freedom fighters and the gangsters were lovable rogues who fought by Queensbury Rules and loved their mums. This is not to suggest that nothing ever changes, nor that crime and political violence do not fluctuate in intensity and deadliness, but rather that historical analyses can guide students, policy makers and practitioners to avoid demonising the present and glorifying the past.

Furthermore, a grasp of the historical processes which led to a particular policy outcome can limit at least four of the five conditions identified by Robert Merton as increasing the likelihood of unanticipated policy consequences. Historical research can 1) reduce ‘ignorance’ by providing knowledge and data to frame the present problem within a longer-term context whilst allowing deeper insight into contemporary trends; 2) reduce ‘error’ by highlighting the processes which led to policy successes or failures; 3 and 4) reduce ‘immediate interest’ and ‘self-defeating prophecies’ by identify continuity of the problem, which can


For example, several chapters in this volume present a critique of the alien conspiracy perspective. Alien conspiracies are foremost moral panics founded in stereotypes whereby organised crime and organised criminals are imported from abroad, and undermine the ‘American way of life’. They have been a staple of policy, media and academic discourse on organised crime, and continue to drive much policy and practice. In its original conceptualisation, the perspective identified organised crime as primarily Italian, rather than American, and promoted a number of myths associated with the Italian-American Mafia. Other ethnic groups were later the subject of alien conspiracies.


Of course, this is not unique to the US. The British have long identified US culture, specifically Hollywood gangster films, as threatening British Middle-class life: see Emsley, Hard Men; G. Pearson, Hooligan: A History of Respectable Fears, London: McMillan, 1983.

49 Hobbs and Antonopoulos, “Endemic to the species”.

While the term alien conspiracy is more commonly used in organised crime studies, similar mechanisms have long been at play in public and official terrorism discourse. Indeed, the term ‘conspiracy of aliens’ was used by US Congress to describe the threat posed by Eastern European Communists during the McCarthy era;\(^1\) at about the same time that the Kefauver hearings portrayed Cosa Nostra as a ‘moral conspiracy aimed at the vitals of American life’.\(^2\)

Three chapters in this volume provide challenges to the alien conspiracy perspective, as have other historical accounts.\(^3\) Lombardo demonstrates how Italian-American organised crime groups did come to dominate organised crime in the post-Kefauver era, yet played no part in the original development of US organised crime. Furthermore, the analysis demonstrates how it was structural conditions within the US which led to the establishment of the particular form of


\(^3\) Block, *East Side*; Inciardi, Block and Hallowell, *Historical Approaches*. 

organised crime, rather than organised crime being imported to the US. That is, sitting firmly in the Chicago School tradition, Lombardo argues the city, rather than ethnicity, as criminogenic. Lombardo, alongside Densley and Gingeras’s chapters, also show how ‘ethnic’ organised crime has often been enmeshed within networks of politicians and police officers. Gingeras argues that the Federal Bureau of Narcotics depiction of:

… the drug trade as an exclusively foreign threat provided a convenient means of diverting attention from acts of complicity and incompetence among government agencies and representatives.

In summary, we argue that history allows debates to be driven by more realistic and in-depth analyses in historical context rather than by the anxieties of the present, whilst illuminating lessons for contemporary policy and practice. As such, we hope the following chapters will demonstrate that historical research is valid beyond the provision of basic context, and should be provided equal billing as social science research in organised crime and terrorism studies.

Chapter summaries and some key lessons learnt

The premise of this edited volume is simple: Historical accounts of organised crime and terrorism offer critically important lessons for understanding and responding to contemporary threats and phenomena. While this introduction
Drawing on the experiences of the past can be fruitful, ignoring them can be disastrous: Morrison provides a narrative on how the British government and PIRA learned from the failures of previous peace processes to develop more effective diplomatic strategies. Collins, conversely, highlights how the British experience of drug control in Burma was largely ignored in favour of less effective policies promoted by the US. In the Irish example, institutional learning facilitated an eventual peace. Whereas, in Burma, the failure to learn from the past or understand the countries history became a factor in a number of prolonged insurgencies fueled by the profits of the illicit opium trade. That is, learning from the past established peace in Northern Ireland while ignoring the past fueled war in Burma. Finally, as Winter notes, understanding how and why

the KKK emerged allows us to identify the conditions facilitating its current revival in the US.

*Think long term:* Collins case of Burmese drug policy, Morrison’s case of peace negotiations in Northern Ireland and Twyman-Ghoshal’s case of Somalian piracy demonstrate the importance of selecting longer term goals and avoiding policy impatience. For PIRA, the consequences of attempting to achieve instant ‘success’ was a severe weakening of, and split within, the organisation. The consequence of short term, repressive, policies for Burma (opium) and Somalia (piracy) was to push communities further from state authority, further weakening the state and inflating insurgencies. Indeed, in Burma, Northern Ireland and Somalia, the more effective longer term policies may have been to build political capital through economic and social development, rather than reducing political capital by repressive military tactics.

The utility of socio-economic development is also apparent in Lombardo’s discussion of the origins of Italian-American organised crime and Silke’s discussion of Jamaat-al-Muslimeen in Trinidad and Tobago. Although the latter highlights how criminal groups can exploit, corrupt and profit from otherwise well-meaning development projects.
The alien conspiracy perspective is deeply flawed: Three of the chapters demonstrate how the alien conspiracy perspective fails to stand up to the scrutiny of historical analysis, and that policymakers and the media often need to look closer to home before scapegoating the ‘other’. Lombardo, Densley and Gingeras show how organised crime is neither limited to one ethnic group nor one class. Indeed, in all three cases, the gangsters may have risen up from the slums, but they did so with the help of well-heeled politicians and businesspeople, and corrupt cops. As discussed above, the alien conspiracy perspective has significant relevance to terrorism studies, especially during the current political climate of far right activists and populist politicians promoting and exploiting hate and fear, issues explored by Winter’s chapter.

Furthermore, Lombardo’s comparative analysis of organised crime in Chicago and New York lends support for social structural explanations. That is, rather than being imported from Italy or elsewhere, it was socio-economic and political structural conditions within the US which led to the establishment of that particular form of organised crime. Densley’s analysis of organised police corruption in St Paul similarly demonstrates how the massive police corruption of the St Paul ‘O’Connor System’ was facilitated by public support and a laidback political system. While Silke offers a more contemporary discussion of the linkages between politics, terrorism and organised crime in Trinidad and Tobago. The relevance here being that countering organised crime or terrorism will often require deep seated political, economic or social reforms.
The media can play an important role in countering organised crime, but can also perpetuate unhelpful myths: The chapters by Gingeras and Lombardo demonstrate how uncritical media portrayals of organised crime can perpetuate dangerous misconceptions about crime and ethnic groups. Indeed, Gingeras’s analysis of the so-called French Connection highlights how policymakers and the police used the media to scapegoat foreigners in a bid to divert attention from the home grown police corruption facilitating the transnational trade in heroin.

The media can also, however, act as a mechanism for change. Densley’s analysis of police corruption in St Paul shows the media igniting the reform of a corrupt police force who have enabled crime to flourish. The standout lesson from this chapter being that states should protect, and indeed promote, the dyeing investigative journalist tradition. While these chapters are concerned solely with organised crime, there are obvious lessons here for terrorism regarding both interrogating media-state cooperation in terrorism reporting and, enabling the media’s role as a watchdog of state policy and practice.

*International drug policy is about much more than public health concerns:*

Collin’s chapter demonstrates how international and national illicit drug policy is
seldom about crime or drug consumption, but rather a response to wider geo-political, economic and security issues. Gingeras similarly argues that much contemporary drug policy is founded upon the Federal Bureau of Narcotics framing of the illicit opiate trade as a Cold War security threat in order to protect its own institutional interests. While Gaffney illustrates how counter-insurgency has underpinned much of Colombia’s counternarcotic policy.

*Violence is unhealthy for criminal networks:* Windle’s study of a British organised crime network demonstrates the importance of social capital for the effective running of an organised crime network and, more importantly, that losing social capital can fragment the network. Similarly, Gingeras demonstrates how the declining influence of the ‘French Connection’ resulted less from law enforcement, and more from conflicts between Marseille factions over other illicit enterprises.

*Inappropriate use of the terrorism label has negative unintended consequences:* Twyman-Ghoshal shows how applying the terrorist label to piracy – a profit-making enterprises – put the issue centre stage and increased military resources. This ‘excessive militarization’ of the issue also frustrated and angered local communities whilst cementing a focus upon a short-term deterrence focused approach at the expense of longer-term policies designed to tackle the root causes of piracy.
The distinction between terrorist and criminal can be blurred: Chapters by Silke and Twyman-Ghoshal demonstrate the difficulties of differentiating between criminals and terrorists. Twyman-Ghoshal demonstrates how Somali pirates, once partly motivated by resistance to inequality, gradually become primarily profit orientated whilst maintaining the label of terrorist. While Silke concludes that Jamaat-al-Muslimeen have, at vary points in their history, operated as a combination of terrorist group, organised crime group, community group, religious movement and vigilante posse.