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Ollscoil na hÉireann, Corcaigh
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‘CLEAR – HOLD – (RE)BUILD’

An Examination of the Irish Civil War

Thesis presented by

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for the degree of

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2022

‘CLEAR – HOLD – (RE)BUILD’



Picture 1 – Free-State Troops firing off a ship in support of the Cork Landings – August 1922(Courtesy Military Archives Ireland).

An Examination of the Irish Civil War

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Declaration:

This is to certify that the work I am submitting is my own and has not been submitted for another degree, either at University College Cork or elsewhere. All external references and sources are clearly acknowledged and identified within the contents. I have read and understood the regulations of university College Cork concerning plagiarism.

Signature of the candidate:

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Abstract

What was achieved by the Free State during the Irish Civil War was remarkable. Within a period of less than a year they raised and equipped a standing National Army of nearly 60,000 soldiers, defeating an insurgency by the anti-Treaty elements of the IRA. Using the counterinsurgency framework of Clear-Hold-Build, and concentrating on the Civil War actions of the National Army in Cork, I will explain how the Free State managed to attain this remarkable achievement. Outnumbered at the start of the fighting, the Free State overcame the IRA insurgency by utilising a number of key concepts that included the combination of kinetic clearance operations and 'Good Governance' stability actions. Ultimately the disintegration of the anti-Treaty IRA occurred because of their inability to gain outright public support and the ability of the Free State to undermine their cause. The Free State also employed a superior force generation strategy using local forces living amongst the population. When these advantages were combined with enhanced Information Operations and the use of superior counterinsurgency tactics, they ultimately brought victory for the National Army.

Foreword

The complexity in Irish life is best illustrated through the Irish family network.

In the summer months of 1919, my Grandfather Patrick Prendergast enlisted in the Irish Republican Army – the IRA. He joined his local Kerry unit, A Company (Ballyhar) of the 4th (Killarney) IRA Battalion. Prendergast remembered being approached by two men dressed in trench coats while undergoing his initial tactical training in the Kerry foothills. One of them was his Unit Commander. They questioned him on the freedom of movement that was accessible to him as the son of a prominent cattle dealer.¹ Young Patrick announced that he could travel all over Ireland without suspicion under the guise of selling cattle. With this information now available to both men, Prendergast was taken off the basic infantry line and converted into an intelligence operative for the IRA in their battle for Independence against the British Security Forces.

After the War, Patrick married Rose Murphy in 1926 and they settled in Johnstown House, Enfield, County Meath. Rose was also from Kerry, but she attended the Holy Faith Boarding School in Glasnevin, Co. Dublin. She would often tell her children the story of how as a young 18-year-old student, she watched out the windows of her school as the British artillery guns shelled Dublin City centre during Easter Week 1916. She would recall seeing the flames of Dublin City lighting up the night sky during this week-long rebellion. She would also tell the story of how before the summer holidays in 1916, a young British Army Officer, wearing his uniform walked into her classroom, and kissed goodbye to a girl who she sat beside

¹ Patrick Prendergast's Application for Service (1917-1921) Medal identifies Maurice Horgan, Michael Spillane and Patrick Allmon as the IRA Unit Commanders for Patrick during this period. This document also outlines the Company (A), Battalion (4th), Brigade (2nd Kerry) and Division (First Southern) that Prendergast enlisted in on 4th August 1919.

in school. That Officer was called Emmet Dalton and he was heading off to war on the Western Front, where he would later go on to win the Military Cross (MC) in September 1916 for gallantry in the Battle of Ginchy.

After the First World War, Dalton returned home to Ireland, left the British Army and, like many other veterans, enlisted in the IRA to fight in the Irish War of Independence. He would side with Michael Collins and the pro-Treaty side during the Irish Civil War, becoming a 24-year-old Major General in the National or 'Free State' Army. During the civil war, Dalton, along with his Deputy Commanding Officer, Major General Tom Ennis, would launch a very successful amphibious operation in August 1922 to seize Cork from the anti-Treaty IRA. Whilst based in Cork in November 1922, Dalton would marry Alice Shannon, the girl he kissed goodbye in 1916.

Tom Ennis was a very able and experienced Second-in-Command to Dalton, and after landing in Cork by sea, he is often remembered for triumphantly travelling through the streets of Cork City in an armoured car known as 'The Manager', where it was said he could be seen "standing upright like a ship's captain on the bridge."² Ennis was a veteran of the 1916 Easter Rising in Dublin, and he was undoubtedly sheltering in those burning buildings watched by Rose and her school friends. He was actively involved in most of the major IRA operations in Dublin throughout the War of Independence, including the attack on the Customs House and the assassinations of British intelligence agents at Mount Street, Dublin on the morning of November 21st, 1920, 'Bloody Sunday'. That afternoon, Tom Ennis along with some other IRA men (on both teams), played football for Dublin against Tipperary in a GAA match in Croke Park. Ennis' football career was cut short after he was shot twice, once in the hip and once in

² John Borgonovo, *The Battle for Cork* (Cork: Mercier Press 2011), p.120.

the pelvis while fighting with and against the IRA. On 28th June 1922, Ennis was prominent in the battle of the Four Courts in Dublin which started the Irish Civil War.

Tom Ennis was born in Enfield, Meath in 1892 and his first cousin, good friend, classmate and neighbour was my other Grandfather John Ryan. Ryan was the son of an RIC (Royal Irish Constabulary) policeman, but he never got to meet his father as he died four months before John was born in March 1892. It is ironic that the cousins and close school friends would take such opposite career paths, fighting on opposite sides during the War of Independence after John followed in his father's footsteps, joining the RIC. After surviving the war, John Ryan and Tom Ennis remained good friends with Ennis attending and presenting John a beautiful silver tea set on his marriage to Agnes Duffy in 1932. Agnes was a schoolteacher in Dublin, but she was originally from Scotstown, County Monaghan in Ulster. As a young officer in the Irish Defence Forces, I was based in Monaghan, on the border with Northern Ireland during the period of 'The Troubles'. It was during this time, on a beautiful summer's day in 1990, while I was on my first foot patrol near my grandmother's hometown of Scotstown, that I was called a 'Free State Bastard' for the very first time.

Chapter One - Introduction

*War with the foreigner brings to the fore all that is best and noblest in a nation – civil war all that is mean and base.*³

- Frank Aiken, 3rd August 1922.

1.1 Introduction

The Irish Free State was forged from the flames of a hostile struggle, amid a bitter civil war fought between 28th June 1922 and 24th May 1923. It eventually brought to an end a decade of insurrection and conflict in Ireland.

From the Home Rule Crisis of 1913-14 to the end of the Irish Civil War in 1923, the island of Ireland transitioned through a very turbulent and violent decade, transforming from being an important part of the British Empire into a divided island, with one part staying in the United Kingdom and the remainder forming a nascent Free State. The Irish Civil War was one of the most divisive and violent aspects of these troubled times. One of the dramatic consequences of the civil war was that the young and idealistic leadership from the War of Independence (1919-1921) decimated itself during this final year of internecine violence, leaving a leadership vacuum for the newly established Irish Free State that was very hard to recover from.

To the neutral observer, it appears obvious that the National Army won the Irish Civil War because of superior numbers and equipment.⁴ But this advantage could have been easily squandered by neglecting the support of the population. Throughout history, military leaders and their armies have not capitalised on the initial support they received from the local

³ Frank Aiken quoting an old priest, 3 August 1922, Mulcahy Papers, P7A/175, UCDA.

⁴ The National Army can also be referred to as the Free State Army – but for continuity reasons, I will use the National Army as my main descriptor of the Free State forces fighting to support the Treaty.

population. Heavy-handed tactics; disregard for public opinion; clumsy operations resulting in excessive civilian damage; non-legitimate governance; absence of local security forces; continued lack of essential services; and other such errors of judgement; including a lack of common sense, can be devastating to a military campaign. It can result in the squandering of the original advantages that were initially available to the military leadership. The forces of liberation can easily become an army of occupation because of poor planning and a lack of cultural awareness. This was the problem faced by the leadership of the National Army during the Irish Civil War and the solutions they provided throughout this conflict will form the core of my research.

1.2 Thesis Statement

While the Free State eventually won the Irish Civil War due to superior numbers and equipment, the disintegration of the anti-Treaty IRA primarily occurred because of their inability to gain outright public support and the ability of the Free State to undermine their cause. The Free State also employed a superior force generation strategy using local forces living amongst the population. When these advantages were combined with enhanced Information Operations and the use of superior counterinsurgency tactics, they ultimately brought victory for the National Army.

1.3 Significance of my Research

In Chapter Two, my Review of Literature on counterinsurgency, I will note how the counterinsurgent theorists Berman, Felter and Shapiro in *Big Data: The Information Revolution in Modern Conflict*, believe that there is a gap in current counterinsurgency doctrine. This gap is “how to convert local victories into an overall political victory or settlement.”⁵ The theorist Jacqueline Hazelton in her counterinsurgency book *Bullets Not Ballots* describes the gap “as how best to facilitate the sharper kinetic edge alongside a softer ‘Good Governance’ approach.”⁶ My thesis will progress these discussions and add to the overall narrative by describing how best to succeed in counterinsurgency operations by combining ‘Good Governance’ with the sharper ‘Compellence’ or kinetic edge, used in clearance and holding operations.⁷ By describing what worked best in Cork and Munster during the Irish Civil War for the National Army in their suppression of the tactics adopted by anti-Treaty elements of the IRA, I will add to the overall understanding of the theoretical literature and debate associated with counterinsurgency. Included in this understanding will be a description and analysis on how best to sustain the initial tactical successes, by bridging the gap between a local victory and strategic success.⁸ The difference between what it takes to win a village and what it takes to win a counterinsurgency war matters greatly, yet it is little understood and scarcely acknowledged in policy debates.⁹ Within the towns and villages of civil war Cork and Munster, this thesis will examine how the National Army managed to convert the initial tactical

⁵ Eli Berman, Joseph H. Felter and Jacob Shapiro, Small Wars, *Big Data: The Information Revolution in Modern Conflict*, with Vestal McIntyre (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 2018), p. 308.

⁶ Jacqueline L. Hazelton, *Bullets Not Ballots, Success in Counterinsurgency Warfare* (Ithaca and London, Cornell University Press, 2021).

⁷ Clearance and Holding Operations will be described later in the thesis. They are robust and kinetic in nature.

⁸ In the military realm, tactics teach the use of armed forces in engagements, while strategy teaches the use of engagements to achieve the goals of the war.

⁹ Berman, Felter and Shapiro, Small Wars, *Big Data: The Information Revolution in Modern Conflict*, with Vestal McIntyre, p. 308.

successes into an overall victory. This thesis will explain how the Free State won the Irish Civil War.

1.4 Focus of the Thesis

Previously, the majority of studies on the Irish Civil War have been conducted at the geographic, chronological, personality or military level. As an alternative, I will examine the conflict using doctrine as my primary framework for analysis, focusing on the civil war actions of the National Army in the southern province of Munster, and in particular on Cork City and County. Acknowledging the excellent works and local studies already conducted by Marnane, McCarthy, Doyle, Power and Dwyer on civil war activities in their particular counties of Munster, my research is similar but also different.¹⁰ Similar to the author Pat McCarthy in his book on Waterford during the revolutionary period, I also want to bring a fresh scholarship within an interpretative framework making available local revolutionary experiences to a wider audiences.¹¹ By achieving this, McCarthy throughout his book manages to demonstrate the connection between political level policies and local level activities, giving the reader a better understanding of how strategic level actions influence tactical level events.¹² Similarly and in conjunction with McCarthy, Joe Power in his book on Clare during the civil war, expertly demonstrates how the course of the conflict in the county of Clare was to a large extent “dictated by military events outside of the county especially in the control of the strategic city

¹⁰ The local studies referenced for the civil war in Munster are Denis G. Marnane, *The Civil War in Tipperary* (Tipperary, Ara Press, 2021), Pat McCarthy, *The Irish Revolution, 1912-23 Waterford*, (Dublin, Four Courts Press, 2015), Tom Doyle, *The Summer Campaign in Kerry*, (Cork, Mercier Press, 2010), Joe Power, *Clare and the Civil War*, (Dublin, Eastwood Books, 2020), T. Ryle Dwyer, *Tans, Terror and Troubles, Kerry's Real Fighting Story 1913-23*, (Cork, Mercier Press, 2001). These books give an excellent insight into what happened in these counties during the Civil War.

¹¹ Pat McCarthy, *The Irish Revolution, 1912-23 Waterford*, (Dublin, Four Courts Press, 2015).

¹² Ibid.

of Limerick.”¹³ Wanting to achieve the same effect and demonstrate how local level victories feed into and are connected to the overall strategic or national narrative, the focus of my research is an analysis of the Irish Civil War in Cork and Munster set at both the strategic and tactical levels. It is an examination on how tactical successes in Cork and Munster related directly to overall strategic success for the Free State.

What is different to McCarthy and Power, is my focus on doctrine as the primary framework of analysis. Doctrine will be the methodology through which I will examine and explain how the counterinsurgency tactics adopted by the National Army in Cork, fed directly into and were influenced by the overall Free State national strategy for the civil war. By interweaving the counterinsurgency doctrinal framework of Clear-Hold-Build throughout my research, I will endeavour to explain how the tactical successes of the National Army in Cork and Munster achieved strategic and national significance.¹⁴ I contend that by inadvertently using the Clear-Hold-Build framework as a codified doctrine, the Free State Government simplified complexity, indicating the best pathway forward for their success.¹⁵

The reason for selecting Cork and Munster as the regional focus for my research is because in 1922, Cork and the other provincial counties of the ‘Munster Republic’ became a direct threat to the newly established sovereignty and viability of the Free State.¹⁶ The Commander of British Land Forces still in Ireland, General Neville Macready wrote to Winston Churchill – who as Secretary of State for the Colonies had significant responsibility for Irish affairs – that the Republic exists in Cork and the surrounding country and that there is no sign or shadow of Provisional [National] Government authority.¹⁷ This was a dangerous precedent

¹³ Joe Power, *Clare and the Civil War*, (Dublin, Eastwood Books, 2020), p.55.

¹⁴ The Clear-Hold-Build Framework will be explained in detail in Chapter Two.

¹⁵ John Nagl, *Knife Fights, A Memoir of Modern War in Theory and Practice* (New York, Penguin Press, 2014), p. 37.

¹⁶ The Governance issues and economic viability of the Munster Republic will be discussed in Chapter Eight. The restoration of Essential Infrastructure will be examined in Chapter 7. The clearance operations to secure and hold Cork will be discussed in Chapters 4 and 5.

¹⁷ Tom Mahon, *The Ballycotton Job* (Cork, Mercier Press, 2022), p. 112.

for the newly established Free State because as pointed out by *The Irish Times* from this period, “two opposing Governments cannot exist in the same country.”¹⁸

The ‘Munster Republic’, is hard to define territorially but it contained those counties south of the anti-Treaty defensive line which stretched from Limerick City to Waterford. South of this line were the counties of Cork, Kerry, Waterford and substantial parts of Limerick and Tipperary. Further details on the governance mechanisms established by the largest units in the ‘Munster Republic’ the 1st and 2nd IRA Southern Divisions, will be contained in Chapter Eight.¹⁹ However the Irish Historian Peter Hart describes this entity as a simulacrum of statehood which possessed a police force, tax collectors, censors and even postage stamps. But he posits that it also commanded little loyalty and less legitimacy.²⁰ Cork became the de facto capital of the ‘Munster Republic’ and because of this it became a focal point for IRA resistance to the newly established Free State. Over ten per cent of National Army soldiers were deployed in the county during the conflict, receiving nearly fifteen per cent of National Army fatalities as a result of the fighting.²¹ General Richard Mulcahy of the National Army stated that after the initial summer clearance operations of 1922, the most significant ‘military problem’ remaining in the state was in the area of Cork and also Waterford, Kerry and Limerick.²²

Munster was the main effort for the National Army and Cork was the Decisive Operation. Dwyer posits that the fighting during the entirety of the civil war in Munster was the most intense in the country and he describes the fighting in Kerry as particularly severe and robust. He speculates that the reason for this severity in Kerry was because the Free State troops

¹⁸ *Irish Times*, 30 September 1922.

¹⁹ Bill Kissane, *The Politics of the Irish Civil War* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005), P 78.

²⁰ Peter Hart, *The IRA and Its Enemies: Violence and Community in Cork, 1916-1923* (New York, Clarendon Press, 1999), p.113.

²¹ These figures are from Bryan Cooper, *Dáil Éireann*, Vol. 21, 16 November 1927 combined with Andy Bielenberg, Cork Civil War Fatality Register, UCC, <https://www.ucc.ie/en/theirishrevolution/collections/cork-fatality-register/register-index/#d.en.1399690>. and National Army Report on Strength and Posts 01 April 1923, DT S3361, NAI.

²² Townsend, *The Republic, The Fight for Irish Independence*, 1918-1923, p.428

were similar to that of an occupying force, because most of them could not be recruited locally.²³ As a direct result of this, Kerry became more ‘Compellence’ focused rather than a ‘Hearts and Minds’ or ‘Good Governance’ philosophy. In comparison, Hopkinson states that after the initial intense conventional fighting, the occupation of Cork was not as severe or robustly conducted by the National Army because most of the Free State soldiers had been recruited locally.²⁴ Hence compared to Kerry, the Free State strategy in Cork was a better combination of ‘Compellence’ with ‘Good Governance’ and as a result of this it is a better fit for a doctrinal examination of the civil war. Therefore in order to properly assess why the counterinsurgency strategy of the National Army was most effective in Munster and particularly in Cork, the following key doctrinal concepts from the Clear-Hold-Build framework will be examined:

- a. The force generation of a standing army and how best to utilise local support and locally recruited forces.
- b. The transition from conventional war fighting or clearance operations to prosecuting an effective unconventional campaign to hold the terrain.
- c. The importance of building or rebuilding society, infrastructure, governance, the economy and a safe and secure society.²⁵

1.5 Literature Review and Breakdown of Chapters

The extensive collected works on the Irish Civil War links both the theoretical literature on the conflict and the ongoing debate on counterinsurgency. By utilising an all-inclusive and comprehensive approach during the civil war, the Free State succeeded in the

²³ T. Ryle Dwyer, *Tans, Terror and Troubles, Kerry's Real Fighting Story 1913-23*, (Cork, Mercier Press, 2001), p.366.

²⁴ Michael Hopkinson, *Green Against Green*, (Dublin, Gill & Macmillan, 2004). P. 239.

²⁵ US Army, FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency (April 2006).

counterinsurgency campaign they conducted against the anti-Treaty IRA.²⁶ This all-inclusive comprehensive approach adopted by the National Army will be explained in Chapter Two, my Literature Review. This chapter will also examine the development of counterinsurgency doctrine and how it pertained to the Free State's actions during the civil war. Classical, revisionist and new scholarship connected with counterinsurgency and associated with current theoretical literature will add to the debate pertaining to my chosen area of research. Arising from this Chapter, how the local victories in Cork, shaped the overall Free State strategy will be discussed throughout the remainder of my study.

The generation, of a standing national army is a key doctrinal concept and it is covered in detail in Chapter Three, forming the first part of my framework of analysis. This was a very necessary strategic requirement by the National Government in order to conduct the clearance and holding operations necessary to win a civil war at both the strategic and tactical levels. The generation of the National Army discusses how the Free State generated, equipped and trained a standing army at the beginning of the conflict. How the British government supported the newly established National Army both directly and indirectly will also be critically assessed. I will also emphasise the importance of local forces supported by professionally trained and specialised forces, explaining how this combination was the backbone of the drive towards gaining public support, public information and acceptance. This was crucial to how the National Army fought the IRA insurgents during the civil war in Munster. In order to achieve this review of associated literature and resources, I relied heavily on John Duggan's seminal work, *A History of the Irish Army*²⁷, because it is essential reading in order to understand how the Free State formed equipped and trained the new National Army. Equally Maryann

²⁶ From now on – the anti-Treaty IRA will be referred to as the IRA.

²⁷ John P. Duggan, *A History of the Irish Army* (Dublin, Gill and MacMillan, 1991).

Gialanella Valiulis', *Almost a Rebellion: The Irish Army Mutiny of 1924*²⁸ and her *Portrait of a Revolutionary*²⁹, give an excellent insight into the leadership positions and tensions surrounding the formation of the National Army and split with the anti-Treaty elements of the IRA. Eunan O'Halpin, in *Defending Ireland*³⁰, discusses the recruitment and organisational advantages that the Free State had over their IRA adversaries, and Diarmaid Ferriter, in his book *Between Two Hells, The Irish Civil War*³¹, goes into more detail on the organisational challenges, strengths and successes prevalent within the leadership group of the National Army. Meanwhile Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff, in *The Sources of Military Change, Culture, Politics, Technology*³², outline the defence costs of a standing army and how the National Army had to initially model their organisation on British Army structures, before they could explore and examine other militaries. Patrick Long, in *The Army of the Irish Free State, 1922 – 1924, (Unpublished Thesis)*³³, goes into great details on how the Free State recruited skilled military veterans into the National Army and the advantages of these veterans. William Kautt, in *Arming the Irish Revolution: Gunrunning and Arms Smuggling, 1911-1922*³⁴, outlines the weapons that both sides had available at the start of the conflict and how the British Government gave the Free State side a marked advantage by the end of the conflict because of the constant flow of weapons and ammunition they provided. In contrast, to Kautt, Hart in *The IRA and Its Enemies: Violence and Community in Cork 1916-1923*³⁵, outlines the difficulties

²⁸ Maryann Gialanella Valiulis, *Almost a Rebellion: The Irish Army Mutiny of 1924* (Cambridge, University Press, 1992).

²⁹ Maryann Gialanella Valiulis, *Portrait of a Revolutionary* (Kentucky, University Press, 1992).

³⁰ Eunan O'Halpin, *Defending Ireland* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999).

³¹ Diarmaid Ferriter, *Between Two Hells, The Irish Civil War* (London, Profile Books, 2021).

³² Theo Farrell, Terry Terriff, *The Sources of Military Change, Culture, Politics Technology* (London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002).

³³ Patrick Long, *The Army of the Irish Free State, 1922 – 1924*, (Masters of Arts, Modern Irish History, UCD, 1981-1983).

³⁴ William H. Kautt, *Arming the Irish Revolution: Gunrunning and Arms Smuggling, 1911-1922*, (Kansas, University Press of Kansas, 2021).

³⁵ Peter Hart, *The IRA and Its Enemies: Violence and Community in Cork, 1916-1923* (New York, Clarendon Press, 1999).

encountered by the IRA in their attempts at obtaining weapons and securing their supply and logistical networks.

The clearance operations conducted by the National Army to conventionally attack the IRA in the province of Munster are examined in detail during Chapter Four. These shaping and supporting operations were fundamentally kinetic in their nature and I will review how these shaping operations at the tactical level supported the main effort in Munster, which was the seizure, securing and clearance of the IRA from Cork and surrounding counties. During this chapter John Borgonovo's *The Battle for Cork*³⁶ is heavily cited because it is a very significant work on the decisive operations conducted by the National Army during the summer months of 1922, especially in Cork. His breakdown, detailed research and comprehensive account of the landings and subsequent fighting associated with the Free State operations in this region provided the scope and latitude for my own research on this period in Irish history. Borgonovo, along with Hopkinson, Kissane and Townsend are the 'big four' authors most frequently cited in this dissertation on the Irish Civil War. Michael Hopkinson, in *Green Against Green*³⁷, gives a very detailed account on the shaping efforts in the large towns of Munster and the main attack on Cork executed by the National Army. Bill Kissane, in *The Politics of the Irish Civil War*³⁸ and Charles Townsend, in *The Republic, The Fight for Irish Independence, 1918-1923*³⁹ are equally well versed on the civil war, both producing extremely well researched and accessible books on the conduct of the civil war and the politics, strategy and policies underpinning the struggle for both sides. These authors helped me to raise the tactical skirmishes during the clearance phase to a more strategic level, explaining in detail the consequences of the fighting, the personalities involved and the motivation behind the conflict. Carlton Younger, in *Ireland's*

³⁶ John Borgonovo, *The Battle for Cork* (Cork, Mercier Press, 2011).

³⁷ Michael Hopkinson, *Green Against Green*, (Dublin, Gill & Macmillan, 2004).

³⁸ Bill Kissane, *The Politics of the Irish Civil War* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005).

³⁹ Charles Townsend, *The Republic, The Fight for Irish Independence, 1918-1923* (London, Penguin, 2014).

*Civil War*⁴⁰ outlines the conventional battles in detail, describing for the reader the actions and consequences of these clashes.

Holding the already cleared terrain is a primary focus of counterinsurgency operations and Chapters Five and Six explain how the National Army and Civic Guard brought Civil Security and Civil Control to the province of Munster. Along with Hopkinson, Kissane and Townsend, Sean Boyne's excellent biography on *Emmet Dalton*⁴¹, is cited extensively in the Hold phase of this work because all of these authors give excellent insights and descriptions on the actions of the Free State leadership including Major General Emmet Dalton in Munster. They also give a first-rate understanding into the strategies, plans and operations conducted by the National Army during this phase of operations.

Meanwhile Ernie O'Malley in his series of books *The Men Will talk to Me*, *The Singing Flame*⁴² and his published papers⁴³ along with Florence O'Donoghue, in *No Other Law*⁴⁴, gives an excellent insight into the IRA activities' and reasoning during this phase of the fighting. These studies help me to emphasise how the variables changed and how the IRA reconsolidated and brought the fight back to the National Army in the latter months of 1922. In order to counter this IRA threat, I will examine how the Free State became a successful learning organisation and outline how this led to the effective re-organisation of the National Army. Long and Duggan are utilised during this chapter and their works are corroborated against National Army Reports from the period which clarify how successfully the National Army re-organised to take the fight back to the IRA. The specialisation of forces in January 1923 will also be reviewed using Long and National Army Reports from the period in order to examine how a newly adopted doctrine and strategy led to 'a winning' both at the local and national levels.

⁴⁰ Carlton Younger, *Ireland's Civil War* (New York, Taplinger Pub., 1968).

⁴¹ Sean Boyne, *Emmet Dalton* (Dublin, Merrion Press, 2015).

⁴² Ernie O'Malley, *The Singing Flame* (Cork, Mercier Press, 2012).

⁴³ Earnie O'Malley, *No Surrender Here, Civil War Papers of Earnie O'Malley 1922-24* (Cork, Mercier, 2007).

⁴⁴ Florence O'Donoghue. *No Other Law* (Dublin, Irish Press, 1954).

O’Halpin and Gavin Foster, in *The Irish Civil War and Society, Politics, Class, and Conflict*⁴⁵, are frequently cited to explain the formation, deployment of a new Irish Police Force and the re-establishment of the Rule of Law in Ireland in Chapter Six of the thesis. Their analysis and literature give insightful perspectives on this tense but important time of establishing law and order throughout the Free State. Brian McCarthy in his unpublished thesis on the *Civic Guards*⁴⁶ and Donal Corcoran, in *Freedom to Achieve Freedom*⁴⁷ also provide excellent analysis on how the formation of a new civil police force in the middle of a violent civil war filled the vacuum of the ungoverned spaces, creating a safe environment and maintaining the confidence of the population. Chapter Six also reviews and explains how Information Operations and the security provided by the Free State allowed for the attainment of useable information and intelligence that led to targeted operations and overall victory by Free State forces.

Corcoran; Regan, in *The Politics of Utopia: Party Organisation Executive, Autonomy and the New Administration, Ireland: The Politics of Independence*; ⁴⁸ Tom Garvin, in *The Birth of Irish Democracy*; ⁴⁹ and Cronin, in *Ireland: The Politics of Independence 1922-49* ⁵⁰ are the key authors cited regularly when describing how the Free State rebuilt back the country after many years of conflict. Chapter Seven cites these authors explaining how the repair, protection and restoration of key infrastructure provided for a better living standard and services to the local population. This restoration fostered a better relationship with the local population; helping to undermine the cause and highlighting the wanton destruction conducted by the IRA on the transport and commercial systems of the new Free State. Using Regan and

⁴⁵ Gavin M. Foster, *The Irish Civil War and Society, Politics, Class, and Conflict* (London, Palgrave MacMillan, 2015).

⁴⁶ Brian McCarthy, Unpublished Thesis, (Department of Politics, UCD, 1977).

⁴⁷ Donal Corcoran, *Freedom to Achieve Freedom*, (Dublin, Gill and Macmillan, 2013).

⁴⁸ M. Regan, *The Politics of Utopia: Party Organisation, Executive Autonomy and the New Administration, Ireland: The Politics of Independence, 1922-49*, (London, 2000).

⁴⁹ Tom Garvin, *The Birth of Irish Democracy* (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1996).

⁵⁰ M. Cronin, *Ireland: The Politics of Independence 1922-49*, (London, 2000).

Cronin, Chapter Eight describes and defines how the provision of ‘Good Governance’, the rebuilding of the state’s economy and reducing unemployment significantly contributed to the populations’ wants and needs. Hopkinson, Borgonovo, Boyne, Kissane and Townsend are also frequently cited in this chapter in order to describe how the Free State re-established Governance or ‘Good Governance’ and restored the economy in the new state during this period. These actions by the Free State, expertly described by all the authors listed above gave a sense of the security and trust placed in the new government, by the Irish population, further disenfranchising the IRA in their quest for an overall Irish Republic.

1.6 Research Methodology – Primary Research and Additions to the Narrative

Many of the National Army’s civil war files in Military Archives were destroyed in 1932 for political reasons after a change of government. Accurate report writing was not fully utilised by the National Army until the re-organisation of January 1923 and the new professionalism it brought with it.⁵¹ Up until this point, my primary research relied heavily on private papers and the written correspondence between the leadership on both sides of the conflict as well as newspaper articles and war correspondence reports from the period. For events and occurrences after January 1923, the National Army Reports available from the Irish National Archives were heavily consulted. Archival papers of the key participants from all sides were also visited in both Ireland and England in order to get a better understanding of the Irish and British involvement in this contentious conflict.⁵² Additionally the archival material visited in Britain

⁵¹ This re-organisation and professionalism will be reviewed in Chapter Five.

⁵² Private Papers visited included, Lloyd George, Churchill, Collins, Mulcahy, de Roiste, O’Malley, Cosgrave, Moloney and Ennis.

helped to fill the vacuum and discover relevant files and information that may have been destroyed by the Irish in 1932.

Researching a civil war is always fraught with danger; evoking and re-opening old wounds that can lead to intensive debates because of ideological, family and historical biases. The Irish Civil War is a case in point and still a very sensitive subject to research. The Irish Historian Anne Dolan states that a civil war can bring a sense of shame and silence and “the memory of the Irish Civil War has been assumed, distorted, misunderstood. It has been manipulated, underestimated, but most of all ignored.”⁵³ Writing fifty years after the end of hostilities, F.S.L. Lyons in his popular text book *Ireland Since the Famine*, states that “the civil war was an episode which has burned so deep into the heart and mind of Ireland that it is not yet possible for the historian to approach it with the detailed knowledge or the objectivity which it deserves.”⁵⁴

One hundred years after the conflict, I intend to approach my research with an innate objectivity and unbiased nature because the political systems of Ireland were born from the ashes of this violent conflict and deserve to be fully understood. Similarly the strategic successes and counterinsurgency strategy of the National Army during this bitter campaign also needs to be fully understood, recognised and examined in order to learn from their actions. I am cognizant that local histories are still alive with stories of the alleged atrocities committed by both sides and that one of the most tragic consequences of the Irish Civil War was that deaths of so many of the leaders of the IRA, who had previously fought the British Army to a standstill during the Irish War of Independence. Because of these underlying tensions, the focus of my research will not be concentrated on the local skirmishes in the towns and villages of Ireland, but rather I will focus on the strategy, policies and doctrine used at the strategic and

⁵³ Anne Dolan, *Commemorating the Irish Civil War, History and Memory, 1923-2000* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 200.

⁵⁴ F.S.L. Lyons, *Ireland Since the Famine*, (London, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1971), p. 460

operational levels. I will avoid getting mired down in the local controversies of the war, local casualty figures and the names of tactical combatants and instead concentrate on connecting the tactical actions to strategy and analyse the operational planning and execution of the campaigns conducted by the National Army.

The civil war was a watershed in Irish politics. It marked the end of an era, where for the previous decade gunmen had controlled Irish politics and revolutionary thinking. As a direct consequence of the civil war, governmental authority and civilian control asserted itself fully over the new National Army. It also allowed the constitutional opposition to separate itself from the IRA, creating a new political system free from the shadows of collusion, allowing civil government to be rightfully re-established.⁵⁵

1.7 Why was there a Civil War in Ireland?

*Ireland is big enough for great things and great movements, but it is too small for Civil War. Civil War means death and destruction. It means the material ruin of the nation and the moral degradation of its people.*⁵⁶

-Kilkenny People, 15 April 1922.

In 1921, the British Government needed to end the Anglo-Irish War, because the conflict was not popular either domestically or internationally. A British Labour Party commission investigating conditions in Ireland during the war concluded that “things are being done in the name of Britain which make our name stink in the nostrils of the whole world.”⁵⁷ When the Truce came into effect on 11th July 1921, suspending the War of Independence, many IRA fighters believed that it would only last for about two or three weeks, and worked to make the

⁵⁵ Michael Hopkinson, *Green Against Green*, (Dublin, Gill & Macmillan, 2004), p. 272.

⁵⁶ *Kilkenny People*, 15 April 1922.

⁵⁷ T. Jones, *Whitehall Diary*, Vol. 3: *Ireland 1918-25* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1971), p.48.

most of the breathing space. They believed hostilities would soon restart and the IRA wanted to be ready to continue the fight for Irish Independence and the much sought-after Republic.⁵⁸ An IRA Quarter Master General (QMG) Logistics Report demonstrates the preparations been made by the IRA during the period of the Truce. By December 1921, the Republicans had sufficient arms and ammunition to fight at greater levels of intensity than at any time during the previous two and a half years of conflict. The IRA leadership containing Richard Mulcahy and Michael Collins knew this, therefore nullifying any argument that the Treaty of December 1921 was a military necessity due to want of armaments.⁵⁹

On 6th December 1921, the Anglo-Irish Treaty was signed, providing an alternative to a Republic. Ireland would become a Dominion, styled the Irish Free State. The Free State would enjoy sovereignty subject to inclusion within the British Commonwealth of Nations and to other imperial trappings.⁶⁰ The anti-Treaty or Republican elements of the IRA, stringently objected to continued citizenship within the British Empire, which was enshrined in an Oath of Allegiance to the King of England. Added to this, the historian John Borgonovo posits that “the endorsement of a partitioned Northern Ireland, the remaining six counties of Ireland to remain in the United Kingdom, only added to the distaste for the settlement on the anti-Treaty side.”⁶¹

Arthur Griffith, the founder of Sinn Féin and one of the leading Irish negotiators during the Anglo-Irish Treaty talks, said he signed this Treaty in the belief that the end of the conflict of centuries was at hand.⁶² Others, such as Michael Collins, were less optimistic, and more philosophical. Collins in signing the Anglo-Irish Treaty stated that he had “signed my actual

⁵⁸ Ernie O'Malley, *The Singing Flame* (Cork, Mercier Press, 2012), p.23.

⁵⁹ William H. Kautt, *Arming the Irish Revolution: Gunrunning and Arms Smuggling, 1911-1922*, (Kansas, University Press of Kansas, 2021), p. 208.

⁶⁰ John McColgan, *British Policy and the Irish Administration 1920-22*, (London, George Allen & Unwin, 1983), p. 90.

⁶¹ John Borgonovo, *The Battle for Cork* (Cork, Mercier Press, 2011), p.23.

⁶² Eoin Neeson, *The Civil War in Ireland* (Dublin, Mercier Press, 1966), p.39.

death-warrant.”⁶³ Collins and Griffith, as part of the Irish Delegation in London, did not report back to Dublin before signing the final document, and when news of the Treaty signing first appeared, Eamon de Valera, the President of Dáil Éireann, was furious.⁶⁴ Some in the IRA believed the delegation that was sent to negotiate the Treaty should have been arrested, insisting that “...[T]hey had no authority to sign [the Treaty] without first referring the matter to their Cabinet.”⁶⁵ In public, de Valera vehemently denounced the fact that the Irish negotiating team had not achieved the status of a Republic for Ireland. However, in private he had other sentiments and was more realistic. According to the diaries of Liam de Roiste, a prominent Pro-Treaty Sinn Féin TD (Member of Parliament) in Cork, Eoin MacNeill, one of the founders of Óglaigh na hÉireann, was more philosophical about de Valera. MacNeill told de Roiste that “from conversations with dev [de Valera] in 1919-20, the latter certainly considered then that ‘The Republic’ could not be achieved; that it was a good fighting position: That another arrangement would sometime become inevitable.”⁶⁶

A week after the return of the Treaty delegation to Ireland, parliamentary debates in the Dáil began. These debates were passionate and uncompromising, with both sides arguing their case with great vigour. Collins argued that after a lapse of 750 years, the country would be left with a parliament to make laws for the peace, order and good government of Ireland and with it an executive responsibility to that parliament.⁶⁷ Some of the IRA, however, did not feel the same way as Collins. Ernie O’Malley, a prominent IRA Divisional Commander in Munster, proclaimed that “how often had we vowed, as we sat around the turf fires, or as we tramped with squelching feet, ... that we in our generation would finish the fight.”⁶⁸

⁶³ T. Ryle Dwyer “*I Signed My Death Warrant*”: *Michael Collins & the Treaty* (Dublin, Mercier Press, 2006), p.207.

⁶⁴ Bill Kissane, *The Politics of the Treaty Split and the Civil War; Atlas of the Irish Revolution* (Cork, University Press, 2017), p. 652.

⁶⁵ Ernie O’Malley, *The Singing Flame* (Cork, Mercier Press, 2012), p.58.

⁶⁶ De Roiste Diaries, 19 October 1922, Cork City and County Archives, U271/A/46.

⁶⁷ Bill Kissane, *The Politics of the Treaty Split and the Civil War; Atlas of the Irish Revolution*, p. 652.

⁶⁸ O’Malley, *The Singing Flame*, p.61.

For the most part, those who opposed the Treaty “could see no good in it, looking down from the height of the Republic, seeing it as degradation and sheer loss.”⁶⁹ Mary MacSwiney, a TD and sister of Terence, who had previously died in 1920 on hunger strike in Cork, supported the common Republican sentiments. She stated that “without the machinations of the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB)⁷⁰ led by Collins, the Treaty would not have been supported by 5 percent of the TDs.”⁷¹ O’Malley, MacSwiney and a large minority of IRA volunteers condemned the Treaty as “falling short of the national aspiration, and it proved to be a bone of contention.”⁷²

The Treaty debates continued both outside and inside the Dáil. Soon the country started to fracture owing to the ideologies and political loyalties of the population. These debates continued into the Christmas period where the churches were overflowing, and sermons calling for peace were heard throughout the country. O’Malley best sums up the tumult and divisions engulfing Ireland as a result of the Treaty debates when he states “the press approved of their conduct; county councils expressed agreement or disagreement. The Catholic clergy as a whole applauded their signing.”⁷³ In Cork, the Chamber of Commerce laid out signature books for business leaders to record their support for the Treaty.⁷⁴ Constitutionalist bodies such as the South of Ireland Cattle-traders and the Cork Legion of Ex-Servicemen similarly endorsed the agreement.⁷⁵ After the Christmas recess when Irish politicians had a chance to spend time with their families and reflect, a vote was called for in early January 1922.⁷⁶

On a majority vote of seven, (64 for, 57 against), the Dáil recommended acceptance of the Treaty. Most of those on the Treaty side did so on pragmatic grounds, to avoid further war,

⁶⁹ Dorothy Macardle, *The Irish Republic* (London, Corgi, 1968), p.617.

⁷⁰ A more detailed analysis on the IRB will be presented in Chapter Three.

⁷¹ Mary MacSwiney, 22 January 1924, Moss Twomey Papers, P69/15/ (66), UCDA.

⁷² John McColgan, *British Policy and the Irish Administration 1920-22*, (London, George Allen & Unwin, 1983), p. 90.

⁷³ O’Malley, *The Singing Flame*, p.58.

⁷⁴ *The Cork Examiner*, 7,9,10,12 December 1921,

⁷⁵ *Cork Constitution*, 31 December 1921, 31 January 1922.

⁷⁶ O’Malley, *The Singing Flame*, p.63.

rather than enthusiasm for the document.⁷⁷ Two days after the vote was taken, de Valera resigned as President, and Arthur Griffith, one of the signatories to the Treaty, was elected President of Dáil Éireann in his place.⁷⁸ Between January and June 1922, continuous and strenuous efforts were made by both sides of the Treaty debate to produce an acceptable political compromise, but at the same time both the National Government and the IRA prepared for hostilities.⁷⁹

What troubled Michael Collins most during this period of uncertainty was the split in the army, his beloved Irish Republican Army. Collins tried to satisfy the consensus of his former comrades, to prevent the split within the IRA. He would rather have any one of the type of anti-Treaty advocates such as Liam Lynch, Liam Deasy, Tom Hales, Rory O'Connor, or Tom Barry on his side than a dozen like de Valera.⁸⁰ The IRA split affected the vast majority of its members and Ernie O'Malley, stated that there were "...two parties now, Republican and Free State, those who believed in an absolutely independent Ireland and those who wished to become a Dominion of the British Empire."⁸¹

A general election held on 16th June 1922 allowed Irish voters a further voice on ratification of the Treaty. The calling of this election was supported by the British Government. Winston Churchill, The Secretary of State for the Colonies, was anxious that this election would succeed, because a victory by Treaty supporters would legitimise the Treaty in the eyes of the Irish population.⁸² The results validated this strategy. In terms of parliamentary representation, the parties received the following numbers of seats in the election: Pro-Treaty

⁷⁷ Kissane, *The Politics of the Treaty Split and the Civil War; Atlas of the Irish Revolution* , pp. 652-3.

⁷⁸ O'Malley, *The Singing Flame*, p.64.

⁷⁹ Eunan O'Halpin, *Defending Ireland* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999), p.2.

⁸⁰ Unsigned notes (possibly by Collins), Mulcahy Papers, P7a/145, UCDA: O Muirthile Memoir, 189; cited by Michael Hopkinson, *Green Against Green*, (Dublin, Gill & Macmillan, 2004), p. 104.

⁸¹ O'Malley, *The Singing Flame*, p.65.

⁸² O'Malley, *The Singing Flame*, p.73.

58, Anti-Treaty 36, Labour Party 17, Farmers 7, Unionists (Trinity College) 4, Independents 6.⁸³

The new Free State Provisional Government felt that the election result had shown the people's support for the Treaty, and that they had been given a mandate to proceed with its full implementation.⁸⁴ The Pro-Treaty side, represented by the newly formed Cumann na nGaedheal political party, believed there could be no doubt that the overwhelming majority wished for the crisis to be settled peaceably.⁸⁵ However, the shadows of conflict continually hung over the burgeoning state, as it struggled to formulate itself into a functioning entity. The slide to civil war eventually became a reality as the newly formed Free State faced its greatest challenge within a few months of its establishment.

1.8 The Battle for the Four Courts

After the IRA repudiated Dáil Éireann control and established its own ruling executive, it set up a new headquarters in the judicial centre of Dublin, the Four Courts. Initially the British Government was satisfied with how the Provisional [National] Government was dealing with events. On the 19th of April 1922 Churchill wrote to British Prime Minister David Lloyd George stating that he thought the British "Government is wise to put up with the occupation of the Four Courts until public opinion is exasperated against the raiders. I feel a good deal less anxious than I did a fortnight ago."⁸⁶ Churchill's upbeat attitude would have been reinforced by a letter he received from Alfred Cope, the Assistant Under Secretary for Ireland during this

⁸³ Maryann Gialanella Valiulis, *Portrait of a Revolutionary* (Kentucky, University Press), p.100.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Churchill to Lloyd George, Letter dated 19 April 1922, Parliamentary Archives Westminster, Lloyd George Papers, F/10/2/68, PAW.

period. In the letter Cope stated that “the situation in the Four Courts is unchanged. The mutineers [IRA] are commandeering food etc. from the local shopkeepers and thus making themselves very unpopular. It would not pay the P.G. [Provisional/ National Government] to take drastic action at the moment.”⁸⁷

The British Commanding General in Ireland, General Macready, also warned that it was “...vitally important to avoid a general conflict, because it is probable that Rory O’Connor, [the leader of the Republican armed men in the Four Courts] hopes to embroil British Troops in order to bring about unity in the Irish Republican Army against a common enemy.”⁸⁸ The British were fully aware of the anti-Treaty strategy of trying to drag the British back into a fight in order to re-unify the IRA against them and the Treaty, as such they held firm. They put their trust in the newly formed Irish Free State Government. The British felt that if the National Government, and not the British for obvious political reasons, put their “foot down and assert their authority strongly ... that they would have the country behind them, except a few hundred, or possibly thousand, extremists, like Rory O’Connor and Co., who will resist any form of settled Government.”⁸⁹ Whilst the internal and external debates were happening between the British and Irish, events took a dramatic turn across the Irish Sea. On 22nd June 1922, members of the London IRA apparently decided unilaterally to assassinate the British Army Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson on his own doorstep.⁹⁰ This sent a shockwave through Westminster and Whitehall, even though Wilson’s extremism probably posed more of a threat to British mainstream politics than it did to Irish Republicanism.⁹¹ Borgonovo states that “the British Government incorrectly blamed the killing on Republican militants from the Four Courts, and

⁸⁷ Cope to Churchill, Letter dated 16 April 1922, Parliamentary Archives Westminster, Lloyd George Papers, F/10/2/68, PAW.

⁸⁸ General Macready to Churchill, Letter dated 16 April 1922, Parliamentary Archives Westminster, Lloyd George Papers, F/10/2/67(b), PAW.

⁸⁹ General Macready to Churchill, Letter dated 16 April 1922, Parliamentary Archives Westminster, Lloyd George Papers, F/10/2/67(b), PAW.

⁹⁰ Peter Hart, *The I.R.A. at War 1916-1923* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 194-222.

⁹¹ Charles Townsend, *The Republic, The Fight for Irish Independence, 1918-1923* (London, Penguin, 2014), p.404.

demanded that the National Government move against them.”⁹² In contrast, O’Malley and his fellow anti-Treaty IRA volunteers believed that Wilson had been shot through the instructions of the Irish Republican Brotherhood that is Collins, O’Hegarty and Mulcahy, who were members of the Supreme Council.⁹³

The threat of action by the British Government was real and reinforced by the British troops still in Ireland and yet to be evacuated. On the 22nd June 1922, Prime Minister Lloyd George wrote in a handwritten letter to Collins that:

...documents have been found upon the murderers of Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson which clearly connect the assassins with the Irish Republican Army, and which further reveal the existence of a definite conspiracy against the peace and order of this country.⁹⁴

He continued and went on to say that:

...information has reached His Majesty’s Government showing that active preparations are on foot among the irregular elements of the I.R.A. to resume attacks upon the lives and property of British subjects ... the ambiguous position of the Irish Republican Army can no longer be ignored by the British Government.⁹⁵

General Macready stated on the 22nd June 1922, that he was somewhat taken aback when asked if the Dublin Four Courts could be captured at once by British troops.⁹⁶ The British cabinet instructed Macready to prepare a full-scale assault on the Four Courts using tanks and aircraft as well as field artillery. On 24th June 1922, the London Government decided that the British attack should go ahead the following day. Macready took a dim view of this project. In his view the assassination had thrown the British cabinet into panic.⁹⁷ Churchill was even

⁹² Borgonovo, *The Battle for Cork*, p.45.

⁹³ O’Malley, *The Singing Flame*, p.112.

⁹⁴ Lloyd George to Collins, Letter dated 22 June 1922, Parliamentary Archives Westminster, Lloyd George Papers, F/10/6/4, PAW.

⁹⁵ Lloyd George to Collins, Letter dated 22 June 1922, Parliamentary Archives Westminster, Lloyd George Papers, F/10/6/4, PAW.

⁹⁶ O’Malley, *The Singing Flame*, p.115.

⁹⁷ Townsend, *The Republic, The Fight for Irish Independence, 1918-1923*, p.405.

talking of air action (a habit the Colonial Office had got into overseas) and how to disguise British aircraft in Free State colours.⁹⁸

Historian Keith Jeffrey argues that Macready “deliberately delayed acting on orders from London to deploy British forces against the Republican occupied Four Courts on the sensible grounds that this would plunge Ireland and Anglo-Irish relations into deep crisis.”⁹⁹ The same day an extra layer of defiance was added with the kidnapping of the Free State General J.J. O’Connell, the Deputy Chief of Staff of the pro-Treaty forces, by the Four Courts IRA garrison.¹⁰⁰ On the 27th June 1922, Churchill stated in the House of Commons that “if it [the Four Courts siege] does not come to an end, and a speedy end, then it is my duty, on behalf of his Majesty’s Government, to say that the Treaty has been formally violated.”¹⁰¹ Facing pressure from all directions the National Government issued an ultimatum to the Four Courts garrison on 28th June to evacuate.¹⁰² The IRA garrison did not comply and on the night of 27/28th June 1922, National troops commanded by General Tom Ennis began shelling the Four Courts.¹⁰³ Artillery and ammunition was given to the National Army by the British and had been moved into firing positions. The IRA claimed that the “British were observing the results of artillery fire and they would report to their new allies [The National Army].”¹⁰⁴

⁹⁸ Ibid., p.408.

⁹⁹ Keith Jeffrey, ‘Sir Nevil Macready’, in James McGuire and James Quinn (eds.), *Dictionary of Irish Biography*, 9 vols, (Cambridge, University Press, 2009) (DIB), vol, 6, pp. 181-2; cited by Diarmaid Ferriter, *Between Two Hells, The Irish Civil War* (London, Profile Books 2021), p. 43.

¹⁰⁰ Ferriter, *Between Two Hells, The Irish Civil War*, p. 44.

¹⁰¹ Winston Churchill, House of Commons 27 June 1922; cited by, Ernie O’Malley, *The Singing Flame* (Cork, Mercier Press, 2012), p.119.

¹⁰² Ferriter, *Between Two Hells, The Irish Civil War*, p. 44.

¹⁰³ Kissane, *The Politics of the Irish Civil War*, p. 74.

¹⁰⁴ O’Malley, *The Singing Flame*, p.137.



Picture 2 – Free-State Troops shelling the Four Courts on 28th June 1922 with 18 pounder artillery pieces handed over by the British Government (Courtesy Military Archives Ireland).

Whether the British were observing or not is unconfirmed, but the artillery pieces were definitely handed over to Free State soldiers by members of the 17th Battery Royal Field Artillery Regiment from a British Army depot in the Phoenix Park on the night in question. With British assistance, two guns were hitched onto the backs of Lancia armoured Lorries, and straw placed on the floors of the Lorries in order to protect the artillery shells placed in the backs of these vehicles.¹⁰⁵ British Army Major Colin McVean Gubbins handed over the guns as the unit commander. Gubbins recorded in the Divisions' war diary for June 1922 that two eighteen-pounders were handed over to the Provisional Government on 27th June 1922.¹⁰⁶ The shelling and attack on the Four Courts by National Army troops was effective and for the next few days fighting shifted to Sackville Street, in Dublin City Centre, where the anti-Treaty forces occupied prominent buildings similar to 1916 but by 5th July the fighting had come to a close.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁵ Sean Boyne, *Emmet Dalton* (Dublin, Merrion Press, 2015), p. 141.

¹⁰⁶ Aaron R.B. Linderman, *Lessons Learnt by SOE from the Irish War of Independence*, p. 5; cited by Boyne, *Emmet Dalton*, p. 141.

¹⁰⁷ Ferriter, *Between Two Hells, The Irish Civil War*, p. 46

1.9 The National Army and Counterinsurgency Doctrine

The leadership of the National Army did not have the luxury of referencing doctrine on counterinsurgency during their struggle for survival, but their methods closely resembled the counterinsurgency tactics, doctrine and strategy that is taught and practiced by modern western militaries.

An insurgency can take on the characteristics of a civil war, yet there is a difference in the form the war takes in each case.¹⁰⁸ In Ireland's case, the country was divided on an ideological basis over the terms of a peace treaty, rather than on a religious or socio-political basis. The campaign that was conducted by the National Army had all the hallmarks of a well prosecuted counterinsurgency campaign using an identifiable doctrine and strategy. Doctrine helps to simplify complexity and some of the key areas where this was most evident was in the areas of utilising local forces, provision of a legitimate government at national and local level, the establishment of civil control, the successful use of Information Operations, and the attempts to protect and restore essential services, the economy and governance.

It is difficult proposition to generate and train a professional army for a counterinsurgency operations. A number of key attributes are a necessity including a doctrine, a training cadre and the logistical support for such undertakings.¹⁰⁹ Before the Treaty was even ratified, the December 1921 publication of '*An t-Óglách*' (the journal or magazine for the Irish Volunteers, IRA, and later the National Army), stated, "the army is the servant of the nation and will obey the national will expressed by the chosen representatives of the people and interpreted through the proper military channels."¹¹⁰ Thus, before ratification of the Anglo-Irish Treaty, the foundations of a disciplined and regimented army were already laid.

¹⁰⁸ David Galula *Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice* (Westport CT, Praeger Security International 1964, 2006), p. 2.

¹⁰⁹ From authors own overseas experience, especially with an EU training Mission in Mali (2018).

¹¹⁰ *An t-Óglách*, 16 December 1921.

No evidence has emerged that any of the Free State military leadership had studied counterinsurgency or ‘Small Wars’ theorists such as Callwell, who had published during this period. But the fact that in most correspondence and reports the Free State leadership referred to the anti-Treaty IRA as Irregulars, would tie in with the Callwell philosophy when he defines small wars as “operations of regular armies against irregular, or comparatively speaking irregular forces.”¹¹¹

A number of military history articles are also prevalent throughout a sizeable number of the *An t-Ógláchs* from the period of the civil war. Basic tactical lessons such as the defence of a village and how to conduct ambushes are numerous. However, there is no immediate evidence of counterinsurgency or ‘Small Wars’ theorists in these pages. Nevertheless, the importance of the population and winning over its support are very evident in most of the publications as are other indirect lessons on counterinsurgency. *An t-Óglách* from 27th January 1923, carries an article on ‘Fight Fair’ which outlines in detail the Hague Convention of 1907, and that states the necessity to conduct “... operations in accordance with laws and customs of war.”¹¹² The 10th June edition from 1922 actually asks the question; “what is the problem?” in an article on the ‘Principles of War’. Students throughout the Defence Academies and Universities of the western world are very familiar with this question, and the importance of understanding the problem before formulating the solution - as per the recent US Army Doctrine on ‘Design Methodology’.¹¹³

A strong sentiment advocating a connection between the National Army and the population is also prevalent throughout *An t-Óglách* from this period. The edition of 31st March 1922 states the following:

¹¹¹ C.E. Calwell, *Small Wars: Their Principle and Practice* (Omaha, University of Nebraska Press, 1996), p. 21.

¹¹² The Editor, ‘Fight Fair’, *An t-Óglách* magazine, dated 27 January 1923.

¹¹³ Authors experience as a student on the US Army Command and General Staff Course, Fort Leavenworth Kansas.

It would be a criminal act to break this sacred alliance between the [National] Army and the people, and no good volunteer would be guilty of such an act. During the war [1919-1921] the people stood by the army, and it is now the army's turn to show that it will stand by them and respect their rights.¹¹⁴

Specific 'Small Wars' theorists may not be quoted or examined by *An t-Óglách*, but what they advocated and preached certainly were. What the National Army practiced in the field against the IRA certainly pointed to the fact that the leadership of the National Army tried to be a learning organisation at all levels and certainly had a basic understanding of counterinsurgency tactics and strategy.

¹¹⁴ The Editor, 'The IRA and the People', *An t-Óglách* magazine, dated 31 March 1922.

Chapter Two – Literature Review Counterinsurgency

“Counterinsurgency is not just thinking man’s warfare – it is the graduate level of war.”¹¹⁵

-US Special Forces Officer in Iraq, 2005.

2.1 Introduction to Counterinsurgency

The French military theorist David Galula states that in terms of counterinsurgency, 20 percent is military, and 80 percent is everything else – “political, economic, and information operations.”¹¹⁶ A successful counterinsurgency campaign should not be dominated by military action but rather by those aspects which improve security and quality of life for the local population. Effective counterinsurgency operations need to combine military force with a policy to diminish the support of the insurgents by undermining the insurgent cause and the building of a more attractive alternative. To defeat an insurgency, the population do not have to approve of the counterinsurgent force – but actions should be taken that allows the local population to accept and respect the force. Because of this counterinsurgency operations need to be all-inclusive, combining hard military power with the other aspects of national power.¹¹⁷

2.2 Aim of Chapter

The aim of this chapter is to firstly explain the development of counterinsurgency theory and doctrine and how this will be used as the framework of analysis on the Free State

¹¹⁵ *Special Forces Officer in Iraq, 2005; cited by US Army (2006), FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency (December 2006).*

¹¹⁶ John Nagl, *Knife Fights, A Memoir of Modern War in Theory and Practice* (New York, Penguin Press 2014), p. 195.

¹¹⁷ National power refers to DIME – Diplomatic, Information, Military and Economic.

counterinsurgency campaign in Cork during the Irish Civil War. One of the key tenets of modern military counterinsurgency doctrine that has been developed in recent years is 'Clear–Hold–Build'. This construct will be examined, explaining how it will form the framework for analysis. A number of key theorists will be considered, particularly how they informed the writing of key modern doctrine associated with counterinsurgency. Dissenting voices to the popular perceptions on counterinsurgency, formulates and adds to the methodology through which I will conduct my research. It is hoped that this thesis will unfreeze, unlock and contribute to the debate on the Irish Civil War by using a fresh lens of analysis and explanation.

2.3 Clear – Hold – Build

The key variable in determining whether organizations adapt or die is not at the lower levels but at the top; key leaders have to determine that real change is required. If they make that decision, it is comparatively easy to transmit instructions on how to respond to changes in the environment; in the military, such instructions are called 'doctrine'.¹¹⁸

-John A. Nagl, *Knife Fights, A memoir of Modern War in Theory and Practice*.

Doctrine is a trailing indicator of inherited practices and a receptive intellectual environment. It is a combination of tactical and operational routines developed by units to meet current contingencies.¹¹⁹ Clear-Hold-Build as a doctrinal concept is a by-product of US Counterinsurgency Doctrines; *FM 3-24: Counterinsurgency*, and *FM 3-07: Stability Operations*.¹²⁰ These counterinsurgency doctrines combine offence (finding and eliminating the insurgent), defence (protecting the local populace) and stability (rebuilding the

¹¹⁸ Nagl, *Knife Fights, A memoir of Modern War in Theory and Practice*, p. 37.

¹¹⁹ Douglas Porch *Counterinsurgency Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War* (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 179.

¹²⁰ The US Army published FM 3-24 a new Counterinsurgency manual in 2006 and published FM 3-07, *Stability Operations* in 2008.

infrastructure, increasing the legitimacy of the local government and bringing the rule of law to the area) operations.¹²¹ As a result, a Clear–Hold–Build doctrinal operation is executed in a specific area, with the following objectives:

- a. (Clear) Create a secure physical and psychological environment.
- b. (Hold) Establish firm government control of the populace and area.
- c. (Build/ ReBuild) Gain the populace’s support.¹²²

What succeeds in counterinsurgency is an erudite plan, combined with the efficient use of resources that are not primarily military, although in a combat zone military forces might be the only forces able to complete certain elements of the plan.¹²³ As a result of this, military forces need to be adaptable and flexible in stability operations and kinetic warfare. Thus the Clear–Hold–Build doctrinal concept takes into account the necessity for kinetic actions that combine with and support the ‘Hearts and Minds’ philosophy. Counterinsurgent forces need to provide security, as well as restore essential services to the population, encourage ‘Good Governance’, and support economic development. This needs to be all wrapped up in a comprehensive Information Operations campaign. Consequently, in order to successfully prosecute a counterinsurgency campaign a number of key supporting provisions inherent in the Clear–Hold–Build framework need to be promoted. These provisions will form the basis of the ensuing sections and chapters of this Thesis and include:

- a. Generate - The Establishing/ Generation of a Host Nation Army.
- b. Clear – The Clearance Operations against Insurgent Forces.
- c. Hold - The Provision of Civil Security and Civil Control.
- d. Hold - The Targeted use of Information Operations.
- e. Build - The Restoration of Essential Services.

¹²¹ US Army, FM 3-24.2 *Tactics in Counterinsurgency*, April 2009, pp. 3-17.

¹²² US Army, FM 3-24. *Counterinsurgency*, December 2006, pp. 5-18 and US Army, FM 3-07, *Stability Operations* (October 2008).

¹²³ Nagl, *Knife Fights, A Memoir of Modern War in Theory and Practice*, p. 134.

f. Build – Good Governance and Supporting the Economy.¹²⁴

FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency Doctrine, first promulgated in 2006 was heavily influenced by the classical counterinsurgency theorists and of the many books that were influential in the writing of this doctrine, perhaps none was more important than the French theorist David Galula's *Counterinsurgency Warfare*.¹²⁵ Gentile claims Galula's book and essays on the French experience in Algeria played an influential role in the writing of *FM 3-24*.¹²⁶ To American military intellectuals, Galula's practices were a revelation. Among them were the importance of defending the population, of Information Operations, the requirement to "deal with root causes" of insurgency, and the benefits of civil-military fusion with the military assuming many governance and police function.¹²⁷ Roger Trinquier, another French classical counterinsurgency leading light, also influenced the writings of *FM 3-24*. His statement that military operations alone are not sufficient as well his assertions on the need for a comprehensive, civil military campaign, impacted on the writers of this Field Manual.¹²⁸

However, an alternative view to US Army counterinsurgency doctrine was offered by American theorist Edward Luttwark when he stated that *FM 3-24* offers no strategy for success, only a compendium of practices, procedures, and tactics that discount the fact that insurgencies are political phenomena. As such, "its prescriptions are in the end of little or no use and amount to a kind of malpractice."¹²⁹ The eminent Israeli historian Martin van Creveld asserted:

¹²⁴ FM 3-24. *Counterinsurgency*, December 2006.

¹²⁵ Porch *Counterinsurgency Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War*, p.175.

¹²⁶ Gentile, *Wrong Turn, America's Deadly Embrace of Counterinsurgency*, p.26.

¹²⁷ Ann Marlowe, "Forgotten Founder: The French Colonel Who Wrote the Book(s) on Counterinsurgency," *The Weekly Standard*, 15:5 (October 19, 2009), <http://m.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/017/054kkhvp.asp>

¹²⁸ Roger Trinquier *Modern Warfare* (Westport CT, Praeger Security International 1964, 2006).

¹²⁹ Edward Luttwark, "Dead End: Counterinsurgency Warfare as Military Malpractice," *Harper's Magazine*, February 2007, www.harpers.org/archive/2007/02/0081384.

The first and absolutely indispensable thing to do is to throw overboard 99 percent of the literature on counterinsurgency, counter guerrilla, counterterrorism, and the like. Since most of it was written by the losing side, it is of little value.¹³⁰

Gentile supports van Creveld by stating that the “simple truth is that we have bought into a doctrine for counterinsurgencies that did not work in the past, as proven by history, and whose efficacy and utility remain problematic today.”¹³¹ However problematic these practices were in the past, I contend that when properly adopted, the practices and procedures advocated by *FM 3-24*, and critiqued by Luttwark, can and have turned tactical victories ‘in the past’ into strategic success. The strategy adopted by the Free State during the Irish Civil War will be my case in point. The Clear-Hold- Build counterinsurgency operations conducted by the National Army will be renamed as Clear-Hold-ReBuild - because the Free State rebuilt the country after a decade of conflict. This will be the doctrinal framework through which I demonstrate how the tactical victories were converted into an overall strategic success for the pro-Treaty side during the civil war.

2.4 Classic Counterinsurgency Theory

An insurgency is a competition between insurgents and the government for the support of the civilian population. The population is “...the sea in which the insurgent swims” and the centre of gravity when it comes to fighting insurgencies.¹³² Another more commonly used name for an insurgency is guerrilla warfare. This is defined as tactics used by diminutive groups of

¹³⁰ Martin van Creveld, *The Changing Face of War: Combat from the Marne to Iraq*, (California, Ballantine, 2008), p. 268.

¹³¹ Gian Gentile, ‘Time for the deconstruction of FM 3-24’, *Joint Force Quarterly*, 58 (July 2010), available at: www.ndu.edu/press/deconstruction-3-24.html

¹³² Forward by John A. Nagl to David Galula *Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice* (Westport CT, Praeger Security International 1964, 2006), p. viii.

fighters' utilising surprise as a force multiplier to carry out ambushes, sabotage, and raids to harass and forage on the margins of large clashes of armies.¹³³

The term counterinsurgency has had many different names. Initially Small Wars doctrine was the commonly used term in the western hemisphere to describe the non-conventional warfare often associated with the colonial wars of the 19th and 20th Centuries.¹³⁴ The Anglo-Irish theorist C.E. Callwell defines Small Wars as "operations of regular armies against irregular, or comparatively speaking irregular forces."¹³⁵ As a form of warfare insurgencies have been labelled and relabelled many times, including such terminology as subversive warfare or revolutionary warfare. But primarily an insurgency differs fundamentally from conventional warfare in that victory is not expected from the clash of two armies on a field of battle.¹³⁶

As the 20th Century progressed and larger countries got more involved in unconventional warfare - Small Wars doctrine *a la* Callwell was updated to counter-revolutionary warfare and then to the more modern, population-centric counterinsurgency or COIN. The reason for the term counterinsurgency, and how it came into use by the American military in the late 1950s, was primarily because of the US Army's discomfort with the label used in the French and British armies: counter-revolutionary warfare.¹³⁷ By 1962, 'counter-revolutionary warfare' had been modernised, refined, and rebranded as 'counterinsurgency,' in part to eliminate the heroic 'revolutionary' subtext.¹³⁸

Counterinsurgency is a whole of government approach, tying in the varying strands of governance, rule of law, military action, economic development, and security. These strands must be coordinated and synchronised so as to ensure the most effective and efficient way to

¹³³ Porch, *Counterinsurgency Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War*, p.4.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ C.E. Calwell, *Small Wars: Their Principle and Practice* (Omaha, University of Nebraska Press, 1996), p. 21.

¹³⁶ Trinquier *Modern Warfare*, p. 5.

¹³⁷ Gentile, *Wrong Turn, America's Deadly Embrace of Counterinsurgency*, p.13.

¹³⁸ Porch *Counterinsurgency Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War*, p. 208.

defeat the insurgency. As Galula stated, “to let the military direct the entire process...is so dangerous that it must be resisted at all costs.”¹³⁹ However, at times the military are sometimes the only people available to conduct counterinsurgency operations. In an ideal world, military and civilian agencies should work together in a common strategy against the insurgency. However, an ideal world is never reflected in the scenarios faced by counterinsurgent forces. In its purest terms, counterinsurgency or COIN is a competition with the insurgent for the right to win the hearts, minds and acquiescence of the population.¹⁴⁰ Or as Porch puts it the “combined civic and psychological action programs to capture the ‘Hearts and Minds’ of indigenous populations.”¹⁴¹ This oft quoted and somewhat simplistic mantra does actually hold a vital element of truth. A truth that will be examined in detail throughout this chapter and subsequent chapters.

2.4.1 ‘Hearts and Minds’ Philosophy

Military action alone is not a solution and Porch contends that ‘Hearts and Minds’ was “formulated from contemporary counterinsurgency doctrine and the belief that military action provided the mechanism for the foundation for indigenous governance and social, political, and economic transformation of pivotal regions.”¹⁴² Gentile assesses that because of this ‘Hearts and Minds’ “has become the primary operational instrument in the [US] Army’s repertoire for dealing with insurgency and instability throughout the world.”¹⁴³

¹³⁹ Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, p.103.

¹⁴⁰ David Kilcullen, *Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency*. Military Review 86, 3 (May-Jun 2006), pp. 103-108.

¹⁴¹ Porch *Counterinsurgency Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War*, p. 155.

¹⁴² Ibid., p. 1.

¹⁴³ Gentile, *Wrong Turn, America’s Deadly Embrace of Counterinsurgency*, p.15.

So intricate is the perception of legitimacy and the interplay between the political and military actions that they cannot be tidily separated. On the contrary, every military move has to be weighed with regard to its political effects and vice versa.¹⁴⁴ Galula stresses this when he says that every military action is secondary to the political one, with its primary purpose being to afford the political power enough freedom to work safely with the population.¹⁴⁵ This freedom to work with the population is based on the degree of which the government is perceived to be legitimate by the population. Classic counterinsurgency theorists believe that the more legitimacy a government can obtain, the better its chances are of suppressing an insurgency. But legitimacy needs to be combined with perception because as the American theorist John Nagl states:

[The] attempted reinforcement of corrupt and ineffective host-nation governments are unfortunately and currently the stock in trade of modern counterinsurgency campaigns; effective governments regarded as legitimate by their population do not give rise to insurgencies in the first place.¹⁴⁶

Along with this legitimacy, the support and confidence of the population is vital in order to successfully defeat an insurgency. The counterinsurgent force needs to show competence that can be assisted by a convincing success as early as possible in order to demonstrate they have the will, the means, and the ability to win. This ability and means to win must be supported so that the counterinsurgent can equip themselves with a political program designed to take as much wind as possible out of the insurgent's sails.¹⁴⁷ The oxygen that an insurgent force needs to survive is a disenfranchised population. Unrest, uncertainty and discontentment allow insurgents to inflame the population. According to Galula, the counterinsurgent reaches a position of strength when his/her power is embodied in a political organisation firmly supported

¹⁴⁴ Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice*, p. 5.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 63.

¹⁴⁶ Nagl, *Knife Fights, A Memoir of Modern War in Theory and Practice*, p. 229.

¹⁴⁷ Galula *Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice*, p. 72.

by the population.¹⁴⁸ The British theorist Robert Thompson, states that the counterinsurgent force should concentrate on securing its base areas amongst the population first, in part through the pursuit of economic, political, educational, and infrastructure reforms to point up the benefits of supporting the incumbent power.¹⁴⁹ By doing this the population will not be treated as an enemy, but rather a prize whose support is to be coveted.¹⁵⁰

Kitson's water analogy advocates that in a counterinsurgency, the population represents the water in which the fish (the insurgent) swims. "But if the rod and net cannot succeed by themselves [to catch the fish] it may be necessary to do something to the water which will force the fish into a position where it can be caught."¹⁵¹ Isolating the insurgent from the population, forcing the insurgent to act indiscriminately and undermining the overall cause of the insurgency can be achieved amongst the local populations by actively patrolling, providing security along with economic assistance, bridges, schools, roads, and other elements of infrastructure, and finally 'Good Governance'.¹⁵² Thus, the rebuilding of social structures along with the provision of a secure way of life become the key components in a successful counterinsurgency campaign.

2.5 Revisionist Counterinsurgency Theory

There are a number of dissenting voices challenging classic counterinsurgency theorists. Included amongst these are Porch and Gentile. Likewise the American theorist Jacqueline

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 55.

¹⁴⁹ Robert Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam* (New York, Praeger, 1966), pp. 50-57.

¹⁵⁰ Galula *Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice*, p. 81.

¹⁵¹ Frank Kitson, *Low Intensity Operations: Subversions, Insurgency and Peacekeeping* (London, Faber & Faber, 1971), p. 49.

¹⁵² Gentile, *Wrong Turn, America's Deadly Embrace of Counterinsurgency*, p.2.

Hazelton and the revisionist side of the counterinsurgency debate also provide an alternative view point.¹⁵³ They agree with the basic assumption that counterinsurgency success requires ‘Good Governance’, greater sensitivity to civilian interests, more restrained uses of military power, and stronger support for civilian state building efforts because it is logical and appealing.¹⁵⁴ However, upon analysing various counterinsurgency campaigns conducted by western powers, the revisionists also believe the “story [to be] quite different.”¹⁵⁵ Hazelton argues that counterinsurgency success can be defined as the “marginalization of the insurgents to the point at which they are destroyed, co-opted, or reduced to irrelevance in numbers and capability.”¹⁵⁶ According to her, what succeeds in counterinsurgency is not just ‘Good Governance’ and ‘Hearts and Minds’. It is something

...uglier, costlier in lives, more remote from moral and ethical considerations, and far less ambitious than what western countries are attempting in trying to build and reform the political systems in so called weak states and ungoverned spaces.¹⁵⁷

She claims that successful counterinsurgency is “alliance building among elites within the state for the purpose of reducing the insurgent military threat to little more than annoyance.”¹⁵⁸ American theorist Paul Staniland supports this concept, arguing that the autonomy of insurgent groups is flexible and may enable them to change the portfolio of plausible policies that is available to states. He suggests the building blocks of political order and governance are found in these interactions [and alliances] between armed actors.¹⁵⁹

¹⁵³ Hazelton argues her thesis by examining a number of specific types of military intervention into internal conflicts: when a Great Power backs a client government facing an insurgency. Included in the case studies examined by Hazelton in *Bullets Not Ballots, Success in Counterinsurgency Warfare* are Malaya, Greece, Philippines, Dhofar, Oman, El Salvador and Turkey.

¹⁵⁴ Jacqueline L. Hazelton, *Bullets Not Ballots, Success in Counterinsurgency Warfare* (Ithaca and London, Cornell University Press, 2021), p. 147.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

¹⁵⁶ U.S. Government Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative, *U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2009), p.4.

¹⁵⁷ Hazelton, *Bullets Not Ballots, Success in Counterinsurgency Warfare*, p. 2.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 1.

¹⁵⁹ Paul Staniland, *Networks of Rebellion, Explaining Insurgent Cohesion and Collapse* (Ithaca and London, Cornell University Press), p. 223.

Hazelton states that a successful counterinsurgency is not a process of building a centralized, modern, liberal, democratic state. It is not a competition to govern with the people as the prize. Counterinsurgency is a “competition for power among armed groups. Successful counterinsurgency is one armed group coming to dominate the rest or the creation of greater order through the use of organised violence.”¹⁶⁰ Staniland agrees stating that armed groups can be incorporated into state structures, colluded with as armed political parties, tolerated below particular thresholds, or mobilized as allies for economic gain or against mutual enemies.¹⁶¹

The Greek political scientist Stathis Kalyvas adds to the discussion by arguing that violence in civil wars is not unilateral, but is produced by at least two political actors who enjoy partial and/or overlapping monopolies of violence. “Political actors use violence to achieve multiple overlapping and sometimes mutually contradictory goals.”¹⁶² Kalyvas further claims that unlike the unilateral production of violence, in some counterinsurgencies a more targeted approach on individuals can often shift their support, allegiances and resources to competing actors. This is possible because at least one actor intends to govern the population rather than to exterminate it.¹⁶³ Kalyvas stresses that although violence in civil war or counterinsurgencies may fulfil a variety of functions, “...the instrumental use of coercive violence to generate compliance constitutes a central aspect of the phenomenon.”¹⁶⁴ Coercion is present in standard definitions of state terror and some form of coercion is a necessary evil in order to influence or convince targeted individuals. Kalyvas cites a Spanish Inquisitor who in 1578 stated that; “we must remember that the main purpose of the trial and execution is not to save the soul of the accused but to achieve the public good and put fear into others.”¹⁶⁵ The British academic Mary

¹⁶⁰ Hazelton, *Bullets Not Ballots, Success in Counterinsurgency Warfare*, pp. 2-3.

¹⁶¹ Paul Staniland, “The State and Monopoly of Violence” unpublished Working Paper, University of Chicago, 2013; cited by Staniland, *Networks of Rebellion, Explaining Insurgent Cohesion and Collapse*, p. 6.

¹⁶² Stathis N. Kalyvas, “New” and “Old” Civil Wars, *A Valid Distinction* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001). p. 13.

¹⁶³ Stathis N. Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006), p.31

¹⁶⁴ Kalyvas, “New” and “Old” Civil Wars, *A Valid Distinction*, p. 28.

¹⁶⁵ Kamen 1998; cited by Stathis N. Kalyvas, “New” and “Old” Civil Wars, *A Valid Distinction*, p. 30.

Kaldor argues that counterinsurgency theory as articulated by the theorists, aims to capture ‘Hearts and Minds’, but that new warfare also borrows from counterinsurgency techniques of destabilisation aimed at sowing fear and hatred.¹⁶⁶ To support these assertions Hazelton rationalises a number of theories to reinforce her argument. She firstly picks apart the ‘Good Governance’ theory, advocating instead that what works best is her Compellence Theory, or perhaps a combination of both.

2.5.1 ‘Good Governance’ versus ‘Compellence’

American theorists Stephen Hosmer and Sybille Crane state that the ‘Good Governance’ theory is a list of requirements to defeat an insurgency. They espouse that the first to-do items on this list are “identify and redress the political, economic, military, and other issues fuelling the insurgency.”¹⁶⁷ By doing this they claim that you can undermine the cause of the insurgents and win over the neutral majority of the population.

American academic Nadia Schadlow agrees but argues for a combination of kinetic and non-kinetic actions, stating that “‘Good Governance’ tasks are not separate from conventional war” and recognises that both activities need to take place concurrently.¹⁶⁸ She agrees with the basis of classical counterinsurgency and ‘Good Governance’ but warns against vacuums and states that the US military must continue to fill ungoverned spaces with “governance operations – those political and military activities undertaken by military forces to establish and

¹⁶⁶ Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars, Organised Violence in a Global era* (Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press, 1999), p.8.

¹⁶⁷ Stephen T. Hosmer and Sybille O. Crane, *Counterinsurgency: A Symposium, April 16-20, 1962* (Santa Monica, CA, RAND, 1962), p. iv.

¹⁶⁸ Nadia Schadlow, *War and the Art of Governance: Consolidating combat success into Political Victory* (Washington, DC, Georgetown University Press, 2017), pp. 273-277.

institutionalize a desired political order during and following the combat phase of war.”¹⁶⁹ Therefore one of the priorities for ‘Good Governance’ is to fill the ungoverned spaces, preventing vacuums for insurgencies to flourish.

Hazelton identifies an insurgency as a problem created by the incomplete reconstruction of government, political system, economic system, and society. She argues the solution is state bureaucratization, economic development, and democratization to resolve popular grievances.¹⁷⁰ She admits that the ‘Good Governance’ approach underscores its casual logic vis-à-vis the populace. It typically means “economic growth, political representation, and efficient administration.”¹⁷¹ In her view, ‘Good Governance’ is necessary to defeat insurgency because she argues that it is bad governance that causes insurgency. But more pragmatically, Hazelton contends that counterinsurgency success is also about power, co-optation, building a coalition and crushing opposition, not just ‘Good Governance’.¹⁷² The lack of an institutional building process and development prevent or delay ‘Good Governance’ and are often the reason why nascent states very often end up fighting insurgencies or civil wars in the early years of their existence. Nagl explains that the institutions within these states play a major role in establishing peaceful relations both internally and externally, but that building them can take decades.¹⁷³ American theorist Andrew Radin concurs, and also posits that counterinsurgency and state-building need to be treated as two separate processes.¹⁷⁴

Following on from her tacit agreement with the need for ‘Good Governance’, whilst also acknowledging the need to fill ungoverned spaces, Hazelton proposes an alternative ‘Compellence Theory’ stating that there are two intervening variables involved in a

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

¹⁷⁰ Hazelton, *Bullets Not Ballots, Success in Counterinsurgency Warfare*, p. 9.

¹⁷¹ Ibid., p. 8.

¹⁷² Ibid., p. 149.

¹⁷³ Nagl, *Knife Fights, A Memoir of Modern War in Theory and Practice*, p. 195.

¹⁷⁴ Andrew Radin, *Institutional Building in Weak States: The Primacy of Local Politics*, (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2020).

counterinsurgency. One is political and the other is military.¹⁷⁵ Political is the use of threats and rewards to gain the cooperation of political and military leaders in exchange for information on the insurgency and populace. Military is to directly and indirectly destroy the insurgent's capability and will to continue the fight.¹⁷⁶

The 'Compellence Theory' firstly identifies armed and unarmed elites as the key actors in counterinsurgency, rather than the populace or the great power intervener. Second, the 'Compellence Theory' identifies the government's use of force against civilians as well as insurgents as an important factor in counterinsurgency success rather than a choice likely to doom the government's chance of success.¹⁷⁷ Hazelton uses American political scientist Robert Pape to support her case, citing that the direct military effort is an attrition campaign against the insurgency.¹⁷⁸ Similarly, British theorist Frank Ledwidge contends that all counterinsurgency operations are primarily hard-edged and exceedingly resource-intensive.¹⁷⁹

British academic Colin Gray also advocates for a form of repression but warns that half-hearted repression conducted by self-doubting persons of liberal conscience certainly does not work.¹⁸⁰ Ledwidge reasons that such force must be applied within a coherent and solid strategic framework, against the background of a clear realistic political context and firmly understood end-state.¹⁸¹ Theorist Andrew Bennett agrees, arguing that force must be targeted and military effort can utilise brute force to block the flow of resources to insurgents, often by using force to control civilians.¹⁸² Thus Hazelton's prescribed and recommended process involves what

¹⁷⁵ Hazelton, *Bullets Not Ballots, Success in Counterinsurgency Warfare*, p. 18.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid..

¹⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 5.

¹⁷⁸ Robert A. Pape, *Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War* (Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1996); cited Hazelton, *Bullets Not Ballots, Success in Counterinsurgency Warfare*, p. 18.

¹⁷⁹ Frank Ledwidge, *Loosing Small Wars, British Military Failures in the 9/11 Wars* (London and New Haven, Yale University Press, 2017), p. 186.

¹⁸⁰ Colin Gray, *Another Bloody Century*, (Sheffield, Phoenix Press, 2005), p. 222.

¹⁸¹ Ledwidge, *Loosing Small Wars, British Military Failures in the 9/11 Wars*, p. 186.

¹⁸² Andrew Bennett, "Process Tracing and Casual Inference," in *Rethinking Social Inquiry Diverse Tools, Shared Standards*, ed. Henry E. Brady and David Collier (Lanham, MD: P Rowman and Littlefield, 2010), p.209; cited by Hazelton, *Bullets Not Ballots, Success in Counterinsurgency Warfare*, p. 18.

theorist Thomas Schelling describes as “the use of compellence to break the insurgency as a fighting force and organization based on the threat, display, or application of force to change other actors’ behaviour.”¹⁸³

Understanding the process and outcomes of counterinsurgency matters in scholarly terms because according to Hazelton, her theory of counterinsurgent success extends our understanding of the functions of force. It identifies a political process involving ‘Hearts and Minds’ combined with targeted political concessions among elites, compellence, and brute force that attains the core political goal of survival for the challenged government.¹⁸⁴ British theorist David Benest goes as far as to completely undermine the ‘Hearts and Minds’ philosophy of the classic counterinsurgents by stating that coercion was the reality in most counterinsurgent campaigns, while ‘Hearts and Minds’ was the myth.¹⁸⁵

As a result of her deliberations on ‘Good Governance’ and ‘Compellence Theory’, Hazelton advocates the following three requirements for success. The first is the government’s relatively low-cost accommodation of elite domestic rivals – that is, political actors such as warlords and other armed actors, regional or cultural leaders, and traditional rulers to gain fighting power and information about the insurgency. The second requirement is the application of brute force to reduce the flow of resources to the insurgency, not only by controlling civilian behaviour with brute force. The third requirement is the direct application of force to break the insurgency’s will and capability to fight on.¹⁸⁶

These three elements represent a phased process in which the counterinsurgent government builds its strength and, as it does so, exerts its capabilities to directly and indirectly weaken the insurgency and remove the threat it poses to government survival.¹⁸⁷ Staniland

¹⁸³ Thomas Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1966), p.173.

¹⁸⁴ Hazelton, *Bullets Not Ballots, Success in Counterinsurgency Warfare*, p. 3.

¹⁸⁵ David Benest, ‘Aden to Northern Ireland’; cited by Ledwidge, *Loosing Small Wars, British Military Failures in the 9/11 Wars*, p. 175.

¹⁸⁶ Hazelton, *Bullets Not Ballots, Success in Counterinsurgency Warfare*, p. 5.

¹⁸⁷ Hazelton, *Bullets Not Ballots, Success in Counterinsurgency Warfare*, p. 5.

states that in addition to brutal violence and escalation, we see the emergence of deals, bargains and norms that make insurgents and other armed groups key players in political life.¹⁸⁸ According to Hazelton, insurgents and counterinsurgents do not engage in a competition to govern with the population as the prize. They are part of a competition for power amongst armed groups with conflicting political interests.¹⁸⁹ Herman Kraft supports Hazelton by demonstrating that counterinsurgency success is the first step in establishing a relatively stable political order, but it has both moral and human costs.¹⁹⁰

Hazelton concludes that the classical counterinsurgency theorists do not give enough credit to the military campaign: “It is not necessary to kill all the insurgents, or their political and military leaders. It is necessary to break their will to fight by showing them that they cannot attain their goals.”¹⁹¹ Thus success can be defined as the “marginalization of the insurgents to the point at which they are destroyed, co-opted, or reduced to irrelevance in numbers and capability.”¹⁹² Hazelton agrees that her findings are likely to be controversial because they challenge the conventional wisdom on counterinsurgency success.¹⁹³ Revisionism doesn’t represent the only alternative or dissenting voice within the counterinsurgency debate. A new form of scholarship, which was ironically written prior to Hazelton’s recent publication also plays a key part in assessing the assertions and outputs of the classical theorists on counterinsurgency.

¹⁸⁸ Paul Staniland, “States, Insurgents and Wartime Political Orders.” *Perspectives in Politics* 10, No.2 (2012); pp. 243-264.

¹⁸⁹ Hazelton, *Bullets Not Ballots, Success in Counterinsurgency Warfare*, p. 149.

¹⁹⁰ Herman Kraft, “The Philippines: The Weak State and the Global War on Terror”, *Kasarinlan* 18, nos. 1-2 (2003): 133-152.

¹⁹¹ Hazelton, *Bullets Not Ballots, Success in Counterinsurgency Warfare*, p. 149.

¹⁹² U.S. Government Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative, *U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide*, 4.).

¹⁹³ Hazelton, *Bullets Not Ballots, Success in Counterinsurgency Warfare*, p. 151.

2.6 New Scholarship on Counterinsurgency

What is meant by the term ‘new scholarship’? It is paradoxical that the form of scholarship by Eli Berman, Joseph Felter and Jacob Shapiro start off their thesis with an old reliable quote: “The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgement that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish the kind of war on which they are embarking.”¹⁹⁴ Berman et al., advocate the importance of knowing the war you want to prosecute from the start, and they state that in ‘asymmetric wars’ “...the struggle is fundamentally not over territory but over people – because the people hold critical information.” ... The ability of the stronger side to take advantage of information is very important “because holding territory is not enough to secure victory.”¹⁹⁵

Their new scholarship on counterinsurgency is founded on data metrics and case study analysis. Their detailed findings indicate that “quelling violence locally can open up opportunities for larger political bargains that did not exist when the insurgency was strong.”¹⁹⁶ Berman et al.’s prescription for successful counterinsurgency is to reduce violence in areas within a country experiencing internal conflict. The crux of their theory focuses on the provision of information useful for targeting insurgents and insurgent sites.¹⁹⁷ It assesses that civilians who feel sufficiently safe in government-held areas or who yearn for the goods and services that the government can provide, will divulge useful tactical information on the insurgents to the counterinsurgent force. The counterinsurgent will then have the opportunity

¹⁹⁴ Carl Von Clausewitz; cited by Eli Berman, Joseph H. Felter and Jacob Shapiro, *Small Wars, Big Data: The Information Revolution in Modern Conflict*, with Vestal McIntyre (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 2018), p. 1.

¹⁹⁵ Berman, Felter and Shapiro, *Small Wars, Big Data: The Information Revolution in Modern Conflict*, with Vestal McIntyre, p. 9.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid., pp. 16-17.

¹⁹⁷ Hazelton, *Bullets Not Ballots, Success in Counterinsurgency Warfare*, p. 11.

to use this information to target the insurgents, their leaders, their supplies, and their activities.¹⁹⁸

To encourage the population to impart useful information to the counterinsurgent force, the following conditions for analysis and data collection need to be considered and are set by Berman et al., as follows. Firstly, changes are required in the communications infrastructure in a society making it safer for citizens to pass on information. Secondly, governments can make citizens more willing to share critical information by doing a better job of delivering services, because doing so demonstrates the government can control the local space.¹⁹⁹

Thus the flow of information from non-combatants is a key element in asymmetric conflicts.²⁰⁰ But it needs to be understood that the population will only identify the insurgents in their midst if they can be certain that they will survive the experience.²⁰¹ Their ongoing safety is an important requirement in the information sharing nexus. Kalyvas reinforces how important this information is during irregular warfare; it is the link connecting one side's strength with the other side's weakness.²⁰² However, Kalyvas warns that not all the information provided by civilians may be accurate. He stresses that the counterinsurgent force needs to ensure the accuracy of the information "...in order to be able to target selectively, to distinguish [the insurgent] from among the sea of civilians... [but] there is significantly a great potential for abuse in such a system."²⁰³ The potential for abuse is substantial because an informant can provide inaccurate or accurate information for political gain or malicious reasons, hoping the counterinsurgent force will act on this information.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹⁹ Berman, Felter and Shapiro, *Small Wars, Big Data: The Information Revolution in Modern Conflict*, with Vestal McIntyre, p. 17.

²⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 18.

²⁰¹ Nagl, *Knife Fights, A Memoir of Modern War in Theory and Practice*, p. 130.

²⁰² Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*, p.174.

²⁰³ Ibid., p.209.

Underlining the importance of the new scholarship theory on information flowing from non-combatants, the classical theorist Galula states that the information offered by the civilian population will help to marginalise the insurgent force, and once this happens a certain sign and metric to measure that a breakthrough has occurred is when spontaneous intelligence increases sharply from the local popular.²⁰⁴ Nagl likewise states a key to success is massing intelligence derived from the local population to identify the enemy.²⁰⁵ Combined with massing intelligence, it is also important for the counterinsurgent force to undermine the cause of the insurgent force because as Ledwidge emphasises the cause motivating the rebels needs to be addressed.²⁰⁶

By undermining or rectifying the cause, the counterinsurgent force can win over the neutral majority of the population, those not on the margins. This is a key component to success for a government because in any situation, whatever the cause, there will be an active minority for the cause, a neutral majority, and an active minority against the cause.²⁰⁷ According to Gentile, within a population, a small minority is on the side of the counterinsurgent force, a small active minority as Galula calls it is strongly against it, but in the middle (not on the margins) is the rest of the population, those who are uncommitted to either side.²⁰⁸ Thus the uncommitted majority in the middle which has yet to be fully committed politically, is the key or decisive terrain in counterinsurgency operations. This section of the population needs to be targeted, informed and influenced, especially by stability operations and information

²⁰⁴ Galula *Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice*, p. 92.

²⁰⁵ Forward by John A. Nagl to David Galula *Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice* (Westport CT, Praeger Security International 1964, 2006), p. vii.

²⁰⁶ Frank Ledwidge, *Loosing Small Wars, British Military Failures in the 9/11 Wars* (London and New Haven, Yale University Press, 2017), p. 175.

²⁰⁷ David Galula *Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice* (Westport CT, Praeger Security International 1964, 2006), p. 53.

²⁰⁸ Gian Gentile, *Wrong Turn, America's Deadly Embrace of Counterinsurgency* (New York, The New Press, 2013), p. xvii.

operations.²⁰⁹ The winning over of the neutral population can be achieved by undermining and discrediting the insurgents cause. It can also be achieved by providing a better alternative to what the insurgent force wants to achieve. This preferable alternative is tritely achieved or summed up as good governance in all aspects, which prioritized schools, democratic transparency, self-help projects, and security provided by close cooperation of the police and the army.²¹⁰

Thus, it can be surmised that the new scholarship of Kalyvas, Berman et al., supported by classic theorists like Galula, argue that providing services in exchange for information on the insurgents can be a win-win situation. It is a desirable situation because it undermines the insurgent cause; influences the large uncommitted sections of society in the middle, and bolsters support for the government's counterinsurgent policy. Ultimately the population and society, especially those not on the margins, seeks stability and counterinsurgent forces acting on information from those not on the margins can provide the protection sought by the civilians and can 'win the village' as a support for future stability operations.²¹¹

However, government forces acting in a counterinsurgent role have to be careful that they do not get embroiled in century's old ethnic or tribal arguments/ violence. This was the case I witnessed in Mali while operating with an EU Training Mission in 2018. Malian Government forces supported the more settled Dogon people in central Mali, while jihadist groupings sided with the semi-nomadic Fulani herders. This tribal support from both sides in the Malian conflict led to inter-ethnic violence on a very large scale, with hundreds being killed on an annual basis.²¹² Kalyvas concurs when calling for critical approaches to locally-received

²⁰⁹ From the authors experience as a graduate of the Information Operations Course in the NATO School, Oberammergau, Germany.

²¹⁰ Robert Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam* (New York, Praeger, 1966), pp. 111-13.

²¹¹ Berman, Felner and Shapiro, *Small Wars, Big Data: The Information Revolution in Modern Conflict*, with Vestal McIntyre, pp. 304-305.

²¹² Authors experience as Irish Contingent Commander with the EU Training Mission, Mali 2018.

information during modern day counterinsurgencies because much of the “conflict within communities during a civil war involves private interests and quarrels, making information provided in this context profoundly suspect.”²¹³

2.7 Where do I stand – ‘A Better Good’?

Counterinsurgency doctrine is not just a simple solution, or one size fits all prescription to a standard problem. It is something much more complex which requires a myriad of solutions to the innumerable challenges created by an insurgency. These solutions will invariably have gaps and it is the ability to bridge these gaps that will bring overall success. As already stated, Berman et al. believe that the gap in current counterinsurgency doctrine is “how to convert local victories into an overall political victory or settlement?”²¹⁴ Hazelton describes the gap as how best to facilitate the sharper kinetic edge alongside a softer ‘Good Governance’ approach.²¹⁵

Solutions need to be conducive, complimentary and have the ability to run concurrently. They require a flexible approach; counterinsurgency doctrine must have the adjustability to fit the required problem. Doctrine does not always provide the prescribed solution, but it should provide the guidance on how to act and how to navigate a complex operational environment. Berman et al., warn that winning the village does not win the war. They question the transition to overall victory, stating that there remains a big difference between reducing violence locally and ultimately reaching a conflict-wide political settlement.²¹⁶ This study will demonstrate

²¹³ Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*, p. 253.

²¹⁴ Berman, Felter and Shapiro, *Small Wars, Big Data: The Information Revolution in Modern Conflict*, with Vestal McIntyre, p. 308.

²¹⁵ Hazelton, *Bullets Not Ballots, Success in Counterinsurgency Warfare*.

²¹⁶ Eli Berman, Joseph H. Felter and Jacob Shapiro, *Small Wars, Big Data: The Information Revolution in Modern Conflict*, with Vestal McIntyre (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 2018), p. 305.

where I stand in this particular counterinsurgency debate by using the counterinsurgency theory previously outlined as a filter, descriptor and compendium on how the actions of the National Army and Free State Government during the Irish Civil War facilitated the required transition, converting the local victories into overall success. The Free State achieved overall victory by utilising an all-inclusive approach and by adhering to the following guiding principles or themes as advocated by me in the following five subsections:

2.7.1 Combination of 'Good Governance' with 'Compellence'

As already described, Hazelton argues that what succeeds most in counterinsurgency is

...uglier, costlier in lives, more remote from moral and ethical considerations, and far less ambitious than what western countries are attempting in trying to build and reform the political systems in so called weak states and ungoverned spaces.²¹⁷

I agree that this succeeds - especially in the ungoverned spaces where I believe that there has to be a sharper edge. There has to be an element of realism and realistic actions to influence the situation, especially during the initial 'clear' or clearance and conventional phase of a counterinsurgency campaign. As already discussed, counterinsurgency success can be defined as the "marginalization of the insurgents to the point at which they are destroyed, co-opted, or reduced to irrelevance in numbers and capability."²¹⁸ Gray agrees stating government forces need to be steadfast in their conduct because half-hearted repression executed by self-doubting persons certainly does not work.²¹⁹ Ledwidge caveats repression and the use of force by arguing that such force must be applied within a coherent and solid strategic framework, against

²¹⁷ Hazelton, *Bullets Not Ballots, Success in Counterinsurgency Warfare*, p. 2.

²¹⁸ U.S. Government Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative, *U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2009), p.4.

²¹⁹ Gray, *Another Bloody Century*, p. 222.

the backdrop of a firmly understood end-state.²²⁰ It is this strategic framework that allows tactical victories to fit into an overall success. Clear-Hold-ReBuild is such a framework.

The clearance of the insurgents from key locations and the holding of key terrain are vital to countering an insurgent. But these clearance operations need to be supported by targeted actions, informed by useable intelligence provided by a population living in safe spaces. It is true that “dramatic effects can be achieved by making information sharing safer for civilians.”²²¹ From this information comes targeted kinetic operations and the avoidance of collateral damage. From these secure environments, from these governed spaces and from better living conditions the ‘build back better’ or the ReBuild should take priority. Thus success can be defined as the creation of a safe and secure environment and the “marginalization of the insurgents to the point at which they are destroyed, co-opted, or reduced to irrelevance in numbers and capability.”²²²

Accordingly, it should not be ‘Hearts and Minds’ versus kinetic actions, but rather, ‘Compellence’ needs to coincide and co-exist with ‘Good Governance’, hopefully on a reducing scale. Therefore, after the kinetic actions and requirements of directly targeting the insurgent subside, they no longer need to take priority and a ‘Better Good’ can be developed to prevent the insurgency from re-starting. This ability to rebuild is what makes a counterinsurgency campaign sustainable, flexible and an overall success. It is the build back better after the initial ‘Clear’ and ‘Hold’ operations that counters the prolonged warfare of the insurgent and makes a counterinsurgency campaign sustainable and helps to achieve strategic successes.

But this ‘Better Good’ still needs a constant edge, as advocated by Hazelton, Gray and Ledwidge, to be sustainable, protected and accepted by the local population. Berman et al.

²²⁰ Ledwidge, *Loosing Small Wars, British Military Failures in the 9/11 Wars*, p. 186.

²²¹ Berman, Felter and Shapiro, *Small Wars, Big Data: The Information Revolution in Modern Conflict*, with Vestal McIntyre, p. 321.

²²² U.S. Government Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative, *U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide*, 4.).

convincingly argue that the main task for the military is to provide local-level security and the critical space for follow-on developments and governance efforts. Winning the ‘Hearts and Minds’ of the local population over the long-term requires a complimentary process, that convinces the population that supporting the government is a more attractive option than supporting the insurgency.²²³ As mentioned before, Berman et al. call this the gap in current doctrine “... how to convert local victories into an overall political victory or settlement? How to facilitate the sharper kinetic edge or ‘Compellence’, alongside a softer ‘Good Governance’ approach? How to sustain the initial tactical successes?”²²⁴ Schadlow posits that ‘Good Governance’ and ‘Compellence’ or kinetic operations need to take place concurrently.²²⁵ The priority is to fill the ungoverned spaces, preventing vacuums in which insurgencies flourish. This can be achieved by a combination of for ‘Good Governance’ and kinetic operations.²²⁶

The difference between what it takes to win a village and what it takes to win a war strategically matters greatly, yet it is little understood and scarcely acknowledged in policy debates. How does winning the village really help in the greater scheme of things? Simply put, the quelling of violence locally can create opportunities for longer political bargains that did not exist when the insurgency was strong. Mainly local successes can reduce violence to a level society can tolerate. Secondly, local victories may open up political opportunities to settle underlying issues contributing to the conflict – opportunities that don’t exist when the fighting is raging.²²⁷ Finally, local victories fill the ungoverned spaces, facilitating political and military

²²³ Berman, Felter and Shapiro, *Small Wars, Big Data: The Information Revolution in Modern Conflict*, with Vestal McIntyre, p. 305.

²²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 308.

²²⁵ Schadlow, *War and the Art of Governance: Consolidating combat success into Political Victory*, pp. 273-277.

²²⁶ *Ibid.*

²²⁷ Berman, Felter and Shapiro, *Small Wars, Big Data: The Information Revolution in Modern Conflict*, with Vestal McIntyre, p. 309.

activities to establish a desired political order during and following the combat phase of war.”²²⁸

But local victories need to be sustained by a rebuilding and a recognisable improvement to a safe and secure environment. A sense of realistic expectations, sustainability and rebuilding need to be included in a counterinsurgency plan. The government do not need to win over the broad mass of the population. The people who matter are the ones on the margins.²²⁹ The population on the margins, that can be the neutral majority that want peace and security – they are the target audience for a ‘Better Good’, for the rebuild.

2.7.2 *Undermine the Insurgent Causes*

One of the principal goals of an insurgency should be to restrict the freedom of movement of the counterinsurgent forces and to isolate the population from the established power and its security forces. Insurgencies are political events possessing an underlying cause. They are carried out with violence to achieve strategic goals, because it is on the political and strategic level, not the tactical, that counterinsurgencies are won or lost.²³⁰ A common cause prolongs a conflict and acts as a unifying ‘call to arms’. This cause will provide the political and financial capital to sustain the insurgency and undermines the legitimacy of the government. This cause, when combined with police and administrative weaknesses in the counterinsurgent camp, a not-too-hostile geographic environment, and outside support, are the conditions for a successful insurgency.²³¹ As Galula further elaborates, this cause must also last, if not for the

²²⁸ Schadow, *War and the Art of Governance: Consolidating combat success into Political Victory*, pp. 273-277.

²²⁹ Berman, Felter and Shapiro, *Small Wars, Big Data: The Information Revolution in Modern Conflict*, with Vestal McIntyre, p. 321.

²³⁰ Porch *Counterinsurgency Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War*, p. 320.

²³¹ Galula *Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice*, p. 28.

duration of the revolutionary war, at least until the insurgent movement is well on its feet. This differentiates a strategic cause from a tactical one.²³² Strategic causes normally result in strategic successes for the insurgent. Similarly local causes lead to local successes.

As a result a key factor in strategic success for the counterinsurgent forces is to deprive the insurgent of a good cause which unifies the insurgency. As Ledwidge emphasises “the cause motivating the rebels needs to be addressed.”²³³ In any situation, whatever the cause, there will be an active minority for the cause, a neutral majority, and an active minority against the cause.²³⁴ Gentile agrees and elaborates stating that within a population, a small minority is on the side of the counterinsurgent force, a small active minority as Galula calls it is strongly against it, but in the middle is the rest of the population, those who are uncommitted to either side.²³⁵ The winning over of the neutral population or active minority can tritely be achieved by ‘Good Governance’ in all aspects, education; democratic transparency; restoration of essential services and the security provided by close cooperation of the police and the army.²³⁶ The uncommitted majority is key in this regard and in counterinsurgency operations this grouping needs to be targeted, especially by Information Operations.²³⁷ The winning over of the neutral majority will be achieved by building back better the essential services and infrastructure of a country, especially after years of conflict and neglect.

Therefore at the heart of any counterinsurgency campaign lies one basic requirement according to Crawshaw. This requirement is simply to undermine the insurgent cause by offering a better alternative and by allowing “the population of the territory concerned [to] form

²³² Ibid., p.13.

²³³ Ledwidge, *Loosing Small Wars, British Military Failures in the 9/11 Wars*, p. 175.

²³⁴ Galula *Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice*, p. 53.

²³⁵ Gentile, *Wrong Turn, America’s Deadly Embrace of Counterinsurgency*, p. xvii.

²³⁶ Robert Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam* (New York, Praeger, 1966), pp. 111-13.

²³⁷ From the authors experience as a graduate of the Information Operations Course in the NATO School, Oberammergau, Germany.

the perception that the government offers a better deal than the insurgents.”²³⁸ Since Mao proclaimed that it was the insurgent fish that swam in the sea of the local population and gained support and protection from them, counterinsurgency theory had as its basic guiding principle that the population had to be won over to the counterinsurgent side.²³⁹ Ultimately, the key terrain in an insurgency can be secured by being an adaptive learning organisation that can operate with flexibility because this key space is not a physical space, but the political loyalty of the people who inhabit that space.²⁴⁰

2.7.3 Use of Local and Specialised Forces against Insurgent Networks

As already stated, information, is a key enabler in counterinsurgency warfare. How you obtain this information and how you act on it are essential during a successful campaign. Berman et al., using examples from counterinsurgency operations in Chechnya and the Philippines outline the benefits of obtaining information and the advantages of using local forces in counterinsurgency operations and in particular sweep and search operations. They cite evidence from data to indicate that the number of insurgent attacks drop when local forces were used compared to the deployment of outside forces.²⁴¹ Additionally, Berman et al. state that that when these local forces are supported by specialised intelligence forces who help plan and prepare raids and sweeps, “...over three times more rebels were apprehended and over 50 percent more rebel firearms recovered.”²⁴² These substantial gains are produced because

²³⁸ Michael Crawshaw, ‘The evolution of British COIN’, MOD JDP 3-40, paragraph 1; cited by Frank Ledwidge *Loosing Small Wars, British Military Failure in the 9/11 Wars*, (London, Yale University Press), p. 187.

²³⁹ Gentile, *Wrong Turn, America’s Deadly Embrace of Counterinsurgency*, p.16.

²⁴⁰ Forward by Nagl to Galula *Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice*, p. ix.

²⁴¹ Berman, Felter and Shapiro, *Small Wars, Big Data: The Information Revolution in Modern Conflict*, with Vestal McIntyre, p. 27.

²⁴² Berman, Felter and Shapiro, *Small Wars, Big Data: The Information Revolution in Modern Conflict*, with Vestal McIntyre, p. 273.

“locally recruited and employed units had preferential access to information since they were operating in areas where they lived and among populations they knew intimately.”²⁴³

Felter, from his extensive research and practical experiences, outlines the advantages that local forces provide to obtain information from the civilian population and how to use it in breaking down insurgent networks. Felter claims that this form of collaboration between local troops and specialised units allows for the following capabilities:

[1] “Superior small unit level leadership who can accurately assess and respond to ever changing local conditions; [2] troops with high quality training emphasising tactical readiness; and [3] doctrine and command and control measures that facilitate rapid adaption and innovation, and the application of flexible responses and tactics.”²⁴⁴

The American theorist John Arquilla in an interview advocates that a central counterinsurgency concept is the need to understand how networks fight.²⁴⁵ The organisation of an insurgent network is crucial to its effectiveness. As Huntington argues, “numbers, weapons, and strategy all count in war, but major deficiencies in any one of those may still be counterbalanced by superior cohesion and discipline.”²⁴⁶ Integrated and cohesive insurgent organisations are characterised by leadership, unity and discipline at the centre and high levels of local compliance on the ground.²⁴⁷ These integrated networks are effective militarily and resilient in the face of pressure from counterinsurgent forces. These groups are not necessarily widely popular or ultimately victorious, but their organisational cohesion makes them major political and military relevant.²⁴⁸ Porch agrees with this fact, stating “successful insurgencies

²⁴³ Ibid., p. 273.

²⁴⁴ Joseph H. Felter, “Sources of Military Effectiveness in Counterinsurgency; Evidence from the Philippines,” in *The Swords Other Edge; Trade-offs in the Pursuit of Military Effectiveness*; ed. Daniel Reiter (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2017).

²⁴⁵ Michael Few, “Interview with Dr. John Arquilla: How Can French Encounters with Irregular Warfare in the 19th Century Inform COIN in our Time?” *Small Wars Journal* (November 30, 2010), <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/608-arquilla.pdf> : Cited by Porch *Counterinsurgency Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War*, pp. 4-5.

²⁴⁶ Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven CT, Yale University Press, 1968), p. 23.

²⁴⁷ Staniland, *Networks of Rebellion, Explaining Insurgent Cohesion and Collapse*, p. 6.

²⁴⁸ Ibid.

evolve resiliency through ideological commitment that rises above clan or tribe and the organizational capacity and popular stamina to engage in protracted war.”²⁴⁹

Insurgent networks are more often driven by local issues and alliances, which makes them particularly vulnerable to local forces. These local forces have a better understanding of what is required on the ground and the particular cause of an insurrection in a particular area. Local forces, supported by specialised units have a better understanding of how the insurgent networks recruit, operate, sustain themselves and where they operate. Local forces also have a better understanding of the social networks, family relationships and local culture both obvious and ingrained within the insurgent network. Performances in combat by insurgent networks have often led to an erroneous inference that rebels are highly dedicated to an ideological cause, rather than engaged local disputes and associations. However numerous studies, according to Grossman, have concluded that men in combat are usually motivated by group pressures and processes involving regard for their comrades, respect for their leaders, concern for their own reputation with both, and an urge to contribute to the success of the group.²⁵⁰ Grossman posits that usually, the processes of training are rooted in network dynamics.²⁵¹ Hart states that during the Irish War of Independence and Irish Civil War, the most important bonds holding volunteers together were those of family and neighbourhood. Indeed, IRA companies were very often founded upon such networks. Judging by the recollections of Cork veterans, the Treaty itself and Republican ideology were rarely discussed within their ranks. The politics of it was second place at times. Most couched their decisions in the same collective terms they used to describe their joining the organisation.²⁵²

Staniland warns against the creation of generic doctrine to counter insurgent networks. He states the resources devoted to the creation and operation of counterinsurgency doctrine has

²⁴⁹ Porch *Counterinsurgency Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War*, p. 161.

²⁵⁰ Grossman, *On Killing; The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society*, pp. 89-90.

²⁵¹ Ibid.

²⁵² Hart, *The IRA and Its Enemies: Violence and Community in Cork, 1916-1923*, pp. 209, 264.

made for good publicity, but the actual success of this doctrinal approach varied greatly across and within these wars.²⁵³ The Taliban in Afghanistan has a different set of linkages to society than Al-Qaeda in Iraq. More broadly, counterinsurgency approaches should be adapted to the nature of the adversary.²⁵⁴ As recent history shows, no matter how good your doctrine is, it needs to be universally practiced by all participants in the counterinsurgency campaign and it cannot be subject to time constraints imposed for political gain. The use of local forces enables key information on insurgent networks and it facilitates coherent actions at the tactical level. The strategic level generic doctrine can be interpreted as required by local forces, adapting the overarching guidance to what is required in the towns and villages.

2.7.4 Requirement to be an Adaptive Learning Organisation

Nagl states that a successful counterinsurgency force needs to be “...centred on the need to build adaptive learning organizations to succeed in counterinsurgency campaigns.”²⁵⁵ Once the particular elements of a counterinsurgency campaign have been decided upon, they must not be set in stone. Flexibility and learning are key tenants to effectively counter an insurgency. Being an adaptive learning organisation can help facilitate the co-existence of ‘Compellence’ and ‘Good Governance’, and also plan to sustain operations effectively. Common sense, flexibility and education recognise how these important factors in counterinsurgency can co-exist.

As a result of wartime experiences, adaptive military organisations “...must be able to react positively to the unexpected, adjusting their methods of operation rapidly to the

²⁵³ Staniland, *Networks of Rebellion, Explaining Insurgent Cohesion and Collapse*, p. 229.

²⁵⁴ Ibid.

²⁵⁵ Nagl, *Knife Fights, A Memoir of Modern War in Theory and Practice*.

circumstances actually prevailing.”²⁵⁶ Success in a counterinsurgency campaign is not achieved by using a generic solution to an ever-changing problem. Victory is gained through a tempo of adaptation that the opponent cannot match. Therefore, counterinsurgents should seek to sustain advantages over insurgents by emphasizing learning and adaptation.²⁵⁷ “Learning is also demonstrated in... the structure of military organizations, in the creation of new organizations to deal with new or changed situations, and in the myriad other institutional responses to change.”²⁵⁸ Adaptive learning organisations can react and change in order to rectify setbacks and to exploit opportunities. Conventional military forces have historically struggled with the need to adapt and to defeat insurgencies. Nagl states that those that succeeded did so because they were adaptive learning organisations.²⁵⁹ Transitioning from the kinetic actions associated with conventional or clearance operations to the non-kinetic actions associated with a ‘Hold’ or ‘Build’ campaign requires a military force to be flexible and adaptive. Military organisations need to have the ability to transition effectively and efficiently between kinetic combat warfighting to conduct humanitarian, peacekeeping/stabilization operations. These operations can happen concurrently depending on the area of operation the troops are deployed.²⁶⁰ Flexibility, doctrine, local knowledge and a military education allows a military force to transition within a complex environment. Being an adaptive learning organisation, provides the military force a key combat multiplier, giving the counterinsurgent force a marked advantage.

A liberal dose of humility in counterinsurgency operations is essential, to learn from the experience of others.²⁶¹ We can learn from previous conflicts, but history does not repeat

²⁵⁶ Army Code 71451, *Design for Operations: The British Military Doctrine* (1989), p. vii.

²⁵⁷ US Army Field Manual 3-24. Counterinsurgency (December 2006), 5-31.

²⁵⁸ John Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2005).

²⁵⁹ Nagl, *Knife Fights, A Memoir of Modern War in Theory and Practice*, p. 116.

²⁶⁰ Doctor A. Walter Dorn and Michael Vare, The Rise and Demise of the “Three Block War” in <http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vol10/no1/doc/07-dornvarey-eng.pdf>. Accessed 10 March 2022.

²⁶¹ David Benest, “Aden to Northern Ireland”; cited by Frank Ledwidge *Loosing Small Wars, British Military Failure in the 9/11 Wars*, (London, Yale University Press), p. 180.

itself. However prepared, trained, and indoctrinated the counterinsurgent forces may be, reality will always differ from theory. Mistakes are bound to happen, but it would be inexcusable not to learn from them.²⁶² These mistakes need to be documented, learnt from, and inscribed rather than forgotten. Counterinsurgency doctrine, like all doctrine, needs to be constantly updated by lessons learned and should be used as an overarching guidance. The one generic solution to all problems is not applicable when dealing with an insurgency.

2.7.5 Fostering Trust with the Population – The Information Sharing Nexus

Protracted warfare should be the goal of insurgent organisations because a vulnerable resource to opposition forces is time. Trinquier states, “the goal of the guerrilla, during what can be a long period of time, is not so much to obtain local successes as to prolong the campaign... it is to create a climate of insecurity, compel the forces of order to retire into their most easily defensible areas.”²⁶³

To succeed in a counterinsurgency environment, the military needs to emphasize intelligence; focus on the population, its needs, and its security; establish and expand secure areas; avoid a concentration of military forces in large bases for protection; or overemphasize killing or capturing the enemy rather than engaging the populace.²⁶⁴ When forces are scattered amongst (and living with) the population, they need not be told any longer how to win its support. Being more vulnerable, they realize instinctively that their own safety depends on good relations with the local people.²⁶⁵ Security cannot be provided from large, isolated bases, or just during daylight hours. Troops must live among the population and give it protection

²⁶² Galula *Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice*, p. 73.

²⁶³ Trinquier *Modern Warfare*, p. 45.

²⁶⁴ Nagl, *Knife Fights, A Memoir of Modern War in Theory and Practice*, p. 117.

²⁶⁵ Galula *Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice*, p. 85.

until the population is able to protect itself with a minimum of outside support.²⁶⁶ Civilians who feel sufficiently safe in government-held areas or who desire for government-supplied services and commerce, will provide useful tactical information that can be used to target the insurgents, their leaders, and their supplies.²⁶⁷ It needs to be understood that the population will only provide this useful information once security is assured.²⁶⁸

By directly living amongst the population, security forces build a mutual trust with the population that helps to achieve security for both parties.²⁶⁹ Providing this all-round security also helps to separate the population from the insurgents and the underlying causes of the conflict. This is the indirect approach to defeating an insurgency. It is achieved by removing the support insurgents require to challenge the government effectively. This approach is rather different from the direct approach and in the long term is usually more effective.²⁷⁰

To be successful, counterinsurgency operations require the unconditional support of the populace. This support must be maintained at any price.²⁷¹ The counterinsurgent force needs to adopt a better Presence Posture and Profile, reassuring and protecting the local population. Thus, the battle for the population is a major battlefield of the revolutionary war.²⁷² Counterinsurgent forces should not commute to work, but rather, those forces embedded living amongst the local population become intelligence collectors and analysts – and thus the keys to overall victory. They are the holders and builders.²⁷³

²⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 57.

²⁶⁷ Hazelton, *Bullets Not Ballots, Success in Counterinsurgency Warfare*, p. 11.

²⁶⁸ Nagl, *Knife Fights, A Memoir of Modern War in Theory and Practice*, p. 130.

²⁶⁹ As a young 22-year-old Platoon Commander, living in the villages of South Lebanon in the 1990s, I had regular meetings with the local Mayors and Mukhtars as to the ongoing security and welfare of the local inhabitants.

²⁷⁰ Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam*, p. 28.

²⁷¹ Trinquier *Modern Warfare*, p. 17.

²⁷² Galula *Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice*, p. 4.

²⁷³ Forward by Nagl to Galula *Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice*, p. ix.

2.8 Counterinsurgency Theory Summary

Insurgencies and civil wars often bring out widespread suffering, but they also bring out significant tactical and strategic innovation. The Irish Civil War is no exception. The young military leadership of the fledgling National Army raised a substantial army in a short period of time while planning and conducting a very effective military campaign. This campaign will now be reviewed in detail in the subsequent chapters using primary source material combined with modern military doctrine.

A successful counterinsurgency campaign is not just a military campaign, it embodies the military with a more comprehensive civilian approach. The restoration of essential services and enabling a sense of security amongst the population are key facets for success. The legitimacy of the government and support of the population are key to help defeat an insurgency. The military aspect is not always the main effort. The ‘soft’ humanitarian efforts that are implemented to win the ‘Hearts and Minds’ of the population and isolate the insurgents from their support base, are important; more recent theorists suggest they also need to be augmented by ‘hard’ kinetic power, if necessary. The military suppression of an insurgency will not work without government legitimacy, without a functioning and non-corrupt police force, and without an adaptable military force.

Successful counterinsurgency requires a doctrine.²⁷⁴ Inherent in this doctrine is the realisation that the cause or narrative of the insurgent needs to be targeted by a more sustainable and publicly acceptable counter-cause. This counter-cause needs to be a better one than offered by the insurgent or a ‘Better Good’. *FM 3-24: Counterinsurgency* borrowed extensively from classical counterinsurgent theorists and experiences. It advocated a Clear-Hold-Build framework incorporating the key counterinsurgent features of establishing a host nation army,

²⁷⁴ Porch *Counterinsurgency Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War*, p. 178.

civil security, civil control and the restoration of essential services.²⁷⁵ Newer theorists, advocate and promote the importance of using local forces, attacking insurgent networks, information sharing and being an adaptive learning organisation.

FM 3-24 as a doctrinal guidance allowed for the synchronisation of military and civilian activities in order to counter an insurgency. This synchronisation was inherent in the strategy of the National Army during the Irish Civil War, facilitating flexibility, compellence and collaboration that allowed the initial tactical victories to be converted into overall success. In short, the Irish Free State Government utilised a modern doctrine, not yet written at the time, into the successful campaign it prosecuted against the anti-Treaty IRA.

²⁷⁵ FM 3-24. *Counterinsurgency*, December 2006.

GENERATE

Generate - The three pillars of Force Generation are: manning, training, and equipping. These three elements feed directly into the readiness of a state to secure its territorial integrity, and also engage in proficient combat operations.²⁷⁶

²⁷⁶ STAND-TO! – [US] Army Readiness Guidance. US Army Website.
http://www.army.mil/standto/archive_2016-05-19.htm accessed 24 April 2018.

Chapter Three - The Establishment of the National Army

*A standing army is necessary for Ireland, the absence of it has been the cause of all her misfortunes for 700 years. There is no safety for any country unable to defend itself.*²⁷⁷

-Colonel Maurice Moore to IRA Chief of Staff Richard Mulcahy, January 1921.

3.1 Introduction to Generate

Article 8 of the 1921 Anglo Irish Treaty permitted the new Irish Free State to raise a standing National Army. For the first time in over seven hundred years, Ireland had the right to raise its own Defence Forces and defend its territorial integrity:

Article 8. With a view to securing the observance of the principal and international limitations of armaments, if the government of the Irish Free State establishes and maintains a military defence force, the establishment thereof shall not exceed in size such proportion of the military establishments maintained in Great Britain as that which the population of Ireland bears to the population of Great Britain.²⁷⁸

Compared to what had been previously conceded in earlier negotiations in either the 1914 Home Rule Act or the 1920 Act of Ireland, this concession was momentous.²⁷⁹ To fully grasp this opportunity and secure the country, the Free State needed to quickly build an effective Defence Force. Valiulis, states that the initial steps in the force generation of a Free State or henceforth to be known as National Army were taken when General Headquarters (GHQ) of the IRA “began to raise, train and equip an army ... through the recruitment of an original nucleus of 4,000 men.”²⁸⁰ Normally this complex process takes a substantial amount of time and money by which a “military force resources the personnel and equipment needed to carry

²⁷⁷ Letter from Colonel Moore to Chief of Staff IRA, 12 January 1922, Mulcahy Papers, P7 A/56, UCDA.

²⁷⁸ John Duggan, *A History of the Irish Army*, (Dublin, Gill and MacMillan, 1991), p. 121.

²⁷⁹ Ibid.

²⁸⁰ Maryann Gialanella Valiulis, *Almost a Rebellion: The Irish Army Mutiny of 1924*(Cambridge, University Press 1992), p.23-24.

out approved operations and missions.”²⁸¹ However the Free State did not have time because circumstances and an impending war dictated that its leaders had to act quickly to create a robust army to defend the Treaty and “to take control of the territory of the new state.”²⁸²

The three pillars of force generation are: manning, training, and equipping. These three elements feed directly into the readiness of a state to secure its territorial integrity, and also engage in proficient combat operations.²⁸³ The British Government, realising the importance of a functioning Defence Forces in the Irish Free State, wanted to ensure that these three pillars were achieved. As a result; it acted as a guarantor to the efficiency of the new Irish National Army.

3.2 Aim of Chapter

This chapter argues that the existence of the Free State and National Army was guaranteed by British direct support of weapons and equipment and its indirect support of available trained manpower. The Free State needed to generate, man, train and equip a standing army in a very limited time and space. To short-cut a normally elongated process, the National Army used local Irish soldiers which included former British Army soldiers from World War I who were originally recruited in Ireland. This chapter outlines why and how these veterans formed the cadre force for the new National Army. Secondly it will show how these veterans provided the leadership, weapons expertise and training mainstay to the fledgling Irish Army. Finally the chapter will examine how the new force was directly equipped with weapons, ammunition and

²⁸¹ Troop Contributions. NATO website. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50316.htm accessed 23 October 2017.

²⁸² Tom Garvin, *The Birth of Irish Democracy* (Dublin, Gill and Macmillan 2nd ed., 2005), pp 122-123.

²⁸³ STAND-TO! – [US] Army Readiness Guidance. US Army Website. http://www.army.mil/standto/archive_2016-05-19.htm accessed 24 April 2018.

logistical supplies by the British Government. This support undoubtedly established and maintained the National Army as an effective fighting force.

3.3 Why the British Supported the Irish National Army

*Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them.*²⁸⁴

-T.E. Lawrence.

Exorbitant financial implications and war weariness, reduced the chances of British military re-intervention in Irish affairs without strong political support in Britain. Ireland had been offered Dominion status because elite public opinion in Britain determined the government's controversial counterinsurgency tactics in Ireland, were not successful and undermined its good name abroad, especially in the United States.²⁸⁵ Towards the end of the Anglo-Irish War, public opinion in Britain had been turned sour by the activities of the British security services. Porch states that the British newspapers were filled with stories of the 'Black and Tans' and 'Auxiliary' para-military forces excesses, which deepened the feeling that London had lost control of its forces in Ireland. American and British Commonwealth public opinion condemned British actions and caused Prime Minister David Lloyd George to fear the unravelling of the Empire.²⁸⁶ For its part, General Sir Neville Macready, was also horrified at the excesses of the Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC) especially their Auxiliary Division and so reduced contact with them to a minimum.²⁸⁷

²⁸⁴ Malcolm Brown, *T.E. Lawrence in War & Peace, An Anthology of the Military Writings of Lawrence of Arabia* (London, Greenhill Books, 2005), p. 54.

²⁸⁵ D.G. Boyce, *Englishmen and the Irish Troubles: British Public Opinion and the Making of Irish Policy 1918-22* (Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1972), p. 99.

²⁸⁶ Porch *Counterinsurgency Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War*, p. 118.

²⁸⁷ Hew Strachan, *The Politics of the British Army*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997). pp. 165-166.

Compared to the turmoil consuming Ireland, the Treaty was an outstanding success for the British government and enjoyed favourable public support. According to McColgan the agreement was so overwhelmingly accepted in Britain that the Irish question could now be regarded as closed.²⁸⁸ However the British Government still feared the residual effects from those IRA volunteers who opposed the Treaty and considered them a significant threat to the new Irish Free State, the Anglo-Irish Protestant community still living in Ireland, and to the new Northern Ireland state. The British Government would not countenance these continued threats from IRA forces and Lloyd George expressed his concerns to Michael Collins in a letter dated 23 June 1922:

Other information has reached His Majesty's Government showing that active preparations are on foot among the irregular elements of the IRA to resume attacks upon the lives and property of British subjects both in England and Ulster. The ambiguous position of the Irish Republican Army can no longer be ignored by the British Government.²⁸⁹

More detailed information on the exact numbers of weapons and equipment handed over by the British to the Free State will be covered later in this chapter. Suffice to say, Lloyd George adopted a pragmatic approach to protecting British interests in Ireland by subduing the IRA threat. Along with Winston Churchill, his Secretary of State for the Colonies, he actively but quietly equipped and indirectly manned and trained the Irish National Army.²⁹⁰ The British establishment deployed a hybrid strategy similar to that applied by T.E. Lawrence in Arabia during the Arab Revolt of World War I. To paraphrase Lawrence – with the British Army withdrawing it was better that the Irish do it tolerably instead, but with British support.²⁹¹ There

²⁸⁸ McColgan, *British Policy and the Irish Administration 1920-22*, p. 90.

²⁸⁹ Lloyd George to Collins, 23 June 1922, Parliamentary Archives Westminster, Lloyd George Papers, F/10/6/4, PAW.

²⁹⁰ Indirectly Manning and Training refers to British Army veterans of Irish decent who populated the new National Army, giving it the requisite leadership and experience needed. The British did not have direct control over this but British organisations like the British Legion certainly supported this endeavour as will be discussed later in this chapter.

²⁹¹ Brown, *T.E. Lawrence in War & Peace, An Anthology of the Military Writings of Lawrence of Arabia*, p. 54.

was also the pragmatic advantage, according to Ferriter, that Churchill did not want the Provisional Government ordering weapons and ammunition from elsewhere.²⁹²

Churchill did not want the Irish fostering security arrangements with other countries, nor did he want to create a security vacuum following the withdrawal of British forces from Free State territory. The British understood the need for a coherent Irish National Army to support the British exit strategy. According to the theorist John Nagl, the best form of an exit strategy in a counterinsurgency campaign, is the strengthening and supporting of the capabilities of the host nation security forces left behind.²⁹³ In accordance with this sentiment Churchill stated:

We shall certainly not be able to withdraw our troops from their present positions until we know that the Irish people are going to stand by the Treaty, neither shall we be able to refrain from stating the consequences which would follow the setting up of a republic.²⁹⁴

The British Government believed that British-backed Irish troops was the most acceptable solution. Beyond the political benefits, Irish soldiers had other advantages compared to young British Army soldiers who had previously fought against the IRA during the War of Independence, because “...for the purpose of understanding the strategic environment [in Ireland] through cultural and linguistic awareness...[they] might as well have been in Nepal.”²⁹⁵ The situational awareness of local Irish soldiers would be a significant force multiplier during the Free State counterinsurgency campaign, especially in intelligence, information engagement, negotiations and targeting. They understood the operational environment far better than foreign troops, and could provide excellent human intelligence.²⁹⁶

²⁹² The National Archives Colonial Office 739/6, Irish Free State 1922, vol.6, note from Colonial Office, 20th July 1922; cited by Ferriter, *Between Two Hells, The Irish Civil War*, p. 48.

²⁹³ Nagl, *Knife Fights, A Memoir of Modern War In Theory and Practice*, p.177.

²⁹⁴ Churchill to Under Secretary Cope, April 1922, (Parliamentary Archives Westminster, Lloyd George Papers, F/10/2/67d), PAW.

²⁹⁵ Porch, *Counterinsurgency: Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War*, p. 114.

²⁹⁶ US Army, FM 3-24.3, *Tactics in Counterinsurgency* (2009).

Churchill understood that the moral costs of continuing a British counterinsurgency campaign in Ireland were too high, asking “what was the alternative? It was to plunge one small corner of the empire into an iron repression, which could not be carried out without a mixture of murder and counter-murder.”²⁹⁷ Supporting the National Army was the best way for the British to negotiate the political conundrum that was Ireland.

3.3.1 Free State Recruiting Campaign – The Available Recruiting Pool of British Army Veterans

To form an effective counterinsurgent force, the National Army needed to expand rapidly. A recruiting campaign in the early part of 1922 was initially successful, but by the outbreak of the civil war, the anti-Treaty elements of the IRA still outnumbered the National Army, and retained an advantage in battle experience. However according to O’Halpin unlike the Republicans [IRA], the Free State Government in the summer of 1922 had the resources to quickly expand its army, especially using World War I veterans.²⁹⁸

How many former British Army soldiers that were originally from Ireland served in the National Army is a difficult figure to calculate. The army census of November 1922 details every member of the organisation but does not indicate previous military employment.²⁹⁹ Perhaps one of the best assessments of the number of Great War veterans serving in the Irish National Army during the civil war was in a speech given in Dáil Éireann in 1926, which stated that “...upon its formation, many [ex-British Army servicemen] joined the National Army, which grew to almost 60,000 men, around half of whom were ex-servicemen.”³⁰⁰

²⁹⁷ Winston Churchill, *The Aftermath* (London, Thornton, 1929), p. 297.

²⁹⁸ O’Halpin, *Defending Ireland*, p.16.

²⁹⁹ Army Census 1922 Irish Military Archives; Vasilis, p. 274.

³⁰⁰ Bryan Cooper, Dáil Éireann, Vol. 21, 16 November 1927; cited by Paul Taylor, *Heroes or Traitors?: Experiences of Southern Irish Soldiers Returning from the Great War 1919-1939*, (Liverpool, University Press, 2015) p. 15.

Returning World War I veterans were spread throughout Ireland. The male population of the Irish Free-State in 1927, was 1,506,889. Ex-servicemen from the British Army made up a significant portion of that population.³⁰¹ Population data reports from 1926, referred to 150,000 ex-servicemen still resident in the Free State.³⁰² This figure does not include those now living in the newly created Northern Ireland or those that had since died or emigrated. The veterans were located throughout Ireland, but certain urban areas in the provinces of Leinster and Munster contained a sizeable proportion of ex-servicemen. In 1924, the total population of Dublin was 304,802, and 30,000 of these or 9.8% were British Army veterans. The population of Cork City in 1924 was 76,673 and 16,000 or 20.9% of the population were British Army or Navy veterans.³⁰³ This was a very sizeable recruitment pool of experienced soldiers for the National Army to exploit and use, especially after Cork and other Munster cities were seized and occupied by the National Army.

In fact, all the Munster cities proved to be a ripe recruitment ground for the National Army because Limerick and Waterford also contained very sizeable percentages of ex-servicemen, at 9.9% and 13.5% respectively. Remarkably, the Kerry town of Tralee and its surrounds, a former recruiting centre and depot for the Munster Fusiliers of the British Army, was a battle zone during the civil war, but it had 2,116 British Army veterans living within its environs.³⁰⁴ Clearing, seizing and holding these Munster towns and cities would prove vital to the Free State recruitment campaign, opening up their populations to the Free State recruitment mechanism. To further facilitate this, Free State bases were established in most urban locations throughout Munster and other such regions as potential recruitment centres. In total the

³⁰¹ Population data from Central Statistics Office (Ireland), 1926 census; cited by Taylor, *Heroes or Traitors?: Experiences of Southern Irish Soldiers Returning from the Great War 1919-1939*, p. 13.

³⁰² Dáil Éireann, Vol, 21, 16 November 1927; PIN 15/758, Lavery Report, NAI.

³⁰³ Taylor, *Heroes or Traitors?: Experiences of Southern Irish Soldiers Returning from the Great War 1919-1939*, p. 12.

³⁰⁴ Taylor, *Heroes or Traitors?: Experiences of Southern Irish Soldiers Returning from the Great War 1919-1939*, p. 12.

National Army occupied 367 bases throughout Ireland, with Cork numbers second only to Dublin. Overall 17.4% of all the Free State bases in Ireland were located in Cork (a more detailed description on National Army bases, especially in Cork, will be outlined in Chapter Four). These bases would provide the much needed security infrastructure and reassurances to recruit successfully and securely from the local population. From these bases the Irish Government paid the Free-State soldiers, which enticed many to join, especially in areas of economic decline. Ferriter contends that Free State soldiers were paid the then generous wage of 25 Shillings per week and their keep. This had a staggering impact on the poor needy labourers and ex-British soldiers.³⁰⁵ In comparison, Borgonovo states that “IRA Volunteers served without payment and were in danger of losing precious jobs while on active service.”³⁰⁶ De Roiste posits and adds to the narrative by stating that the IRA volunteers were forced for economic circumstances to join up because: “They have no means of livelihood, but while armed, they are sure at least of food and shelter.”³⁰⁷

Unemployment was very high in the new Irish Free State and 46% of all Irish ex-servicemen were drawing ‘out of work donations’ in November of 1921.³⁰⁸ As a result of financial enticements, the National Army grew substantially and Irish veterans of the Great War were perfectly happy to utilize their skill sets in return for employment and a regular salary. Other factors that may have contributed to the active enlistment of veterans, included a sense of isolation and reckoning amongst them. In the immediate aftermath of returning from World War I, these veterans faced a country in turmoil and one that was not entirely welcoming.³⁰⁹ Thus the National Army became a ready-made refuge and repository for the

³⁰⁵ Ferriter, *Between Two Hells, The Irish Civil War*, p. 101.

³⁰⁶ Borgonovo, *The Battle for Cork*, p.63.

³⁰⁷ De Roiste Diaries, 04 July 1922 (Cork City and County Archives, U271/A/145).

³⁰⁸ Peter Hart, *The IRA and its enemies: violence and community in Cork 1916-1923* (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1998), p.312.

³⁰⁹ Jane Leonard, "Facing the Finger of Scorn: Veteran's Memories of Ireland after the Great War" in *War and Memory in the Twentieth Century*, ed. Geoff Eley (Oxford: Berg, 1997), p. 218.

talents of these soldiers. Their fighting acumen, skills and discipline, would be better utilised on their home soil and for a cause that was not inconsistent with their ideology.

3.4 Organisation of the National Army

From its inception, the Irish National Army was modelled on the British Army. Initially there were good reasons for this.³¹⁰ The army urgently needed regimentation and to easily organize itself because it was too busy fighting for survival. Hence initially the structure of the British Army was adopted almost by default.³¹¹ General Headquarters (GHQ) of the National Army whether following a British example as espoused by Historians Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff or just using previous experiences comprised the Departments of the Commander-in-Chief, Chief of Staff, Adjutant-General, Quartermaster-General and Director of Intelligence.³¹²

Detailed hand drawn organisation charts of the proposed GHQ and command structures for the National Army are contained in the National Archives of Ireland. These charts show the organisation of the National Army from Commander in Chief down to General Officers Commanding District Commands and Officer Commanding Battalions. Senior Staff Officers, including Adjutant General (AG), Quarter Master General (QMG), Director of Intelligence, Assistant AG Communications, Personnel, Discipline, General Staff Officers Operations and Training and Judge Advocate General (JAG).³¹³ Michael Collins was appointed the Commander-in-Chief of the National Army, leaving the running of the Government to

³¹⁰ Theo Farrell, Terry Terriff, *The Sources of Military Change, Culture, Politics, Technology* (London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), p.76.

³¹¹ Theo Farrell, Terry Terriff, *The Sources of Military Change, Culture, Politics, Technology* (London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), p.76

³¹² National Army Organisational Charts, 1922, DT S3361, NAI.

³¹³ National Army Organisational Charts, 1922, DT S3361, NAI.

Cosgrave. Richard Mulcahy was appointed both as Chief of Staff and Minister for Defence.³¹⁴ The conduct of the civil war was vested in a War Council consisting of Collins, Mulcahy and General Eoin O'Duffy, who was a Deputy Chief of Staff in the initial National Army.³¹⁵

A significant boost and substantial advantage for the pro-Treaty side was that during the IRA split of early 1922, the staff of the Quartermaster-General's department, primarily based in Dublin and under the command of General Sean Mac Mahon, transferred en masse to the National Army during the second week of February 1922.³¹⁶ These officers brought their experiences from the Irish Republican Army into the Irish National Army set-up and they were a group of very capable and respected individuals, most of whom remained prominent in the formative years of the Army.³¹⁷ British Army veterans because of their previous experiences and knowledge filled many of the key positions within the National Army, but the GHQ of the army was still comprised predominantly of IRA volunteers.³¹⁸ The first Headquarters was established at Beggar's Bush Barracks, Dublin, on 31st January 1922. However from the start, the National Army GHQ continued to call itself the IRA in spite of raised eyebrows in the British House of Commons.³¹⁹

As Collins was Commander-in-Chief of the National Army, he also quietly moonlighted as President of the Supreme Council of the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB). This association would suggest an underlying IRB influence in both the leadership of the Free State Government and Army.³²⁰ Ernie O'Malley, a prominent IRA commander, argued that the leadership of the IRA during the War of Independence, especially those based in Dublin, was

³¹⁴ Ferriter, *Between Two Hells, The Irish Civil War* (London, Profile Books, 2021), p. 46.

³¹⁵ Ibid.

³¹⁶ Dáil Éireann, Quartermaster-General Files, DE 6/8/2, NAI.

³¹⁷ Patrick Long, *The Army of the Irish Free State, 1922 – 1924*, (Masters of Arts, Modern Irish History), UCD, 1981-1983 p. 5.

³¹⁸ Maryann Gialanella Valiulis, *Almost a Rebellion: The Irish Army Mutiny of 1924* (Cambridge, University Press 1992), pp.22-24.

³¹⁹ Eoin Neeson, *The Civil War in Ireland* (Dublin, Mercier Press 1966), p.51.

³²⁰ John M. Regan, *Myth and the Irish State* (Dublin, Irish Academic Press, 2013). pp. 126-9.

dominated by the IRB. The IRB were a secret, oath-bound society established in 1858 as the Fenian Brotherhood and it had maintained a small powerful nucleus within the Irish Volunteers and later the IRA.³²¹ Like Collins, Mulcahy was also in the IRB, as well as in the IRA and helped to recruit key IRA figures into the National Army, especially from the east of Ireland. The actual influence of the IRB is difficult to gauge. In terms of numbers, its membership did not exceed five percent of the total strength of the IRA. The Brotherhood, however, did have control over positions of authority. According to Valiulis, many officers who were IRB men and on the Supreme Council were also on the Staff of GHQ.³²² Some members of the IRA claimed that the “IRB controlled most of the administrative machinery of the Army and could direct the manner of its operations.”³²³ However, the precise parameters and influence of the IRB on the National Army remains unclear.

The Free State War Council was set up in order to exert governance, control, and support to the fledgling army. However according to Mulcahy, the War Council never functioned as a definite body, due to various circumstances.³²⁴ Nevertheless, Collins used his personal charisma to gain support from many of the IRA units for the Free State Government, and this was one reason he was chosen as Commander-in-Chief.³²⁵ As a progressive step into a modern democracy it should be noted that the War Council had a civilian majority and was given considerable powers to limit the army’s autonomy. It possessed the authority to enquire into the administration of any military department, and it could recommend the removal of any officer, including generals.³²⁶

³²¹ Ernie O’Malley, *The Singing Flame* (Cork, Mercier Press 2012), p.48.

³²² Valiulis, *Almost a Rebellion: The Irish Army Mutiny of 1924*, p.24.

³²³ Florence O’Donoghue, *No Other Law* (Dublin, Irish Press, 1954). P.199.

³²⁴ Statement by General Mulcahy to the Army Inquiry Committee 29 April 1924, (Irish Military Archives, IE/MA/03021), MAI.

³²⁵ Walsh, *The Civil War*, p.7.

³²⁶ Executive Council Minutes, 22, 27, 30 March, 9,17 April 1923; cited by Michael Hopkinson, *Green Against Green*, (Dublin, Gill & Macmillan, 2004), p. 227.

According to O’Halpin, the Free State had a number of governance advantages over the IRA. These included firstly the fact that they had British backing, giving access to financial support and military equipment. The second was that it could look for guidance to Collins, who, in the words of one army officer “...in pre-Truce days was... the Commander in Chief and the man.” The third and most important advantage was that Mulcahy, the Chief of Staff, had a clear view and strategic vision of what he wanted to achieve, namely a permanent and centrally controlled Defence Force which would take its orders from the elected government.³²⁷ This would feed directly into the organizational structures of the National Army.

3.5 The Desired Strength and Disposition of the National Army

*The defence of national territory is the raison d’etre of an army; it should always be capable of accomplishing this objective.*³²⁸

-Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare.

As already introduced - Article 8 of the Anglo-Irish Agreement stipulated that the Irish Free State could establish and maintain a military Defence Force for territorial security and that the force could not exceed in size the proportion of the military establishments maintained in Great Britain with respect to populations of Ireland and of Great Britain.³²⁹ This pragmatic approach adopted by the British Government was immediately undermined when the IRA started to fracture into the pro and anti-Treaty factions. As the split grew, the British Government intention was not to restrict the size of the National Government’s army but to strengthen it. The British authorities felt that, unless this was done correctly, the IRA could defeat the Free

³²⁷ O’Halpin, *Defending Ireland*, p.16.

³²⁸ Trinquier, *Modern Warfare*, p. 3.

³²⁹ Padraic Kennedy, *Key Appointments and the Transition of the Irish Volunteers, the Irish Republican Army and the National Army (1913-23)*, (Defence Forces Review 2016), p.34.

State Government's forces in an armed confrontation.³³⁰ This would have been a strategic and political disaster for the British, and a significant reversal to their newly established and evolving policy for Ireland.

The IRA leadership took advantage of the Truce with the British in the latter half of 1921 to enrol new recruits in case hostilities began again. According to O'Halpin, this resulted in entire 'Trucer'³³¹ companies in some divisions, doubling the IRA's total paper strength from roughly 30,000 to an estimated 70,000.³³² Borgonovo states that this figure could be higher because the Department of Defence Military Service Pensions Membership Roll show a nominal national strength of "115,550 [IRA] volunteers. Almost all of these were part-time activists."³³³

How many of these were active fighters from the War of Independence and how many of them supported the Treaty or remained neutral is debateable. Hopkinson argues that at the start of the civil war, after the split in the IRA, the anti-Treaty side had the advantage with circa. 13,000 active fighters, while those in the IRA who joined the National Army stood at just 9,700.³³⁴ The Free State General MacMahon, in his statement to the Army Inquiry in 1924, states that at the start of the conflict, the National Army numbered roughly 8,000 men – reputedly one quarter the size of its enemy [the IRA]. He also states that around 6,000 of the early National Army were armed and fewer still, 5,000, were fully uniformed and equipped.³³⁵ A large portion of the new Free State recruits, according to MacMahon, had never handled a

³³⁰ O'Halpin, *Defending Ireland*, p.15.

³³¹ Trucer or Trucileer refers to individuals who joined the IRA after the Truce with the British in 1921.

³³² O'Halpin, *Defending Ireland*, p. 42.

³³³ John Borgonovo 'Army without Borders: the Irish Republican Army 1920-21'; *Atlas of the Irish Revolution* (Cork, University Press, 2017), p. 390.

³³⁴ Hopkinson, *Green Against Green*, P. 187.

³³⁵ MacMahon to Army Inquiry Committee, 6 May 1924, Mulcahy Papers P7/C/14, UCDA.

rifle.³³⁶ He recalled how “...men were taught the mechanism of a rifle, very often on the way to a fight.”³³⁷

The opposing IRA may have outnumbered the National Army at the start of the conflict but “nationally, the IRA possessed only about 3,000 rifles in 1921, with nearly all of these captured from British forces.”³³⁸ However the IRA did gain a substantial increase in weapons and ammunition in the first half of 1922, doubling their War of Independence arsenal and this will be explained later in the chapter.

Taking into account various elements and combat ratios, the numbers of troops needed to be recruited by the Free State in order to defeat the IRA would have to substantially outnumber and be better equipped than what the IRA could assemble on the conventional or non-conventional battlefield. In fact the number of soldiers recruited by the Free State Government should have been comparable in size to the numbers of withdrawing British Army troops. The average strength in station for British Army troops in Ireland during the peak of the War of Independence, in October 1920 was 55,800 all ranks with 20,000 of these troops deployed in the British Army 6th Division Area of Responsibility, Munster.³³⁹ Ferriter estimates that even by October 1921, the British Army strength in Ireland stood at the substantial number of 57,000.³⁴⁰

The National Army would have to recruit similar numbers to the previous British strength in stations. But the majority of these new Irish recruits would possess the significant advantage of having local knowledge, compared to the previous British troops. Another advantage was that the British Army soldiers that served in Ireland during this period were as

³³⁶ A more accurate assessment of how many armed active IRA fighters faced the National Army in Munster and especially Cork will be conducted in the next Chapter – Chapter 5 Clear.

³³⁷ Hopkinson, *Green Against Green*, pp. 136-137.

³³⁸ GHQ to Minister of Defence, 19 December 1921, Statement of Munitions, October 1921, O'Malley Papers, UCDA; cited by *Atlas of the Irish Revolution* (Cork, University Press, 2017), p. 390.

³³⁹ William Sheehan, *The British Army in Ireland, Atlas of the Irish Revolution, Atlas of the Irish Revolution* (Cork, University Press, 2017), pp. 365-366.

³⁴⁰ Ferriter, *Between Two Hells, The Irish Civil War*, p. 32.

a whole relatively new recruits compared to the combat experiences from World War I that the veteran recruits who enlisted in the Irish National Army possessed.³⁴¹

3.5.1 Success of the Recruitment Campaign and Overall Size of the National Army

On 6th July 1922, the Provisional [National] Government issued a nationwide call to arms to attract new recruits for the National Army. Advertisements were placed in newspapers for “Trained men ... of good character ... able to handle firearms.”³⁴² The response to this appeal proved remarkable, with up to 1,000 men presenting themselves at the different recruiting centres each day.³⁴³ On 7th July 1922 the authorised strength of the National Army was increased to 35,000 (15,000 regulars and 20,000 reservists).³⁴⁴ Hopkinson supports Long’s figures adding that 5,000 new recruits joined the National Army in the weeks after the Four Courts attack.³⁴⁵ As the forces loyal to Collins and the Treaty advanced south and westward into Munster and Connaught this freed up potential recruits who wanted to support the National Army but were living quietly in IRA controlled areas. Amongst these potential recruits were Irish veterans of World War I “who had been careful to conceal their opinions during the ‘Tan Fight’ [War of Independence].” Once free from IRA controlled areas they started to populate the ranks of the National Army, and had the possibility to demonstrate their proven skillsets for their new employers.³⁴⁶

³⁴¹ Sheehan, *The British Army in Ireland, Atlas of the Irish Revolution, Atlas of the Irish Revolution*, pp. 365.

³⁴² *Freeman’s Journal*, 8 July 1922.

³⁴³ Maryann Gialanella Valiulis, *Portrait of a Revolutionary* (Kentucky, University Press, 1992), p.102

³⁴⁴ Patrick Long, “Organization and Development of the pro-Treaty Forces, 1922-1924’ in *Irish Sword*, vol xx no.82, p. 311.

³⁴⁵ Michael Hopkinson, ‘Civil War, Opening Phase’ in *Atlas of the Irish Revolution* (Cork, University Press, 2017), p. 679.

³⁴⁶ Ernie O’Malley, *The Singing Flame* (Cork, Mercier Press, 2012) p.182.

In July 1922, General Mulcahy signed General Order No.1, organising the army into District Commands, comprising the Eastern District Command, The Western District Command, and the Southern District Command.³⁴⁷ The naming of these District Commands demonstrated the ambition of Free State Government to increase the size of the army but also to enhance and enable governance at all levels and as the civil war progressed. These Districts were further sub-divided down into the following commands: 1st Northern, Eastern, Curragh, Western, South Western and 2nd Southern. Additional organisational changes also took place as the strength of the army increased.³⁴⁸ By the end of August 1922, as the army strength increased further, it underwent yet another organisational change with the introduction of eight territorial commands.³⁴⁹ Townsend asserts that the creation of these District or Regional Commands in the National Army made it possible – at least in principle – for the Free State to develop a strategic plan of action which was a vital advantage over their IRA adversaries.³⁵⁰ Active recruitment continued throughout the war and by August 1923 there was a total of 60,000 men on the National Army payroll.³⁵¹

3.5.2. The Cost of a Standing Arm – Leading to Political Tensions

For a nascent country, an expensively assembled army may well be an indulgence, but for the Irish Free State in the throes of a violent insurgency, it became a necessity. By late 1922, the initial force of 1,246 Officers, 25,970 Men, and 2,000 Railway Corps had an estimated maintenance cost of £7,245,000 per annum. This amounted to a cost per head of approximately

³⁴⁷ Valiulis, *Portrait of a Revolutionary*, p.102.

³⁴⁸ Ibid., p.103.

³⁴⁹ Ibid., p.114.

³⁵⁰ Townsend, *The Republic, The Fight for Irish Independence, 1918-1923*, p. 421-422

³⁵¹ Patrick Long, 'Organisation and Development of the pro-Treaty Forces, 1922-1924' in *Irish Sword* Vol xx No.82 p. 311.

£241 per annum.³⁵² This was an enormous expense for a newly independent state to sustain. The estimates for other security entities like the Civic Guard and the Railroad Protection and Maintenance Corps were both well over £1 million for 1922-23.³⁵³ There was also a considerable expense involved in housing a sizeable number of prisoners captured during the civil war.³⁵⁴ By 1923-24, with a total expenditure of £7,500,000 on the National Army and £1,250,000 on compensation, 30 per cent of all national expenditure was devoted to Defence.³⁵⁵ Interestingly Farrell and Terriff point to the adjustments and priority shifts made when peace was won, as the security budget was slashed from £11 million in 1924 to just over £1 million in 1932.³⁵⁶

This considerable financial cost fostered resentment, and certain factions of the government, wanted this money to be spent elsewhere, in particular Kevin O'Higgins, the Economic Affairs and later Justice/ Home Affairs Minister.³⁵⁷ He resented the budgetary primacy of the National Army during this period, and alleged army leaders ran their campaign without oversight from other members of the government.³⁵⁸ O'Higgins maintained that Richard Mulcahy was a soldier rather than a Minister when he sat as the Minister for Defence in the Dáil to give an account of what was happening in the National Army. This distrust between the civilian and military leaders was further exaggerated when at the time his civilian ministerial colleagues were housed together in ministerial blocks for safety, Mulcahy was

³⁵² Estimates of Army, Quarter Master Generals Department, GHQ, 29 Nov 1922, Mulcahy papers P7B/318, UCDA.

³⁵³ The Civic Guard and the Railroad Protection and Maintenance Corps will be described in subsequent chapters.

³⁵⁴ Army Estimates, Dail Debates, 1450-62 (1 June 1923).

³⁵⁵ Hopkinson, *Green Against Green*, p. 273.

³⁵⁶ Theo Farrell, Terry Terriff, *The Sources of Military Change, Culture, Politics Technology* (London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), p.76.

³⁵⁷ Army Inquiry, verbatim report of evidence given by Mr. Kevin O'Higgins, Minister for Home Affairs, 22 Apr. 1924, Mulcahy papers, P7/C/23, UCDA; cited by Defence Forces Review 2016, *A Retreat from Revolution: Government and Army after the Civil War*, B. Campbell, p.100.

³⁵⁸ Army Inquiry, verbatim report of evidence given by Mr. Kevin O'Higgins, Minister for Home Affairs, 22 Apr. 1924, Mulcahy papers, P7/C/23, UCDA; cited B. Campbell, *A Retreat from Revolution: Government and Army after the Civil War*, (Defence Forces Review 2016), p.100.

separated as the Minister for Defence, living and working in Portobello Barracks and actively engaged with National Army activities. According to Valiulis, any criticism of the Army's performance by Cabinet made Mulcahy even more defensive, highlighting his estrangement from government, resulting in a lack of trust and strained relations between the Army and Cabinet.³⁵⁹

3.6 Training of the National Army

Training is for the known and education is for the unknown.

-Anonymous.

It is a remarkable achievement that the National Army (General Headquarters) GHQ staff was able to assemble, train, and direct a new conventional force that had sufficient combat capabilities to defeat its anti-Treaty opponents despite being initially outnumbered.³⁶⁰ As civil strife ensued, the Free State leadership, “were determined to win at all cost.”³⁶¹ In order to accomplish this the National Army needed to instil regimentation, good order, discipline and professionalism. Key enablers in achieving this was found by tapping into the skill-sets of the newly recruited Irish veterans of the First World War. These men joined the National Army in large numbers and they were ready made trained soldiers with combat experience and military discipline. They would ultimately form the initial cadres that helped make recruiting contacts in their local areas.³⁶² The Free State leadership realised that “other armies had the traditions

³⁵⁹ Valiulis, *Almost a Rebellion: The Irish Army Mutiny of 1924*, p.111.

³⁶⁰ Hoyt, T, (2016), Military Innovation in Ireland 1916-1923. *Journal - Defence Forces Review* 2016, 14.

³⁶¹ Valiulis, *Almost a Rebellion: The Irish army mutiny of 1924*, p.24.

³⁶² Trinquier, *Modern Warfare*, p. 85.

behind them” and that they did not have “the advantages of experience.”³⁶³ The recruitment and enabling of combat veterans from World War I would help to fill this space.

During the Truce and prior to the civil war, Lieutenant General J.J. (Ginger) O’Connell, a US Army National Guard (non-combat) veteran, was appointed the Assistant Chief of Staff of the National Army, with the responsibility of training and organizing the regular army. Amongst the other veterans who joined O’Connell in the training environment, was the British Army veteran Emmet Dalton who was promoted to Major General in the National Army and acted as liaison with the British at the start of the Irish Civil War. According to Borgonovo, he possessed extensive First World War combat experience, “having won the Military Cross on the Western Front while still a teenager.”³⁶⁴ Demonstrating his willingness to immerse fellow veterans into the training requirements and regime of the National Army, Dalton stated that he had recruited a number of Irishmen into the National Army who had served as officers in the British Army. With these men on board and using their experience and expertise he was able to organize a training schedule and cadre for the different areas, especially at the Curragh.³⁶⁵ The continuous recruitment and additional experience of these veteran officers and non-commissioned officers became an extremely valuable asset for the National Army especially in regards to their professional skills and organizational abilities. In addition a large proportion of these veteran officers were actively involved in the subsequent ongoing improvements in the army, in particular the successful reorganization of the National Army in January 1923.³⁶⁶ This reorganization will be discussed in subsequent chapters.

³⁶³ Theo Farrell, ‘The model army: military imitation and the enfeeblement of the army in post-revolutionary Ireland 1922-42, in *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, vol. viii, (1997), pp 111-128.

³⁶⁴ Borgonovo, *The Battle for Cork*, p.80.

³⁶⁵ Emmet Dalton interview with Cathal O’Shannon, *Emmet Dalton Remembers*, RTE, March 1978, cited by Sean Boyne, *Emmet Dalton* (Dublin, Merrion Press, 2015), p. 177.

³⁶⁶ Colonel Michael Costello, Report to Chairman Army Enquiry Committee, 22 April 1924, MJC/5, PC 586, pp. 10,12.

As Dalton and O'Connell were actively involved recruiting WWI veterans, Mulcahy supporting this concept urged the use of sound men who had served in the British Army in order to fill the knowledge and experience vacuum.³⁶⁷ Lt Col Patrick Paul, was one such British Army veteran who had also fought with the IRA during the War of Independence and the National Army in Waterford during the civil war. He similarly identified the benefits of placing former British Army veterans in key training positions:

...hunting round, I found that there were quite a few other men who had seen service in the British army during the war, like myself, and I arranged to take advantage of their training by having them appointed as instructors.³⁶⁸

Meanwhile in Cork, Dalton openly recruited British Army veterans as Free State soldiers and instructors. He described the situation upon his arrival in the county:

Collins had made arrangements to have 700 ex-servicemen sworn in and ready to take up service with me upon my arrival at Cork City...in fact when I arrived in Cork, 5,000 ex-servicemen offered their services... some of them had been operating in order to assist our entry. All officers under my command are in agreement with me when I state that officers and men of the two Companies [ex-servicemen] are the most disciplined and effective troops under my command... I have formed the nucleus of two more companies, making the four companies one battalion called the 1st Cork Reserve.³⁶⁹

Dalton further reported that the ex-servicemen had performed all duties imposed upon them and they have been an "unqualified success."³⁷⁰ He spoke very favourably about the capabilities of these troops and rated them higher than the War of Independence veterans who had also joined the National Army.³⁷¹ Colonel Maurice Moore, a former British Army Officer, offered his services in this recruiting effort.³⁷² Colonel Moore, in a letter to the Chief of Staff

³⁶⁷ Mulcahy Memo to Collins, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/35, UCDA.

³⁶⁸ Lt Col PJ Paul, BMH WS 0877, Bureau of Military History, Military Archives Ireland.

³⁶⁹ Dalton report to C-in-C, *Cork Report*, 13 Sept 1922 (IE/MA/CW/OPS/4/1), MAI.

³⁷⁰ Dalton report to C-in-C, *Cork Report*, 13 Sept 1922 (IE/MA/CW/OPS/4/1), MAI.

³⁷¹ Borgonovo, *The Battle for Cork*, p.128.

³⁷² Letter from Colonel Moore, British army to Chief of Staff IRA, 12 January 1922, Mulcahy Papers, P7 A/56, UCDA.

of the IRA (Mulcahy), outlined the numbers available and advantages of recruiting ex-British Army veterans into the Irish National Army when he stated that:

All the Irish Regiments in the English [British] Army are about to be disbanded (16 Battalions of Infantry and 3 Regiments of Cavalry); their officers are to be given an option of transfer to English and Scotch units or to receive a bonus on discharge. Those men enlisted in Ireland will, it is presumed, be sent to Ireland and added to the unemployment list. There are already about 80,000 discharged soldiers unemployed in Ireland... many of these are anxious to join an Irish army.³⁷³

However even with the influx of many World War I veterans, Kautt estimated that it still took time to get the force ready for war.³⁷⁴ Collins acknowledged the contribution that ex-British officers and servicemen of vast experience could provide "...if we could get the right type."³⁷⁵ Eventually the integration of these veterans and their specialist's skills into the National Army would need to take on the Trinquier dictum that training should be conducted by specialized volunteer cadres, officers, and NCOs who will ultimately assume charge.³⁷⁶

By 1923, the strength of the army grew and an official tally showed that 1,163 Officers in the National Army were listed as having experience of British Army service.³⁷⁷ This was approximately 50 percent of the overall strength of Free State officers or according to Fitzgerald "half of the 3,500 officers in the National Army."³⁷⁸ Calculating that half of the National Army officers had World War I service, it is however difficult to gauge if this service in the British military was as an officer or enlisted rank. Nonetheless Dalton had previously mentioned in a television interview that he actively recruited former British Army officers into

³⁷³ Letter from Colonel Moore, British army to Chief of Staff IRA, 12 January 1922, Mulcahy Papers, P7 A/56, UCDA.

³⁷⁴ William H. Kautt, *Arming the Irish Revolution: Gunrunning and Arms Smuggling, 1911-1922*, (Kansas, University Press of Kansas, 2021), p. 151.

³⁷⁵ Letter from Michael Collins to Chief of Staff dated 12 Dec 1921, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/153, UCDA.

³⁷⁶ Trinquier *Modern Warfare*, p. 85.

³⁷⁷ 'Ex British Servicemen in Commands and Services, 1923' Military Archives Ireland; cited by Padraic Kennedy, *Key Appointments and the Transition of the Irish Volunteers, the Irish Republican Army and the National Army (1913-23)*, (Defence Forces Review 2016).

³⁷⁸ Garrett Fitzgerald 'Reflections on the foundation of the Irish Free State', speech given in UCC April 2003 http://www.generalmichaelcollins.com/cumann_na_ngael/garrett.fitzgerald.html accessed 05 September 2021.

the National Army.³⁷⁹ However, W.T. Cosgrave posited how difficult it was to recruit former British Army officers of a certain class into the National Army.³⁸⁰ Regardless of their previous service history, the training capabilities and junior leadership of these National Army officers was important because it provided and strengthened the discipline and fighting acumen for the new National Army.

General MacMahon, a former Chief of Staff of the National Army, in his evidence to the Army Inquiry Committee of 1924 stated that the majority of pre-Truce IRA officers supported the anti-Treaty side. He estimated that the National Army during the civil war was composed of 25 percent post-Truce and 75 percent pre-Truce officers.³⁸¹ Amongst the officers who joined after the truce, many had World War I combat, logistical and administrative experience. Despite their much needed skills, their inclusion was controversial amongst the IRA veterans in the National Army, who had not fought in the Great War. At times they believed that the ex-British Army veterans received preferential treatment.³⁸² As a result of these perceptions, Mulcahy advised that the Free State should “absorb the best of the disbanded Irish Regiments in a way that will get over any stigma on us for them – and get them in [and] broken up sufficiently to be able to absorb them.”³⁸³ These veterans were used in key leadership roles and as a training staff, comprising a significant proportion of the required training cadre. This was a key force multiplier and requirement because as Mulcahy told General Sean Mac Eoin in August 1922 that “we are simply going to break up what we have of an army if we leave it any longer in small posts and do not give it proper military training.”³⁸⁴

³⁷⁹ Emmet Dalton interview with Cathal O’Shannon, *Emmet Dalton Remembers*, RTE, March 1978, cited by Sean Boyne, *Emmet Dalton* (Dublin, Merrion Press, 2015), p. 177.

³⁸⁰ Desart to Midleton 20 and 22 October 1922, (The National Archives, Public Records Office 30/67/51; cited by Ferriter, *Between Two Hells, The Irish Civil War*, p. 64.

³⁸¹ Valiulis, *Almost a Rebellion: The Irish Army Mutiny of 1924*, p.95.

³⁸² *Ibid.*, p.24.

³⁸³ Memo from Mulcahy to Collins, 1 July 1922 quoted by Mulcahy to AIC, par. 14, 29 April 1924, Mulcahy Papers, P7 C/10, UCDA.

³⁸⁴ Correspondence between Mulcahy to Mac Eoin, 14 August 1922, MacEoin Papers, P151/161/5, UCDA.

3.6.1. Skill Sets of the Training Cadre

The opportunity to serve in a new Irish National Army must have appeared a most attractive option to unemployed ex-soldiers of the British Army. Mr. M.R. Walker, Chairman of the Legion of Irish ex-servicemen based at 3 Molesworth Street Dublin, seemed eager that members of his own organisation accomplish this, and perhaps get a preference.³⁸⁵ Gaining already trained specialists and skilled military practitioners became a priority to the raising and concentration of the National Army. On 25th July 1922, Mr Walker, again contacted Collins making available more men for service. These men numbered about five hundred and included artillerymen, machine-gunners, motor drivers, engineers and signallers.³⁸⁶ The leadership of the National Army quickly realised how these veterans would be a vital cog in the combat effectiveness and training expertise of a growing army. A further list of requirements was sent by Dalton to Walker for training instructors, weapons experts, military policemen, armourers, aircraft riggers and fitters, drivers and medical personnel. Political sensitivities dictated that first class instructors would receive an increased £5 per week but with no specific military rank.³⁸⁷

As the war progressed, weapons training and safety became a training priority for the veteran soldiers and instructors. They were instrumental in professionalising the army because on 21st October 1922, *The Irish Times* reported that steps needed to be taken “to instruct troops in the proper use of weapons.”³⁸⁸ Throughout the period of fighting, the Free State suffered 105 fatalities from accidental shootings and suicides. This was a substantial number and represented over 13 percent of the total National Army fatalities during the conflict.³⁸⁹

³⁸⁶ Patrick Long, *The Army of the Irish Free State, 1922 – 1924*, (Masters of Arts, Modern Irish History, UCD, 1981-1983), pp. 26-27.

³⁸⁷ Ibid.

³⁸⁸ *The Irish Time*, 21 October 1922.

³⁸⁹ Draft Copy of Roll of Deceased Personnel – Irish Civil War. Provided to the author on 24 January 2022 by Military Archives Ireland, MAI.

Weapons safety and the safe handling of weapons needed to be instilled into the new recruits of the National Army and veteran soldiers were instrumental in improving the training standards.

The employment of former officers of the British Army also became necessary to staff the National Army's special services.³⁹⁰ The technical and training expertise and corporate knowledge of these former British Army officers formed the foundation for the training, tactics, techniques and procedures adopted by the National Army.

Throughout the course of the civil war, the size of the National Army continued to grow. Likewise, the proportion of ex-British servicemen and their level of responsibility also increased. However resentment against the former British Army men also increased particularly after the occupation of the towns in the west and south where the recruitment pool was particularly well stocked.³⁹¹ But regardless of what former IRA volunteers perceived, military veterans who changed allegiance from Britain to Ireland found no inconsistency in reapplying their obedience and skills to new masters.³⁹² The term 'once a soldier, always a soldier' applied especially in this case of these ex-British Army service personnel. They consistently demonstrated their specialised skills as fighters or trainers to their new employers.

3.6.2. Free State Training Schools Established

Training needs to be linked to policy and an overriding doctrine to be effective. It must have seemed natural for the army to initially model itself on its British equivalents, since that was

³⁹⁰ Hopkinson, *Green Against Green*, p. 138.

³⁹¹ Patrick Long, *The Army of the Irish Free State, 1922 – 1924*, (Masters of Arts, Modern Irish History, UCD, 1981-1983), pp. 26-27.

³⁹² David Fitzpatrick, *Militarism in Ireland 1900-1922*, in Thomas Bartlett and Keith Jeffery (eds.) *A Military History of Ireland* (Cambridge, University Press, 1996), p.400.

what the rest of the Irish Government was doing.³⁹³ Irish military training doctrine at the beginning of the civil war had many similarities to the British doctrine and was originally mirrored on that which the veterans had learnt in their previous service.

Nevertheless the initial training and the doctrine adopted also needed to improve, adapt and be regularised to meet Irish needs as indicated by Major General Diarmuid MacManus of the National Army who was also a veteran of World War I.³⁹⁴ He described the military knowledge of average junior officers of the National Army at the start of the war as ‘absurdly nil’ and stressed the need to employ ex-British soldiers.³⁹⁵ His fellow generals concurred and Collins went so far as to adopt delaying tactics aimed at avoiding conflict with the IRA until the army was trained to some extent and be ready to fight.³⁹⁶

Even before the end of the War of Independence there was a realisation in the IRA on the need to formalise training. The 1921, IRA GHQ staff wanted to develop a professional officer corps with a dedicated program of training and education. To this end, they ordered all field divisions to set up officer training camps to provide uniform levels of training for IRA officers as prescribed by a centralized organization.³⁹⁷

The first training manuals issued by IRA GHQ to all volunteers’ emphasized close-order drill and administration above all other skills.³⁹⁸ *An t-Óglách*, the IRA journal (and later for the National Army), was used to update its readership about ongoing combat operations but it was also used to impart training and education. Prior to and during the civil war, it published articles on doctrine, tactics, strategy and the ‘Principles of War’. The editions of this magazine from 27th May, 3rd June, and 10th June 1922, carry articles on these principles, quoting such

³⁹³ Farrell, Terriff, *The Sources of Military Change, Culture, Politics Technology*, p.76.

³⁹⁴ Further information on the previous combat experience of MacManus, especially his experiences in Gallipoli, will be discussed in the next chapter ‘Clear’.

³⁹⁵ MacManus to A/G, 18 Sept. 1922, and memo by him, O’Malley Papers, P17a/215, UCDA.

³⁹⁶ Donal Corcoran, *Freedom to Achieve Freedom*, (Dublin, Gill and Macmillan, 2013) p.88.

³⁹⁷ GHQ, *Volunteer Training Manual*, IRA, 1921, Mulchay papers P7a/22, UCDA.

³⁹⁸ GHQ, *An Introduction to Volunteer Training Manual* (IRA, 1921), Mulchay papers P7A/22.UCDA.

theorists as Von Moltke, Marshal Foch, Jomini, and von Peucker.³⁹⁹ Statements such as “the teaching of military knowledge has before all the object of bringing the student to utilise his intellectual equipment.”⁴⁰⁰ The 3rd June 1922, edition also states that “there is a long distance between an intellectual conception and their priceless faculty which allows a man to make acquired military knowledge the basis for his decisions.”⁴⁰¹ Carl von Clausewitz the Prussian military theorist is also quoted in an article on “the Characteristics of Modern Warfare” in the *An t-Óglách* from the 24th June 1922. In this article the following quotation by Clausewitz is highlighted; “War is produced by, and receives its form, from the ideas, feelings and relations which obtain at the moment it breaks out.”⁴⁰² This was a well-timed publication and somewhat anticipated, considering fighting broke out on the 28th June 1922.

British funding and support was important to the beginnings of the National Army and in order to guarantee its continuation, it was important that the National Army constantly proved its training standards, professionalism, and combat performance. In April 1923 the Under Secretary to Ireland, Alfred Cope told Churchill of the improving capabilities of the newly formed Free State or Provisional Government and its Army. He stated that “McKeown [Major General Seán MacEoin] put up a good show at Sligo over the week-end and the P.G. [Provisional Government]⁴⁰³ behaved very well in Dublin yesterday.”⁴⁰⁴

To further enhance the developing capabilities of the Free State soldiers, the Free State enabled the foundation of professional training schools. The highest priority was given to training schools that instructed soldiers how to effectively use British-supplied equipment. An example of this can be seen when an Artillery School was organised by the National Army

³⁹⁹ Search by Author of all the *An t-Óglách* magazines from the period 1921-1923 contained in the Collins Barracks Museum, Cork.

⁴⁰⁰ Marshal Von Moltke, ‘Principles of War’, *An t-Óglách* magazine, dated 03 June 1922.

⁴⁰¹ Eduard von Peucker, ‘Principles of War’, *An t-Óglách* magazine, dated 03 June 1922.

⁴⁰² Carl von Clausewitz, ‘Characteristics of War’, *An t-Óglách* magazine, dated 24 June 1922.

⁴⁰³ Provisional Government can also be referred to as Free-State or National Government.

⁴⁰⁴ Under Secretary Cope to Churchill, Telegram dated 17 April 1923, Parliamentary Archives Westminster, Lloyd George Papers, F/10/2/67(c), PAW.

after the consolidation of the artillery pieces that were initially handed over by the British (five MKI and four MKII 18-pounders).⁴⁰⁵ These 18-pounders guns which had previously been scattered throughout the various military barracks of the Free State, were grouped together on 23rd March 1923, and the Artillery School was formed, in Clancy Barracks, Islandbridge, Co. Dublin. On 5th June 1923, Colonel Patrick Mulcahy was promoted to Officer Commanding (OC) Artillery Corps.⁴⁰⁶ The 'Freelance' armoured cars (Rolls Royce, Peerless and Lancia) were consolidated and formally reined in on 14th September 1922 under Capt. Joe Hyland as OC Armoured Car Corps. This would constitute the first Cavalry Corps of the National Army.⁴⁰⁷ The amount of armour received by the National Army from the British will be discussed later, but suffice to say that throughout the conventional and non-conventional phases of the civil war the National Army was considerably enhanced by the training and effectiveness of the combined arms operations which were facilitated by specialist training.

In early 1923, steps were taken to organise a dedicated Infantry Corps. The Infantry had been already re-organised as part of an overall re-organisation into sixty-five independent 'Battle-Grouped' Battalions in January 1923.⁴⁰⁸ These Battalions needed to be instructed in tactics and the use of the weapons and equipment at their disposal, courtesy of British logistical supplies.⁴⁰⁹ In April 1923, centralised training started to take place with a Company Commanders', Machine-Gun, NCOs' and Cooks' courses conducted in the Curragh Camp. A School of Instruction was soon established, and so the first seeds of a Military College were being sown even before the civil war ended.⁴¹⁰ The combat experience and theoretical knowledge that was obtained over the previous months of fighting and from various British

⁴⁰⁵ M.E.A. to Churchill, Letter 02 Sept 1922, Churchill Archives, Cambridge University, CHAR 22/14, CAC.

⁴⁰⁶ Duggan *A History of the Irish Army*, p. 109.

⁴⁰⁷ Liam McNamee, 'The Cavalry Corps', *An Cosantoir*, January 1976.

⁴⁰⁸ Patrick Long, *The Army of the Irish Free State, 1922 – 1924*, Master of Arts, Modern Irish History, UCD, 1981-1983, p. 46-47.

⁴⁰⁹ The Battle-Grouping concept will be dealt in more detail in Chapter Five – Hold.

⁴¹⁰ Duggan *A History of the Irish Army*, p. 106.

Army veterans, ultimately was used to formulate the doctrine and training syllabi for these schools and their designated courses.

3.6.3. Discipline within the National Army

Many of the new recruits were raw and needed to be transformed into disciplined soldiers. This was recognised by the Free State leadership when Kevin O'Higgins sent a memo to the cabinet asking how this army of 'raw lads' with no experience of fighting were to cope with hardened units of the IRA that saw themselves as custodians of the Republican ideal.⁴¹¹ Discipline, culture, morale and fighting spirit are key traits in a professional and regimented army. Dalton, MacManus, Paul and other British Army veterans in the National Army recognised this and became the driving force for Mulcahy's long-running efforts to create a military culture that echoed the rules of soldierly behaviour set by regular armies elsewhere. The easy-going familiarity of the revolutionary forces would be out of place in the new Free State order.⁴¹² Dalton, in a letter to Mulcahy in September 1922, stated that the ex-servicemen were "...conspicuous by their better discipline, deportment and efficiency than my other troops."⁴¹³ This discipline and regimentation needed to be spread throughout the organisation.

Alfred Cope suggesting an underlying indiscipline within the National Army early in the conflict stated that the "PG [National Army] forces will have to be pulled up firmly both in leadership and on the part of officers and men."⁴¹⁴ In Cork, Liam de Roiste mentioned that "in many cases, apparently, the firing is wanton by men of the National Forces: like the Irregulars

⁴¹¹ O'Higgins to Executive Council n.d. DT, S6696, NAI.

⁴¹² Townsend, *The Republic: The Fight for Irish Independence, 1918-1923*, p.422.

⁴¹³ Dalton report to C-in-C, *Cork Report*, 13 Sept 1922 (IE/MA/CW/OPS/4/1), MAI.

⁴¹⁴ Correspondence between Cope and Curtis, 8 September 1922 (Parliamentary Archives Westminster, Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/10/3/48) ; cited by Ferriter, *Between Two Hells, The Irish Civil War*, p. 60.

[IRA], they have not the discipline or steadiness of old trained forces.”⁴¹⁵ In Limerick, O’Duffy declared the national troops to be:

a disorganised, in-disciplined and a cowardly crowd...when a whole garrison was put in jail owing to insubordination, the garrison sent to replace them often turned out to be worse. One group of 300 reinforcements were absolutely worthless, 200 of them having never handled a rifle before.⁴¹⁶

British Army veterans holding key junior leadership and training roles within the National Army, enforced the discipline that was needed within a professional army. But the positive reception of the veteran soldiers afforded by the Free State General Staff was not universally held within the lower ranks of the National Army. Some of the new Irish recruits were not so keen on the discipline being imparted on them and they resented their former British Army NCOs for doing so. Some British intelligence reports went so far as to suggest, that:

There is absolutely no discipline in the Free State army and things are getting worse. Men who have been NCOs in the British army are killed if they start enforcing discipline and it is put down to an ambush or accident.⁴¹⁷

While there is no clear evidence of anything so drastic occurring to former British NCOs, the political and social ramifications of recruiting so many ex-servicemen worried both the British and Free State leadership. Dalton stated that “upon reviewing the situation [in Cork], I foresaw the possible bad political effect of recruiting [too many] ex-servicemen.”⁴¹⁸ But they were needed because de Roiste recorded that the National Army were “not well disciplined and very badly officered.”⁴¹⁹ Cosgrave in conversation with the Earl of Desart assured that they were gradually weeding out the ruffians but “one difficulty was that the best old soldiers were

⁴¹⁵ De Roiste Diaries, 26 August 1922 (Cork City and County Archives, U271/A/146).

⁴¹⁶ GOC SW Command Memo, Mulchay Papers, P7/B/40, UCDA.

⁴¹⁷ G.M. Boyd, ‘Dublin district weekly intelligence summary’. P.57 October 1922, DT/3/S1784, UCDA.

⁴¹⁸ Dalton report to C-in-C, *Cork Report*, 13 Sept 1922 (IE/MA/CW/OPS/4/1), MAI.

⁴¹⁹ De Roiste Diaries, 13 November 1922 (Cork City and County Archives, U271/A/147).

accustomed to serve under officers who were skilled and of a class they respected and that officers of this class they could not get.”⁴²⁰

The leadership of the National Army recognised the threat from indiscipline and set about introducing additional corrective measures. Collins told the new Legal Service Officer, Cahir Davitt to draw up a code of discipline for the army as well as rules of procedure for courts martial. Davitt purchased in Eason’s Bookshop the British Army *Manual of Military Law* and they got down to work.⁴²¹

This became a very trying and stressful period but discipline more or less held within the National Army with notable exceptions. With the employment of additional ex-servicemen army efficiency and discipline improved, and according to Garvin and “new officers with British experience were sharpening things up in the provinces.”⁴²² Discipline was enhanced by continuous training practices and education. This training continued after the civil war ended in order to enhance professionalism. A fortnightly review from 16th November 1923 stated that “training of troops continues to be brisk with discipline good.”⁴²³ The consensus was that most of the disciplinary problems had been as a result of a transition from a guerrilla army into a more professional standing army. As army administration became more systemised and more formulised, conditions improved.⁴²⁴ During the Army Inquiry Committee of 1924, Professor (and Major-General) James Hogan the former Head of Intelligence, believed that there had been an “extraordinary improvement in the army during the period from December, 1922 until April 1923, although a slight breakdown in control had occurred with the cessation of hostilities.”⁴²⁵

⁴²⁰ Desart to Midleton 20 and 22 October 1922, (The National Archives, Public Records Office 30/67/51; cited by Ferriter, *Between Two Hells, The Irish Civil War*, p. 64.

⁴²¹ Duggan, *A History of the Irish Army*, p. 116.

⁴²² Garvin, *The Birth of Irish Democracy*, p. 125.

⁴²³ Fortnightly Report, Cork, 16 November 1922 (IE/MA/S/12360), MAI.

⁴²⁴ Valiulis, *Almost a Rebellion: The Irish Army Mutiny of 1924*, p.107.

⁴²⁵ Testimony given by Professor Hogan, Army Inquiry Committee 1924, Mulcahy Papers P7/C/21, UCDA.

3.7 Equipping and Sustaining of the National Army, with British Assistance

While British-veteran soldiers fought with the National Army, British weapons and supplies substantially increased the combat effectiveness of the Free State forces.⁴²⁶ Logistics is a relatively new word used to describe a very old practice; To supply, equip, move and maintain an armed force is a considerable undertaking.⁴²⁷ British support gave the Free State a considerable advantage over its IRA adversary. As the initial Chief Liaison Officer with the British, Dalton was fortunate because as already stated the British Colonial Secretary Winston Churchill was amenable to providing equipment and arms to the Free State Government.⁴²⁸ In fact, for political reasons, he preferred that Britain provide all the equipment rather than other suppliers.⁴²⁹

Heavier calibre weapons were most needed by both sides, particularly in the earlier conventional exchanges and these were exclusively made available to the National Army by the British. Prior to the 'Battle of the Four Courts', Lloyd George, sent a hand written letter to Collins on 22nd June 1922, underwriting the British commitment to the security of the Irish Free State. Lloyd George clearly stated that artillery and other assets would be provided to defeat the republican insurgency:

Assistance has on various occasions been given to Dominions of the Empire in cases where their authority was challenged by rebellion on their soil; and His Majesty's Government are prepared to place at your disposal the necessary pieces of artillery which may be required or otherwise to assist you as may be arranged.⁴³⁰

⁴²⁶ O'Halpin, *Defending Ireland*, p.15.

⁴²⁷ From authors own experience as the Chief Logistics Officer of the EU training Mission in Mali.

⁴²⁸ Boyne, *Emmet Dalton*, p. 125.

⁴²⁹ The National Archives Colonial Office 739/6, Irish Free State 1922, vol.6, note from Colonial Office, 20 July 1922; cited by Ferriter, *Between Two Hells, The Irish Civil War*, p. 48.

⁴³⁰ Hand Written Letter - Lloyd George to Collins, 22 June 1922, Parliamentary Archives Westminster, Lloyd George Papers, F/10/6/4, PAW.

Artillery is a significant combat multiplier. These guns gave the National Army a marked advantage over their IRA adversary, particularly when they were crewed by former British Army soldiers.

3.7.1 British Equipment Support to the National Army

In 1922 the British support to the National Army proved to be continuous and reliable, as demonstrated in a telegram from Churchill to the Under Secretary in Ireland, Alfred Cope: “You should do everything in your power to persuade Mr. Collins to draw arms from the British Government, which has a large surplus. I am quite ready to continue the steady issue of arms to trustworthy Free State troops.”⁴³¹

Further telegram correspondence between Churchill and Cope underlines the continual logistical support given to the National Army. In a letter dated 17th April 1922, Cope informs Churchill of his progress to date in supplying British weaponry to the National Army: “I have supplied 6,000 rifles which is the limit authorised by you. May I supply a further thousand to-day and another thousand during the week. I am satisfied the P.G. [Provisional Government] is in earnest in dealing with the mutineers [IRA].”⁴³² Churchill replied to Cope positively and agreed to “...authorise further issue of 1,000 rifles to-day and 1,000 later in the week total 8,000 also the twenty Lewis guns you should obtain concurrence both of Viceroy and Commander-in-Chief in both cases.”⁴³³ Having received this authorisation from Churchill,

⁴³¹ Churchill to Under Secretary Cope, Telegram dated 02 May 1922, Churchill Archives, Cambridge University, CHAR 22/13, CAC.

⁴³² Under Secretary Cope to Churchill, Telegram dated 17 April 1922, Parliamentary Archives Westminster, Lloyd George Papers, F/10/2/67c, PAW.

⁴³³ Churchill to Under Secretary Cope, Letter dated April 1922, Parliamentary Archives Westminster, Lloyd George Papers, F/10/2/67d, PAW.

Cope reported that he had already supplied thirty-four Lewis guns and requested authority to supply twenty more that were required.⁴³⁴

A letter from M.E.A. to Winston Churchill, provides the amounts of equipment, arms and ammunitions that had been supplied to the National Army by the British as of 2nd September 1922:

Rifles:	27,400 issued
Revolvers:	6,606 issued
Lewis Guns:	246 issued
Vickers Machine Guns:	5 issued
Rifle Ammunition:	4,745,848 issued
Revolver Ammunition:	435,280 issued
Grenades:	8,495 issued
18 Pounder guns (12 Authorised):	9 issued
18 Pounder Ammunition:	2160 issued. ⁴³⁵

The supply of weapons and ammunition to the National Army had a substantial impact on the combat effectiveness of them as a fighting force. Correspondence from the Army Commander-in-Chief to the President of the Free State Cabinet in early 1923, shows that the Free State received 14,744 RIC rifles and 27,052 other rifles from the British, for a total of 41,796.⁴³⁶ This was particularly noteworthy because:

1. It demonstrates that the vast majority of National Army troops received their weapons/rifles from Britain.
2. Upon disbandment the majority of RIC rifles went to the National Army rather than arming a new Irish Civic Police Force.

Another interesting dynamic surrounding the supply of weapons and ammunition was that during this period in early 1922, whilst gladly receiving arms and equipment from the

⁴³⁴ Under Secretary Cope to Churchill, Telegram dated 17 April 1922, Parliamentary Archives Westminster, Lloyd George Papers, F/10/2/67c, PAW.

⁴³⁵ M.E.A. to Churchill, Letter 02 Sept 1922, Churchill Archives, Cambridge University, CHAR 22/14, CAC.

⁴³⁶ Letter dated 02 February 1923, from the Commander-in-Chief of the Free-State to the President of the Free-State Cabinet, Arms and Equipment, (IE/MA/DoD/A/3389), MAI.

British, Michael Collins was also covertly liaising with the IRA to supply arms to IRA units in Northern Ireland. In March 1922, according to Kautt, Irish Republicans in Germany with the approval of Collins, loaded a vessel called *The Hannah* with six tons of rifles and ammunition at Bremen. They landed in Helvick, Waterford and dispersed the weapons, primarily to the Northern Divisions.⁴³⁷ In total, the Third Northern Division received six hundred rifles and sixty thousand rounds of ammunition from this shipment and these were divided evenly amongst their three brigades.⁴³⁸ Other significant activities organised by Collins to support the Northern IRA was a rifle swap between the IRA and the National Army. This occurred secretly in May 1922, as Free State rifles supplied by Britain were swapped with IRA rifles, which were then sent to arm the IRA in Ulster.⁴³⁹ The significance of these activities in May 1922 would suggest that Collins did have alternate plans for Northern Ireland even in May 1922 and he was still trying to avoid a civil war in the remainder of the country. However, Ferriter states that the Northern Ireland Government discovered this Free State activity and had reliable information that a quantity of munitions of war supplied by the British Government to the Free State Government was finding its way to the IRA in the North. Because of this they wanted the Provisional [Free State] Government to disclaim the IRA in the North and to cease giving them assistance.⁴⁴⁰ Eventually activities by the Free State did decrease and Kissane asserts that Collins' death removed the last person in the Free State government with a strong protective interest in Northern Catholics.⁴⁴¹

⁴³⁷ William H. Kautt, *Arming the Irish Revolution: Gunrunning and Arms Smuggling, 1911-1922*, (Kansas, University Press of Kansas, 2021), p. 150.

⁴³⁸ Ibid.

⁴³⁹ Ernie O'Malley, *The Men Will Talk to Me, The West Cork Interviews*, p. 30.

⁴⁴⁰ Public Records Office Northern Ireland, Home Affairs 32/1/247, A. Solly-Flood (Military Advisor (MA) to NI Government) to Secretary Minister for Home Affairs 22 July 1922; cited by Ferriter, *Between Two Hells, The Irish Civil War*, p. 49.

⁴⁴¹ Kissane, *The Politics of the Irish Civil War*, p. 83.

3.7.2 *The British supply of Mobility Equipment to the National Army*

Apart from being better armed than their opponents, The National Army also had the greater mobility. By early July 1922, Borgonovo states that the British Government had handed over 355 vehicles to the transport fleet of the National Army.⁴⁴² According to a British Government report, the vehicles handed over included 79 armoured Lancia trucks and 153 Crossley Tenders (15 of which were armoured).⁴⁴³ Irish correspondence between Collins and Cosgrave differs slightly, stating that by August 1922 the Free State claimed it had received 13 Rolls Royce 1920 Pattern Armoured Cars, 7 Peerless Armoured Cars and 111 Lancia Armoured Personnel Carriers.⁴⁴⁴

These vehicles considerably improved the mobility and force protection of the National Army, which substantially increased its combat effectiveness. Further vehicles were received from the British, such as the December transfer of twenty Lorries, twelve touring cars and four mobile search lights.⁴⁴⁵ Armour and combat support assets gave an advantage to the Free State during the subsequent fighting with the IRA. Armour offered protection, mobility, enhanced freedom of movement and also increased firepower depending on the type of armoured vehicle, available.

The British also supported the formation of the Irish Air Corps by supplying planes, pilots and mechanics.⁴⁴⁶ The first thirteen pilots that flew with the National Army Air Corps were veterans of the Royal Air force (RAF) and the Royal Flying Corps.⁴⁴⁷ Notable amongst

⁴⁴² Borgonovo, *The Battle for Cork*, p.62.

⁴⁴³ Statement No.7&8, List of Materials Taken over from the British from 31 January 1922 to 30 July 1922, DT S3361, NAI.

⁴⁴⁴ Correspondence from Collins to Cosgrave, 5th August 1922, Mulchay Papers, P7/B/29, UCDA.

⁴⁴⁵ Conservative Government Secretary of State for the Colonies, the Duke of Devonshire, to the Governor General of Ireland Arms and Equipment, Telegram dated 08 December 1922 (IE/MA/DoD/A/3389), MAI.

⁴⁴⁶ Donal MacCarron, *A View from Above: 200 years of Aviation in Ireland* (Dublin, O'Brien Press, 2000), p. 57.

⁴⁴⁷ Patrick Long, *The Army of the Irish Free State, 1922 – 1924*, (Masters of Arts, Modern Irish History, UCD, 1981-1983), pp. 26-27.

these were Charlie Russel and James Fitzmaurice.⁴⁴⁸ The First aeroplane landed in Baldonnell during the summer of 1922 and soon the Air Corps were equipped with three Bristol Fighters, two Avro Instructional Machines, one Martinsyde Passenger and a single seater Scout-SE5, operating from both Baldonnell and Fermoy airfields. In a brief twelve months, the air arm blossomed in size and efficiency.⁴⁴⁹ Compared to the IRA, the Free State enjoyed air supremacy for the entirety of the conflict, which substantially increased the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities of the National Army.

3.7.3 British Change in Policy

The Conservative Government that came to power in Britain in October 1922, was less favourably disposed to the Irish Free State Government. As a result it started to reduce the support originally provided by the Lloyd George and Churchill government. The new British Secretary of State for the Colonies, the Duke of Devonshire complained to the Irish Governor General Mr. T.M. Healy: “Supplies which have been furnished to the Provisional [Free State] Government were drawn from surplus stocks which remained over from the late war ... the drain on these stocks has been large and continuous.”⁴⁵⁰ Financial remuneration for British equipment was sought by the British, and in early 1923, Devonshire, informed the Governor General of Ireland of the new change in policy:

Under no conditions can he hand over any Rolls Royce armoured cars because they cannot be replaced within many months... a telegram has already been sent to say that six fearless armoured cars are at the disposal of your Government in Dublin to which

⁴⁴⁸ Donal MacCarron, *A View from Above: 200 years of Aviation in Ireland* (Dublin, O’Brien Press, 2000), p. 57.

⁴⁴⁹ Duggan, *A History of the Irish Army*, p. 108.

⁴⁵⁰ Conservative Government Secretary of State for the Colonies, the Duke of Devonshire, to the Governor General of Ireland, Arms and Equipment, Letter dated 13 December 1922 (IE/MA/DoD/A/3389), MAI.

the conditions stated in this telegram do not apply and which can be handed over forthwith.⁴⁵¹

The remainder of the telegram continues in the same vein and Devonshire goes on to say that munitions would no longer be supplied “...at short notice on the old informal lines.”⁴⁵²

As 1923 progressed and the British Government became more confident that the Irish National Army would be victorious, a firmer method of accountancy and accountability for weapons procurement was introduced by the British. Details of this policy were contained in an extract from financial agreements made between the British and Free State Governments in London on the 12th February 1923, titled *The Refund of Cost of Munitions*.⁴⁵³ The British agreed that the cost of munitions of war supplied to the Irish Government up to the present date should: “...constitute a debt to be funded for the purpose of adjustment at the ultimate financial settlement ... on the understanding that the Irish Free State agree to pay cash for future supplies.”⁴⁵⁴

A subsequent letter from the Director of Equipment and Ordnance stores within the British War Office to the High Commissioner for The Irish Free State, dated 27th February 1923, made clear that the financial end was being dealt with from the Treasury in accordance with agreements known of by the British.⁴⁵⁵ The British were willing to supply some combat assets by the older methods, but they wanted payment from the Free State for the more attractive weapons and equipment requested.

⁴⁵¹ Conservative Government Secretary of State for the Colonies, the Duke of Devonshire, to the Governor General of Ireland, Arms and Equipment, Letter dated 6th Week of 1923 IE/MA/DoD/A/3389, MAI.

⁴⁵² Conservative Government Secretary of State for the Colonies, the Duke of Devonshire, to the Governor General of Ireland, Arms and Equipment, Letter dated 6th Week of 1923 IE/MA/DoD/A/3389, MAI.

⁴⁵³ Extract dated 12 February 1923, from Financial Agreements made between British and Free State Governments in London titled *The Refund of Cost of Munitions*, IE/MA/DoD/A/3389, MAI.

⁴⁵⁴ Extract dated 12 February 1923, from Financial Agreements made between British and Free State Governments in London titled *The Refund of Cost of Munitions*, IE/MA/DoD/A/3389, MAI.

⁴⁵⁵ Mr R.W. Scott, the Director of Equipment and Ordnance stores within the British War Office to The Secretary, High Commissioner for The Irish Free-State, Arms and Equipment, Letter dated 27 February 1923 IE/MA/DoD/A/3389, MAI.

Public representatives in Britain also started to enquire into the cost of supporting the Irish National Army. Because of political pressures, British backing of the National Army by could no longer be achieved covertly. In an extract from the British House of Commons Report, Vol. 166 No 90 Col. 618, Mr Ormsby Gore states that: “the arrangement whereby munitions, arms and stores were handed over by the British Government to Free State Government, subject to subsequent valuation ... came to an end on 12 February [1923] last.”⁴⁵⁶

The tightening of financial screws by the new British Conservative Government did have an effect on the supplies to the National Army. On the 14th February 1923, the Aireacht Airgid (Irish Minister for Finance), stated that the Free State stocks were exhausted and that he had 4,000 men without arms. He requested the following in his list of supplies to the British; “... 10,000 rifles, 200 Lewis Guns, and 100 Vicar Guns as well as 4,000,000 rounds of .303 ammunition and 2,000,000 rounds of .303 Special Ammunition.”⁴⁵⁷ No record is available as to the British supply of this request.

In March 1923, James McNeill, an Irish Free State Emissary in London, was informed that with a view to getting the assistance from persons in the British War Office who had experience in dealing with such purchasing, the Irish Quartermaster-General or a special representative of his would be in attendance in London.⁴⁵⁸ The following month, the Office of the Free State Commander-in-Chief, made a request to Mr. McNeill, requesting “...40,000 Boots & Leggings, 30,000 Tunics and Caps and 100,000 pairs of breeches.”⁴⁵⁹

The Free State Government pragmatically responded to the new British policy by accepting the British weapons but simultaneously neglecting to pay for them on time or at all.

⁴⁵⁶ Extract from the British House of Commons Report, Vol. 166 No 90 Col. 618, Mr Ormsby Gore’ Arms and Equipment, IE/MA/DoD/A/3389, MAI.

⁴⁵⁷ Aireacht Airgid [Irish Minister for Finance], to a Mr. N.G. Loughnane in the Vice Regal Lodge Dublin, 14 February 1923, Arms and Equipment, IE/MA/DoD/A/3389, MAI.

⁴⁵⁹ The Office of the Commander-in-Chief – Free-State army to Mr. James McNeill [an Irish Free-State emissary in London] 02 March 1923, Arms and Equipment, IE/MA/DoD/A/3389, MAI.

This was a financial necessity since 30 percent of the entire Free State Government's budget was spent on Defence during the years 1922 and 1923.⁴⁶⁰ On 25th June 1923, the British Secretary of State for the Colonies wrote to the Governor General of Ireland still looking for payment for two Rolls Royce armoured cars issued to the Free State Government the previous October 1922, asking for "...£5301.19.10d in respect of these cars."⁴⁶¹ No documentation relating to this payment by the Free State Government was discovered by the author.

Notwithstanding the new policy and haggling's over late payments, the British Government could still be relied upon to supply the National Army with much needed ordnance, ammunition and logistics. This was a major advantage for the National Army and undoubtedly raised its combat effectiveness and fighting acumen. This was in direct contrast to the anti-Treaty IRA side, which got very little outside assistance and found it increasingly difficult to supply its forces as the war progressed.

3.8 IRA Force Generation and Logistical Problems

In comparison to the Free State, "despite all the rhetoric and occasional bombast the anti-Treaty Republican side had made no adequate preparation for civil war," wrote historian Michael Hopkinson.⁴⁶² In March 1922, the anti-Treaty elements of the IRA organised a convention "re-affirming the IRA's loyalty to the Republic."⁴⁶³ An Executive was elected and Liam Lynch was appointed Chief of Staff, and Liam Mellows Quartermaster-General of the IRA. Liam Deasy, the former head of the West Cork Brigade replaced Lynch as O/C 1st Southern Division.⁴⁶⁴

⁴⁶⁰ Hopkinson, *Green Against Green*, p. 273.

⁴⁶¹ Handing over of Armoured Cars & Motor Cars by British HQ, IE/MA/DoD/A/7399, MAI.

⁴⁶² Hopkinson, *Civil War, Opening Phase; Atlas of the Irish Revolution*, p. 675.

⁴⁶³ Borgonovo: *IRA Conventions; Atlas of the Irish Revolution*, p. 671.

⁴⁶⁴ Hart, *The IRA and Its Enemies: Violence and Community in Cork 1916-1923*, p.113.

Other prominent positions in the IRA Command Structure were given to Rory O'Connor as Director of Engineering, Jim O'Donovan as Director of Chemicals and Sean Russell as Director of Munitions. Ernie O'Malley took on the role of Director of Organisation.⁴⁶⁵ According to O'Farrell, the leadership of the IRA contained many various strands, from moderate to more extreme. Cathal Brugha who was killed during the initial fighting in Dublin, has often been seen as the "totem for violent republicanism." But even Brugha was shouted down by his more extreme IRA colleagues Rory O'Connor and Liam Mellows for his perceived moderation.⁴⁶⁶ The pre-emptive occupation of the Four Courts by O'Connor and Mellows before IRA logistical alignment, did not bode well for the Republican war effort.

The need for IRA leadership, proper staff work and effective administration was demonstrated when O'Malley proclaimed that "...[t]he sooner we form an independent headquarters, the better ... the men do not know what to do. Time is on the side of the others to wear us down."⁴⁶⁷ Billy Pilkington, another IRA commander agreed with O'Malley's proclamation, stating that the Free State side controlled "...the press, the clergy and the arms...I vote we here and now form an independent headquarters."⁴⁶⁸ O'Malley admitting that it was badly needed, also noted that it was probably pointless because the "...Free State will be maintained with the arms which the British have sold."⁴⁶⁹

But it was not always this way because at the outset of the Irish Civil War the military advantage appeared to be with the anti-Treaty forces who dominated the provinces of Ulster, Connacht and Munster.⁴⁷⁰ Only seven of a total of sixteen IRA divisions were loyal to the Free State Ministry of Defence. This was in addition to the fact that the largest IRA Divisions, the

⁴⁶⁵ O'Malley, *The Singing Flame*, p.84.

⁴⁶⁶ Fergus O'Farrell, *Cathal Brugha* (Dublin, University College Dublin Press, 2018), pp. 85-88.

⁴⁶⁷ O'Malley, *The Singing Flame*, p.69.

⁴⁶⁸ O'Malley, *The Singing Flame*, pp.69/71.

⁴⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁷⁰ Kissane, *The Politics of the Irish Civil War*, p. 76.

First and Second Southern Divisions, were anti-Treaty.⁴⁷¹ However, though the IRA possessed a numeric advantage at the start of the civil war, an IRA report to the Minister of Defence stated that “nationally, the IRA possessed only about 3,000 rifles in 1921, with nearly all of these captured from British forces... rifle ammunition remained paltry with an average of forty-three rounds available per weapon.”⁴⁷² Such shortages were common even in the comparatively well-armed Cork units. The IRA’s commander of the Cork 5th Brigade, Ted O’Sullivan assessed that there was an average of 8 to 10 Rifles in each battalion.⁴⁷³

Hopkinson states however that there was an arms improvement by the time of the civil war and “a Provisional [Free State] Government source put anti-Treaty IRA numbers at 12,900 with 6,780 rifles.”⁴⁷⁴ Kautt contends that it is difficult to know how many IRA volunteers were active. He also claims that most of the IRA arms supply centres in Britain and overseas were against the Treaty, and so the IRA had at least the advantage of established networks and experienced smugglers. However this did not translate into great success because these networks were also known to the Free State personnel.⁴⁷⁵ .⁴⁷⁶ As a result there was IRA shortages in arms and munitions, and Kautt posits that smuggling continues to be one of the great enterprises and requirements for guerrillas forces like the IRA. He called this ‘Irregular Logistics’ and because of this counterinsurgent forces need to devote considerable time and resources to counter this threat.⁴⁷⁷

The availability of rifles, equipment and ammunition to the IRA substantially increased prior to fighting as a result of numerous raids on RIC barracks. One of the most substantial raids was conducted on the Clonmel RIC Barracks by Ernie O’Malley’s IRA 2nd Division on

⁴⁷¹ Ibid.

⁴⁷² GHQ to Minister of Defence, 19 December 1921, Statement of Munitions, October 1921, O’Malley Papers UCDA; cited by *Atlas of the Irish Revolution* (Cork: University Press 2017), p. 390.

⁴⁷³ Interview of Ted O’Sullivan (West Cork IRA) by Ernie O’Malley, O’Malley Papers, P17b/108, pp. 1-27, UCDA.

⁴⁷⁴ Hopkinson, *The Civil War: The Opening Phase in Atlas of the Irish Revolution*, p. 676.

⁴⁷⁵ Kautt, *Arming the Irish Revolution: Gunrunning and Arms Smuggling, 1911-1922*, pp. 151-152.

⁴⁷⁶ Kautt, *Arming the Irish Revolution: Gunrunning and Arms Smuggling, 1911-1922*, pp. 151-152.

⁴⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 206.

26th February 1922.⁴⁷⁸ According to Neeson 300 rifles, 200,000 rounds of ammunition, seven machine guns, four armoured cars and hundreds of grenades were captured during the raid.⁴⁷⁹ Other noteworthy raiding activities included Waterford where the IRA raided a party of forty British soldiers at the railway station and took their weapons. However Kautt contends that these methods were not sustainable for the IRA.⁴⁸⁰

The Clonmel raid was further augmented on 29th March 1922 when the *RFA (Royal Fleet Auxiliary) Upnor* steamed from Haulbowline in Cork, bound for Devonport, England. By raiding the *Upnor*, the leadership of the IRA hoped that they would have enough guns and ammunition to keep “Collins and Mulcahy out of Cork.”⁴⁸¹ IRA raiders in an audacious plan boarded it, locking the crew below deck and according to Kautt, they unloaded 381 rifles, 727 pistols, 33 Lewis Guns, 6 Maxim Machine Guns and 25,000 rounds of ammunition in Ballycotton Bay. Kautt contends that this was the most significant capture of weaponry by the IRA during the revolutionary period.⁴⁸² An IRA report from 1st (Cork) Brigade of the 1st IRA Division supports Kautt and states that by seizing *the Upnor* they had captured “80 tons of machine guns, rifles and ammunition.”⁴⁸³ Borgonovo estimates that this one raid doubled the 1st Southern Division supply of weapons, including thousands of rounds of precious .303 ammunition.⁴⁸⁴ In his recent publication on Ballycotton, Mahon makes a “conservative estimate” that the IRA actually obtained 1,000 rifles, 2,000 grenades and up to 200,000 rounds of small arms ammunition in the raid on *the Upnor*.⁴⁸⁵ Mahon critically assess that this single

⁴⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 153.

⁴⁷⁹ Eoin Neeson, *The Civil War in Ireland* (Dublin, Mercier Press, 1981), p.51.

⁴⁸⁰ Kautt, *Arming the Irish Revolution: Gunrunning and Arms Smuggling, 1911-1922*, p. 153.

⁴⁸¹ Mahon, *The Ballycotton Job*, p. 124.

⁴⁸² Ibid., p. 154.

⁴⁸³ Report on ‘The Seizure of Upnor, 29 March 1922’ A Coy, 4 Battalion, 1 Cork Brigade, Brigade Activity Reports (MA/MSPC/A1 -4), MAI.

⁴⁸⁴ Borgonovo, *The Battle for Cork*, p.21.

⁴⁸⁵ Mahon, *The Ballycotton Job*, pp. 191-192.

exploit supplied most of the weaponry and munitions to the IRA in Munster, allowing them to fight a more effective insurgency.⁴⁸⁶

Critically, as *the Upnor* also contained “numerous crates of high explosives”, the IRA now had the means to mass produce landmines and explosive devices.⁴⁸⁷ This would lead onto a destructive campaign by IRA engineers on the Free State freedom of movement and significantly on the transport infrastructure in the province of Munster as will be described in detail in subsequent chapters. It should be noted that in 1924, the British Government were still looking for £29,972 in compensation, for the weapons and ammunition stolen from the *Upnor* by the IRA in 1922.⁴⁸⁸

However successful the IRA were at capturing and seizing weapons, they found it difficult to gain substantial support from an international sponsor for their campaign. But they did have some successes and Desmond Fitzgerald, a Free State Government Minister, wrote to Mulcahy in December 1922 stating that the IRA were getting weapons and munitions in from England “in fairly large quantities’ through shipping companies, while in the US, it was noted that guns were easily procured by the IRA and in New York “the dockers would help willingly to smuggle the guns out.”⁴⁸⁹ However as a whole the IRA leadership failed to seize the opportunity to influence political opinion in the USA and remobilize Irish-Americans.⁴⁹⁰ As a last ditch attempt, Liam Lynch dispatched Sean Moylan to the USA to purchase arms, telling him in February 1923, of the need for “... even a few [Artillery Guns], with sufficient shells,”

⁴⁸⁶ Ibid, pp. 218-219.

⁴⁸⁷ Borgonovo, *The Battle for Cork*, p.21.

⁴⁸⁸ ‘Letter written from the Department of Finance to the Department of defence, dated 21 November 1922’; Arms and Equipment, IE/MA/DoD/A/3389, MAI.

⁴⁸⁹ Fitzgerald to Mulcahy, 2 December 1922 and Timothy Smiddy (Irish US Envoy) to Fitzgerald, 15 December 1922, (Fitzgerald Papers, P80/338/3, UCDA; cited by by Ferriter, *Between Two Hells, The Irish Civil War*, p. 65.

⁴⁹⁰ Hopkinson, *Green Against Green*, p. 253.

because he believed it “would finish the business here.”⁴⁹¹ But these supplies never materialised.

Though better equipped, especially in Cork, than they were for the entirety of the War of Independence, the IRA were still at a disadvantage because they did not have the discipline, training and regimentation of their pro-Treaty adversaries. O’Malley in correspondence to Sean Lemass vented his frustrations about IRA tardiness, while also bemoaning the fact that training had been neglected.⁴⁹² O’Malley also wrote to Deasy lamenting that even after IRA equipment raids, “the men are scattered and the equipment and armament poor.”⁴⁹³ Eventually this would be to their disadvantage because according to Kissane, the pro-Treaty leadership proved far superior strategically and logistically to the Republican side throughout the conflict.⁴⁹⁴ Ultimately this would have substantial consequences for the insurgency campaign conducted by the IRA against the Free State Government.

3.9 Chapter Summary

The National Army was the first instrument and state institution that was at the immediate disposal to the Free State Government in order to maintain law and order and to protect life and property. The loyalty of the National Army to the Treaty was paramount for the survival of the Free State.⁴⁹⁵ The British, realised the necessity for a fully functioning Irish National

⁴⁹¹ Liam Lynch letter to Sean Moylan, dated 6th February 1923, Joseph McGarrity Papers, MS 17, 466/12/2, NLI.

⁴⁹² Ernie O’Malley to Sean Lemass, 21 October 1922 in Cormac O’Malley and Anne Dolan, ‘*No Surrender Here*’, *the Civil War Papers of Ernie O’Malley 1922-1924* (Dublin, Lilliput Press, 2008), p. 148.

⁴⁹³ Ernie O’Malley to Liam Deasy, 9 October 1922 in Cormac O’Malley and Anne Dolan, ‘*No Surrender Here*’, *the Civil War Papers of Ernie O’Malley 1922-1924*, p. 165.

⁴⁹⁴ Kissane, *The Politics of the Irish Civil War*, p. 65.

⁴⁹⁵ Duggan *A History of the Irish Army*, p. 85.

Army in order to protect its own interests, put its trust in the leadership of the Free State. This trust was backed up by the provision of weapons, ammunition and equipment. These capabilities, combined with the leadership and expertise provided by Irish ex-soldiers, helped the National Army maintain a favourable force ratio over the anti-Treaty IRA as the Irish Civil War progressed.

The integration of ex-servicemen from the British Army proved to be an unqualified success and provided much-needed leadership. British ex-soldiers boosted the National Army. They offered steady leadership, and also specialist knowledge in transport and combat support, especially artillery. These ex-British Army veterans according to Borgonovo also provided the training expertise and important junior leadership at the squad and platoon levels for the army and proved to be much more cohesive and responsive than the IRA.⁴⁹⁶ By the start of the conflict the Free State soldiers (usually) wore uniforms and were armed with rifles that worked and had ample ammunition they could trust. When fighting, they were supported by armoured cars, Lorries and artillery.⁴⁹⁷ In time, the Free State Government's superiority in arms, numbers, professionalism and resources would tell – and large consignments of arms were regularly supplied to them by the British Government, including the artillery. This would prove crucial in the fighting during the civil war.⁴⁹⁸

The formation of the National Army was not all plain sailing and Lt General Collins Powell later commented that "...it would be wrong to accept the neat idea that the organisation went smoothly. The civil war disrupted many plans and the growth of the army was quite haphazard in 1922-23."⁴⁹⁹ But with the direct support of British logistical supply system and the indirect support of British trained combat veterans, the National Army evolved into a competent fighting force that was eventually disciplined, regimented and well equipped. These

⁴⁹⁶ Borgonovo, *The Battle for Cork*, p.82.

⁴⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁹⁸ Hopkinson, *Green Against Green*, p. 127.

⁴⁹⁹ Duggan, *A History of the Irish Army*, p. 105.

were essential factors in ensuring that the National Army was able to effectively conduct the Clear-Hold-ReBuild counterinsurgency strategy, needed to subdue and ultimately defeat the IRA.

CLEAR

Clear - A tactical mission task that requires the commander to remove all enemy forces and eliminate organized resistance within an assigned area. The force does this by destroying, capturing, or forcing the withdrawal of enemy forces so they cannot interfere with the friendly unit's mission.⁵⁰⁰

⁵⁰⁰ US Army Field Manual 3-90 Tactics, July 2001.

Chapter Four – Clear, The Conventional Phase of Warfare

*Never, probably, in the history of the world has a newly born army – hardly out of its swaddling clothes – achieved in such a short space of time, a series of sweeping victories comparable to those won up to date by Ireland's National troops.*⁵⁰¹

- Cork Examiner, 14 August 1922.

4.1 Introduction to Clear

For the first seven months of 1922 the IRA constituted the only real authority in Cork and most of Munster, establishing what became known as the 'Cork Republic' or 'Munster Republic'.⁵⁰² Notwithstanding its feasibility, the British Government were concerned by the developments in Cork and its surrounding counties in Munster. Due to this ongoing threat to the viability of the newly created Free State they were keen that the Irish Provisional Government received as much British support as was necessary to subdue this existential threat. On 30th June 1922, a few days after Free State artillery had shelled the Four Courts, Churchill spoke in the British Houses of Parliament, confirming that Britain would support "...the Free State with such materials as they may require" while also noting that

...they have continued to decline any [direct] assistance of any sort from British troops, in which they are no doubt well advised, as it is undoubtedly an Irish quarrel, one [in] which the Irish Provisional [Free State] Government are acting in the sense of the mandate they have received from the Irish people.⁵⁰³

Both the British and Free State Governments agreed that the redeployment of British troops to Ireland to quell anti-Treaty sentiment or secession was not a wise option. The re-entry of British troops would have been unwelcomed by the local population and would have helped the IRA reunite the country against a common enemy. So British assistance remained indirect

⁵⁰¹ *Cork Examiner*, 14 August 1922.

⁵⁰² The Munster Republic was an attempt by the IRA to establish an Independent entity in the southern province of Ireland during the early months of the Civil War. Michael Harrington, *The Munster Republic* (Dublin, Mercier Press, 2009).

⁵⁰³ *The Times* (London), 30 June 1922.

and it primarily comprised of equipping the National Army with weapons, ammunition, vehicles and clothing.⁵⁰⁴ On 30th June 1922, the London *Times* reported that at roughly around the same time as Churchill was speaking in Westminster, the Irish Minister for Defence, Mulcahy, announced that “...to maintain your rights, and to defend your liberties, the Government have been reluctantly compelled to take armed action against the elements of disorder.” Mulcahy emphasised that this armed action was a last resort, stating that “...before coming to this decision, they [the National Government] had exhausted every effort to prevent the necessity of a resort to armed force.”⁵⁰⁵ With this similar narrative setting the tone, it became politically sanctioned on both sides of the Irish Sea, that with British support, the Free State side of the Treaty debate had set about planning to ‘Clear’ the IRA from their strongholds throughout the country especially in the south and west. This was done, according to both Churchill and Mulcahy, in order to uphold the Treaty, subdue the IRA and cement the validity of the new Irish Government.

4.2 Aim of Chapter

This Chapter argues that the clearance operations conducted by the National Army in Munster adhered to a progressive doctrine, demonstrating a superior strategy, leadership and tactical acumen on the Free State side. Using the correct military terminology and effects, these operations conducted by the National Army will be described in order to explain how the Free State shaped the battle space using supporting operations in the South-east, South-west and Kerry. This allowed the National Army to set favourable conditions before the decisive land and amphibious turning operation in Cork.

⁵⁰⁴ As already discussed in detail in Chapter Three.

⁵⁰⁵ *The Times* (London), 30 June 1922.

National Army operational plans, maps and orders from this period are practically non-existent because during the early months of the civil war, report writing, records and filing was not institutionally conducted to the extent that it would be in 1923, when the army was run on a more professional basis.⁵⁰⁶ Nevertheless, using newspaper correspondent's reports, personal archives and available National Army documentation, this chapter will examine the clearance operations, both shaping and decisive, conducted by the leadership of the Free State in Munster. By clearing Munster of IRA resistance, the National Army set the context and conditions for the follow-on Hold and Rebuild operations in the province.

4.3 The IRA in Munster

In the opening weeks of the Irish Civil War, the IRA had the numerical advantage over the pro-Treaty National Army. The size of active IRA divisions varied in Munster but the vast majority of volunteers of the two largest divisions, the 1st and 2nd Southern, supported the anti-Treaty side as they were commanded by two staunch anti-Treaty Republicans, Liam Lynch and Ernie O'Malley respectively. These two divisions, based in Munster, contained a third of the IRA's total force, hence according to Harrington, the majority of its most active experienced troops supported the cause of the Republic.⁵⁰⁷ The following table - compiled by the author using the Military Service Pensions Collection, IRA Nominal Rolls - outlines the strength of the 1st and 2nd Southern (IRA) Divisions on 1st July 1922:

⁵⁰⁶ As Free State General Michael Costello said at the army enquiry after the civil war, every officer admitted that there had been an extraordinary improvement in the army between December 1922 and April 1923. Much of that was put down to the re-organisation which occurred in January 1923. (Costello at Army Enquiry), Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/25, UCDA.

⁵⁰⁷ Niall C. Harrington. *Kerry Landing, August 1922: An Episode of the Civil War*. (Dublin, Anvil Books, 1992), p.14, 34 & Florence O'Donoghue. *No Other Law: The Story of Liam Lynch and the IRA, 1916-1923* (Dublin, Irish Press, 1954), p. 214.

IRA Nominal Roll – 1 July 1922 - 1 Southern Division and 2 Southern Division											Total
1 Div	Cork Brigades					Kerry Brigades			Limerick	Waterford	
	I	II	III	IV	V	I	II	III	WEST	COMBINED	1 Div
	4,944	2,318	2,445	2,604	2,701	4,843	3,033	1,084	1,403	1,897	27,272
2 Div	Tipperary Brigades		Limerick Brigades		Kilkenny Brigades						
	II	III	EAST	MID	I						2 Div
	601	2,792	2,003	1,397	2,151						8,944
Total IRA Forces 1 and 2 Southern Divisions - 1 July 1922											36,216

Table 1 – indicates the IRA Nominal Rolls for 1 and 2 Southern Divisions – 1 July 1922 – MSPC.⁵⁰⁸

In addition to the initial numerical supremacy, financially and equipment wise the IRA were much better equipped than they were in 1919-21 and could meet the “British-armed National Army on something like equal terms.”⁵⁰⁹ Most IRA units had more weapons than before and Hart states that, for example, both the Bandon and Ballyvourney Battalions in Cork had doubled their stock of rifles since 1921.⁵¹⁰ O’Callaghan assesses a higher figure than my estimates stating that the “IRA in Munster fielded an estimated 53,397 Volunteers, organised into eighteen brigades... [and] organised itself geographically on a parish-by-parish basis.”⁵¹¹ However these figures could be from the 1921 IRA Nominal Rolls or could include parts of Munster not within the 1st and 2nd Divisions areas of operations. Borgonovo caveats these assessments of large numbers of IRA volunteers available in Munster by stating that the “majority of IRA members probably never held a loaded gun, much less fired one during the War of Independence.”⁵¹² Foster supports this when he states that “a Free State correspondent confidentially claimed ‘to be in a position to know’ that of the 10,000 (sic) anti-Treaty fighters

⁵⁰⁸ Military Service Pensions Collection - IRA Nominal Rolls (Ref Code: RO/1-611), <https://www.militaryarchives.ie/en/collections/online-collections/military-service-pensions-collection-1916-1923/search-the-collection/organisation-and-membership/ira-membership-series>. <accessed 21 March 2022>.

⁵⁰⁹ Borgonovo, *The Battle for Cork*, p.21.

⁵¹⁰ Inspector of Org. to O/C Org. 1st South Div., 7 Sept. 1922 (MA, A/0991/2); O/C 1st South Div., Report, 5 Sept. 1922 (MA, IRA/2) and Pat O’Sullivan (O’Malley Papers, P17b/111), UCDA.; cited by Hart, *The IRA and its Enemies, Violence and Community in Cork 1916 -1923*, p. 116.

⁵¹¹ John O’Callaghan ‘*The Geography of the War of Independence, Munster; Atlas of the Irish Revolution* (Cork, University Press, 2017), p. 595.

⁵¹² Borgonovo ‘*Army without Borders: the Irish Republican Army 1920-21*’; *Atlas of the Irish Revolution* (Cork: University Press, 2017), p. 395.

in the field less than 200 ... ever fired a shot against the British Forces.”⁵¹³ By defining a ‘Trucileers’ in the *Atlas of the Irish Revolution*, White adds to the overall debate by stating that the IRA still included many officers and men who fought in the War of Independence but “it also contained many others contemptuously referred to as ‘Trucileers’ because they joined after the Truce had come into effect.” White surmises that the “fighting qualities of these men were unknown and they lacked military experience.”⁵¹⁴ Ferriter disagrees with these suggestions and the talk about ‘Trucileers’ and lack of previous combat experience, stating it was “nonsense given that 75% of IRA members opposed the Treaty.”⁵¹⁵ According to Ferriter, The IRA had many experienced fighters but not as many as they had in the previous fight with the British. He gives a lower number of IRA active fighters in all of the country by quoting Tom Barry, the West Cork IRA Commander who estimated that in total the anti-Treaty IRA strength did not exceed 8,000 men.⁵¹⁶ Hopkinson has a higher figure for all of Ireland, when he states that by the time the civil war started “a Provisional [Free State] Government source put anti-Treaty IRA numbers at 12,900, ... having the advantage of fighting in their own territory.”⁵¹⁷

Regarding the IRA in Cork, Borgonovo claims that prior to the civil war the “IRA brigades in Cork accounted for 17,976 of the total [IRA strength].”⁵¹⁸ My Table 1, compiled from the Military Service Pensions, IRA Nominal Rolls puts the figure at 15,012 for the total IRA strength in Cork during July 1922.⁵¹⁹ However Borgonovo caveats his figures when he refers to active fighters stating that the “estimated strengths of all IRA flying columns and

⁵¹³ Gavin M. Foster, *The Irish Civil War and Society, Politics, Class, and Conflict* (London, Palgrave MacMillan, 2015), p. 26.

⁵¹⁴ Gerry White, *Free State versus Republic, the Opposing Armed Forces in the Civil War; Atlas of the Irish Revolution* (Cork, University Press, 2017), p. 691.

⁵¹⁵ Ferriter, *Between Two Hells, The Irish Civil War*, p. 77.

⁵¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 41.

⁵¹⁷ Hopkinson, *The Civil War: The Opening Phase; Atlas of the Irish Revolution*, p. 676.

⁵¹⁸ Borgonovo ‘The Geography of the war of Independence; *Atlas of the Irish Revolution*, p. 558.

⁵¹⁹ Military Service Pensions Collection - IRA Nominal Rolls (Ref Code: RO/1-611), <https://www.militaryarchives.ie/en/collections/online-collections/military-service-pensions-collection-1916-1923/search-the-collection/organisation-and-membership/ira-membership-series>. <accessed 21 March 2022>.

active service units in 1921 totalled 1,379 IRA full-time fighters of which 466 (34 percent) served in County Cork.”⁵²⁰ Borgonovo further states that the “1st Southern Division [Cork] possessed 26 percent of Irish rifles, 25 percent of its pistols and 58 percent of its machine guns.”⁵²¹ De Roiste in his 1922 diary entry and without the full details available posits and agrees that the “Irregulars [IRA] have got all the arms and ammunition there was to be had [in Cork], in their possession.”⁵²²

In comparison to the varying and diverse figures for IRA strengths, composition and experience mentioned above, Hopkinson states that at the start of the conflict the National Army stood at 9,700.⁵²³ Hopkinson also claims that after the shelling of the Four Courts another 5,000 joined bringing the numbers on the Free State side to 15,000 by 17th July 1922.⁵²⁴ Valiulis reports that by August 1922, when the Free State clearance operations were at their busiest, the National Army comprised approximately 14,000 regular soldiers and 5,000 reservists.⁵²⁵ As already documented, the British Government equipped the majority of the National Army, before the conventional clearance phase of the fighting and this included; “nine eighteen pounder field [artillery] guns, thirteen Rolls Royce 1920 Armoured Cars, seven Peerless Armoured Cars and 111 Lancia Armoured Personnel Carriers.”⁵²⁶ Thus the combat power advantage was with the Free State. But did they have the required troop ratios to launch offensive operations southwards?

⁵²⁰ Borgonovo ‘*The Geography of the war of Independence; Atlas of the Irish Revolution*, p. 558.

⁵²¹ Ibid.

⁵²² De Roiste Diaries, 4-18 July 1922, Cork City and County Archives, U271/A/45.

⁵²³ Hopkinson, *Green Against Green*, p. 187.

⁵²⁴ Hopkinson, *The Civil War: The Opening Phase; Atlas of the Irish Revolution*, p. 679.

⁵²⁵ Valiulis, *Portrait of a Revolutionary*, p.165.

⁵²⁶ Collins to Cosgrave, 5 August 1922, Mulcahy Papers P7/B/29, UCDA.

4.4 Shaping Operations and the Deployment of the National Army

A Shaping operation is an operation that establishes conditions for the decisive operation⁵²⁷ through effects on the enemy, other actors, and the terrain. Shaping operations may occur throughout the area of operations and involve any combination of forces and capabilities.

- US Army Field Manual (ADP) 3-0, Operations (October 2017).

After being briefly detained but then allowed to leave Dublin by Mulcahy on the hope that he would remain a voice for peace, Liam Lynch – the Chief of Staff of the IRA and former Commander of 1st Southern Division Commander - travelled south. Conversely and instead of being a peace advocate, Lynch set about organising IRA forces to challenge the Free State Government. According to Kissane, the hope of the IRA was that they could defend a Republic south of a Limerick-Waterford defensive line demonstrating the limited authority of the Free State in the region.⁵²⁸ Nobody has ever questioned Lynch's selfless dedication to his cause, but his capacity to direct the Republican campaign has come in for criticism.⁵²⁹ Notwithstanding the aspiration for an independent Munster, Lynch lacked a definite policy or overall IRA strategy. Townsend states that he "... seemed to reject the very notion of having one. He was an honourable person, but he did not have a revolutionary mind. He could not descend from the high ground of the Republic to the level of politics."⁵³⁰

Florence O'Donoghue, a prominent IRA Commander in Cork City, who remained neutral during the civil war, states that from the start Lynch had ordered his men to fight within their own divisional areas rather than to storm Dublin.⁵³¹ At the outset this may have been a wise decision because in the Munster area, the IRA had an initial advantage as only two posts

⁵²⁷ The Decisive Operation is the operation that directly accomplishes the mission. It determines the outcome of a large scale combat operation, battle or engagement.

⁵²⁸ Kissane, *The Politics of the Irish Civil War*, p. 78.

⁵²⁹ Townsend, *The Republic, The Fight for Irish Independence*, 1918-1923, p.412.

⁵³⁰ Townsend, *The Republic, The Fight for Irish Independence*, 1918-1923, p.412.

⁵³¹ O'Donoghue. *No Other Law: The Story of Liam Lynch and the IRA, 1916-1923*, p.272.

were initially held by pro-Treaty forces, and these were immediately taken by the IRA at the start of the conflict. At that point in Munster, according to Townsend, the government's forces were outnumbered and outgunned by the IRA.⁵³² But the IRA made the strategic error of trying to initially fight the Free State conventionally, using up valuable manpower conventionally in order to position themselves in and around the main towns. They made the mistake of not utilising their familiar hedge-fighting tactics against semi-armoured Free State troops.⁵³³ At the start of the civil war the IRA valued the support bases of urban centres rather than the countryside that they had controlled in the previous conflict with the British.

4.4.1 National Army Shaping Strategy

The clearance phase of counterinsurgency operations are often the most kinetic and bloodiest in nature.⁵³⁴ Nevertheless these clearance operations are strategically important because they remove the insurgents from key terrain. By assigning geographic areas of responsibility the leadership of the National Army, was formulating a strategic plan that included the capture of Munster and Cork.⁵³⁵ The planning and leading of divisional scale operations, the size of which had never been witnessed during the War of Independence, was so important and indicated the level of ambition employed by the National Army and its strategic intent. Compared to the civil war IRA, the pro-Treaty side benefited from the advantage of having centralised command and overall direction. On 13th July 1922, an Army Council was set up, composed of General Michael Collins as Commander-in-Chief, General Richard Mulcahy as Chief of Staff and

⁵³² Townsend, *The Republic, The Fight for Irish Independence, 1918-1923*, p.413.

⁵³³ Neeson, *The Civil War in Ireland*, p.107.

⁵³⁴ Hazelton, *Bullets Not Ballots, Success in Counterinsurgency Warfare*, p. 2.

⁵³⁵ Townsend, *The Republic, The Fight for Irish Independence, 1918-1923*, pp. 421-422.

Minister for Defence, and General Eoin O'Duffy, Assistant Chief of Staff.⁵³⁶ Centralised leadership allows for centralised planning, which gave the Free State a marked advantage over their IRA adversaries.

As the Commander-in-Chief of the National Army, Collins set the government's overall strategy and guidance, but its implementation does not seem to have suited his skills. He certainly spent little time drawing arrows on maps or researching the art of war. According to Townsend his policy was simple enough – to win as quickly as possible, “but with the least possible nastiness.”⁵³⁷ Collins became, in effect, a kind of generalissimo, combining military and political supremacy. Townsend states that Arthur Griffith, the President of the Executive Council, had no desire or capacity to dispute the day-to-day conduct of government with him, and while Mulcahy had greater implementation and administrative capacity, he sensibly deferred to Collins as a strategist.⁵³⁸

Fortuitously for Collins, within the General Staff of the National Army there were experienced operational planners. These planners translated Collins' guidance and strategies into a coherent framework. This plan, though hard to fully contextualise, is best summarised by IRA leader Frank Aiken. Writing as an opponent facing the Free State advances, Aiken best describes the strategy adopted by the National Army in the southern province of Ireland:

The Provisional Government must inevitably succeed in advancing and conquering the South, even though it is quite possible to keep up guerrilla warfare for several years and thus make government and social peace impossible in large districts. Meanwhile, the Provisional Government will be hailed as saviours of the people, they will receive a great accession of power and authority. The national defences of Ireland will be handed over to those who are weakest nationally. The best fighters and strongest leaders will be killed, jailed and scattered; they will have lost all place in public life and all influence with the people. The greatest blow against the Republic is the coming exclusion of Republicans from the vast majority of Ireland will regard as the Irish Army and the Irish Parliament.⁵³⁹

⁵³⁶ Duggan, *A History of the Irish Army*, p. 91.

⁵³⁷ Townsend, *The Republic, The Fight for Irish Independence*, 1918-1923, p.424.

⁵³⁸ Townsend, *The Republic, The Fight for Irish Independence*, 1918-1923, p.423.

⁵³⁹ The outcome of Present Position; Confidential Memo, handwriting, supposed to be of Barry Egan of Cork, n.d., Frank Aiken Papers, P104/1244(2)UCDA.

Free State planners assessed that prior to the main strike into the heartland of Munster, initial shaping operations needed to be conducted by the National Army in north and east Munster as presented in Map No. 1. Limerick and Waterford City were the main co-ordinating points on the IRA defensive line for the 'Munster Republic'. The line consisted of moving from east to west, the city of Waterford and the towns of Carrick-on-Suir, Clonmel, Fethard, Cashel, Golden and Tipperary, ending in the city of Limerick where Lynch established his first Headquarters. To the south lay the territory held by the 1st and 2nd IRA Southern Divisions.⁵⁴⁰ In July 1922, the seizing and securing of Limerick and Waterford which anchored the line defending the 'Munster Republic' became the focus of attention for the Free State leadership. De Roiste, gauging from Cork City, estimated that the IRA would have difficulty operating as a conventional force because as an "army they cannot hold out against artillery, which is being used by the Dáil Forces."⁵⁴¹ In the professional opinion of the author, positional (static) or delay (mobile) defence by the IRA was futile and ultimately impossible because according to Townsend they had few machine guns and no artillery.⁵⁴² McCarthy described the IRA defences as grandiose because the Republican forces did not have the manpower, equipment, training or planning expertise to establish a cohesive defensive line. Instead they concentrated in Limerick and Waterford and awaited the inevitable attack.⁵⁴³ Riccio likewise states that the IRA did not have the required equipment to sustain a static or mobile defensive posture.⁵⁴⁴ Without artillery support and facing overwhelming Free State artillery and the capability for counter battery fires, the defensive line established between Waterford and Limerick was therefore more symbolic than operational.⁵⁴⁵

⁵⁴⁰ Kissane, *The Politics of the Irish Civil War*, P 78.

⁵⁴¹ De Roiste Diaries, 21 July 1922, Cork City and County Archives, U271/A/45.


⁵⁴² Townsend, *The Republic, The Fight for Irish Independence, 1918-1923*, p.415.

⁵⁴³ McCarthy, *The Irish Revolution, 1912-23 Waterford*, P.105.

⁵⁴⁴ Ralph A. Riccio, *Irish Coastal Landings 1922* (Petersfield, Mushroom Model Publications, 2012), p. 17.

⁵⁴⁵ This is the informed opinion of the author who is a graduate of the US Army Command and General Staff Course and instructed for five years in the Irish Military College on Division, Brigade and Formation level tactics.

Map of Free State Shaping Operations against ‘The Munster Republic’



Map 1. – Free State Shaping Operations against the ‘Munster Republic’ and Defensive line 1922, Irish Civil War.⁵⁴⁶

⁵⁴⁶ Authors own map using graphic designer Tom Reddy, made from research into the Free State shaping operations, and examination of Free State Army campaign maps in Irish Military Archives and newspaper articles in Cork examiner, London Times and Irish Independent from July 1922..

4.4.2 Shaping on the South Eastern Front

Under the command of General John T. Prout, a US Army veteran of World War I, a National Army force of 800 troops began its shaping operations in the southeast of Ireland.⁵⁴⁷ Prout moved the National Army swiftly through Kilkenny, and into Waterford by mid-July 1922.⁵⁴⁸ As a result of this rapid advance, Hopkinson claims that the IRA Forces in Waterford City became isolated and that the Cork and Tipperary IRA units failed to give sufficient support to the Waterford Republican [IRA] Columns.⁵⁴⁹ However, Borgonovo differs stating that up to “100 Cork City IRA Volunteers anchored the Republican defence of Waterford.”⁵⁵⁰ McCarthy agrees stating that in total, Waterford had between 200 and 300 IRA defenders, commanded by Pax Whelan with some volunteers from Cork No 1 Brigade.⁵⁵¹

Prior to the National Army assault, McCarthy states that there was ‘anarchy’ in Waterford City and ultimately IRA indiscipline fatally undermined any prospects of successfully defending it.⁵⁵² Amongst the National Army troops laying siege to Waterford City was the Waterford native, Lt Col Patrick ‘Paddy’ Paul. Because Paul had also served with the British Army in France and was used to planning, Prout requested that he submit a plan for the seizing of the city.⁵⁵³ Paul had also commanded an East Waterford IRA Unit during the War of Independence and he knew the area very well. Importantly the National Army troops under

⁵⁴⁷ McCarthy, *The Irish Revolution, 1912-23, Waterford*, P.106.

⁵⁴⁸ Prout was born in Co. Tipperary and he immigrated to the United States at an early age. At the time of World War I he enlisted in the US 69th National Guard Infantry Regiment, commonly known as “The Fighting 69th.” Prout earned the rank of captain and following the war he returned to Ireland and joined the IRA, becoming the Training and Intelligence Officer of the Third Tipperary Brigade. With the outbreak of the civil war, he sided with the pro-Treaty forces.

⁵⁴⁹ Hopkinson, *The Civil War: The Opening Phase; Atlas of the Irish Revolution*, p. 683.

⁵⁵⁰ Borgonovo, *The Battle for Cork*, p.65.

⁵⁵¹ McCarthy, *The Irish Revolution, 1912-23, Waterford*, P.106.

⁵⁵² Ibid.

⁵⁵³ Ralph A. Riccio, *Irish Coastal Landings 1922* (Petersfield, Mushroom Model Publications, 2012), p. 38.

his command also came from the local southeast counties of Waterford, Wexford, Kilkenny and Tipperary, having a very similar beneficial local knowledge.⁵⁵⁴

The plan envisioned by Paul, who was also a former gunnery officer, consisted of an artillery barrage on Waterford City by Free State gunners.⁵⁵⁵ From the commanding heights of Mount Misery, indirect artillery fire was unleashed onto the city by Free State gunners in order to prepare and subdue the city for a direct assault by the infantry.⁵⁵⁶ Newspapers reported that the use of artillery by the National Army proved to be decisive and “the deadly accuracy of the Irish gunners...compelled the irregulars [IRA] to vacate their best positions. One shell exploded a mine in the infantry barracks [Waterford], whereupon the occupants hurriedly left.”⁵⁵⁷ Liam Deasy, who was the IRA 1st Division Commander, assessed that as a result of the shelling the Waterford defended columns had “broke up, [and] [h]ardly any defence [was] made.”⁵⁵⁸ Townsend agrees emphasising the importance that the artillery had played when he states that “Waterford was taken by Free State troops with a single field gun playing an apparently decisive role.”⁵⁵⁹

The *Irish Independent* reported that at 9pm on Friday 21st July 1922, the pro-Treaty troops lowered the bridge to volleys and cheers and “by crossing the river [Suir] by night, National Forces succeeded in surprising [the IRA] on the quays.” Ferriter states that by 21st July 1922, the only centre of IRA resistance left in the city was the jail.⁵⁶⁰ Free State troops secured the city by “advancing steadily along the quays...are gradually establishing their domination over the city.”⁵⁶¹ A significant victory in arms had been won in Waterford. The line of the ‘Munster Republic’ was now turned on the southeast flank.⁵⁶² Duggan further states

⁵⁵⁴ Duggan *A History of the Irish Army*, p. 89.

⁵⁵⁵ Riccio, *Irish Coastal Landings 1922*, p. 34.

⁵⁵⁶ McCarthy, *The Irish Revolution, 1912-23, Waterford*, P.106.

⁵⁵⁷ *The Irish Independent*, 21 July 1922.

⁵⁵⁸ Interview of Liam Deasy (West Cork IRA) by Ernie O'Malley (O'Malley Papers, UCDA P17b/86, pp. 6-24).

⁵⁵⁹ Townsend, *The Republic, The Fight for Irish Independence, 1918-1923*, p.416.

⁵⁶⁰ Ferriter, *Between Two Hells, The Irish Civil War*, p. 50.

⁵⁶¹ *The Irish Independent*, 21 July 1922.

⁵⁶² Duggan *A History of the Irish Army*, p. 91.

that the Free State could now, “roll up the IRA defensive line through Carrick and Clonmel and there to link up with the forces moving south from the Thurles-Cashel-Roscrea area.”⁵⁶³

In order for the Free State forces to reorganise, recruit, reconstitute and exploit this success, Hopkinson accounts that a consignment of 500 rifles arrived on the gunboat *Helga*⁵⁶⁴ to equip the Free State forces.⁵⁶⁵ With local knowledge, an open advantageous road network, resupply, new recruits and a building momentum, the National Army fanned southwards as they pursued the IRA.⁵⁶⁶ Townsend states that the IRA under Dinny Lacey launched an immediate counter-attack against the National Army in the region. Three IRA columns that had assembled in Carrick-on-Suir advanced on Kilkenny through Mullinavat but retreated again when Lacey thought he had lost the element of surprise.⁵⁶⁷

The *Irish Independent* further reported that the route to the next Free State objective, Carrick-on Suir, was congested and the National Army “cleared Callan, Mullinahone, Ninemilehouse, Kilmogany, and Windgap of the irregulars.”⁵⁶⁸ The London *Times* reported that the anti-Treaty forces “fought stubbornly to retain the position in Carrick-on-Suir and were dislodged only when shrapnel shells burst above them.” Indeed it was also reported that before retreating, they “...made an effort to turn the right flank of the National Army, but the attack was beaten off and they abandoned the town.”⁵⁶⁹ The London *Times* also reported that “in the retreat, the Irregulars blew up all the bridges and cut off the water supply.”⁵⁷⁰ Once the IRA withdrew from the town, a National Army advance party “...entered the town [Carrick-on-Suir] at 2pm to-day [03 August] and were reinforced in the evening by a strong force.”⁵⁷¹

⁵⁶³ Ibid., pp. 89-91.

⁵⁶⁴ The *Helga* was a former British gunboat that the British had used to fire upon Dublin during 1916 Easter Rising, but now it had been given to the National army by the British authorities, in order to assist them in the fight against the IRA.

⁵⁶⁵ Hopkinson, *Green Against Green*, p.155.

⁵⁶⁶ Duggan *A History of the Irish Army*, p. 89.

⁵⁶⁷ Townsend, *The Republic, The Fight for Irish Independence, 1918-1923*, p.416.

⁵⁶⁸ *The Irish Independent*, 04 August 1922.

⁵⁶⁹ *The Times (London)*, 05 August 1922.

⁵⁷⁰ *The Times (London)*, 05 August 1922.

⁵⁷¹ *The Irish Independent*, 04 August 1922.

The London *Times* further reported that “the fall of the town of Carrick-on-Suir, announced today, is a serious blow to the Irregular leaders since the capture makes the evacuation of Clonmel almost certain.”⁵⁷² A number of days later, on 8th August 1922, the London *Times* analysed the battle for the south-east stating that “...the more one follows the operations in the field the more one realizes the difficulties against which the National Forces have to contend... the fact this little town [Carrick-on-Suir], some fifteen miles distant from Waterford, should have fallen a full fortnight after the capture of the latter place is the best proof of the resistance put up by the Irregulars [IRA].”⁵⁷³ This resistance continued and when Carrick-on-Suir was secured, the *Irish Independent* reported that “The irregulars [IRA], estimated at about 300, crossed the river and retreated hurriedly across the mountains towards Kilmacthomas and Dungarvan” and into the west of Waterford.⁵⁷⁴ Dungarvan soon fell to the National Army advance, and the *Irish Independent* reported on 12th August that “the remnants of the irregular [IRA] forces evacuated Dungarvan [on 9th August 1922] ... close on 300 men left the previous day.”⁵⁷⁵

Harrington whilst acknowledging the stubborn resistance by the IRA in parts of the southeast, concludes that many factors and National Army equipment superiority contributed significantly to the collapse of the anti-Treaty forces in the Waterford area and the resultant retreat westward.⁵⁷⁶ An additional advantage of capturing Waterford and clearing the southeast coast of the IRA, meant that the amphibious routes and sea lines of control to the more strategically important Munster cities and towns in the south were now clear for Free State maritime advances.

⁵⁷² *The Times (London)*, 05 August 1922.

⁵⁷³ *The Times (London)*, 08 August 1922.

⁵⁷⁴ *The Irish Independent*, 04 August 1922.

⁵⁷⁵ *The Irish Independent*, 12 August 1922.

⁵⁷⁶ Harrington, *The Munster Republic*, p. 71.

4.4.3 South Western Front

Limerick City was strategically vital because if the Republicans controlled it, they could consolidate their grip on the south and the west of Ireland. In other words, Limerick City linked the west and south of Ireland. The capture of Limerick was also important for the Free State because, according to Borgonovo, the IRA plan had been to use Limerick as a staging base for clearance operations in Clare and Galway before linking up “with Republican concentrations in Sligo and Mayo. They would then march on Dublin.”⁵⁷⁷ Kissane asserts that if the Free State gained control of Limerick, they would “cut off the Republicans in Connacht and Munster from each other and use the city as a base for further attacks on both areas.”⁵⁷⁸ The IRA commander Tom McEllistrim would later recall the strategic significance of Limerick and that he believed the civil war was over once they [IRA] left Limerick.⁵⁷⁹ The strategic importance of Limerick to the IRA was emphasised by de Roiste when he recorded that many of the IRA in Cork have gone in large numbers to defend Limerick and comparatively few remain in Cork City.⁵⁸⁰ Borgonovo reinforces this when he states that “immediately after the Free State [National] Army attacked the Four Courts, the Cork City IRA formed two large flying columns totalling about 100 men and moved on Limerick.”⁵⁸¹ Dwyer adds to the narrative of IRA defenders moving northwards by stating that key IRA men from Kerry “went to areas of county Limerick to defend a mythical defensive line that they set up from Limerick to Waterford in what Eamon de Valera privately called ‘the Republic of Munster’.”⁵⁸²

⁵⁷⁷ Borgonovo, *The Battle for Cork*, p.63.

⁵⁷⁸ Kissane, *The Politics of the Irish Civil War*, p. 78.

⁵⁷⁹ Ferriter, *Between Two Hells, The Irish Civil War*, p. 53.

⁵⁸⁰ De Roiste Diaries, 21 July 1922, Cork City and County Archives, U271/A/45.

⁵⁸¹ Borgonovo, *The Battle for Cork*, p.46.

⁵⁸² T. Ryle Dwyer, *Tans, Terror and Troubles, Kerry's Real Fighting Story 1913-23*, (Cork, Mercier Press, 2001), p.353.

In July 1922, the first nine days of the Battle of Limerick involved intense street fighting that resulted in a stalemate. However, similar to Waterford, the arrival of National Army artillery swung the battle in favour of the Free State, as they bombarded key IRA positions. Townsend states that when General Eoin O'Duffy, who was Operational Commander of the National Army in the southwest, arrived with reinforcements, and an 18-pounder gun, the four key Republican positions in the city were abandoned and left in flames.⁵⁸³ Lacking any artillery of their own, the IRA could not defend all the military barracks in Limerick City and were “demoralised by the gunnery of the Irish troops.” Because of this, the IRA set fire to “the strand Barracks, which had already been breached by the [Free State] artillery.”⁵⁸⁴ On the evening of 21st July, after they burnt their outposts, the IRA retreated south and west from Limerick towards the town of Kilmallock, near the Cork-Limerick border.⁵⁸⁵ On 22nd July, the *Irish Independent* reported that “Limerick has fallen and its long ordeal is at an end. The National Army is in full possession, and the Irregulars [IRA], who occupied so many strong positions, have either been made prisoners or have fled from the city.”⁵⁸⁶ On Friday 28th July, O'Duffy proclaimed that in the subsequent fighting in East Limerick, he would face the “best fighting material the irregulars can muster... . Having concentrated all their forces from Munster on the Kilmallock frontier.”⁵⁸⁷

4.4.4 The Battle for Kilmallock

As the anti-Treaty Republicans from all over Munster, evacuated their defences in Limerick City, resistance then spread out to east and south Limerick County. The IRA forces that

⁵⁸³ Townsend, *The Republic, The Fight for Irish Independence, 1918-1923*, p.416.

⁵⁸⁴ *The Irish Independent*, 22 July 1922.

⁵⁸⁵ Hopkinson, *The Civil War: The Opening Phase; Atlas of the Irish Revolution*, p. 703.

⁵⁸⁶ *The Irish Independent*, 22 July 1922.

⁵⁸⁷ *Limerick Chronicle*, 29 July 1922.

concentrated in the town of Kilmallock were under the command of Liam Deasy.⁵⁸⁸ Kilmallock is located near the border with Cork, and one of the last towns for the National Army troops on the southwest front to capture, before entering into County Cork. Younger assesses that here more than anywhere else during the Irish Civil War the opposing sides faced each other in a conventional setting, as they both occupied clearly defined defensive front lines which consisted of a number of outposts in villages and towns, and upon the high ground.⁵⁸⁹

Traversing the *bocage*-type terrain around Kilmallock proved difficult for the pro-Treaty troops. Moreover, their Tactical Commander, Major General W.R.E Murphy, according to Duggan, was fixated by his trench-warfare experience (he was a senior British Army Officer in France). He was supposedly painfully ponderous, as he inched along, relying on his map, and ordering his troops to dig in the minute they came under sniper fire.⁵⁹⁰ By contrast, the leadership of the opposing IRA force were more dynamic and according to Duggan, Liam Deasy and Sean Moylan were outstanding.⁵⁹¹ Townsend supports Duggan, stating that Deasy was one of the most able IRA commanders and his tenacious defence of the Kilmallock front brought the National Army advance to a standstill and showed that Republican forces could fight positional battles in the countryside.⁵⁹² Deasy himself stated that the “only fight was in Kilmallock area... [with] Cork No. 3 Brigade.”⁵⁹³

Notwithstanding the leadership capabilities contained within the IRA in Kilmallock, eventually the tide of battle turned in favour of the Free State. On Thursday 3rd August 1922, National Army forces consisting of some 2,000 troops supported by armoured cars and artillery began a steady advance on a wide front towards the town.⁵⁹⁴ The *Irish Independent* captured

⁵⁸⁸ Younger, *Ireland's Civil War*, p. 393.

⁵⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁹⁰ Duggan, *A History of the Irish Army*, p. 88.

⁵⁹¹ Ibid.

⁵⁹² Townsend, *The Republic, The Fight for Irish Independence, 1918-1923*, p.416.

⁵⁹³ Interview of Liam Deasy (West Cork IRA) by Ernie O'Malley, O'Malley Papers, P17b/86, pp. 6-24, UCDA.

⁵⁹⁴ Duggan, *A History of the Irish Army*, p. 88.

this decisive moment when it reported that the arrival of the "...armoured car 'Danny Boy' led the troops from the hill on the main road."⁵⁹⁵ Hopkinson states that the arrival of these Free State reinforcements, armour and artillery meant that Republican control of the Kilmallock area was only temporary.⁵⁹⁶ By Saturday 5th August 1922, Free State forces had surrounded the town, and the extra artillery reinforcements had shelled Kilmallock Hill and the surrounding high ground. The National Army then advanced upon this high ground and after some heavy fighting, occupied most of the hills surrounding Kilmallock.⁵⁹⁷ Deasy records the battle by stating that the IRA "broke through [the] line on [the] Bruree side of Kilmallock but [National Army] reinforcements drove them back. They had casualties and captured a good number of prisoners."⁵⁹⁸ Eventually it took one of the 18-pounder field artillery guns giving covering fire and the "dash of the crack Dublin Guards under Comdt Tom Flood" to penetrate the IRA defences. According to Duggan, Kilmallock village was eventually occupied at 4 am on 5th August 1922 after a fierce fight.⁵⁹⁹

John O'Callaghan, the Irish historian doubts the Free State victory was as a result of the brilliant planning of General W.R.E. Murphy but rather it was because there was "no final battle for Kilmallock, no all-out last stand." It was because the IRA "had chosen to abandon the town."⁶⁰⁰

As the IRA withdrew, they destroyed key infrastructure before it could be seized by the National Army. To counteract this, a disgruntled O'Duffy, issued a proclamation stating that his troops had:

...definite orders to fire on any person discovered in the act of (a) destroying bridges, railway lines, stations or signal cabins, canal locks, telephone or telegraph

⁵⁹⁵ *The Irish Independent*, 07 August 1922.

⁵⁹⁶ Hopkinson, *The Civil War The Opening Phase; Atlas of the Irish Revolution*, p. 681.

⁵⁹⁷ Eoin Neeson, *The Civil War in Ireland 1921-23*, (Swords, Co. Dublin, Poolbeg Press, Ltd., 1989), p.208

⁵⁹⁸ Interview of Liam Deasy (West Cork IRA) by Ernie O'Malley, O'Malley Papers, P17b/86, pp. 6-24, UCDA.

⁵⁹⁹ Duggan, *A History of the Irish Army*, p. 88.

⁶⁰⁰ John O'Callaghan, *The Battle For Kilmallock*, (Cork: Mercier Press, 2011), p. 118.

lines, (b) obstructing public roads, felling trees or cutting trenches, [or](c) looting of private or public property.⁶⁰¹

On 8th August 1922, O'Duffy issued a review of the military situation in his Area of Operations. The review stated that "the victorious march of the National troops in the South-Western Command continues from day to day."⁶⁰² It continued:

On 1st August we [National Army] held East and Mid-Limerick from the Tipperary border to the River Maigue. We have since crossed the Maigue and captured Adare, Rathkeale and Newcastle-West, 12 miles beyond the river.⁶⁰³

Accordingly the success of the Free State operations in the southwest of Ireland were a substantial setback for the IRA defensive line as now both flanks had been captured. This seriously damaged the IRA ambitions of defending the independent entity that was the 'Munster Republic'. Dwyer contributes additional information on the IRA strategic predicament in Kilmallock. He states that a substantial amount of IRA men from Kerry and Cork who were fighting to prevent the National Army from advancing south, were disillusioned when they subsequently "got word that they [the Free State] had encircled [them] by sea and landed a strong force in Fenit."⁶⁰⁴ Perhaps Younger assess this strategic setback best when he states that the IRA had to withdraw from Kilmallock "allowing their front door to give so easily was the news that intruders had burst in the back"⁶⁰⁵ With Free State forces threatening from two fronts, the Cork and Kerry IRA withdrew to defend their own regions.

⁶⁰¹ *The Irish Independent*, 05 August 1922.

⁶⁰² *The Irish Independent*, 09 August 1922.

⁶⁰³ *The Irish Independent*, 09 August 1922.

⁶⁰⁴ T. Ryle Dwyer, *Tans, Terror and Troubles, Kerry's Real Fighting Story 1913-23*, (Cork, Mercier Press, 2001), p.354.

⁶⁰⁵ Younger, *Ireland's Civil War*, pp. 396-7.

4.4.5 The Kerry Landings

As already discussed when fighting was ongoing on the Limerick and Waterford fronts, supporting operations and subsequent concurrent amphibious landings of pro-Treaty forces were being planned for Fenit (near Tralee) in County Kerry. Located in the southwest of Ireland, Kerry had witnessed significant fighting during the War of Independence, and a large number of active IRA fighters were located there. But the local fighting strength was diluted as many experienced Kerry volunteers had also been sent to support Kilmallock.⁶⁰⁶ On 2nd August 1922, a Free State force numbering 450 soldiers landed behind enemy lines in Kerry. The *Irish Independent* reported it as “...the most dramatic coup of the present fighting” and stated that the National Army had “...struck a deadly blow at the left flank of the position held by the irregulars [IRA].”⁶⁰⁷ Harrington dramatically describes the landings as “with a roar the Vickers gun of the armoured car, together with Lewis guns and rifles opened up from the deck of the *Lady Wicklow* with terrifying effect ... within half an hour of the ship’s berthing, the first important foothold had been gained in the south.”⁶⁰⁸ The *Irish Independent* reported that “the seaborne landing forces of National Army soldiers quickly gained a lodgement in the costal port by using suppressive heavy machine gun fire to quickly silence the small IRA garrison at Fenit.”⁶⁰⁹ It further reported that the Fenit assault was supported by another landing “...at Tarbert [in Kerry] by a [Free State] force which crossed the Shannon. This took the Irregulars [IRA] by surprise and little opposition was offered to their landing.”⁶¹⁰

Four companies of the Dublin Guards under the command of General Patrick O’Daly disembarked from the chartered ship the *Lady Wicklow* and landed in Fenit. Once ashore and

⁶⁰⁶ Riccio, *Irish Coastal Landings 1922*, p. 50.

⁶⁰⁷ *The Irish Independent*, 05 August 1922.

⁶⁰⁸ Niall C. Harrington, *Kerry Landing: August 1922* (Dublin, Anvil Books, 1992), p. 71.

⁶⁰⁹ *The Irish Independent*, 05 August 1922.

⁶¹⁰ *The Irish Independent*, 05 August 1922.

consolidated, the Dublin Guards moved on to the provincial town (and key terrain) of Tralee, which they captured after a short bloody battle.⁶¹¹ The *London Times*, stated that “a body of National [Free State] troops landed last night at Fenit, some eight miles from Tralee... The secret of their departure was not too well kept, and they were compelled to affect a difficult landing under machine-gun fire, in which they suffered three casualties.”⁶¹² The *London Times* goes into further detail, stating that “the bald facts given above suffice to indicate that the [Free State] Government is determined to close in upon the Irregulars [IRA] on all sides, and has no intention of allowing its opponents, as they fall back from Tipperary and Limerick, to find an unmolested haven in the rugged hills of the south-western extremity of the country.”⁶¹³ Duggan posits that the landing at Fenit, had a chain reaction. Not only did it envelop the rear of the Cork-Kerry anti-Treaty redoubt, it also drew away Kerry units away from the critical battle for Kilmallock, leaving the axis ahead clear for the pro-Treaty forces to advance.⁶¹⁴

From Fenit, the National Army secured Tralee and according to the *Irish Independent* they advanced into the heartland of Kerry where many prisoners were taken, including “...several leaders of the irregulars [IRA] in the county [Kerry].”⁶¹⁵ The seizing of Tralee, according to Doyle “...was a major blow in a powerful Free State punch combination intended to win the war in Munster.”⁶¹⁶ According to O’Donoghue, these landings caused confusion and consternation amongst the rank and file IRA in Kerry and precipitated the same domino Republican collapse in this county as had happened in Waterford.⁶¹⁷ The National Army pushed on from Tralee and “...Castleisland and Farranfore were captured by [Free State] troops at 12.30pm on 05th August.”⁶¹⁸

⁶¹¹ Valiulis, *Portrait of a Revolutionary*, p.103.

⁶¹² *The Times* (London), 04 August 1922.

⁶¹³ *The Times* (London), 04 August 1922.

⁶¹⁴ Duggan *A History of the Irish Army*, p. 94.


⁶¹⁵ *The Irish Independent*, 05 August 1922.

⁶¹⁶ Tom Doyle, *The Summer Campaign in Kerry*, cited by John Borgonovo, *The Battle for Cork* (Cork, Mercier Press, 2011), p.77.

⁶¹⁷ Florence O’Donoghue, *No Other Law* (Dublin, Avril Books 1986), p.266.

⁶¹⁸ *The Irish Independent*, 09 August 1922.

Map of Kerry Landings - August 1922



Map 2. – The ‘Munster Republic’ and Free State Amphibious Landings August 1922, Irish Civil War.⁶¹⁹

Retreating from various former IRA strongholds in Kerry, “[IRA] Irregulars from many parts have assembled in the town and hilly country about Killarney.”⁶²⁰ The attention of these IRA volunteers turned on the local inhabitants and “scores of young men known to be loyal to the [Free State] Government were rounded up and brought out to trench roads and construct

⁶¹⁹ Map Generated by Author with Graphic Designer Tom Reddy using Reports from Cork Examiner, Irish Independent and cited literature and map created by Paul V. Walsh, *The Irish Civil War 1922-1923: A Military Study of the Conventional Phase, 28 June - 11 August 1922*. Paper delivered to NYMAS at the CUNY Graduate Center, New York, N.Y. on 11 December 1998.

⁶²⁰ *The Irish Independent*, 14 August 1922.

defensive works on the hills, whilst armed Irregulars [IRA] stood over them giving instructions.”⁶²¹

On 11th August a further 200 strong invasion force under Commandant Tom O’Connor landed in Kenmare. This force went on to secure Rathmore and Millstreet on the Cork-Kerry border before doubling back to seize Cahersiveen. By mid-August the National Army had taken most of the main population centres in Kerry.⁶²² The subsequent battle for Kerry would take many more months and bitter fighting continued until the very end of the civil war in May 1923. Nevertheless, the Kerry landings helped encircle the IRA in Munster, as well as providing a very beneficial rehearsal for the main landings in Cork, a few days later.

4.5 From Shaping to Decisive Operation

The end of Republican resistance in Waterford, coupled with the fall of Limerick, meant that both ends of the much vaunted ‘Waterford-Limerick Defensive Line’ were in government hands.⁶²³ The relative speed with which the Free State forces rolled up the anti-Treaty defensive flanks, and the success of their attacks on the Tipperary towns at the centre of the IRA defensive line reinforced the perceptions of the anti-Treaty leadership that the main Free State strike would come from Dublin, through Tipperary, and eventually on to Cork. National Army leaders were content to reinforce these perceptions but planners recognised that the fight to capture the decisive terrain of Cork City by a land route would be long and arduous, especially with the IRA preparing and reinforcing their defences in North Cork. Speculation was rife as

⁶²¹ *The Irish Independent*, 14 August 1922.

⁶²² Dwyer, *Tans, Terror and Troubles, Kerry’s Real Fighting Story 1913-23*, p.354.

⁶²³ McCarthy, *The Irish Revolution, 1912-23, Waterford*, P.109.

to what axis of advance the National Army would take to seize Cork City and County, and “as to whether the Irregulars [IRA] will make a stand at all in Cork City.”⁶²⁴

During the summer of 1922, the IRA in Cork had sent many of its best fighters to the southwest and southeast fronts, leaving Cork exposed to a direct attack. This was an IRA vulnerability and a major advantage to the National Army who as the fighting progressed, were transforming into a competent and well organised fighting force. The improving organisational structures and reporting lines of communications within the Free State were captured in Cabinet Minutes which highlighted the speed of advancement and identified the need for the Free State Government to be situationally aware.⁶²⁵ The opposing IRA had no such organisation in place, and as a force they suffered as a result of the fighting encountered during the summer months of 1922. As Borgonovo states, the Republican forces were “built for guerrilla operations, [and] the organisation of the IRA did not adjust well to conventional fighting.”⁶²⁶

As fighting continued, the Free State started to refine their tactics. They relied more on the fighting abilities of the National Army troops, especially the Dublin Guard, and the use of artillery. The advances of the National Army south would have certainly focused the minds and concentration of those IRA men left to defend Cork. De Roiste opinions that “the likelihood is that they themselves have not yet definitely decided what to do regarding Cork City. The actual forces here are now small.”⁶²⁷ O’Caoimh posits that “even though most of the best pre-Treaty fighting men had gone anti-Treaty, their hearts were not really in the struggle.”⁶²⁸ Cork would test this resolve and ultimately prove to be the decisive operation for the National Army

⁶²⁴ De Roiste Diaries, 21 July 1922, Cork City and County Archives, U271/A/45.

⁶²⁵ Cabinet of the Provisional Government, (Meeting Minutes) 24th July 1922 DT/1/1/1, NAI.

⁶²⁶ Borgonovo, *The Battle for Cork*, p.129.

⁶²⁷ De Roiste Diaries, 21 July 1922, Cork City and County Archives, U271/A/45.

⁶²⁸ Information from Peadar O’Donnell, 2 August 1984 and from “Todd” Andrews, 3 August 1984; interviews cited by Padraig O Caoimh *Richard Mulcahy From the Politics of War to the Politics of Peace, 1913-1924* (Newbridge, Irish Academic Press, 2019), p. 130.

during the conventional phase of fighting. By capturing Cork, the status of the ‘Munster Republic’ would be severely undermined.

4.6 The Cork Landings – The Decisive Operation/ Campaign Fulcrum

*The Decisive Operation is the operation that directly accomplishes the mission. It determines the outcome of a large-scale combat operation, battle or engagement.*⁶²⁹

Turning Movement- A form of [Offensive] manoeuvre in which the attacking force seeks to avoid the enemy's principal defensive positions by seizing objectives behind the enemy's current positions, thereby causing the enemy force to move out of his current positions or divert major forces to meet the threat. A major threat to his rear forces the enemy to attack or withdraw rearward, thus "turning" him out of his defensive positions.⁶³⁰

On 4th August 1922, Mulcahy assured Collins that the only ‘definite military problem’ was the Waterford-Cork-Kerry-Limerick area. Everywhere else the problems were minor, and the army could operate in support of the police.⁶³¹ Mulcahy believed that in the turbulent regions of Munster, the army had to take the lead. In a letter to Collins, he confidently stated that “the establishing of ourselves in a few more of these positions would mean the resurgence of the people from their present cowed condition and the immediate demoralisation of the Irregular [IRA] rank and file.”⁶³²

Cork City and County was one of the more important of these positions because following the outbreak of hostilities in June 1922, the city of Cork found itself cut off from much of Ireland and under direct IRA military rule. According to Borgonovo, Cork was important because it is a main population centre, supply hub, and a key industrial and communications centre for the south. The six-week life of the ‘Munster’ or ‘Cork Republic’

⁶²⁹ US Army Field Manual (ADP) 3-0, *Operations* (October 2017).

⁶³⁰ US Army Field Manual (ADP) 3-0, *Operations* (October 2017).

⁶³¹ Townsend, *The Republic, The Fight for Irish Independence, 1918-1923*, p.428

⁶³² Mulcahy, letter to Commander-in-Chief, 4 August 1922, Mulcahy Papers P7/B/143 UCDA.

was not entirely accepted by the population and successful amphibious landings could harness this reaction and prove decisive, because as Hart speculates that during this period the IRA, had assumed the role of an occupying army.⁶³³

The population of Cork, was not wholeheartedly against the Treaty. In fact, Cork gives an accurate picture of the unhappy relationship that existed generally between the civilian population and the anti-Treaty military administration during the civil war.⁶³⁴ There was a level of general dissatisfaction on the part of the populace towards the anti-Treaty regime in the city. This was exaggerated when the rising levels of unemployment were matched by rising taxes on the part of the occupiers.⁶³⁵ Adding to the dissatisfaction amongst the population of Cork, was that “every available motor vehicle was seized [by the IRA]...while large quantities of foodstuffs were commandeered.”⁶³⁶ Hart states that “once again fearful townspeople and farmers were sleeping in the fields at night” to avoid the IRA rampages.⁶³⁷ De Roiste assessed that 99 per cent of the people of Cork City would welcome, cheer, and applaud the National Forces if they did they come to Cork. He also reasoned that, “within the past few days, feeling has grown very strong here that the best chance for peace is the absolute defeat of the Irregulars [IRA].” ... “The people indeed object to the swaggering airs and the “Commandeering” and the threats and terrorism of the Irregular [IRA] forces.”⁶³⁸ The National Army would have been aware of this dissent among sections of Cork society and sought to take advantage of it turning this dissent within Cork society into an IRA vulnerability.

⁶³³ Hart, *The IRA and Its Enemies: Violence and Community in Cork 1916-1923*, p.118.

⁶³⁴ Neeson, *The Civil War in Ireland*, p.144.

⁶³⁵ Riccio, *Irish Coastal Landings 1922*, p. 61.

⁶³⁶ Freeman’s Journal 21 Aug 1922 and Irish Independent 12 August 1922; cited by Hart, *The IRA and Its Enemies: Violence and Community in Cork 1916-1923*, p.118.

⁶³⁷ Hart, *The IRA and Its Enemies: Violence and Community in Cork 1916-1923*, p.118.

⁶³⁸ De Roiste Diaries, 25 July 1922, Cork City and County Archives, U271/A/45.

4.6.1 Cork as an Amphibious Target

As the summer fighting campaign intensified in 1922, the status of Cork City as the capital of the Munster Republic was waning. Neeson wrote, the “regional status and symbol of secession was really threatened when Waterford and Limerick were captured by the pro-Treaty forces, the city [Cork] was left open to attack by land and by sea.”⁶³⁹ Imaginative sea landings at Westport had already clinched the takeover of Mayo in the west of Ireland. Castlebar was taken on 25th July 1922, and it was supported by a National Army division sweeping westward from Athlone practically unopposed.⁶⁴⁰ When included with the successful Kerry landings, amphibious operations in the west and southwest acted as the supporting operations and test cases for the more strategically important landings into Cork.

The Cork landings were planned for early August 1922. Collins had been told by various sources, including family members, that if the National Army arrived in force inside Munster, it would be well received by the citizens who were anxious to be relieved from the ‘oppressions’ of rule by the IRA.⁶⁴¹ As previously acknowledged, the majority of the experienced fighting men in Cork had in fact sided with the anti-Treaty IRA side. However, according to Free State reports it was felt that some of these forces would only fight “half-heartedly... [Because] with such men it is a case of bread and butter. Many of those would have joined the National Army had they the opportunity of doing so.”⁶⁴² De Roiste stated what he had learnt from every day conversations in Cork prior to the landings. He assessed that while the IRA “will make their headquarters in Cork City. They will only conduct the guerilla

⁶³⁹ Neeson, *The Civil War in Ireland*, p.144.

⁶⁴⁰ Duggan, *A History of the Irish Army*, p. 94.

⁶⁴¹ Emmet Dalton interview with Padraig O Raghallaigh, *RTE Radio*, February-March 1977, cited by Sean Boyne, *Emmet Dalton* (Dublin, Merrion Press, 2015), p. 180.

⁶⁴² Report on the situation in Cork, 19 July 1922, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/40, UCDA.

campaign from it, and still not fight in the city itself, but evacuate it without fighting and withdraw to the country westward and engage in guerilla tactics.”⁶⁴³

The IRA defences of Cork had been based, largely, on the assumption that any attack would come by land and from the north. However, the IRA did have defences along the south coast pre-empting Free State amphibious actions. The rolling up of the Waterford-Limerick line and the concentration of Free State forces on the Kilmallock, Tipperary, and Waterford fronts had certainly encouraged and reinforced the previous assumptions of a land attack already held by the leadership of the IRA. The National Army did nothing to discourage it. On the contrary, according to Neeson, they ordered diversionary attacks well to the north of Cork, which had the desired effect of employing the bulk of the IRA forces over a broad front.⁶⁴⁴ The Free State leadership having witnessed the stiff resistance of the IRA in Kilmallock, Tipperary and North Cork, assessed that a turning movement was the best course of action. A turning movement from the sea would also be necessary to avoid the damage and blockages that had been wrought to the transportation infrastructure in north Munster by the anti-Treaty forces. This was coupled with the presence of significant numbers of anti-Treaty troops still in the north of Cork County.⁶⁴⁵ Boyne supports this by stating that large parts of the province of Munster were still under the control of anti-Treaty forces, especially the northern approaches to Cork City and County.⁶⁴⁶ Jim Byrne, who served in the National Army and landed in Cork by sea, recalled simply that “...there was no such thing as a railway or a road, they were all blocked or blown up.”⁶⁴⁷ The blocking of routes and the strong resistance of the IRA was a common theme in newspaper reports from the period and the London *Times* elaborated that the

⁶⁴³ De Roiste Diaries, 21 July 1922, Cork City and County Archives, U271/A/45.

⁶⁴⁴ Neeson, *The Civil War in Ireland*, p.152.

⁶⁴⁵ Riccio, *Irish Coastal Landings 1922*, p. 61.

⁶⁴⁶ Boyne, *Emmet Dalton*, p. 178.

⁶⁴⁷ Tape recorded interview from 1985 with Jim Byrne from Newtown Kildare who served with the National Army during the Irish Civil War. A copy of the recording was given to the author in October 2020 by Eamonn Mulvihill of Enfield Meath.

Free State forces “...were constantly forced to turn back owing to obstructions... dodging under telegraph wires stretched across the roads and wriggling through the debris of destroyed railway bridges.”⁶⁴⁸ The paper further analysed that “...the more one follows the operations in the field the more one realizes the difficulties against which the National Forces have to contend....”⁶⁴⁹ A land attack on Cork City would have been resisted by IRA forces in North Cork and slowed by obstacles and the destruction of key transport infrastructure in the region.

With these considerations the Free State were aware that attacking the Republican positions head-on would be slow and result in heavy casualties, so according to Valiulis, the National Army leadership, devised a strategy to outflank the IRA by sea.⁶⁵⁰ Thus, the strategy of seaborne landings by National Army troops first in Kerry and then in Cork, as espoused by Valiulis, would achieve the following desired end-state if successful:⁶⁵¹

1. Enable the National Army to capture large tracts of undefended ‘enemy’ territory.
2. Disrupt the Republicans’ lines of communication.
3. Draw Republican forces from the Limerick-Waterford line allowing the remainder of the National Army to continue its advance southwards.⁶⁵²

A secondary effect and additional advantage of the turning/amphibious landings in Cork City was that the land advance southwards by the remainder of the National Army forces, would be hastened by IRA troops having to withdraw from the defensive line to defend Cork City. These Free State advances south would also allow for link up operations with the National Army troops who had been part of the seaborne landings into Cork and Kerry. If successfully executed, the seaborne and land advances on Cork City had the possibility of entrapping and capturing many IRA fighters between the advancing National Army soldiers on both flanks.

⁶⁴⁸ *The Times (London)*, 08 August 1922.

⁶⁴⁹ *The Times (London)*, 08 August 1922.

⁶⁵⁰ Valiulis, *Portrait of a Revolutionary*, p.103.

⁶⁵¹ That state of affairs which needs to be achieved at the end of a campaign either to terminate or to resolve the conflict on favourable or satisfactory terms. British JWP 5-00.

⁶⁵² Valiulis, *Portrait of a Revolutionary*, p.103.

However to achieve this, coordination and cooperation between the various Free State commanders was vital.

4.6.2 Planning for the Attack

The initial planning for the coastal landings in Cork was done by Major General Emmet Dalton and his staff. He was one of the finest field commanders of the Irish Civil War. Though still only twenty-four years old, he possessed extensive First World War combat experience, having won the Military Cross on the Western Front while still a teenager.⁶⁵³ Borgonovo states that he “had commanded relatively large bodies of British troops, but also learned guerrilla warfare during his later IRA service.”⁶⁵⁴ Dalton had also served with the British Army during Allenby’s advance through Palestine and Syria, where he would have witnessed first-hand how effective hybrid or proxy warfare could be.⁶⁵⁵ His awareness of doctrine associated with hybrid warfare is questionable but he would recognise its significance, the necessity for the support of a locally recruited force, and the importance of local knowledge when dealing with complex operations in a hostile environment.⁶⁵⁶ Whilst serving in the British Army, Dalton had also learnt to be a military planner and how to write operations orders. The Dalton Papers in the National Library have examples of detailed hand-written operations orders produced by Dalton for combat operations and exercises by the 2nd Leinster Regiment during and after the First World War.⁶⁵⁷ How knowledgeable Dalton was on amphibious warfare is debateable but whilst serving as a

⁶⁵³ Hopkinson, *Green Against Green*, p.163.

⁶⁵⁴ Borgonovo, *The Battle for Cork*, p.80.

⁶⁵⁵ Hybrid or Proxy warfare is when a conventional force empowers a local militia to fight against an adversary in order to enhance their combat power or effectiveness.

⁶⁵⁶ Casualty Form – Active Service, Lieut Dalton J.E, Attd 6th Leinsters – British Army.

⁶⁵⁷ Operation Orders - Emmet Dalton Papers, MS 46,687/3 NLI.

member of the Royal Dublin Fusiliers (RDF) and the 10th 'Irish' Division, he would have been exposed to veterans who had participated in the British amphibious landings in Gallipoli.⁶⁵⁸⁶⁵⁹

Within the National Army General Staff were other British Army veterans, including Major General Dermot (Diarmuid) McManus. Originally from Mayo, McManus completed a cadetship in the British Royal Military Academy in Sandhurst in 1910. He fought with the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers during World War I, and was wounded during the Gallipoli amphibious landings. McManus joined the National Army before the Civil War and helped plan the Free State landings in Cork and Kerry in August 1922. He was in charge of the successful National army Amphibious landings at Tarbert (03 August) and Kenmare (11 August).⁶⁶⁰

Alongside those planners with World War I experiences, there was a cohort of pro-Treaty IRA leaders who had gained valuable combat experience and connections over the last number of years fighting against the British. Major General Tom Ennis, who served as Dalton's second-in-command during the Cork landings and subsequent campaign in Cork, was one. He was a veteran of the 1916 Easter Rising and commanded the Dublin Brigade's 2nd Battalion during the War of Independence. Ennis was an intelligent and charismatic leader, considered by Ernie O'Malley to be 'the best officer in Dublin'.⁶⁶¹ Borgonovo states that reflecting his high level of competence, Ennis was charged with storming the Four Courts at the start of the civil war and amongst the former Dublin Street fighters, "Ennis enjoyed perhaps the smoothest transition to a conventional officer."⁶⁶²

⁶⁵⁸ McCanace, *History of the Royal Munster Fusiliers. 1861 to 1922* (Uckfield, Naval and Military Press, 2017). p. 24.

⁶⁵⁹ Aspinall Oglander, *Military operations – Gallipoli, vol. 1* (London, Imperial War Museum, 1928). p. 141. Chapter 3, Section 41, Pp. 64-67 of Field Service Regulations 1909 outlines the general principles of co-operation between the Navy and Army.

⁶⁶⁰ Riccio, *Irish Coastal Landings 1922*, p. 60.

⁶⁶¹ O'Malley, *Dublin's Fighting Story*, p. 289.

⁶⁶² Borgonovo, *The Battle for Cork*, p.80.

The plan that Dalton chose was simple but audacious. These fundamentals are key for most successful offensive operations. The plan involved setting sail from Dublin with a large body of Free State troops and then “launching the attack from the open sea into Cork Harbour and steaming all the way up the River Lee before landing in the city centre itself and capturing the critical bridges intact before the Republicans could respond.”⁶⁶³ This was important for so many reasons including resupply, reinforcement and freedom of movement.

4.6.3 Required Shipping

When the Free State began planning for the coastal landings in Cork, Kerry and Mayo, the Provisional Government had no ships of its own that had the requisite troop-carrying capacity to transport an attack force. The former British gunboat *Helga*, used in 1916 to shell Dublin, was given to the Irish by the British and it would later support the Cork landings at Youghal. In subsequent operations along the West Cork coast in September, the *Helga* landed troops and armoured cars at Bantry.⁶⁶⁴ The only available option open was to charter the services of commercial vessels available to Ireland.⁶⁶⁵ As early as 15th July 1922, Mulcahy wrote a memo to Collins providing a list of vessels that could be made available as troop transports.⁶⁶⁶

Two suitable ships were identified to support the amphibious landings in Cork, namely the *Arvonja* and the *Lady Wicklow*. They were chartered on 20th July 1922 by the Free State Government from London & North-Western Railways. The charter terms stated that “the cargo

⁶⁶³ Ibid., p.70.

⁶⁶⁴ *Connacht Tribune*, 16 September 1922.

⁶⁶⁵ Riccio, *Irish Coastal Landings 1922*, p. 27.

⁶⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 9.

shall be laden and discharged at all ports to which the vessels may be ordered.”⁶⁶⁷ The charter also stated that the Steamship *Arvonian* is provided:

Commencing from 20th day of July 1922... to be placed, with clear holds, at the disposal of the charterers at Holyhead, they being tight, staunch, and in every way fitted for service, and being maintained by the owners with a full complement of Officers, Seamen, Engineers, and Firemen necessary.⁶⁶⁸

Jointness at both the military and the civil-military level was required to ensure the successful execution of these plans. This jointness would also be supported by critical intelligence processed by the Free State.

4.6.4 Intelligence Assessment

Prior to any large-scale operation, the intelligence preparation of the battle space is a vital piece of the planning jigsaw. The National Army’s intelligence department was built during the War of Independence and was essentially a counter-intelligence organization rather than a tactical intelligence one. It did not direct its efforts towards the gathering and processing of basic intelligence data that would support large scale operations. These necessary intelligence requirements include information on the enemy order of battle and combat capabilities; location of military and police installations; tide tables; offloading capabilities at ports selected for landings; and possible anti-Treaty defensive measures, locations and capabilities.⁶⁶⁹ This certainly hampered the prior planning by the National Army but the pro-Treaty government forces did have a number of intelligence assets available in Cork and received assistance from many other sources which included; ex-British Army servicemen living in Cork and the

⁶⁶⁷ File on *Arvonian*, (Irish Military Archives IE/MA/DoD/A/5412), MAI.

⁶⁶⁸ File on *Arvonian*, (Irish Military Archives IE/MA/DoD/A/5413), MAI.

⁶⁶⁹ Riccio, *Irish Coastal Landings 1922*, p. 14.

residual British forces still in Ireland, especially the Royal Navy.⁶⁷⁰ Borgonovo states that other Free State human intelligence operatives were active in Cork and a number of these were arrested by the IRA prior to the landings.”⁶⁷¹

Additional intelligence on the strength, location and disposition of anti-Treaty forces in the area was also obtained by other covert intelligence sources in Cork – these included Michael Collins’ own sister, Mary Collins Powell - who seems to have been very well informed concerning the defenses of Cork.⁶⁷² Additional support to Dalton and his planners in other domains included intelligence provided at the joint level by way of aerial reconnaissance flights carried out by the new Military Air Service in advance of the landings.⁶⁷³ Also on-board one of the landing ships in Cork was the Free State officer Captain Frank O’Friel who had spent his boyhood in the Cork harbour area where his father had served as a lighthouse keeper.⁶⁷⁴

In comparison the IRA lacked intelligence resources, especially in the Free State staging area of Dublin. They may have envisioned Free State amphibious operations but because of Free State pressure they could not determine when and where they would occur. The IRA “were incapable of warning Munster Republicans about troops sailing for the south.”⁶⁷⁵

⁶⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 15.

⁶⁷¹ Borgonovo, *The Battle for Cork*, p.53.

⁶⁷² Riccio, *Irish Coastal Landings 1922*, p. 72 and MOC [Micheal O Coileain], *Air Services*, 4 August 1922, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/10, UCDA.

⁶⁷³ MOC [Micheal O Coileain], *Air Services*, 4 August 1922, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/10, UCDA.

⁶⁷⁴ Borgonovo, *The Battle for Cork*, p.81.

⁶⁷⁵ Ibid., p.67.

4.7 Execution of the Plan

By early August 1922, the forces of the 'Cork Republic' fell back as the Free State forces advanced from the north.⁶⁷⁶ Meanwhile Dalton, as the Operational Commander for the amphibious operation, set about planning to secure Cork City by using a three-pronged assault from the sea. The main force objective was Cork City, with two other supporting objectives at Youghal and Union Hall.⁶⁷⁷ The plan, in detail, was as follows. The main force, which Dalton termed Party A, was for Cork City and had a strength of about 450 men, while the first supporting force was called Party B, for East Cork at Youghal, having a strength of about 200. Finally, Party C was for West Cork at Union Hall with about 150 men.⁶⁷⁸ In total, over 800 soldiers of the National Army had assembled at the North Wall Quay in Dublin to board the ships that took them down the coast to Cork.⁶⁷⁹ *The Arvonian* and *Lady Wicklow* set sail for the main objective from Dublin with Dalton and his second in command, Ennis, taking charge of the expedition from on-board the *Arvonian*. On board the *Lady Wicklow*, were armoured cars and an eighteen-pound gun.⁶⁸⁰ These combat support platforms represented a sizeable commitment of National Army assets.⁶⁸¹

The port of embarkation for all of the landing forces was Dublin, due both to the availability of shipping there as well as to the concentration of troops and equipment. Riccio calculates that *The Helga* and *Alexandra* departed for the supporting objectives of Youghal and Union Hall (respectfully) in the late evening of 6th August, before the embarkation of the ships bound for Cork City. These left a little after noon on 7th August.⁶⁸²

⁶⁷⁶ Hart, *The IRA and Its Enemies: Violence and Community in Cork 1916-1923*, p.118.

⁶⁷⁷ Boyne, *Emmet Dalton*, p. 181.

⁶⁷⁸ Ibid.


⁶⁷⁹ Valiulis, *Portrait of a Revolutionary*, p.104.

⁶⁸⁰ Hopkinson, *Green Against Green*, p. 163.

⁶⁸¹ Riccio, *Irish Coastal Landings 1922*, p. 14.

⁶⁸² Riccio, *Irish Coastal Landings 1922*, p. 75.

Map of National Army Landings in Munster



Map 3. – The ‘Munster Republic’ and Free State Amphibious Landings August 1922, Irish Civil War.⁶⁸³

The captain of *Arvonía* had informed Dalton that his plan was impossible and that he and his mostly Welsh crew did not wish to become embroiled in a battle between Irishmen.⁶⁸⁴ However, once they sailed, the crews of all the ships involved proved to be extremely competent as described by Dalton when he wrote to the Chief of Staff of the National Army:

⁶⁸³ Map Generated by Author with Graphic Designer Tom Reddy using Reports from *Cork Examiner*, *Irish Independent* and cited literature and map created by Paul V. Walsh, *The Irish Civil War 1922-1923: A Military Study of the Conventional Phase, 28 June - 11 August 1922*. Paper delivered to NYMAS at the CUNY Graduate Center, New York, N.Y. on 11 December 1998.

⁶⁸⁴ Riccio, *Irish Coastal Landings 1922*, p. 75.

I AM WRITING THIS ABOARD THE ARVONIA JUST BEFORE I GIVE ORDERS TO SAIL.

I think that in view of the tremendous difficulties that presented themselves to us on this expedition a word of thanks and appreciation is due to the captain and crew of the ship. They have really behaved very well and if they were a bit nervous and tense it is not to be wondered at.

I would consider it advisable for you to write the ships owners stating your appreciation of the work they have done.

I have a special word for the captain who was really splendid.

I have presented the Stewarts with £20.

Is mise,

JE Dalton⁶⁸⁵

Facing the Free State Maritime Task Force when it landed was the Cork IRA. Anecdotal evidence suggests that many of the defending IRA troops were not of the highest quality, as a good number of the best Cork troops had been sent to aid in the defence of Kilmallock and Waterford.⁶⁸⁶ IRA reinforcements also came from other areas within the ‘Munster Republic’, so that at times units found themselves in totally unfamiliar territory.⁶⁸⁷ Facing this, the Cork City landing contingent comprised soldiers from the 2nd Eastern Division of the National Army’s Eastern Command. The majority of these troops came from “...the Dublin Guards battalion, which had participated in the recent Dublin fighting and was composed of former IRA veterans.”⁶⁸⁸ However not all the Free State soldiers were veterans, and some had only just been recruited and they had to be instructed on basic rifleman skills as they sailed for Cork.⁶⁸⁹

⁶⁸⁵ Letter from Major General JE Dalton to Chief of Staff National Army from on-board the Arvonnia, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/66, UCDA.

⁶⁸⁶ Interview of Liam Deasy (West Cork IRA) by Ernie O’Malley, O’Malley Papers, P17b/86, pp. 6-24, UCDA.

⁶⁸⁷ Riccio, *Irish Coastal Landings 1922*, p. 15.

⁶⁸⁸ Borgonovo, *The Battle for Cork*, p.79.

⁶⁸⁹ Riccio, *Irish Coastal Landings 1922*, p. 72.

4.8 The Landings

Between 11pm and after midnight on 7th to 8th August 1922, a force of 200 men landed at Youghal and 180 disembarked at Union Hall. At Union Hall the IRA had mined the pier so the National Army troops rowed ashore with the primary objective of taking the larger town of Skibbereen in West Cork which was vacated by the IRA on 8th August 1922.⁶⁹⁰

Ted O’Sullivan, who was in West Cork, recollected that in “Skibbereen Barracks [we] had from 20 to 30 [IRA] men. We had complete control of the area from 3rd July to the middle of August [1922].” O’Sullivan speculated that behind his back “the Free State crowd were quietly organizing all the time. Skibbereen sent most men to Dublin to join the Free State Army. And they got good men in Skibbereen.”⁶⁹¹ When the “Free State troops landed at Glandore and Union Hall where [the IRA] had a small outpost as coast watchers. They cleared them out and they [The IRA] retreated to Leap, and the Free State came to Skibbereen.” O’Sullivan explains how the IRA “rushed troops down, but they [National Army] had already reached Skibbereen by moving across country for 5 miles, but it had been organized by the Free State before this. This was a strongly Free State area and our friends there were very few.”⁶⁹² On the opposing side an eye-witness account from Jim Byrne of the National Army states that after the landing they “...worked [their] way under fire, constantly being attacked, to Skibbereen and a short time in Skibbereen [they] started off to work [their] way further down towards Clonakilty...

⁶⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 70.

⁶⁹¹ Interview of Ted O’Sullivan (West Cork IRA) by Ernie O’Malley, O’Malley Papers, P17b/108, pp. 1-27, UCDA.

⁶⁹² Interview of Ted O’Sullivan (West Cork IRA) by Ernie O’Malley, O’Malley Papers, P17b/108, pp. 1-27, UCDA.

we were all the time on the go.”⁶⁹³ On the route the National Army passed a “...place called Sam’s Cross where Michael Collins was born and reared, and we moved onto Clonakilty.”⁶⁹⁴

Meanwhile and concurrently in Youghal, a force of 200 men landed under the guns of the Helga. They also landed two armoured cars and an 18-pound field artillery gun.⁶⁹⁵ Dalton reported to Dublin that they “had a heavy fight for Youghal.”⁶⁹⁶ Eventually after gaining a lodgment, the National Army troops posted strong guards on all the roads into the town. They then fanned out and waited to conduct effective link-up operation with those that were landing in Cork City.⁶⁹⁷

In the early hours of Tuesday, 8th August 1922, the *Lady Wicklow* and *Arvonía* entered Cork Harbour and made their way up the River Lee.⁶⁹⁸ Contrary to popular misconceptions the IRA did fear an amphibious attack and took steps to try and prevent them but did not have significant resources. In Cork, IRA engineers had mined piers and approaches to likely landing spots. They had prepared bridges for demolition and erected road barriers guarded by sentries.⁶⁹⁹

Dalton had initially planned to steam upriver into Cork City as far as Ford’s Wharf [Ford Motor Car Factory] and to disembark his main body there. However the plan was altered radically when Dalton was apprised that the IRA had obstructed the river upstream by positioning two ships in Cork Harbour to act as a boom. Because of this the Free State landing force could not progress all the way up the River Lee into the city centre.⁷⁰⁰ The British Royal

⁶⁹³ Tape recorded interview from 1985 with Jim Byrne from Newtown Kildare who served with the National Army during the Irish Civil War. A copy of the recording was given to the author in October 2020 by Eamonn Mulvihill of Enfield Meath.

⁶⁹⁴ Tape recorded interview from 1985 with Jim Byrne from Newtown Kildare who served with the National Army during the Irish Civil War. A copy of the recording was given to the author in October 2020 by Eamonn Mulvihill of Enfield Meath.

⁶⁹⁵ Borgonovo, *The Battle for Cork*, p.79.

⁶⁹⁶ Report from Arvonía to GHQ Dublin (A/563) 13 August 1922, Mulchay Papers P7/B/70, UCDA.

⁶⁹⁷ *Irish Independent*, 12 August 1922

⁶⁹⁸ Valiulis, *Portrait of a Revolutionary*, p.104.

⁶⁹⁹ Borgonovo, *The Battle for Cork*, pp.61-68.

⁷⁰⁰ Borgonovo, *The Battle for Cork*, pp 72-89.

Navy were still occupying their strategic seaports in Cork Harbour and according to Boyne, they were taken by surprise by the arrival of Dalton's seaborne forces.⁷⁰¹ Once communications were established, the Royal Navy advised the Captain of the *Arvonía* that he needed a pilot to take him further up the River Lee to Cork. The British summoned a pilot at Cobh, and he went on-board the *Arvonía* to help the Free State landing force.⁷⁰² With this support, and advice alternate plans were made, and the main landing force successfully selected and gained a lodgement in Passage West, a port town situated on the west bank of Cork Harbour, some 10 km southeast of Cork City.

Dalton recorded this hindrance quite simply in his after-action report when he stated "A' Landing had not taken place as arranged, but the alternative landing had been made at Passage West without loss."⁷⁰³ A newspaper correspondent clocked the docking at exactly 2:20AM and the first troops were ashore two minutes later on 8th August.⁷⁰⁴ Neeson states that the IRA were taken by surprise.⁷⁰⁵ Borgonovo counters, arguing that "within ninety minutes of the Free State army troops landing in Cork, a fierce cross-river firefight broke out and bridges began to explode around the City."⁷⁰⁶ The IRA destroyed the bridge on the road from Passage West to Cork City and the sound of the explosion added to the panic and confusion being experienced by the local population.⁷⁰⁷

As fires erupted between the National Army and IRA, the *Arvonía* berthed in Passage West, and within ten minutes of landing, 150 to 200 troops went quickly ashore and divided into three parties to form a protective screen half a mile inland.⁷⁰⁸ Boyne stated that the National Army also successfully disembarked "...an eighteen-pounder field gun...two

⁷⁰¹ Boyne, *Emmet Dalton*, p. 184.

⁷⁰² Ibid.

⁷⁰³ Dalton letter to Commander-in-Chief, 11 September 1922, IE/MA/ CW/OPS/2/4.

⁷⁰⁴ *The Irish Times*, 15 August 1922; *The Freeman's Journal*, 15 August 1922.

⁷⁰⁵ Neeson, *The Civil War in Ireland*, p.149.

⁷⁰⁶ Borgonovo, *The Battle for Cork*, p.88.

⁷⁰⁷ Valiulis, *Portrait of a Revolutionary*, p.105.

⁷⁰⁸ Riccio, *Irish Coastal Landings 1922*, p. 80.

armoured cars, a Rolls Royce Whippet known as *The Manager* equipped with the usual Vickers machine gun, and a Peerless, a much heavier vehicle with twin Hotchkiss machine guns.”⁷⁰⁹ However, according to Riccio, the disembarking of the heavy Peerless armoured car proved more difficult as no suitable crane was available in Passage West. The National Army had to wait for a lower tide to offload the Peerless from the ship directly onto the dock.⁷¹⁰ Extra rifles were also disembarked because it was planned that each contingent would rapidly expand its strength after landing by recruiting local volunteers from pro-Treaty members of the IRA and local ex-servicemen. Hundreds of these extra rifles were carried with the convoy into Cork City in order to arm those who would be recruited.⁷¹¹



Picture 3 – Free State soldiers landing in Passage West, south of Cork City on August 8, 1922 (Courtesy Military Archives).

⁷⁰⁹ Boyne, *Emmet Dalton*, p. 188.

⁷¹⁰ Riccio, *Irish Coastal Landings 1922*, p. 80.

⁷¹¹ Boyne, *Emmet Dalton*, pp. 181-182.

The landings in Cork were a major coup de force for the Free State and Borgonovo contends that this turning operation proved to “be a major success as approximately 830 troops were positioned behind the IRA front line.”⁷¹² The *Irish Independent* further adds that the landings were a complete shock to the IRA and “the surprise created by the coup was only equalled by the successful, daringly brilliant manner in which it was accomplished.”⁷¹³

The *Cork Examiner* heralded the arrival of the Free State troops, giving the following acclamations:

Never, probably, in the history of the world has a newly born army – hardly out of its swaddling clothes, achieved in such a short space of time a series of sweeping victories comparable to those won up to date by Ireland’s National troops... In estimating this truly wonderful achievement the average civilian cannot thoroughly grasp the huge amount of work that has been accomplished. The mere recruitment, elementary drilling, training and equipping of so many men meant a fairly stiff proposition even if time was no consideration.⁷¹⁴

On 9th August 1922, the London *Times* summarised the landings in the following report: “The most daring stroke of the whole campaign has been struck by the [Free State] Government at the Irregulars [IRA]. Four ships containing ... men, with artillery, having been sent from Dublin to Cork.”⁷¹⁵ In Dalton’s Report to the National Army Leadership he states that the expeditionary force that landed into Cork consisted of three drafts:

- ‘A’ – 500 strong to land in Cork City.
- ‘B’ – 200 strong to land at Youghal.
- ‘C’ – 150 strong to land at Glandore.⁷¹⁶

With this considerable force now safely ashore, Dalton and his commanders set out to capture Cork City and the other urban centres close to the landing sites.

⁷¹² Borgonovo, *The Battle for Cork*, p.79.

⁷¹³ *The Irish Independent*, 12 August 1922.

⁷¹⁴ *Cork Examiner*, 14 August 1922.

⁷¹⁵ *The London Times*, 10 August 1922.

⁷¹⁶ Dalton letter to Commander-in-Chief, ‘Cork Report’, 11 Sept 1922, IE/MA/ CW/OPS/2/4.

4.8.1 Advance on Cork City

After a successful lodgement was made and all of his men and equipment were put ashore, Dalton commenced his march on Cork City.⁷¹⁷ The dispersion of IRA forces on either side of the fairway between Monkstown and Passage West meant that the Republicans could not easily concentrate their forces. When the news of the landings first reached Cork City, there was confusion amongst the anti-Treaty leadership. Most of the available IRA forces had to be rushed to unprepared positions at Rochestown, between Cork City and Passage West.⁷¹⁸ The IRA took up positions on the hills overlooking the road towards Rochestown, maximizing the advantage offered by the high ground to slow the progress of the National Army troops advancing from the south. Hart called it a “thin IRA firing line [which] was assembled to block the National Army advances on Cork City.”⁷¹⁹

The IRA plan for defending Cork City hinged on keeping the National Army to the south of city prior to reinforcements coming from North Cork and the Kilmallock defences. Borgonovo states that “by holding a defensible line along the Lee, the IRA could retain a sizeable portion of north and mid-Cork. This was mountainous country and included their bases in Macroom, Fermoy and Mallow.”⁷²⁰ To counter this, and gain the momentum, Duggan posits that the Free State troops advanced at a steady pace and on a wide front into Cork City, over undulating terrain.⁷²¹ The two forces clashed in the suburban hills around Rochestown and Douglas, and some sharp fighting ensued.⁷²² Dalton recorded the progress in correspondence to the leadership of the Free State giving the following account of the fighting in Rochestown:

Advance made on Cork City on a two-mile front – direction due west.
Continuous Advance Guard action between Passage and Rochestown

⁷¹⁷ Valiulis, *Portrait of a Revolutionary*, p.104.

⁷¹⁸ Neeson, *The Civil War in Ireland*, p.151.

⁷¹⁹ Hart, *The IRA and Its Enemies: Violence and Community in Cork 1916-1923*, p.118.

⁷²⁰ Borgonovo, *The Battle for Cork*, p.75.

⁷²¹ Duggan *A History of the Irish Army*, p 96.

⁷²² Hart, *The IRA and Its Enemies: Violence and Community in Cork 1916-1923*, p.118.

– two-and-a-half-hour engagement at Rochestown – Machine gun, rifle and shot gun resistance to my right flank... [Troops] disobeyed orders by failing to close and enfilade. My right flank [was] assaulted and won the position.⁷²³

Hart summarises the Rochestown fighting by stating that the IRA managed to capture quite a number of unwary National Army soldiers, but in the end they were “outnumbered, outgunned, and exhausted.”⁷²⁴ Borgonovo states that late in the evening of 8th August a total of 140 Republicans arrived into Cork to support the city defences, but by this stage Rochestown was already in National Army hands. These IRA volunteers had been moved from the Kilmallock and Waterford fronts and by the time they arrived they were already exhausted.⁷²⁵

A civilian witness, Olga Pyne Clarke recalled the scene:

They [IRA] were tired, marching raggedly, no military precision about them. They probably had not been properly fed and had slept rough. Their trench coats were dirty and muddy, their faces hollow-eyed had a starved savage look in them... at six pm they came from all directions... they were a rabble and they knew it.⁷²⁶

Duggan states that the advance towards Cork from Passage West via Rochestown led to “bloody encounters in which both sides showed great bravery and resource.”⁷²⁷ The most intense combat occurred on the following day, 9th August, when National Army troops attempted to turn the flank of the defenders who had established a strong defensive line at Oldcourt, but this attack failed due to the withering fire of the IRA. But the fighting continued in the vicinity of Ballincummins Cross. Using field artillery, the National Army had advanced and by 10th August they had captured the village of Douglas south of the city.⁷²⁸ Garvin contends that it took the junior leadership of the Free State officers and NCOs, most of whom had already possessed combat experience from the Anglo-Irish War and World War I, to push

⁷²³ Dalton letter to Commander-in-Chief, ‘Cork Report’, 11 Sept 1922, IE/MA/ CW/OPS/2/4.

⁷²⁴ Hart, *The IRA and Its Enemies: Violence and Community in Cork 1916-1923*, p.118.

⁷²⁵ Borgonovo, *The Battle for Cork*, pp. 94-95.

⁷²⁶ Olga Pyne Clarke, *She Came of Decent People* (London, 1985), p.55; cited by Peter Hart, *The IRA and Its Enemies: Violence and Community in Cork 1916-1923*, (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1998), p.119.

⁷²⁷ Duggan *A History of the Irish Army*, p. 96.

⁷²⁸ Garvin, *The Evolution of Nationalist Politics*, p. 123.

some of the raw Free State recruits onto Cork City over the unforgiving terrain and through the IRA defensive fires.⁷²⁹

4.8.2 Seizing of Cork City

In the end the IRA did not have enough troops available to hold the Limerick and Waterford fronts and prevent amphibious landings in Cork and Kerry.⁷³⁰ The concentration of combat power on numerous fronts by the Free State proved too much for the conventional IRA and eventually resistance from the anti-Treaty side disappeared as the Free State troops advanced. After scattered resistance from the city suburbs, the IRA vacated Cork City by 4pm on the 10th August, leaving it open for the National Army advances.⁷³¹ Just before the Free State troops entered into Cork City, according to Borgonovo “the last IRA volunteers commandeered vehicles and sped out of the city at around 5 p.m., thus ending the Republican control of the city.”⁷³² Reporting on the IRA activity, the *Irish Times*’ special correspondent stated that “the advance is becoming swift, but the retreat...is swifter. Of the thousands of IRA who occupied Cork a month ago, there is no trace.”⁷³³

After the ordered evacuation, the IRA set about the destruction of key infrastructure within Cork City, before they withdrew into the surrounding countryside. As a result of this order, property damage was substantial.⁷³⁴ However, countering Riccio, Dorney argues that the destruction could have been far worse and the fact that IRA commander Liam Deasy declined to defend Cork City in the streets undoubtedly spared the city the inevitable destruction and

⁷²⁹ Ibid.

⁷³⁰ Borgonovo, *The Battle for Cork*, p.68.

⁷³¹ Riccio, *Irish Coastal Landings 1922*, p. 87.

⁷³² Borgonovo, *The Battle for Cork*, p.119.

⁷³³ *Irish Times*, 16 August 1922.

⁷³⁴ Riccio, *Irish Coastal Landings 1922*, p. 87.

civilian casualties that would have resulted.⁷³⁵ Instead Deasy issued the order that “as a result of the enemy invading the divisional area in numbers much larger than our available armed forces, verbal instructions to vacate all barracks and form into columns are hereby confirmed.”⁷³⁶ The National Army in their fight for Cork City, were assisted by local and government supporters. At the Cork Ex-Servicemen’s Association rooms, a disturbance broke out with the IRA. The Irish ex-servicemen of the British Army defended their headquarters from possible destruction. The Republicans fired some shots over the heads of the ex-servicemen, seemingly scattering them. However, elsewhere with the National Army establishing itself close to the city, ex-British Army soldiers worked to assist the approaching National Army troops. They sabotaged the Cork phone lines, making communication even more difficult for the IRA, as they tried to counter the National Army advances.⁷³⁷

4.8.3 Securing of Cork City

The last of the IRA left Cork City an hour before pro-Treaty troops under General Ennis marched in.⁷³⁸ The *Irish Independent* reported that on 11th August 1922, an official bulletin from National Army headquarters announced that “the troops entered Cork City and were given a tremendous reception by the citizens.”⁷³⁹

⁷³⁵ John Dorney, *The Civil War in Dublin, The Fight for the Irish Capital 1922-1924*, (Merrion Press, Newbridge, 2017), p. 124.

⁷³⁶ Orders from Southern Division Commander Liam Deasy, 12 August 1922, O’Malley Papers P17a/87, UCDA.

⁷³⁷ Emmet Dalton to Commander-in-Chief, 13 September 1922, CW-OPS-04-01, MAI and Neeson, *The Civil War in Ireland*, p. 258.

⁷³⁸ Neeson, *The Civil War in Ireland*, p.153.

⁷³⁹ *The Irish Independent*, 12 August 1922.

Dalton upon arrival into Cork sent the following report back to Dublin.

From Arvonía

We occupy Cork City. The reception our troops received passed imagination. The enemy evacuated the city before our arrival. They burned the following barracks: Union Quay, Empress Place, Cornmarket Street, Tuckey Street, Technical Schools, Victoria Barracks. The following bridges were destroyed: Brian Boru, Parnell, and Parliament. The enemy fled in disorder and threw their transport into the river.⁷⁴⁰

Borgonovo reports that when “the IRA withdrew from Cork City, Irish flags were hoisted on many buildings, and the troops quickly established outposts in key locations throughout the city. Most soldiers spent the night at the Cork, Bandon and South Coast railway station at Albert Quay. The Victoria Hotel delivered hot drinks and cigarettes to the victors.”⁷⁴¹ The *Irish Independent* reported that everyone from all segments of society came out into the streets of Cork to welcome the Free State soldiers into the city:

It was not the rich, the big manufacturers, the merchants; it was not even the middle classes, the small shopkeepers, the commercial classes, but the very poorest of the poor, the working men and their wives – the labouring men, who were mainly responsible for the warmth of the reception given to the troops when they entered the city.⁷⁴²

The British Army reported that the “Provisional Government troops received a very warm welcome on entering the town.” The British Commander in Ireland, General Macready added that the warm welcome was, “...especially from the young ladies, whose embraces considerably delayed the pursuit of the enemy.”⁷⁴³ Once secure in Cork, Dalton reported back to Dublin that “I felt quite safe in saying that the morale of our enemies is practically broken. The impression

⁷⁴⁰ Report from Arvonía to GHQ Dublin (A/563) 13 August 1922, Mulchay Papers P7/B/70, UCDA.

⁷⁴¹ *Irish Independent*, 12 August 1922; *The Irish Times*, 14, 15 August 1922; *The Freeman's Journal*, 14 August 1922; *The Cork Examiner*, 19 August 1922; cited by Borgonovo, *The Battle for Cork*.

⁷⁴² *Irish Independent*, 12 August 1922.

⁷⁴³ Report on the Situation in Ireland, week ended 12 August 1922, CAB/24/138, Kew; Mick Leahy, OMN; cited by Borgonovo, *The Battle for Cork*, p.121.

one gets is that many of the people who were fighting were doing so more or less under a delusion.”⁷⁴⁴

When local residents were satisfied that the Republicans had gone, looting began. Initially the burning barracks were targeted, despite the heat and exploding ordnance. Furniture, fixtures and other items were carried from the smoking buildings. One witness saw a piano being taken away in a donkey and cart. However, in the absence of any police authority, Borgonovo states “more useful booty was sought from shops that were neither abandoned nor burning.”⁷⁴⁵ Dalton reported back to National Army HQ that upon surveying the situation in Cork, he saw that “starvation has been staring a great many people in the face, and this horrible state of affairs has, to some extent, encouraged looting.”⁷⁴⁶ In order to stabilise the situation and maintain the support of the local population, it became necessary for the Free State leadership to stop the looting and provide immediate relief to the population of Cork.

4.9 Information Operations in Cork

Forward thinking Free State officers such as General Dalton understood the significance of the press in warfare. They facilitated members of the media to accompany National Army troops as long as they did not interfere with military operations and found their own accommodation.⁷⁴⁷ This policy had been supported by Collins since the start of the National Army campaign. It signified the importance that public relations and Information Operations would play in the overall Free State strategy. This was especially visible during the Free State

⁷⁴⁴ Dalton letter to Chief-of-Staff, 12 August 1922; cited by Borgonovo, *The Battle for Cork*, p.123.

⁷⁴⁵ Borgonovo, *The Battle for Cork*, pp.119-120.

⁷⁴⁶ Dalton letter to Commander-in-Chief, 12 August 1922, Mulcahy Papers P7B/20, UCDA.

⁷⁴⁷ Boyne, *Emmet Dalton*, p. 211.

amphibious landings in Cork, which were accompanied by a photographer and two newspaper correspondents.⁷⁴⁸

Publicizing the Free State narrative was prioritized by the Free State leadership. The national and international press trumpeted the Free State victory in Cork. In London, *The Times* hailed the landings by the National Army troops at Passage West, Youghal and Union Hall as “the most daring stroke of the whole campaign against the Irregulars....”⁷⁴⁹ Under the headline, “Irish Nationalists’ Coup”, the newspaper published a photograph of Major General Dalton aboard a ship with sailors in the background.⁷⁵⁰ Photographers were accompanied by newspaper reporters. Dalton also ensured that his publicity officer issued statements to the press, organised photo opportunities for press cameramen, and sent reports to the publicity department at HQ. ‘Presence Posture and Profile’ are key components in an Information Operations campaign. Throughout the civil war, Dalton consistently respected the press and in particular the *Cork Examiner*. He recognised the accuracy of their reporting and recording of events. This was important in a period when National Army report writing had not been fully institutionalised. Dalton even submitted to Free State HQ a copy of the *Cork Examiner’s* report on the 8th August 1922 landings, stating that “while inaccurate in some details, it was mainly correct.”⁷⁵¹

⁷⁴⁸ OC Eastern Command to commander-in-chief, 7 August 1922, P7B/16, Mulcahy Papers, UCDA; *The Irish Times*, 10 August 1922; *The Freeman’s Journal*, 15 August 1922.

⁷⁴⁹ ‘Irish Nationalists’ Coup’, *The Times (London)*, 12 August 1922, cited by Boyne, *Emmet Dalton*, p. 199.

⁷⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁷⁵¹ Major General J.E. Dalton, Cork Command HQ, letter to Commander-in-Chief, 12 August 1922, Mulcahy Papers, P/7/B/20, UCDA.

4.10 Campaign Fulcrum and Consolidation

The landings in Cork could be described as the campaign fulcrum for the National Army operations in Munster and a major culmination point for the IRA. The IRA Commander Liam Deasy stated that “any possibility of our forces mounting a full-scale defence of Munster was by now discounted. The Free State forces were well organised and fully equipped with arms, armoured cars and transport.”⁷⁵² Dalton, having captured Cork City, referred to the IRA exit in amazement, proclaiming that “it is hard to credit the extent of the disorder and disorganisation that was displayed in retreat.”⁷⁵³ In a later report, Dalton told Mulcahy that he had been surprised by the lack of resistance following the arrival of the pro-Treaty troops.⁷⁵⁴ On 12th August, the Office of Adjutant General of the National Army wrote to the Minister of Defence stating the following details and casualties as a result of the fighting in Cork;

He [General Emmet Dalton] instructed that I was to send up all my escort except six men and return to Dublin with bodies of eight of our men and thirty-six prisoners. The dead did not arrive until 3 pm on Friday and we sailed at 6pm. Arrived at North wall at 8 am today and brought dead men and prisoners to Portobello. One wounded prisoner, Frank O'Donoghue of the No. 1 Brigade [IRA] who was wounded in fight at Rochestown was sent in an ambulance to the hospital at Beggar's bush.

P. Dalton, Capt.⁷⁵⁵

Borgonovo posits that the casualty figures from the Cork landings are hard to calculate. Dr. Lynch a local doctor stated a figure of 35 killed and 75 wounded in total. Borgonovo ‘carefully’ qualifies an estimate of between 17 to 25 killed and 30-60 wounded.⁷⁵⁶ The Cork Civil War

⁷⁵² Liam Deasy, *Brother Against Brother* (Cork, Mercier Press, 1982), p.83.

⁷⁵³ Hopkinson, *Green Against Green*, p. 164.

⁷⁵⁴ Dalton letter to Commander-in-Chief, 11 September 1922, Irish Military Army Archives; cited by Michael Hopkinson, *Green Against Green*, (Dublin, Gill & Macmillan, 2004), p. 201.

⁷⁵⁵ Report from the Office of the Adjutant General to the Minister for Defence 12 August 1922, Mulcahy Papers P7B/70, UCDA.

⁷⁵⁶ Borgonovo, *The Battle for Cork*, p.109.

Fatality Register, compiled by UCC, lists 11 National Army fatalities in Cork for the period of the landings.⁷⁵⁷

According to Cottrell, the battle for Cork and the surrounding area, highlighted the leadership qualities of Dalton describing how he had displayed drive and ingenuity, which helped to produce such a major victory.⁷⁵⁸ Perhaps the *London Times* best sums up the significance of the amphibious landings into Cork City by stating that “[t]he city was the last stronghold of the rebels before a retreat to the mountains. With Cork in their hands and their line pressing strongly southwards from Limerick and Kerry, the National troops will be able to harry the rebels both in front and rear.”⁷⁵⁹

4.11 Consolidation in Cork

With the line pressing from all directions against the IRA, the National Army, if properly coordinated could have inflicted serious damage to Republican resistance. But despite his progress, Dalton was still deeply concerned about his military position. On Friday, 11th August, Dalton appealed urgently to Collins for reinforcements – he needed hundreds of extra men. “I am at a standstill” he said bluntly.⁷⁶⁰ As an experienced veteran, Dalton anticipated that the Republicans would respond with guerrilla warfare, and he wanted to be prepared for this eventuality. More troops arrived by sea in the following days. The *Lady Wicklow* had re-sailed at about 1 am from Dublin on 11th August with 200 men and six officers. Also on-board was

⁷⁵⁷ Andy Bielenberg, Cork Civil War Fatality Register, UCC, <https://www.ucc.ie/en/theirishrevolution/collections/cork-fatality-register/register-index/#d.en.1399690>.

⁷⁵⁸ Peter Cottrell, *The Irish Civil War, 1922-1923*, pp. 60-63; Sean Murray, OMN; *Dictionary of Irish Biography*, vol. 3, pp.7-9.

⁷⁵⁹ *The London Times*, 11 August 1922.

⁷⁶⁰ Boyne, *Emmet Dalton*, p. 200.

another eighteen-pounder field gun, 100 shells of high explosive and shrapnel, two Lancias, six Lewis guns and various ammunition and rations.⁷⁶¹

After consolidating his gains, Dalton split up his forces to clear routes to the north and west of Cork.⁷⁶² According to Boyne, Dalton's progress was greatly assisted by local pro-Treaty IRA leaders such as Sean Hales who deployed their own forces in support of the National Army and who assisted in taking control of various towns.⁷⁶³ With towns in Cork falling under Free State control on a regular basis, Dalton kept up the pressure. The National Army pushed out of Cork City and Middleton was cleared of anti-Treaty IRA forces on 11th August 1922.⁷⁶⁴ The *Irish Independent* also reported on 12th August that the Free State troops in Cork had linked-up with those that had also landed in Youghal.⁷⁶⁵ Riccio confirms that by 15th August 1922, the National Army troops that had landed in Youghal had even pushed out as far as Dungarvan in West Waterford linking up with the National Army troops under the command of Prout.⁷⁶⁶ They also linked up with the Free State forces that had landed at Union Hall and Borgonovo states that the Free State "then conducted three simultaneous drives to seize the county's [Cork] population centres."⁷⁶⁷

However in North Cork, the situation was more challenging, with the National Army troops slowly advancing south from the Limerick front. On 12th August, Dalton stated that Cork City was entirely in his hands, although he thought there might be ambushing and sniping in a few days. He also reported: "Trains to Thurles and Roscrea only." However, Dalton states that "no information as to whether Limerick party reached Cork."⁷⁶⁸ This suggests that a pre-planned link up between Dalton's Command and O'Duffy's National Army forces advancing

⁷⁶¹ Transport Order, 10 August 1922, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/70, UCDA.

⁷⁶² Hopkinson, *Green Against Green*, p. 164.

⁷⁶³ Boyne, *Emmet Dalton*, p. 200.

⁷⁶⁴ *Irish Independent*, 12 August 1922.

⁷⁶⁵ *Irish Independent*, 12 August 1922.

⁷⁶⁶ Riccio, *Irish Coastal Landings 1922*, p. 69.

⁷⁶⁷ Borgonovo, *The Battle for Cork*, p.123.

⁷⁶⁸ GGS to CINC Limerick 12 August 1922, Mulchay Papers P7/B/70, UCDA.

south into Cork from Limerick did not materialise. Lawlor highlights this as an example of the lack of co-operation between various commands in the National Army.⁷⁶⁹ Other Free State correspondence suggests that O'Duffy's relationship with officers in adjoining Commands, particularly Dalton, the Cork GOC, was poor.⁷⁷⁰ Hopkinson believed the link up did not occur because O'Duffy became bogged down in the heaviest continuous fighting of the civil war as the IRA fought desperately to hold east Limerick road and rail routes necessary to defend Munster from a Northern advance.⁷⁷¹ Lawlor posits that the link-up did not happen on time because the stiff IRA resistance in the southwest led to the usually self-assured O'Duffy becoming hesitant, so much so that ... co-operation between his and Dalton's command was virtually non-existent.⁷⁷² This non-cooperation by the two generals and their commands had strategic consequences as described by Corcoran when he argues that correspondence from Dalton to National Army HQ, "complains the civil war could have been ended by September 1922 if there had been proper co-ordination."⁷⁷³

As a direct result of this lack of co-operation between the South and South West Commands of the National Army, the IRA in Cork had the opportunity and managed to "evacuate Buttevant and Mallow and returned to Dromcollogher for two weeks and sent the columns home. [Dromcollogher was] a clearing house for columns from Buttevant and Mallow."⁷⁷⁴ This undoubtedly prolonged the war, allowing the IRA to transition back into a guerrilla army and prosecute a campaign that they were experienced in.

⁷⁶⁹ Shelia Lawlor, *Britain and Ireland 1914-1923* (New Jersey, Gill and MacMillan, 1983), pp. 210-11 and p.267.

⁷⁷⁰ O'Duffy to CGS, 6 Sept., 1922, Mulchay Papers P7/B/71, UCDA.

⁷⁷¹ Hopkinson, Green against Green, p.150.

⁷⁷² Lawlor, *Britain and Ireland 1914-1923*, pp. 210-11 and p.267.

⁷⁷³ Corcoran, *Freedom to Achieve Freedom – The Irish Free State 1922-1932*, p. 31.

⁷⁷⁴ Interview of Liam Deasy (West Cork IRA) by Ernie O'Malley, O'Malley Papers, P17b/86, pp. 6-24, UCDA.

4.12 Local Recruitment

Within two weeks of the landings almost all of the towns of Cork had been occupied and the IRA had retreated to the mountainous redoubts along the Cork/ Kerry border.⁷⁷⁵ The war had not ended and the National Army believed that the IRA in Cork and Kerry were still more or less intact. The Free State had captured towns, but they had not captured IRA troops and arms on anything like a large scale.⁷⁷⁶ Dalton stated that he believed that the anti-Treaty IRA would hold a line from Mallow to Millstreet with Macroom and Bantry as bases. In order to prevent this from happening, he undertook simultaneous operations, taking Fermoy, Macroom and Bantry, immediately following up by taking Clonakilty, Bandon and Kinsale.⁷⁷⁷ Borgonovo posits that with the experience already garnered the leadership of the National Army improved as the fighting continued and leaders such as Dalton and Ennis, the commanders of Free State troops in Cork, “deployed their troops properly, kept them in hand, and adjusted and reinforced the advances when needed.”⁷⁷⁸

In addition to the reinforcements sent from Dublin on-board the *Alexandria*, “a number of government officials in connection with relief and reconstruction” were also on the ship.⁷⁷⁹ As the fighting transitioned to unconventional warfare it needed a different strategy and additional resources. The use of recruits sent from Dublin and especially former British Army veterans based in Cork had been planned prior to the landings, and the “hundreds who flocked to the Free State banner were armed with extra rifles that had been carried by the *Arvonnia*.”⁷⁸⁰

In later life Dalton, explained part of his consolidation plan and strategy, stating that a local force of about 250 Volunteers had been organized in Cork prior to the arrival of the

⁷⁷⁵ Hart, *The IRA and Its Enemies: Violence and Community in Cork 1916-1923*, p.119.

⁷⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷⁷ Dalton letter to Commander-in-Chief, 11 Sept 1922, (IE/MA/CW/OPS/2/4).

⁷⁷⁸ Borgonovo, *The Battle for Cork* (Cork, Mercier Press, 2011), p.129.

⁷⁷⁹ CGS to Major General Dalton 14 August 1922, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/70, UCDA.

⁷⁸⁰ Borgonovo, *The Battle for Cork*, p.124.

National Army. They made contact with Dalton and were armed with the rifles he had transported from Dublin. Dalton considered them of considerable assistance to his campaign, giving a very good account of themselves in the subsequent fighting.⁷⁸¹ The *Irish Independent* reported on 14th August 1922 that there was great “...enthusiasm in Cork [and] a rush to join the [National] Army.”⁷⁸² Dalton, on reviewing these new recruits, stated in a report to Dublin: “I am sorry and I am glad, that they [the former British servicemen] are conspicuous by their better discipline, deportment and efficiency than my other troops.”⁷⁸³ The backbone provided by Irish ex-servicemen of the British Army to the Free State was extremely important, especially to the overall fighting capabilities of the National Army. Although the rank and file of the army at the start of the Irish Civil War were relatively inexperienced, Harrington stated that they soon had in their ranks trained ex-British Army Officers with experience of leading men and planning strategy from the First World War.⁷⁸⁴

It soon became obvious to Dalton that as he worked to increase the strength of his forces in the Cork region, he was finding no shortage of men willing to join the National Army and fight the IRA.⁷⁸⁵ In comparison to the Irish ex-servicemen of the British Army, Dalton was much more critical of the local pro-Treaty IRA Volunteers assimilated into his force. He reported that “these men are really almost out of control and only the most drastic action on my part is likely to have the desired effect.”⁷⁸⁶ Nevertheless the recruitment of Cork IRA volunteers into the National Army had more strategic importance than tactical merit. It helped with the overall acceptance by the local population of Free State forces into Cork City and

⁷⁸¹ Dalton interview, O’Raghallaigh, RTE; cited by Sean Boyne, *Emmet Dalton* (Dublin, Merrion Press, 2015), p. 206.

⁷⁸² *Irish Independent*, 12 August 1922.

⁷⁸³ Dalton letter to Commander-in-Chief, Richard Mulcahy, 13 September 1922, CW-OPS-04-01; cited by Borgonovo, *The Battle for Cork*, p.124.

⁷⁸⁴ Harrington, *The Munster Republic*, p.131.

⁷⁸⁵ Dalton Letter to Commander-in-Chief, 12 August 1922, Mulcahy Papers, P/7/B/20, UCDA.

⁷⁸⁶ White and Harvey, *A History of Victoria/ Collins Barracks*, pp.258-260; cited by Borgonovo John, *The Battle for Cork* (Cork, Mercier Press, 2011), p.125.

County and local pro-Treaty IRA leaders such as Sean Hales certainly helped in this regard and were an excellent support to the National Army throughout operations in the region.⁷⁸⁷

4.13 Chapter Summary

The landings in Cork were an unqualified success as they drove the IRA defenders from the largest and most important city under their control. The fight for Cork City was brief but the landings were not without cost. Ultimately the bodies of eighteen Dublin Free State soldiers were sent back to be buried in Glasnevin Cemetery, Dublin. Ten were from the Kerry landings and eight from the Cork landings.⁷⁸⁸ Overall the conventional phase was very costly for both sides as nearly two-thirds of those killed in the war died in its first three months.⁷⁸⁹

To recover from this fighting, the National Army in Cork continued to make plans. In late August a Free State Memorandum outlined that the gunship *Helga* would travel to Cork to support Dalton through the now more secure sea lines of communication. Victoria Barracks was to be repaired in order to accommodate 600 men, with additional requirements in Cork for 1,000 Rifles; 1,000 Uniforms; 2 Armoured Cars; 12 Crossley Tenders; 12 Lancias and 50 Lewis Guns.⁷⁹⁰ During September 1922, the *Helga* helped Dalton circumvent the disruption by the IRA of road and rail travel in West Cork, and on 7th September, the ship sailed from Cork and delivered troops and Lancia vehicles, under fire, at Courtmacsherry in an operation overseen by Tom Ennis.⁷⁹¹ After Courtmacsherry was secured in another operation along the

⁷⁸⁷ Boyne, *Emmet Dalton*, p. 200.

⁷⁸⁸ Dorney, *The Civil War in Dublin, The Fight for the Irish Capital 1922-1924*, p. 124.

⁷⁸⁹ Townsend, *The Republic, The Fight for Irish Independence, 1918-1923*, pp.428-429.

⁷⁹⁰ Free State Memorandum – Cork Command, 31 August 1922, Mulcahy Papers, P/7/B/270, UCDA.

⁷⁹¹ Tom McGinty, *The Irish Navy* (The Kerryman Ltd., 1995), p. 99.

Cork coast as already stated in September 1922, the *Helga* landed troops and armoured cars at Bantry.⁷⁹²

With the capture of Cork by the National Army, the conventional phase of the war in Munster had ended. This gave way to a guerrilla campaign waged by the Republican forces that were far more effective than in conventional warfare.⁷⁹³ The IRA returned to the tactics honed over recent years of fighting the might of the British Empire, but deployed to fight their own countrymen. The IRA returned to whatever safe areas and houses they could find and to their old routine of roadside ambushes, drive-by shootings, nocturnal raids, and sabotage. The first guerrilla attacks on National Army troops began a week after the capture of Cork City.⁷⁹⁴ In reply, the National Army took the unconventional fight back to the IRA, and a genuine effort was made to 'Hold' the already captured and cleared terrain. This would afford the people the protection from violence which they were entitled to by way of a national military of 50,000 plus personnel properly equipped.⁷⁹⁵

The campaign conducted by the leadership of the National Army, in particular Major General Dalton, demonstrated how a newly constituted and generated force became combat effective in a very short period of time. This combat effectiveness was as a result of the equipment and training they received from the British Government and former British Army veterans. The seizing and securing of the flanks of the IRA defensive line at Waterford and Limerick set the conditions for a Free State strike south through Tipperary and onto Cork. Instead, by way of a turning movement the main strike came in the form of Free State amphibious support landings in Kerry and the main effort Cork. The clearance campaign conducted by the National Army in Munster proved to be particularly successful and set the IRA on the back foot forcing them into conducting an unconventional insurgency. However,

⁷⁹² *Connacht Tribune*, 16 September 1922.

⁷⁹³ Boyne, *Emmet Dalton*, p. 209.

⁷⁹⁴ Hart, *The IRA and Its Enemies: Violence and Community in Cork 1916-1923*, p.119.

⁷⁹⁵ O'Higgins at Army Enquiry, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/33, UCDA.

unlike the guerrilla campaign the IRA had successfully fought against the British security apparatus in Ireland in the previous War of Independence, they could no longer rely on the complete support of the local population.

HOLD

Hold – After clearing the area of guerrillas, the counterinsurgent force must then assign sufficient troops to the cleared area to prevent their return, to defeat any remnants, and to secure the population. This is the hold task.⁷⁹⁶

⁷⁹⁶ US Army Field Manual, M 3-24.2 *Tactics in Counterinsurgency* (April 2009), pp. 3-20.

Chapter Five – Establish Civil Security

“In Ireland the conventional phase of the civil war between June and September 1922 was less traumatic than what followed. Guerrilla warfare, terrorism, and systematic executions punctuated the last phase.”⁷⁹⁷

-Bill Kissane, *The Politics of the Irish Civil War*.

5.1 Introduction to Hold

By mid-August 1922, the National Army had cleared most of the IRA fighters from the large towns and cities of Cork and the ‘Munster Republic’. The conventional fighting was finished and the civil war now transitioned to an insurgency. In order to win such a conflict, the insurgent must be denied the opportunity to return to former strongholds through ‘Hold’ or holding operations. However these operations are manpower intensive. They involve the securing of terrain; the securing of the civilian population; confidence building operations and the denial of this terrain to the insurgent force.⁷⁹⁸ Thus the key to a successful counterinsurgency operation lies in holding both the physical terrain and the moral high ground.

The National Army needed to establish its authority in the entirety of Munster and Cork in order to protect the civilian population and restore civil security throughout the region. By active patrolling and establishing bases, the counterinsurgent forces become aware that they need to win the support of the local population. They realize instinctively that their own safety depends on good relations with the local people.⁷⁹⁹ When the counterinsurgent force is firmly embedded with and lives amongst the local population, they can provide the required all-round protection. They become the holders and builders.⁸⁰⁰

⁷⁹⁷ Kissane, *The Politics of the Irish Civil War*, p. 65.

⁷⁹⁸ From Authors own operational experience working in Mali and the Middle East.

⁷⁹⁹ Galula *Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice*, p. 85.

⁸⁰⁰ Forward by John A. Nagl to Galula *Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and*, p. ix.

5.2 Aim of Chapter

Civil Security is an inherent part of holding operations and it predominantly involves complex operations that are both kinetic and non-kinetic in nature. This chapter will explain and illustrate how the Free State forces brought Civil Security to the regions, eventually exploiting the gains they made in Munster following the successful clearance operations of July and August 1922. Clearance operations are usually followed by a prolonged period of holding the terrain in order to prevent the insurgent forces from returning and trying to undermine the overall counterinsurgency strategy.

The Free State forces initially attained Civil Security by securing key terrain, building operating bases and providing freedom of movement within the region. However, the IRA countered the early National Army gains by reverting to successful guerrilla tactics, inflicting casualties and hardship on the Free State forces. To maintain security, control and regain the momentum, the National Army had to adapt and counter the ever-improving IRA tactics. They did this by re-organising and recalibrating their fighting effectiveness and combat power demonstrating a remarkable maturity, adaptiveness and critical thinking on behalf of a newly organised security force.

5.3 Free State Counterinsurgency Strategy

*Counterinsurgency is 20 percent military and 80 percent everything else – political, economic, and information operations.*⁸⁰¹

-John Nagle, *Knife Fights, A Memoir of Modern War in Theory and Practice*.

Civil Security operations are labour intensive, they involve continuously securing the population, separating them from the insurgents, and establishing terrain domination. It requires firm government control over an area by recruiting; organising; arming; and training local forces for use in and operations against the insurgents.⁸⁰²

From the top down, the National Army had a considered approach to its goals and methods during the Irish Civil War. Townsend asserts that the Free State General Mulcahy had an impeccable dedication to duty, "...because he had a clear-eyed view of what could and what needed to be done."⁸⁰³ Mulcahy as Chief of Staff, and most of the other Free State generals understood the nature of the war that they needed to prosecute in Munster. Townsend contends that it was at this operational level that the real positives of Mulcahy's leadership were "visible compared to the failings of Lynch, his opposing commander in the IRA."⁸⁰⁴ The Free State Government also fundamentally understood that it had to win the civil war not only on the battlefield, but also in the minds of the Irish population. The Free State needed to come up with strategy that would be responsive to the security needs of the country and capable of suppressing and eventually defeating the IRA in all regions of the country.

⁸⁰¹ John Nagle, *Knife Fights, A Memoir of Modern War in Theory and Practice* (New York, Penguin Press, 2014).

⁸⁰² US Army Field Manual 3-24.2 *Tactics in Counterinsurgency* (April 2009), pp. 3-21.

⁸⁰³ Townsend, *The Republic, The Fight for Irish Independence, 1918-1923*, p.420

⁸⁰⁴ Ibid.

5.3.1 An Irish Solution to an Irish Problem

Before the fighting had even begun, in April 1922, General Michael Collins best surmised the strategic policy of the Free State Government when he stated:

We may be depended upon to deal with the disorder in our midst just as effectively, and just as thoroughly, as those several [other European] governments dealt with it in their sphere. Our methods may be different, but the results will be equally satisfactory.⁸⁰⁵

Collins advocated an Irish solution to an Irish problem. Compared to the British Army during the War of Independence, Collins predicted that the National Army would be more clinical and precise in their actions.⁸⁰⁶ The *modus operandi* of the National Army would be different to that of the British Army. The more local soldiers you can recruit into the counterinsurgent force the better, as they bring with them better situational awareness and intelligence gathering. Local recruitment also helps to support the legitimacy of the government forces.⁸⁰⁷ Locally recruited units also have access to added information since they were operating in areas where they lived and amongst populations they knew intimately.⁸⁰⁸

The National Army instinctively knew the Irish population and as a native Irish force, they understood the Irish social infrastructure, both apparent and hidden. They recognised how Irish people think and react to certain provocations and encouragements.⁸⁰⁹ They had an intimate knowledge of the IRA personnel which the British lacked, and inevitably they knew all their trusted haunts.⁸¹⁰ Additionally O'Donoghue, noted that the IRA faced two serious disadvantages which they had not faced in the previous fight against the British. Firstly, the

⁸⁰⁵ Interview given 28 April 1922, 'Michael Collins': Statements and Speeches' DT, S10961, NAI.

⁸⁰⁶ Porch, *Counterinsurgency: Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War*, p. 114.

⁸⁰⁷ US Army Field Manual 3-24.2 Tactics in Counterinsurgency (April 2009), 3-21.

⁸⁰⁸ Berman, Felter and Shapiro, *Small Wars, Big Data: The Information Revolution in Modern Conflict*, with Vestal McIntyre, p. 273.

⁸⁰⁹ O'Malley, *The Singing Flame*, p.187. O'Malley in the Singing Flame annotates that the key difference between the National Army was that the British Army did not know the key members of the IRA, whilst the National Army did. By recruiting from the local population as discussed in Chapter Three, The National Army also had a very good understanding of the communities they were trying to secure.

⁸¹⁰ O'Donoghue, *No Other Law*, p.266.

majority of the people were no longer on the IRA side, and secondly their opponents had an intimate, detailed knowledge of their personnel.⁸¹¹ Townsend states that in an unconventional war, “it is such factors [as the support of the population], rather than armaments or supplies that are the key elements. There is little sign that many, if indeed any, of the local IRA Republican leaders recognized this.”⁸¹² Evidence indicates that the Free State Government and National Army did.

5.4 Dalton’s Harassment Strategy in Cork

Dalton inherently knew from his previous military experience the importance of critical thought as a combat multiplier, especially when dealing with such unknowns as those witnessed in trying to counter an insurgency.⁸¹³ A pre-invasion report on Cork, dated 5th August 1922, from the Commander-in-Chief to the acting chairman of the Provisional [National] Government, stated that the Free State needed to take advantage of the good will from the general population of Cork once the city had been secured.⁸¹⁴ The Free State, through their information and intelligence services worked on answering the unknowns and they had already identified areas of local dissention in Cork towards the IRA within the general population. Dalton needed to exploit this and take advantage of the successes already achieved. The pre-invasion report outlined the situation:

In the south, the immediate military problem that confronts us is not so much the military defeat of the Irregulars [IRA] in that area as the establishing of our Forces in certain principal points in the area, with a view to shaking the domination held over the ordinary people by the

⁸¹¹ O’ Donoghue, *No Other Law*, P.266 cited by; Charles Townsend, *The Republic, The Fight for Irish Independence*, 1918-1923, P.417.

⁸¹² Townsend, *The Republic, The Fight for Irish Independence*, 1918-1923, p.417.

⁸¹³ Casualty Form – Active Service, Lieut Dalton J.E, Attd 6th Leinsters – British Army.

⁸¹⁴ Report from Commander-In-Chief to Acting Provisional Government, dated 5th August 1922, DT S3361, NAI.

Irregulars...[Leading to] the realisation by the Irregulars that they had lost their grip on the people and that they could not hope to last.⁸¹⁵

By supporting the local population and by pressurising the remaining Republicans, Dalton hoped to prevent the IRA from re-organising successfully in the countryside after the surrender of Cork City. Dalton outlined his strategy to Mulcahy and the higher Free State HQ Staff, stating that:

In view of the fact that their [IRA] numbers must be in the vicinity of four or five thousand, taking into account the poor nature of the country and knowing that all communications, roads, railways, etc., were broken, it will be seen that their position was next to hopeless.

There was one obvious course for us to take and that was to harass them, keep them moving.⁸¹⁶

Dalton's strategy can best be described as co-ordinating and exploiting the National Army momentum in order to discommode the IRA. This would be achieved by the constant harassment of IRA fighters in the county. Inherent in his strategy, Dalton set about securing the population by establishing bases throughout Cork County, but he also advocated a less static version of a holding operation. This required the National Army to be more offensive in the conduct of numerous searches, patrols, sweeps and round-ups in the rural countryside of Cork.⁸¹⁷ Thus, Dalton's policy in Cork can be summarized as follows:

- a. Intelligence-led patrolling, 'harassment' and 'round-up' operations which allowed for the cordoning, capture or killing of IRA fighters, especially the IRA leadership.
- b. The occupation of bases throughout County Cork in order to dominate the terrain, protect the local population and ensure freedom of movement while denying safe areas and key terrain to the IRA.

⁸¹⁵ Report from Commander-In-Chief to Acting Provisional Government, dated 5th August 1922, DT S3361, NAI.

⁸¹⁶ Dalton Letter to Commander-in-Chief, 11 Sept 1922, M/A, CW/OPS/2/4.

⁸¹⁷ Roundups are co-ordinated, intelligence driven raids and sweeps on IRA strongholds that captured IRA suspects.

- c. Increasing of National Army troop levels augmented by the recruitment of local soldiers to increase the combat power and intelligence capabilities of the National Army in Cork.

The execution of this policy would be challenging for Dalton and it relied heavily on continued recruitment, the maintenance of discipline and improved logistical support in order to increase the footprint of National Army troops in Cork. It also relied on keeping the pressure on the IRA, preventing them from consolidating. Coordination, communications and liaison with neighbouring friendly forces and commanders would also prove to be a determining factor.

5.5 Execution of the Free State Strategy

Dalton set about recruiting soldiers from amongst the local Cork population, especially those with previous military experience and service. He observed that about 100 soldiers of his C Company, 1st Battalion who had recently enlisted in the National Army had previous military experience.⁸¹⁸ The initial forces landed by the National Army had numbered a total of 850 men across County Cork, but local recruits, “especially those with previous combat experience, almost immediately doubled its strength to 1,600. In Cork City alone, 700 British ex-servicemen had secretly been sworn into the National Army before the invasion, and another 500 were ready in Youghal.”⁸¹⁹ The training, discipline and previous combat experience of these former British Army recruits to the National Army was a significant force multiplier for the Free State and gave them a distinct advantage. They only needed minimal induction training and could be operationally deployed to locations where they were most needed almost immediately.

⁸¹⁸ John Borgonovo, *The Battle for Cork* (Cork, Mercier Press, 2011), p.31.

⁸¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p.124.

The Free State needed these additional numbers of combat ready troops because within the villages of rural Munster, they would face a more resolute IRA than they had faced in Cork City. By mid-August 1922, Liam Lynch had ordered the formation of IRA ‘Flying Columns’ and assigned them defined operating areas, thus allowing the Republicans to “launch the kind of guerrilla campaign at which they excelled.”⁸²⁰ The National Army needed to counter this and as the counterinsurgency theorist Galula explained, the main body of the guerrilla forces must be prevented by government forces from returning to insurgency tactics by installing garrisons to protect the population, and by tracking the guerrilla remnants.⁸²¹ The National Army needed to demonstrate its security presence in the Munster countryside to signal that the National Army was the dominant force and there to stay.



Picture 4 – Free State Troops capturing IRA activists (Courtesy Military Archives).

⁸²⁰ White and Harvey, *A History of Victoria/ Collins Barracks*, (Cork, Mercier Press, 1997), pp. 258-260.

⁸²¹ Galula *Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice*, p. 61.

5.5.1 Polarisation

Dalton wanted to pursue the IRA from the towns and urban centres into their safe havens and sanctuaries stating that "...the enemy [IRA] had crowded into positions of a barren nature without a base for supplies."⁸²² But Dalton had to be vigilant, constantly assessing the situation, cautious to the prospect of being isolated and vigilant to enemy fighters re-grouping to threaten his forces.⁸²³ This was a major concern because at the start of his campaign, Dalton had reported to Dublin that "one may travel 70 to 80 miles in part of the county [Cork] without meeting even one Free State soldier."⁸²⁴ With additional troops recruited, Dalton pushed them out into newly established bases in the towns and villages of the rural countryside. He did this for security reasons but also because he initially feared that the lack of any observable pro-Treaty progress could reflect badly on the Free State Government.⁸²⁵ A military stalemate would not be advantageous to the Free State and would allow the IRA insurgent forces to capitalise on a prolonged conflict and perceived lack of progress by the National Army and Government. Because of this Dalton's strategy had to correspond with the strategic intent advanced by Mulcahy and the National Army HQ. They did not want bases isolated and wanted to avoid National Army posts being left to the mercy of IRA forces with a 'punch'... "it is absolutely necessary to have at our disposal central force enough to allow elasticity in our plans" or in military parlance a flexible and mobile reserve.⁸²⁶

In order to support the push out into the countryside, and counter the IRA propaganda, it was important for Dalton that local newspaper articles portrayed National Army activities and advances in a positive light. These positive media reports would also help demonstrate the

⁸²² Dalton, Cork, letter to Commander-in-Chief, 'Cork Report', 11 Sept 1922, M/A, CW/OPS/2/4.

⁸²³ Boyne, *Emmet Dalton*, p. 245.

⁸²⁴ Dalton letter to Commander-in-Chief and other GHQ members, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/67, UCDA.

⁸²⁵ Hopkinson, *Green Against Green*, p. 173.

⁸²⁶ Correspondence between Mulcahy to Mac Eoin, 14 August 1922, MacEoin Papers, P151/161/5, UCDA.

National Army's resolve and commitment – On 15th August 1922 the *Cork Examiner*⁸²⁷ reported on the situation:

The National troops, having taken undisputed possession of Cork City and the eastern area of the county, Cobh and Youghal and Midleton areas are apparently arranging concentration camps in these districts.⁸²⁸

On their arrival at Midleton from Youghal last night at 10.30 p.m. the National troops were the recipients of a very enthusiastic welcome from the townspeople.⁸²⁹

At the national level, the *Irish Times* quoted General Michael Collins, who was satisfied with the initial "...progresses of the Free State troops since landing in Cork, and the effective consolidation of the important positions they held throughout the county."⁸³⁰ However, on 22nd August 1922, Collins was killed in an IRA Ambush at Béal na Bláth in his native West Cork.⁸³¹ However tragic the death of Collins, it did not interrupt the measured advances of National Army troops into the rural environs. On 11th September 1922, Dalton informed Mulcahy that he initially deployed his forces in bases for the subsequent counterinsurgency operations in Cork:

‘A’ Party [Cork] reinforced City positions occupied Cobh, Douglas, Blarney.
‘B’ Party [Youghal] occupied Youghal, Killeagh, Carrigtwohill, Midleton, and gained touch with Cork City.
‘C’ Party [Glandore] occupied Skibbereen and Roscarberry.⁸³²

The Free State Government policy was to support Dalton's requirements in order to further expand and he received a cipher message on 19th September 1922, stating that 350 reinforcements "will leave here [Dublin] for you [Cork] Thursday afternoon."⁸³³

⁸²⁷ It should be noted that The *Cork Examiner* changed and became a firm advocate for the Free State after these forces secured Cork City.

⁸²⁸ *Cork Examiner*, 15 August 1922.

⁸²⁹ *Cork Examiner*, 15 August 1922.

⁸³⁰ *Irish Times*, 23 August 1922.

⁸³¹ Neeson, *The Civil War in Ireland*, pp.98-121.

⁸³² Dalton Letter to Commander-in-Chief, 11 Sept 1922, IE/MA/ CW/OPS/2/4.

⁸³³ Cipher Message from National Army HQ to Dalton 19 Sept 1922, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/66, UCDA.

The events in Béal na Bláth had strategic consequences and Kissane states that with the death of Collins, the guerrilla phase of the civil war really began in earnest and with this came the “assumption of power by a group of Free State personalities who were determined to exclude the Republican viewpoint entirely from the chambers of power.”⁸³⁴ This marked a seminal turning point and polarisation for both sides in the civil war. With Collins gone, all hope of an early cessation of the violence disappeared into the grave with him. In order to counter any potential swing of momentum in favour of the IRA, after the death of Collins, Dalton expanded his operations progressively. The number of Free State forces in Cork rose and the continuous harassment of Republicans in their strongholds began to have an initial telling effect on the numbers and morale of the IRA.⁸³⁵ Younger assesses that the National Army started to exert pressure on the IRA, because by holding the towns it held the country.⁸³⁶ In September 1922, Dalton wrote to National Army HQ further advocating his proposition of pressurizing and harassing the IRA and how he was going to utilise Free State reinforcements. The letter was also used to formally announce his intention to get married in October 1922, but prior to the timeframe of the proposed nuptials, Dalton expected “to do a big round-up with 800 men in west Cork this week and will then be able to hand over a more or less quiet area to Colonel Comdt Byrne to look after in my absence.”⁸³⁷

5.5.2 Spreading out of National Army Forces into the Countryside

As troop numbers increased the Free State forces spread into the Cork countryside establishing forward operating bases. From these bases the National Army counterinsurgent force attempted

⁸³⁴ Kissane, *The Politics of the Irish Civil War*, p. 84.

⁸³⁵ Harrington, *The Munster Republic*, p.103.

⁸³⁶ Younger, *Ireland's Civil War*, p.476.

⁸³⁷ Dalton Letter to Commander-in-Chief, 6th September 1922, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/66, UCDA.

to “concentrate on its primary purposes: to disrupt, identify, and ultimately eliminate the insurgents, especially their leadership and infrastructure.”⁸³⁸ To succeed in a counterinsurgency environment, the military needs to focus on the population, and its security; establish and expand secure areas; and don’t concentrate military forces in large bases for protection. A preponderance of smaller bases in key population centres along with the securing and engagement with the populace should take precedence.⁸³⁹ By September 1922, the Free State were displaced throughout Cork County with the following number of troops, (1,620 in total) garrisoned within the largest towns and villages:

Cork City	600
Fermoy	100
Lismore	40
Cappoquin	30
Kilworth	40
Youghal	80
Middleton	50
Carrigtwohill	30
Castlemartyr	30
Killegh	20
Kinsale	50
Passage	30
Waterfall	50
Bantry	100
Skibbereen	60
Rosscarbery	50
Clonakilty	50
Bandon	60
Dunmanway	50
Macroon	100. ⁸⁴⁰

By establishing security forces in these bases, it enabled the National Army’s attempts at the “disruption, identification, and elimination of the local insurgent leadership and infrastructure.”⁸⁴¹ It also demonstrated an armed force growing in size, reassuring the population and allowing normal life to return to the urban centres of Cork County. On 05th

⁸³⁸ US Army Field Manual 3-24.2 *Tactics in Counterinsurgency* (April 2009), pp. 3-20.

⁸³⁹ Nagl, *Knife Fights, A Memoir of Modern War In Theory And Practice*, p. 117.

⁸⁴⁰ Dalton Letter to Commander-in-Chief, ‘Cork Report’, 11 Sept 1922, (M/A, CW/OPS/2/4).

⁸⁴¹ US Army Field Manual 3-24 *Counterinsurgency* (December, 2006), pp. 5-19.

October 1922, Dalton communicated to National Army HQ that he had advanced on Ballyvourney and National Army troops were engaged “in a vigorous campaign in the Inchigeelagh-Ballyvourney area of County Cork. There has been quite a battle around the village of Ballingeary.”⁸⁴²

As part of Dalton’s ‘Harassment’ policy the National Army continually tried to isolate the IRA insurgents from the population. Out of necessity, the IRA had to revert to guerrilla tactics without barracks or bases. As in the War of Independence, they were again totally dependent on their supporters in their areas of operation.⁸⁴³ But this loyalty from the local population was no longer assured and it would be questioned, especially as the IRA had to target the civilian population, and local businesses in order to survive the ongoing economic hardships imposed upon them. As a result of the National Army moving into the towns and villages of Munster and Cork, disrupting IRA activities and forcing a denial of resources to the IRA, it forced them to commandeer from the local population. According to Ted O’Sullivan, a West Cork IRA Commander, “... everything we [The IRA] wanted, we had to commandeer.”⁸⁴⁴ The IRA even regularized the commandeering of goods from the local population by issuing notifications with statements such as the following:

Warning is hereby given that seven days after the date of this notice...
Any of the above-mentioned forms of Motor transport or Push-Bicycles being used for which a permit has not been obtained after the date mentioned are liable to be confiscated by the forces of the Irish Republican Army.⁸⁴⁵

This commandeering, combined with the upheaval to normal life, damaged the standing of the IRA in the localities. De Roiste believed that “it is the unarmed community that is

⁸⁴³ Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/93, UCDA; cited by Harrington Michael, *The Munster Republic* (Dublin, Mercier Press, 2009). p.78.

⁸⁴⁴ Interview of Ted O’Sullivan (West Cork IRA) by Ernie O’Malley (O’Malley Papers, P17b/108, pp. 1-27, UCDA.

⁸⁴⁵ Public Notice by IRA to Civilian Population, O’Malley Papers, P17a/14, UCDA.

suffering most between the activities of the armed men.”⁸⁴⁶ The IRA paid scant attention to bad publicity when they commandeered vehicles, citing the needs of warfare and the chance to get back at some of the wealthier factions of society. This was especially annotated by O’Sullivan when he pointed out that “all roads were cut by us [IRA] and provisions were scarce in the houses. We commandeered a boat of flour in Castletownbere and we took cattle from the big shots.”⁸⁴⁷ ‘[B]ig shots’ refers to those locals with wealth and standing in the community who became a particular target for IRA economic activities and retribution. De Roiste further elaborates on these reprisals and the intent of the IRA to increase their commandeering and intimidation when he states in a diary entry that:

...in letters that were captured by the National Forces recently – dated 25th and 26th Oct 31st Oct 1st and 2nd Nov – the following ideas for action are expressed by the... Irregular army [IRA] for approval by De Velera.

- (1) Collection of money by forcible seizure of publicans’ licences fees.
- (2) The burning of the private houses of the proprietors of the *The Freeman* and *Independent*.⁸⁴⁸

To the detriment of their cause - for some IRA units commandeering and survival took precedence over the needs of the local population, further isolating them from their original support base.

5.5.3 Quarter-mastering and Support

While the IRA resorted to commandeering resources in order to survive, the Free State put in place a proper logistical organisation. Quarter-Mastering and accommodating nearly two thousand (and rising) Free State Officers, NCOs and soldiers in Cork County was a very

⁸⁴⁶ De Roiste Diaries, 29 October 1922, Cork City and County Archives, U271/A/46.

⁸⁴⁷ Interview of Ted O’Sullivan (West Cork IRA) by Ernie O’Malley, O’Malley Papers, P17b/108, pp. 1-27, UCDA.

⁸⁴⁸ De Roiste Diaries, 29 October 1922 (Cork City and County Archives, U271/A/47).

difficult proposition “owing to the wholesale destruction of barracks and other army premises by the ‘Irregulars’ [IRA] at the beginning of the fight.”⁸⁴⁹ As the civil war progressed, these difficulties were gradually improved “with the co-operation of the Board of Works and through the establishment of the Army Works Companies.”⁸⁵⁰ A Free State Quarter-Master General’s report outlines how “billeting took place on a very large scale throughout the country and was done at the discretion of local officers.”⁸⁵¹ At one stage because of difficulties feeding the troops, Dalton in Cork advocated that “it would be easy to get the dietary scale of the British Army and model ours. [But] some wouldn’t like it.”⁸⁵² Dalton further complained that he objects to “the price it costs the army...where possible the army should have issued stores...thus avoid enormous retail profit charges. It’s monstrous...”⁸⁵³

Regardless of these complaints, the garrisoning of the Free State troops allowed the National Army to spread its influence throughout Munster. This was especially relevant as many of the Free State troops occupying these towns and villages were drawn from the local region and thus had very good local knowledge of the area, advantageous local connections, and familiarity with their Republican enemies.⁸⁵⁴ Free State bases also brought with them trade and military commerce to the impoverished towns and villages of Munster and Cork. This proved to be very beneficial and popular amongst the local populations.

⁸⁴⁹ National Army Quarter Master General’s Department Report, DT S3361, NAI.

⁸⁵⁰ National Army Quarter Master General’s Department Report, DT S3361, NAI.

⁸⁵¹ National Army Quarter Master General’s Department Report, DT S3361, NAI.

⁸⁵² Dalton Letter to Commander-in-Chief, 18 November 1922, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/67, UCDA.

⁸⁵³ Dalton Letter to Commander-in-Chief, 18 November 1922, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/67, UCDA.

⁸⁵⁴ Boyne, *Emmet Dalton*, p. 249.

5.6 Free State Uncertainty and Lack of Co-operation

To the advantage of the IRA, the Free State leadership apparatus in Munster continued to experience problems of co-operation and mutual support, especially between the O'Duffy and Dalton Command Areas. Lawlor states that by early September, collaboration between some of the National Army Commands in Munster was not functioning.⁸⁵⁵ This lack of co-operation allowed many IRA fighters to escape into ungoverned and uncontested spaces, often lying on the boundaries between the National Army Command responsibilities. In an attempt to try and counter this lack of cooperation, the south and west Munster regions were divided into extended Command Areas primarily under the control of O'Duffy in Limerick and Dalton in Cork. National Army HQ tried to improve the dysfunctional relationship and O'Duffy was directed that;

[You] will arrange for closest possible cooperation of your troops at Mallow... Lombardstown, Banteer, Millstreet and Rathmore with Major General Dalton. Cooperation between Millstreet and Macroom very important. I propose to divide the southwestern command forthwith making Dalton responsible for the Cork Kerry area.⁸⁵⁶

But the required improvements took time to materialise and Colonel Comdt Charles Russell from the [Irish] Military Air Service reported that;

In conversation with General Dalton yesterday in Cork, he explained the position with regard to the mountainous area immediately south of the towns – Mallow, Banteer, Millstreet, Killarney, as follows:
The irregulars [IRA] are occupying this ground because of lack of cooperation between the forces on either side of them. This lack of cooperation is the result of the dual command of this area.⁸⁵⁷

The IRA continued to exploit this Free State vulnerability and a National Army Report from September 1922 stated that “about 60 of the most dangerous Irregulars [IRA] are situated

⁸⁵⁵ Shelia Lawlor, *Britain and Ireland 1914-1923* (New Jersey, Gill and MacMillan, 1983), pp, 210-11 and p.267.

⁸⁵⁶ Letter from National Army HQ to O'Duffy, 31 August 1922, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/70, UCDA.

⁸⁵⁷ Russell Letter to Commander-in-Chief 12 September 1922, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/66, UCDA.

in the area [between both Command Areas] around Dromina, S.W. of Charleville [near Kilmallock]. These Irregulars [IRA] were dominating the rural countryside, “creating major difficulties for the pro-Treaty forces.”⁸⁵⁸ The *Irish Times* reported that, it became increasingly difficult for the National Army to strike “any blow of immediate effect” and that unless there was to be a quick improvement in the army and an increase in its size, there was going to be a long, protracted conflict.⁸⁵⁹ O’Caoimh quotes Free State documentation from autumn 1922, stating that the National Army began to lose its sense of organisation and direction.⁸⁶⁰ A lack of co-operation combined with National Army troops been isolated in bases in rural Munster was certainly a contributing factor to this disorder. A few years after the war, the initial decision to deploy Free State troops to remote bases was questioned by General Seán MacMahon in his statement to the Army Inquiry Committee, when he surmised that:

The Irregular [IRA] columns were moving around attacking our troops, looting, and destroying property. During the winter months the conditions under which our troops worked proved to be demoralising and the form of operations which had to be carried out was very severe on both officers and men. We had occupied numerous towns and villages and established small posts in them in order to try and prevent Irregular [IRA] columns from swooping down and looting such places. These small posts had a very demoralising effect on our men.⁸⁶¹

Without proper support, manpower and logistics the IRA turned Free State isolation and vulnerabilities into weaknesses, susceptible to attack. The National Army needed to improve its coordination and reinforcement capabilities.

⁸⁵⁸ Pro-Treaty South-Western Command Report, 08 September 1922, Mulcahy papers, P7/B/113 UCDA; cited by Harrington Michael, *The Munster Republic* (Dublin, Mercier Press 2009). p.83.

⁸⁵⁹ *Irish Times*, 20 September 1922.

⁸⁶⁰ General criticisms of the state of the National Army detailing incompetency, lack of discipline, mutiny, cowardice and lack of hygiene’, anonymous, n.p, Autumn [?] 1922: Mulcahy Papers, P7a/141.UCDA; cited by Pádraig O Caoimh *Richard Mulcahy From the Politics of War to the Politics of Peace, 1913-1924* (Newbridge, Irish Academic Press, 2019), p. 130.

⁸⁶¹ General Seán MacMahon, Statement to the Army Inquiry Committee, 6 May 1924 , IE/MA, AMTY/3/27, MAI.

5.7 IRA Counter Strategy

*However desirable for the insurgent to possess territory, large regular forces, and powerful weapons, to possess them and to rely on them prematurely could spell his doom.*⁸⁶²

-David Galula Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice.

Prior to August 1922, the IRA had freely controlled the towns and cities of the 'Munster Republic' in defiance of the Free State Government. They did this by being better armed and equipped than they had been during the previous war against the British.⁸⁶³ As previously stated, after the initial conventional fighting, the IRA had to transition hastily back to a non-conventional force, reverting to their default setting of guerrilla warfare. Guerrilla fighting was what they did best, and Liam Lynch "believed that the IRA would defeat the National Army in a war of attrition, just as it had defeated the British Army."⁸⁶⁴ The IRA believed the National Army could be worn down, spread out and discouraged by the cost of fighting in a prolonged conflict.⁸⁶⁵

Ultimately the IRA guerrilla strategy was to prevent the Free State from governing, that popular opinion would force their abdication and that the decent elements in the National Army would revolt.⁸⁶⁶ They returned to whatever safe areas and houses they could find, and resumed roadside ambushes, drive-by shootings, nocturnal raids, and sabotage. They quickly adapted and unconventional attacks against the National Army and key infrastructure started to increase.⁸⁶⁷ But by doing this the IRA made the mistake of taking local public opinion for granted because most of the population questioned "...the views of the Irregular [IRA] leaders

⁸⁶² Galula *Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice*, p. 7.

⁸⁶³ Report on 'The Seizure of Upnor, 29 March 1922' A Coy, 4 Battalion, 1 Cork Brigade, Brigade Activity Reports MA/MSPC/A1-4, MAI.

⁸⁶⁴ Borgonovo, *The Battle for Cork*, p.64.

⁸⁶⁵ Townsend, *The Republic, The Fight for Irish Independence, 1918-1923*, p.420

⁸⁶⁶ Barry to Executive Council, 7 March 1923, De Valera Papers, P150/1647, UCDA.

⁸⁶⁷ Hart, *The IRA and Its Enemies: Violence and Community in Cork 1916-1923*, p.119.

as to what is best for Ireland in the present circumstances.”⁸⁶⁸ Garvin states that “the civil war was fought over an issue that most people cared little about.”⁸⁶⁹ Without the moral support of their communities, this was always going to be a difficult proposition for the Republican forces.

Another determining and detrimental factor for the IRA was that nearly 2,000 IRA fighters were captured during the summer months of 1922, seriously degrading their combat power.⁸⁷⁰ But by September 1922, Dalton believed he was still facing “in the vicinity of four or five thousand” IRA Volunteers still active in Cork.⁸⁷¹ These fighters when properly reconstituted and corralled into a coordinated campaign started to attack the vulnerabilities still being experienced by the National Army as they attempted to secure the greater parts of Cork and Munster.

5.8 IRA Counter Tactics Start to be Effective

To seek refuge, consolidate and support their reconstitution, the IRA moved further north and westward in Cork, to the Comeraghs of Waterford, the Galtees of Tipperary and the MacGillycuddys of Kerry.⁸⁷² The IRA were determined to use these ungoverned spaces and operating areas in order to regroup and launch an offensive against the National Army. Defensive positions were prepared, bridges were blown up, railway tracks were sabotaged and roads were mined or destroyed.⁸⁷³ Dalton described how columns of IRA men made preparation for a prolonged guerrilla war.⁸⁷⁴ From these staging points, the IRA formulated a

⁸⁶⁸ De Roiste Diaries, 29 October 1922, Cork City and County Archives, U271/A/46.

⁸⁶⁹ Garvin, 1922: *The Birth of Irish Democracy*, p. 164.

⁸⁷⁰ Free State Army, Statement No. 6 Statement of Prisoners in Custody on 31st July 1922 (NA D/T S3361).

⁸⁷¹ Dalton letter to Commander-in-Chief, 11 Sept 1922, M/A, CW/OPS/2/4.

⁸⁷² Neeson, *The Civil War in Ireland*, p.157.

⁸⁷³ Valiulis, *Portrait of a Revolutionary*, p.103.

⁸⁷⁴ Dalton, Cork, Letter to Commander-in-Chief, ‘Cork Report’, 11 Sept 1922, M/A, CW/OPS/2/4.

policy of attacking small Free State outposts. They concentrated on destroying enemy [National Army] intelligence services, attacking the Free State wherever they left bases, destroying enemy rail and road communications, and intensifying their campaign in cities and towns.⁸⁷⁵ The IRA campaign centred on prolonging the war by disorder, trying to undermine the Free State Government's lack of practical authority in the ungoverned spaces throughout the state.⁸⁷⁶ National Army bases became a symbol of their presence in rural parts of Munster and the IRA recognising the significance of these bases, targeted them and started to fight back; "we [IRA] cut their communications in the towns, and we isolated them as much as we could."⁸⁷⁷ Casualties started to increase on the Free State side. Writing to Mulcahy, in September 1922, Dalton believed that he had suffered twenty-six casualties in a twenty-two hours.⁸⁷⁸

As the IRA transitioned back into an unconventional guerrilla army, they once again became a very effective fighting force. Dalton stated that the anti-Treaty forces had adopted a type of warfare of which they have years of experience:

They now operate over territory which they know. They are now better armed and better trained than they were against the British. In short, they have placed me and my troops in the same position as the British were a little over a year ago.⁸⁷⁹

Captured IRA documents in Cork give an outline of the pattern of the evolving IRA tactics used for guerrilla fighting. IRA 'Flying Columns' when reconstituted normally consisted of 35 men, including engineers, signallers and machine-gunners, sub-divided into squads of five men and a leader.⁸⁸⁰ O'Sullivan, stated that his 'Flying Column' was larger than this and took on a more amalgamated version. He states that "the 5th Brigade IRA column in

⁸⁷⁵ Operation Order No. 9 from IRA Commander-in-Chief, Liam Lynch, 19 August 1922, O'Malley papers P17a/87, UCDA.

⁸⁷⁶ Garvin, *The Birth of Irish Democracy*, pp. 101-6.

⁸⁷⁷ Interview of Ted O'Sullivan (West Cork IRA) by Ernie O'Malley, O'Malley Papers, P17b/108, pp. 1-27, UCDA.

⁸⁷⁸ Dalton Letter to CS, 2 September 1922, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/70, UCDA.

⁸⁷⁹ Dalton Letter to Commander-in-Chief, 'Cork Report', 11 Sept 1922, (M/A, CW/OPS/2/4), MAI.

⁸⁸⁰ Neeson, *The Civil War in Ireland*, p.168.

Cork – was from 96 to 120 men. We had 3 Machine Guns, 1 Hotchkiss, and 2 Lewis, which we got from division during the truce.”⁸⁸¹ A large preponderance of these weapons were obtained from the raid on the British Ship *the Upnor* in March 1922 and as a result of this the majority of IRA ‘Flying Columns’ were broken down into self-sufficient squads to ambush Free State supply lines and communications.⁸⁸² Movement between towns became hazardous for the National Army but an adverse consequence of this for the IRA was their actions also angered the general public.⁸⁸³ The IRA raids on towns became frequent, and the interference with communications undermined confidence in the Free State Government’s ability to govern.⁸⁸⁴ Other IRA activities included constant sniping at Free State positions, trenching and blocking roads, breaking bridges, localised attacks on Free State patrols and large-scale attacks on Free State garrisons in the larger towns.⁸⁸⁵ As the conflict entered the winter months these IRA activities began to undermine National Army resolve.

5.8.1 The IRA Offensive

Even before Dalton had formulated his policy of Harassment, on 30th August 1922, at 1.30am, the IRA attacked the Bantry Free State garrison. Bantry is a key provincial town in west Cork, and of major strategic interest to both sides. This was one of the first IRA mass attacks on a Free State base and according to the *Irish Independent*, the IRA attackers numbered between 400 to 500 IRA fighters.⁸⁸⁶ O’Sullivan gives different figures stating “...we mobilized all our

⁸⁸¹ Interview of Ted O’Sullivan (West Cork IRA) by Ernie O’Malley, O’Malley Papers, P17b/108, pp. 1-27, UCDA.

⁸⁸² Mahon, *The Ballycotton Job*, pp. 191-192.

⁸⁸³ Duggan, *A History of the Irish Army*, p. 96.

⁸⁸⁴ Hopkinson, *Green Against Green*, p. 173.

⁸⁸⁵ Harrington, *The Munster Republic*, p.82.

⁸⁸⁶ *Irish Independent*, 01 September 1922.

men for an attack [on Bantry] for they couldn't up to this show their noses... We had roughly 90 men... [The Combined IRA figure meant] we would have had 120 all told.”⁸⁸⁷ This was a well-co-ordinated complex attack as documented by the national newspapers and prior to the attack the “Irregulars [IRA] started tunnelling operations with a view to attacking our [Free State] people from strategic positions – from 1.30am machine-gun and rifle fire was kept up continuously until 6pm.”⁸⁸⁸ O’Sullivan claims that the IRA:

...captured their [National Army] first few billets about daybreak. We had taken about 8 or 10 billets and we ran into the flat of the town.” captured more billets, but on account of the 4 [IRA] lads dying being anointed (the Catholic Sacrament of the Last Rites) we decided to retreat. We had captured 22 prisoners with their rifles and ammunition.⁸⁸⁹

The Free State and National newspapers contested this, claiming that “after intense fighting the National Army eventually repelled the attack.”⁸⁹⁰ The newspapers named four IRA volunteers killed with several more wounded, mentioning that one National Army soldier was killed during the attack.⁸⁹¹ The UCC, Cork Civil War Fatality Register confirms the newspaper reports of fatalities on both sides.⁸⁹² After the attack the Free State reinforced Bantry from the sea and from Cork through Clonakilty.⁸⁹³ This attack, though not successful, did demonstrate the fighting prowess and determination of the reconstituted IRA Flying Columns and set up a precursor for the following months of IRA activities against the National Army in North and West Cork.

Following on from Bantry, on 11th September 1922, a Free State patrol was attacked by the IRA on a bridge near Carrigaphooca, three miles from Macroom. The patrol was travelling between Macroom and Kerry and in all “eight soldiers of the National Army were actually

⁸⁸⁷ Interview of Ted O’Sullivan (West Cork IRA) by Ernie O’Malley, O’Malley Papers, P17b/108 UCDA.

⁸⁸⁸ *Irish Independent*, 01 September 1922.

⁸⁸⁹ Interview of Ted O’Sullivan (West Cork IRA) by Ernie O’Malley, O’Malley Papers, P17b/108, UCDA.

⁸⁹⁰ *Irish Independent*, 01 September 1922.

⁸⁹¹ *Irish Independent*, 01 September 1922.

⁸⁹² Andy Bielenberg, Cork Civil War Fatality Register, UCC,

<https://www.ucc.ie/en/theirishrevolution/collections/cork-fatality-register/register-index/#d.en.1399690>.

⁸⁹³ Interview of Ted O’Sullivan (West Cork IRA) by Ernie O’Malley, O’Malley Papers, P17b/108, UCDA.

blown to pieces by a road mine cunningly laid” beside the bridge.⁸⁹⁴ Amongst the dead was a high-ranking Free State officer, Colonel-Commandant Tom Kehoe, a prominent member of Michael Collins’ ‘Squad’ during the War of Independence.⁸⁹⁵ In retaliation a Republican prisoner was shot dead by Dublin Guards troops.⁸⁹⁶ The Cork Civil War Fatality Register confirms a figure of seven National Army fatalities in this attack, including Colonel-Commandant Kehoe.⁸⁹⁷ On 27th October 1922, three IRA volunteers were killed by Free State forces as they returned from a funeral in Castletownroche in north Cork, near Mallow. A further nine IRA volunteers were wounded in this attack.⁸⁹⁸

Gaining momentum, the IRA increased the numbers used in complex ‘Mass Attacks’.⁸⁹⁹ Enniskean and Ballineen are two adjoining villages near Bandon in West Cork (see Map 4). On the morning of 5th November 1922, at least 200 IRA volunteers stormed the Free State garrisons, demonstrating the complexity and command and control abilities of the attackers. The National Army defenders comprised of “one officer and 25 men at Enniskean and two officers and 38 men and Ballineen.”⁹⁰⁰ The IRA seized control of both villages at approximately 10pm but withdrew on the arrival of National Army reinforcements at 11pm.⁹⁰¹

⁸⁹⁴ *Irish Independent*, 16 September 1922.

⁸⁹⁵ *Irish Independent*, 16 September 1922.

⁸⁹⁶ Peter Hart, *The IRA and its enemies, violence and community in Cork, 1916-1923* (Oxford, University Press, 1998).

⁸⁹⁷ Andy Bielenberg, Cork Civil War Fatality Register, UCC, <https://www.ucc.ie/en/theirishrevolution/collections/cork-fatality-register/register-index/#d.en.1399690>.


⁸⁹⁸ *Irish Times*, 28 October 1922.

⁸⁹⁹ A Mass Attack is an IRA Attack numbering more than 200 fighters, usually complex, involving support weapons.

⁹⁰⁰ *Irish Independent*, 07 November 1922.

⁹⁰¹ *Irish Independent*, 07 November 1922.

Map of IRA Attacks on Free State Forces – August 1922 to January 1923



Map 4.⁹⁰² – IRA Attacks on Free State Forces and Heat Spots August 1922 – January 1923.⁹⁰³

⁹⁰² 1. Bantry – On 30 August 1922, the IRA attacked the Free State garrison in Bantry. It was one of the first IRA mass attacks and according to the Irish Independent, the IRA attackers numbered between 400 to 500 IRA fighters.

2. Macroom (Carrigphooka) – Free State forces captured Macroom on 18 August 1922 and after initially retreating, the IRA counter attacked and tried to destroy the historic castle in the centre of the town.

3. Castletownroche – On the 27 October 1922, three IRA volunteers were killed by Free State forces as they returned for a funeral in the village.

4. Dunmanway On the 4 December 1922, approximately 60 IRA volunteers ambushed two National army trucks as they were on a road in Drimoleague near Dunmanway.

5. Enniskeane – Ballineen - On the morning of 5 November 1922, two National army posts suffered “a determined attack” by IRA forces. At least 200 IRA volunteers were involved in both attacks.

6. The Attack on Millstreet – 4th January 1923, approximately 400 IRA volunteers were involved in the attack.

⁹⁰³ Map Generated by Author with Graphic Designer Tom Reddy using Official Free State Army Reports and Reports from Cork Examiner, Irish Independent and cited literature.

As the evenings shortened and by the winter months of 1922, the IRA grew in confidence continually increasing the pressure on the National Army. Ted O’Sullivan describing the situation as:

[U]p to close on Christmas of 1922 there was no other Free State post in our area save Bantry and Skibbereen. We had a good column, and we raided these towns at times, and they sallied out, but we beat hell out of them each time they came out.⁹⁰⁴

However compared to other regions in Ireland, the IRA took a considerate amount of casualties during these complex attacks in Cork, compared to the National Army defenders. A number of factors could explain this, but suffice to say a large proportion of the National Army soldiers deployed in these rural outposts in Cork had previous military experience as previously described in Chapter Three. Similarly with military experience came the ability to properly deploy your soldiers into adequately defended localities and positions. As Chapter One explains, throughout the civil war a sizeable number of the *An t-Ógláchs* had articles on basic tactical lessons such as the defence of a village and how to conduct ambushes.⁹⁰⁵

This ability to protect the force and reduce Free State casualties, enabled the National Army to persist in the fight during the winter months of 1922-23. But the leadership in Cork was concerned by the increased IRA activities and Dalton’s overriding fears were communicated to Dublin in November 1922 when he exclaimed his freedom of movement was being hampered not only by the IRA but also by “a horrible lack of transport, competent drivers... a lack of spares for motors.”⁹⁰⁶ Dalton was exasperated and decried that there are more Republicans here now [in Cork] than there was at the election. The people are never reasonable where circumstances are as they have been... from their distorted viewpoint.”⁹⁰⁷ MacMahon purported that “towards the end of 1922 and in the beginning of 1923 the Irregulars

⁹⁰⁴ Interview of Ted O’Sullivan (West Cork IRA) by Ernie O’Malley, O’Malley Papers, P17b/108, pp. 1-27, UCDA.

⁹⁰⁵ *An t-Óglách*, December 1921 to May 1923.

⁹⁰⁶ Dalton Letter to Commander-in-Chief, 18 November 1922, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/67, UCDA.

⁹⁰⁷ Dalton Letter to Commander-in-Chief, 18 November 1922, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/67, UCDA.

[IRA] concentrated on the use of explosives and also on holding up and looting trains, the burning of houses and other forms of destructive warfare. This form of warfare was very difficult to counteract but steps were taken to deal with it.”⁹⁰⁸ As the fighting continued, pressure mounted on the Free State Government to bring an end to the conflict.⁹⁰⁹ A prolonged war would be to the advantage of the IRA and would undermine confidence in the abilities of the Free State Government to govern and provide stability. A protracted conflict is exactly what Dalton and National Army HQ wanted to avoid because Dalton felt that “adverse public opinion is daily on the increase.”⁹¹⁰

On 5th December 1922, Free State cabinet papers note that Major General Emmett Dalton returned from “active duty in Cork and was appointed to be the Clerk of the Seanad.”⁹¹¹ However, he continued for some more weeks in his military post, and was on the army payroll until 9th December.⁹¹² Speculation surrounding Dalton’s new appointment was intense.⁹¹³ A letter written by Dalton in November 1922, gives an insight into his mind-set and may represent that his frustrations were one of the deciding factors in him leaving his Cork Command. In this letter Dalton exclaims that “I am beginning to lose hope.”⁹¹⁴ He further expands that:

I believe the lack of transport – cohesion – organisation are creating the necessity for the soldier, particularly in Cork, to find some means of occupation, they naturally choose the fascinating one.⁹¹⁵⁹¹⁶

⁹⁰⁸ General Seán MacMahon, Statement to the Army Inquiry Committee, 6 May 1924 , IE/MA, AMTY/3/27, MAI.

⁹⁰⁹ Valiulis, *Portrait of a Revolutionary*, p.116.

⁹¹⁰ Dalton Letter to Commander-in-Chief, 18 November 1922, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/67, UCDA

⁹¹¹ Cabinet Meeting of the Provisional Government, (Meeting Minutes) 5th December 1922 DT/1/1/1, NAI.

⁹¹² Major General E. Dalton Pension Records (IE/MA/MSPC/24SP13470).

⁹¹³ Boyne, *Emmet Dalton*, p. 277.

⁹¹⁴ Dalton letter to Commander-in-Chief, 18 November 1922, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/67, UCDA.

⁹¹⁵ Dalton letter to Commander-in-Chief, 18 November 1922, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/67, UCDA.

⁹¹⁶ By ‘fascinating’ and ‘occupation’, Dalton is referring to the high jinks and trouble a bored soldier on outpost duty may get himself into if not properly supervised. Please see the discipline section in Chapter 3 for more context.

In December 1922, General Dalton was replaced by Major General David Reynolds as the Commander of Free State Forces in Cork. Before Dalton resigned, he made a speech in Fermoy where he said that;

The army was the army of the people: they were not the dictators of the people; the people were their master. The army was there to protect and to help the people in maintaining their rights and their property, and to carry out their wishes.⁹¹⁷

According to the *Freeman's Journal* report, Dalton received loud applause.⁹¹⁸

5.8.2 IRA Final 'Mass Attack'

One of the final IRA 'Mass Attacks' occurred in early 1923. Millstreet is a small rural town in the north of County Cork (see Map 4). In January 1923, Millstreet was occupied by a platoon of approximately thirty Free State soldiers. The strength of the attacking party of the IRA was at least 300 volunteers, not counting the number they used to hold the different roads and approaches to the town. At the start of the attack the IRA captured the National Army outposts on the periphery of the town, they then launched the main IRA attack on Free State HQ at the end of the town known as Carnegie Hall. On this post the most determined IRA attack was made. The IRA used six machineguns and concentrated a heavy fire on the building from various vantage points.⁹¹⁹ The Free State troops in the HQ, who numbered twenty-three by this time, had only one Lewis gun in the building and replied vigorously to the attackers who advanced under cover of machine-gun fire as far as the entrance of the hall. However, due to the solid defensive fighting of the Free State soldiers the IRA forces were forced to withdraw.

⁹¹⁷ *Freeman's Journal*, 9 November 1922; cited by Sean Boyne, *Emmet Dalton* (Dublin, Merrion Press, 2015), p. 276

⁹¹⁸ *Freeman's Journal*, 9 November 1922; cited by Sean Boyne, *Emmet Dalton* (Dublin, Merrion Press, 2015), p. 276

⁹¹⁹ Report by Commandant General Galvin, O/C 1st Southern Division [National Army], M/A, CW/OPS/2/D, MAI.

The main body of the IRA retreated in the direction of Kerry and Ballyvourney.⁹²⁰ The *Cork Examiner* reported that the Republican casualties were reported by the doctor in attendance as seven killed and nineteen wounded, though these do not appear to be accurate.⁹²¹ Likewise, the IRA claimed that sixty-five Free State soldiers were in Millstreet and that they captured thirty-nine prisoners, thirty-eight rifles and one Lewis gun.⁹²² This claim was not validated but the Cork Civil War Fatality Register lists three National Army soldiers killed in Millstreet. No IRA fatalities are recorded.⁹²³ The *Freemans Journal* described the defence of Millstreet by National troops as a “thrilling story of gallant defence by a small National Army force against great odds.”⁹²⁴

The failure to capture Millstreet, and the determined resistance put up by the National Army defenders was a serious setback for the IRA, especially as the mass attack column was led by the IRA hero Tom Barry. Harrington called it a commensurate blow to their morale.⁹²⁵ Along with the failings of Millstreet, the leadership of the IRA also had concerns about the effectiveness of their volunteers and for how long they could sustain these tactics against a National Army that was now growing in strength in Cork. The IRA policy of attacking and isolating National Army bases, though effective at the start, did not drive the Free State out of the rural towns and villages in Cork, and create the required ungoverned spaces for the IRA to operate in freely. The dogged resistance by the Free State and continual ability to reinforce rural garrisons paid dividends, enabling and facilitating an improvement in strategy, tactics and a ‘Surge’ capacity for the National Army in Cork County. A return to guerrilla warfare did have rewards for the IRA in the period from September to December 1922 but the National

⁹²⁰ Report by Commandant General Galvin, O/C 1st Southern Division [National Army], M/A, CW/OPS/2/D, MAI.

⁹²¹ *The Cork Examiner*, 08 Jan 1923.

⁹²² Harrington, *The Munster Republic*, p.111.

⁹²³ Andy Bielenberg, Cork Civil War Fatality Register, UCC, <https://www.ucc.ie/en/theirishrevolution/collections/cork-fatality-register/register-index/#d.en.1399690>.

⁹²⁴ *The Freemans Journal*, 06 January 1923.

⁹²⁵ Harrington, *The Munster Republic*, p.111.

Army were different to the British because they had nowhere to go; “it was fighting for basic survival.”⁹²⁶ De Roiste, posits that it was a lack of “a realisation that the present violence of the Irregulars [IRA] is not a war with the British ...it is therefore, a ‘war’ against the Irish people, and for what?”⁹²⁷ De Roiste summarised in his diary entry that perhaps the most important question for the IRA was: What was their War about? What did they want to achieve? What was the end game?

5.9 The National Army as a Learning Organisation

Victory in a counterinsurgency campaign is gained through a tempo of adaptation that is beyond the other side’s ability to achieve or sustain. Therefore, counterinsurgents should emphasize learning and adaptation.⁹²⁸ As the National Army expanded it had to be aware of the additional responsibility of not alienating the local population, by acting like a force of occupation. The use of mass detentions, cordon-and-search, collective punishments, or property destruction as intelligence collection tactics typically alienate the population, whatever their informational benefits.⁹²⁹

Conventional military forces have historically struggled to display common sense and defeat insurgencies. Those that succeeded in learning how to protect the population did so because they were adaptive learning organisations.⁹³⁰ Learning is also demonstrated in “... the structure of military organizations, in the creation of new organizations to deal with new or

⁹²⁶ Townsend, *The Republic, The Fight for Irish Independence, 1918-1923*, p.420

⁹²⁷ De Roiste Diaries, 29 October 1922, Cork City and County Archives, U271/A/46.

⁹²⁸ US Army Field Manual 3-24. *Counterinsurgency* (December 2006), pp. 5-31.

⁹²⁹ David French, *The British Way in Counter-Insurgency, 1945-1967* (Oxford, University Press, 2011), p. 109.

⁹³⁰ Nagl, *Knife Fights, A Memoir of Modern War In Theory And Practice*, p. 116.

changed situations, and in the myriad other institutional responses to change.”⁹³¹ Adaptive learning organisations can react and change in order to rectify setbacks. They are more responsive and react to change better, giving them an advantage in counterinsurgent warfare.

The evolving IRA tactics, along with the Enniskean and Millstreet complex attacks, were a wake-up call for the National Army. The National Army and Free State Government needed to continue to learn lessons and transform its efforts in order to counter the IRA momentum and tactics. In order to counter the improvement in IRA tactics during late 1922, the National Army needed to regain the initiative. On 12th December 1922, Mulcahy suggested to General Sean MacMahon, that former British Army officers, despite their widespread unpopularity, should be enlisted on to a ‘technical committee’ so that “their ideas would...provide a base line against which we would compare what we’re actually doing ourselves.”⁹³² The powers at the political-strategic level (the Cabinet or Executive Council) also wanted to fight the war in a different manner. To that end, on 11th January 1923, each Minister submitted a memorandum of his own personal opinions on the military, economic, and political developments taking place throughout the country. After pooling these opinions, certain lines of policy were provisionally agreed to in consultation with the Army Council.⁹³³ With new political guidance, the leadership of the National Army understood it had to change in order to counter the developing IRA tactics, and to bring the civil war to a swifter resolution for political expediency. This led to a re-structuring and realignment of the overall Free State strategy in early 1923.

The evolution of the National Army progressed steadily. By early 1923, the Free State strategy responded very well to the continually changing situation because adaptive military organisations are “able to react positively to the unexpected, adjusting their methods of

⁹³¹ John Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2005).

⁹³² Mulcahy to MacMahon, 12 December 1922, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/153, UCDA.

⁹³³ Executive Council Minutes, 11 January 1923, DT/1/2/1, C.1/28, NAI.

operation rapidly to the circumstances actually prevailing.”⁹³⁴ When developing a capability, whether organisational, doctrinal, or material, analysis of the enemy threats is vital. Free State capabilities needed to progress and improve. Because of this the Free State developed four policies or capability improvements. These policies were as follows:

- a. Expand National Army bases and additional troop surges.
- b. National Army mobility and armoured mobility was improved dramatically to bring the fight to the IRA and secure freedom of movement.
- c. ‘Counter Columns’ were established within the National Army using it’s the most experienced soldiers, to counter the effectiveness of IRA ‘Flying Columns’.
- d. The National Army ‘Battle-Grouped’ its infantry battalions to make them more self-sufficient and deployable. These units were used at the end of the civil war to target the IRA in their last safe havens using overwhelming National Army combat power.

5.10 The National Army Expands

The enhanced Free State recruitment policy meant that the National Army had the increasing ability to deploy more troops to rural outposts in the Cork countryside. In his later writings on counterinsurgency, Trinquier advocated the expansion of bases and freedom of movement, stating that the network of roads must be kept open to allow the movement of troops specializing in offensive operations.⁹³⁵ Prior to the Free State expansion the IRA had; “burned all our barracks before we cleared out so that the Free State had to billet their men around town.”⁹³⁶ This was a major inconvenience for the National Army but it also indirectly helped them by forcing them to live closer with the people, building up confidence and better relationships with the local population. By being more vulnerable, the National Army troops

⁹³⁴ Army Code 71451, *Design for Operations: The British Military Doctrine* (1989), p. vii.

⁹³⁵ Trinquier *Modern Warfare*, p. 72.

⁹³⁶ Interview of Ted O’Sullivan (West Cork IRA) by Ernie O’Malley, O’Malley Papers, P17b/108, pp. 1-27, UCDA.

realize instinctively that their own safety depends on good relations with the local people.⁹³⁷

This working relationship with the localities was further strengthened when the IRA took the unpopular decision to threaten townsfolk who cooperated with Free State Forces:

Warning is hereby given to all such civilians who continue to work or reside in premises which are at the same time occupied by Free State forces, that after the date of the publication of this notice they will do so at their own risk.⁹³⁸

By April 1923, the situation regarding the number of Free State bases had changed dramatically from Emmet Dalton's September 1922 report. During the entirety of the civil war the National Army grew and established 64 bases in Cork, and those bases were occupied by 220 Officers and 5,219 other ranks.⁹³⁹ In total the National Army occupied 367 bases throughout Ireland, with Cork numbers second only to Dublin. Overall, nearly 18 percent of all the Free State bases in Ireland were located in Cork.⁹⁴⁰ Cork soon became the 'Main Effort' for the National Army during the civil war. It was also the centre of operations for the IRA, as it was the location of Lynch's HQ. Because of this Cork had to be secured, occupied, and the insurgency defeated.

By April 1923, following additional increases or surges by Free State forces, they had over 5,000 troops. The largest bases in Cork were as follows:

Free State HQ (Cork City) – 594 All Ranks
Michael Collins Barracks (Cork City) – 214 All Ranks
Bandon – 202 All Ranks
Macroon – 336 All Ranks
Mallow – 171 All Ranks
Kanturk – 215 All Ranks
Youghal – 315 All Ranks
Fermoy – 145 All Ranks
Bantry – 213 All Ranks
Kinsale – 162 All Ranks⁹⁴¹

⁹³⁷ Galula *Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice*, p. 85.

⁹³⁸ Public Notice by IRA to Civilian Population, O'Malley Papers, P17a/14 (S/12039), UCDA.

⁹³⁹ National Army Report on Strength and Posts 01 April 1923, DT S3361, NAI.

⁹⁴⁰ National Army Report on Strength and Posts 01 April 1923, DT S3361, NAI.

⁹⁴¹ National Army Report on Strength and Posts 01 April 1923, DT S3361, NAI.

The National Army troops in these posts were actively living amongst the local population, aggressively patrolling the contested spaces and reassuring the local population. They provided the safe and secure environment needed in an effective counterinsurgency campaign and keenly sought by the local traders and population.

5.11 Improved Free State Mobility

As the various small towns in Cork were occupied by pro-Treaty troops, forward operating bases or combat outposts were established to hold the key terrain.⁹⁴² The Free State realised that the National Army soldiers in these bases should not remain static, they needed to bring the fight to the IRA.⁹⁴³ But various pro-Treaty sources admitted that in the latter half of 1922, in many areas, National Army troops controlled little more than the towns in which they were based.⁹⁴⁴ The IRA continued to trench roads and the National Army needed adopt a dedicated counter-mobility strategy.⁹⁴⁵ Free State mobility had to be improved and National Army bases needed more secure transportation.

The US Department of Defence defines counter-mobility operations as ‘the construction of obstacles and emplacement of minefields to delay, disrupt, and destroy the enemy by reinforcement of the terrain... to slow or divert the enemy.’⁹⁴⁶ Since the fight with the British, the IRA had become adept in counter-mobility operations in the various modes of transportation in Ireland.”⁹⁴⁷ The IRA used the same tactics against the Free State during the

⁹⁴² Neeson, *The Civil War in Ireland*, p.163.

⁹⁴³ General Dalton Letter to General Mulcahy, 6 September 1922, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/66, UCDA.

⁹⁴⁴ Hopkinson, *Green Against Green*, p. 173.

⁹⁴⁵ William H Kautt, *Ambushes and Armour The Irish Rebellion 1919-1921* (Dublin – Portland, Irish Academic Press, 2010), p. 4.

⁹⁴⁶ U.S. Army Field Manual, *Counter-mobility* (October 2004).

⁹⁴⁷ Kautt, *Ambushes and Armour The Irish Rebellion 1919-1921*, p. 4.

civil war but Kautt posits that the National Army proved to be a learning organisation and had adopted various ideas and methodologies to counter these IRA counter-mobility tactics.⁹⁴⁸ This was important for the Free State but in order to mount an effective campaign against the IRA, the National Army required a knowledge of mechanised warfare and required an additional supply of armoured cars and motorized transport.⁹⁴⁹ Mobility was important for the National Army because troops that were responsible for the isolation of insurgents need to become thoroughly familiar with the terrain over which they repeatedly travel.⁹⁵⁰ They also needed armoured mobility to protect their own forces, to harass the IRA, to round-up the IRA insurgents, and to keep the IRA permanently moving and on the defensive. Mobile light infantry forces with light armoured vehicles make the best counterinsurgency soldiers. Because of this Dalton's harassment strategy needed to be supported by mobile columns, especially in the more remote and dangerous parts of Cork. These mobile columns could enter IRA safe areas, seize arms and support the National Army lines of supply.⁹⁵¹ They also provided brute force to break the insurgency's will and capability to fight on.⁹⁵² Additional mobility, especially armoured mobility also corresponded to Richard Mulcahy's intent "to have at our disposal central force enough to allow elasticity in our plans" or in military parlance a flexible and mobile reserve.⁹⁵³

Achieving this level of mobility was a constant struggle for Dalton and his successor General David Reynolds. In November 1922, Dalton complained to Mulcahy about the lack of suitable transport in Cork, warning of the consequences if deficiencies were not addressed. Dalton stated "transport continues hopelessly impoverished down here and unless it is immediately attended to the garrisons must continue as they are – comparatively

⁹⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁴⁹ Boyne, *Emmet Dalton*, p. 246.

⁹⁵⁰ Trinquier, *Modern Warfare*, p. 67.

⁹⁵¹ Boyne, *Emmet Dalton*, p. 246.

⁹⁵² Hazelton, *Bullets Not Ballots, Success in Counterinsurgency Warfare*, p. 5.

⁹⁵³ Correspondence between Mulcahy to Mac Eoin, 14 August 1922, MacEoin Papers, P151/161/5, UCDA.

ineffective.”⁹⁵⁴ Eventually, after much persuasion, transport vehicles started to become more available to Free State troops in Cork. This increased mobility allowed the Free State forces to extend their operational reach in a safer and more robust manner throughout the county.

At the start of the civil war, over 395 former British vehicles were handed over to the National Army. These vehicles included 3-ton lorries, touring cars, armoured Lancia trucks, armoured and unarmoured Crossley Tenders.⁹⁵⁵ These vehicles provided the mobility and protection required by the National Army. In addition the British Army also supplied the National Army with seven Peerless armoured cars and most importantly thirteen Rolls Royce 1920 pattern armoured cars.⁹⁵⁶

These vehicles, especially armoured vehicles, gave the National Army a marked advantage over the IRA as they allowed aggressive patrolling and the re-supply outlying garrisons.⁹⁵⁷ This permitted the National Army to keep its lines of communication open and to keep the IRA discommoded. By the end of the civil war, practically all the National Army posts in Cork were supplied with an armoured car or armoured Lancia.⁹⁵⁸ Another consequence of improved mobility was an improvement in National Army morale. This was annotated by Dalton when he reported that “the remedy is plenty of transport and no excuse for plenty of work which will keep them [National Army soldiers away from] brooding over their ‘cups’ of imaginary wrongs, and sterner conduct towards [their] enemy’s.”⁹⁵⁹

⁹⁵⁴ Major General Emmet Dalton to Commander-in-Chief, 18 November 1922, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/67, UCDA.

⁹⁵⁵ Statement No.7&8, List of Materials Taken over from the British from 31st January 1922 to 30th July 1922, DT S3361, NAI.

⁹⁵⁶ Ralph A. Riccio, *The Irish Artillery Corps since 1922*, (Hamish, 2012), P.14 and 25; cited by Gerry White, *Free-State versus Republic; The Opposing Armed Forces in the Civil War; Atlas of the Irish Revolution* (Cork, University Press, 2017), p. 691.

⁹⁵⁷ Boyne, *Emmet Dalton*, p. 247.

⁹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 246

⁹⁵⁹ Major General Emmet Dalton to Commander-in-Chief, 18 November 1922, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/67, UCDA.

As experience grew, the National Army became more adept at using armoured mobility. From the IRA perspective, O’Sullivan describes the combat effectiveness of the National Army armour fleet and how it reacted to the capture of an armoured car by the IRA:

After the capture of the Slieve na mBan [An armored Rolls Royce car] in Bandon which was captured by Cork 3 Brigade... The National army sent out patrols in West Cork to recapture this most valuable armor asset. The terrain in this vicinity was not ideally suited to armored car warfare as when the IRA tried to evade capture and get it [Slieve na mBan] into Bantry... it used to sink in the roadway.”⁹⁶⁰

Eventually on the 8th December 1922, the National Army cornered IRA troops and there was a noteworthy armour versus armour conflict in the vicinity of Bantry–Dunmanway–Drimoleague Region. According to O’Sullivan, the National Army discovered an IRA column and:

...pasted at us from across the river [in the vicinity of Kealkil] and Mossy [Donegan] went off to get the armored lorry [given to Cork 5 Brigade by Cork 1 Brigade] and with it get close to them. To counter this the Free State got their armored cars across the river and got behind the IRA armored lorry. The IRA armored lorry escaped but they burnt the engine to prevent its capture intact by the National army.⁹⁶¹

This was a significant clash for both sides and IRA reports suggest that eight IRA sections were surrounded by 2,000 Free State soldiers with eight armoured vehicles who were all out searching for Slieve na mBan.⁹⁶² This may have been an overestimation by the IRA source, but National Army forces did converge on Kealkil in order to retrieve Slieve na mBan with multiple columns deployed from Free State bases in Clonakilty, Kinsale, Skibbereen, Ballineen and Bantry.⁹⁶³

⁹⁶⁰ Interview of Ted O’Sullivan (West Cork IRA) by Ernie O’Malley ,O’Malley Papers, P17b/108,UCDA.

⁹⁶¹ Interview of Ted O’Sullivan (West Cork IRA) by Ernie O’Malley O’Malley Papers, P17b/108,UCDA.

⁹⁶² Interview of Ted O’Sullivan (West Cork IRA) by Ernie O’Malley O’Malley Papers, P17b/108,UCDA.

⁹⁶³ Ernie O’Malley, *The Men Will Talk to Me, The West Cork Interviews* edited by Bielenberg, Borgonovo and O Ruairc (Cork, Mercier Press), p.138.

5.12 Development of National Army ‘Counter Flying Columns’

Evidence of the National Army transforming its organisation to counter IRA developments can also be grasped by the formation of Free State ‘Counter Columns’ to fight the effective IRA ‘Flying Columns’. Essentially this meant taking on the anti-Treaty forces at their own game. The ability to use small, mobile columns in intelligence-led operations to raid specific areas was already evidenced before the January 1923, reorganisation. On Tuesday, 28th November 1922, as a test of new tactics and procedures, mobile columns of fifteen National Army soldiers “proceeded from Charleville to the village of Dromina”, where they rounded-up nine Republicans.”⁹⁶⁴ Similarly in Donegal a system was developed where large National Army columns would guard the mountain passes while smaller ‘mopping up’ columns would operate in the interior searching for IRA volunteers.”⁹⁶⁵ This became a very effective tactic of harassing and tiring out the IRA, forcing them to rediscover “what it means to pass several nights hungry, tired and cold ... [because] the plan has been to allow no rest.”⁹⁶⁶

The US Army Field Manual *FM 3.24.2, Tactics in Counterinsurgency*, published in 2009, states that in search operations, small, well-trained units should be used, since they move quickly and more quietly among the population regardless of the area of operation. Once this force locates the insurgents, they can strike or fix the insurgent for a larger attack force.⁹⁶⁷ As previously described, by Berman et al., the use of local forces supported by specialised troops dramatically increases the capabilities of the counterinsurgent force, especially in cordon and search operations.⁹⁶⁸ By early 1923, specialised Free State search units countered the IRA

⁹⁶⁴ *Cork Examiner*, 29 Nov. 1922.

⁹⁶⁵ Sean Lehane to Ernie O’Malley, 15 October 1922 in Cormac O’Malley and Anne Dolan, ‘*No Surrender Here*’, *the Civil War Papers of Ernie O’Malley 1922-1924* (Dublin, Lilliput Press, 2008), p. 282.

⁹⁶⁶ National Army Monthly Operational Report for December 1922 by General Lawlor on operations in the west, MacEoin Papers, P151/180, UCDA.

⁹⁶⁷ US Army Field Manual 3-24.2 *Tactics in Counterinsurgency* (April 2009), pp. 5-7.

⁹⁶⁸ Berman, Felter and Shapiro, *Small Wars, Big Data: The Information Revolution in Modern Conflict*, with Vestal McIntyre, p. 273.

‘Flying Columns’ operating in isolated parts of Cork. These ‘Counter Columns’ units usually contained experienced Free State soldiers and as the fighting progressed their need became more pressing because “even [Free State] sweeping movements by large forces have failed to envelope [IRA] Columns working in the mountains or even get into touch with them at all.”⁹⁶⁹

In order to defeat the IRA ‘Flying Columns’ operating in the mountainous regions of Munster, “it required dogged, drawn-out manoeuvring to deal with them [IRA] and the most successful way has been to operate against them with ‘Counter Columns’ moving quietly and surprising them in their haunts.”⁹⁷⁰ Such specialised units when combined with locally recruited forces have: (1) “Superior small unit level leadership who can accurately assess and respond to ever changing local conditions; (2) troops with high quality training emphasising tactical readiness; and (3) doctrine and command and control measures that facilitate rapid adaption and innovation, and the application of flexible responses and tactics.”⁹⁷¹

Free State ‘Counter Columns’ also deployed a light horse scouting capability to counter an IRA cavalry unit. *The Irish Times* reported that “some of the Republicans were also on horseback, having commandeered hunters in the Muskerry foxhunting district.”⁹⁷²

The exact composition of these ‘Counter Columns’ is unknown but the strength can be assessed from newspaper articles and official documentation to be in the region of 15 to 20 trained Free State soldiers. The establishment of these ‘Counter Columns’ demonstrated the practical nature within Free State HQ, the ability to critically think and arrive at feasible solutions. The National Army needed to adapt quickly to the problem of the IRA seeking refuge in the ungoverned mountainous areas and the ‘Counter Columns’ were an excellent solution. A National Army ‘After Action Report’ on a major operation conducted in West Cork and

⁹⁶⁹ National Army Report on the Military Situation 31st March 1923 DT S3361, NAI.

⁹⁷⁰ National Army Report on the Military Situation 31st March 1923 DT S3361, NAI.

⁹⁷¹ Felter, “Sources of Military Effectiveness in Counterinsurgency; Evidence from the Philippines,” in *The Swords Other Edge; Trade-offs in the Pursuit of Military Effectiveness*; ed. Daniel Reiter.

⁹⁷² *Irish Times*, 2nd October 1922.

South Kerry in late April and early May 1923, describing how “The [Railway] Corps had to establish billeting centres at Loo Bridge, Morleys Bridge, and Kilgarvan, and convey the operations Quartermaster with stores to these points for feeding the columns on the following day.”⁹⁷³ But importantly it outlines how the National Army used these ‘Counter Columns’ to discommode the IRA ‘Flying Columns’ operating in the mountainous regions on the Cork/Kerry Border:

On this day [30th April 1923] all columns moved as per operation order, but the weather was entirely against the operation and it was very difficult for columns to keep in touch... This in no doubt greatly facilitated Irregulars [IRA] in the area in making their escape through the cordon of columns which was closing in on the railway line.⁹⁷⁴

By 3rd May 1923, the Free State ‘Counter Columns’ were having more success as operations became refocused and better administrated. Supplementary Operation Orders were issued which detailed the columns “to move back over the same ground”, because of better weather conditions, also noting that “this day’s operation was very heavy on the troops and...some columns had to operate a distance of 35 miles.”⁹⁷⁵ This same National Army Report commends the co-operation between the sweeping new Infantry Battalion Battle-Groups and the newly developed ‘Counter Columns’. Most of the prisoners taken were captured by the columns operating outside and whilst the ‘Counter Columns’ in the first line captured very few prisoners, they captured quite a number of dumps and a number of motor cars concealed in dugouts.⁹⁷⁶ ‘Counter Columns’ would become a very successful and adaptive capability for the National Army, especially when they worked alongside the newly re-organised Infantry Corps.

⁹⁷³ National Army Report on Operations carried out in the West Cork, and South Kerry areas, 29th April – 5th May 1923, DT S3361, NAI.

⁹⁷⁴ National Army Report on Operations carried out in the West Cork, and South Kerry areas, 29th April – 5th May 1923, DT S3361, NAI.

⁹⁷⁵ National Army Report on Operations carried out in the west Cork, and South Kerry areas, 29th April – 5th May 1923, DT S3361, NAI.

⁹⁷⁶ National Army Report on Operations carried out in the west Cork, and South Kerry areas, 29th April – 5th May 1923, DT S3361, NAI.

5.13 Battle-Grouping of Free State Infantry Battalions

By early 1923, the National Army had recognised that counterinsurgency war is primarily a war of Infantry, and that it would benefit a smaller logistical tail and being more combined.⁹⁷⁷ This led to a strategy and organisational transformation from a conventional to a non-conventional force. The Free State also understood that a significant combat advantage was obtained by the deployment of forces to a specific area in the quickest time possible, to overwhelm the enemy IRA forces through a concentration of superior combat power.

The deployment and organisation of a counterinsurgent force is vitally important to the success of a counterinsurgency operation. A concentrated population is easier to protect; an infantry company of 100 soldiers can easily control a small town of 10,000-20,000 inhabitants, short of a general uprising. On the other hand, it would take a much larger unit if the same population were spread throughout the countryside.⁹⁷⁸ Ireland during the period of the civil war had numerous rural and urban centres, especially in Munster. Because of this ‘holding’ operations were manpower intensive. Trinquier suggests a possible solution when he states that a counterinsurgent force can be supported when the population is allowed to participate in their own defence.⁹⁷⁹ To allow this local security participation, the local population needs continual military and civil police protection and a sense of security from the counterinsurgent force. This sense of security can be provided by a consistent military presence comprised of mobile, self-sufficient infantry forces actively patrolling the area of operations and unsettling the insurgent force.

As more transport and mobility became available, to the National Army, they transformed into a more mobile, self-sufficient and effective force capable of supporting

⁹⁷⁷ Galula *Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice*, p. 21.

⁹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 70.

⁹⁷⁹ Trinquier *Modern Warfare*, p. 54.

isolated Free State outposts. The reorganisation of January 1923 featured the arranging of the National Army into independent Infantry Battalions that were Battle-Grouped.⁹⁸⁰ The National Army transformed the whole Infantry Corps into sixty-five battalions, abandoning divisional organisation structures inherited from the British Army. This helped stabilize the Irish countryside by bringing the fight to the IRA.⁹⁸¹ The entire Infantry force of the National Army was established at 32,304 between all ranks and independent units were Battle-Grouped to become self-sufficient entities, easily deployable with combat support.⁹⁸² Units became more robust and better able to stand-up to the IRA mass attacks, while also providing better protection to the towns and villages of Ireland. This new strategy also allowed the National Army to mass forces quickly to specific locations in order to overwhelm the IRA defenders.

A National Army organisation report from 1923 elaborated more on the composition and taskings of these Infantry Battalions Battle-Groups in Cork. The report stated that the new “battalions of infantry are commanded by the G.O.C. (General Officer Commanding) of the command in which they are stationed.”⁹⁸³ The report continued, that “battalions have no territorial area but, for purposes of organisation and control, centres have been fixed for battalion HQs.”⁹⁸⁴ These new battalions would be predominantly mobile and deployed to areas where the IRA were most active. There would be seven headquarter towns in Cork, predominantly located in the north and west of the County, where the fighting was most intense at the end of the civil war.⁹⁸⁵ Mobility and flexibility became key principles and fundamentals for the newly re-organised National Army. In order to ‘Hold’ the towns and villages, they

⁹⁸⁰ Battle-Grouping is where the combat arms are combined together into one inherent unit, in order to maximize combat power, unity of effort and command and control.

⁹⁸¹ Long, Patrick, *The Army of the Irish Free State, 1922 – 1924*, Master of Arts, Modern Irish History, UCD, 1981-1983, p. 46-47.

⁹⁸² Long, Patrick, *The Army of the Irish Free State, 1922 – 1924*, Master of Arts, Modern Irish History, UCD, 1981-1983, p. 46-47.

⁹⁸³ Army Organisation Report September 1923, DT S3361, NAI.

⁹⁸⁴ Army Organisation Report September 1923, DT S3361, NAI.

⁹⁸⁵ Army Organisation Report September 1923, DT S3361, NAI.

needed to actively patrol as well as bring a focused fight to the IRA in the isolated hills and countryside of North and West Cork.

Free State reports highlight the ability of the National Army to concentrate its forces to overwhelm the IRA in locations they once dominated: “Operation reports show that all battalions are working hard, continual sweeping and searching is weakening enemy morale and preventing any attempt at concentrated activity.”⁹⁸⁶ This is evidenced in the National Army Report on operations carried out in West Cork, and the South Kerry in April and May of 1923. These operations seriously degraded the IRA and the ‘After-Action Report’ from West Cork states that the Free State had the ability to mass forces and “in this operation we had roughly 2,500 troops cooperating.”⁹⁸⁷ The area covered during this week-long operation in mountainous terrain, “covered almost 500 square miles and is the most difficult area in the country to operate over.”⁹⁸⁸ Combined with these large scale National Army operations, pro-Treaty troops conducted even more intensive efforts in the southern counties of Ireland. In one of the biggest operations of its kind during the war, the whole of South Tipperary was combed by battle-grouped National Army troops yielding to the capture of the important Republican political leader, Austin Stack.⁹⁸⁹

The overall results of these large, co-ordinated operations were impressive. The National Army Report from the large-scale operations in April/May 1923 states that; “Before this type of operation it was fairly well established that there were at least four IRA columns in the area of West Cork/South Kerry, numbering from 30 to 50 fighters. By the end of

⁹⁸⁶ National Army Report on the Military Situation 07th April 1923, DT S3361, NAI.

⁹⁸⁷ National Army Report on Operations carried out in the West Cork, and South Kerry areas, 29th April – 5th May 1923, DT S3361, NAI.

⁹⁸⁸ National Army Report on Operations carried out in the West Cork, and South Kerry areas, 29th April – 5th May 1923, DT S3361, NAI.

⁹⁸⁹ Neeson, *The Civil War in Ireland*, p.199.

operations, it was established that there remained only one small band of about a dozen that could be called a column.”⁹⁹⁰

An interesting parallel tactic developed by the National Army during this operation related to the exploitation of its successes. The National Army acknowledged that “in order to clinch the operation, and with a view to picking up stragglers and discovering dumps and dug-outs, numerous small posts have been established.”⁹⁹¹ These posts were temporary, but allowed the National Army to hold, consolidate and secure the terrain, while also accommodating specialised troops such as ‘Counter Columns’. They also helped re-assure the local population and support future exploitation operations.

5.14 Improving Free State Discipline and Performance

By May 1923 the outright defeat of the IRA by the National Army was the ultimate objective.

A National Army ‘After-Action Report’ critiques the operational effectiveness of the new battalions, stating that:

it is quite clear that the battalion organisation is working well, and each battalion is beginning to feel that it is the best...it is agreed by those who have had experience in other armies that in no Army could the same amount of work be got out of the troops as we got out of our men last week.⁹⁹²

The new task organisation of the Infantry into independent and mobile Battle-Grouped battalions, allowed the National Army to bring the fight to the IRA in overwhelming numbers in even the most isolated areas of the country. The newly adopted leadership format, the

⁹⁹⁰ National Army Report on Operations carried out in the West Cork, and South Kerry areas, 29th April – 5th May 1923, DT S3361, NAI.

⁹⁹¹ National Army Report on Operations carried out in the West Cork, and South Kerry areas, 29th April – 5th May 1923, DT S3361, NAI.

⁹⁹² National Army Report on Operations carried out in the West Cork, and South Kerry areas, 29th April – 5th May 1923, DT S336, NAI.

streamlining of command and control and the breakdown of territory for these units, allowed these battalions to co-operate and operate in a cohesive and effective manner. It also gave the Infantry units the “elasticity” and flexibility as advocated by Mulcahy as early as August 1922.⁹⁹³

In counterinsurgency warfare strength and discipline are essential. In conventional warfare, it is important to hold the high ground as the key terrain. Counterinsurgent forces also needs to occupy the moral high ground and not be dragged down or mired in the philosophical low ground. Undisciplined behaviour can antagonise the local population and feed into negative propaganda fostered by the insurgent side. At the start of the fighting Free State Army discipline was poor but it improved eventually and in the opinion of the Judge Advocate General “it is a matter for congratulation that for a year past discipline has been steadily improving. It is now excellent.”⁹⁹⁴

The moral high ground also builds the legitimacy of the government that sends out the counterinsurgent force. The fact that the Free State Government were democratically elected strengthened its legitimacy in the eyes of the population. It also strengthened their resolve to defeat the IRA insurgents, whose own legitimacy ultimately waned amongst the population as the civil war progressed. In modern day counterinsurgency discourse, the legitimacy of the government is questioned constantly by those that oppose it. Whether this is a reality or a determining factor is debateable but the testimony of Captain⁹⁹⁵ Joseph Lawless of the National Army shows it meant a great deal to some of those involved in the fighting, including him: “although I had no heart in the fratricidal struggle, I realised that I must make my contribution towards the supremacy of the Government of Dáil Éireann as representing the democratic

⁹⁹³ Correspondence between Mulcahy to Mac Eoin, 14 August 1922, MacEoin Papers,P151/161/5, UCDA.

⁹⁹⁴ Cahir Davitt (1894–1986), Bureau of Military History Witness Statement No. 1,751, 18 Aug. 1958.

⁹⁹⁵ Captain during the civil war – retired later as a Colonel.

majority of the people of Ireland.”⁹⁹⁶ With better discipline, with better tactics, and with an improving organisation, General Michael Costello stated in 1924, that every officer admitted that there had been an extraordinary improvement in the army between December 1922 and April 1923. Much of that was put down to the re-organisation and re-structuring which occurred in January.⁹⁹⁷ Mulcahy agreed and commented that “we are getting some strength and discipline into the Army.”⁹⁹⁸ This was a marked improvement on the force that the IRA faced in the previous war with the British and it obviously effected their ability to prosecute their insurgency against the Free State.

5.15 The IRA Reach Culmination Point

One of the keys in a successful counterinsurgency campaign is the ability to take advantage of favourable conditions. Such opportunities are often ignored by non-local troops but are more noticeable to local soldiers. The National Army troops deployed in Cork and Munster were more culturally aware than the British security forces had ever been during the War of Independence. The Irish troops had a better feeling for the prevalent atmosphere and society they were operating in. A recognition by the National Army of the need for popular support is witnessed in reports from the period. The majority of reports make reference to “the relationship between the army and the people” and how it was steadily improving, especially in Cork.⁹⁹⁹ In conjunction with this, Liam Deasy, Officer Commanding the 1st Southern Division IRA, reported that “there are indications that in many instances ASUs [Active Service

⁹⁹⁶ Colonel Joseph Vincent Lawless (1896–1969) Bureau of Military History, Witness Statement No. 1,043, 9 Dec. 1954, MAI.

⁹⁹⁷ Costello at Army Enquiry, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/25, UCDA.

⁹⁹⁸ Mulcahy Letter to Brennan, 8 February 1923, Mulcahy Papers P7/B/76, UCDA.

⁹⁹⁹ National Army General Surveys of the Situation” for weeks ending; 31 March 1923, 7th April 1923 15th April 1923 21st April 1923, 28 April 1923, DT S3361, NAI.

Units], are not properly staffed, receive no regular directions, are not supplied with the necessary local or other intelligence, carry out no systematic method of attempted ambushes, or other forms of attack.”¹⁰⁰⁰ In guerrilla warfare it is such factors, rather than armaments or supplies that are the key elements.¹⁰⁰¹

The combat effectiveness of some of the IRA Brigades started to decrease as the Free State forces became more effective. Ted O’Sullivan explained how the IRA 5(Cork) Brigade “...fell asunder quickly... there was no real brigade column to hold them, and the Free State had the towns around them held. Towards December they [Free State] occupied Castletownbere, and they always recruited local fellows to guide them.”¹⁰⁰² This was an extraordinary turnaround considering the performance of many of the same IRA Cork units in the previous fight against the British.

In early January 1923, the 1st Southern Division of the IRA held a meeting. O’Sullivan, recalled, “at that time the Staters [National Army] were giving us the full whack. I had said that if ... the other areas in Kerry and in Cork 1, 2 [and] 3 Brigades didn’t work harder I could not hold out.” The other IRA units promised to “intensify the war for you [O’Sullivan].”¹⁰⁰³ But this support did not materialise. By the spring of 1923, the National Army had the upper hand in its counterinsurgency campaign against the IRA. The IRA Chief of Staff Liam Lynch commented on the large enemy presence around the boundary between the IRA Cork 1 and 2 Brigades. He stated that Richard Mulcahy “...has realised the importance of initiative and his forces are continually on the move, following up our men to our safer areas.”¹⁰⁰⁴ The number of Republican safe havens, which were so important during the War of Independence,

¹⁰⁰⁰ Deasy to Brigade O/Cs, 13 September 1922, O’Malley Papers, P17a/88 UCDA.

¹⁰⁰¹ Townsend, *The Republic, The Fight for Irish Independence, 1918-1923*, p.417.

¹⁰⁰² Interview of Ted O’Sullivan (West Cork IRA) by Ernie O’Malley, O’Malley Papers, P17b/108, pp. 1-27, UCDA.

¹⁰⁰³ Interview of Ted O’Sullivan (West Cork IRA) by Ernie O’Malley, O’Malley Papers, P17b/108, UCDA.

¹⁰⁰⁴ DC/S to C/S, 6 March 1923, O’Malley Papers, P17a/85, UCDA.

substantially decreased as the civil war progressed. As the ungoverned spaces decreased so to did the support for the IRA from the local population.

Ernie O'Malley agreed with Lynch when he stated that the essential differences between the British and the Irish National Army during this period was that "they [The British] did not know our [IRA] officers personally. We were an invisible army who melted away when they tried to steam-roll. Now the people, on the whole, were against us, they were willing to give information."¹⁰⁰⁵

5.15.1 The Final Nail in the Coffin

The IRA's 1st Southern Division met again on 26th February 1923. Representatives from all the Brigades agreed that only small operations were now possible. The Officer Commanding the Cork 3 Brigade stated that in a very short time he would "not have a man left owing to the great number of arrests and casualties."¹⁰⁰⁶ Moreover, the cumulative effect of peace moves by influential civic groups and senior representatives on both sides inevitably affected Republican resolve. The National Army had the support of the majority of the population and of the Catholic Church, along with the backing of the press and a government with substantial resources and outside support.¹⁰⁰⁷ Kissane claims "the will to resist in arms and the fighting resolve eventually deserted the anti-Treatyites, especially after the death of Liam Lynch on 10th April 1923, and the subsequent capture of key leaders during large scale National Army operations."¹⁰⁰⁸ Their overall military position was bleak, their war materials and essential

¹⁰⁰⁵ O'Malley, *The Singing Flame*, p.187

¹⁰⁰⁶ 1st Southern Division Meeting, 26 February 1923, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/89, UCDA.

¹⁰⁰⁷ Harrington, *The Munster Republic*, p.131.

¹⁰⁰⁸ Neeson, *The Civil War in Ireland*, p.199.

supplies were steadily diminishing and, to avoid capture, many had to take refuge high in the hills and in well-concealed dugouts.¹⁰⁰⁹

Additional National Army troops were locally recruited, and as they gained combat experience, their effectiveness improved. By April 1923, with a newly re-organised army, the Free State searches were meticulously planned. National Army forces had detailed knowledge of the topography of the areas and of the regular billets used by IRA Republicans.¹⁰¹⁰ The ‘After-Action Reports’ on Free State operations in West Cork and South Kerry demonstrates how detailed, efficient and co-ordinated National Army staff officers had become. Operation Orders, supported by Supplementary Orders and detailed terrain analysis were now the remit of Free State tactical and operational planners.¹⁰¹¹ Co-ordination between Command Areas improved and internal communications were enhanced, ensuring unity of effort and economy of force. By 11th April 1923, the *Irish Times* reported that “The National Army has now a position of overwhelming superiority in the field. The militant Republicans have lost their most active leaders ... The hour is ripe for peace. The whole country seeks it.”¹⁰¹²

Free State reports from March and April 1923 outline how the National Army were defeating the IRA. On 31st March 1923 the National Army reported that “these areas, with a little more pressure, will be cleaned up in the course of a few weeks, providing that we can come into contact with the Irregular [IRA] forces operating.”¹⁰¹³ This report also describes IRA prisoners as being ‘fed up’.¹⁰¹⁴ On 28th April 1923, a National Army report stated that “the army’s grip on the situation is daily becoming stronger and better, while within the army itself

¹⁰⁰⁹ Harrington, *The Munster Republic*, p.114.

¹⁰¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p.126.

¹⁰¹¹ National Army Report on Operations carried out in the West Cork, and South Kerry areas, 29th April – 5th May 1923 DT S3361, NAI.

¹⁰¹² *Irish Times*, 11 April 1923.

¹⁰¹³ National Army Report on the Military Situation 31st March 1923, DT S3361, NAI.

¹⁰¹⁴ National Army Report on the Military Situation 31st March 1923, DT S3361, NAI.

a healthy spirit of confidence, discipline, and a very real soldierly outlook is growing to a very appreciable extent.”¹⁰¹⁵

As the counterinsurgency theorist Galula states “...complete elimination of the guerrillas by military action being practically impossible at this stage, remnants will always manage to stay in the area, and new recruits will join their ranks so long as the political cells have not been destroyed.”¹⁰¹⁶ The National Army needed to make it difficult for IRA ‘Flying Columns’ to gain or regain any continual traction with the local population and to operate safely in Cork County. They needed to also prevent the IRA from recruiting locally. The anti-government cause being advocated by the IRA needed to be subdued by a dedicated rebuilding programme. Key areas of Cork County were flooded with troops and resources to deny them to the IRA. By this stage, any armed action by the IRA won little sympathy with a population eager for a more settled economic and social environment.¹⁰¹⁷

5.15.2 Momentum Swing

By the end of the civil war, the morale of the IRA in Cork was at an all-time low. Pa Murray, a senior IRA leader, bemoaned the fact that the National Army could now concentrate its forces at will and overwhelm the IRA: “...the Staters [National Army] have all areas overran [sic] and...columns cannot exist except in small parties ... Killing a few of the other side does not count as they can be easily replaced.”¹⁰¹⁸

¹⁰¹⁵ National Army Report on the Military Situation 28th April 1923, DT S3361, NAI.

¹⁰¹⁶ Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice*, p. 77.

¹⁰¹⁷ Hopkinson, *Green Against Green*, p. 240.

¹⁰¹⁸ Letter to Pa Murray, 13 February 1923, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/89, UCDA.

Although there had never been an outright defeat of the IRA, the pro-Treaty forces had progressively worn down their will to continue the struggle.¹⁰¹⁹ By the spring of 1923, the IRA was in disarray. ‘Flying Columns’ still in the field were harassed without rest by superior Free State forces. Republican fatigue was rampant, supplies were scarce, and clothing and equipment were unobtainable.¹⁰²⁰ A National Army Report from 4th May 1923, states that Free State forces in Cork had captured 60 IRA prisoners in the previous week. This was by far the largest number of prisoners taken in the country.¹⁰²¹ Another National Army Report from 5th May 1923, stated that “their [the IRA in Cork] policy seems to be one of waiting for some kind of settlement at the same time letting it be known that they are still around.”¹⁰²² Millstreet was perhaps the final big attack put in by the IRA in Cork. In the first four months of 1923, there was a progressive disintegration of the anti-Treaty war effort. Any large-scale military activity by the IRA became impossible by the end of the civil war in Munster; columns could only remain in existence if small, while arms and financial resources were extremely limited.¹⁰²³

In County Cork at the end of the war – as recalled by Mick Murphy – “Republicans resembled wandering sheep.”¹⁰²⁴ As spring turned to summer in 1923, when the days lengthened, the prospect of a summer campaign lay before the IRA. Many of the leaders doubted their battered and weary troops could face such a campaign.¹⁰²⁵ To support Neeson’s assertion, a National Army Report from June 1923 outlined how “...the Irregulars [IRA] have no intention of resurrecting the vicious aggressive campaign out of which the country has just emerged.”¹⁰²⁶ The Republicans gradually lost the will to fight and they put their weapons away on 24th May 1923. O’Sullivan decried that “we dumped our arms and we ran through the

¹⁰¹⁹ Hopkinson, *Green Against Green*, p. 240.

¹⁰²⁰ Neeson, *The Civil War in Ireland*, p.286.

¹⁰²¹ National Army Statistical Summary 04 May 1923, DT S3361, NAI.

¹⁰²² National Army Report on the Military Situation 05 May 1923, DT S3361, NAI.

¹⁰²³ Hopkinson, *Green Against Green*, p. 228.

¹⁰²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 240.

¹⁰²⁵ Neeson, *The Civil War in Ireland*, p.196.

¹⁰²⁶ General weekly Report No.4 for the Week Ending 16th June 1923, DT S3361, NAI.

country, and they caught men wholesale. Up to that time they had taken a lot of our combatants and they filled the gaols with them.”¹⁰²⁷

The IRA had also lost the good will of the people by their use of heavy-handed tactics, including the focus on the destruction of infrastructure and railways.¹⁰²⁸ This seriously inconvenienced the rural communities that they sought support from and isolated them from the very lifeline they needed to prosecute a successful insurgency. The burning of buildings and commandeering of goods further undermined the popular support that was needed to carry on an extended guerrilla campaign.¹⁰²⁹ These activities were tolerable in the War of Independence against a common enemy such as the British, but they seemed to have been adjudged as futile in an internecine struggle.¹⁰³⁰



Picture 5 – Free State Soldiers consolidating their positions. (Courtesy Military Archives).

¹⁰²⁷ Interview of Ted O’Sullivan (West Cork IRA) by Ernie O’Malley, O’Malley Papers, P17b/108, UCDA.

¹⁰²⁸ Harrington, *The Munster Republic*, p.143.

¹⁰²⁹ Peter Hart, *Mick the Real Michael Collins* (London; MacMillan, 2005), p. 404.

¹⁰³⁰ Harrington, *The Munster Republic*, p.143.

5.16 Chapter Summary

The IRA underestimated the need to win the support of the population. This support was essential in order to survive and prosper. During the War of Independence, the IRA had numerous safe havens in which they sheltered from the British security forces. But during the Irish Civil War, these safe areas became scarce. In his notebooks, the prominent IRA leader Ernie O'Malley stated that "in the Tan War [War of Independence], you would be received into any house you went into, but in the civil war you had to be very sure of your house."¹⁰³¹ This uncertainty damaged the activities and morale of the IRA during the Irish Civil War. The Free State policy and strategy of harassment seriously degraded the combat fighting power of the IRA in the south.

After the initial gains made by the National Army during the conventional phase of the civil war in Cork, the IRA successfully regrouped and brought the war back to the Free State using guerrilla tactics. In turn, Free State reinforcements, a dogged resistance combined with additional mobility and extra bases established throughout Cork County helped swing the momentum back in favour for the Free State.

The co-ordination between the National Army Commands in Munster also improved, allowing the Free State to gain and move into the ungoverned spaces, previously controlled by the IRA. The Free State Government on 10th September 1922, announced that the "Minister of Home affairs reported that General Eoin O'Duffy had accepted the post of Chief Commissioner of the Civic Guard, the appointment was approved."¹⁰³² This appointment will be discussed in the subsequent chapter on Civil Control, but it helped reduce the personality clashes between the Free State Commanders in Munster.

¹⁰³¹ O'Malley Notebooks, P17b/108, UCDA; cited by Harrington Michael, *The Munster Republic* (Dublin, Mercier Press 2009). p.79.

¹⁰³² Minutes of the Cabinet Meeting of the Provisional Government, 10th September 1922 (NA TSCH/1/1/1).

With a successful re-organisation and adoption of a new strategy, the Free State authorities, using local troops, supported by specialised troops, eventually broke the IRA network and fighting spirit. The IRA strategy during the civil war had failed because of Free State resilience and because the IRA hoped “the decent elements in the Free State Army would revolt, that they could not hold out financially, that the people would come over to us. But none of these things happened.”¹⁰³³

Instead, the National Army reinforced their forces throughout the country, increased their mobility, harassed the IRA and learnt from their mistakes. The Free State re-constituted the army in early 1923, and brought the fight back to the IRA by improving their tactics and strategy. The leadership of the National Army recognised the consequences of the IRA demise stating in a National Army Report that; “events of the past few days point to the beginning of the end so far as the Irregular [IRA] campaign is concerned ... The general feeling of the people seems to be that Irregular organisation, as a whole, is doomed as a result of the recent operations and captures of leaders.”¹⁰³⁴ To ensure this demise and to fill the vacuum, civil security imposed by the National Army needed to be supported and replaced by civil control enforced by a newly established civil police force, upholding a newly constituted Rule of Law.

¹⁰³³ Barry to Executive Council, 7 March 1923, De Valera Papers, P150/1647, UCDA.

¹⁰³⁴ National Army Report for week ending 21 April 1923, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/139, UCDA.

Chapter Six – Establish Civil Control

*[Kevin] O'Higgins had no doubts. Although a virulent critic of the army on grounds both of inefficiency and ill-discipline, he told Cosgrave in April 1923 that it was up to the military to restore order.*¹⁰³⁵

-O'Halpin, *Defending Ireland*.

6.1 Introduction to Civil Control

In April 1922, an Irish Ministry of Home Affairs Report outlined the breakdown in law and order following the withdrawal of the British security apparatus:

The peace of the country is at present menaced by the operation of armed bands engaged in robberies of Banks and Post Offices; armed interference with public meetings, suppression of free speech, and of the press. Trains are being held up and goods stolen; business premises are being raided and large quantities of goods removed by force; and large money levies are being made on proprietors of business premises...Order should be restored, and life and property respected.¹⁰³⁶

The Free State military actions against the IRA insurgents in Cork needed to be supported by civil police actions. Defeat of an insurgency requires a joint civil/ military security force, working in conjunction. The military provides Civil Security, while the civil police force provide Civil Control. The initial military actions by the National Army had helped to restore a semblance of order in the Free State. This had shaped the initial environment, setting the necessary conditions to facilitate the transition of power in Ireland, from military security to a more civil control. At the start of the fighting in June 1922, the National Army was one of the few functioning Free State organs of power and, as a result of this, the army was multi-tasked in most areas to provide Civil Control and Civil Security. Civil Control is primarily a civil police function because it supports the rule of law, channelling the population's activities to

¹⁰³⁵ O'Halpin, *Defending Ireland*, p.40.

¹⁰³⁶ Ministry of Home Affairs Report April 1922, DE 2/51, NAI.

allow for the provision of security and essential services while co-existing with a military force that is conducting operations.¹⁰³⁷

The timely transition from the army to a new civil police force was important because as Porch contends, turning soldiers into policemen diverts them from their core mission, undermines military professionalism, and can unduly enhance the politicization of the military.¹⁰³⁸ The politicization of the military can become a major barrier between the population and the civilian guardians of the peace. The gunman had to be removed from Irish politics, from Irish society and from everyday Irish life, and replaced by a functioning, regularised, police force. A civil police force needed to be recruited, trained and deployed throughout the state in order provide the required impartial and legitimate alternative to the army in the effective provision of Civil Control in Ireland. This police force had to come from the local population, and differ from the previous British Police Force, the Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC) in order to be accepted by the Irish population.

6.2 Aim of Chapter

This chapter will examine how the formation of the Civic Guard (as the new Irish Civil Police Force), helped bring civil control to the new Irish Free State. The replacement of the RIC was a difficult process but in order to restore a safe environment and release National Army resources, a local Irish replacement police force needed to be established, recruited, trained and deployed throughout the country. This chapter will also examine how establishing Civil Control led to the restoration of the rule of law and observe, without a predisposition, the ‘Public Safety’ Bill or Execution Policy and how this affected the outcome of the conflict. Finally, this chapter

¹⁰³⁷ US Army (2001), Field Manual 3, Operations.

¹⁰³⁸ Porch *Counterinsurgency Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War*, p. 192.

will analyse the Information Operations campaign conducted by the Free State Government and show how it harnessed the power of the church and press to undermine the IRA and support the Free State and its policies.

6.3 Establishment and Recruitment of an Irish Civil Police Force

The Civic Guard was officially launched in Dublin in the RDS (Royal Dublin Society) Ballsbridge in February 1922 under Michael Staines, its first Commissioner. Staines was an active IRA officer from the west of Ireland, who coincidentally was the son of an RIC officer. He would later state that he viewed the appointment as temporary as he had little interest in continuing the position on a long-term basis.¹⁰³⁹ As the force was being established and with the necessity to expand, on 25th April 1922, an estimated 1,100 new police recruits were transferred from the RDS to a new headquarters in the former British Army barracks in Kildare. Accompanying these recruits was an arsenal of 200 rifles and 1,000 revolvers which were sent to Kildare to help train and arm the new police force.¹⁰⁴⁰

6.3.1 *The Kildare Mutiny*

Upon arrival in Kildare Barracks, disgruntlement among the recruits spread after it was discovered that the majority of the twelve most senior positions within the Civic Guard were

¹⁰³⁹ Evidence presented by Commissioner Michael Staines, 'Commission of Inquiry into the Civic Guard Mutiny,' August 1922, DJ, H235/329, NAI.

¹⁰⁴⁰ Gregory Allen, *The Garda Síochána, Policing Independent Ireland, 1922-1982* [hereafter Allen, *The Garda Síochána*] (Dublin, Gill & Macmillan, 1999), p. 34.

bestowed upon former members of the RIC.¹⁰⁴¹ On the morning of 15th May 1922, training of the Civic Guard came to an abrupt halt following the official announcement that additional (disbanded and experienced) RIC Officers were to be promoted to the positions of Superintendent, within the new Civic Guard.¹⁰⁴² This proved too much for the majority of Civic Guard recruits. Under the leadership of Thomas Daly, a disenfranchised protest committee was formed. Daly was a new recruit who helped lead an anti-Treaty faction within the Civic Guard. He directed the protest committee to issue Staines with an ultimatum.¹⁰⁴³ This ultimatum demanded “the immediate expulsion of certain ex-RIC men, and threaten[ed] drastic action in case of non-compliance with the demand.”¹⁰⁴⁴ Following the recruits’ demands, dissention and division spread throughout the Kildare police training depot. According to Ferriter, Staines faced a mutiny not only because of resentment at senior police roles being occupied by ex-RIC men but also because of “underlying tensions still prevalent amongst the rank and file recruits owing to the Treaty.”¹⁰⁴⁵

National Army units were dispatched to Kildare Barracks to try to quell the situation. Upon the arrival of the Free State troops there was a stand-off at the main gates of the barracks. Captain Corry, a National Army Officer told the Civic Guards inside the gates that he had been instructed to take over the camp, by force if necessary. The Civic Guards inside responded by pointing “in the direction of the avenue, from which three hundred rifles were trained on the gate.”¹⁰⁴⁶ After a brief exchange between Captain Corry, and those inside the gates, one of the Civic Guard recruits telephoned the captain’s superior officer and “convinced the military that

¹⁰⁴¹ Evidence presented by J.A. O’Connell, 14 July 1922, ‘Commission of Inquiry, Minutes of Evidence, Book II’, DT, S 9048, NAI.

¹⁰⁴² Evidence presented by Staines, July 1922, ‘Commission of Inquiry, Minutes of Evidence, Book I’, July 1922, DT, S 9048, NAI.

¹⁰⁴³ Evidence presented by Staines, July 1922, ‘Commission of Inquiry, Minutes of Evidence, Book I’, July 1922, DT, S 9048, NAI.

¹⁰⁴⁴ Evidence presented by Staines, July 1922, ‘Commission of Inquiry, Minutes of Evidence, Book I’, July 1922, DT, S 9048, NAI.

¹⁰⁴⁵ Ferriter, *Between Two Hells, The Irish Civil War*, p. 33.

¹⁰⁴⁶ Seán Liddy, ‘Smothered History’ in *An Síothadóir*, December 1962, p. 31.

the ‘Irregulars’ [IRA] were not in control of the camp and that the dispute was an internal issue.”¹⁰⁴⁷ Eventually the situation calmed down and order was restored and training resumed. But another significant and ominous event occurred during the period of the purported mutiny. Evidence in the subsequent Commission of Inquiry alleged that Thomas Daly supplied the password and led a convoy of anti-Treaty IRA trucks into Kildare Barracks, which were filled with weapons and driven away for later use by the IRA, possibly in the Four Courts.¹⁰⁴⁸

6.3.2 Results and Analysis of the Commission of Inquiry into the Kildare Mutiny

The events of the 15th and 16th of May 1922 had lasting consequences for Irish policing. The decisions by the original Civic Guard recruits to openly challenge appointments and arm themselves against the military provoked the Government to seriously reconsider future policing policy.

On 12th July 1922 a Commission of Inquiry was held into the Civic Guard mutiny in Kildare.¹⁰⁴⁹ Some of the main recommendations from the Inquiry were:

- a. The presence of at least one ex-policeman in each established station ... this man need not necessarily be in charge of the station.¹⁰⁵⁰
- b. The main body of the new Civic Guard would be unarmed policemen and be deployed in stations around the country, as the disarming of the main body of the force would facilitate public acceptance of this force.¹⁰⁵¹

The Commission also noted the concerns of many of the Civic Guard recruits who wanted to be different to their predecessors and who stated their belief that the RIC training

¹⁰⁴⁷ Liddy, ‘Smothered History’ in *An Siothadóir*, p. 31.

¹⁰⁴⁸ ‘Commission of Inquiry, Facts, Charges and Counter-Charges,’ August 1922 DT, S 9048, section 2, p. 17, NAI.

¹⁰⁴⁹ Brian McCarthy, *The Civic Guard Mutiny*, (Dublin, Mercier Press, 2012), p.139.

¹⁰⁵⁰ Proceedings in the Commission of Enquiry into the Civic Guard, 13 July 1922, D/J, 325/329, p.16, NAI.

¹⁰⁵¹ McCarthy, *The Civic Guard Mutiny*, p.186.

methods employed, merely served to create the new Irish police force into a second edition of the RIC.¹⁰⁵² This issue needed to be addressed because the new Irish Civic Police Force needed to differ from their predecessors in order to uphold their impartiality, legitimacy and acceptance by the population they wanted to police and recruit from.

On 17th August 1922, two senior civil servants Kevin O'Shiel and Michael MacAuliffe presented the findings of the Commission to the Free State Government. It asserted that the ultimate mistake made by the original Organising Committee of the Civic Guard was to arm the force: "By arming all the men, thereby creating a militaristic instead of a peaceful outlook in the minds of the officers and men, and not tending to assure the public that the day of militaristic and coercive policemen was at an end in Ireland."¹⁰⁵³ As a result, Staines predicted that "the Civic Guard will succeed not by force of arms, or numbers, but on their moral authority as servants of the people."¹⁰⁵⁴

Some of the more direct consequence of the Free State Government's unarmed police force policy, were as follows:

- a. All of the 14,744 RIC rifles that were no longer needed by the Civic Guard were handed over directly to the Free State Government with the diverted purpose of supporting the ongoing process to arm the National Army. This was a substantial force multiplier and combat advantage for the Free State soldiers over their IRA adversaries.¹⁰⁵⁵
- b. The initial proposition of an unarmed police force became a political matter. Minister for Local Government and later Finance; Ernest Blythe remembered some ministers contending that the police would be hunted out of their stations within a few days if they had not guns to defend themselves. Nevertheless, the new government, were steadfast in their resolve to remove the gun from Irish society, and promote policing by consent.¹⁰⁵⁶

¹⁰⁵² 'Case for the Men', statement read by Guard J.A. O'Connell, 15 July 1922, in Minutes of Evidence to Mutiny Enquiry cited by; McCarthy, *The Civic Guard Mutiny*, p.88.

¹⁰⁵³ 'Commission of Inquiry, General Findings of the Commission, Part II', DT, S 9048, p. 19, NAI.

¹⁰⁵⁴ Report of Commission of Inquiry into the Civic Guard: findings of commission, August 1922, Papers of Ernest Blythe, P24/69, UCDA; cited by Ferriter, *Between Two Hells, The Irish Civil War*, p. 33.

¹⁰⁵⁵ Letter dated 02 February 1923, from the Commander-in-Chief of the Free-State to the President of the Free-State Cabinet, Arms and Equipment, IE/MA/DoD/A/3389.

¹⁰⁵⁶ Ernest Blythe (BMH WS 939); cited by Brian McCarthy unpublished MA thesis, UCD, (Department of Politics, 1977).

On 22nd August, 1922, O'Shiel wrote to Michael Collins and summarised the recommendations. O'Shiel urged Collins to dispatch the Civic Guard on police duty as soon as possible.¹⁰⁵⁷ However, Collins never received the memorandum as he was killed on the same day. Only days later, the first public appearance of the Civic Guard occurred in the funeral cortège for Collins.

According to James Donohue, a significant consequence of the Kildare Mutiny, was a diffusion of a potential conflict between two-newly formed institutions of the Irish Provisional [National] Government. Donohue wrote, "had the discharge of a single firearm occurred it might have altered the course of events, not only of that day and of the formation of a police force, but of the future politically."¹⁰⁵⁸ Instead the Free State established an unarmed civil police force that was free from colonialism and political interference. However, Ferriter contends that the Civic Guard was not that much of a "radical departure from the RIC as the structure of policing remained highly centralized and political."¹⁰⁵⁹

6.3.3 Implementing the Commission of Inquiry into the Kildare Mutiny

The Free State Government immediately set out to implement the Commission findings wanting to push the police force out into the countryside as soon as possible. They were determined that an unarmed police force interwoven with the community, would be the safest and the best way to get public acceptance. The government also believed that the only thing that would get real sympathy for the 'Guards' was to have them defenceless against armed

¹⁰⁵⁷ Kevin O'Shiel to Collins, 22 August, 1922, TL, 'Commission of Inquiry, Recommendations for the future of the Civic Guard', DJ, H 99/23, NAI.

¹⁰⁵⁸ James Donohue, 'Depot Day at Kildare' in *Garda Review*, July 1948, p. 617.

¹⁰⁵⁹ Ferriter, *Between Two Hells, The Irish Civil War*, p. 33.

attack.¹⁰⁶⁰ From the outset, the Free State strategy was to establish sufficient police and military barracks throughout the state in order to break the hold that local brigades of the IRA had on the public's perception of events.¹⁰⁶¹ The Civic Guards needed to move into and live amongst the communities it hoped to police because security should be all-encompassing and cannot just be for a specific period of time.¹⁰⁶²

Ferriter states that in the aftermath of the Kildare Mutiny, Staines resigned from the Force because the Commission recommended that politicians should not serve in the Civic Guard.¹⁰⁶³ General Eoin O'Duffy replaced Staines as the new Civic Guard Commissioner and according to historian Brian McCarthy he inherited a largely untrained and disgruntled force.¹⁰⁶⁴ The Minister for Justice Kevin O'Higgins, believed that only a figure of O'Duffy's stature could, "redeem the force which had been paralysed by indiscipline since its formation."¹⁰⁶⁵ The new Commissioner needed to secure the loyalty of the new police force and to quickly demonstrate its capabilities, to both the Free State Government as well as the Irish public it hoped to secure.

6.4 Deployment of the Civic Police Force

Before his death, Michael Collins had reported to the cabinet that in the west of the country only four IRA units presented a problem. He recommended that outside the Waterford-Cork-Kerry-Limerick area, the Civic Guard should be introduced to restore law and order.¹⁰⁶⁶ This initial rollout of the Civic Guard began in earnest meeting varying levels of success. But the

¹⁰⁶⁰ Townsend, *The Republic, The Fight for Irish Independence, 1918-1923*, p.387.

¹⁰⁶¹ Kissane, *The Politics of the Irish Civil War*, p. 166.

¹⁰⁶² Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, p.57.

¹⁰⁶³ Ferriter, *Between Two Hells, The Irish Civil War*, p. 33.

¹⁰⁶⁴ Brian McCarthy unpublished thesis, (Department of Politics, UCD, 1977), pp. 1-7.

¹⁰⁶⁵ Fearghal McGarry, *Eoin O'Duffy, A Self Made Hero*, (Oxford, University Press, 2005), p. 113.

¹⁰⁶⁶ Collins to Cosgrove, 5th August 1922, DT, S3361, NAI.

ungoverned spaces throughout the Free State needed to be policed and the Civic Guards needed to establish a firm presence countrywide. Mulcahy told O'Higgins in September 1922 that he was gradually evacuating government forces from many districts. He urgently required the Civic Guard to take up their duties in Limerick, Cork and Waterford as "there is danger in some places that barracks that we evacuate in this way, will be burned."¹⁰⁶⁷

To comply with Mulcahy's request and to foster public confidence, O'Duffy quickly allocated recruits to unoccupied police stations throughout the country, sometimes without the assistance of experienced police personnel or even manuals.¹⁰⁶⁸ Commissioner O'Duffy realising the dangers but also the political-strategic implications and advantages of this policy paraded new Civic Guards deploying to former RIC barracks, stating that:

You are going out unarmed into a hostile area. You are the first to be sent out. You may be murdered, your barracks burned, your uniform taken off you, but you must carry on and bring peace to the people.¹⁰⁶⁹

With these words of encouragement, the Civic Guards set about deploying throughout the new Free State. Between September and October 1922, it is estimated that 1,700 men took up duty at the various stations around the country.¹⁰⁷⁰ Many of these Civic Guards were deployed to the more hostile areas within the province of Munster.

Cork was a key battleground county, and it soon became an important area to recruit and deploy the new police force. Even before the deployment of the Civic Guard, Cork public bodies had made plans for civil and local policing. In August 1922, the *Cork Examiner* published the following advertisement, titled 'Cork City Police':

The Civic Committee representing the Corporation and other Public Bodies have instituted a Provisional Civic Force for the Policing of the City. About one hundred men

¹⁰⁶⁷ Richard Mulcahy (Minister for Defence) to Kevin O'Higgins (Minister for Home Affairs), 3 September 1922, TLS, 'Civic Guard: General Distribution, 1922-26' (NAI, D/J, H 99/29).

¹⁰⁶⁸ Brian McCarthy unpublished thesis, (Department of Politics, UCD, 1977), pp. 1-7.

¹⁰⁶⁹ *Irish Independent*, 13 June 1977.

¹⁰⁷⁰ Liam McNiffe, *A History of the Garda Síochána*, (Dublin: Wolfhound Press, 1997), p. 28.

are required. ... Applicants must be of good height and physique, of Irish nationality, of good education and reliable character.
J. MURPHY (Provisional Organiser).¹⁰⁷¹

Civic Guard recruitment and deployment started to spread in Cork and Munster and by early 1923, due to National Army actions, the situation was more amenable to policing by consent. A Civic Guard Report from January 1923, reported that Republicans had moved from conducting attacks chiefly directed against the army and army posts and were now focused on creating economic damage.¹⁰⁷² A February 1923, Civic Guard report further highlighted the differences between the regions within Cork, indicating where the Civic Guard could operate alone, and where it still needed army support:

Cork East: This is an area in which the Guards have recently taken up quarters in some of the more important towns, and in which it cannot at present be said that they are absolutely familiar with all the currents of life in the areas to which they have come. This difficulty is, however, being rapidly overcome.¹⁰⁷³

Cork West: [The Superintendent] states that many people who were apparently cold, if not hostile, in their demeanour, are now inclined to be friendly and...it can be gathered that the hostile elements are anxious to terminate hostilities.¹⁰⁷⁴

6.5 IRA Response to the Civic Guards

The IRA response to the creation of the Civic Guard was summed up by an IRA General Order issued in November 1922. The IRA leadership dismissed the new force as simply the “continuation of the old RIC” and accused it of hiding ‘under the cloak of a purely civic body’ while really functioning as ‘an arm of the ‘Provisional Government’s’ Intelligence

¹⁰⁷¹ *Cork Examiner*, 14 August 1922.

¹⁰⁷² Monthly Confidential Report, for the Civic Guard, Cork East Riding, January 1923, M/A, A/8454.

¹⁰⁷³ Civic Guard Confidential Monthly Report for February, dated 14th March 1923, DT S3361, NAI.

¹⁰⁷⁴ Civic Guard Confidential Monthly Report for February, dated 14th March 1923, DT S3361, NAI.

Department.¹⁰⁷⁵ This proclamation was text book Republican, highlighting their attempts to consistently brand the new Free State security forces as a continuation of the former British security apparatus. It also justified the concerns of many of the Civic Guard recruits who wanted to differ from their predecessors in the RIC.¹⁰⁷⁶ Yet the threats by the IRA leadership did not envision deploying lethal force against the Civic Guard, presumably out of concern for the public response. IRA headquarters explicitly ordered that, “while any unit or Civic Guard remain unarmed they will not be fired upon.”¹⁰⁷⁷ Foster additionally argues the IRAs overall policy was to harm but not kill the Civic Guard and “force them to leave the area or get armed.”¹⁰⁷⁸ By getting the Civic Guards armed, the IRA hoped to confirm the force’s succession to the RIC and therefore damage its legitimacy.

Notwithstanding these prevailing IRA threats, the vast majority of Civic Guard stayed resolute in their duty, including resistance to IRA harassment and intimidation.¹⁰⁷⁹ Additionally given the high levels of unemployment it was unlikely that many ‘Guards’ would simply walk away from their new and potentially lifelong careers in the state’s employ.¹⁰⁸⁰

Initially the IRA attacked the new police force using small bombs, mines and sledgehammers to break barrack doors and windows. There was also periodic looting of property inside, including uniforms, bedding, furniture and files; and finally arson to prevent the posts from being easily reoccupied.¹⁰⁸¹ The IRA also attacked the Civic Guard indirectly through a boycott tactic, which it had already successfully used against the RIC. They focused on traders and contractors who serviced Civic Guard (and Army) Barracks, threatening to

¹⁰⁷⁵ IRA ‘Proclamation – Civic Guard’, Lot No 110, 22 November 1922, Captured Documents, MAI; cited by Gavin M. Foster, *The Irish Civil War and Society, Politics, Class, and Conflict* (London, Palgrave MacMillan, 2015), p. 123.

¹⁰⁷⁶ ‘Case for the Men’, statement read by Guard J.A. O’Connell, 15 July 1922, in Minutes of Evidence to Mutiny Enquiry cited by; McCarthy, *The Civic Guard Mutiny*, p.88.

¹⁰⁷⁷ Foster, *The Irish Civil War and Society, Politics, Class, and Conflict*, p. 123.

¹⁰⁷⁸ General Order No. 10, 9 April 1923, Lot No. 118, Captured Documents, MAI; cited by Foster, *The Irish Civil War and Society, Politics, Class, and Conflict*, pp. 123-124.

¹⁰⁷⁹ Foster, *The Irish Civil War and Society, Politics, Class, and Conflict*, p. 124.

¹⁰⁸⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸¹ Ibid.

confiscate all goods and services they could intercept. The IRA also planned raids on factories producing police and army uniforms.¹⁰⁸²

Corcoran states that throughout the winter of 1922-1923, the IRA destroyed 485 police stations across the Free State, including many in Cork. The unarmed Civic Guards could not always resist their armed attackers and some 400 policemen were physically beaten, stripped of their uniforms and robbed of their personal possessions.¹⁰⁸³ In many areas where the IRA operated freely, the police were often at the mercy of the local Republicans. But despite their helplessness, O’Halpin contends that the Civic Guards won over public support.¹⁰⁸⁴ By 1923, General Surveys noted that favourable reports were received from across the country as to the attitude of the people towards the Free State security forces.¹⁰⁸⁵ As Berman, Felter and Shapiro argue, public support does not mean the government has to win over the broad mass of the population. When “winning the village,” the people who matter are the ones on the margins. These are the local population that are the ‘neutral majority’ and want peace and security.¹⁰⁸⁶ Public acceptance through public influence can be transformed into popular support. This allowed for policing by consent to develop in Ireland, which ultimately supported the police and the Free State government in obtaining overall legitimacy.

6.6 Restoration of Law and Order

By early 1923, the Free State Government believed that its position to be as follows:

the effective Irregular [IRA] war has definitely taken the form of a war... with no common basis except this – that all have a vested interest

¹⁰⁸² IRA General Order No.12 (‘Civilians Cooperating with Enemy’), Lot. No. 77, Captured Documents, MAI.

¹⁰⁸³ Corcoran, *Freedom to Achieve Freedom*, p.113.

¹⁰⁸⁴ O’Halpin, *Defending Ireland*, p.9.

¹⁰⁸⁵ The General Survey for the period ending 17 October 1923, CW/OPS/3/B, MAI.

¹⁰⁸⁶ Berman, Felter and Shapiro, *Small Wars, Big Data: The Information Revolution in Modern Conflict*, with Vestal McIntyre, p. 321.

in chaos, in bringing about a state of affairs where force is substituted for law... trains are attacked; post offices robbed; banks raided... [and] men are murdered for personal reasons or in the name of the Republic.¹⁰⁸⁷

To counter this the Civic Guard needed to exploit their deployment, becoming a noticeable security presence and a vital building block of the new Irish Free State.¹⁰⁸⁸ Townsend contends that from the start, the public attitude of the Irish to the Civic Guard was different than it was to the RIC.¹⁰⁸⁹ Monthly Civic Guard Reports from Cork, outline how the new civil police force became more acceptable to the local population once it became more established in their communities.¹⁰⁹⁰ Public acceptance leads to public co-operation facilitating government security forces preferential access to information in areas they controlled. Hazelton writes that civilians who feel sufficiently safe in government-held areas, normally co-operate better with security forces, and provide useful information on the insurgents.¹⁰⁹¹ A local Irish police force was perfectly situated to maximise the advantages afforded from this situation. As a result of their connections, through their good actions and because of the overall growing acceptance by the population, they acquired virtual immunity from assassination by the IRA. Only one member of the Civic Guard was killed in the course of the civil war, although many were assaulted and their stations ransacked and burnt.¹⁰⁹² Similar to the National Army, the Civic Guard, demonstrated remarkable resilience in the occupation of their posts and barracks, establishing a local police presence which undoubtedly helped to normalise the communities in the new Free State.

Minister O'Higgins had no doubts about the varying roles of the Civic Guard and the National Army and the difference between the two of them. Although critical of the army on

¹⁰⁸⁷ Hogan Letter to Cosgrave, 11 January 1923, Mulcahy Papers, P76/96(2), UCDA.

¹⁰⁸⁸ Corcoran, *Freedom to Achieve Freedom*, p.113.

¹⁰⁸⁹ Townsend, *The Republic, The Fight for Irish Independence*, 1918-1923, p.387.

¹⁰⁹⁰ Civic Guard Confidential Monthly Report for February, dated 14th March 1923, DT S3361, NAI.

¹⁰⁹¹ Hazelton, *Bullets Not Ballots, Success in Counterinsurgency Warfare*, p. 11.

¹⁰⁹² O'Halpin, *Defending Ireland*, p.9.

grounds both of inefficiency and ill-discipline, he told Cosgrave in April 1923 that it was up to the military to restore order.¹⁰⁹³ Once order had been restored, then the Civic Guard would become the primary government security agency.

As more and more IRA volunteers were taken out of the fight, and more regions became relatively secure, O’Halpin states that the Civic Guard took advantage and opened police stations in most parts of the country.¹⁰⁹⁴ In May 1923, a National Army ‘After Action Report’ reported that in Munster “The Civic Guard should be established throughout the area...[because] the pioneering work has been done by the soldiers and ...the possibility of a recurrence of armed Irregulars is practically negligible.”¹⁰⁹⁵ As they spread their influence and dedication to most regions of the country, members of the Civic Guard gained a firm footing within the state, within Munster and within Irish society as a whole.

6.7 The Special Infantry Corps

Being unarmed led to increased public support. However, the Civic Guard were not totally defenceless. To provide armed support to the unarmed civic policemen, the government organised an Irish Gendarmerie style force to assist some of the more robust civil control taskings. Kevin O’Higgins had consistently sought the military assistance of a generic force to aid the Civic Guard. These demands materialized when the Special Infantry Corps (SIC) was formally set up in January 1923. Under the command of Patrick Dalton, the SIC consisted of roughly 4,000 soldiers in eight companies or units (later battalions stationed semi-permanently

¹⁰⁹³ O’Halpin, *Defending Ireland*, p.40.

¹⁰⁹⁴ *Ibid*, p.9.

¹⁰⁹⁵ National Army Report on Operations carried out in the west Cork, and South Kerry areas, 29th April – 5th May 1923, DT S3361, NAI.

in strategic locations across the country.¹⁰⁹⁶ They acted as an additional security force to exert civil control but on occasion ventured outside the realms of civic policing. The Special Infantry Corps troops, sometimes acted in conjunction with unofficial groups organized by farmers, making vigorous and partisan interventions in agrarian and industrial disputes.¹⁰⁹⁷ The SIC also operated as an outside armed security force to deal with potentially delicate and unpopular activities like strike-breaking, land clearing, process serving and evictions.¹⁰⁹⁸

In April 1923, O'Higgins told Cosgrave that with the prevailing 'revolt against all idea of morality, law and social order', no greater disaster could happen to the country than that "peace" should overtake it, leaving conditions such as these to be dealt with by a new and unarmed Police Force and by legal processes.¹⁰⁹⁹ It was important therefore that the government through the National Army and the SIC shaped conditions for the Civic Guard to take control, in order to maintain policing and uphold law and order.

6.8 The Free State Execution Policy

O'Donoghue claims that a major factor in the Free State success was the National Army had an intimate knowledge of the IRA personnel which the British lacked, and inevitably they knew all their trusted haunts.¹¹⁰⁰ As a result of this local knowledge, more and more prisoners were captured. Boyne states that the National Army captured over 1,800 prisoners during the civil war in Cork.¹¹⁰¹ Murphy reports that in total, by the end of the civil war, the Irish Free State

¹⁰⁹⁶ Cover memorandum RE: SIC scheme from Min for Home Affairs, 5 April 1923, DT S 582, NAI; cited by Foster, *The Irish Civil War and Society, Politics, Class, and Conflict*, p. 133

¹⁰⁹⁷ O'Halpin, *Defending Ireland*, p.33.

¹⁰⁹⁸ Foster, *The Irish Civil War and Society, Politics, Class, and Conflict*, p. 131.

¹⁰⁹⁹ O'Higgins to Cosgrave, 5 Apr 1923, DT, S.582, NAI: cited by O'Halpin, *Defending Ireland*, pp.32-3.

¹¹⁰⁰ O'Donoghue, *No Other Law*, p.266.

¹¹⁰¹ Boyne, *Emmet Dalton*, p. 278.

held 11,989 IRA prisoners associated with the conflict.¹¹⁰² Ferriter puts the figure at about “13,000 republican internees.”¹¹⁰³ Foster agrees more or less with these figures for IRA prisoners, stating the number of Republicans in Free State custody at that time vary widely, though a figure of roughly 12,000 is most often cited.¹¹⁰⁴ This was an enormous number of prisoners captured and it represented a considerable majority of active IRA fighters taken out of the fight due to intelligence led raids and a relatively secure prison system.

No work can be written on the Irish Civil War without mention of the Free State Government Public Safety Bill. This was a draconian policy undertaken in order to regain control over the military situation at that time. This chapter will not describe the Bill in great detail but rather mention the basic facts of its promulgation and stress the psychological effects it had on both sides.

After Michael Collins was killed, an attempt was made to shorten the war by introducing a form of Martial Law. On 15th September [1922], Richard Mulcahy asked the cabinet to introduce emergency powers of arrest, detention and capital punishment.¹¹⁰⁵ The Public Safety Bill or ‘Execution Policy’ was introduced into the Dáil on 27th September 1922. Hopkinson states that this legislation set up military courts which were given powers, including that of execution, for sundry offences such as the possession of arms and the aiding of attacks on government forces.¹¹⁰⁶ This understandably drew immediate scorn from the leadership of the IRA as they perceived this policy as the setting up of secret military courts, thereby giving the Free State Officers in command of districts the power to inflict the death penalty on any IRA Volunteer captured with arms.¹¹⁰⁷

¹¹⁰² William Murphy, *Imprisonments During the Civil War, Atlas of the Irish Revolution*, p. 737.

¹¹⁰³ Ferriter, *Between Two Hells, The Irish Civil War*, p. 75.

¹¹⁰⁴ Foster, *The Irish Civil War and Society, Politics, Class, and Conflict*, p. 146.

¹¹⁰⁵ O Caoimh *Richard Mulcahy From the Politics of War to the Politics of Peace, 1913-1924*, p. 133.

¹¹⁰⁶ Hopkinson, *Green Against Green*, p. 181.

¹¹⁰⁷ O'Malley, *The Singing Flame*, p.210.

Valiulis states that, whether legal or not, the Free State Government persisted with this policy to break the morale of the anti-Treaty Republicans. The Free State Government believed that some form of coercion was a necessary evil in order to influence or convince targeted individuals to persist in their subversive actions against the newly formed state. As already described in Chapter Two, Kalyvas states that; “we must remember that the main purpose of the trial and execution is not to save the soul of the accused but to achieve the public good and put fear into others.”¹¹⁰⁸

The Public Safety Bill or ‘Execution Policy’ certainly put fear into many on the anti-Treaty side, especially their supporters and family members. Simultaneously the civilian leaders of the Free State Government believed that it was necessary to pursue this unpopular policy because the people carrying out armed resistance to the government should be made aware that “they shall forfeit their lives if they continue to do that work ... [The Army] is prepared to do the work of executing these people ... it is the servant of the Government.”¹¹⁰⁹

The first executions caused IRA leaders to formulate reprisals against the Free State political leadership. On 28th November 1922, Liam Lynch addressed a letter to the Ceann Comhairle (Speaker) of Dáil Éireann threatening ‘very drastic measures’ against those who had voted for the ‘Public Safety Bill’. Two days later a General Order was sent out to all IRA units to kill listed categories of Provisional [Free State] Government supporters.¹¹¹⁰ Lynch argued that up to that time, the IRA had abided by the rules of warfare, but that now it had to respond to the ultimate provocation.¹¹¹¹

On the Government side, Cosgrave noted his prior opposition to the death penalty, but now he could see “no other way... in which ordered conditions can be restored in this country, or any security obtained for our troops – or indeed to give our troops any confidence in us as a

¹¹⁰⁸ Kamen 1998; cited by Stathis N. Kalyvas, “*New” and “Old” Civil Wars, A Valid Distinction*, p. 30.

¹¹⁰⁹ Dáil Debates, 27 September 1922, Vol, I, cols. 807-809.

¹¹¹⁰ Liam Lynch for Army Council to Ceann Comhairle, O’ Malley Papers, P17a/19, UCDA.

¹¹¹¹ Hopkinson, *Green Against Green*, p. 190.

Government.”¹¹¹² “It was decided that the first firing squad would be picked from the men of the best unit we had in Dublin and that proved successful.”¹¹¹³ The Free State could not afford the risk of its soldiers refusing to carry out the order to open fire. The Free State Government believed that drastic times needed drastic measures and firmly advocated this deterrent as an effective counter-measure. Whereas the British authorities had executed twenty-four IRA Volunteers up to the Truce, the Free State executed at least seventy-seven, and probably four more, for political offences during the Irish Civil War.¹¹¹⁴ Cosgrave turned down any peace or reconciliation moves by the IRA during the height of the executions and the pace of the executions continued into 1923 and began to intensify, with thirty-four in January alone.¹¹¹⁵ Cosgrave was adamant that a minority had made war and now “...it is easy for them to try and win the peace now when they have lost the war.” ... [they needed to] ... “act like men and admit the authority of the ballot box” ... [if not] “they will have to submit to stronger force....”¹¹¹⁶

The Execution Policy had its opponents within the Free State establishment because there was a real fear about the possible adverse effects that the executions would have on members of the local population. The Commander of the Kerry Command, General W.R.E. Murphy wrote to Mulcahy in December 1922, counselling that, while the handful of executions already carried out were having a ‘salutary effect’ on public opinion. Too many executions would backfire.¹¹¹⁷ Foster contends that the executions produced a very toxic legacy, deeply embittering many Republicans.¹¹¹⁸ Jim Byrne, who was a Free State soldier serving in Cork during this period, was very disillusioned and forthright about the ‘Execution Policy’ voicing

¹¹¹² Townsend, *The Republic, The Fight for Irish Independence*, 1918-1923, p.437.

¹¹¹³ General Seán MacMahon, Statement to the Army Inquiry Committee, 6 May 1924 IE/MA, AMTY/3/27, MAI.

¹¹¹⁴ Townsend, *The Republic, The Fight for Irish Independence*, 1918-1923, p.443.

¹¹¹⁵ Ferriter, *Between Two Hells, The Irish Civil War*, p. 94.

¹¹¹⁶ Cosgrave to General Sean MacEoin, January 1923, Sean MacEoin Papers, P151/202, UCDA ; cited by Ferriter, *Between Two Hells, The Irish Civil War*, p. 95.

¹¹¹⁷ Correspondence from Murphy to Mulcahy Dec 1922, Mulcahy Papers P7/B/72 (6-7,8), UCDA.

¹¹¹⁸ Foster, *The Irish Civil War and Society, Politics, Class, and Conflict*, p. 157.

his concerns in later life that “an awful lot of great men [were] executed.” Byrne elaborated by saying that “this would not have happened had Collins’ lived.”¹¹¹⁹ It is interesting to note that Byrne also states that “we let it be known that there was to be no firing parties from our crowd.”¹¹²⁰ He went on to clarify this by saying “if they wanted any shootings [executions]... if there was any prisoners brought into where we were to be shot ... the [more disciplined] British ex-soldiers [within the National Army] do it... we wouldn’t do it.”¹¹²¹

Cork was one of the busiest areas of operations, yet no comparable cycle of executions set in. Kissane states that only one of the seventy-seven official executions took place in Cork.¹¹²² A factor in Cork and explanation why this may have occurred was that the majority of Free State soldiers deployed in Cork had been recruited locally. Hopkinson posits that this had a significant factor because the National Army presence in Cork was less oppressive than in other counties.¹¹²³ This familiarity would help to explain the reticence within the Cork command from proclaiming a death sentence on a fellow county man. Dalton pointed out in one letter to Mulcahy that he had 1,800 prisoners in Cork caught in the possession of arms and asked if he was expected to execute them all.¹¹²⁴ Dalton was perhaps being facetious but Mulcahy replied that this was not expected of him. But the government had got to the stage “where it had decided that strong action would have to be taken.”¹¹²⁵

The contentious Free State Execution Policy did have a very serious detrimental effect on the morale of the IRA volunteers. The fear amongst Republicans was that if they intensified

¹¹¹⁹ Tape recorded interview from 1985 with Jim Byrne from Newtown Kildare who served with the National Army during the Irish Civil War. A copy of the recording was given to the author in October 2020 by Eamonn Mulvihill of Enfield Meath.

¹¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹¹²¹ Tape recorded interview from 1985 with Jim Byrne from Newtown Kildare who served with the National Army during the Irish Civil War. A copy of the recording was given to the author in October 2020 by Eamonn Mulvihill of Enfield Meath.

¹¹²² Kissane, *The Politics of the Irish Civil War*, p. 93.

¹¹²³ Hopkinson, *Green Against Green*, P. 239.

¹¹²⁴ Boyne, *Emmet Dalton*, p. 278.

¹¹²⁵ Dalton interview with Cathal O’Shannon, RTE TV documentary, *Emmet Dalton Remembers*; cited by Sean Boyne, *Emmet Dalton* (Dublin, Merrion Press, 2015).

the war “it will mean some of our best men will be executed.”¹¹²⁶ Hopkinson further portrays the changing IRA belief when he quotes the following IRA correspondence; “it was no good carrying out an [IRA] operation... for our prisoners... would have been taken out and shot.”¹¹²⁷

As a result of this, the executions brought pressure on the IRA to suspend or conclude hostilities. According to Harrington, IRA “supporters and their families, including those in prison [were] under a sentence of death.”¹¹²⁸ Thus the threat of executions was perhaps the most effective psychological operations tool available to the National Army during the counterinsurgency phase of the conflict. In Limerick IRA prisoners issued an appeal to their comrades still fighting that a continuation of the present struggle is a “waste of blood and developed into a war of extermination.”¹¹²⁹ Kamen states that threats and coercion especially in a civil war are perceived a necessary evil in order to convince targeted individuals to desist in their actions against the state.¹¹³⁰ Because of this a leading Republican commented to Liam Lynch that “all the enemy do now is issue a *threat* of execution and the men will give way.”¹¹³¹ Hopkinson contends that this fear on behalf of the IRA still fighting; the IRA prison population; and the families of IRA prisoners; “was ruthlessly used and taken advantage of by the Free State to influence the situation outside.”¹¹³² In February 1923, after a number of peace proposals were spurned, Cosgrave made it clear that he would accept no result other than the complete defeat of the anti-Treaty forces: [We will not] hesitate if ... we have to exterminate 10,000 Republicans’ because “the 3 million of our people is bigger than this 10,000.”¹¹³³

¹¹²⁶ Hopkinson, *Green Against Green*, P. 228.

¹¹²⁷ Bertie Scully in the Earnie O’Malley Notebooks, P17B/102, UCDA; cited by Hopkinson, *The Civil War The Opening Phase; Atlas of the Irish Revolution*, p. 685.

¹¹²⁸ Harrington, *The Munster Republic*, p.115.

¹¹²⁹ Letter to P. Murray, 13 Feb 1923, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/89, UCDA.

¹¹³⁰ Kamen 1998; cited by Stathis N. Kalyvas, “*New*” and “*Old*” *Civil Wars, A Valid Distinction* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001). p. 30.

¹¹³¹ Hopkinson, *Green Against Green*, p. 228.

¹¹³² *Ibid.*, pp. 228-229.

¹¹³³ Interview between Cosgrave, and Hannigan and Burke (of the neutral IRA), 27 February 1923 quoted in Lawlor Britain, p, 225 and p. 271 pn; cited by O’Caoimh *Richard Mulcahy From the Politics of War to the Politics of Peace, 1913-1924*, p. 155.

Cosgrave also declared in February 1923 that de Valera's followers were scarce throughout the country, and his cause had not a ghost of a chance of success.¹¹³⁴

The execution of former comrades during the civil war was an extremely harsh and draconian measure by the Free State, which undoubtedly caused friction and hatred. It also shortened the war considerably. Along with the harassment, capture, killing or execution of IRA volunteers during the Civil Security and Civil Control phases, the Free State also successfully utilised non-kinetic actions, like psychological warfare and Information Operations. Combined together, these activities and actions proved to be very important weapons in the National Army arsenal in order to defeat the IRA.

6.9 Free State Information Operations Campaign

*If they [anti-Treatyites] had wooed public support instead of flouting it, the outcome of the war might well have been affected.*¹¹³⁵

-Neeson, *The Civil War in Ireland*.

A key success in any counterinsurgency campaign is the massing of intelligence derived from the local population to identify the enemy.¹¹³⁶ The information that the Free State gathered during the civil war was something that the British security forces did not match during the previous War of Independence and Free State Intelligence services were brought to a high pitch, during the latter phases of the war.¹¹³⁷ Because of this, by early 1923, IRA resistance and optimism started to fade. Tom Barry surmised this sense of IRA pessimism when he stated that “in the past [we hoped] that we could prevent their governing, that popular opinion would force

¹¹³⁴ *The Irish Times*, 13 February 1923.

¹¹³⁵ Neeson, *The Civil War in Ireland*, p.97.

¹¹³⁶ Forward by Nagl to Galula *Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice*, p. vii.

¹¹³⁷ Neeson, *The Civil War in Ireland*, p.169.

their abdication. ... But none of these things happened.”¹¹³⁸ Berman et al. argue that the ability of the stronger side to take advantage of information is very important “because holding territory is not enough to secure victory.”¹¹³⁹ Popular support is all important in a counterinsurgency campaign; the opponent that dictates the narrative through a successful Information Operations campaign normally wins such a conflict. An insurgency needs to revolve around a popular cause that will engage the population. This cause must be strong enough that both the insurgent and his support base are willing to endure prolonged hardships and subsequent repercussions. A key strategy for a government during a counterinsurgency campaign is to undermine that cause and win over of the neutral majority of the population.¹¹⁴⁰ It is critical for the counterinsurgent force to turn popular support against the insurgents, win the middle ground and deny the insurgent physical, mental and moral sanctuary amongst the population. The insurgent must be placed on the defensive, must be discredited, and the cause undermined. The insurgent must also be placed in a precarious position by the population; the counterinsurgent force must consistently come out with an acceptable counter cause.¹¹⁴¹ This counter cause strengthens government legitimacy, and helps marginalise the insurgent force. A key metric to measure popular support and whether a breakthrough has occurred is when spontaneous intelligence increases sharply from the local population.¹¹⁴²

Sinn Féin had formed a powerful information arm during the War of Independence and members of both the IRA and National Army had conducted and experienced Information Operation campaigns during this conflict. Taking advantage of the openness of both the British and American press, between 1919 and 1921, the Sinn Féin Information departments fought a

¹¹³⁸ Barry to Executive Council, 7 March 1923, de Valera Papers, P150/1647, UCDA.

¹¹³⁹ Berman, Felter and Shapiro, *Small Wars, Big Data: The Information Revolution in Modern Conflict*, with Vestal McIntyre, p. 9.

¹¹⁴⁰ David Galula *Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice*, P 53.

¹¹⁴¹ Galula *Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice*, p. 54.

¹¹⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 92.

successful propaganda war with the British government.¹¹⁴³ The knowledge of how significant Information Warfare is carried through to 1923, where a National Army Report underlined how the pro-Treaty side understood the importance of Information Operations. It stated that every man in uniform should understand that the slightest suggestion of ‘Black and Tan methods’ in any portion of the [Cork] Command would be tangibly harmful.¹¹⁴⁴ The Free State Government inherently realised it had to discredit the Republican organisation and must not feed into the IRA counter narrative of the Free State being a replica or proxy of the previous British Administration.

As part of their Information Operations campaign, the Free State used both internal and external communications to expound their narrative and assure their legitimacy. Internally *An t-Óglách*, was the instrument used by the National Army to communicate their message.¹¹⁴⁵ Externally the Free State sought to maintain public support through two key information and influence organs, The Catholic Church and the Free State supporting press. Both were considered to be reputable sources of information during this period, and both had access to the all-important local population.

6.10 Information Operations and the Catholic Church

Fortunately for the Free State, the Church did not seek to occupy a neutral position in the conflict, rather use its influence with the public to garner public support for the Provisional [Free State] Government.¹¹⁴⁶ Before the Irish Civil War had even started, on 26th April 1922, the Irish Catholic Bishops issued a stinging condemnation of the IRA, calling their rejection of

¹¹⁴³ Tim Hoyt, *Military Innovation in Ireland 1916-1923*, Defence Forces Review, p. 16.

¹¹⁴⁴ National Army Report on the Military Situation 07th April 1923, DT S3361, NAI.

¹¹⁴⁵ The Editor, ‘The IRA and the People’, *An t-Óglách* magazine, dated 31 March 1922.

¹¹⁴⁶ Kissane, *The Politics of the Irish Civil War*, p. 129.

civilian authority both ‘a sacrilege against national freedom’, and ‘an immoral usurpation and confiscation of the people’s rights.’¹¹⁴⁷ This statement went on to further demonise the IRA as the Bishops bluntly put it:

[T]hey proceed to make shameful war upon their own country...when they shoot their brothers on the opposite side they are murderers; when they commandeer public or private property, they are robbers and brigands...all sins and crimes of the most heinous kind.¹¹⁴⁸

Liam de Roiste, a prominent pro-Treaty Sinn Féin TD in Cork, supported the Bishops by stating that the Catholic Church had now declared that the present Government was a lawful one and therefore from the moral point of view, it was entitled to obedience.¹¹⁴⁹ The Free State Government actively encouraged this perception and also the supported clerical rhetoric. In early August 1922, Cosgrave addressed a letter to each parish priest, suggesting what they could do to help the Free State Government and National Army in what he called the ‘present crises.’¹¹⁵⁰

The Catholic hierarchy was attached to the institutions of the new state, as many senior figures in the clergy excused the excesses of the state’s security forces and blamed the IRA for all the evils of the civil war.¹¹⁵¹ This was certainly the case in Cork, and it was not only on the Catholic side that the National Army received religious support. Shortly after Dalton’s arrival in Cork, the Church of Ireland Bishop of Cork, Cloyne and Ross visited him in order “to assure him of the loyal cooperation of the clergy and members of the Church of Ireland.”¹¹⁵² Dalton was also visited in his initial Command HQ in the Imperial Hotel Cork, by the Most Rev. Dr. Cohalan, the Catholic Bishop of Cork, who openly and publicly welcomed the pro-Treaty

¹¹⁴⁷ *The Freeman’s Journal*, 27 April 1922.

¹¹⁴⁸ Statement issued by the Cardinal Primate and the Archbishops and Bishops of Ireland on the Present Condition of their Country’. 26 April 1922, Fitzgerald Papers P80/179, UCDA.

¹¹⁴⁹ De Roiste Diaries, 12 October 1922 (Cork City and County Archives, U271/A/46).

¹¹⁵⁰ P. Murray, *Oracles of God: The Roman Catholic Church and Irish Politics, 1922-1937* (Dublin, 2000), p. 69.

¹¹⁵¹ Murray, *Oracles of God: The Roman Catholic Church and Irish Politics, 1922-1937*, p. 90.

¹¹⁵² *Cork Examiner*, 14 August 1922.

troops to Cork City.¹¹⁵³ This interaction with the Churches and Bishop soon paid dividends, as Cohalan essentially excommunicating IRA Volunteers in Cork within weeks, and ordered his Cork Diocese to support the new state.¹¹⁵⁴

The Church in Cork spoke of young minds being poisoned by false principles, falling into cruelty, robbery, falsehood, and crime. The church also argued that “any priests who approve of this Irregular [IRA] insurrection were false to their sacred office.”¹¹⁵⁵ The church had a firm control over their congregations, influencing many parishioners in Cork. This moral argument was echoed by de Roiste, who as a devout Catholic stated that the: ‘the taking of life by the Irregulars [IRA] is [hence] murder: the taking of property robbery: destruction a grievous crime. Thus the sacraments cannot be administered to those who persist in these crimes.’¹¹⁵⁶ The Catholic hierarchy further announced that “the duty of every citizen to support the civil and military authorities by every available means.”¹¹⁵⁷

On 10th October 1922, the combined Catholic Bishops issued a Pastoral Letter, which was read from the pulpits. The letter declared that the IRA’s war lacked legal justification, therefore morally it should be regarded as only a system of murder and assassination of the National Forces, “for it must not be forgotten that killing in an unjust war is as much murder before God as if there were no war.”¹¹⁵⁸ Hopkinson states that for maximum effect and influence, the Bishops’ Pastoral Letter coincided with the amnesty period and the application of the ‘Public Safety Bill’ or Execution Policy.¹¹⁵⁹ The Pastoral Letter was also published in local and national newspapers. It stressed that the public had a clear duty to support the government, and that continued resistance to the Free State Government would result in

¹¹⁵³ Neeson, *The Civil War in Ireland*, p.154.

¹¹⁵⁴ *Cork Examiner*, 25 September 1922.

¹¹⁵⁵ *Irish Times*, 11 Oct 1922.

¹¹⁵⁶ De Roiste Diaries, 12 October 1922 (Cork City and County Archives, U271/A/46).

¹¹⁵⁷ *Irish Times*, 12 October 1922.

¹¹⁵⁸ Catholic Bishops Pastoral, 10 October 1922, published in National Newspapers; cited by Hopkinson, *Green Against Green*, p. 182.

¹¹⁵⁹ Hopkinson, *Green Against Green*, p. 182.

excommunication.¹¹⁶⁰ De Roiste reflected that the October Pastoral Letter seriously undermined the “Republican monopoly and claims of upholding the moral right.”¹¹⁶¹ On the Republican side, O’Faolain stated that some of the civil war outrages committed by the Free State under the guise of the Bishops Pastoral letter were “perpetrated by those that forgot God.”¹¹⁶² However, according to de Roiste any criticism of the Catholic Hierarchy from the IRA was “the height of arrogance” and he noted that the “churches are thronged these days while the novena of prayer for peace is being offered.”¹¹⁶³

Exclusion from absolution and the Last Sacraments, and a policy of excommunication was now the fate for IRA members who fell in action or were executed.¹¹⁶⁴ According to O’Donoghue, the Catholic Church’s hostility towards the IRA was devastating for them and their families.¹¹⁶⁵ O’Malley reiterated stating that, “it crystallised the random fulminations of the great majority of the priests who were in favour of the Treaty. Sunday after Sunday their sermons had degenerated into essays of political abuse.”¹¹⁶⁶ To counter the damage being inflicted by the clergy, in January 1923, the IRA sent a delegation to Rome to try to convince the Vatican to lift the excommunication order on IRA members. In reply the Vatican sent Monsignor Luzio as a Papal Envoy to Ireland. The Free State Government complained bitterly, especially as Luzio expressed Republican sympathies. Luzio was later recalled.¹¹⁶⁷

Others in the Republican leadership, such as Austin Stack, dismissed the effect of the Catholic Church, stating that “the stories of all these periods in history are simply the telling of how the church’s heads helped the oppressor against a people.” He also denied the churches

¹¹⁶⁰ Catholic Bishops Pastoral, 10 October 1922, published in National Newspapers; cited by Michael Hopkinson, *Green Against Green*, (Dublin, Gill & Macmillan, 2004), p. 182.

¹¹⁶¹ De Roiste Diaries, 18 April 1923 (Cork City and County Archives, U271/A/47).

¹¹⁶² Sean O’Faolain, *Inishfallen: Fare Thee Well* (London, 1940; cited by ; Ferriter, *Between Two Hells, The Irish Civil War*, p.7.

¹¹⁶³ De Roiste Diaries, 4 -6 and 11 November 1922 (Cork City and County Archives, U271/A/48).

¹¹⁶⁴ Neeson, *The Civil War in Ireland*, p.273.

¹¹⁶⁵ O’Donoghue, *No Other Law*, p. 289.

¹¹⁶⁶ O’Malley, *The Singing Flame*, p.221.

¹¹⁶⁷ Ferriter, *Between Two Hells, The Irish Civil War*, p. 87.

influence, saying that “...their influence in politics is not what it was ... The recent pronouncement from Maynooth has fallen flat.”¹¹⁶⁸ On the other hand, de Roiste declared, that ‘there can be an appeal to Rome: but until Rome declares to the contrary, the Bishops’ voice is the authoritative voice of the Church.’¹¹⁶⁹

IRA propaganda handbills countered the pro-Treaty clergy, questioning the relevance of the Catholic Church, reading; “Ghosts – Other Ghosts or the Priests and the Republic.”¹¹⁷⁰ O’Malley spoke about the treatment IRA volunteers received from the Catholic clergy who once tacitly supported them in the War of Independence. Yet during the civil war the priests would exclaim that; “so long as you intend to wage war against the existing lawful government, I cannot give you the sacraments.”¹¹⁷¹ Soon IRA volunteers felt that they could no longer attend mass as they felt that the sermon “was about ourselves. We were looters, robbers, and murderers. The Hand of God was against us.”¹¹⁷² Some hard-line anti-Treaty activists did not care too much about the influence of the Catholic Church and its message. However, most commented that the social ostracism engendered by Church and State had its effect on their families.¹¹⁷³

Defeating the IRA on the field of battle was not enough. The Free State military efforts were supplemented by an intensive psychological offensive against the guerrillas.¹¹⁷⁴ The actions of the Catholic Church reached deep down into the Irish psyche discrediting the IRA and seriously affecting their support structures. Propaganda and pressures have always been powerful tools to influence public perceptions.¹¹⁷⁵ The use of the Catholic Church by the Free State authorities as a propaganda tool, reached deep into the Christian faith of the Irish

¹¹⁶⁸ Letter from Austin Stack to Joseph McGarrity dated 18th October 1922, MS 17, 489/8, NLI.

¹¹⁶⁹ De Roiste Diaries, 12 October 1922, Cork City and County Archives, U271/A/46.

¹¹⁷⁰ IRA Handbill, Erskine Childers Papers MS 48, 086/5 NLI.

¹¹⁷¹ O’Malley, *The Singing Flame*, p.250.

¹¹⁷² O’Malley, *The Singing Flame*, p.183.

¹¹⁷³ Hopkinson, *Green Against Green*, p. 182.

¹¹⁷⁴ Galula *Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice*, p. 94.

¹¹⁷⁵ Trinquier *Modern Warfare*, p. 6.

population. Sean Gaynor from the IRA's 2nd Division in Tipperary, exclaimed that the "pronouncements of the clergy are having a very serious effect on our men, and in many cases, the refusal to give them absolution is turning men from our ranks."¹¹⁷⁶ Some IRA leaders saw the hypocrisy in this, and O'Malley complained that "prisoners who die whilst in military custody in the Kerry Command shall be interred by the troops in the area in which the death has taken place. The thundering religious pulpits were strangely silent about what the crows ate in Kerry."¹¹⁷⁷

6.11 The Effect of the Free State Press

In order to marginalise the insurgent forces, it is vitally important to discredit them and advocate the legitimacy of the established government, its institutions, and its security forces. At the start of the civil war, the IRA made a fundamental mistake by leaving Dublin and all its instruments of power, including the majority of the National Press, in the hands of their adversaries. This allowed the Free State Government to present themselves to the country and outside world as the lawful government in overall control of the situation.¹¹⁷⁸

The Free State Government recognised from an early stage the value of good publicity and strong press relations. Michael Collins stated that the press "may be allowed to photograph at the discretion of the Officer Commanding operations in any particular area. They will, of course, be asked to undertake that they obey censorship rules issued or to be issued."¹¹⁷⁹ The Free State Government had an early and inherent understanding about the power of the press

¹¹⁷⁶ Report by Sean Gaynor (IRA 2nd Division Adjutant, Tipperary, 29th July 1922, Twomey Papers UCDA; cited by Brian Hanley, *The IRA, A Documentary History 1916-2005*, (Dublin, Gill and MacMillan, 2010), p. 45.

¹¹⁷⁷ O'Malley, *The Singing Flame*, pp.305-306.

¹¹⁷⁸ Frances Blake, *The Irish Civil War 1922-1923 And What it Still Means for the Irish People*, (London, Information on Ireland, 1986), p.36.

¹¹⁷⁹ Commander-in-Chief, Portobello to CGS, 15 July 1922, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/1, UCDA.

and how it could influence the national and international audiences. Government legitimacy as communicated by the press became a key weapon in the Free State information armoury. The Free State Government set out measures to influence and control the press in order to ensure their support. Rigorous censorship of the media, including the prohibition of certain films in cinemas, was put in place. As early as 29th June 1922, it was decided that newspaper references to the military situation in Dublin should be censored.¹¹⁸⁰ On the 6th July 1922, a Free State Government notice appeared in the *Freeman's Journal* describing the IRA campaign as “a conspiracy to override the will of the nation and subject the people to a despotism based on brigandage...regardless of the people’s inalienable right to life, liberty and security.”¹¹⁸¹ On 11th July, the cabinet minutes refer to an “interview with the editor of the *Freeman's Journal* and *The Irish Times* that had produced a good effect” and that “current members of these papers had shown a considerable improvement on previous issues.”¹¹⁸² However not all newspapers in the Free State were completely compliant and it was observed that “the attitude of the *Irish Independent* is still unsatisfactory...the publicity department of the Free State Government should prepare a full statement of the case for Mr. Collins, who will see the proprietor, Mr. Lombard Murphy, on the matter.”¹¹⁸³

On 12th July 1922, Collins wrote to Desmond Fitzgerald, who was in charge of publicity, encouraging him to emphasize the economically destructive nature of the IRA campaign.¹¹⁸⁴ This became one of the key propaganda messages from the Free State throughout the civil war and a National Army Report advised: “propaganda should be taken now, so that the people will be in no doubt as to what the issue was.”¹¹⁸⁵ The IRA had to be discredited, undermined and marginalised in the eyes of the general population because the attitude ‘the

¹¹⁸⁰ Provisional Government (Meeting Minutes), 28 June 1922, DT G1/1, NAI.

¹¹⁸¹ *Freeman's Journal* 6 July 1922.

¹¹⁸² Cabinet Meeting of the Provisional Government, (Meeting Minutes) 11th July 1922, DT, G 1/1/1, NAI.

¹¹⁸³ Cabinet Meeting of the Provisional Government, (Meeting Minutes) 11th July 1922, DT, G 1/1/1, NAI.

¹¹⁸⁴ Collins letter to Fitzgerald, 12 July 1922, DT, S595, NAI.

¹¹⁸⁵ National Army Report on the Military Situation 21st April 1923, DT S3361, NAI.

poor boys put up a good fight, anyhow' will grow if not stamped out. Through the individual soldier and the press columns a feeling of pride in the army should be inculcated in every citizen.¹¹⁸⁶

6.11.1 Free State Censorship

Following on from the initial censorship policies in the early summer months of 1922, official government censorship became a key Free State policy. The Free State Cabinet Papers in July 1922 reveal that initially “the manner in which the censorship was being carried out was very unsatisfactory and... [the Free State Government Minister] Mr Desmond Fitzgerald was instructed to draft a letter to the Army authorities on the matter.”¹¹⁸⁷ Censorship needed to be regularised in order to thwart a growth in IRA sympathisers. To formalise censorship matters, Piaras Beaslai, a pro-Treaty TD, former editor of *An tÓglach*, and eventual Major-General in the National Army, was appointed the official military censor by the Free State Government. Following an initial period when a number of Irish and British publications had their circulation temporarily stopped by the government, a clear press censorship policy was developed and after a re-alignment, most publications subsequently followed Beaslai’s rules and were allowed to circulate.¹¹⁸⁸

The Free State censors did not permit news to be published as to the movements of troops, foodstuffs, trains, transport, or equipment for army purposes. Articles or letters concerning the treatment of the IRA prisoners were not allowed to be published. Government policy insisted that the IRA was to be undermined by substituting words or phrases, such as

¹¹⁸⁶ National Army Report on the Military Situation 21st April 1923, DT S3361, NAI.

¹¹⁸⁷ Cabinet Meeting of the Provisional Government, (Meeting Minutes) 18th July 1922, DT G1/1/1, NAI.

¹¹⁸⁸ David O Drisceoil, *Irish Newspapers, The Treaty and the Civil War*, Atlas of the Irish Revolution (Cork, University Press, 2017), p. 663.

‘Irregular’ for ‘Republicans’; ‘fired at’ for ‘attacked’; ‘seized’ for ‘commandeered’; ‘kidnapped’ for ‘arrested’; ‘enrolled’ for ‘enlisted’. The ranks of IRA officers were also not mentioned.¹¹⁸⁹ In contrast the pro-Treaty Forces were to be emboldened and called ‘The Irish Army’, ‘The National Army’, ‘National Forces’, or simply ‘Troops’, while the ‘Provisional Government’ was the ‘Irish Government’ or simply ‘the Government’.¹¹⁹⁰

As the Free State forces spread security throughout Cork, the press followed. Newspapers supporting the Free State Government counteracted the IRA narrative. An example of how influential newspapers were during this period can be seen in Sneem, in South Kerry near the Cork border. Once the town was secured, according to a National Army Report, “there were miles of country between that point and Killarney where the people had not seen a paper for months and were fed solely on Irregular [IRA] propaganda.”¹¹⁹¹

6.11.2 IRA Reaction and Counterpropaganda

The IRA, exasperated by the censorship of the Free State, tried to counter with their own propaganda. They initially used coercive methods against the press, threatening some of the local newspaper offices. In Waterford an IRA Gunman threatened that “[y]our paper has got to be produced as I say, not as you say.”¹¹⁹² In Cork, it was reported that soon after the National Army’s successful landings:

About forty IRA men with sledgehammers and revolvers entered the *Examiner* office. When the staff refused to leave, shots were fired over their heads to force them outside. IRA Volunteers then systematically smashed up the printing presses, causing £39,000

¹¹⁸⁹ ‘The Pen is Mightier than the Sword’, NIC 53, NLI.

¹¹⁹⁰ O’Malley, *No Surrender Here, Civil War Papers of Earnie O’Malley 1922-24*, pp. 47, 51.

¹¹⁹¹ National Army Report on Operations carried out in the west Cork, and South Kerry areas, 29th April – 5th May 1923, DT S3361, NAI.

¹¹⁹² Edmund Downey, *Waterford News*, to W.T. Cosgrave 19 August 1922, Fitzgerald Papers, P80/282, UCDA ; cited by Ferriter, *Between Two Hells, The Irish Civil War*, p. 69.

worth of damage. A similar group went on to the *Constitution* and created another £23,000 worth of destruction.¹¹⁹³

IRA Handbills and press releases were also produced to try to undermine the Free State supporting press. One IRA handbill exclaimed “the newspapers can provoke a war, but they cannot win it.”¹¹⁹⁴ Another IRA Handbill from the period informed people that “the Free State have borrowed British soldiers, British guns, British munitions and British methods. Look around for yourself and see what their denials are worth.”¹¹⁹⁵ Erskine Childers, was the main propagandist on the IRA side. He issued Republican supporting press releases, while newsletters were printed sporadically proclaiming that “the British press of Ireland refuses to publish any of the successes of the Republican troops.”¹¹⁹⁶ Childers tried to put an altogether different complexion upon the so called “victorious march of the Free State Troops through the South.”¹¹⁹⁷ The IRA consistently tried to re-affirm their loyalty to the Irish Republic, and continuously questioned British support and partition of the Free State, saying “the army of the South is united under Liam Lynch in the defence of the Republic. Men of Dublin where do you stand? With the English allies or with a united South of Ireland?”¹¹⁹⁸ The *Irish Independent* reported on 10th August 1922, other IRA slogans that were distributed and publicized trying to question the allegiances of the Free State by stating “Collins is marching on Cork - Why not Belfast?”¹¹⁹⁹

IRA propaganda slogans continuously tried to link the Free State Government with the British, claiming it was a proxy for the British establishment. IRA propaganda also described the Free State Government as ‘a Colonial Junta’ deriving its powers not from the people but

¹¹⁹³ *Irish Independent*, 12 August 1922; *The Freeman’s Journal*, 12 August 1922; *The Cork Examiner*, 29 September 1922.

¹¹⁹⁴ IRA Handbill, Erskine Childers Papers, MS 48,087/1, NLI.

¹¹⁹⁵ IRA Handbill, Ephemera Collection, EPH B12, NLI.

¹¹⁹⁶ IRA Newsletter, Erskine Childers Papers, MS 48, 058/13 NLI.

¹¹⁹⁷ IRA Newsletter, Erskine Childers Papers, MS 48, 058/13 NLI.

¹¹⁹⁸ IRA Handbill, Ephemera Collection, EPH B11, NLI.

¹¹⁹⁹ *Irish Independent*, 10 August 1922.

from the British. It also emphasized the “mercenary nature of the National Army, which is carrying out a war of re-conquest on the part of the British.”¹²⁰⁰ By doing so the IRA attempted to undermine the Free State Government in the eyes of the Irish population. To counter this, as Galula states, the goal of the Free State was “to divide the ranks of the insurgents, to stir up opposition between the mass and the leaders, and to win over the dissidents.”¹²⁰¹ To discredit the IRA leadership was a primary objective of the Free State, which it did very well. In comparison, handbills had limited success in the IRA campaign to discredit the Free State supporting press. Attempts were made to compare them to the British Press with appeals such as: “Read what the Free State leaflets are saying about Republican soldiers and Republican Prisoners. Remember what the British Press said about Terence MacSwiney.”¹²⁰² In addition to handbills and posters, the IRA tried other propaganda methods. A National Army Report from 15th April 1923 states that the IRA tactic of “serving threatening letters on civilians is becoming quite general.”¹²⁰³ These letters were designed to stop them supporting the Free State through threats and extortion.

Without the full backing of the established press, the majority of these IRA press did not receive wide circulation. It was already a challenging information environment for the Republicans. Activities such as the commandeering of goods and the destruction of infrastructure, significantly reduced public support for the IRA. As a whole, the population wanted an end to the fighting and wanted a return to economic stability. An IRA West Cork Commander, Sean Lehane told Ernie O’Malley that the civilian population is practically 90%

¹²⁰⁰ Cabinet Meeting of the Provisional Government, (Meeting Minutes), 18 August 1922, DT, G1/3, NAI.

¹²⁰¹ Galula *Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice*, p. 86.

¹²⁰² IRA Handbill, Ephemera Collection, EPH B11, NLI.

¹²⁰³ National Army Report on the Military Situation 15th April 1923, D/T S3361, NAI.

Free State'.¹²⁰⁴ Without this support and without the support of the church and press, it was very hard for the IRA to counter the Free State information operations campaign.

6.12 Free State Information Operations in Cork

Information Operations were not just conducted at the strategic level, locally, tactically and just before the amphibious landings in Cork, the Free State Cabinet Minister Desmond Fitzgerald made alternative arrangements for the “distribution and dissemination of propaganda literature [because previous methods were] unsatisfactory. An aeroplane for use in this connection was now ready, and under control of the civil aviation authority.”¹²⁰⁵ This Free State Bristol fighter aeroplane had been tasked with reporting on conditions, strafing Republican formations and dropping thousands of National Army propaganda leaflets.¹²⁰⁶

After Cork City was secured by the National Army, the IRA lost control of its last major media outlets that could reach a wider audience. Ferriter states that after the initial Free State landings in Cork Harbour, the conveyors of news were specifically targeted by the IRA, with both the Cork newspaper offices attacked and machinery wrecked.¹²⁰⁷ Nevertheless, the owners of the *Cork Examiner*, the Crosbies, with their remarkable entrepreneurial ability, got the newspaper back onto the streets quickly.¹²⁰⁸

Dalton, understood the importance of maintaining high levels of public support and issued the following edict to his troops operating in Cork: “It should be remembered that the

¹²⁰⁴ Sean Lehane to Ernie O'Malley, 19 September 1922 in Cormac O'Malley and Anne Dolan, '*No Surrender Here*', *the Civil War Papers of Ernie O'Malley 1922-1924* (Dublin, Lilliput Press, 2008), p. 200.

¹²⁰⁵ Cabinet Meeting of the Provisional Government, (Meeting Minutes) 18th July 1922, DT, G 1/1/1, NAI.

¹²⁰⁶ Borgonovo, *The Battle for Cork*, p.117.

¹²⁰⁷ Frank Geary, 'The Taking of Cork, July 1922', in John Horgan (ed.), *Great Irish Reportage* (Dublin, 2013), pp. 1-16; cited by Ferriter, *Between Two Hells, The Irish Civil War*, p. 51.

¹²⁰⁸ Boyne, *Emmet Dalton*, p. 202.

vast majority of the civilian population is friendly, and that discourteous treatment is likely to alienate their sympathy and friendship.”¹²⁰⁹ He further stated that “it is necessary to display discipline through our actions and smartness of dress.”¹²¹⁰ The Free State portrayal of their troops as the liberators of Cork City and the continuation of its emphasis of the army’s popular support paid dividends throughout this period. By September 1922, Dalton stated “there are two outstanding points in my favour. I have the good will of the people. [Secondly] They [The IRA] have poor morale owing to the indefiniteness of their objective and owing to the lack of confidence in their leaders.”¹²¹¹ This Free State interest in self-promotion continued into 1923, and the National Army produced another internal magazine called *The Cap Badge* documenting and circulating the actions of Free State soldiers during the fighting.¹²¹²

6.13 Information Operations Having an Effect

With control of the press and Catholic Church, the Free State Government dictated the narrative during the civil war, further marginalising and isolating the IRA. Because Republicans abstained from the Dáil, there was no public forum for the Republican political leadership to present its views.¹²¹³ Once the IRA occupation of provincial towns ended, (and with it control of the *Cork Examiner* and other newspapers), there was no hope for the IRA cause to be represented by the Irish press.¹²¹⁴

¹²⁰⁹ Boyne, *Emmet Dalton*, p. 174.

¹²¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹²¹¹ Dalton letter to Commander-in-Chief, 11 Sept 1922, CW/OPS/2/4, MAI.

¹²¹² Lt. A. Barry, Publicity, Command Headquarters, Cork, Report, Week Ending 13 Jan [1923], IE MA CW/OPS/04/13, MAI; cited by Boyne, *Emmet Dalton*, p. 212.

¹²¹³ Hopkinson, *Green Against Green*, p. 132.

¹²¹⁴ *Ibid.*

A successful counterinsurgency campaign must be supported by an effective publicity campaign. This was a key ingredient that Dalton and the National Army utilised from the early stages of the civil war. The leadership of the IRA eventually (but too late) understood the consequences of their failed propaganda strategy, as Liam Deasy stated, “the increasing support for the F.S. [Free State] Government, [was] consequent on our [the IRA] failure to combat the false propaganda.”¹²¹⁵ Contrastingly, the leadership of the Free State contradicted this point by stating that “our propaganda should be on a more solid and permanent basis even if what may look to be advantages have to be sacrificed.”¹²¹⁶ Solid propaganda combined with good press relations had a telling effect on the morale of the IRA, as espoused by one of the IRA leaders Harry Boland when he stated “there is no doubt that the people in the main is [sic] against us at present, believing that we are to blame for the present state of affairs.”¹²¹⁷

A National Army Report from April 1923 states that “spectacular show, parades, route marches, etc. and all other methods of indirect propaganda produce very good results here and should be concentrated on.”¹²¹⁸ As a result of the parades and shows of force the National Army reported that “it is indirect propaganda and the comment of the citizens [that] is most gratifying.”¹²¹⁹ These actions reinforced the legitimacy of the National Army and Government, helping to undermine the status of the IRA amongst the population. Because of this the army’s grip on the situation was “...daily becoming stronger and better, while within the army itself a healthy spirit of confidence, discipline, and a very real soldierly outlook is growing to a very appreciable extent.”¹²²⁰ The reaction to these shows of force was closely monitored and the fact that “...our own people are taking up the proper attitude in relations with the army” was

¹²¹⁵ Liam Deasy letter to Seamus O’Donovan, 30 January 1923, O’Donovan Papers, MS 22,306 NLI.

¹²¹⁶ Collins letter to Cosgrave, 25 July 1922; cited by Hopkinson, *Green Against Green*, P. 140.

¹²¹⁷ Harry Boland to Luke Dillon, 27 July 1922, Fitzgerald Papers UCDA; cited by Gerry White, *Free State versus Republic; The Opposing Armed Forces in the Civil War; Atlas of the Irish Revolution* (Cork, University Press 2017), p. 704.

¹²¹⁸ National Army Report on the Military Situation 07th April 1923, DT S3361, NAI.

¹²¹⁹ National Army Report on the Military Situation 05th May 1923, DT S3361, NAI.

¹²²⁰ National Army Report on the Military Situation 28th April 1923, DT S3361, NAI.

stressed in National Army Command Reports.¹²²¹ The posture and profile of the National Army paid dividends throughout the civil war and because of this the local population in Cork were “...beginning to see light, [being] quite friendly towards our troops and [it is believed that] most of these men will one day join either the Army or Civic Guard.”¹²²²

As the war concluded, even the most stridently Republican population areas became more favourable to the Free State. A National Army Report on 5th May 1921 observed that “in West Cork it is altogether untrue that the people were really hostile to us. On coming into actual contact with them the impression of hostility immediately evaporates, in fact the first impression was one of general friendliness.”¹²²³ The overall perception of the National Army among the general public was positive and the “people seemed glad to have our [Free State] troops in their locality and treated them in most cases without reserve or suspicion. In some cases, they gave information more freely than has been experienced in any other part of Ireland.”¹²²⁴ This was an important consequence of the effective Information Operations campaign conducted by the Free State.

6.14 Civil Control Overall Summary

Hunted and harassed, the IRA difficulties increased and by March 1923, a National Army Report stated that “armed opposition in anything like column strength could be found only in a few places, and where such columns existed it was mainly due to the mountainous terrain.”¹²²⁵

¹²²¹ National Army Report on the Military Situation 28th April 1923, DT S3361, NAI.

¹²²² National Army Report on Operations carried out in the West Cork, and South Kerry areas, 29th April – 5th May 1923, DT S3361, NAI.

¹²²³ National Army Report on Operations carried out in the west Cork, and South Kerry areas, 29th April – 5th May 1923, DT S3361, NAI.

¹²²⁴ National Army Report on Operations carried out in the west Cork, and South Kerry areas, 29th April – 5th May 1923, DT S3361, NAI.

¹²²⁵ National Army Report for Week Ending 15 April, DT, S331, NAI.

As the IRA did their best to avoid capture, their morale was further hit in early 1923, when several iconic Republican figures were killed in action, captured or surrendered. Dinny Lacey was killed on 18th February 1923 and Con Moloney was captured, having been seriously wounded, on 7th March. Dan Breen capitulated without putting up a fight when captured in a dugout on 17th April 1923.¹²²⁶ The capture of Liam Deasy, proved an even worse affair for the IRA. Deasy was ‘tried by Court Martial’ on 25th January 1923, and found guilty of “having in his possession, without proper authority, one long Parabellum revolver and twenty-one rounds of ammunition”, and was duly sentenced to death.¹²²⁷ However a stay of execution was ordered and, following negotiations, Deasy signed a document stating that he would aid in an immediate unconditional surrender of men and arms, and that he would appeal to Liam Lynch and the Republican Executive to do likewise.¹²²⁸ Hopkinson states that the actions of Deasy “was a severe blow to the IRA morale.”¹²²⁹ In a letter to Liam Lynch on 11th February 1923, Frank Barrett an IRA Officer from Clare supports this sentiment by stating that;

... until recent developments [Liam Deasy’s statement] I had no doubt but we could have defeated the Free-State army, and compelled the Free-State government to capitulate. My hopes of ever doing this now are not all bright. Anyhow to do so will exhaust our last resources and England is there always.¹²³⁰

The IRA Executive did not meet until April 1923, but the combination of limited popular support and Free State military success forced the most ardent Republicans to accept the reality that the Free State policies were defeating the IRA. As 1923 progressed, the majority of the leadership and fighting cadre of the IRA was dead, injured, imprisoned, or in hiding, leaving very few fighting men in the field to question the authority of the Free State. The Free State authorities continued to detain IRA prisoners for a period after the civil war, until they were

¹²²⁶ Harrington, *The Munster Republic*, p.131.

¹²²⁷ *Cork Examiner*, 9 Feb. 1923.

¹²²⁸ Harrington, *The Munster Republic*, p.118.

¹²²⁹ Hopkinson, *Green Against Green*, p. 231.

¹²³⁰ Frank Barrett to Lynch, 11 February 1923, P69/39/18, UCDA.

sure the fighting was really over. Up to 90 percent of the IRA prisoners were only released by the end of 1923, with all being set free before the autumn of 1924.¹²³¹

The formation of a legitimate civil police force strengthened the Free State authority and undermined IRA activities and their cause. The people were tired of war and observing a local police force trying to reinforce law and order struck a chord that was accepted by the majority of the local population. The Civic Guard were certainly more acceptable than their predecessors the RIC and it was important that they were perceived to be different. After a fractious start and deployment, the Civic Guard managed to bring law and order to an Irish population, eager to be governed by its own people. These actions freed up National Army forces to fight in the ungoverned spaces, whilst the Civic Guard provided Civil Control in the more peaceful areas.

After the civil war, the number of wanted IRA volunteers still at large and being tracked by Army Intelligence decreased throughout the Free State. It listed just 22 names for Cork, and merely one for Dublin.¹²³² In November 1923, a cabinet minute divided the state into three classes of area. There were 13 counties where normal conditions existed and 6 counties where Civic Guards could enforce law and order with the support of the military. Finally, there were seven counties or portions of counties (namely Cork, Leitrim, South Clare, South Galway, Tipperary, Offaly and Roscommon) where owing to the presence of bands of IRA men, the Civic Guards could still not take full responsibility for the restoration of order.¹²³³ But by recruiting, training and deploying more Civic Guards with army support, civil control soon extended to all these regions.

The support of the Catholic Church and press proved to be a hugely significant factor for the Free State Government in the information battle. They helped the Free State win the

¹²³¹ Kissane, *The Politics of the Irish Civil War*, p.166.

¹²³² Correspondence RE: 'warrants for wanted Irregulars still at large'. Sept-Dec. 1923, CW P/1 (Civil War) Box 1, MAI; cited by Foster, *The Irish Civil War and Society, Politics, Class, and Conflict*, p. 140.

¹²³³ Minutes of Meeting of Executive Council, 20 November 1923, DT, S3435, NAI.

narrative, undermine the IRA cause and influence local and popular support. The National Army received substantial support from these national and local institutions. As Trinquier argues, any propaganda which undermined the state's morale or cause it to doubt the necessity of its sacrifice was to be unmercifully repressed.¹²³⁴ What was significant was that the government was Irish and had popular approval, the Church could then enthusiastically support the established order.¹²³⁵

An insurgent movement like the IRA required popular support to survive. The support by the Church and press for the Free State in Cork damaged the morale of the IRA in the county. By securing the support from the two bishops in Cork, Dalton immediately shaped the information narrative in the region. Alongside the targeted information operation campaigns, the Free State Public Safety Bill or 'Execution Policy' further damaged IRA morale and influenced the population. Throughout the civil war, the Irish population were made to believe that supporting the IRA would lead to more commandeering and infrastructure damage. A compelling message was put forward that economic prosperity and peace were best achieved by supporting the Free State Government.

¹²³⁴ Trinquier *Modern Warfare*, p. 24.

¹²³⁵ Hopkinson, *Green Against Green*, p. 182.

REBUILD

CAPACITY BUILDING

Build - The build phase of clear-hold-build operations consists of carrying out programs designed to remove the root causes that led to the insurgency, improve the lives of the inhabitants, and strengthen the host nation's ability to provide effective governance.¹²³⁶
To rebuild is to do it all again.

¹²³⁶ US Army FM 3-24.2 Tactics in Counterinsurgency (April, 2009), 3-21.

Chapter Seven – Restoration of Essential Services

The construction [Build] of a new state with enduring democratic institutions, an army subservient to the civil power, an unarmed police force and a meritocratic civil service free from political interference are seen rightly as the great achievement of the treatyite regime between 1922-32.¹²³⁷

-J.M. Regan, *The Politics of Utopia*.

7.1 Introduction to ReBuild

As part of their overall strategy to discredit and undermine the Free State Government, the IRA conducted an extensive campaign to destroy the essential services and railway infrastructure of the new state. Nearly a fifth of Republican operations in Munster took the form of railway sabotage of some kind. The objective was not to just deny the railways to government forces, but to paralyse the whole system.¹²³⁸ The IRA conducted a systematic campaign of destruction of roads, railways and bridges, which seriously degraded the basic infrastructure of Ireland. The country's essential services were in danger of collapse and in desperate need of repair.¹²³⁹ Kevin O'Higgins assessed that the wheels of administration lay idle, battered out of recognition by the clash of rival jurisdictions.¹²⁴⁰ The Free State needed to defeat and counter the IRA campaign of destruction of public and private property, because by counteracting and exploiting these IRA excesses, the National Army would "alienate them from the general population."¹²⁴¹ If the Free State wanted to win the war, then it needed to rebuild the capacity of the State, and in the process undermine the root causes that would allow the IRA to prolong the insurgency.¹²⁴²

¹²³⁷ J.M. Regan, *The Politics of Utopia: Party Organisation, Executive Autonomy and the New Administration, Ireland: The Politics of Independence, 1922-49*, (London, 2000), p.32.

¹²³⁸ Townsend, *The Republic, The Fight for Irish Independence, 1918-1923*, p.430.

¹²³⁹ Duggan, *A History of the Irish Army*, p. 92.

¹²⁴⁰ Townsend, *The Republic: The Fight for Irish Independence, 1918-1923*, p.425.

¹²⁴¹ Duggan, *A History of the Irish Army*, p. 93.

¹²⁴² US Army FM 3-24.2 *Tactics in Counterinsurgency* (April, 2009), 3-21.

Capacity building is the process of creating an environment that fosters institutional development, community participation, improved governance, and the development of the economy & infrastructure.¹²⁴³ The Free State Government needed to rebuild Irish capacity in a cohesive and all-encompassing effort. This was required to re-establish and coordinate the institutions that provide for basic elements and requirements such as civil participation, livelihood, and well-being of the citizens and the state.¹²⁴⁴ A coordinated approach was vitally important because governments operating in a counterinsurgency need to avoid working in a vacuum. They need to coordinate all the instruments of government and to empower citizens and thereby make them more willing to provide support. As Berman, et al. argue, the government achieves this by delivering services and demonstrating the value of having a joint civil-military organisation that can control this space.¹²⁴⁵

7.2 Aim of Chapter

The aim of this chapter is to outline the measures taken by the Irish Free State Government and National Army to bring stability back to Ireland and rebuild the country and its essential services. Capacity building is a key factor in stabilizing a country that has suffered from prolonged warfare, and it is done in conjunction with ongoing military operations. According to US Army Stability Operations Doctrine, a comprehensive and joint civil-military approach to capacity building, and the restoration of essential infrastructure, is one of the most effective government strategies during a counterinsurgency campaign.¹²⁴⁶

¹²⁴³ US Army, FM 3-07, Stability Operations (October 2008).

¹²⁴⁴ US Army, FM 3-07, Stability Operations (October 2008).

¹²⁴⁵ Berman, Felner and Shapiro, *Small Wars, Big Data: The Information Revolution in Modern Conflict*, with Vestal McIntyre, p. 17.

¹²⁴⁶ US Army, FM 3-07, Stability Operations (October 2008).

This chapter will analyse how the Free State rebuilt the essential services and railway infrastructure. It will first describe the extensive levels of infrastructure destruction and damage caused by the IRA. It will then discuss the ramifications of these actions for both the IRA and for the National Army. The chapter will then detail the actions taken by the Free State Government to rebuild back the basic infrastructure of Ireland in a coordinated manner at the both the national and local levels. Finally, it will describe how these actions restored the confidence of the Irish population in the capabilities of the government, enabling the National Army to undermine some of the underlying causes fuelling the insurgency.

7.3 The IRA Campaign of Destruction

*There never has been a case of any country in which such a fierce attack was made on its railway system.*¹²⁴⁷

The destructive campaign carried out by the IRA on the infrastructure and essential services of the Irish Free State was profound. Republican saboteurs inflicted “thousands of pounds of destruction ... instead of building up the country.”¹²⁴⁸ In her diary entry, Mary Spring Rice, a prominent Nationalist further questioned if; “this is the end of the first phase. What will the second be?”¹²⁴⁹

Phase Four of combat operations involves capacity building and returning stability to a conflict zone.¹²⁵⁰ In the Irish Free State, definite actions needed to be taken by the government because as argued by Corcoran; “infrastructural and social investments were required

¹²⁴⁷ Notes for speech, possibly of Mulcahy’s, Mulcahy papers, P7/B/179, UCDA.

¹²⁴⁸ Mary Spring Rice Diary pp. 235/30, Spring Rice to Knox, 28 September 1922, UCDA; cited by Ferriter, *Between Two Hells, The Irish Civil War* (London, Profile Books 2021), p. 67.

¹²⁴⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁵⁰ US Army FM 3-07 Stability Operations (October, 2008).

immediately.” But within the new state, “money was scarce and difficult to borrow due to the [Free] [S]tate’s instability and fears that it might be unable to repay.”¹²⁵¹

Ireland in this period relied on its railway and transport services. Central to economic and social recovery was the restoration of this key transportation infrastructure because an incapacitated transport system limits freedom of movement, social interaction, trade and development.¹²⁵² The IRA demonstrated a remarkable indifference and was more concerned with making government impossible for the Free State, no matter how much disruption it caused.¹²⁵³ Con Moloney was the Adjutant of the IRA 2nd Division in Munster.¹²⁵⁴ In correspondence to Ernie O’Malley, he demonstrated the overall Republican mind-set in regards to the IRA campaign of railway destruction. He wrote that that he expected the local populations to survive and get on with life, given the extensive damage to transport infrastructure. He assessed that they would eventually settle “down to the inconvenience of rail and road destruction.”¹²⁵⁵

7.3.1 Initial IRA Attacks on Free State Infrastructure in Cork

After losing the conventional warfare phase, the IRA adopted guerrilla tactics, and hoped that it could disrupt the economy and provoke discontent. A prolonged conflict would also undermine the strength and the authority of the Free State Government. Moreover, disorder is cheap to create and very costly to prevent.¹²⁵⁶

¹²⁵¹ Corcoran, *Freedom to Achieve Freedom*, p.47.

¹²⁵² US Army FM 3-07 Stability Operations (October, 2008).

¹²⁵³ Letter to Pa [Murray], 13 February 1923, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/89, UCDA.

¹²⁵⁴ Officers of 2 Southern Division, Con Moloney Papers, P9, UCDA.

¹²⁵⁵ Con Moloney memorandum to Ernie O’Malley, 28 September 1922, in Cormac O’Malley and Anne Dolan, *‘No Surrender Here’, the Civil War Papers of Ernie O’Malley 1922-1924* (Dublin, Lilliput Press, 2008), p. 235.

¹²⁵⁶ Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice*, p. 6.

Road and railway disruption may have been the best-organized aspect of the Republican defence of its Munster Republic. Within ninety minutes of the National Army troops landing in Cork, "...bridges began to explode around the City."¹²⁵⁷ As fighting continued, among the facilities listed for destruction by the IRA as they withdrew from Cork City were the cantilevered railway bridges spanning the River Lee.¹²⁵⁸ On the evening of Tuesday, 8th August 1922, as the National Army advanced on Cork City centre, the IRA blew up the railway bridge outside Rochestown. The destruction of this bridge cut the road from Passage West to Cork City and the sound of the explosion added to the anxiety experienced by the city's population.¹²⁵⁹ As the fighting raged in Cork, panic set amongst the population as the departing IRA set about destroying more key infrastructure in the city. Concerns of the local populace were intensified when the "long Douglas Channel railway bridge was brought down, further cutting the railway line, as well as the Douglas electric tramway to Cork."¹²⁶⁰ Borgonovo further states that "at 4am on 9th August 1922, IRA engineers blew up Fota Railway Bridge, severing the Cork to Cobh rail line." This was part of a "preconceived defensive response to the anticipated Free State Army landings in Cork."¹²⁶¹ IRA transport destruction took on many other forms and, once Cork was no longer defensible, rather than letting its own motor vehicles fall into Free State hands, the IRA dumped the lorries, cars and motorcycles into the river.¹²⁶²

IRA engineers were also busy across Cork Harbour. Republicans from "the 9th IRA Battalion destroyed the piers at Ringaskiddy and Currabinny by setting them alight, while the naval pier in Ringaskiddy was damaged by flames."¹²⁶³ *The Irish Times* reported that in the early morning of 10th August 1922, IRA engineers had blown up part of the Chetwynd railway

¹²⁵⁷ Borgonovo, *The Battle for Cork*, p.88.

¹²⁵⁸ Valiulis, *Portrait of a Revolutionary*, p.106.

¹²⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p.105.

¹²⁶⁰ Borgonovo, *The Battle for Cork*, p.93.

¹²⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p.89.

¹²⁶² *Irish Independent*, 12 August 1922.

¹²⁶³ Borgonovo, *The Battle for Cork*, p.95.

viaduct (Cork, Bandon and South Coast Railway), about two miles southwest of the city on the Bandon road. They had also “wrecked the Rathpeacon viaduct north of Cork, thereby severing the Great Southern and Western Railway.”¹²⁶⁴ *The Irish Times* reports on 10th August were confirmed by the following eye-witness account:

There were huge explosions during the early hours and these were the viaduct on the Bandon and South Coast Railway and the Rathpeacon Viaduct on the Great Southern and Western Railway, thus stopping every railway and closing 5/6 of our business down.¹²⁶⁵

On 13th August 1922, the National Army conducted an aerial reconnaissance of Cork to ascertain the scale of the IRA destruction of essential services in the area. The pilot reported that “The main road from Kanturk to Charleville via Freemount was apparently clear. Bridges were observed to be blown up including the railway bridge crossing Blackwater at Mallow.”¹²⁶⁶ The efforts of the IRA to destroy the city’s essential infrastructure prior to the arrival of the National Army was both comprehensive and deliberate.

7.3.2 IRA Campaign Continues – What the Newspapers Reported

Even after withdrawing from Cork City, the IRA policy of destruction continued and the *Cork Examiner* carried the following reports of ‘wanton destruction’ conducted by the IRA in the periods of August and September 1922.¹²⁶⁷

MORE DESTRUCTION – Bridges Destroyed near Cork

During Monday night the Irregulars were very active close to the city, on the Western and Northern sides, and the wanton destruction of bridges continued.¹²⁶⁸

¹²⁶⁴ *Irish Times*, 12 August 1922 and Borgonovo, *The Battle for Cork*, p.113.

¹²⁶⁵ Diary kept by Frank Brewitt, an eye-witness account into the arrival of the National Army into Cork, cited by Valiulis, *Portrait of a Revolutionary*, p.108.

¹²⁶⁶ Report from Pilot Commandant Russell, 13 August 1922, (UCDA Mulcahy papers P7B/39).

¹²⁶⁷ *Cork Examiner*, 16 August 1922.

¹²⁶⁸ *Cork Examiner*, 16 August 1922.

DRIPSEY BRIDGE BLOWN UP

During the early hours of yesterday morning the Irregulars [IRA] blew up Dripsey bridge and now people of the Macroom area have to come to Cork by Berrings and Clougduv as other bridges in the same area had previously been removed by explosives.¹²⁶⁹

DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY

Midleton, Thursday - The loss of the East Ferry floating bridge which was destroyed or nearly so by the Irregulars is causing serious inconvenience to passengers and traffic from Cobh.¹²⁷⁰

TELEGRAPH WIRES CUT – YOUGHAL TRAINS DELAYED

Owing to the cutting of telegraph wires during the night.¹²⁷¹

Because of the intensity and destructive nature of the IRA activities, the daily life for local inhabitants was being seriously curtailed. Swift and decisive action needed to be taken in order to rectify this situation.

7.4 Railway Position Reports in Cork (August-September 1922)

A series of reports were filed by the Ministry of Economic Affairs which vividly described the IRA's systematic destruction of the railway network in Cork. They also show initial efforts made by the National Army to protect and restore these essential services. These reports are laid out in a table chronologically as follows:

¹²⁶⁹ *Cork Examiner*, 2 September 1922.

¹²⁷⁰ *Cork Examiner*, 2 September 1922.

¹²⁷¹ *Cork Examiner*, 9 September 1922.

Table 2 - Reports filed by the Ministry of Economic Affairs to the other government bodies in the Irish Free-State

Date	Event & Location
24 th Aug 1922	Chetwynd viaduct, 5 miles from Cork, is very badly damaged. The company has had over from England representatives of the firm who constructed the bridge and it will take considerable time before necessary repairs can be affected. ¹²⁷²
24 th Aug 1922	Ballymantle Bridge, 17 miles from Cork on line to Kinsale, is small and can probably be repaired in a few days. ¹²⁷³
24 th Aug 1922	Cork and Muskerry Railway, A three arch span masonry bridge four miles from Cork over the River Lee, has been seriously damaged. In this case perhaps you could use your influence with the authorities responsible so that repairs may be proceeded with at once. ¹²⁷⁴
25 th Aug 1922	GSW Railways: The viaduct at 91½ miles between Wellington Bridge and Ballycullane was almost completely destroyed by explosives on the night of 23/24 August 1922. ¹²⁷⁵
26 th Aug 1922	GSW Railways: Bridge No. 4 near Glanworth Station was burned, Bridge No. 7 between Glanworth and Ballindanger was damaged by explosives. Bridge No. 36 between Fermoy and Clondule was damaged by explosives. ¹²⁷⁶
26 th Aug 1922	Bridge No 4 near Glanworth station was burned. Bridge No 7 between Glanworth and Ballindangan was damaged by explosives. Bridge No 36 between Fermoy and Clondulane was damaged by explosives. ¹²⁷⁷
29 th Aug 1922	A bridge between Barna and Devon Road was blown up. ¹²⁷⁸
30 th Aug 1922	GSW Railways: The company report that Carrick Bridge between Mallow and Castletownroche was blown up. ¹²⁷⁹

¹²⁷² Railway position Report No. 115, Report from the Ministry of Economic Affairs To Chief of staff, Commander in Chief, director of Intelligence and Ministry of Agriculture, 24 August 1922, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/23, UCDA.

¹²⁷³ Railway position Report No. 115, Report from the Ministry of Economic Affairs To Chief of staff, Commander in Chief, director of Intelligence and Ministry of Agriculture, 24 August 1922, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/23, UCDA.

¹²⁷⁴ Railway position Report No. 115, Report from the Ministry of Economic Affairs To Chief of staff, Commander in Chief, director of Intelligence and Ministry of Agriculture, 24 August 1922, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/23, UCDA.

¹²⁷⁵ Railway position Report No. 115, Report from the Ministry of Economic Affairs To Chief of staff, Commander in Chief, director of Intelligence and Ministry of Agriculture, 25 August 1922, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/23, UCDA.

¹²⁷⁶ Railway position Report No. 115, Report from the Ministry of Economic Affairs To Chief of staff, Commander in Chief, director of Intelligence and Ministry of Agriculture, 26 August 1922, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/23, UCDA.

¹²⁷⁷ Railway position Report No. 115, Report from the Ministry of Economic Affairs To Chief of staff, Commander in Chief, director of Intelligence and Ministry of Agriculture, 26 August 1922, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/23, UCDA.

¹²⁷⁸ Report Number 114, from Ministry of Economic Affairs to Chief of Staff, Commander in Chief, Director of Intelligence, Minister of Agriculture, 29 August 1922, Mulcahy papers P7B/23, UCDA.

¹²⁷⁹ Railway position Report No. 115, Report from the Ministry of Economic Affairs To Chief of staff, Commander in Chief, director of Intelligence and Ministry of Agriculture, 30 August 1922, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/23, UCDA.

Borgonovo assesses that “in all, thirty-two bridges around Cork were damaged or wrecked in the weeks following the National Army landings.”¹²⁸⁰ Other Free State Reports from September 1922, indicate that the IRA’s widespread destruction was seriously affecting the routine life of the Irish population. One report explained how “the damage to the railway system inflicted by the IRA was widespread and extensive. Communications stopped to Killarney and all beyond, to Bandon and all west, to Fermoy and Mallow.”¹²⁸¹ By late 1922, all the railway routes to the south and west of Ireland were non-functioning.¹²⁸²

7.5 IRA’s Policy of Destruction Intensifies

*Killing a few of the other side does not count as they can be easily replaced. Making government impossible is your only chance of success and for the past month it has been more effective than for the six months prior to that.*¹²⁸³

-Letter to Pa [Murray], 13 February 1923

As the fighting progressed, preventing the functioning of the Free State Government became one of the IRA’s main purposes.¹²⁸⁴ The IRA’s campaign of destruction was not just concentrated on the railway network. IRA Volunteers destroyed the telegraph office at the General Post-Office, as well as the telephone exchange on MacCurtain Street.¹²⁸⁵ Other commercial entities were targeted and the *Cork Examiner* reported that “the damage suffered by the Cork Harbour Commissioners as a result of the Irregulars [IRA] using and destroying part of their plant and property is estimated to be at least £14,000.”¹²⁸⁶ While it may have been tactically astute, the transportation and infrastructural destruction by the IRA was strategically

¹²⁸⁰ Borgonovo, *The Battle for Cork*, p.126.

¹²⁸¹ Postmaster General Office Report, 02 September 1922, Mulcahy papers P7B/108, UCDA.

¹²⁸² Hopkinson, *Green Against Green*, p. 198.

¹²⁸³ Letter to Pa [Murray], 13 February 1923, *Mulcahy Papers*, P7/B/89, UCDA.

¹²⁸⁴ Hopkinson, *Green Against Green*, p. 198.

¹²⁸⁵ *The Cork Examiner*, 27 September 1922.

¹²⁸⁶ *Cork Examiner*, 17 August 1922.

unwise. It added to “Cork’s economic woes especially as it also occurred during harvest time, creating strong animosity among the local population.”¹²⁸⁷

Not all Republicans supported this destruction of key infrastructure. Shrewder IRA Commanders such as Ernie O’Malley protested about the destruction of communications as an end in itself: “I thought the policy a fatal one, giving an excuse to men in some areas who would not fight. If such tearing up of rails and roads was to be a prelude to good fighting, then it was justified, otherwise not.”¹²⁸⁸ A common perception throughout Cork during this period, according to the Cork Chamber of Commerce, was that if Republicans “wanted to understand their growing unpopularity they needed to look no further than the nearest collapsed bridge.”¹²⁸⁹

Local community leaders pointed out to the Republican leadership the disastrous social and economic consequences such actions were having for the state. In reply, De Valera argued that it was a military necessity.¹²⁹⁰ This view stemmed from the opinion that by proving the Free State Government unable to protect the essential services and infrastructure, Republicans had a “vested interest in disorder, whether or not they inspired it, because it underlined the government’s lack of practical authority in the country.”¹²⁹¹ But by making efforts to counter this campaign of IRA destruction and by providing better services to the population, the Free State had the opportunity to win over the neutral majority of the population.¹²⁹²

¹²⁸⁷ Borgonovo, *The Battle for Cork*, p.126.

¹²⁸⁸ O’Malley, *The Singing Flame*, pp. 282/283.

¹²⁸⁹ Cork Chamber of Commerce Annual Report, 1922, MP 507, University College Cork; cited by Borgonovo, *The Battle for Cork*, pp.126-7.

¹²⁹⁰ Hopkinson, *Green Against Green*, pp. 198-199.

¹²⁹¹ Garvin, *The Birth of Irish Democracy*, pp. 101-6.

¹²⁹² Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice*, p. 53.

7.5.1 Outline of the IRA Units Conducting the Campaign of Destruction

The IRA in County Cork was split into five Brigade Areas during the civil war.¹²⁹³ As the active fighters battled Free State forces, a number of the newer recruits were inexperienced. The IRA re-designated and disarmed most of them, putting them into their next best or ‘Y’ Class units. These volunteers were sent back to their own areas with instructions to organise, do intelligence work, destroy roads and railways, keep up sniping operations and remain in a position to co-operate with the IRA ‘Flying Columns’ in their areas.¹²⁹⁴ These ‘Y’ Class IRA men were the primary conduits for the assault on the essential services and infrastructure of Munster during this period. These units were also equipped by the “numerous crates of high explosives”, that the IRA had captured on the *UPNOR* having the means to mass produce landmines and explosive devices.¹²⁹⁵ As a result of this and other high explosive seizures, the IRA trail of destruction continued. Most IRA operations took the form of railway sabotage of some kind, denying the railways to government forces, and destroying the whole system.¹²⁹⁶

The IRA’s Cork No. 4 Brigade operating in North Cork was one of the busiest units involved in destroying infrastructure. Its campaign of destruction was widespread and prolonged. The following table is a breakdown of the Cork No. 4 Brigade operations for the month of October 1922, which gives a sense of the infrastructural damage and destruction caused by the IRA during a single month.

¹²⁹³ Updated Memo (1940), Seamus MacCos to Secretary, 17 March 1938 and April 1940 MSPC/A4_2; cited by Donal O Drisceoil, *The Military Military Service (1916-1923) Pensions Collection, The Brigade Activity Reports*, 2018.

¹²⁹⁴ Dalton, Cork, to C-in-C, ‘Cork Report’, 11 Sept 1922, CW/OPS/2/4, MAI.

¹²⁹⁵ Borgonovo, *The Battle for Cork*, p.21.

¹²⁹⁶ Townsend, *The Republic: The Fight for Irish Independence, 1918-1923*, p.430.

Table 3: Breakdown of Infrastructure Destruction by North Cork IRA Units.

Date	Unit	Activity
2 nd Oct 1922	3 rd Batt 4 th Brigade	Destruction of ten bridges in the vicinity of Charleville and Liscarroll, The IRA also blocked the Charleville-Buttevant road and the Charleville-Doneraile road, and trenched all the roads in the area.
5 th Oct 1922	5 th Batt 4 th Brigade	Destruction of fifteen bridges in the vicinity of Mallow. Roads in the area were blocked, and telegraph poles had been cut between Mallow and Lombardstown and between Mallow and Buttevant. The Railway signal cabs at Mourneabbey and Lombardstown were destroyed.
17 th Oct 1922	4 th Brigade	The cutting of poles and wires on the railway line between Charleville and Buttevant. Trenches were created on the Charleville to Dromina road and the Milford to Drumcollogher road.
20 th Oct 1922	3 rd Batt 4 th Brigade	Serious damage to the railway line between Ballinguile Bridge and Shannagh. Poles and wires were cut.
21 st Oct 1922	3 rd Batt 4 th Brigade	The IRA Fired on a breakdown gang repairing [railway] line. ¹²⁹⁷

7.5.2 A Winter of Discontent

As 1922 drew to a close, the destruction of the railway system in Cork remained a priority for the IRA. On 29th December 1922, the IRA Director of Engineering emphasised the need for “...bringing railways to a standstill, as on this to a great extent depends the success of our campaign.”¹²⁹⁸ However successful the IRA was at destroying key infrastructure, it became increasingly ambivalent about the consequences of their wanton destruction on the local population. The IRA lacked awareness as to how the destruction of infrastructure seriously

¹²⁹⁷ Collation of notes from Ernie O'Malley papers, P17a/97, UCDA, from Michael Harrington, *The Munster Republic* (Dublin: Mercier Press 2009) and from IRA Brigade Activity Reports, MSPC/ A4_5 & A4_7, MAI.

¹²⁹⁸ D/E to 'Liam F', Engineering Inspector, 3rd S. Div., 29 December 1922, IE/MA/ A/0990/10-12, MAI; cited by Hopkinson, *Green Against Green*, p. 199.

discommoded rural communities in carrying out their daily activities. As a result, Republican support in those same communities was seriously affected.¹²⁹⁹

IRA activities continued unabated into 1923. In January the monthly report by the Civic Guard for Cork East Riding reported that while Republican activity was “...formerly chiefly directed against the army and army posts ... it is now concentrated with a view to ruin on the economical side... [including the destruction of] railways and all sources of revenue for the state.”¹³⁰⁰ A National Army report from the Charleville area on 21st January 1923 stated that a “large force of Irregulars [IRA] have been operating in this area and traces of their activity are shown in the blocking of roads and railways. Shinana Bridge came into the line of destruction.”¹³⁰¹

Map 5, indicates the scale of IRA destruction in Cork up to the start of 1923, especially in North Cork and in the IRA No.4 Brigade area. It also demonstrates how widespread and indiscriminate this destruction was. The IRA policy of trying to make government impossible by systemically destroying state infrastructure was having the desired effect. As the IRA focused their attention and their efforts on undermining Free State authority, they also imposed compulsory levies on the local population and employers. They robbed post offices for funds, newspaper distribution was interfered with, and transport services frequently disrupted. These activities continued throughout the entire civil war and the Free State Government referred in the Dáil to 331 raids on post offices between 23rd March and 19th April 1923, and 319 attacks on the Great Southern and Western Railway by armed men between 1st March and 22nd April 1923.¹³⁰²


¹²⁹⁹ Harrington, *The Munster Republic*, p.96.

¹³⁰⁰ Monthly Confidential Report, for the Civic Guard, Cork East Riding, January 1923, A/8454, MAI.

¹³⁰¹ National Army Report 21 January 1923, CW/OPS/2/D, MAI.

¹³⁰² Hopkinson, *Green Against Green*, p. 90.

7.6 Map of Railway Destruction in Cork



Map 5- (Developed by the author and Tom Reddy). Source: *Freemans Journal* 6 Jan 1923.¹³⁰³

A deepening sense of frustration grew amongst the leadership of the Free State Government about the increasing destruction of property and communications by the IRA. Politicians saw that it threatened the effective establishment of government throughout the Free State.¹³⁰⁴ The constant detailing of burnt railway stations and bomb outrages also hurt the economy by discouraging both external and internal investment in the new state.¹³⁰⁵ The Free State leadership had to stabilise the situation and restore the already damaged infrastructure

¹³⁰³ Authors own map developed by Tom Reddy using a map from the *Freemans Journal* 6th Jan 1923.

¹³⁰⁴ Hopkinson, *Green Against Green*, p. 220.

¹³⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 273.

and essential services. Solutions to these infrastructural problems created by the IRA would have to be innovative and, systematic.

7.7 National Army Actions and Resolve to Restore and Protect Essential Services

*As early as 5th August 1922, General Eoin O’Duffy had found it necessary to issue a proclamation stating that troops had been authorized to fire on persons committing a variety of offences such as destroying bridges and railway lines, blocking roads, felling trees and looting.*¹³⁰⁶

-Irish Independent, 5th August 1922.

In 1922 the principle infrastructure services delivered to the population by Irish local authorities included public roads, transport, and footpaths.¹³⁰⁷ By September 1922, because of IRA destruction, the *Irish Independent* reported that local authorities were overwhelmed. In terms of the southern railway system: “The damage in practically every direction is so serious that in some cases years must elapse before a complete service is attempted.”¹³⁰⁸ The government ascertained the magnitude of the IRA’s destruction of key infrastructure, especially at the local level. A report published in January 1923 was staggering - it revealed that during the previous twelve months, Irish railway lines had been damaged in 375 places and 42 engines had been derailed. In addition, 51 over-bridges, 207 under-bridges, 83 signal cabins and 13 other buildings had been destroyed.¹³⁰⁹ Peter Hart contends that in Cork County alone, the IRA destroyed 211 bridges and 301 railway buildings between 1917 and 1923. The majority of this destruction, especially bridges, took place during the civil war.¹³¹⁰

¹³⁰⁶ *Irish Independent*, 5 August 1922.

¹³⁰⁷ Corcoran, *Freedom to Achieve Freedom*, p. 57.

¹³⁰⁸ *Irish Independent*, 22 September 1922.

¹³⁰⁹ National Army Report on Railway Damage, 23 January 1923, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/124, UCDA.

¹³¹⁰ Hart, *The IRA and Its Enemies: Violence and Community in Cork 1916-1923*, p.51.

Transportation infrastructure is relied upon by a population to sustain basic living conditions. In times of conflict, if necessary, an “army force [can] establish or restore the most basic services and protect them until a civil authority can provide them.” By doing this, the counterinsurgent force works towards meeting the population’s basic needs.¹³¹¹ The National Army, as one of the few Free State Government instruments of power operating during the early stages of the civil war, had to reverse the IRA campaign of destruction and to provide a safe environment for normal life to continue. At both the national and local levels, Irish military forces played a significant role in stabilisation and also infrastructural development. This restoration of essential services included protecting, repairing and reconstructing state infrastructure. It complemented Free State efforts to stabilise the economy, needing to focus “on the society’s physical aspects that make the state economically viable.”¹³¹²

7.7.1 Early National Army Resolve in Cork to Rebuild Key Infrastructure

Dalton would recall in later life how Collins had told him of the need to capture Cork City intact, because an IRA disruption of road and rail links would leave the Republican forces in full control of Munster.¹³¹³ To reverse the momentum of destruction, the National Army needed to demonstrate its resolve to the Irish public and show it was capable of rebuilding Ireland after many years of warfare, destruction, and division. Even before his death, Collins, in his notebook entries, noted the need “...to send Engineering help to Mallow re Blackwater.”¹³¹⁴

¹³¹¹ US Army FM 3-24.2 Tactics in Counterinsurgency (April, 2009).

¹³¹² US Army FM 3-07 Stability Operations (October, 2008).

¹³¹³ Boyne, *Emmet Dalton*, p. 180.

¹³¹⁴ Entry in Note Book of Michael Collins, dated 20 August 1922, Notebook located in Collins Army Barracks Museum, Cork.

The rebuilding of the Irish railways would also demonstrate the futility of the IRA campaign of destruction. Efforts to rebuild the essential services started early and in earnest. The *Cork Examiner* reported that just after the Cork landings: “Taking advantage of the darkness, National Army soldiers cleared away some of the wreckage and made the Rochestown bridge, previously damaged by the IRA, accessible to foot traffic.”¹³¹⁵ After the heavy fighting in the vicinity of Rochestown, the situation calmed down. Dalton reported to Dublin that the army had:

completed their advance on Cork via Douglas without further resistance. Enemy had all roads mined, but Infantry flanking advance made these futile. Enemy destroyed all city barracks and telephone communications. [The IRA] Endeavoured to destroy bridges without success. Tactical positions occupied in city and positions [were] consolidated.¹³¹⁶

At a national level, a tentative reconstruction policy was formulated. The acting Minister of Labour, Patrick Hogan reported to government that he had agreed to the government’s ‘Three Days’ guarantee that railway lines would “...be repaired for the period 21st August to 3rd September inclusive, to the following sections of the Great Southern & Western Railway: Mallow to Waterford (excluding Waterford), Mallow to Kilmallock.”¹³¹⁷ The Free State Government focused its propaganda on the ‘campaign of destruction’ being waged by the IRA, with particular attention being paid to interference with railways, roads and bridges, injury to industries, and destruction of property.¹³¹⁸ W.T. Cosgrave believed that the best way to stop the campaign of outrage and destruction is to let it be seen for what it is and “that it is rousing the people to opposition.”¹³¹⁹

¹³¹⁵ *The Cork Examiner*, 12 August 1922.

¹³¹⁶ Dalton, Cork, to Commander-in-Chief, ‘Cork Report’, 11 Sept 1922, IE/MA/CW/OPS/2/4, MAI.

¹³¹⁷ Minutes of the Cabinet Meeting of the Provisional Government, 29th August 1922, D/TSCH/1/1/1, NAI.

¹³¹⁸ Provisional Government Decision, 26 July 1922, G1/1, NAI.

¹³¹⁹ ‘To all whom it may concern’ Memo by W.T. Cosgrave, Jul 1922, Fitzgerald Papers, P4/254, UCDA.

7.8 The Need for Outside Expert Support

Pro-Treaty sources admitted that the IRA tactics of destruction of infrastructure coupled with “...the interference with communications threatened to undermine confidence in the Provisional [Free State] Government’s stability.”¹³²⁰ In Cork, Dalton wanted to get the railway system working again by fixing bridges and repairing facilities. The repair of railway bridges and the protection of those carrying out the repair work was a particular priority for him and the National Army.¹³²¹ Initial efforts by the National Army to restore essential services were admirable but not sustainable owing to the sheer scale of the destruction by the IRA. Dalton and other Free State Generals quickly ascertained that they would need additional support to restore the railway system.¹³²² Dalton asked General Headquarters to send aircraft pilot Colonel Charles Russell to conduct aerial reconnaissance.¹³²³ On 19th September 1922, Dalton told Mulcahy, he was starting to restore the bridges that the IRA had destroyed in August, saying “protection for Rathpeacon and other bridges arranged, work about to go ahead.”¹³²⁴

The government decided to provide external and expert support at national and local levels, in the form of civil engineer expertise. This professional assistance was seen as critical to restore the damaged infrastructure, especially the all-important railway system. In a letter to the General Staff of the National Army, Mulcahy announced the appointment of a Government Consulting Engineer, who was a Dr. J.F. Crowley of 16, Victoria Street, London and that he would “...have offices at Merrion Street [and] in his position of Consulting Engineer he will especially control and advice in connection with our present railway work.”¹³²⁵

¹³²⁰ Michael Hopkinson, *Green Against Green* (Dublin, Gill and Macmillan, 1988), p. 173.

¹³²¹ Boyne, *Emmet Dalton*, p. 266.

¹³²² *Ibid.*, p. 246.

¹³²³ Railway Protection, IE/MA/DOD/A/6943, MAI.

¹³²⁴ Dalton to Commander-in-Chief, 19 September 1922, IE/MA/CW/OPS/01/02/06, MAI.

¹³²⁵ Letter from Richard Mulcahy, Chief of General Staff, 02 August 1922, Mulcahy Papers P7/B/119, UCDA.

The repair of essential infrastructure was also decentralised. Cork Corporation took responsibility for the administration of funds for rebuilding and “ensuring payments were made only with engineering certificate of work done.”¹³²⁶ This external expertise was utilised by the Free State throughout the country, but the task of rebuilding was extensive and the National Army needed to support this strategy. They had to find the extra resources within their own organisation to load, spread resources and reduce the costs.

7.9 The Railway Protection Corps

The National Army leadership in conjunction with the Great Southern and Western Railway Company, had perceived how to best protect the railways in the summer months of 1922. Both understood the requirement for a coherent strategy in this regard:

The vital necessity of maintaining as far as possible on your company's system a service of trains adequate not only for military requirements of the Government but also for the distribution of food supplies to the population and the maintenance of trade generally. To effect this every effort should be made to have any obstacle to traffic caused by the breaking or obstructing of the lines removed at the earliest possible moment.¹³²⁷

The railway engines and tracks became essential assets for the Free State Government. The protection of this equipment was an important part of the army's campaign. In late July 1922 the Ministry of Economic Affairs wrote to the Minister for Defence:

I am informed that if the government wish to complete immediately the armoured train there will be no difficulty in getting volunteers from men employed at Inchicore and the Great Southern & Western Railway generally to work day and night to complete it at very short notice. I think also that the time has come to urge Portobello to put a guard on all trains.¹³²⁸

¹³²⁶ Minutes of the Cabinet Meeting of the Provisional Government, 3rd March 1922, D/TSCH/1/1/1, NAI.

¹³²⁷ Letter from Chairman to the Manager Great Southern & Western Railway Co., Kingsbridge, 22 July 1922, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/23, UCDA.

¹³²⁸ Letter from Ministry of Economic Affairs to the Minister of Defence and Commander in Chief, 25 July 1922, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/23, UCDA.

The Great Southern & Western Railways felt that the Ministry of Economics needed to be “... appraised immediately of any interruption of traffic and should be kept constantly informed as to the progress made with works of repair.”¹³²⁹ Later, in August 1922, Mulcahy issued General Order No. 12, outlining the necessity to protect the railway infrastructure and equipment of the State:

It is desired to give some protection to those goods trains, with a view of preventing interference with them by Irregulars, and, at the same time, keep in touch with the general conditions of railway traffic along the routes mentioned. To this end it will be arranged that as far as possible use will be made of those goods trains to transport military stores, and a suitable guard will be sent with those stores.¹³³⁰

Informal arrangements with the Railway Companies needed to be formulised, leading to the creation and establishment of a dedicated unit within the army to support and protect the railways.

7.9.1 Formation of the Railway Protection Corps

Free State Cabinet Minutes in September 1922 outlined that due to the activities of the IRA, about 1,200 railway employees were idle. It was suggested that their services might be usefully utilised for police or military work in connection with the maintenance of railway services. The matter was referred to the Commander-in-Chief.¹³³¹ These 1,200 railway idle employees became the main cohort for a new unit, the Railway Protection Corps. On 20th September 1922, Mulcahy told Dalton to use railway men out of work to enrol a number of these men in the army, for repairing and guarding the railway system. Mulcahy added that he would arrange

¹³²⁹ Letter from Chairman to the Manager Great Southern & Western Railway Co., Kingsbridge, 22 July 1922, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/23, UCDA.

¹³³⁰ General Order No. 12, from Chief of The General Staff, 02 August 1922, Mulcahy papers P7B/24, UCDA.

¹³³¹ Minutes of the Cabinet Meeting of the Provisional Government, 10th September 1922, D/TSCH/1/1/1, UCDA.

with the Quartermaster General to send a number of rifles “...for the immediate arming of some of these men.”¹³³² This special force of railwaymen was formed into a specialised unit in the National Army to be known as the Railway Preservation, Maintenance and Repair Corps, or simply the Railway Protection Corps.¹³³³

National Army organisation reports outlined a Corps that was “commanded by a Major General...for the purpose of protecting railways and for carrying out repairs in certain areas.”¹³³⁴ The new Commanding General was Charles Russell.¹³³⁵ The Railway Protection Corps was deployed and commanded throughout the State, and in Cork it was “...controlled from Headquarters at Wellington Barracks through sub-headquarters at Cork... [covering] the important points on the railway lines from Dublin to Cork.”¹³³⁶ The corps soon became an imperative part of the growing National Army. Its members were predominantly rail workers and navvies, who were paid at very favourable rates.¹³³⁷ Once fully established it became a key enabler within the National Army organisation.¹³³⁸ National Army Reports from January 1923 state that “the closing down of the railways out of Cork to the west and north of the area is responsible for a very serious economic position.”¹³³⁹ The report also highlights the importance of the initial works been attempted by the Railway Protection Corps:

The people are almost entirely dependent on road transport, and if even goods trains could be run, the position would not be quite so bad. The Railway Maintenance Corps have begun work on the smaller lines out of Cork ... but in the immediate future, there seems very little hope that the people will be facilitated in this matter.¹³⁴⁰

¹³³² Commander-in-Chief to Major General Dalton, Cork, 20 September 1922, Mulcahy Papers, P/7B/66, UCDA.

¹³³³ Boyne, *Emmet Dalton*, p. 266.

¹³³⁴ Army Organisation Report September 1923, D/T S3361, NAI.

¹³³⁵ Army Organisation Report September 1923, D/T S3361, NAI.

¹³³⁶ Army Organisation Report September 1923, D/T S3361, NAI.

¹³³⁷ Hopkinson, *Green Against Green*, p. 199.

¹³³⁸ Russell to Chief of General staff, 25 October, 3 November 1922, Mulcahy Papers, P/7B/110, UCDA.

¹³³⁹ O Muirithile to Commander in Chief, 23 January 1923, Mulcahy Papers P/7B/67, UCDA.

¹³⁴⁰ O Muirithile to Commander-in-Chief, 23 January 1923, Mulcahy Papers P/7B/67, UCDA.

The National Army magazine, *An t-Óglách*, published articles on the Railway Protection Corps, stating that it performed “worthwhile jobs of bridge repairing and maintaining the railway service.”¹³⁴¹ The article described some of the protection work in more detail;

The tactics utilised by the Railway Protection, Repair and Maintenance Corps to protect the railway network was varied. The Corps established blockhouses at all important bridges, signal cabins and stations. Use was also made of improvised armoured trains, consisting of Lancia cars attached to the roofs of railway carriages; later in the war, swivel turrets were used [on the trains] to enable the machine-gunners to fire in all directions.¹³⁴²

The Railway Protection Corps grew exponentially both in size and capabilities. By 1st April 1923, the strength of the Railway Protection corps was 165 officers plus 3,789 other ranks.¹³⁴³ By this time it had become one of the most effective and important units in the army. An after action report by the National Army on operations in West Cork and South Kerry in April and May 1923 gave the following examples of efficiency:

Sunday 29th April 1923.

On this day the Railway Corps started operations from Headford Junction and proceeded along the line towards Kenmare... The line from Headford Junction to Kenmare was badly damaged and progress was very slow... At some points along the line the train with troops and supplies was moved along by lifting rails behind the train and placing them in front. The Railway Corps, however, succeeded in establishing all posts and reached Kenmare on Sunday night April 29th 1923.¹³⁴⁴

The report continued and gave a broader overview of the operations of that week and how important these operations were in gaining public support and trust:

For the past week our troops have swarmed all over the area, penetrated into the most remote places, trickled here, there, and everywhere, roads have been opened to motor traffic (some of which were closed since the War against the English), bridges down for years have been rebuilt. At first the people were interested spectators in all this week but by degrees they began to take a hand and could be seen towards the end of the week

¹³⁴¹ *An tOglach*, 2/4/23, p.3.

¹³⁴² *An tOglach*, 21/4/23.

¹³⁴³ National Army Weekly Report on Strength and Posts, 1 April 1923, D/T S3361, NAI.

¹³⁴⁴ National Army Report on Operations carried out in the West Cork, and South Kerry areas, 29th April – 5th May 1923, D/T S3361, NAI.

helping at the building of bridges and assisting our troops in every way... of course there are still sections of the people suspicious and irresponsible but the constructive work done under their eyes is helping more than anything else to overcome their fears and suspicions.¹³⁴⁵

This work undoubtedly played a major part in restoring Irish infrastructure and restoring the credibility of the Irish Free State Government within this region. The National Army reported; “the building of bridges and opening of railway lines is doing more than anything else to bring the people back to normal and to overcome their fears and suspicion.”¹³⁴⁶

The IRA had a vested interest in disorder, and it continually tried to undermine the government’s lack of practical authority in the country.¹³⁴⁷ But the participation of local people in the repair of essential infrastructure undermined the IRA efforts. The formation of the Railway Protection Corps ensured that the Free State Government could rebuild, repair and defeat the IRA’s campaign of destruction. Army Reports clearly reflect the success of their operations to repair key infrastructure and win over popular support:

Every important road in Cork and Kerry has been opened in a way which will allow the people to travel between villages and towns.¹³⁴⁸

The improved rail and line (telephonic and telegraphic) communications is perhaps one of the best indications of the changed situation... The Railway Protection and Maintenance Corps are engaged on the work of repair on the few closed sections.¹³⁴⁹

The Railway Protection Corps reopened numerous lines. It won much praise in the Dáil, where William Davin, a Labour TD, stated that the units had saved the country millions of pounds.¹³⁵⁰ It also saved the Irish population from undue hardships. The formation of the

¹³⁴⁵ National Army Report on Operations carried out in the West Cork, and South Kerry areas, 29th April – 5th May 1923, D/T S3361, NAI.

¹³⁴⁶ National Army Report on Operations carried out in the West Cork, and South Kerry areas, 29th April – 5th May 1923, D/T S3361, NAI.

¹³⁴⁷ Garvin, *The Birth of Irish Democracy*, pp. 101-6.

¹³⁴⁸ National Army Report on Operations carried out in the West Cork, and South Kerry areas, 29th April – 5th May 1923, D/T S3361, NAI.

¹³⁴⁹ National Army Report on the Military Situation 15th April 1923, D/T S3361, NAI.

¹³⁵⁰ Hopkinson, *Green Against Green*, p. 199.

Railway Protection Corps certainly repaired and protected the railway system in Ireland. It also helped save the Free State Governments authority among the Irish population.

7.9.2 The Salvage Protection Corps

The Railway Protection Corps was not the only specialist National Army unit involved in the restoration of essential services. The Salvage Protection Corps, was a precursor to the Army Engineer Corps. It overcame formidable difficulties and helped in the stabilisation of the Irish Free State, especially in the face of the onslaught of the IRA on its essential services.¹³⁵¹ The members of the Salvage Corps played a significant role in repairing the roads, rebuilding bridges and restoring the essential infrastructure required by the Irish population to live in a secure and economically viable environment.

Even in April 1923, as the civil war drew to an end, the Commander-in-Chief mentioned that in addition to protecting infrastructure, men in the National Army should be used for construction before being demobbed.¹³⁵² There was a lot of work to be done to repair and re-build the Irish Free State after many years of conflict. The Salvage Protection Corps prepared schemes for new work and vetted ones initiated by commands now subdivided into districts serviced by an engineer officer with technical staff and essential stores.¹³⁵³ Because of these new works, physical restoration went on apace after the civil war and the National Army was to the fore with the Works [Salvage] Corps doing good work repairing bridges and other infrastructural construction works.¹³⁵⁴

¹³⁵¹ Duggan, *A History of the Irish Army*, p. 107.

¹³⁵² *An tOglach*, 5/5/23, p.22.

¹³⁵³ *An tOglach*, 6/10/23, pp. 1, 3-6,8.

¹³⁵⁴ *An tOglach*, 7/4/23, p.3.

An example of this kind of work by the National Army can be seen in the restoration of Carrig Bridge/ Viaduct. Carrig Viaduct was located four miles from Mallow in North Cork. It was an important piece of railway and transport infrastructure in the area. On 30th August 1922, IRA forces destroyed the viaduct.¹³⁵⁵ Nearly one year later, on 21st August 1923, J.F. Crawley and Partners (Consulting Engineers to the Free State Government) reported to the Ministry of Defence, the reconstruction of this viaduct had been completed.¹³⁵⁶

Throughout this process, a military guard of one officer and eighteen men was placed on Carrig Viaduct to protect it and the engineer works that were ongoing to restore and repair it. This guard was continued long after the civil war ended.¹³⁵⁷ The protection and the continued restoration of this essential viaduct continued into the latter months of 1923 despite financial restraints. The 13th September 1923 meeting of the Cork County Council indicate the number of restraints when they state that:

A long discussion took place on the damaged and dangerous bridges which were many and widespread throughout the county... The Council had no money to do the work, the overdraft was £100,000, the Government were delaying the payment of grants and would not allow the Council to retain the motor tax collected in the county.¹³⁵⁸

However, financial support slowly started to flow into the Local Authorities for the required reconstruction. The 28th February 1924, Cork County Council: "...welcomed the notification of a grant of £100,000 from the Department of Local Government for the improvement of Trunk Roads."¹³⁵⁹ These extra finances along with the National Army support helped county official rebuild its essential infrastructure in the months and years after the withdrawal of IRA forces. The Carrig Viaduct was a symbolic part of this plan.

¹³⁵⁵ Railway position Report No. 115, Report from the Ministry of Economic Affairs To Chief of Staff, Commander in Chief, Director of Intelligence and Ministry of Agriculture, 30 August 1922, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/23, UCDA.

¹³⁵⁶ Protection: Carrig Viaduct, IE/MA/DOD/A/06078, MAI.

¹³⁵⁷ Protection: Carrig Viaduct, IE/MA/DOD/A/06078, MAI.

¹³⁵⁸ Minutes of the Cork County Council Meeting, dated 13th September, 1923, Edward J. Marnane, *The Cork County Council: The First Hundred Years*, Cork County Library, CCCA.

¹³⁵⁹ Minutes of the Cork County Council Meeting, dated 28th February, 1924, Edward J. Marnane, *The Cork County Council: The First Hundred Years*, Cork County Library, CCCA.

7.10 Improvements in Munster Infrastructure due to National Army Activities

An April 1923 National Army Report demonstrated that “...the activity in rail and line destruction has decreased. The main road routes in all Command Areas [are] trafficable, and in most commands, in good condition.”¹³⁶⁰ National Army Engineers had overcome many difficulties with “...any slight interruptions being remedied in a few hours.”¹³⁶¹ Lt Mullane, a National Army Officer based in Cork, outlined how the National Army supported the efforts to repair which sometimes included forced civilian labour. He states in a report that he “left Macroom with a party of 25 men. When I got to Carriganimma which was the objective, I commandeered about 20 [local] men and got them to repair the bridge which was broken.”¹³⁶² Troops from the National Army, 59th Infantry Battalion, based in the vicinity of Blarney, regularly conducted infrastructure protection patrols and “captured two prominent Irregulars... [who admitted to] blowing up bridges, robbing of mails and robbing of St. Ann’s Post Office.”¹³⁶³ By removing IRA saboteurs and activists from the battlefield, the Free State helped prevent the destruction of more essential infrastructure. The Weekly Command Situation Report from 15th March 1923, states that there were only “6 Attacks on Commercial Transport [and] 1 Bridge wrecked.”¹³⁶⁴ Further National Army Reports stated that every road in the Cork area was now open, and the rail services almost entirely restored. The Mallow-Fermoy line was the only route of any importance left to be opened. The reopening of the Drimoleague and Skibbereen branch of the Cork, Bandon, & South Coast Railway were also scheduled.¹³⁶⁵

The National Army understood the positive effect its works were having on the population, detailing how “...the restoration of train services has had a psychological effect on

¹³⁶⁰ National Army Report on the Military Situation 21st April 1923, D/T S3361, NAI.

¹³⁶¹ National Army Report on the Military Situation 31st March 1923, D/T S3361, NAI.

¹³⁶² Free State Operational Report to the Department of Military Statistics 23rd March 1923, IE/MA/CO/203, MAI.

¹³⁶³ Free State Daily Report (Cork Command) 23rd March 1923, IE/MA/Co/202, MAI.

¹³⁶⁴ Free State Weekly Report (Cork Command) 15th March 1923, IE/MA/Co/183, MAI.

¹³⁶⁵ National Army Report on the Military Situation 19th May 1923, D/T S3361, NAI.

all class and a quiet optimism is general. It has awakened business in country towns. Food supplies and civilian transport are adequate.”¹³⁶⁶ By May 1923, all roads in the Command Area were available for transportation apart from a portion of Southwest Cork.¹³⁶⁷ The same month, “...all rail services have been restored except the problematic Mallow – Waterford and Cork – Macroom lines.”¹³⁶⁸

The National Army was improving basic living conditions. When combined with the developing fighting prowess of the army, these elements helped to bring the Irish Civil War to a conclusion in May 1923. By 1924, National Army Intelligence Reports were signifying the importance still placed by the Free State in the restoration of essential infrastructure; “Government grants for road improvement are very welcome at the present time, and will help to some extent.”¹³⁶⁹

7.11 Chapter Summary

As the Free State Government protected and repaired the essential infrastructure of the country, especially in Munster and Cork, it slowly gained the upper hand in winning public support. The IRA’s destructive tactics ultimately proved futile. Their attempts to undermine the support for the government by attempting to destroy its architecture and essential services was a short term policy that only alienated the population and undermined their cause.

Repairing essential infrastructure and restoring the economy played key roles winning over popular support. In January 1923 Kevin O’Higgins stated that “the government is simply a committee with a mandate to make certain conditions prevail, to make life and property safe,

¹³⁶⁶ National Army Report on the Military Situation 7th April 1923, D/T S3361, NAI.

¹³⁶⁷ National Army Report on the Military Situation 5th May 1923, D/T S3361, NAI.

¹³⁶⁸ National Army Report on the Military Situation 5th May 1923, D/T S3361, NAI.

and to vindicate the legal rights of their fellow citizens.”¹³⁷⁰ The IRA policy of making government impossible, translated into ‘wholesale destruction’ during the civil war. It used up scarce resources and delayed development in the country. One of the reasons why the IRA undermined their own cause and lost the support of the Irish population and ultimately the civil war, was because of the infrastructure and essential services destruction they inflicted on the general population.¹³⁷¹

Ultimately, the IRA’s infrastructure campaign failed. The Free State Government understood the psychological effect its works were having on the population. By restoring and protecting essential services, it allowed trade to flow again, helped to restore normal life and improved living standards. Moreover, freedom of movement for both the military and civilians was enabled by the Free State Government and military entities, such as the Railway and Salvage Protection Corps. The restoration of key roads, railways, and communications helped restore the economy, increasing the majority of public opinion behind the Free State Government. This further marginalised the IRA and their attempts to undermine the national authorities.

¹³⁷⁰ O’Higgins memorandum, 11 January 1923, Mulcahy Papers, P7b/96, UCDA.

¹³⁷¹ Corcoran, *Freedom to Achieve Freedom*, p.233.

Chapter Eight – Supporting Governance and the Economy

“Simply eight young men in the City Hall, standing amidst the ruins of one administration, with the foundations of another not yet laid, and with wild men screaming through the keyholes.” ¹³⁷²

- Kevin O’Higgins, 31st October 1924

8.1 Introduction to Supporting Governance and the Economy

With poverty comes instability. Therefore, it is vitally important that governance, the economy, and the restoration of essential services are wholeheartedly supported by the operations of a counterinsurgent force in order to establish or re-establish stability. With improved governance, economic management and living conditions comes an enhanced standard of living, less corruption and improved popular support. Poor economic conditions lead to unemployment, disenfranchisement, discontent, and subversion. In a list of requirements to defeat an insurgency, counterinsurgent theorists Homer and Crane listed their first to-do item as “identify and redress the political, economic, military, and other issues fuelling the insurgency.”¹³⁷³ Military tasks executed to support governance and the financial sector are critical to sustainable economic and infrastructure development, and will help the government restore stability.¹³⁷⁴

¹³⁷² Address by Mr Kevin O’Higgins, Minister for Justice, Irish Free State, to the Irish Society at Oxford University, 31 October 1924, , *MacNeill papers*, LA1/F/305, p.7, UCDA.

¹³⁷³ Hosmer and Crane, *Counterinsurgency: A Symposium*, April 16-20 1962, p. iv.

¹³⁷⁴ US Army, FM 3-07, Stability Operations (October 2008).

8.2 Aim of Chapter

The aim of this chapter is to examine the manner in which the Free State Government pursued ‘Good Governance’ and the secure management of the economy. The Free State understood that a functioning government needs to be financially viable, uphold a common set of rules, and operate in a stable environment at both the national and local levels. This chapter will explain how Free State Government policies connected with and directly affected what was going on in the regions, especially in Munster and Cork. It will also discuss how governance was pushed down to the local level, and identify the steps the Free State Government took to alleviate the economy, preventing illicit financial activity and reducing unemployment in order to stabilise the new Irish State.

8.3 ‘Good Governance’

Governance, according to the US Army Doctrine, is the state’s ability to serve the citizens through the rules, processes, and behaviour by which interests are articulated, resources are managed, and power is exercised in a society. This includes the representative participatory decision-making processes typically guaranteed under inclusive and constitutional authority.¹³⁷⁵

‘Good Governance’, according to Hazelton, must provide political, economic, and social reforms that meet the needs of the population and gain its support; it must make sure that these reforms reduce the grievances fuelling the insurgency.¹³⁷⁶ Effective, legitimate

¹³⁷⁵ US Army, FM 3-07, Stability Operations (October 2008).

¹³⁷⁶ Hazelton, *Bullets Not Ballots, Success in Counterinsurgency Warfare*, p. 8.

governance ensures transparency and accountability while also involving public participation.¹³⁷⁷ In the Ireland of 1922, Minister Kevin O’Higgins, argued that “nothing could be more disastrous than the virtual isolation of the government. A responsible government meant one that had to answer to the people.”¹³⁷⁸ Good governance is about inclusivity and ‘Good Governance’ activities are amongst the most important of all in establishing lasting stability for a region or nation.¹³⁷⁹

Military support essentially sets the enabling conditions and provides the requisite security that empowers the national and local level governments to perform their elected duties. These duties include focusing on restoring public administration, the economy, the infrastructure and public services. They also foster long-term efforts to establish a functional, effective system of political governance.¹³⁸⁰ But military support, while so necessary at the start of a crisis, cannot take precedence over civil governance. Separation of powers is extremely important to create a functioning and stable state. In 1920s Ireland, the Free State Government and Army found itself in an initial power struggle over the independence of state institutions, and divisions between military and civil powers. The settling of this dispute in favour of the new state’s civil institutions was crucial to the democratic development of the Irish State. However, at the start of the Irish Civil War, Regan states that such an outcome was by no means certain.¹³⁸¹ The ability of the governing organisation to hold the people’s loyalty and secure the stability of the State is vital. The governing political party in the Irish Free State during this period believed that this loyalty depended upon its efficiency in giving reasonable satisfaction to the needs and hopes of its supporters.¹³⁸² But the governing must cater for more

¹³⁷⁷ US Army (2008), FM 3-07, Stability Operations.

¹³⁷⁸ J.M. Regan, *The Politics of Utopia: Party Organisation, Executive Autonomy and the New Administration, Ireland: The Politics of Independence, 1922-49*, (London, 2000), p.44.

¹³⁷⁹ US Army, FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency (April 2006).

¹³⁸⁰ US Army, FM 3-07, Stability Operations (October 2008).

¹³⁸¹ Regan, *The Politics of Utopia: Party Organisation, Executive Autonomy and the New Administration, Ireland: The Politics of Independence, 1922-49*, p.33.

¹³⁸² Cummann na nGaedheal Minute Book 10 Oct 1924, Fitzgerald Papers, P39/1/1, UCDA.

than just its political supporters; they must respond to the needs of the entire population, throughout the whole country.

8.4 The 'Munster Republic': A Dangerous Alternative

*The Government has made it fully clear that its desire is to secure obedience of proper authority. When an expression of such obedience comes from the Irregular leaders, I take it that there will no longer be any necessity for armed conflict. When the Irregulars – leaders and men - see fit to obey the wishes of the people, as expressed through their elected representatives... there will be no longer need for hostilities.*¹³⁸³

– Michael Collins, 4th August 1922.

With the signing of the Treaty, the majority of people from both communities and religious persuasions had hoped that the leadership of the Free State Government could be trusted to provide political and economic stability and protect the rights of property owners. Alternatively they feared that if the IRA were to gain the upper hand the country would be plunged into renewed war with little prospect of a functioning civil administration.¹³⁸⁴ Once the British Government apparatus started to dismantle in Ireland, it left an obvious and dangerous vacuum in civil governance and security. This governance vacuum or ungoverned space was initially filled at the local level by Irish Republican forces, especially in the west and south of the country where IRA men played a dominant role in their localities and helped fill the void left by the departing British.¹³⁸⁵

The President of the Executive Council of the Irish Free State, W.T. Cosgrave realised the need to react and fill these ungoverned spaces by governance operations when he stated:

¹³⁸³ Reply from Michael Collins sent to Michael O Cuill (People's Rights Association, Cork), dated 4th August 1922; cited by Eoin Neeson, *The Civil War in Ireland* (Dublin: Mercier Press 1966), p.147.

¹³⁸⁴ Mahon, *The Ballycotton Job*, p. 136.

¹³⁸⁵ Hopkinson, *Green Against Green*, p. 89.

It is my intention to implement this Treaty as sanctioned by vote of the Dáil and the electorate in so far as it was free to express an opinion; to enact the Constitution not yet framed; to assert the authority and supremacy of the parliament; to support and assist the National Army in asserting the people's rights; to ask parliament, if necessary, for such powers as may be deemed essential for the purpose of restoring order.¹³⁸⁶

Restoring public order is a key provision of effective governance operations, because it establishes the rule of law, and satisfies the needs of the entire country, regardless of political affiliation. Thompson advocated the same when he said that “the government must serve all the population and must always function in accordance with the law.”¹³⁸⁷

Thompson advocated the same when he said that “the government must serve all the population and must always function in accordance with the law.”¹³⁸⁸

In the spring and early summer months of 1922, within the southern province of Ireland, south of a defensive line which stretched from Limerick to Waterford, the IRA established the ‘Munster Republic’ with Cork City as its capital. This provided a direct and dangerous alternative to the Irish Free State Government which was predominantly based in Dublin.¹³⁸⁹ The IRA established a police force, tax collectors, censors and even postage stamps in Cork and the wider territories of Munster, however it “commanded little loyalty and less legitimacy.”¹³⁹⁰

This attempted breakaway by the IRA in Munster left the Free State Government with no alternative but to oppose this challenge of secession because, as identified by *The Irish Times*, “two opposing Governments cannot exist in the same country.”¹³⁹¹ Collins and his

¹³⁸⁶ Cosgrave, Statement of Policy at the Provisional Parliament on September 9, 1923, cited by; Neeson, *The Civil War in Ireland*, p.176.

¹³⁸⁷ Robert F. Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences from Malaya and Vietnam* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1972), pp. 50-60.

¹³⁸⁸ Robert F. Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences from Malaya and Vietnam* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1972), pp. 50-60.

¹³⁸⁹ Riccio, *Irish Coastal Landings 1922*, p.8 and Harrington, *The Munster Republic*.

¹³⁹⁰ Peter Hart, *The IRA and Its Enemies: Violence and Community in Cork, 1916-1923* (New York, Clarendon Press, 1999), p.113.

¹³⁹¹ *Irish Times*, 30 September 1922.

colleagues were set against the ‘Munster Republic’ because it could form a breakaway region within the new state.¹³⁹² Lord Midleton had previously warned about a Republican entity in the southern province when he told the British monarch, King George V that “...the hasty withdrawal of British troops, against which your Majesty’s Government were repeatedly warned, has left the South of Ireland without any force to preserve order and even if individuals were made amenable, there are no courts sitting effectively to deal with them.”¹³⁹³ Chaos and crisis thrive in a security vacuum, especially if the government is unable to fill the contested space and faces adversaries determined to do so. The Free State needed to fill the ungoverned spaces with “governance operations – those political and military activities undertaken by military forces to establish and institutionalize a desired political order during and following the combat phase of war.”¹³⁹⁴ The National Army, as one of the state’s first functioning organisations, was initially the only entity available to the government to respond to this challenge.

8.4.1 The Munster Republic as a Functioning Entity

When fighting the British, the independence movement had spawned a rebel counter-state to undermine the British civil administration throughout Ireland.¹³⁹⁵ In order to replicate this during the civil war, for a six week period at the start of the conflict, the anti-Treaty IRA tried to create something like a Republican Government apparatus in Cork. However, it was not a functioning economic entity and Townsend suggests that there was no intention on the part of

¹³⁹² Mulcahy’s notes on an interview with Cosgrave 25 June 1923, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/195, UCDA.

¹³⁹³ Lord Midleton to King George V; cited by Hopkinson, *Green Against Green*, p. 90.

¹³⁹⁴ Schadow, *War and the Art of Governance: Consolidating combat success into Political Victory*, pp. 273-277.

¹³⁹⁵ Regan, *The Politics of Utopia: Party Organisation, Executive Autonomy and the New Administration, Ireland: The Politics of Independence, 1922-49*, p.32.

the IRA to reconstruct the previous War of Independence Republican civil administration. For many, the ‘Munster Republic’ remained primarily symbolic.¹³⁹⁶ In reality, it was essentially a military government, with Liam Lynch as military governor.¹³⁹⁷

If the IRA had managed to establish an actual functioning shadow government in Cork, it would have undoubtedly increased its credibility and legitimacy. But this did not materialise and there was wide-spread criticism throughout the Republican movement of Liam Lynch’s reluctance to consider social and economic issues.¹³⁹⁸ Lynch was not a strategic politician, and he was increasingly preoccupied by the military sphere. In early September 1922 he confirmed as much when he spoke to his deputy commander, Liam Deasy:

I know of no alternative policy to the present one of fighting we could adopt. ... At present it is a waste of time to be thinking too much about policy; we should strike our hardest for some time, and this would make the question of policy easier to settle.¹³⁹⁹

Peader O’Donnell, an IRA Executive Member in 1922, sums up the failings of an Independent Republican entity when he states that the IRA “were a very pathetic executive, an absolutely bankrupt executive. All it did was oppose the Treaty. It had no policy of its own.”¹⁴⁰⁰ Without a coherent alternative to the governance of the Free State, the IRA were at a marked disadvantage. The economic outcomes of IRA efforts to fund the ‘Munster Republic’ will be examined later on in this chapter.

¹³⁹⁶ Townsend, *The Republic: The Fight for Irish Independence, 1918-1923*, p.420.

¹³⁹⁷ Ibid.

¹³⁹⁸ Hopkinson, *The Civil War: The Opening Phase; Atlas of the Irish Revolution*, p. 685.

¹³⁹⁹ Lynch to Deasy, 1 September 1922, O’Malley Papers P17a/17, UCDA.

¹⁴⁰⁰ Fintan O’Toole, ‘*A Portrait of Peader O’Donnell as an Old Soldier*’, *Magill*, February 1982, pp.25-31; cited by Ferriter, *Between Two Hells, The Irish Civil War*, p. 34.

8.5 Free State ‘Good Governance’ and Popular Support

*The people here want no compromise with the Irregulars [IRA] ... civil administration [is] urgent everywhere in the south. The people are splendid.*¹⁴⁰¹

– Michael Collins, diary entry (no date).

The people may be splendid but the population does not actively support any form of a government unless it is convinced that it has the means, ability, stamina, and will to win.¹⁴⁰²

The IRA’s failed attempts to form an alternative government was a case in point. Republican efforts in Munster did not gain public traction because the population lacked confidence in the IRA’s ability to win and to govern. The business entities and population of Cork were also very unsatisfied with the IRA attempts to collect unpaid taxes in order to fund their war effort.¹⁴⁰³ In contrast, by August 1922, the Free State Government began building up a new National Army, overseeing the work of establishing a new civil service, and developing government departments.¹⁴⁰⁴ Regan states that the Free State was propelled from being the administrator of revolutionary Sinn Féin’s proto-state to government ministers responsible for a well-equipped functioning modern state with a full range of departments.¹⁴⁰⁵ ‘Good Governance’ was evolving in Ireland and this typically means “economic growth, political representation, and efficient administration.”¹⁴⁰⁶ The Free State needed these entities to be fully functioning within its government apparatus. However for the Free State, the transition to ‘Good Governance’ was not all smooth. Early public frustration was expressed by Lord Midleton early on, stating that the Free State Government had only “have a vague war policy

¹⁴⁰¹ Michael Collins diary, preserved at the Military Museum, Collins Barracks, Cork.

¹⁴⁰² US Army, FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency (April 2006).

¹⁴⁰³ Cork Corporation Law and Finance Committee meeting minutes (Corporation Law and Finance), 25 August 1922, 27 September 1922, CP/C/CM/LF/A, CCCA.

¹⁴⁰⁴ Kissane, *The Politics of the Irish Civil War*, p. 152.

¹⁴⁰⁵ Regan, *The Politics of Utopia: Party Organisation, Executive Autonomy and the New Administration, Ireland: The Politics of Independence, 1922-49*, p.32.

¹⁴⁰⁶ Hazelton, *Bullets Not Ballots, Success in Counterinsurgency Warfare*, p. 8.

but absolutely no civil policy'; they would not concentrate on 'constructive projects' being too preoccupied with propaganda."¹⁴⁰⁷

Gavin Foster argues, that the new Irish Government leaders were functioning but it did have initial problems especially as they found themselves assuming control of a formal state apparatus for the first time in Irish history.¹⁴⁰⁸ They needed assistance and at the start of the civil war the majority of Government Departments relied on the National Army for support including "...the mainstay of other state departments, namely Local Government and Agriculture, but especially Home Affairs [Justice]."¹⁴⁰⁹ O'Higgins explained that military help was initially required in all these departments, because no Police Force was functioning and no system of justice was operating: "the wheels of administration hung idle, battered out of recognition by the clash of rival jurisdictions."¹⁴¹⁰

Kissane is more reflective of the initial Irish democratic aspirations and military involvement in governance. He questions whether "Irish society was still not quite ready for democracy." He also asks if the task of democratic state-building for the Free State in reality concealed authoritarian actions because it required in the first instance "the ruthless imposition of centralized authority."¹⁴¹¹ Townsend also contends that the Free State Government and the National Army was run by Collins who became, in effect, a kind of generalissimo, combining military and political supremacy.¹⁴¹² Townsends further states that Collins relied on his personal ascendancy, rather than what was needed for a fledgling democracy and that he might have done more before his death to equip the nascent Free State with what it needed most, a

¹⁴⁰⁷ The National Archives, Public Records Office, Memorandum of Midleton 28 July 1922; cited by Ferriter, *Between Two Hells, The Irish Civil War*, p. 37.

¹⁴⁰⁸ Foster, *The Irish Civil War and Society, Politics, Class, and Conflict*, p.173.

¹⁴⁰⁹ O'Caoimh *Richard Mulcahy From the Politics of War to the Politics of Peace, 1913-1924*, p. 154.

¹⁴¹⁰ Townsend, *The Republic, The Fight for Irish Independence, 1918-1923*, p.425.

¹⁴¹¹ Kissane, *The Politics of the Irish Civil War*, p. 152.

¹⁴¹² Townsend, *The Republic, The Fight for Irish Independence, 1918-1923*, p.423.

symbolic political objective to match and neutralise the invocation of the Republic as the symbol of independence.¹⁴¹³

Notwithstanding the debate on how authoritarian the initial Free State Government was under Collins, it became the National Army's responsibility to create the right conditions to spread government authority via state ministries throughout the entirety of the Free State. The initial actions by the National Army allowed the government to rebuild the Irish economy, re-establish law and order, and enable the civil administration to function.¹⁴¹⁴ To reinforce the authority of the Free State a meeting of the Irish Parliament (The Dáil) was convened on 5th September 1922.¹⁴¹⁵ This was a strategically important decision to affirm Free State governance and democracy. Mr. A. Belton, a leading Southern Unionist, told Lord Midleton in early October 1922 that "I really believe that the assembling of the Dáil and the progress already made with the constitution has done more to damage the Republican forces than any action taken by the Free State Army."¹⁴¹⁶

Liam de Roiste posits that by trying to create a viable political alternative based on a Republic, Liam Lynch needed to unite the people behind the IRA and against the Free State.¹⁴¹⁷ But as already stated, Lynch and the IRA had difficulties in this regard. National Army Reports questioned the IRA commitment to governance stating that the IRA were operating with "... lack of resources and unified control, and almost complete ineffectiveness from a military standpoint, [and as a result] their policy of militant action is slowly changing to one of sheer destructiveness and obstruction of the civil government."¹⁴¹⁸ Without governance and sound

¹⁴¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴¹⁴ Dáil Éireann Debates, cols 896 and 909, 17 January 1923.

¹⁴¹⁵ As already explained, Michael Collins was killed on 22nd August 1922 in an IRA ambush in Cork

¹⁴¹⁶ Belton to Middleton, 3 October 1922, PRO, Midleton Papers, 30/67/51; cited by Hopkinson, *Green Against Green*, p. 180.

¹⁴¹⁷ De Roiste Diaries, 17 November 1922 (Cork City and County Archives, U271/A/47).

¹⁴¹⁸ National Army Report, 21 January, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/124, UCDA.

economic principles, the ‘Munster Republic’ and the other IRA attempts at shadow governance and all they hoped to achieve were ultimately doomed to failure.

The vast majority of Free State Government officials worked to construct a viable new state. Governance became a primary function and duty, despite the dangers. According to Regan, in the initial phases of the civil war, government ministries still functioned despite pressing security concerns. Senior civil servants withdrew to protected administration centres in Dublin’s City Hall, Dublin Castle and government buildings in Merrion Street which with took on the appearance of ministerial bunkers.¹⁴¹⁹ But from this ‘Green Zone’¹⁴²⁰ of bunkers, the Free State authorities provided coherent leadership, especially when compared to the IRA. Later on, as Dublin became more secure amid a growing collaborative approach being adopted by the Free State Government. Executive Council Minutes from 11th January 1923 show that each minister of the Free State Cabinet, or Executive Council, submitted a memorandum of his own personal opinions. At a centralised strategic level these opinions were pooled and the minutes state that certain “lines of policy were provisionally agreed on by the various Departments within the Free State Government, to be further reviewed.”¹⁴²¹ The coordination of these submissions on the military, economic, and political developments throughout the country, demonstrated a more collective, inclusive and democratic approach on behalf of the Free State Government.

¹⁴¹⁹ Regan, *The Politics of Utopia: Party Organisation, Executive Autonomy and the New Administration, Ireland: The Politics of Independence*, 1922-49, p.38.

¹⁴²⁰ A Green Zone is a secure centralised environment in a conflict area that is protected in order to facilitate centralised governance and command & control.

¹⁴²¹ Executive Council Minutes, 11 January 1923, D/TSCH/1/2/1, C.1/28, NAI.

8.6 Local Governance

According to Corcoran, in 1922 the principal services delivered to the population by Irish local authorities were rudimentary, dated from the nineteenth century and included public roads, highways, streets, and footpaths.¹⁴²² Other services included relief of the poor, care of the sick and public housing of the working classes.¹⁴²³ As the Free State was finding its feet, advice to the Government came from all areas of Irish society. Father Peter Coffey, a Professor of Philosophy at Maynooth, advocated a practical scheme whereby the government could “...utilise the nation’s credit to raise money for public work schemes such as housing. The returns, interest-free, would then be reinvested in more public schemes.”¹⁴²⁴ W.T. Cosgrave, replied to Coffey stating that he “need not refer to the fact that your scheme would require some detailed criticism. If I might say so without offence, it is the scheme of an amateur.”¹⁴²⁵ Though discourteous to Coffey, Cosgrave was primarily guided by his civil servants. These were experienced in the British civil service and inherited from the previous administration.¹⁴²⁶

During the transition period, the Free State civil servants endorsed a policy “...to proceed on conservative well-established lines; for one thing we cannot afford to frighten English finance.”¹⁴²⁷ Thus the initial Free State economic and governance policy for was borne out of conservatism and a fear of upsetting British sensibilities rather than what was best for the population. However, Fanning argues that inheriting former British civil servants had many

¹⁴²² Corcoran, *Freedom to Achieve Freedom*, p.57.

¹⁴²³ Ibid.

¹⁴²⁴ Peter Coffey to W.T. Cosgrave, 25 October 1922, D/Fin 519, Department of Finance, NAI.

¹⁴²⁵ W.T. Cosgrave to Peter Coffey, 27 October 1922, D/Fin 519, Department of Finance, NAI

¹⁴²⁶ Martin Maguire, *The Civil Service, The State and the Irish Revolution, 1886-1938*, (Doctoral PhD Thesis, Trinity College Dublin, 2005), p. 215.

¹⁴²⁷ P Hyland to W.T. Cosgrave, 5 December 1922, D/Fin 519, Department of Finance, NAI.

advantages, because of their distance from the revolutionary state-building process they ensured stability and continuity.¹⁴²⁸

The Irish Free State inherited the old British civil service working in Ireland almost in its entirety. These were fully trained, professional, theoretically apolitical and by 1922, predominantly Irish-born.¹⁴²⁹ Ireland had inherited a complete apparatus of government, both central and local and over 21,000 civil servants, opted to transfer to the Irish Free State.¹⁴³⁰ This was a significant boost to the nascent Free State, guaranteeing trained administrators who were removed from the complex ideological strains and loyalties of a Sinn Féin movement at war with itself for supremacy in Southern Ireland.¹⁴³¹ However, the lack of Sinn Féin influence on these Irish born civil servants led to disgruntlement amongst sections of Irish society. According to government documentation there was a "...distinct uneasiness throughout the whole country because of the fear that vital Irish interests are in the hands of those men whose allegiance does not lie in Ireland."¹⁴³² Foster claims that anti-Treaty elements predictably pounced on this as damning evidence of the new regime's fundamental continuities with its colonial predecessor.¹⁴³³ Regan states that those within the Sinn Féin's shadow Dáil administration during the War of Independence who supported the Treaty were now also disenfranchised. For the most part they were immediately locked out of the new administration by the nearly direct transfer of all the civil servants from the British to the Irish administrations.¹⁴³⁴ Martin agrees that the stability and continuity associated with the transition

¹⁴²⁸ Ronan Fanning, *The Irish Department of Finance*, pp. 56-8; cited by Maguire: *The Civil Service and the Revolution in Ireland, 1912-38*, p. 215.

¹⁴²⁹ Ronan Fanning, 'Britain's Legacy; Government and Administration', in P.J. Drudy (ed.), *Ireland and Britain since 1922: Irish Studies* (Cambridge, 1986), p.51.

¹⁴³⁰ Sean Dooney, *The Irish Civil Service* (Dublin: Mount Salus Press (Institute of Public Administration), 1976), p.1.

¹⁴³¹ Regan, *The Politics of Utopia: Party Organisation, Executive Autonomy and the New Administration, Ireland: The Politics of Independence*, 1922-49, p.33.

¹⁴³² Minutes of Cumann na nGaedheal Standing Committee 10 October 1924, Fitzgerald Papers P39/1/1, UCDA.

¹⁴³³ Foster, *The Irish Civil War and Society, Politics, Class, and Conflict*, p.181.

¹⁴³⁴ Regan, *The Politics of Utopia: Party Organisation, Executive Autonomy and the New Administration, Ireland: The Politics of Independence*, 1922-49, p.33.

of the civil service was not completely smooth. He cites the example of how the Sinn Fein Dáil Department of “Local Government was one of the successes of the revolutionary administration and by the time of the Treaty it had effected radical changes in the local administration of the country.”¹⁴³⁵ However, tensions were heightened between the Sinn Fein and British Local Government administrators, especially as the IRA had burnt down the Customs House, which had previously housed the British Local Government offices.¹⁴³⁶

Despite these tensions and suspicions, the former British civil servants were professional administrators spread throughout the Free State. According to the Commission of Inquiry into the Civil Service, the inherited civil service helped to ensure that the same main tasks of administration and governance continued to be performed by the same staff with the same general organisation and procedure as before the war.¹⁴³⁷

8.7 Governance Takes Hold

Borgonovo states that within the period of the ‘Munster Republic’ control of the commercial centre that was Cork was important to the IRA.¹⁴³⁸ For the IRA, the basic necessity of funding their insurgency took precedence over establishing an alternative, functioning and viable government in the region. By the end of July 1922, prior to the National Army taking control, Cork was in a governance and economic hiatus. Within the city, construction projects were postponed for fear of destruction in the anticipated street fighting, and fuel supply shortages threatened to shut the Ford factory.¹⁴³⁹ There was a level of general dissatisfaction on the part

¹⁴³⁵ Maguire, *The Civil Service, The State and the Irish Revolution, 1886-1938*, p. 241.

¹⁴³⁶ Ibid.

¹⁴³⁷ *Final Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Civil Service 1932-35* (Dublin: Stationary Office, n.d.), par.8.

¹⁴³⁸ Borgonovo, *The Battle for Cork*, p.56.

¹⁴³⁹ Ibid.

of the populace towards the anti-Treaty regime in the city because of rising unemployment matched by rising taxes on the part of the occupiers.

According to de Roiste, the "...Irregulars [IRA] do not care. While they rob the revenues, they take no responsibilities for administration." Their main purpose was "to demonstrate that the Free State will not and cannot function."¹⁴⁴⁰ De Roiste further claims that the IRA had no interest in helping the general population as "...no feeling for the poor, for the weak, the indignant, moves them."¹⁴⁴¹ In comparison on entering Cork City in early August 1922, General Dalton quickly proclaimed that the intention of the National Army was to restore normal life as quickly as possible.¹⁴⁴² Dalton immediately set about facilitating Local Government and Borgonovo states that following his lead and intent, "the Cork Chamber of Commerce, Cork Employers' Federation and Cork Farmers' Union formed the Cork Commercial Committee as a provisional municipal government."¹⁴⁴³ On occasion, military leadership in Cork had to assume civilian positions of leadership in order fill any potential vacuums. Dalton, in effect, assumed the temporary role of de facto civil governor of Cork City.¹⁴⁴⁴ This demonstrated the realistic intentions of the new government, as Dalton was even authorised by the Minister for Home Affairs to issue passports to persons leaving Cork for the United States.¹⁴⁴⁵

But Dalton realised his role was temporary, and that he needed professional assistance to administer Cork efficiently. Even before the seizing of Cork City, Boyne states that Dalton requested that a representative from each government department be sent south to cope with the situation.¹⁴⁴⁶ This forward planning was revealed on 14th August 1922, when the chartered

¹⁴⁴⁰ De Roiste Diaries, 3 August 1922 (Cork City and County Archives, U271/A/45).

¹⁴⁴¹ De Roiste Diaries, 3 August 1922 (Cork City and County Archives, U271/A/45).

¹⁴⁴² Duggan *A History of the Irish Army*, p. 97.

¹⁴⁴³ Borgonovo, *The Battle for Cork*, p.125.

¹⁴⁴⁴ Boyne, *Emmet Dalton*, p. 205.

¹⁴⁴⁵ Notes for the Daily List of suggestions, GHQ Dublin, 26, September 1922, Mulcahy Papers P7/B/119, UCDA.

¹⁴⁴⁶ Boyne, *Emmet Dalton*, p. 205.

Free State ship *Alexandra*, originally used in the Union Hall (West Cork) landings, returned to Dublin and then steamed back to Cork with additional stores for the troops but also a number of government officials to assist with relief, reconstruction, and the development of a civil administration, as urgently requested by Dalton.¹⁴⁴⁷ A National Army Situation Report indicates who these government officials were on the ship as “a representative of each of the following Departments has been sent to take up duty at Cork: Home Affairs, Industry and Commerce, Local Government.”¹⁴⁴⁸ The representatives came from important departments prioritised by the Free State, demonstrating a commitment to providing vital services to the population of Cork and supporting the overall stability in the region.

Liam De Roiste wrote in his diary, “a small number of men can do such things... [But to] construct, govern, build up, with the dead weight of public opinion against them is an impossibility.”¹⁴⁴⁹ De Roiste posited that, because the Free State were successful in establishing law and order and governance in Cork, “some of the [IRA] leaders have a hope that the English may come back and that then the whole country would unite again against the English, as it was united in 1920.”¹⁴⁵⁰

From early on, the Free State leadership understood the significance of Cork as an important centre of governance, institutions and public services in the south. Cork had a powerful chamber of commerce, and it was easier for the established citizens in Cork and other cities of Munster to take over the reins of order and effect some sort of civil authority than it was in smaller and more volatile communities.¹⁴⁵¹ Cork had a tradition as an influential business concern and the traditional administrative capital of Munster. With Cork came a

¹⁴⁴⁷ CGS to Major General Dalton, Cork, 14 August 1922, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/70, UCDA.

¹⁴⁴⁸ Notes for the Daily List of suggestions, GHQ Dublin, 26, September 1922, Mulcahy Papers P7/B/119, UCDA.

¹⁴⁴⁹ De Roiste Diaries, 4 September 1922 (Cork City and County Archives, U271/A/46).

¹⁴⁵⁰ De Roiste Diaries, 4 September 1922 (Cork City and County Archives, U271/A/46).

¹⁴⁵¹ Neeson, *The Civil War in Ireland*, p.144.

commercial and military port, and a local authority centre of gravity from which to project Free State power into the remaining areas in the south of Ireland. As such the local governance and administration of Cork was a crucial turning point in Irish political development. It enabled the Free State Government to exert its authority over Irish society, undermining the ‘Munster Republic’, but it also determined the basis on which subsequent governments would lay a claim to popular legitimacy.¹⁴⁵² In post-civil war Ireland, as fighting ceased, normality was returning to Irish life and the expansion and reliance on Local Government can take enormous credit for this fact.

8.8 Supporting the Economy - National Economic Policy

*Along with placating the interests of supporters and the overall population, the Free State government recognised the need to manage the economy efficiently and secure the stability of the State.*¹⁴⁵³

-Cumnann na nGaedheal Minute Book, 10th Oct 1924.

The Free State Government faced many challenges especially as “the government was desperately short of money, [and] expenditure needed to be drastically reduced. At the start of the war, Collins and the Provisional Government had to quickly raise a large army to defend the state, establish a civil service and restore financial stability.”¹⁴⁵⁴

Foster states that by 1922, the boom years which followed the First World War – when Britain’s European war effort meant higher agricultural prices and wages in Ireland – had given way to a sharp post-war recession with high unemployment, wage cuts, and the return of mass emigration.¹⁴⁵⁵ To further compound this issue, the Free State Government had to survive in a

¹⁴⁵² Kissane, *The Politics of the Irish Civil War*, p. 152.

¹⁴⁵³ Cumnann na nGaedheal Minute Book 10 Oct 1924, Fitzgerald Papers, P39/1/1, UCDA.

¹⁴⁵⁴ Corcoran, *Freedom to Achieve Freedom*, p.47

¹⁴⁵⁵ Foster, *The Irish Civil War and Society, Politics, Class, and Conflict*, p.172.

new economic entity which excluded the industrial wealth of Ulster.¹⁴⁵⁶ Cronin further asserts that economically, Ireland needed to function in the British economic sphere. Outside of this, there was no viable alternative to the established, if unequal, Anglo-Irish economic relationship.¹⁴⁵⁷ As a result of this economic relationship, Ireland was completely reliant on Britain economically; 92% of Ireland's exports went to Britain, while 78% of imports came from Britain.¹⁴⁵⁸

The civil war was an enormous economic expense for a newly independent dominion to sustain, with 30% of all Irish national expenditure devoted to defence in 1923 and 1924.¹⁴⁵⁹ This was unsustainable and the war's effect on the economy imposed a major burden on the new government, and its economic ambitions. Lee argues that the Free State Government also needed to reassure sceptical British and Anglo-Irish observers from Ireland's main commercial markets, of the adult attitude of their infant government.¹⁴⁶⁰ This was particularly significant because the British Government was the main economic and military guarantor of the Free State.

8.8.1 Free State Government's Fiscal Policy

Cronin states that the Free State Government's financial policy was underpinned by an understanding of the need for active participation in economic life by the individual, local government, and a national assembly.¹⁴⁶¹ One of the first requirements was a banking system and a stock exchange. These were necessary in order to serve the interests of the Irish economy

¹⁴⁵⁶ Cronin, *Ireland: The Politics of Independence* 1922-49, p.144.

¹⁴⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, pp.144-145.

¹⁴⁵⁸ P. Cain and A.G. Hopkins, *British Imperialism: Crisis and Deconstruction 1914-1990* (London, 1993), p.81.

¹⁴⁵⁹ Hopkinson, *Green Against Green*, p. 273.

¹⁴⁶⁰ J.J. Lee, *Ireland 1912-85, Politics and Society* (Cambridge, 1989) p.217.

¹⁴⁶¹ Cronin, *Ireland: The Politics of Independence*, 1922-49, p.149.

and to sever links with British capital.¹⁴⁶² This was a very difficult proposition, especially with skewed loyalties amongst the banking elite and a lack of financial expertise at all levels within Irish society. Duggan suggests that the Free State Government wanted the Bank of Ireland to act as the government's financial agents and to initially accommodate £1m credit but the bank was initially slow to respond to a request.¹⁴⁶³ However, on 1st and 2nd May 1922, twenty-six banks were raided by the IRA. Bank losses were £156,392, and Duggan states that because of this and other factors, it finally dawned on the Bank of Ireland that the Free State Government was all that stood between the country and fiscal chaos. The bank loosened its purse strings accordingly.¹⁴⁶⁴

However the initial reticence amongst the banks operating in Ireland to support the new government continued, forcing the Free State to take corrective measures and put additional pressures on the Irish banking sector. Borgonovo gives examples of this reticence when he states that the "Munster & Leinster Bank were not able to produce balance sheets for its annual meeting. Supplies of silver also dried up in Ireland because of hoarding, and banks withdrew cashier cheques and currency from circulation."¹⁴⁶⁵ This economic obduracy on behalf of the banks stretched down into the provinces and under the heading 'Closing of Banks in Cork', the cabinet minutes from 7th July 1922 state that "it was arranged the acting Chairman should discuss this matter with the governor of the Bank of Ireland at an interview on the following day."¹⁴⁶⁶ The banks needed to stay operational, cash hoarding had to be prevented and 'a run' on the banks had to be avoided at all costs. Ultimately the Free State Government needed to be in economic control of the country both at the national and local levels in order to finance the war, and stabilise the economy.

¹⁴⁶² Cronin, *Ireland: The Politics of Independence, 1922-49*, p.149.

¹⁴⁶³ Duggan, *A History of the Irish Army*, p. 74.

¹⁴⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 87.

¹⁴⁶⁵ Borgonovo, *The Battle for Cork*, p.56.

¹⁴⁶⁶ Minutes of the Cabinet Meeting of the Provisional Government, 7th July 1922, D/TSCH/1/1/1, NAI.

The need to create a National Central Bank and a coherent banking sector was especially pressing as economic expansion needed to flow into the regions of ‘maximum opportunity’. These maximum opportunity regions needed to be tied in with maximum benefit and Cork was a prime candidate, strategically, geographically and economically. But maximum opportunity depends as much upon political considerations of security and economic growth as upon questions of profit. Cronin states that in any particular region, even if economic opportunity seems large, full absorption into the extending economy tends to be frustrated until stabilising power is exerted upon the state in question.¹⁴⁶⁷ This absorption was predicated by the provision of security and the stimulus of the economy by the government. The spread of security throughout the newly established Free State was the responsibility of the National Army. With security would come economic stability, growth, and improved well-being. But security and economic prosperity had to work in unison, by those providing governance and economic regeneration.

8.8.2 Initial Measures to Stimulate the Economy in Munster

From the start, Cosgrave labelled the struggle a war “...upon the economic life of the Irish people.”¹⁴⁶⁸ As a result of this struggle, it became obvious that Cork needed to be secured in order to spread the economic influences of the Free State. Other prominent Munster cities and towns of Waterford, Limerick, Tralee and Clonmel, which dominated the approaches to this provincial capital, needed to be also captured by National Army forces. These cities had ports and through these ports flowed the commerce of several counties. Roads penetrating the anti-Treaty positions also radiated from these ports and the livelihood of many people behind the

¹⁴⁶⁷ Cronin, *Ireland: The Politics of Independence, 1922-49*, pp.144-145.

¹⁴⁶⁸ Townsend, *The Republic, The Fight for Irish Independence, 1918-1923*, p.426.

anti-Treaty lines depended on these commercial centres and their transportation networks. Neeson points out that within these regions the pro-Treatyites built up troops, supplies and headquarter base depots for the final assaults on Cork and the 'Munster Republic'.¹⁴⁶⁹ The National Army war machine was expensive but with it came security and economic prosperity. Some of the Irish population who lived outside of the National Army security influence were envious of those living within this security bubble and the economic stability it brought.¹⁴⁷⁰ Hazelton states that civilians who feel safe in government controlled areas or who yearn for the goods and services that a government can provide will be supportive and often divulge useful information.¹⁴⁷¹ Subsequent National Army Reports from 1923, strengthen this argument proving that the economy had been weaponised by the Free State and the placing of government contracts in Cork "...had had an excellent effect."¹⁴⁷² But prior to the arrival of Dalton and the National Army, the Lord Mayor held a meeting of Cork Merchants deciding on immediate economic requirements and "a committee was set up to ensure food supplies."¹⁴⁷³

Munster and especially the county of Cork was one of the worst affected regions in Ireland economically, having been badly disrupted by the War of Independence. Hundreds of workers downed tools, shutting the Munster railway network in late January 1922. The stoppage continued for "three weeks, closing the port of Cork and crippling trade."¹⁴⁷⁴ The economy of Munster, already in recession, slipped into a depression because of these actions. Newspaper correspondents reported that business was at a standstill while others said "...enterprise is dead."¹⁴⁷⁵ Munster suffered greatly as a result of the previous conflict and at the start of the civil war, the port of Cork suffered losses of £1,700 a week in shipping revenue.

¹⁴⁶⁹ Neeson, *The Civil War in Ireland*, p.133.

¹⁴⁷⁰ Berman, Felter and Shapiro, *Small Wars, Big Data: The Information Revolution in Modern Conflict*, with Vestal McIntyre, pp. 16-17.

¹⁴⁷¹ Hazelton, *Bullets Not Ballots, Success in Counterinsurgency Warfare*, p. 11.

¹⁴⁷² National Army Report on the Military Situation 15th April 1923, D/T S3361, NAI.

¹⁴⁷³ De Roiste Diaries, 5 July 1922 (Cork City and County Archives, U271/A/45).

¹⁴⁷⁴ Borgonovo, *The Battle for Cork*, p.35.

¹⁴⁷⁵ *Irish Independent*, 2 August 1922; *The Irish Times*, 3 August 1922.

In mid-July, Borgonovo states that the “Lee Boot factory closed, while the *Cork Constitution* shut its doors rather than submit to IRA censorship.”¹⁴⁷⁶ Commerce, already depressed in civil war Cork, was further damaged as outside suppliers refused to send goods to Cork. In an attempt to keep economic life going, shopkeepers who tried to shut up shop were ordered by the IRA to carry on trading – even without stock. Townsend asserts that like most military governments, the Cork Republicans found that there were strict limits to their capacity to stimulate the economy.¹⁴⁷⁷

8.8.3 IRA Economic Priorities

The IRA in Cork was not so much interested in stimulating the economy but rather taking from it what they could. De Roiste’s diary entry from 4th July 1922 states that ‘the commandeering’ of supplies was prevalent in Cork City, adding that “of course many ‘stories’ are in circulation but I judge a great number of them to be without foundation, and numbers biased.”¹⁴⁷⁸ But the IRA were actively commandeering in Cork and elsewhere in Munster. In Tipperary an exasperated Irish doctor exclaimed that “as bad as the ‘Black and Tans’ were they never interfered with the cars of doctors.”¹⁴⁷⁹

In Cork City, the Lord Mayor, had to establish a committee to mitigate the losses caused by IRA commandeering.¹⁴⁸⁰ It got so bad in Cork that Frank Daly, an elected representative for the city went to Mallow, saw IRA Chief Liam Lynch, and got an assurance that, as far as

¹⁴⁷⁶ Borgonovo, *The Battle for Cork*, p.56.

¹⁴⁷⁷ Townsend, *The Republic: The Fight for Irish Independence, 1918-1923*, p.421.

¹⁴⁷⁸ De Roiste Diaries, 4 July 1922 (Cork City and County Archives, U271/A/45).

¹⁴⁷⁹ Letter from Dr W. Coogan to Brigade Adjutant, 2 IRA Division, 4th March 1922, Con Moloney Papers, P9/154, UCDA.

¹⁴⁸⁰ De Roiste Diaries, 5 July 1922 (Cork City and County Archives, U271/A/45).

possible, business would not be interfered with.¹⁴⁸¹ Whether it was Daly's communications with Lynch or else a general understanding that started to develop in the IRA meant that an 'official notice' appeared in the *Cork Examiner* in this regard:

O.C. Cork No. 1 Brigade [Leahy of Midleton is O.C. now] orders persons having motor vehicles to get permits. Also, it is announced that goods 'Commandeered' will be commandeered on orders signed by Sean Mac Swiney, the impressions being conveyed that they will be paid for, though this is not explicit.¹⁴⁸²

Whether these payments actually happened is not confirmed. Hopkinson claims that this IRA commandeering did not stop after the fighting for Cork City. It continued throughout the civil war and became a necessary means for the IRA forces to survive, but it also increased its unpopularity amongst the local population.¹⁴⁸³

In order to further finance their operations, the IRA also imposed taxes on the population and appropriated the customs and excise revenue that was still being generated in Cork harbour. It levied an 'income tax' on the city banks, factories and retail establishments. According to IRA calculations, city residents owed a "remarkable £1,250,000 in uncollected tax revenue, and the IRA believed that they could recover a third of that total to fund their activities."¹⁴⁸⁴ Supplies considered to be essential to the Republican war effort were also taken from local shops by way of requisition. The IRA more or less ignored the social fabric of Cork and the needs of the general population, in favour of their Republican cause. On the 18th July 1922, de Roiste's diary entry outlines that in Cork "the customs proceeds were being taken by the Irregulars [IRA]."¹⁴⁸⁵ The *Irish Independent* reported that within the pre-invasion 'Munster Republic' and Cork, the IRA were seeking additional taxation from the local economy, issuing to local business the following message:

¹⁴⁸¹ De Roiste Diaries, 5 July 1922 (Cork City and County Archives, U271/A/45).

¹⁴⁸² De Roiste Diaries, 6 July 1922 (Cork City and County Archives, U271/A/45).

¹⁴⁸³ Hopkinson, *Green Against Green*, p. 131.

¹⁴⁸⁴ Cork Corporation Law and Finance Committee meeting minutes (Corporation Law and Finance), 25 August 1922, 27 September 1922, CP/C/CM/LF/A, CCCA; cited by Borgonovo, *The Battle for Cork*.

¹⁴⁸⁵ De Roiste Diaries, 6 July 1922 (Cork City and County Archives, U271/A/45).

“Irish Republican Army Cork No. 1 Brigade: It appears that Income Tax amounting to £___ is payable by your firm for the financial year 1921-22.”¹⁴⁸⁶

This demand was placed on many businesses in Cork during the IRA occupation of the city, much to the annoyance of local traders and signifying that the IRA priority was not there to stimulate the economy but rather to fund their opposition to the Anglo-Irish Treaty.

The newspapers further reported that this demand by the IRA to local traders came as a bombshell, especially to the directors of the local breweries, distilleries, bacon-curing factories, and other large firms. As a result of these Republican demands, a joint meeting of opposition was held by the Cork Incorporated Chamber of Commerce and Shipping and the Cork Employers Federation Ltd.¹⁴⁸⁷ The majority of the clergy and merchant classes from Cork supported the Treaty, and opposed the IRA. Social class, standing and resentment were very prevalent, and the IRA’s lower social status was not appreciated by the elite of Cork City. Borgonovo states that this was personified in the IRA 1st Southern Division’s leadership triumvirate. Borgonovo states that “Liam Deasy was a [junior] clerk, Florrie O’Donoghue was a draper’s shop assistant and Liam Lynch a hardware shop assistant.” Some of the subsequent hostility towards the IRA in Cork can be attributed to class resentment from the ‘Merchant Princes’ of Cork City towards what they saw as “high-handed IRA Republican officers rising above their perceived station.”¹⁴⁸⁸

De Roiste observed that this resentment was heightened because “the Irregulars [IRA] in Cork have got over £50,000 of the customs revenue during the past fortnight and are making arrangements to capture other revenue proceeds, such as Income Tax.”¹⁴⁸⁹ Neeson states that

¹⁴⁸⁶ *Irish Independent*, 7 August 1922.

¹⁴⁸⁷ *Irish Independent*, 7 August 1922.

¹⁴⁸⁸ Borgonovo, *The Battle for Cork*, p.29.

¹⁴⁸⁹ De Roiste Diaries, 20 July 1922 (Cork City and County Archives, U271/A/45).

this alienation and economic resentment of the IRA was addressed at the aforementioned joint meeting of the city's economic elite.¹⁴⁹⁰ The Cork Corporation Law and Finance Committee was very unsatisfied with the IRA attempts to collect unpaid taxes in order to fund the IRA activities.¹⁴⁹¹ The business elites of Cork were not happy to be under the military and economic control of the IRA, especially as they considered them to be socialists and anti-commerce. The business classes of Cork watched uneasily as ITGWU¹⁴⁹² leaders urged workers to 'arise to action', promising "...all privileges of wealth and birth shall be abolished."¹⁴⁹³ This communist/socialist threat from some of the IRA was real, but Kevin O'Higgins had also employed 'Bolshevik Scare' tactics, insisting "red flag elements were taking advantage of the situation."¹⁴⁹⁴ The IRA leader Liam Mellows, who was captured in the Four Courts, was a socialist supporter. Before his execution, in his writings from prison on 29th August 1922, he advocated for a pretty full-blooded Socialist Republic in a document advocating the nationalization of the banks and industry. Townsend asserts that Mellows advocated for a Republic where all industry would be controlled by the state for the workers and farmers benefit.¹⁴⁹⁵ However, Mellows socialists' visions were never implemented by his colleagues.

The Merchants of Cork stood firm against the Republican Military Government by refusing to pay the IRA income tax, pledging that they would only pay this tax to the Free State Government. All the firms in Cork agreed that should any business be punished by the IRA, they would take the drastic steps of closing all industrial and trading operations and discharging all hands. Crucially, the vehicle manufacturer Ford based in Cork, with a wage bill of £10,000

¹⁴⁹⁰ Neeson, *The Civil War in Ireland*, p.145.

¹⁴⁹¹ Cork Corporation Law and Finance Committee meeting minutes (Corporation Law and Finance), 25 August 1922, 27 September 1922, CP/C/CM/LF/A, CCCA.

¹⁴⁹² Irish Transport Group Workers Union.

¹⁴⁹³ *The Cork Examiner*, 3 June 1922.

¹⁴⁹⁴ Conference on Ireland at Colonial Office, London, 26 May 1922, (Lloyd George Papers, 184/3/12 Parliamentary Archives Westminster); cited by Ferriter, *Between Two Hells, The Irish Civil War*, p. 39.

¹⁴⁹⁵ Townsend, *The Republic: The Fight for Irish Independence, 1918-1923*, p.439.

a week, supported this move.¹⁴⁹⁶ Cork City businesses who threw their weight behind this would later provide a strong foundation for Free State economic policies “as pro-Treaty supporters built up a powerful economic coalition in the city of Cork.”¹⁴⁹⁷ This coalition became a very potent opposition that undermined the authority of the IRA to govern in Cork. It also helped to damage the IRA reputation, supporting the assumption that IRA governance was poor for the economy.

With these crisis conditions, it did not take long for the banks in Cork to run short of ready money. These banks were also ordered by their head offices to close down as part of a Free State economic attack on the republican-controlled south.¹⁴⁹⁸ Commercial and economic life in Cork came to a halt to such an extent that for the pro-Treaty supporters refused to co-operate with IRA. When that was not possible, they co-operated to the minimum degree.¹⁴⁹⁹

Upon arrival in Cork, Dalton recognised the importance of supporting the economy. He interviewed all of the major manufacturers in Cork City and instructed them to get their factories working as quickly as possible.¹⁵⁰⁰ Commercial employers and traders and trade were also actively encouraged in Cork by the leadership of the National Army. This reflected the overall efforts to restore the financial and economic institutions in the entire Irish Free State.

8.9 Limiting IRA Illicit Financial Activities

At the start of the civil war, there was no police force operating in the Free State. The collection of rates and taxes was hampered by the disorderly conditions existing in most counties, and in

¹⁴⁹⁶ Neeson, *The Civil War in Ireland*, p.145.

¹⁴⁹⁷ Borgonovo, *The Battle for Cork*, p.29.

¹⁴⁹⁸ Neeson, *The Civil War in Ireland*, p.145.

¹⁴⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁵⁰⁰ Boyne, *Emmet Dalton*, p. 205.

many instances local IRA units financed themselves by commandeering supplies from shopkeepers and traders.¹⁵⁰¹ In Cork, income tax was collected by the IRA from as late as the first week of August 1922.¹⁵⁰² The Free State authorities tried to seize these funds and actively targeted the IRA economic machinery. On 23rd August 1922, *The London Times* described:

[F]rom the start, the IRA were at a disadvantage in the fiscal side of the civil war. The National government gained the upper hand when a temporary injunction of the Supreme Court of the United States was granted which restrained the Irregular IRA leaders from drawing upon funds collected in that country for the Republican cause. This struck directly at the most sensitive part of their organisation.¹⁵⁰³

In late August 1922, *The Irish Times* stated that with its main railway paralyzed and roads seriously damaged, Cork was suffering economically. *The Irish Times* concluded that were it not for its port facilities, the city would have been entirely isolated.¹⁵⁰⁴ Restoration of normality and economic stability to the lives of the people of Munster was a difficult proposition due to severe financial constraints. Dalton, received deputations from all representative bodies in Cork City, covering practically every branch of life. However, in a message to Collins on 12th August 1922, Dalton expressed frustration at having to spend so much time meeting dignitaries and dealing with civil and economic matters, believing it seriously interfered with his military duties.¹⁵⁰⁵ But Dalton may not have fully appreciated that by preventing commandeering, targeting illicit activities and the rebuilding of the economy, all proved to be the key factors in gaining popular support for the Free State Government and Army. These meetings helped to shape the way economic support would be supplied by the Free State Government to Cork. Dalton and his officers saw the local bank managers collectively and ordered them to re-open

¹⁵⁰¹ Kissane, *The Politics of the Irish Civil War*, p. 153.

¹⁵⁰² Provisional Government Decision 7th August 1922, D/T, S1590, NAI.

¹⁵⁰³ *The London Times*, 23 August 1922.

¹⁵⁰⁴ *Irish Times*, 23 August 1922.

¹⁵⁰⁵ Dalton to C-in-C, 12 August, Mulcahy Papers, P/7/B/20, UCDA.

their banks. Decisive actions like these combined with other economic support helped to end the economic blockade of the south.¹⁵⁰⁶

A transparent and legitimate banking sector is one of the key features in creating a sustainable economy. Corruption can hinder efforts to establish governance, restore rule of law or promote economic recovery and the initial response to this should include military forces creating mechanisms to curtail corruption across government institutions.¹⁵⁰⁷ Martin suggests that the IRA received a substantial amount of revenue through illicit activities which had been illegally collected by commandeering and through customs and excise duties. This was lodged in the National Land Bank of which Robert Barton was a director.¹⁵⁰⁸ Barton was a Sinn Féin politician and supporter of the anti-Treaty IRA. De Roiste wrote in his diary on 20th July 1922, that in order to secure these funds the IRA

...notified the bank that they were appointed Hon. Treasurers of the fund. Previous to this, Barry Egan was one of the Honorary Treasurers: now the two gentlemen named [the names of the two gentlemen are not obvious in the diary entry] have written to the Bank to say – his services have been dispensed with!¹⁵⁰⁹

According to de Roiste, the objective of this action was to utilize this money for the anti-Treaty supporters, and “for the Irregular Forces or their dependents.”¹⁵¹⁰ The IRA was trying to control the banking system in Cork, or at least parts of it. Initially the Banks tried to take matters into their own hands and de Roiste commented in his diaries that “the banks [in Cork] are cancelling their [IRA] notes...the Irregulars [IRA] are running short of cash because of this, notes not being available for exchange of large cheques.”¹⁵¹¹ De Roiste further suggested that

¹⁵⁰⁶ Neeson, *The Civil War in Ireland*, p.155.

¹⁵⁰⁷ US Army FM 3-24.2 Tactics in Counterinsurgency Stability Operations (April, 2009).

¹⁵⁰⁸ Micheal Martin, *Freedom to Choose, Cork Party Politics in Ireland 1918-1932* (Cork: The Collins Press, 2009), p. 77.

¹⁵⁰⁹ De Roiste Diaries, 20 July 1922 (Cork City and County Archives, U271/A/45).

¹⁵¹⁰ De Roiste Diaries, 20 July 1922 (Cork City and County Archives, U271/A/45).

¹⁵¹¹ De Roiste Diaries, 4 August 1922 (Cork City and County Archives, U271/A/45).

the prospect for banking in any sense for Cork City was “...as black as it can be, yet there is an attempt [because of IRA pressure] which is almost pathetic, to go on as usual.”¹⁵¹²

Collins joined Dalton, in Cork, in mid-August 1922 and the two of them actively engaged local employers and financial institutes in order to regenerate the Cork economy and limit illicit economic activity. Boyne contests that together they went to visit a number of local banks as part of the mission to recover funds, mainly excise duties that had been collected by the Republicans and salted away in bank accounts.¹⁵¹³ Some of the banks visited by Collins and Dalton were along the South Mall in Cork City and they did this in order to track down lodgements made by IRA Republicans during their occupation of Cork. This was as an early form of illicit banking practice or money laundering that was prevalent among Republican forces in the local banks. Overall, it is estimated that the IRA had collected £100,000 in customs revenue and through other illicit activities in July 1922, and hidden it in accounts held by sympathisers.¹⁵¹⁴ As already stated, de Roiste put a slightly lower figure of over £50,000 of IRA customs revenue and income tax taken by the IRA.¹⁵¹⁵

Having served as the Sinn Fein and Free State Finance Minister, Collins realised the significance of this money laundering and also of cooperating with the banking sector. In his notebook entry on 21st August 1922, he outlined possible meetings with members of the banking sector including a Mr Crosbie C.E. and Mr Pelly Hibernian [Bank]. Collins noted his intention to contact the banks to “ask for a brief statement in general position.”¹⁵¹⁶

Ryan, opinions that the purpose of the Cork bank visits was to allow Collins the opportunity to seize the IRA assets, having asked bank directors to identify suspicious

¹⁵¹² Ibid.

¹⁵¹³ Boyne, *Emmet Dalton*, p. 217.

¹⁵¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵¹⁵ De Roiste Diaries, 18 July 1922 (Cork City and County Archives, U271/A/45).

¹⁵¹⁶ Entry in Note Book of Michael Collins, dated 21 August 1922, Notebook located in Collins Army Barracks Museum, Cork.

accounts.¹⁵¹⁷ Although Cork banks were initially reluctant to supply the required information to Free State Government authorities, Dalton threatened to close the banks if they did not comply. Eventually he got the information he needed and recovered £90,000 of the money that had gone to the IRA.¹⁵¹⁸

The Free State Government set about enacting a policy where they would undermine and not recognise previous transactions conducted by commercial interests with the IRA. This was revealed in a notebook entry by Michael Collins on 21st August, when he stated that it was “...urgent and we must collect back rent even though it may have already been paid to the Irregulars [IRA].”¹⁵¹⁹ In this way, any business that conducted illicit or any form of trade with the IRA would be financially sanctioned.

Another notebook entry by Michael Collins on 21st August demonstrated the importance he placed on the economic part of the civil war. In the notebook entry Collins stated:

...the bank position here is slightly obscure. It will require a full investigation, there must be an examination of the customs and excise position – all moneys paid in and out must come under this. We shall require three first class independent men... unfortunately Brennan has gone to London.¹⁵²⁰

Brennan, as mentioned by Collins, was a Mr. Joseph Brennan, who according to Boyne was a senior civil servant with the Ministry of Finance. Mr. Brennan, who had previously served in Dublin Castle under British rule, was now working for the new Free State Government.¹⁵²¹ He was one of the main anti-corruption enforcers for the Free State and he was eventually dispatched to Cork. Utilising skilled accounting practitioners such as Brennan highlighted the

¹⁵¹⁷ Ryan, *The Day Michael Collins Was Shot*, pp. 55-57; cited by Borgonovo, *The Battle for Cork*, p.131.

¹⁵¹⁸ Dalton interview with Pádraigh O Raghallaigh, RTE radio, February – March 1977, as cited by Boyne, *Emmet Dalton*, p. 218.

¹⁵¹⁹ Entry in Note Book of Michael Collins, dated 21 August 1922, Notebook located in Collins Army Barracks Museum, Cork.

¹⁵²⁰ Entry in Note Book of Michael Collins, dated 21 August 1922, Notebook located in Collins Army Barracks Museum, Cork.

¹⁵²¹ Boyne, *Emmet Dalton*, p. 207.

importance which the government gave to countering the IRA's financial activities and as well as facilitating a functioning and transparent economy. He was authorised by Collins to travel to Cork to deal with the situation arising out of the 'expropriation' of funds from the banks by Republicans and the seizure of government revenue.¹⁵²²

8.9.1 Enhanced Economical Targeting of the IRA outside of Cork City.

By early September 1922, Liam Lynch, reported that the IRA were "very short of cash, as the [Free State] enemy issued orders to banks to refuse to release funds which they discovered were ours."¹⁵²³ These orders instructed the Banks in Cork not to pay over money to Republicans, and this was of great concern to Lynch because the IRA "needed the funds badly."¹⁵²⁴ By October 1922, the government was putting the squeeze on these Republican funds. In response Lynch wrote on 1st October 1922 to his colleague Ernie O'Malley. According to Micheal Martin, Lynch asked O'Malley to withdraw the money which the government had ordered the banks not to pay.¹⁵²⁵ Lynch tried other methods to get the IRA funds out of the banks hoping to avoid detection. He told O'Malley that he wanted him to meet Barton [the Director of the National Land Bank] in order to advance the money privately to the IRA, in the belief that it was "doubtful if the Provisional Government can prove the money was collected as [illegal] revenue."¹⁵²⁶

The Free State policies against republican funds were having an effect. The Free State authorities further restricted the workings of the IRA financial machine, rendering them close

¹⁵²² Ibid.

¹⁵²³ Hopkinson, *Green Against Green*, p. 131.

¹⁵²⁴ Liam Lynch to Ernie O'Malley, 4 October 1922 in Cormac O'Malley and Anne Dolan, 'No Surrender Here', *the Civil War Papers of Ernie O'Malley 1922-1924* (Dublin, Lilliput Press, 2008), p. 255.

¹⁵²⁵ Martin, *Freedom to Choose, Cork Party Politics in Ireland 1918-1932*, p. 77.

¹⁵²⁶ Lynch to O'Malley, 1 October 1922, Mulcahy Papers, P7 A/81, UCDA.

to bankruptcy. But the IRA grasp on power, both financial and otherwise continued even after being exiled to the rural parts of Munster. Letters captured by the National Army dated 25/26th October, 31st October and 1/2nd November demonstrated the resolve of the IRA to live off the livelihoods of other people and their businesses.¹⁵²⁷ The Free State needed to protect these businesses, these organisations and these people from economic and physical attack by the IRA. The squeezing of the illicit activities of the Republicans by the Free State Government would seriously affect the IRA's ability to finance their actions during the civil war. The protection of key business interests would foster stability and legitimacy. The policy of preventing IRA attacks on business properties, 'chasing the money', and limiting illicit activity turned out to be an undoubted success for the Free State Government and Army as it seriously affected the capabilities of the IRA war machine. Without proper funding, the IRA found it increasingly difficult to finance their insurgency against the Free State. Without proper finances the Free State forced the IRA to attack the population they hoped to represent, further isolating them from local communities and businesses.

8.10 The Creation of a Viable Workforce and Unemployment Reduction in Cork

Economic recovery begins with stimulus packages, government contracts and the reopening of factories and local industries. Regeneration of the economy happens when these are combined with an actively engaged labour force and implementation of employment programs. Such programs reinforce efforts to establish security and civil order by providing meaningful employment and compensation for the local populace.¹⁵²⁸ Unemployment was rife in Ireland

¹⁵²⁷ De Roiste Diaries, 9 November 1922 (Cork City and County Archives, U271/A/47).

¹⁵²⁸ US Army FM 3-07 Stability Operations (October, 2008).

during the period of the civil war and the figures for unemployment were stark. Minister O'Higgins remarked that in the spring of 1922, the economic life of the country was ebbing.¹⁵²⁹ He also relayed to the Dáil his concerns that there were 130,000 unemployed within the Irish Free State at a time when there was so little jurisdiction.¹⁵³⁰ Ferriter agrees with the estimated unemployment figure of 130,000 in the new state prior to the conflict.¹⁵³¹

As soon as 3rd March 1922, the Free State started to act against unemployment and money was made available for issue to county councils which had submitted approved schemes for the relief of unemployment. Cabinet Minutes reflect that Collins and Cosgrave agreed to make the necessary arrangements for payments to these councils.¹⁵³² On 8th March 1922, Cosgrave got the Cabinet to agree to transfer a sum of £275,000 to various county councils for the relief of unemployment.¹⁵³³ This was well timed because on 13th March 1922, up to 50,000 people attended a huge gathering in Cork to protest about economic hardships and lack of employment.¹⁵³⁴ Michael Collins, realising the dangers and inflammatory nature of such gatherings, promised jobs for the city and reconstruction funds, stating loudly that “there is no mistaking the attitude of Cork City” before granting the extra funding of “£250,000 in government reconstruction aid to the city and another £112,000 for housing assistance.”¹⁵³⁵

After the visit of Collins, the IRA consolidated their occupation of Cork. In reply the National Army implemented an economic blockade of the south and this had profoundly serious impacts on unemployment in the region. Unemployment, already disproportionately high before the civil war began, rose rapidly in Munster as workers and office staffs were

¹⁵²⁹ K. O'Higgins typescript copy of an article or letter to a US newspaper 1922-23, Mulcahy Papers, P35 C/160, UCDA.

¹⁵³⁰ Hopkinson, *Green Against Green*, p. 89.

¹⁵³¹ Ferriter, *Between Two Hells, The Irish Civil War*, p. 31.

¹⁵³² Provisional Government Cabinet Minutes, 3 March 1922, D/TSCH, G1/1, NAI.

¹⁵³³ Provisional Government Cabinet Minutes, 8 March 1922, D/TSCH, G1/1, NAI.

¹⁵³⁴ Cork Corporation meeting minutes, 25 February, 4,10,24 March, 7 April 1922, CP/CO/M14, CCCA, cited by Borgonovo, *The Battle for Cork*, p.32.

¹⁵³⁵ Ibid.

dismissed from their employment with production and distribution coming to a standstill.¹⁵³⁶

The situation in Cork particularly deteriorated as the blockade took effect. De Roiste wrote that “unemployment and distress are increasing rapidly in the city. Some of the cases are pitiable.”¹⁵³⁷ De Roiste estimated the numbers of unemployed in Cork from his own contacts and sources:

There are 12,000 registered at the Unemployment Bureaux; and ... 4/5,000 more not receiving unemployment benefits now; and estimating two dependents as an average for each unemployed persons, it may be estimated that there are some 50,000 persons on the starvation line in Cork City and County.¹⁵³⁸

The *Irish Independent* supported this estimation adding that “people live from hand to mouth, from day to day ... not knowing what the morrow may bring.”¹⁵³⁹ De Roiste further posited that there was an, “...absolute want in respectable homes, and paralysis of business is growing gradually, as the unrest prevails and communications are interrupted.”¹⁵⁴⁰ *The Irish Times* put the unemployment figure in Cork at a lower level than De Roiste, stating unemployed and disgruntled young men became plentiful in Cork as unemployment was approaching 8,000– this constituted over 30 percent of the male working population in the county.¹⁵⁴¹ Whatever the correct figure was for unemployment in Cork in the summer months of 1922, it was high and it was a potential boiling pot that could have been exploited by the IRA if not handled correctly.

Economic uncertainty in Cork resulted in destabilising labour agitation throughout the first half of 1922. But the IRA missed an opportunity to use this instability and dissatisfaction to their advantage. They could have motivated and mobilised a popular movement supporting

¹⁵³⁶ Neeson, *The Civil War in Ireland*, p.144.

¹⁵³⁷ De Roiste Diaries, 4 August 1922 (Cork City and County Archives, U271/A/45).

¹⁵³⁸ De Roiste Diaries, 13 July 1922 (Cork City and County Archives, U271/A/45).

¹⁵³⁹ *Irish Independent*, 2 August 1922.

¹⁵⁴⁰ De Roiste Diaries, 4 August 1922 (Cork City and County Archives, U271/A/45).

¹⁵⁴¹ *The Irish Times*, 26 July 1922; *Irish Independent*, 27 July 1922; *The Cork Examiner*, 27 July 1922.

the IRA against the Free State Government, particularly amid a debilitating post-war recession. Moreover, as Borgonovo states the “attempts by employers to further reduce wages were creating industrial strife.”¹⁵⁴²

But during the Free State blockade of Cork and the ongoing and growing poverty in the city, the anti-Treaty IRA forces did not appear to be interested in utilising or solving the unemployment crisis in the city and county. Instead of cooperating with local industries to solve this crisis and stimulate the economy, the IRA did the opposite. They stifled the economy and because of this they faced defiance, especially at the Ford tractor factory in Cork, the city’s largest employer. IRA engineers attempted to commandeer pig iron for the war effort and for the construction of mines and grenades. The American factory manager, Edward Grace, told the Republicans that if they seized anything, he would shut the factory and throw 2,000 staff out of work.¹⁵⁴³ The IRA desisted.

8.10.1 Initial Attempts by Free State to Alleviate Unemployment in Cork

By August 1922, when in control the National Army quickly set about trying to alleviate the unemployment crisis in Cork. Dalton realised that the economic situation needed immediate attention and stated that unemployment was one of the greatest difficulties for Cork City and County.¹⁵⁴⁴ The *Cork Examiner* from August 1922 outlined, as follows, the initial steps taken by the National Army to help alleviate the situation, demonstrating the army’s policy and the conditions in the city during this period:

TO THE MERCHANTS, EMPLOYERS AND CITIZENS OF CORK:

¹⁵⁴² Borgonovo, *The Battle for Cork*, p.34.

¹⁵⁴³ Ibid., p.52.

¹⁵⁴⁴ Boyne, *Emmet Dalton*, p. 205.

All those who have been appealed to for financial or other aid to help the starving people, will please notify the Secretary at once at Connolly Hall.¹⁵⁴⁵

The following day the *Examiner* noted that a largely attended meeting of the unemployed thousands of Cork was held on the Grand Parade on Sunday to take practical steps to deal with the appalling distress in the city and district, created by enforced unemployment and the starvation of thousands in our midst, and to devise the ways and means by which the greatest industrial danger that has ever threatened the country may be promptly averted.¹⁵⁴⁶

The initial stimulus work and the placing of government contracts by Dalton and his troops did a lot to alleviate the unemployment situation. This was recognised by the *Cork Examiner* when it reported on the 16th August 1922 that it was “...most gratifying to be in a position to state that, notwithstanding the gloomy outlook for the country generally, the conditions locally are receiving immediate attention.”¹⁵⁴⁷ On 17th August 1922 the *Cork Examiner* reported that a conference was held in Cork between members of the Cork Reconstruction Committee and representatives of the Free State Government with a view to taking steps to secure the relief of unemployment in the city.¹⁵⁴⁸ As reported by a National Army intelligence officer, the key to the ongoing violent situation in Cork was work, and to get people working. He further elaborated that “...a man, on seeing some lorries with armed men pass by, said to his companion; “if they were hungry as we are, they would not have much stomach for fight.”¹⁵⁴⁹

¹⁵⁴⁵ *Cork Examiner*, 14 August 1922.

¹⁵⁴⁶ *Cork Examiner*, 15 August 1922.

¹⁵⁴⁷ *Cork Examiner*, 16 August 1922.

¹⁵⁴⁸ *Cork Examiner*, 17 August 1922.

¹⁵⁴⁹ *O’Connell Report*, Mulcahy papers, UCDA.

8.10.2 Cork Unemployment Relief Scheme

The policy of the Free State Government to decrease unemployment started very early and it became more effective as time went on. On 28th August 1922, the *Cork Examiner* reported that “the scheme for the relief of unemployment... took a practical turn yesterday, when about 80 men were employed restoring the surface of the North Main Street.”¹⁵⁵⁰ Further efforts were also taken by the Free State to help relieve the unemployment and economic crisis in Cork with the following declaration by the Cork Unemployed Central Committee, to the citizens of Cork:

As unemployment benefits have been stopped for some time past owing to unsettled conditions, the above committee are in a position to announce that these benefits will be almost immediately restored; that Fords and other works and industries will be encouraged by the army authorities; that all classes of pensions will be paid as usual, as soon as the essential communications can be restored. In the way of a temporary relief to meet the present distress £200 will be immediately handed to the St. Vincent de Paul Society to relieve very acute cases, pending representations being made for relief on a large scale, in view of conditions in Cork.¹⁵⁵¹

In September 1922, the *Cork Examiner* stated that the civil war in Ireland and the strategy conducted by the IRA were not good for employment and economic welfare. The paper reported every day the IRA was adding to the army of unemployed. Trade was being held up, railway traffic dislocated, the highways made impassable for vehicles, telegraphs cut, and other means adopted to ruin the country’s trade upon which the employment of the people depended.¹⁵⁵² *The Irish Times* noted that the Cork Workers’ Council stated that the high unemployment in the city was directly related to the activities of armed men. On 5th October 1922, the government announced an amnesty for all those who handed in their weapons by 15th October 1922.¹⁵⁵³ By offering an alternative and by motivating those that practiced violence to

¹⁵⁵⁰ *Cork Examiner*, 28 August 1922.

¹⁵⁵¹ Declaration by Cork Unemployed Central Committee; to the Citizens of Cork, dated 12 August 1922; cited by Neeson, *The Civil War in Ireland*, pp.154-155.

¹⁵⁵² *Cork Examiner*, 9 September 1922.

¹⁵⁵³ *Irish Times*, 6 October 1922.

desist in their actions, the Free State Government hoped to set the right conditions to improve security, stimulate the economy, and decrease unemployment.

8.10.3 National Army Reports on the Unemployment Situation in Cork

As the Free State Government economic and employment policies started to take effect an outline of the improvements in the economic situation and unemployment figures in Cork can be seen in a number of National Army Reports from 1923. Prior to the early months of 1923, the National Army were not as proficient in report writing, but reporting had improved, as had the professionalism, comprehensive nature and administration of the force, by the start of 1923. In April 1923, National Army Reports stated that in Cork City the number of unemployed had been reduced by another hundred and stood at 4,687. The report also pointed out that the figure compared well with any period even before 1914.¹⁵⁵⁴ Remembering that before the civil war started, unemployment and disgruntled young men were plentiful in Cork with an unemployment figure of between 8,000 to 12,000, the newspapers from the period recorded that the Free State Government had made remarkable progress in the intervening period.¹⁵⁵⁵

As 1923 progressed, the reports stated that unemployment returns for Cork were falling and by mid-April 1923, 4,587 were unemployed in Cork, showing a further reduction. The report credits the placing of government contracts in the city stating that they "...had had an excellent effect."¹⁵⁵⁶ Conditions improved and by the end of April the unemployment figures for Cork City and surrounding districts were down to 4,426 (of which only 2,864 are men).

¹⁵⁵⁴ National Army Report on the Military Situation 7th April 1923, D/T S3361, NAI.

¹⁵⁵⁵ *The Irish Times*, 26 July 1922; *Irish Independent*, 27 July 1922; *The Cork Examiner*, 27 July 1922.

¹⁵⁵⁶ National Army Report on the Military Situation 15th April 1923, D/T S3361, NAI.

This was taken to indicate that “the industry is in a fairly good condition... [such that] the restoration of ordinary conditions will restore employment to normal.”¹⁵⁵⁷

As the civil war entered into May 1923, the weekly army reports showed more improvements and stated that “unemployment figures are still dropping – for Cork City and district they now stand at 4,348... This is excellent.”¹⁵⁵⁸ However, it was not all good news and by the end of the civil war the amount of unemployment in the county was still acute, and the problem this presented was being accentuated by the demobilisation of soldiers and the release of prisoners.¹⁵⁵⁹ This proposed demobilisation necessitated action and by mid-May 1923, at the end of the civil war, army reports stated that “It is desirable that every effort be made during the coming months to promote reconstruction works and set up and encourage industries.”¹⁵⁶⁰ Reconstruction works and government schemes to help encourage industry, restore essential services and deal with the unemployment situation in Cork started to take effect, especially after the war. On 21st August 1923 advertisements were placed in the *Cork Examiner* by the government claiming the Free State had paid unemployment benefit to a weekly average of 30,000 workers since October 1922 in Cork and 12,000 workers had been placed in employment and eighty industrial disputes settled.¹⁵⁶¹ These figures may have been exaggerated or calculated differently compared to the National Army Reports but Foster offered a clarification on this when he referenced 30,000 unemployed workers in the south of Ireland (not just Cork) by the close of the civil war.¹⁵⁶²

But for the Free State the mainstay was the economic situation in Cork and this became more important and focused upon in the National Army Reports filed after the conflict ended.

¹⁵⁵⁷ National Army Report on the Military Situation 21st April 1923, D/T S3361, NAI.

¹⁵⁵⁸ National Army Report on the Military Situation 5th May 1923, D/T S3361, NAI.

¹⁵⁵⁹ National Army Report on the Military Situation 19th May 1923, D/T S3361, NAI.

¹⁵⁶⁰ National Army Report on the Military Situation 19th May 1923, D/T S3361, NAI.

¹⁵⁶¹ *Cork Examiner* 21 August 1923; cited by Martin, *Freedom to Choose, Cork Party Politics in Ireland 1918-1932*, p. 94.

¹⁵⁶² ‘Problems of Peace’, Free State, 25 June 1923; cited by Foster, *The Irish Civil War and Society, Politics, Class, and Conflict*, p.174.

In November 1923 the Free State fortnightly review from Command HQ in Cork stated that “...the success of the National Loan had a very salutary and steadying effect on the opinions of the civil population, and was responsible for an increase in confidence in the Government and its administration.”¹⁵⁶³ A National Army Intelligence Report from Cork in February 1924 looked to the future when it stated that “economic conditions are improving” and “with the coming of spring and a settled country a great boost in commercial and agricultural life is looked forward to.”¹⁵⁶⁴ This report goes on to further explain how “fairs and markets are presently being conducted in the old style... business in small towns is improving and when the Government schemes for employment are put into effect a general ‘buck-up’ in all business is confidently anticipated.”¹⁵⁶⁵

Of course, emigration was still an economic way of life in Free State Ireland and the March 1924 intelligence report stated that “hundreds of able-bodied young men are anxiously awaiting the summer months in order to cross to America for work... [but] the quota at the moment is filled.”¹⁵⁶⁶ The Irish economic necessity that was emigration helped reduce unemployment figures but it also inadvertently kept up the tradition of keeping the dreams of a Republic alive on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean.

¹⁵⁶³ National Army Fortnightly Review No.1 (Cork Command) 16th November 1923, IE/MA/S/12360, NAI.

¹⁵⁶⁴ National Army Intelligence Report (Cork Command) 2nd February 1924, IE/MA/S/12360, NAI.

¹⁵⁶⁵ National Army Intelligence Report (Cork Command) 2nd February 1924, IE/MA/S/12360, NAI.

¹⁵⁶⁶ National Army Intelligence Report (Cork Command) 2nd March 1924, IE/MA/S/12360, NAI.

8.11 Chapter Summary

*The government is simply a Committee with a mandate to make certain conditions prevail, to make life and property safe, and to vindicate the legal rights of their fellow citizens.*¹⁵⁶⁷

-Kevin O'Higgins, 11th January 1923

Capacity building is a vital cog in a successful counterinsurgency campaign. It rebuilds the economic capabilities of a country. It re-establishes governance both at the local and national levels, and it rebuilds the confidence of the population in the government attempting to bring stability to a region. This stability is enhanced by programs and policies to improve the economy, prevent illicit activity and reduce unemployment. In comparison to the strenuous efforts by the Free State Government to bring about governance, stability and order, the IRA side provided no viable alternative during the civil war, except for the hollow aspirations of a 'Munster Republic'. This IRA alternative was ultimately undermined by a lack of functioning administration and by their inability to break the coherent strategy by the Free State.

During and after the civil war the government's focus was on consolidating power, reconstruction, and stability. Corcoran states that the executive was fiscally conservative, knowing it would have to pay its way without outside help.¹⁵⁶⁸ 'Good Governance' at all levels reinforces capacity building and after the signing of the Treaty, the Free State authorities were very fortunate to inherit an active and professional civil service as well as a population eager for peace and the economic benefits of peace. It is commendable that the Free State had attempted to remove patronage and policies were put in place to ensure that new employees into the civil service were hired independently, correctly and transparently. These policies according to Regan were additionally strengthened by the establishment of the Civil Service

¹⁵⁶⁷ O'Higgins memorandum, 11 January 1923, Mulcahy Papers, P7b/96, UCDA.

¹⁵⁶⁸ Corcoran, *Freedom to Achieve Freedom*, p.53.

Commission, ensuring that recruitment to the Free State's bureaucracy would be on merit rather than patronage.¹⁵⁶⁹

The defeat of the IRA was necessary if the pro-Treaty government was to govern, and through a mixture of force and cajolement the Free State elite managed to reconcile them to democratic government afterwards.¹⁵⁷⁰ Garvin further contends that the existence of an authoritative state is usually regarded as a precondition for the development of a democracy, 1922 could actually be regarded as 'the birth of Irish democracy'.¹⁵⁷¹ Kissane agrees, asserting that after the war, the establishment of a viable party system, the consolidation of democracy more generally, and the elite's ability to project an Irish identity in international affairs can all be interpreted as the fruits of an uncommonly able revolutionary elite.¹⁵⁷² At the local level and to get a sense of how deeply engrained the philosophy of local governance was, we need only look to what took place immediately after the war and this was evidenced by the fact that of the 27 resolutions sent by constituency committees to the 1924 annual conference, 25 were concerned with issues such as drainage, the provision of cheap railway transport, the provision by a government agency of business credit loans to entrepreneurs and the extension of urban district boundaries.¹⁵⁷³ After many years of conflict, the mundane was taking priority and this was a sure sign of democracy and governance taking priority.

Money and the economy are at the heart of war. To defeat an opponent, especially in a counterinsurgency campaign, you must attack him in all spheres, including economically. The Free State successfully isolated the IRA financially by preventing outside support and by nullifying their illicit economic activity. The Free State also prevented the IRA from

¹⁵⁶⁹ Regan, *The Politics of Utopia: Party Organisation, Executive Autonomy and the New Administration, Ireland: The Politics of Independence, 1922-49*, p.50.

¹⁵⁷⁰ Girvin, *From Union to Union; Nationalism, Democracy and Religion in Ireland- Act of Union to EU*, p. 63.

¹⁵⁷¹ Garvin, 1922: *The Birth of Irish Democracy*; cited by Kissane, *The Politics of the Irish Civil War*, p. 96.

¹⁵⁷² Kissane, *The Politics of the Irish Civil War*, p. 64.

¹⁵⁷³ Resolutions for the Annual Conference of Cumann na nGaedheal 24 Feb. 1924, Mulcahy Papers P7b/59, UCDA.

capitalising on the appeal of communism and the discontent caused by unemployment. They achieved this by immediately putting in place measures to alleviate the IRA's illicit and money laundering activities. They also did this by implementing measures to tackle unemployment in the short and long term.

With 'Good Governance' and a well-supported economy comes the conditions to support a successful counterinsurgency campaign. The combined governance and economic activities of the Free State Government and Army in the south of Ireland certainly damaged the effectiveness and credibility of the IRA, undermining their hollow aspirations of creating a viable alternative government. Their attempts to finance an alternative Republican Government through illicit activities also undermined their legitimacy to govern. The growing numbers of unemployed workers combined with the IRA indifference to the economy ultimately forfeited their right to govern, significantly undermining their credibility to manage an effective economy in the opinions and perceptions of the local populations. Even by 1924, stability was a major concern for the Free State Government, with responsible ministers taking account of the political effect produced and of the possible consequences on the stability of the state.¹⁵⁷⁴

However the Free State Government made a priority of selflessly creating strong state institutions at the expense of any political considerations.¹⁵⁷⁵ They wrongly believed that the continuation and maintenance of peace, stability, 'Good Governance' and a balanced budget would be enough and continue to be sufficient to retain majority electoral support.¹⁵⁷⁶ This demonstrated a lack of political savvy on their behalf, especially their inner beliefs that the government must continue a policy of austerity for long after the civil war ended. This alienated a considerable body of public opinion. In the long term this aided de Valera's prospects of

¹⁵⁷⁴ Seamus Dolan, Secretary of Cumann na nGaedhal, to Ernst Blythe, 17 September 1924, Blythe Papers, UCDA; cited by Martin, *Freedom to Choose, Cork Party Politics in Ireland 1918-1932*, p. 118.

¹⁵⁷⁵ Regan, *The Politics of Utopia: Party Organisation, Executive Autonomy and the New Administration, Ireland: The Politics of Independence, 1922-49*, p.35.

¹⁵⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p.47.

returning to political power in the 1932 elections, less than ten years after losing the civil war.¹⁵⁷⁷ It was the political naivety of the Free State Government, rather than its positive achievements in its basic task of subduing the IRA Republican military challenge to the new state's existence, which were to shape its destiny in the following years.¹⁵⁷⁸

¹⁵⁷⁷ Hopkins, *Green Against Green*, P. 264.

¹⁵⁷⁸ O'Halpin, *Defending Ireland*, p.17.

Chapter Nine - Conclusion

*[The Free State] have numbers and foreign backing we have not. ... Our man-power is proving too weak. The enemy are too well established and ... any further weakness on our side caused by further arrests or executions of our best men will leave us simply a wasted shadow of what was once a glorious little Army of Independence.*¹⁵⁷⁹

-O'Donovan to Lynch, 27th January 1923.

9.1 The End of the Fighting

However many anti-Treaty IRA volunteers started the Irish Civil War, by May 1923, National Army Reports pointed to the fact that in almost every Command Area, the IRA “organisation is absolutely broken or else hampered in such a way as to render it almost impossible for them to carry out any major operation. The large numbers of arrests and captures of dumps during the week is evidence of the effective manner in which the [Free State] troops are clearing the parts of the country that yet call for attention.”¹⁵⁸⁰

As a result of the many setbacks being encountered by the IRA, on May 13th and 14th the anti-Treaty Republican Cabinet and Army Council met. The National Army campaign against the IRA had not abated and the situation, from a military point of view, was beyond hope. With IRA peace proposals being rejected, nothing remained but to bring the war to a conclusion on another basis. No agreement was able to be reached by both sides on the cessation of hostilities and the state slipped into an uneasy peace.¹⁵⁸¹ Eventually Frank Aiken, the new IRA Chief of Staff who replaced Liam Lynch, ordered a suspension of IRA offensives and on 24th May 1923 he ordered the IRA to dump arms.¹⁵⁸² A decade of revolution, conflict and turmoil had come to an end.

¹⁵⁷⁹ O'Donovan to Lynch, 27 January 1923, National Library of Ireland, MS 22306.

¹⁵⁸⁰ National Army reports for weeks ending, 26 May 1923, Mulchay Papers, P7/B/139, UCDA.

¹⁵⁸¹ Corcoran, *Freedom to Achieve Freedom*, P.95.

¹⁵⁸² Ferriter, *Between Two Hells, The Irish Civil War*, p. 118.

By the end of the civil war and however successful the Free State campaign proved to be, the government reported over 800 National Army deaths between January 1922 and June 1923.¹⁵⁸³ No accurate figure exists for total civilian or IRA deaths. Garvin estimates several thousand people in total were dead and much property looted and destroyed.¹⁵⁸⁴ From my research, interactions and discussions with other historians – I would estimate a total figure of nearly two thousand deaths throughout the entirety of the Irish Civil War.¹⁵⁸⁵

9.2 Key Themes

A number of key themes became evident from my analysis of the National Army counterinsurgency campaign in Cork and the shaping operation conducted in the remainder of the ‘Munster Republic’. These themes formed the basis of my primary research and when combined with the modern counterinsurgency doctrine of Clear – Hold – Build, my conclusions on how the Free State won the Irish Civil War are as follows: ¹⁵⁸⁶

¹⁵⁸³ Draft Copy of Roll of Deceased Personnel – Irish Civil War. Provided to the author on 24 January 2022 by Military Archives Ireland, MAI.

¹⁵⁸⁴ To Garvin, 1922: *The Birth of Irish Democracy* (Dublin, Gill and MacMillan, 1996). P. 164.

¹⁵⁸⁵ This figure is an estimation by me from my combined research, interactions and attendance at seminars.

¹⁵⁸⁶ A Clear-Hold-Build operation is a full spectrum operation that combines Offence (Clear - finding and eliminating the insurgent), Defence (Hold - protecting terrain and the local populace) and Stability (Rebuilding the infrastructure and increasing the legitimacy of the local government in the area) operations. (FM 3-24.2 Tactics in Counterinsurgency, April 2009.)

9.2.1 Combination of 'Good Governance' with 'Compellence'

According to Hazelton counterinsurgency is "...uglier, costlier in lives, more remote from moral and ethical considerations, and far less ambitious than what western countries are attempting in trying to build and reform the political systems in so called weak states and ungoverned spaces."¹⁵⁸⁷

'Good Governance' identifies and redresses "the political, economic, military, and other issues fuelling the insurgency."¹⁵⁸⁸ 'Good Governance' fills the vacuum created by ungoverned spaces, supressing support bases for the insurgent. The Free State Government inherently understood this, ensuring that throughout the fighting, the same main tasks of governance continued to be performed with the same general organisation and procedure as before the civil war.¹⁵⁸⁹ The restoration of the local economy and the efforts made by the Free State to establish a coherent national and local government establishment were key methods of undermining the support base required by the IRA. In January 1923, The Free State Minister of Justice Kevin O'Higgins stated in a government memorandum that "the government is simply a Committee with a mandate to make certain conditions prevail, to make life and property safe, and to vindicate the legal rights of their fellow citizens."¹⁵⁹⁰ If the pro-Treaty government wanted to govern, and enable 'Good Governance', the defeat of the IRA was a necessity. Through a mixture of force and cajolement the Free State managed to succeed in this endeavour, and what is even more remarkable is that they later reconciled the Republicans [IRA] back to democratic government afterwards.¹⁵⁹¹ 'Good Governance' needs a democratic framework, with opposing political parties. But in order to succeed during an insurgency, it

¹⁵⁸⁷ Hazelton, *Bullets Not Ballots, Success in Counterinsurgency Warfare*, 2021.

¹⁵⁸⁸ Hosmer and Crane, *Counterinsurgency: A Symposium, April 16-20, 1962*, p. iv.

¹⁵⁸⁹ *Final Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Civil Service 1932-35* (Dublin: Stationary Office, n.d.), par.8.

¹⁵⁹⁰ O'Higgins Memorandum, 11th January 1923, Mulcahy Papers, P7b/96, UCDA.

¹⁵⁹¹ Girvin, *From Union to Union; Nationalism, Democracy and Religion in Ireland- Act of Union to EU*, p. 63.

also needs to co-exist and work alongside ‘Compellence’. The Free State actions during the Hold and Clearance phases of the civil war would support this proposition.

As democratic institutions were being established, the National Army was fighting a substantial conventional campaign for survival. In the Battle of Kilmallock for example, large forces on both sides opposed each other and Free State forces consisted of some 2,000 troops supported by armoured cars and artillery advancing on a wide front.¹⁵⁹² As a result of the intense fighting in Kilmallock, along with the other battles in Munster, nearly two-thirds of those killed in the war died during the conventional fighting and clearance phases of the first three months.¹⁵⁹³

‘Compellence’ and ‘Harassment’ were certainly the plan envisioned by Lt Col Paddy Paul, who as a former British gunnery officer, conducted an effective National Army artillery barrage on the IRA defenders in Waterford City.¹⁵⁹⁴ This would prove the determining factor in this battle and national newspapers consistently reported on the effective use of artillery by the National Army in the battles ensuing in Waterford, Tipperary and Limerick, reporting on “the deadly accuracy of the Irish gunners” ... which proved to be decisive and “compelled the irregulars [IRA] to vacate their best positions.”¹⁵⁹⁵

Major General Emmet Dalton’s initial policy of ‘Harassment’ conducted during the Hold phase was also very kinetic in nature. It was key to the initial success of Dalton’s counterinsurgency campaign in Cork, because he used ‘Compellence’ and ‘Harassment’ to attrit the IRA numbers and to keep them moving.¹⁵⁹⁶ Mobile light infantry forces with light armoured vehicles make the best counterinsurgency soldiers. The National Army strategy and policy of not commuting to work, but rather living amongst the population it wanted to protect,

¹⁵⁹² Duggan, *A History of the Irish Army*, p. 88.

¹⁵⁹³ Townsend, *The Republic, The Fight for Irish Independence*, 1918-1923, pp.428-429.

¹⁵⁹⁴ Riccio, *Irish Coastal Landings 1922*, p. 34.

¹⁵⁹⁵ *The Irish Independent*, 21 July 1922.

¹⁵⁹⁶ Dalton Letter to Commander-in-Chief, 11 Sept 1922, M/A, CW/OPS/2/4, MAI.

was supported and supplemented with mobile columns, especially as the National Army moved out into the more remote parts of Cork. These mobile columns brought the fight to the enemy, and helped to round-up anti-Treaty fighters in their safe areas, seizing arms and inflicting casualties.¹⁵⁹⁷ They would also enable the application of brute force to reduce the flow of resources to the insurgency, along with the direct application of force to break the insurgency's will and capability to fight on.¹⁵⁹⁸ Additional mobility, especially armoured mobility provided by the British Government brought flexibility and helped align with General Richard Mulcahy's Commanders Intent "to have at our disposal central force enough to allow elasticity in our plans" or in military parlance a flexible and mobile reserve.¹⁵⁹⁹ As National Army tactics improved, by December 1922 in West Cork approximately 2,000 Free State soldiers with eight armored vehicles ... "pasted at us [the IRA] from across the river" when they were out searching for the stolen National Army Rolls Royce Armoured Car, 'Slieve na mBan'.¹⁶⁰⁰ Mobility and freedom of movement were vital factors for the National Army in allowing them to keep their lines of communication open and to keep the IRA discommoded. By the end of the civil war, practically all the National Army posts in Cork were supplied with an armoured car or armoured Lancia.¹⁶⁰¹ This undoubtedly contributed to the domination of key terrain and the suppression of IRA activities in Cork. By the end of the civil war, National Army operations seriously degraded the IRA and the 'After-Action Report' from West Cork states that the Free State had the ability to mass forces and "in this operation we had roughly 2,500 troops cooperating" ... covering "almost 500 square miles and is the most difficult area in the country to operate over."¹⁶⁰²

¹⁵⁹⁷ Boyne, *Emmet Dalton*, p. 246.

¹⁵⁹⁸ Hazelton, *Bullets Not Ballots, Success in Counterinsurgency Warfare*, p. 5.

¹⁵⁹⁹ Correspondence between Mulcahy to Mac Eoin, 14 August 1922, MacEoin Papers, P151/161/5, UCDA.

¹⁶⁰⁰ Interview of Ted O'Sullivan (West Cork IRA) by Ernie O'Malley O'Malley Papers, P17b/108, UCDA.

¹⁶⁰¹ Boyne, p. 246.

¹⁶⁰² National Army Report on Operations carried out in the West Cork, and South Kerry areas, 29th April – 5th May 1923, DT S3361, NAI.

The Free State bombardment; ‘Harassment’; ‘Pasting’; and ‘Compellence’ operations correspond with the concept that force must be applied within a coherent and solid strategic framework, against the background of a clear realistic political context and firmly understood end-state.¹⁶⁰³ The kinetic force applied by the National Army throughout the civil war fighting, coincided and coexisted with the ongoing ‘Good Governance’ efforts at the national and local levels. This was a complimentary process that may have been ad-hoc at first, but ultimately, when properly coordinated, it led to the defeat of the IRA by the summer of 1923.

9.2.2 *Undermine the Insurgent Causes*

‘Good Governance’ provides the political, economic, and social reforms that meet the needs of the population and helps to make sure that these reforms reduce the grievances and causes fuelling the insurgency.¹⁶⁰⁴ Therefore at the heart of any counterinsurgency campaign lies one basic requirement, to undermine the insurgent cause by offering a better alternative and “a better deal than the insurgents.”¹⁶⁰⁵ This is a key component for success by a government in a counterinsurgency operation.¹⁶⁰⁶ The Free State Government recognised this and their financial and governance policies were underpinned by being able to provide a better alternative and an understanding of the need for active participation in economic life by the individual, local government, and a national assembly.¹⁶⁰⁷ This policy was in stark contrast to that of the IRA in Cork who found that there were strict limits to their capacity to stimulate the economy.¹⁶⁰⁸

¹⁶⁰³ Ledwidge, *Loosing Small Wars, British Military Failures in the 9/11 Wars*, p. 186.

¹⁶⁰⁴ Hazelton, *Bullets Not Ballots, Success in Counterinsurgency Warfare*, p. 8.

¹⁶⁰⁵ Crawshaw, ‘The evolution of British COIN’, MOD JDP 3-40, paragraph 1; cited by Ledwidge *Loosing Small Wars, British Military Failure in the 9/11 Wars*, p. 187.

¹⁶⁰⁶ Galula *Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice*, p. 53.

¹⁶⁰⁷ Cronin, *Ireland: The Politics of Independence, 1922-49*, p.149.

¹⁶⁰⁸ Townsend, *The Republic: The Fight for Irish Independence, 1918-1923*, p.421.

IRA commandeering continued throughout the civil war and became a necessary means for survival, but it was very unpopular amongst the local population.¹⁶⁰⁹ Along with commandeering, IRA taxes on the economic activities in Cork was perceived as “high-handed IRA Republican officers rising above their perceived station.”¹⁶¹⁰ If the IRA wanted to fully understand why their cause was undermined and why they lost the support of the Irish population, then they just had to recognise how badly they effected the economy in Ireland. The cause was also undermined by the trail of infrastructure and essential services destruction they inflicted on the general population.¹⁶¹¹ The IRA had a lack of awareness regarding how the destruction of infrastructure seriously discommoded rural communities in carrying out their daily activities. As a result of this lack of awareness, their support base in these same communities was seriously affected.¹⁶¹² A common perception throughout Cork during this period, according to the Cork Chamber of Commerce, was that if Republicans “wanted to understand their growing unpopularity they needed to look no further than the nearest collapsed bridge.”¹⁶¹³ In comparison the Free State reacted by repairing, restoring and protecting the essential infrastructure of the country. They providing a better alternative and better services to the population. By doing this the Free State were able to win over the neutral majority of the population, undermining the IRA cause.¹⁶¹⁴

The Free State also used the church and the press as key Information Operations tools in order to undermine the IRA and their cause. The Church in Cork came out very strongly against the IRA and spoke of young minds being poisoned by the false principles of the IRA. They argued that “any priests who approve of this Irregular [IRA] insurrection were false to

¹⁶⁰⁹ Hopkinson, *Green Against Green*, p. 131.

¹⁶¹⁰ Borgonovo, *The Battle for Cork*, p.29.

¹⁶¹¹ Corcoran, *Freedom to Achieve Freedom*, p.233.

¹⁶¹² Harrington, *The Munster Republic*, p.96.

¹⁶¹³ Cork Chamber of Commerce Annual Report, 1922, MP 507, University College Cork; cited by John Borgonovo, *The Battle for Cork*, pp.126-7.

¹⁶¹⁴ Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice*, p. 53.

their sacred office.”¹⁶¹⁵ This had a serious effect on IRA members but most commented that the social ostracism engendered by Church and State had more of an effect on wives and parents.¹⁶¹⁶ As the Free State forces spread security throughout Cork, the press followed. Newspapers supporting the Free State Government, reported their activities favourably, undermining the IRA cause and contradicting the Republican narrative. On the South Kerry-Cork border, newspapers only reached the towns and villages at intervals of weeks before they were finally secured, by the National Army; “there were miles of country between that point and Killarney where the people had not seen a paper for months and were fed solely on Irregular [IRA] propaganda.”¹⁶¹⁷ However once newspapers and other media outlets became more freely available to local populations, IRA activities were challenged further damaging their cause.

The winning over of the neutral majority was a key prerogative for the Free State and as a result of their Information campaign, their Presence Posture and Profile, parades and shows of force, by mid-1923, the National Army reported that “it is indirect propaganda and the comment of the citizens [that] is most gratifying.”¹⁶¹⁸ These actions reinforced the National Army, helping to undermine the status of the IRA amongst the population. Because of this the army’s grip on the situation was “...daily becoming stronger and better, while within the army itself a healthy spirit of confidence, discipline, and a very real soldierly outlook is growing.”¹⁶¹⁹

The general survey for the period ending 17th October 1923, noted that the “people are at last beginning to realise that the soldiers of the National Army are the friends and protectors of the people rather than the representatives of military tyranny as they were formerly led to believe.”¹⁶²⁰ The survey also noted that “from all parts come very favourable reports as to the

¹⁶¹⁵ *Irish Times*, 11 Oct 1922

¹⁶¹⁶ Hopkinson, *Green Against Green*, p. 182.

¹⁶¹⁷ National Army Report on Operations carried out in the west Cork, and South Kerry areas, 29th April – 5th May 1923, DT S3361, NAI.

¹⁶¹⁸ National Army Report on the Military Situation 05th May 1923, DT S3361, NAI.

¹⁶¹⁹ National Army Report on the Military Situation 28th April 1923, DT S3361, NAI.

¹⁶²⁰ The General Survey for the period ending 17 October 1923, CW/OPS/3/B, MAI.

attitude of the people generally towards our troops.”¹⁶²¹ The attitude of the people in Cork was the prize for the National Army and by winning this, they certainly undermined the cause, the narrative and the standing of the IRA in the county.

9.2.3 Use of Local and Specialised Forces against Insurgent Networks

Locally recruited forces have preferential access to information since they are operating in areas where they lived and among populations they knew intimately.¹⁶²² When these local forces are supported by Specialised Forces, the results are significantly enhanced.¹⁶²³ As an example of how effective locally recruited forces can be, in Waterford, Lt Col Paddy Paul who as a Free State Officer, had also commanded an East Waterford IRA Unit during the War of Independence. Because of this he “knew the area backwards and his National Army troops came from Counties Waterford, Wexford, Kilkenny and Tipperary having a good local knowledge.”¹⁶²⁴ This was a remarkable force multiplier for the Free State because it enabled the National Army to hold, compel and exert tremendous pressure on the IRA, as holding the towns meant controlling the country.¹⁶²⁵ Paul also urged the use of sound men who like him were local but had also served in the British Army in order to fill the knowledge and experience vacuum.¹⁶²⁶ He identified the benefits of placing former veterans into key leadership and training positions and “...hunting round, I found that there were quite a few other men who had seen service in the British Army during the war, like myself, and I arranged to take advantage of their training by having them appointed as instructors.”¹⁶²⁷

¹⁶²¹ The General Survey for the period ending 17 October 1923, CW/OPS/3/B, MAI.

¹⁶²² Berman, Felter and Shapiro, *Small Wars, Big Data: The Information Revolution in Modern Conflict*, with McIntyre, p. 273.

¹⁶²³ *Ibid.*

¹⁶²⁴ Duggan *A History of the Irish Army*, p. 89.

¹⁶²⁵ Younger, *Ireland's Civil War*, p.476.

¹⁶²⁶ Mulcahy Memo to Collins, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/35, UCDA.

¹⁶²⁷ Lt Col PJ Paul, BMH WS 0877, Bureau of Military History, Military Archives Ireland.

Similarly Major General Emmet Dalton realised the benefit of local troops and he observed that about 100 of his newly recruited C Company, 1st Battalion National Army soldiers were local and had previous military experience.¹⁶²⁸ The initial entry forces landed by the National Army in Cork during August 1922, were mainly from Dublin and numbered 850 men. But local recruits from across County Cork, “especially those with previous combat experience, almost immediately doubled its strength to 1,600”. In Cork City alone, “700 British ex-servicemen had secretly been sworn into the National Army before the invasion.”¹⁶²⁹ These extra locally recruited soldiers allowed the Free State to rapidly expand in Cork, facilitating the increased establishment of bases and forces throughout the county.¹⁶³⁰ A significant factor and benefit of this local recruitment and deployment during the civil war was that the majority of the troops stationed in Cork were local. This may explain why the National Army presence in Cork was less oppressive than in other counties and that after the war, there was very little resurgence of support for the IRA.¹⁶³¹

Specialised National Army troops started to support these garrisons and these included; the Intelligence Corps, Railway Protection Corps and ‘Counter Columns’. The creation of the ‘Counter Columns’ by the National Army provided a force that were specialised in nature and comprised of experienced soldiers who would link up with local soldiers in search operations. As the local forces manned the outer cordons, the ‘Counter Columns’ would normally operate in the interior searching for IRA Flying Columns.¹⁶³² This became a very effective tactic in harassing and tiring out the IRA, forcing them to rediscover “what it means to pass several nights hungry, tired and cold ... [because] the plan has been to allow no rest.”¹⁶³³ National

¹⁶²⁸ Borgonovo, *The Battle for Cork*, p.31.

¹⁶²⁹ *Ibid.*, p.124.

¹⁶³⁰ National Army Report on Strength and Posts 01 April 1923, DT S3361, NAI.

¹⁶³¹ Hopkinson, *Green Against Green*, P. 239.

¹⁶³² Sean Lehane to Ernie O’Malley, 15 October 1922 in Cormac O’Malley and Anne Dolan, ‘*No Surrender Here*’, *the Civil War Papers of Ernie O’Malley 1922-1924*, p. 282.

¹⁶³³ National Army Monthly Operational Report for December 1922 by General Lawlor on operations in the West, MacEoin Papers, P151/180, UCDA.

Army Intelligence Officers would also normally attend these searches and sweeps, whilst also reporting on infrastructure damage and other IRA activities. Even after the fighting, National Army Intelligence Reports were signifying the importance still placed by the Free State in the restoration of essential infrastructure.¹⁶³⁴

To further demonstrate the collaboration between local forces and specialised troops in April to May 1923, “the [Railway] Corps had to establish billeting centres at Loo Bridge, Morleys Bridge, and Kilgarvan, [Cork/Kerry border] and convey the operations quartermaster with stores to these points for feeding the [counter] columns on the following day.”¹⁶³⁵ Together with local troops providing; local knowledge, intelligence and the cordons, the National Army had the ability to mass forces. In some operations they had over 2,000 local and specialised troops covering areas that were almost 500 square miles in size, done over the most difficult terrain for a week long period.¹⁶³⁶ Local soldiers were especially needed to hold the terrain after the conduct of clearance operations and as a result of this extra rifles were often taken on operations. It was planned that each contingent would rapidly expand its strength after the initial fighting by recruiting and arming local volunteers from pro-Treaty members of the IRA or ex-members of the British Army.¹⁶³⁷ Specialised troops also came in the form of the Special Infantry Corps (SIC) consisting of roughly 4,000 men stationed semi-permanently in strategic locations across the country.¹⁶³⁸ As a whole they acted as an additional gendarmerie security force assisting local soldiers and the local Civic Guards in exerting civil control.¹⁶³⁹

¹⁶³⁴ Free State Army Intelligence Report (Cork Command) 2nd March 1924, IE/MA/S/12360, MAI.

¹⁶³⁵ Free-State Army Report on Operations carried out in the West Cork, and South Kerry areas, 29th April – 5th May 1923, DT S3361, NAI.

¹⁶³⁶ Free State Army Report on Operations carried out in the west Cork, and South Kerry areas, 29th April – 5th May 1923, DT S3361, NAI.

¹⁶³⁷ Boyne, *Emmet Dalton*, pp. 181-182.

¹⁶³⁸ Cover memorandum RE: SIC scheme from Min for Home Affairs, 5 April 1923, DT S 582, NAI; cited by Gavin M. Foster *The Irish Civil War and Society, Politics, Class, and Conflict*, p. 133.

¹⁶³⁹ O’Halpin, *Defending Ireland*, p.33.

A central counterinsurgency concept is the need to understand how networks fight.¹⁶⁴⁰ Insurgent networks are more often driven by local issues and alliances and because of this they are particularly vulnerable to the use of local forces. These local forces have a better knowledge of what is required on the ground and what is the particular cause of an insurrection in a particular area. Local forces, supported by specialised units will have a better understanding of how the insurgent networks recruit, train, operate, sustain themselves and where they operate. Hart states that during the civil war in Ireland, the most important bonds holding volunteers together were those of family and neighbourhood.¹⁶⁴¹ By the end of war, the majority of these IRA networks, families and their vulnerabilities were known to the Free State personnel.¹⁶⁴² The actions taken by the Catholic Church's against the IRA was also devastating for them and their families.¹⁶⁴³ This had serious ramifications for the IRA networks.

The IRA use of heavy-handed tactics that overly concentrated on the destruction of infrastructure and railways, seriously inconvenienced the rural communities, and their support networks.¹⁶⁴⁴ The burning of buildings and commandeering of goods meant they lacked the necessary popular support to carry on an extended guerrilla campaign.¹⁶⁴⁵

Ernie O'Malley agreed with Liam Lynch when he stated that the essential differences between the British and the Irish National Army during this period was that "they [The British] did not know our [IRA] officers personally. We were an invisible army who melted away when they tried to steam-roll. Now the people, on the whole, were against us, they were willing to give information."¹⁶⁴⁶ The overall Republican belief by the end of the war was that because of

¹⁶⁴⁰ Michael Few, "Interview with Dr. John Arquilla: How Can French Encounters with Irregular Warfare in the 19th Century Inform COIN in our Time?" *Small Wars Journal* (November 30, 2010), <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/608-arquilla.pdf> : Cited by Douglas Porch *Counterinsurgency Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War* (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp. 4/5.

¹⁶⁴¹ Hart, *The IRA and Its Enemies: Violence and Community in Cork, 1916-1923*, pp. 209, 264.

¹⁶⁴² Kautt, *Arming the Irish Revolution: Gunrunning and Arms Smuggling, 1911-1922*, pp. 151-152.

¹⁶⁴³ O'Donoghue, *No Other Law*, p. 289

¹⁶⁴⁴ Harrington, *The Munster Republic*, p.143.

¹⁶⁴⁵ Hart, *Mick the Real Michael Collins*, p. 404.

¹⁶⁴⁶ O'Malley, *The Singing Flame*, p.187.

the information being given by the local population to local National Army troops, the IRA would “not have a man left owing to the great number of arrests and casualties.”¹⁶⁴⁷ Locally recruited troops, enabled by key specialists was a key component in this Free State success.

9.2.4 Requirement to be an Adaptive Learning Organisation

A successful counterinsurgency force needs to be “...centred on the need to build adaptive learning organizations to succeed in counterinsurgency campaigns.”¹⁶⁴⁸ Being an adaptive learning organisation is a key requirement in the conduct of an effective counterinsurgency campaign and adaptive learning can help facilitate the co-existence of ‘Compellence’ and ‘Good Governance’.

As a result of wartime experiences, adaptive military organisations “must be able to react positively to the unexpected, adjusting their methods of operation rapidly to the circumstances actually prevailing.”¹⁶⁴⁹ From the start, Collins and Mulcahy were in contact with a Mr Walker from the British Legion who helped facilitate the recruitment of skilled and experienced instructors into the National Army. These men numbered about five hundred and included artillerymen, machine-gunners, motor drivers, engineers and signallers.¹⁶⁵⁰ The leadership of the National Army quickly realised how these veterans would be a vital cog in the combat effectiveness and training expertise of a growing army. In combination with specialised instructors, training establishments were also established in the National Army, for key combat support capabilities, including an Artillery and Armour Schools.¹⁶⁵¹ In April 1923,

¹⁶⁴⁷ 1st Southern Division Meeting, 26 February 1923, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/89, UCDA.

¹⁶⁴⁸ Nagl, *Knife Fights, A Memoir of Modern War in Theory and Practice*.

¹⁶⁴⁹ Army Code 71451, *Design for Operations: The British Military Doctrine* (1989), p. vii.

¹⁶⁵⁰ Patrick Long, *The Army of the Irish Free State, 1922 – 1924*, (Masters of Arts, Modern Irish History, UCD, 1981-1983), pp. 26-27.

¹⁶⁵¹ Duggan *A History of the Irish Army*, P 109.

centralised training started to take place with a Company Commanders', Machine-Gun, and NCOs' courses conducted in the Curragh Camp. A School of Instruction was soon established, and so the first seeds of a Military College were being sown even before the civil war ended.¹⁶⁵²

Learning is also demonstrated in the structure of military organizations and in the creation of new organizations to deal with new or changed situations.¹⁶⁵³ National Army Chief of Staff, Richard Mulcahy, had a clear view and strategic vision of what type of organisation he wanted to achieve, namely a permanent and centrally controlled Defence Force which would take its orders from the Free State Government.¹⁶⁵⁴ Within the organisation of the National Army the creation of District or Regional Commands made it possible – at least in principle – for the Free State to develop a strategic plan of action which was a vital advantage over their IRA adversaries.¹⁶⁵⁵

A strategic plan, enables strategic success and victory is gained through a tempo or rhythm of adaptation that is beyond the other side's ability to achieve or sustain.¹⁶⁵⁶ After the IRA fight back in the autumn months of 1922, where the Free State started to lose the momentum, Mulcahy suggested to his fellow General Sean MacMahon, that former British Army officers, despite their widespread unpopularity, should be enlisted on to a 'technical committee' so that "their ideas would...provide a base line against which we would compare what we're actually doing ourselves."¹⁶⁵⁷ As a result of the findings of the 'technical committee', the Infantry Forces were 'Battle-Grouped' and 'Counter Columns' were formed. The success of these new units can be witnessed from After-Action Reports which state that the new "battalion organisation is working well, and each battalion is beginning to feel that it

¹⁶⁵² Ibid., P 106.

¹⁶⁵³ Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam*.

¹⁶⁵⁴ O'Halpin, *Defending Ireland*, p.16.

¹⁶⁵⁵ Townsend, *The Republic, The Fight for Irish Independence, 1918-1923*, p. 421-422.

¹⁶⁵⁶ US Army Field Manual 3-24. Counterinsurgency (December 2006), 5-31.

¹⁶⁵⁷ Mulcahy to MacMahon, 12 December 1922, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/153, UCDA.

is the best...it is agreed by those who have had experience in other armies that in no army could the same amount of work be got out of the troops as we got out of our men last week.”¹⁶⁵⁸

The formation of the Railway Protection Corps also proved how flexible and adaptable the Free State Government were. Cabinet papers from September 1922 outlined that 1,200 railway employees who were idle, might be usefully utilised for police or military work in connection with the maintenance of railway services.¹⁶⁵⁹ These workers were quickly recruited by the National Army into specialised railway units proving an enormous success in the restoration and protection of key essential services. Flexibility, doctrine and a military education allows a military force to transition within this complexity. The National Army by deploying and reinforcing their forces throughout the country, increased their mobility, harassed the IRA and learnt from their mistakes. By being a learning organisation, the Free State re-constituted the army in early 1923, and brought the fight back to the IRA by improving their tactics and strategy. As the Free State General Michael Costello said at the army enquiry, after the civil war, every officer admitted that there had been an extraordinary improvement in the army between December 1922 and April 1923. Much of that was put down to the re-organisation and re-structuring which occurred in January.¹⁶⁶⁰ In February 1923, Mulcahy stated in a letter: “We are getting some strength and discipline into the Army.”¹⁶⁶¹ The newly adopted leadership format, the streamlining of command and control and the breakdown of territory for these units, allowed the Battle-Groups to co-operate and operate in a very cohesive and effective manner. It also gave the Infantry units the “elasticity” and flexibility required as advocated by Mulcahy as early as August 1922.¹⁶⁶² Learning and adoption allow military

¹⁶⁵⁸ Free State Army Report on Operations carried out in the West Cork, and South Kerry areas, 29th April – 5th May 1923, DT S336, NAI.

¹⁶⁵⁹ Minutes of the Cabinet Meeting of the Provisional Government, 10th September 1922, D/TSCH/1/1/1, UCDA.

¹⁶⁶⁰ Costello at Army Enquiry, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/25, UCDA.

¹⁶⁶¹ Mulcahy Letter to Brennan, 8 February 1923, Mulcahy Papers P7/B/76, UCDA.

¹⁶⁶² Correspondence between Mulcahy to Mac Eoin, 14 August 1922, MacEoin Papers, P151/161/5, UCDA.

forces to regain the initiative and swing the momentum back in their favour. The National Army of the Irish Free State was such an organisation.

9.2.5 Fostering Trust with the Population – The Information Sharing Nexus

The goal of the insurgent is to create a climate of insecurity and compel the forces of order to retire into their most easily defensible areas.”¹⁶⁶³ But security cannot be provided from these large isolated bases. It needs to be all-encompassing and cannot just be for a specific period of time, or just during daylight hours. Troops must live amongst the population and give it protection until the population is able to protect itself.¹⁶⁶⁴ Thus the provision of a safe space and environment makes it safer for citizens to inform and the delivery of services, makes citizens more willing to share critical information.¹⁶⁶⁵ By September 1922, the National Army had established 20 bases in the main towns and villages of Cork County with, 1,620 troops garrisoned within them. By April 1923, the situation had changed dramatically and the National Army because of local recruitment and reinforcement had established 64 bases in Cork, occupied by 220 Officers and 5,219 other ranks.¹⁶⁶⁶ These bases proved to be so important in creating a safe and secure environment because the local population will only identify the insurgents in their midst if they can be certain that they will survive the experience.¹⁶⁶⁷ The comparatively mild occupation of Cork by the use of local troops, did manage to subdue the IRA.¹⁶⁶⁸ As a result of this, the National Army prioritised securing and engaging with the

¹⁶⁶³ Trinquier *Modern Warfare*, p. 45.

¹⁶⁶⁴ Galula *Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice*, p. 57.

¹⁶⁶⁵ Berman, Felter and Shapiro, *Small Wars, Big Data: The Information Revolution in Modern Conflict*, with Vestal McIntyre, p. 17.

¹⁶⁶⁶ Free State Army Report on Strength and Posts 01 April 1923, DT S3361, NAI.

¹⁶⁶⁷ Nagl, *Knife Fights, A Memoir of Modern War in Theory and Practice*, p. 130.

¹⁶⁶⁸ Hopkinson, *Green Against Green*, P. 239.

populace.¹⁶⁶⁹ When forces are scattered amongst, and living with, the population, they need not be told any longer that they have to win its support. Being more vulnerable, they realize instinctively that their own safety depends on good relations with the local people.¹⁶⁷⁰ By the end of the war, the majority of National Army Reports make reference to “the relationship between the army and the people” and how it was steadily improving, especially in Cork.¹⁶⁷¹

Alongside the National Army the Civic Guards were also extensively deployed to unoccupied police stations throughout the country, sometimes without the assistance of experienced police personnel or even manuals.¹⁶⁷² The government realised the dangers but still insisted that the Civic Guards were put out into the local communities “unarmed into a hostile area. ... [where] you may be murdered, your barracks burned, your uniform taken off you, but you must carry on and bring peace to the people.”¹⁶⁷³ But by being embedded in the local communities, becoming a noticeable security presence the Civic Guards became a vital building block of the new Irish Free State.¹⁶⁷⁴ The information sharing nexus with the local population was important and realising the efforts that were made by the Free State to locally recruit, employ and deploy the new police force, the Civic Guards had preferential access to information since they were “operating in areas where they lived and among populations they knew intimately.”¹⁶⁷⁵ Because of this strategy dramatic results were achieved by making information sharing safer for civilians. Free State Intelligence and ‘After-Action Reviews’ claimed that by 1923, the majority of IRA and supporters left fighting were “mostly men who

¹⁶⁶⁹ Nagl, *Knife Fights, A Memoir of Modern War In Theory And Practice*, p. 117.

¹⁶⁷⁰ Galula *Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice*, p. 85.

¹⁶⁷¹ Free State Army General Surveys of the Situation” for weeks ending; 31 March 1923, 7th April 1923^{15th} April 1923 21st April 1923, 28 April 1923, DT S3361, NAI.

¹⁶⁷² Brian McCarthy unpublished thesis, (Department of Politics, UCD, 1977), pp. 1-7.

¹⁶⁷³ *Irish Independent*, 13 June 1977.

¹⁶⁷⁴ Corcoran, *Freedom to Achieve Freedom*, p.113.

¹⁶⁷⁵ Berman, Felner and Shapiro, *Small Wars, Big Data: The Information Revolution in Modern Conflict*, with Vestal McIntyre, p. 273.

have been led astray and who really did not know what they were doing. They simply followed certain [IRA] leaders who led them astray.”¹⁶⁷⁶

The people who matter are the ones on the margins.¹⁶⁷⁷ The population on the margins, are the target audience for information sharing and Information Operations. By the end of the civil war, the overall perception of the National Army among the general public was positive and the “people seemed glad to have our [Free State] troops in their locality and treated them in most cases without reserve or suspicion. In some cases, they gave information more freely than has been experienced in any other part of Ireland.”¹⁶⁷⁸ Providing all round security separates the population from the insurgents and the underlying causes of the conflict. This is the indirect approach to defeating an insurgency. This is different from the direct approach and in the long term is usually more effective.¹⁶⁷⁹ As the war concluded, even the most stridently Republican population areas became more favourable to the National Army. An army report observed that “in West Cork it is altogether untrue that the people were really hostile to us. On coming into actual contact with them the impression of hostility immediately evaporates, in fact the first impression was one of general friendliness.”¹⁶⁸⁰ Locally recruited security forces, embedded with local populations, undoubtedly foster trust and enable an increased sharing of useable and targetable information.

¹⁶⁷⁶ Report on Operations carried out in the West Cork and South Kerry Areas’, May 1923, DT, S3361, NAI.

¹⁶⁷⁷ Berman, Felter and Shapiro, *Small Wars, Big Data: The Information Revolution in Modern Conflict*, with Vestal McIntyre, p. 321.

¹⁶⁷⁸ Free State Army Report on Operations carried out in the west Cork, and South Kerry areas, 29th April – 5th May 1923, DT S3361, NAI.

¹⁶⁷⁹ Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam*, p. 28.

¹⁶⁸⁰ Free State Army Report on Operations carried out in the west Cork, and South Kerry areas, 29th April – 5th May 1923, DT S3361, NAI.

9.3 Bridging the Gap between a Local Victory and Strategic Success

Counterinsurgent forces should not commute to work, but rather, those forces embedded with and living amongst the local population become intelligence collectors and analysts – the keys to ultimate victory. They are the holders and builders.¹⁶⁸¹ By fostering trust, recruiting locally and winning over the support of the population the Free State undermined support for the IRA, enhancing its own standing and ability to obtain useable information from the local population. Local forces and local victories enabled this, as did the ability of the National Army to become a learning organisation. By untangling the IRA support networks; by undermining their cause; by restoring essential infrastructure; by rebuilding the economy; by providing a better governance alternative and ultimately by preventing the IRA from prolonging their fight; the Free State bridged the gap between local victories and overall strategic success. This was the difference between what it took to win the villages of Cork and Munster at the start of fighting and what it took to win a counterinsurgency war strategically. Mistakes were made throughout the campaign, but by being an adaptive, flexible learning organisation, the National Army took the kinetic fight to the IRA, harassing and overwhelming their safe havens by using local forces supported by specialised units. As a metric, the winning of the ‘Hearts and Minds’ of the Munster and Cork populations was never fully measured, but by the end of the fighting, Free State Reports did favourably record the attitude of local inhabitants to the National Army. The winning over of the neutral majority was ultimately achieved by building back the essential services and infrastructure of the country, especially after years of conflict and neglect. At the heart of any counterinsurgency campaign lies one basic requirement which is to undermine the insurgent cause by offering a better alternative. The neutral majority of the local population in

¹⁶⁸¹ Forward by John A. Nagl to David Galula *Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice* (Westport CT, Praeger Security International 1964, 2006), p. ix.

Ireland formed the perception that by 1923, and after ten years of turmoil, the Free State Government offered a better deal than the IRA.¹⁶⁸²

¹⁶⁸² Crawshaw, 'The evolution of British COIN', MOD JDP 3-40, paragraph 1; cited by Ledwidge *Loosing Small Wars, British Military Failure in the 9/11 Wars*, p. 187.

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