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0. Introduction: Self-Knowledge and Emotion

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Abstract

The philosophical literature on self-knowledge has up to now paid too little attention to emotional phenomena. Part of the reason for this is that the philosophy of self-knowledge tends to focus on cases of so-called “trivial” self-knowledge (Cassam 2014). This volume focuses instead on “substantial” self-knowledge, which is both difficult to get and personally valuable for its subject. As this volume shows, affective states play a substantial role in acquiring substantial self-knowledge. This introduction distinguishes three main kinds of affective states: emotions, moods, and sentiments. It claims that, due to their evaluative character, these phenomena can give us access to what we care about and value, and thereby they can help us obtain knowledge of fundamental aspects of our person like, e.g., our character traits. Finally, the introduction gives an overview of the different chapters in the volume and the main threads that run through it, including what affective states illuminate and what they obstruct about us, which sorts of spaces for self-knowledge they provide, how do they affect the dynamic formation of our self-concepts and self-narratives, through which mechanisms they foster or hinder self-knowledge and which roles do other people play in emotional self-knowledge.

The relation between self-knowledge and human emotions is an often emphasized, but poorly articulated one. On the one hand, many philosophers of emotion take affective states to be fundamentally connected to, if not constitutive of, who we are. This is because they believe that our cares and concerns, our values, what motivates us to act, are all affective in nature (Scheler 1973; Goldie 2000; Helm 2001; 2010; Roberts 2003; Roeser and Todd 2014). Thus, insight into our emotions should provide us with crucial self-knowledge. Indeed, some philosophers from other traditions, psychoanalysts, and empirical researchers of the mind converge on the idea that genuine self-knowledge, self-knowledge of a transformative kind that allows the person to evolve, cannot be of a merely cognitive nature but requires “emotional insight” (see, e.g., Bell and Leite 2016; R. G. T. Gipps and Lacewing 2019).

By contrast, the philosophical literature on self-knowledge doesn’t assign a special place to the emotions. A large part of this literature is narrowly concerned with the epistemic privilege of the first-person and focuses on our rational capacities, devoting little attention to our affective lives (see Gertler 2017 for an overview). But even those philosophers who explicitly focus on “substantial” (Cassam 2014) or “Socratic” (Renz 2017a; 2017b) self-knowledge, i.e. knowledge

of the effortful kind that can be considered an epistemic or an existential achievement, often treat emotions as one of the various facts we can get to know about ourselves, on a par with other mental states (such as beliefs, desires or preferences).

Various questions arise in view of this discrepancy: Do philosophers of emotion exaggerate the importance of our affective lives in making us who we are? Or is it philosophers of self-knowledge who do not appreciate the role of emotions for self-knowledge? But then, what exactly is the role of emotions in self-knowledge? What sort of self-knowledge can be secured by paying attention to our emotions? This volume gathers contributions from different relevant fields, with the aim of offering an adequate, comprehensive, and detailed picture of the contribution that understanding our emotions makes to our self-understanding. The volume is divided in two parts. The first one is concerned with fundamental issues: it clarifies in which sense affectivity in its evaluative dimension determines who we are, it elaborates on the kind of knowledge of ourselves that affective phenomena can provide (knowledge of our values, character traits or social identities, for instance), and it also points to some possible routes to affective self-knowledge (e.g., interactions with others or affective forecasting). The second part of the volume gets into the specifics of several affective phenomena, namely: self-esteem, love, boredom, envy, hatred, and hostile emotions in general. Overall, the book reveals how complex and rich the interactions between emotions and self-knowledge are, and how many promising research questions remain to be explored at the intersection of both fields.

But before delving into more details about the structure and contents of the book, let us set the stage by clarifying the sense of “self-knowledge” at stake here, introducing the different classes of affective states that are addressed in the chapters (for not all authors address “emotions” in the narrow sense of episodic attitudes), and offer some of the reasons why we believe that paying attention to the emotional aspects of self-knowledge is so important.

To begin with self-knowledge, it should be stated from the outset that none of the chapters contained in this volume has much to say on the main debates that have traditionally dominated the philosophy of self-knowledge. With the exception of Edward Harcourt, who in Chapter 3 explores the different ways in which others can be sources of knowledge of oneself, the focus of this volume is not mainly on the epistemic privilege of the first person perspective, or on arguing for or against the existence of a form of self-knowledge that is immediate or transparent. All chapters start from the idea that some of the bits of self-knowledge that we care most about are far from immediate, they are hard to get, and obtaining them can constitute a genuine achievement. Thus, the self-knowledge that this volume focuses on for the most part falls under the category of what Quassim Cassam (2014, chap. 3) labels “substantial”, as opposed to “trivial”, self-knowledge. Uku Tooming and Kengo Miyazono have more to say about this distinction in Chapter 1, but let us quickly introduce it here. The distinction between these two varieties of self-knowledge is more intuitive than technical, and it is not supposed to be of a categorical nature either. In fact, Cassam claims that the difference between the two poles is a matter of degree: self-knowledge can be more or less substantial. So what is the difference? Trivial self-knowledge—for example, knowing that I am wearing socks right now—is very easy to get, some would even say immediate (meaning that

one wouldn't need to perform any inferences to obtain it—although Cassam disagrees), and has little personal value. By contrast, substantial self-knowledge—for example knowing whether I'm courageous—is difficult to obtain, we can easily get it wrong, and it has much higher personal value.

Turning now to the value of self-knowledge, what do we mean when we say that substantial self-knowledge is personally more valuable than trivial self-knowledge? Simply that knowing whether I am courageous can have an impact on things like my long-term decision-making, the ways in which I handle conflicts with others or my self-concept, for example, while knowing that I'm wearing socks doesn't have that impact. Thus, in keeping with this idea, a fairly generalized assumption made throughout this volume is that self-knowledge has value for its subject. Most chapters just take this for granted and don't spell out why and how substantial self-knowledge is valuable. But there are exceptions. For instance, Chapters 2 and 7, by Krista Thomason and Pilar Lopez-Cantero respectively, point at ways in which substantial self-knowledge bears upon our narrative self-understanding, thus helping us to find some meaningfulness in our lives. Therefore, according to them, one of the reasons why substantial self-knowledge has value is that it can contribute to a temporally extended self-concept that confers sense to our lives. Yet, the place where the underlying issue of the value of self-knowledge is brought to the fore most explicitly is Chapter 5, by Matt MacKenzie. This chapter offers a survey of several schools of Indian philosophy and explains that, in this tradition, the pursuit of self-knowledge, or knowledge of the nature of consciousness in general, usually had a central soteriological aim: it was taken to be a means of achieving spiritual liberation. Thus, in one way or another, most chapters in the book take for granted that self-knowledge is good to have. Antonio Gómez Ramos, however, warns us in Chapter 8 that the pursuit of self-knowledge can also adopt vicious forms that risk dissolving meaning and purpose, so the value of self-knowledge per se is thrown into question. The conclusion is not that knowing ourselves is bad, simply that we should examine more carefully the kinds of value that it brings into our lives, the cost of the methods we employ to achieve it and the individualistic and even egoistic overtones that its pursuit often acquires.

But how does affectivity feature in the quest for self-knowledge? To address this question, let us start with some quick definitions. While all chapters in this volume deal with affective phenomena in one way or another, not all of them focus on what we would technically refer to as 'emotions'. Different authors carve out the affective territory in slightly different ways, but there are roughly three classes of phenomena that receive attention in this book: emotions, moods and sentiments. All of them are ways of being moved, of caring, of responding to the world; they all colour our perceptions of the world, but they all are different in specific ways. Emotions are generally taken to be the central category, and in some sense the simpler of the three, since emotions have a clear intentional object and involve a relatively unified and characteristic way of responding to it. First, emotions are about something, they have an intentional object, which can be a thing, a person, a situation, etc. For example, we get angry at the driver who cut us in traffic or feel proud of the book that we just published. Furthermore, there is a very widespread consensus that emotions are evaluative states; they put their objects under a specific assessment or appraisal (thereby displaying sensitivity towards these objects' "values" Scheler 1973; or "formal objects" Kenny 2003), e.g.,

my anger evaluates the other driver's behaviour as offensive, my pride evaluates the book's publication as an excellent achievement of mine, and so on. Emotions clearly also have a phenomenology, there is something it is like to undergo them. Often they are felt in the body, in more or less subtle ways, and they have indeed been characterized as "embodied appraisals" (Prinz 2004). But even the emotions that do not involve bodily feelings in such a conspicuous way—think about admiration or gratitude—have a phenomenal feel to them, and as such they have been defined as "intentional feelings of import" (Helm 2001). Finally, most emotions are deemed to involve specific action tendencies, they prepare us to act in certain ways. Thus, according to some theories of anger, this emotion typically motivates aggression (or at least some decided action to recriminate the offender), while pride typically motivates display behaviour, where we tend to communicate to others our virtues or achievements. There is much more to say about emotions, and this short summary doesn't even scratch the surface of all the complex and fascinating debates going on in the philosophy of emotion (see Scarantino and de Sousa 2021 for an overview), but it will do as an introductory characterization. Emotions feature as a general class in most chapters in this book, and fear and envy get special treatments by Thomason (fear in Chapter 2), Ingrid Vendrell Ferran (envy in Chapter 10), and Alessandro Salice and Alba Montes Sánchez (again envy in Chapter 9).

Now, what distinguishes emotions from the other two abovementioned classes of affective phenomena, namely moods and sentiments? Starting with moods, one of the most widespread ways of distinguishing them from emotions is to point out that moods have no intentional object, no clear aboutness. We often feel cheerful or melancholy for no particular reason, without being able to say what we are happy or sad about. When this is the case, we are experiencing a mood, not an emotion. Some authors, however, are unconvinced by the idea that moods lack intentionality, and they argue instead that moods have very broad objects or a diffuse aboutness: they would be about the world as a whole, for example (Heidegger 2008; Elpidorou and Freeman 2015). Building on this Heideggerian idea, Ratcliffe has recently developed the notion of "existential feelings", which are "ways of finding oneself in the world" (Ratcliffe 2005; 2008). Anna Bortolan (Chapter 6) and Lopez-Cantero (Chapter 7) make extensive use of this notion in their respective chapters on self-esteem and love, while Gómez Ramos (Chapter 8) treats boredom predominantly as a mood.

Finally, a third class of affective state that gets addressed in this book is sentiments. Although none of the authors use this traditional term, love and hatred, which both make prominent appearances in this book (in Chapters 7, 9 and 10), have often been characterized in such a way. What distinguishes sentiments from emotions is that sentiments are typically more complex and longer-lasting attitudes that do not consist in a single response, but involve characteristic patterns of thought, judgment, motivation, different emotional responses and so on. In other words, loving someone is not a matter of responding to them in a single way, or of living through feelings of only one kind, but it involves many different and characteristic ways of acting, emoting and judging. Furthermore, sentiments persist even when one is not experiencing any related feelings: parents who love their children typically go about their days engrossed in whichever tasks they need to do, without constantly having emotional episodes of something one could call love (although they will feel surges of affection in the appropriate circumstances). Despite the absence

of emotional experience at a given point in time, these parents still count as loving their children at all times. Moreover, feeling proud of one's children, worrying about their wellbeing and judging them to be valuable people typically count as ways of loving them. Similar points can be made about hatred, although hatred of course involves very different evaluations, emotions and motivations. In any case, both phenomena seem necessarily more long-lasting than episodic emotions of fear or pride for example, and they involve more complex patterns of response than emotional dispositions to feel episodic emotions in specific circumstances—for example, if one is generally afraid of dogs, one will be disposed to feel fear upon encountering them, or caution about preventing such encounters, but the range of responses one is predisposed to experience will be limited to fear and its close cousins. By contrast, love and hatred seem to dispose one to a wider range of responses, and this is why some authors have called these phenomena “syndromes” (Sousa 2015) or “multi-track emotional dispositions” (Deonna and Teroni 2012, chap. 1).

Having offered these quick characterizations of different sorts of affective states, we come to the central issue in this volume: what is the relation between such states and self-knowledge? A first possibility and, as we stated at the outset, the one that features most prominently in the existing philosophy of self-knowledge, is that affective states are one among the various possible facts self-knowledge might be concerned with, one among the various facts we can get to know about ourselves. Approaching one's inquiry in this way means asking how do we know what we feel, what are the challenges to knowing what we feel and similar questions (see e.g. Cassam 2014). This is a valuable approach, that can teach us a lot about emotion and self-knowledge, and several chapters in this book ask this sort of question (specifically Chapters 1, 2, 3, 9 and 10). But the importance of affective states for self-knowledge goes beyond this in at least two directions. Let us address them in turn.

On the one hand, given their evaluative nature, affective states contain the potential to give us access to other pieces of substantial knowledge: as Tooming and Miyazono argue in Chapter 1, they might be central in our endeavors to find out about our character traits or even some of our abilities. As Bennett Helm (Chapter 4) and Thomason (Chapter 2) express most clearly, they play crucial roles in getting to know what we value. And as all authors in Part Two of the volume show, they often impact and shape our self-understanding in significant ways. Thus, paying attention to our affective states can give us important clues on at least two central aspects of our selves and our personal identities: the things that we care about and value (a key element of what some authors call the “moral self”, see Prinz and Nichols 2016) and the ways in which we articulate our temporally extended self-concept (especially through narratives, see e.g. Goldie 2012).

On the other hand, recent research into epistemic emotions and their roles in obtaining knowledge point to the crucial functions that phenomena like curiosity or certainty fulfill in fueling or halting inquiry and to the power that emotions have to make things salient and to direct our attention (Candiotto 2019; Brady 2013). These roles are also relevant for self-knowledge and, as MacKenzie highlights in the last section of Chapter 5, some Indian schools of thought devised ways in which to harness these emotional capacities to direct attention and motivate action to acquire knowledge of the true nature of consciousness and progress towards spiritual liberation. While no chapter in

this book directly addresses epistemic emotions—an issue that must remain the subject of future investigation—several chapters do analyze in detail the role that certain affective states play in redirecting attention away from themselves and from the facts about the subject that they reveal, fueling self-deception (especially Chapters 6, 8, 9 and 10).

The above are just some of the reasons why we believe that emotions and affective phenomena in general should have a more prominent place in the philosophy of self-knowledge than has hitherto been assigned to them. Other specific reasons will become obvious throughout the volume. It is therefore time to offer a more detailed summary of all chapters.

Part One of the book, “Affectivity and Self-Knowledge”, deals with the importance of the affective domain as a whole for self-knowledge, offering a sample of the kinds of spaces that affectivity opens up (or sometimes might close down) for self-knowledge. In Chapter 1, Tooming and Miyazono set out to explain Cassam’s (2014) notion of substantial self-knowledge by appealing to the involvement of emotions in this kind of knowledge and, in particular, to the difficulties that we humans tend to have to predict how we will feel in the future. According to the authors, one of the main factors that make certain bits of self-knowledge more substantial, and thus harder to get, than others is that acquiring the former requires affective forecasting. In other words, to get to know what one values or which character traits one has, for instance, one typically has to be able to accurately predict how one will feel, how intensely and for how long. Empirical studies show that people tend to be bad at making those predictions, and therefore self-knowledge of those aspects of ourselves that involve emotional dispositions is more difficult to obtain and more substantial than self-knowledge of other features. This chapter thus offers an account of emotional dispositions as important sources of self-knowledge, which are nonetheless prone to frequent errors and thus make self-knowledge difficult to secure.

In Chapter 2, Thomason tackles the question of what emotions can tell us about ourselves by focusing on what she calls “alienated emotions”—i.e., those emotions that conflict with and unsettle our self-image—through an example of alienated fear. When an affective response clashes with what we think we know about ourselves, what should we do about this? Thomason argues that, since emotions are tied to what we care about and what we value, we should resist the temptation to dismiss such feelings as odd, irrelevant, or irrational. In fact, they might be more revealing than we think. Sticking too stubbornly to our existing self-image or trying too hard to maintain a coherent self-narrative might then lead us to self-deception: ignoring parts of ourselves that don’t fit into that picture. In our quest for a self-knowledge that might help us make better decisions and, perhaps, live more meaningful lives, Thomason advocates for honesty as one of the guiding principles and for reckoning with alienated emotions as one potential source of a more nuanced understanding of who we are.

Thus, the first two chapters emphasize the importance of emotions for self-knowledge, while drawing attention to the difficulties we face in achieving emotional self-insight as individuals. The following two chapters, by contrast, expand the focus to include other people in our search for self-knowledge. Harcourt does so in Chapter 3 by defending the claim that others can know me

and express my mental states as spontaneously as I do, and they can thus offer me access to a knowledge of myself that is direct. In other words, others can be sources of the same kind of self-knowledge that has often been considered to be reserved to me alone. When a parent says to a child “poor you, that hurts”, or an adult friend says to an adult friend “I think you’re tired”, or a therapist gives a client an interpretation of the client’s feelings or behaviours, they are not—at least not typically—giving them mere labels for their experiences, or theories they need to work through to incorporate into their self-knowledge. Most of the time, the transaction happens immediately and effortlessly and this is so, according to Harcourt, because no transformation is necessary: others have access to spontaneous self-knowledge of me, and can thus offer it to me. Furthermore, this capacity does not depend on others loving me or feeling compassion towards me: I can obtain self-knowledge in this spontaneous way from an enemy or a competitor. This is possible thanks to what Harcourt calls our “ordinary aliveness to one another”, a form of affective-cognitive attunement to each other that points to “a kind of ‘psychological commons’, that I and others indifferently can both spontaneously contribute to and draw upon” (p. XX).

In Chapter 4, Helm continues widening the focus to the role of others for self-knowledge, by addressing social identities. Here, Helm defends two seemingly contradictory claims: social identities are a matter of social construction, *and* we can be wrong about the very facts that we socially construct. How can these two claims be made compatible? First, Helm argues that the point of social identities is for communities to articulate the ways in which we, by each fulfilling the social roles assigned to us by our social identities, can best flourish together. This idea of flourishing is the touchstone on which the contestation of social identity constructions can rest. Secondly and crucially, Helm rejects the ontological priority of facts over constructions or vice versa, and proposes a holistic account of the phenomena that rests on a theory of import and value that centrally involves our emotions. According to Helm, emotions are essential building blocks not only of what we personally value as individuals (and thus are vital for constituting and knowing our personal identities), but also, when they take the form of reactive attitudes (Strawson 1974), of what we collectively value as community members. Since the point of our social identities is to enable us to flourish, and one of the most important sources of evidence about one’s flourishing is provided by one’s experiences, our emotions can provide us with reasons to criticise social identities from the point of view of personal values. But more widely and powerfully, when these emotions become reactive attitudes that are rationally linked with the responses of others in a resistant sub-community within the wider community, they provide us with reasons to contest the ways in which social identities are constructed in the wider community and to argue that those constructions get things wrong. Thus, emotions are both (fallible) sources of knowledge about our social identities and simultaneously part of that which constructs those very identities.

Finally, the first part of the volume closes with an attempt to broaden our horizons beyond the confines of Western academic philosophy. In Chapter 5, MacKenzie takes us on a journey through classical Indian philosophy, offering an overview of the main ideas on self-knowledge and the role that affective states play in it found in several important schools of Indian thought, including Buddhism, Yoga, Nyāya and Advaita Vedānta. Classical Indian thinkers developed extremely sophisticated and detailed accounts of the human mind, including the emotions and other affective

states, many of which resemble and prefigure our contemporary accounts of these phenomena in Western philosophy and psychology. The aims of these thinkers were twofold. First, they had the mainly epistemological aims to accurately describe and account for the nature of the mind and its workings. But secondly, and crucially, these theories had the soteriological aim of serving as aids to liberation from the suffering of existence. In other words, one of the main motivations to pursue an adequate knowledge of the mind and its emotions was its contribution to achieving spiritual enlightenment and, ultimately, transcendence. MacKenzie's chapter thus addresses head-on an issue that is in the background of many other chapters of this volume: the issue of the value of self-knowledge. Why should we pursue it? Thomason (Chapter 2) and Lopez-Cantero (Chapter 7) are the authors who most clearly formulate different versions of answer that many would endorse in contemporary Western philosophy: the pursuit of self-knowledge contributes to finding meaningfulness and purpose in our lives. This, however, is significantly different from the answers we find in Indian philosophy. Both the schools of thought that consider the individual self to be an illusion and those that affirm its existence as a real entity share the idea that achieving spiritual liberation implies transcending the desires and purposes of individual selves here and now. To that end, one will have to understand the true nature of mind and consciousness, and one might strategically cultivate some emotions and desires, directing them in the right way. Thus, for Indian thinkers, the ultimate aim and value of this sort of knowledge is soteriological: achieving spiritual liberation.

After this cross-cultural interlude, Part Two of the volume, "The Emotions, Self-Knowledge and Self-Ignorance", returns to Western philosophy and explores the contributions that specific emotions and affective phenomena can make to self-knowledge or self-ignorance. It begins with an exploration of self-esteem by Bortolan in Chapter 6. Here, Bortolan argues that self-esteem is an "existential feeling", a background affective orientation that shapes the range of things a person can get to know about themselves. In other words, the relationship between self-knowledge and the feeling of our own self-worth is not a one-way street, with self-esteem being simply the product of how we evaluate the things we know about ourselves. Rather, how we feel about ourselves determines which pieces of self-knowledge we are able to obtain and incorporate into our self-concept. Someone with an appropriate degree of self-esteem will be able to integrate all kinds of information about themselves, both positive and negative, into their self-concept, and allow this information to feed into their general level of self-esteem. By contrast, people at the extremes, with either too high (grandiose narcissism) or too low degrees of self-esteem (impostor syndrome), will find it very difficult or impossible to integrate into their self-concept information that contradicts how they feel about themselves. In that way, this affective orientation can either enable or hinder self-knowledge, and in any case, shape it.

Moving on from our self-esteem to our feelings for other people, in Chapter 7 Lopez-Cantero offers us an exploration of how romantic love, in its different stages, impacts on our self-understanding. Most accounts of love define it not as a simple emotional state (like joy, anger, or fear), but as something more complex and long-lasting: a sentiment, a syndrome or a disposition. Thus, it is often argued that love has a narrative structure, a view that Lopez-Cantero endorses. And it is through this narrative structure, through the ways in which love makes us think narratively

about our past and our future together with our loved one, that love changes our self-understanding. According to Lopez-Cantero, falling in love (be it suddenly or gradually) brings about a newfound existential feeling that “things make sense”, which opens up a new branch of possibilities about the future and gives momentum to the love narrative. This momentum is maintained during the middle stage of love, when lovers co-construct and shape their shared possibilities. At the end of love, the existential feeling of things making sense gets lost and the narrative momentum disappears, which ends the love narrative. Thus, one’s understanding of oneself, one’s future possibilities and one’s past is once again altered at the end of love. In this way, love strongly shapes our self-understanding from beginning to end. Now, as Lopez-Cantero suggests, both the pleasant and the painful elements of love and loving relations can push us to construct narratives that are delusional or self-deceiving, but the risks of self-deception are not exclusive to love, and in most cases paying attention to this sentiment allows us to get to know a crucial dimension of who we are.

Chapter 8, by Gómez Ramos, deals with a very different affective phenomenon: boredom. While love connects us to the relations that matter most and fill our lives, boredom confronts us with emptiness and with our insignificance in the face of endless time. At least, that is what many of the authors discussed in this chapter think. Here, Gómez Ramos surveys a large body of literature on boredom, encompassing sociology, cultural studies, and philosophy, he presents a taxonomy of different varieties of boredom and focuses a more intense systematic gaze on two varieties: superficial and profound boredom. While superficial boredom is a familiar mood that anyone can experience when one lacks interesting stimuli, profound boredom is presented as a deeper state that is culturally linked to Modernity, and that arises as a mood that connects to an existence devoid of meaning. This kind of boredom can teach us something about ourselves, about our smallness; it can make us humbler. But at the same time, inasmuch as profound boredom is socially produced and it is connected to certain forms of organizing work and entertainment, it also can tell a lot about how social life may preclude self-knowledge or contribute to it. Therefore, boredom can contribute to self-knowledge, but it also easily pushes us away from it, it can spur a masking endeavor driven by a wish to flee from its discomfort.

Thus, we come to the two final chapters of the volume, which address head-on the threats of self-deception and the ways in which certain emotions, far from fostering self-knowledge, entail strong intrinsic motivations to turn away from it. Chapter 9, authored by the editors Salice and Montes Sánchez, is an exploration of the characteristic and systematic ways in which envy leads to self-deception in the context of identity-based discrimination. By amplifying on their previous account of envy (Salice and Montes Sánchez 2019), they discuss the political relevance of this emotion, which they understand as a group-based, intrinsically hostile attitude that feeds on feelings of inferiority and impotence. In particular, they elaborate on the suggestion, originally presented by Sara Protasi (2021), that—at least certain forms of—racial hatred are fueled by envy. Their account relies on the idea that, to overcome the disturbing experience of envy, the subject can revise the evaluations that ground their emotion, thereby indulging in specific forms of self-deception. Some of these forms are already known in the literature surrounding so-called “emotional mechanisms” (Salice and Salmela 2022), which has shown how envy can transmute into commiseration or moral

indignation towards the rival. The authors advance this literature by explaining how envy can also lead to racial or xenophobic hatred. This is especially the case when the envious subject conceives of their rival as being member of a group that enjoys what are perceived to be unwarranted social privileges that enhance their recognition by a reference group. Rather than acknowledging their envy and, in fact, in order to discard this unpleasant emotion, the envious subject is happy to confabulate about the rival as an individual instantiating an evil social nature and, in so doing, to turn them into an object of their hatred.

Continuing and expanding on this line of thought, in Chapter 10 Vendrell Ferran closes the volume with an investigation into the self-deceptive styles that characterize different hostile affective states. Vendrell Ferran contends that certain negative affective states, such as jealousy, envy, contempt, hatred or Ressentiment, bear inherent motivations for subjects to deceive themselves about what they are feeling. This is because these states, or at least some of their varieties, imply a diminution in their subject's feelings of self-worth, which trigger self-deceptive maneuvers to escape from them. Thus, a self-deceptive style is the characteristic way in which each affective state pushes subjects to escape self-knowledge in order to avoid a distressing impact on their self-esteem. Not all hostile affective states are identical in this respect, though. As Vendrell Ferran shows, self-deception and self-ignorance can come in degrees, and some strategies to ignore certain emotions can blind the subject more than others. According to her comparison, what she calls malicious hatred leaves its subject epistemically worse off than envy.

The volume thus closes on a somewhat pessimistic note, emphasizing the power of certain affective states to mask self-knowledge. But the pressures that such states exert are not inescapable, and the picture is balanced by other chapters, which emphasize the potential of affective phenomena to reveal essential aspects of ourselves and of our identities, both personal and social, and to call our attention to facets of them we would rather ignore. The chapters also suggest many questions that remain unanswered: How do we overcome the obstacles to emotional self-knowledge? What role—if any—do epistemic virtues play in this regard? When is emotional self-knowledge good and when and how does it turn bad? In which further respects is it valuable? How do affective phenomena interact with our beliefs, judgments and desires to constitute our self-knowledge? Does emotional self-knowledge have to be conceptualized or do our emotions “know” things we cannot conceptualize? This is just a sample of the many important questions that have yet to be addressed by a philosophy of self-knowledge that recognizes the crucial place of affectivity in making us who we are. In the meantime, we hope that this volume will testify to the richness of its topic and inspire others to join us in pursuing a rich research agenda on emotional self-knowledge.

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