DP2011 AZIZ

Why Did Occidental Modernity Fail in the Arab Middle East: the Failed Modern State?

Sardar Aziz

PhD thesis (2011)

Department of Government

University College Cork

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE Library CORK

Table of Contents

Acknowledgments.....2

Abstract.....6

Introduction.....7

I. Literature Review

1.1 Literature Review.....21
1.2The External Commentators.....21
1.3 Culturalists.....23
1.4 Modernisation Theory.....29
1.5 Rentier State Theory.....31
1.6 Hybrid Sovereignty
Interpretations.....36
1.7 Internal Interpretations.....38
1. 8Modernity and the State.....49
1.9 Conclusion.....52

2. Background

2.1 The Background.....57
2.2 The Politics of Survival.....63
2.3 The Identity of the State
Elite.....66
2.4 The Ottoman Era.....67
2.5 Napoleon Expeditions
and the Arrival of Modernity.....71
2.6 Genesis of the FMS.....77
2.7 The Nahza.....80
2.8The Colonial Making.....83
2.9The Debacle 1967.....87
2.10 Conclusion.....89

3. Concept

3.1The concept: Failed Modern State (FMS).....91
3.2The Concept.....91

3.3The Failure.....93
3.4The Ellipses (tradition).....101
3.5The Modern.....104
3.6 Modernity in the FMS.....107
3.7 The State.....113
3.8 On the Tool.....115
3.9 The Prohibition of Society.....120
3.10 The FMS as a Void.....121
3.11 Conclusion.....124

4. Camp

4.1 How the FMS Functions: the Camp.....126
4.2 The external Factors.....129
4.3 Why the Camp.....133
4.4 The State of Exception and FMS.....139
4.5 The Camp and the Opposition.....140
4.6The Camp Economy.....153
4.7 Conclusion.....158

5. The Mosque (tradition)

5.1 Tradition.....160
5.2 The Mosque.....161
5.3 The Machine of Anti Politics.....170
5.4 The Mosque as a
Source of Legitimacy.....173
5.5 The Mosque as Home
in the Homeless Society.....176
5.6The Mosque as an
Ideological State Apparatus (ISA).....182
5.7 The Impossibility of Secularism.....186
5.8Can the Mosque Play the
Role of Civil Society.....188
5.9 Conclusion.....190

6. Modernity: the Military

6.1 The Military and the
State.....192

6.2 State Military
Relationship.....193
6.3 The State and Violence.....194
6.4 Modernity and the Military.....197
6.5 The Failed Modern
State and the Military.....199
6.6 The Spectre of Coup.....201
6.7 To Name the State-military
Relation in the FMS.....202
6.8 The Making of
the Mercenary.....204
6.9 Reconceptualising the Mercenary.....206
6.10 The Case of Saudi Arabia.....212
6.11 Conclusion.....216

Conclusion.....220

Bibliography.....234

I declare that this thesis has not been submitted as an exercise for a degree at this or any other university and it is entirely my work.

Professor Stuart Croft	Dr. Seamus O'Tuama	Dr. Andrew Cottey
University of Warwick	University College Cork	University College Cork

Acknowledgements:

The list of people I should rightly include here would likely wind up being long enough to make an extra chapter. However, I will do my best. First and foremost, I would like to thank my partner, PhD candidate herself, Barbara Siller, who supplied tasty Italian cappuccinos with love, during endless moments of crisis and frustrations. The second first person is our son Namo: he provided opportunity to have a break from the doom and gloom of the text: this thesis would, of course, not have been possible without them.

There are many others, first and foremost: my supervisor Dr. Andrew Cottey, who was patient, supportive and a very professional guide. Working under his supervision was rewarding and always a good feeling. There are others who helped make this thesis possible; first and foremost, Patricia Gosch who helped to keep me sane and smiling through these gruelling years. Tim McCarthy, his excellent English, his honest and direct sense of humour words; I cannot say how grateful I am to him. I would like to thank sincerely Allan Cosgrave for his valuable help. I would like to thank sincerely, many people in the Department of Government especially Seamus O'Tuama. I appreciate the postgraduates in the Government Department at the University of Cork, whose encouragement, support, seminar questions, made this so much easier to handle.

Million thanks to my mother who never understood what I am doing but nevertheless generously offered unconditional love and support. I also would like to mention my father, sisters and brothers who are immensely proud of what I do and cannot wait for me to finish.

I declare that this thesis has not been submitted as an exercise for a degree at this or any other university and it is entirely my work.

Abstract

This thesis asks a straightforward but nevertheless a complex question, that is: Why did modernity fail in the Arab Middle East? The notion of modernity in this thesis signifies the occidental modernity which reached the region in many different forms and through various channels. This occidental modernity had an impact on many areas and changed the societies and politics of the region. But these changes stopped short of reaching modernity, in other words it failed to change the society from traditional to modern. The failure of the emergence of a modern society in the region has been a puzzle for those who work on the Middle East. There are plethora of theories, concepts and models attempting to demystify this puzzle. This thesis regards the emerged form of the States and the sovereign in the region as the prime cause behind this failure. The thesis advances a new way of conceptualising statehood and politics in the Middle East: the Failed Modern State (FMS). The key features of the FMS are as follows: the sovereign is the state; both modern and traditional elements are utilised by the state elites; the territory of the state is a space where roles and functions of everything changes. The main features which distinguish the FMS analysis from other analyses of the Middle East are as follows: it does not emphases' one area or aspect; it shows how both modern and traditional tools are necessary for the survival of the State; the Failed Modern State is neither modern nor traditional and resists being either. The FMS mages to reduce both modernity and traditional aspects into tools, this enables the FMS sovereigns to utilise both as instruments. Modern and traditional forces used by the FMS to balance the power, to justify acts, divide society and being able to rule it and conquer it. This makes reform and change difficult if not impossible.

Introduction

For Arab or Middle Eastern modernity there is more than one point of departure. The departure is the moment of *yaqza* waking up, or *nahza* standing up, or *ba'th* rebirth, or essentially *asr altanur alarabi,* the era of Arab renaissance. All these adjectives or concepts are related directly to an event or a mega event. This naming, conceptualising and describing shows what the Arabs wanted from modernity and how they pictured it. These events have occurred either in the region or in the birthplace of modernity (Europe). One of the main events that happened in Europe which affected directly or consequently the region is the French Revolution. As Lewis (1961: 40) puts it:

> The French Revolution was the first great movement of ideas in Western Christendom that had any real effect on the world of Islam. Despite the long confrontation of Christendom and Islam across the Mediterranean, and their numberless contacts, in peace and in war, from Syria to Spain, such earlier European movements as the Renaissance and the Reformation woke no echo and found no response among the Muslim peoples.

While this makes an event like the French Revolution the moment of contact and subsequently the commencement of modernity, others trace the beginning of modernity, in the region, back to the arrival of printing and the emergence of newspapers (az-Zubi: 2006: 40). However, it has been argued that "if any date is to be chosen as marking the end of an era of a long Arab sleep, it will be the day on which Napoleon set foot on Egyptian soil in 1789" (Atiyah, 1958: 73). The notion of sleep is rather thought provoking. Most concepts used in translation for modernity or renaissances in Arabic are related to the act of end of sleeping (wakening). "The idea of modernity rests on rupture" (Dube, 2002: 729): it is the end of an era and the beginning of a new one. The era that has ended, or was supposed to have ended, was an era of a long sleep. Sleep is an action-less form of being in the world. The sleeper is present in the world with no communication, no participation. This signifies that the Arabs were in the world but without any effect.

This long sleep has to be ended. The moment of realisation, of being asleep, happened only when the Arabs faced modernity. This awareness of modernity for the inhabitants of the Middle East manifested itself through many different channels. As a result, attempts were made in various ways by the people, to create the possibility of changing their society and their role in

it, to such a degree and in such a fashion as to make it, in the way they understood the concept, *modern* (Watenpaugh, 2006: 4). But the effort was never fully neutral; at the end becoming the Other was always wrapped with fear and hesitation.

> I say we have not become fully part of Western Civilization because we have only taken from it what is in conformity with traditions and customs of the various races which make up our state. This has caused both material and cultural harm.... For if we just copy Europeans, we will disavow our origins and acquire an antipathy toward our [past]. Instead, we should follow them as closely as possible in the way in which they protect their own race and homeland. We should strive to protect our noble language and ways just as they protect their languages and ways (Watenpaugh, 2006: 4).

The above quote is a paragraph of a speech that was delivered in 1910 in the city of Aleppo (Syria) by Fathallah Qastun, *al-Sha"b* [The People] newspaper editor. The speech crystallises the dilemma that emerged with the arrival of modernity which is the re-emergence of tradition. As Watenpaugh (2006: 5) comments, the most striking feature of the lecture is Qastun's conclusion "his incorporation of the 'essence' of the West and not just its material culture was vital to the survival of his society; moreover, the preeminent threat was not only that West but rather, an *irrational* attachment to tradition and custom".

Modernity made the West regard itself as the centre of the world. From this centre, armies (a modern product) with their new weapons (another modern product) departed the cold continent toward the rest of the world. A long era of colonialism commenced. The discourse of colonialism was always a mission to civilize the other. When Baghdad fell in March 19th, 1917, Lieut. General Sir Stanley Maude issued a proclamation to the inhabitants of the city. In it he stated "[B]ut our armies do not come into your cities and lands as conquerors or enemies, but as liberators" (quoted from Harper magazine, May 2003: 31). The invasion was reported back as liberation on 16th March 1917. Edmund Candler reported in the Manchester Guardian:

> Our vanguard entered Baghdad soon after nine o'clock this morning. The city is approached by an unmetalled road between palm groves and orange gardens. Crowds of Baghdadis came out to meet us: Persians, Krabe, Jew, Armenians, Chaldeans and Christians of diverse sects and races. They lined the streets, balconies and roofs, hurrahing and clapping their hands. Groups of schoolchildren danced in front of us, shouting and cheering, and the women of the city turned out in their holiday dresses. The

> people of the city have been robbed to supply the Turkish army for the last two years. The oppression was becoming unendurable, and during the last week it degenerated into brigandage. I am told that the mere mention of the British was punishable, and the people were afraid to talk freely about the war.

The coloniser aimed at transformation of the region. With their arrival in Iraq the British Empire embarked on the transformation of Mesopotamia.

> Through the provision of technical experts, labour and material for the construction of ships, wharves, railways, dams, canals, harbours and so on, in what was conceived of as a developmental effort, an effort to stake out the land of two rivers as a material object. By 'development' I mean a statist effort to use public investment for the avowed purpose of raising a colony into a modern nation state (Satia, 2007: 213).

The coloniser had a vision that by supplying technical experts and establishing shipping wharves, railways, dams, canals, harbours to the people the country reaches modernity.

> The modern notion of colonial development was a highly contingent product of the expansion of the British Empire into the Middle East. The idea of developing Iraq fulfilled certain military and cultural needs generated by the Great War: in a country famous for its former glory as the cradle of civilization, and against the backdrop of the technological undoing of civilization on the Western front, it offered proof of the constructive powers of modern technology and the British Empire (Satia, 2007: 213).

Elsewhere the coloniser had the same mission and played the same game. However, as a result of intervention, contact and exchange, the region changed, improved but never developed. The idea of separating the wealth of the land from the people and transporting it elsewhere to fulfil certain purposes, continued in a different fashion. If the colonisers separated the wealth from the people, the emerging states continued in a similar vein. Despite the arrival of modern ideas and techniques, there was a lack of force to drive it toward modernity.

The States that emerged, after WWII, were handed over to the local elites who were collaborating with the colonisers. The ruling classes which took over power, in those states, at the end of the colonial era, to paraphrase Fanon (2001: 120), were an under-developed middle class. This emerging ruling class was easily convinced that it could advantageously replace the colonial power. Through mimicking their previous coloniser, the new leader, of the new States, wanted to be like the coloniser. They created the circumstances to wield and maintain their

power. This condition has been seen widely as unsophisticated by both outside and local population and thus interpreted in a rather essentialist manner.

The elites, who came to power with help from the outside, treated the State as booty. Their dilemma was not how to improve it, make it more legitimate or democratic. Their main concern was and remained hitherto the same, how to hold onto power and survive. They utilised both modernity and tradition toward this end. In the newly created condition modernity became a counter modern force. The creators of these conditions were the new elites and their states. Thus the State ended up being the main impediment to completing the development of the project of modernity.

In this case modernity has to be imagined as a body whose spirit has been taken out by the State. The Saudi writer, Mansur al-Hazimi (1988: 385-91), describes the Saudi man walking the streets of London with "his suit of pure English wool, his French tie made of fine genuine silk, his Italian shoes of the best leather, and his expensive Swiss watch," as being "a walking showcase of the industries of the entire world". Therefore, as Elmusa (1997: 345-46) commented:

> The technology that inundated Saudi Arabia is essentially of the consumer type, except for the capital-intensive, petrochemical industry run largely by expatriates. It lacks backward and forward linkages: it neither takes from nor gives to local production or science. It is bereft of background and foreground, as if having descended from the heavens on a society that was not culturally prepared to receive it.

Technology is the material side of modernity. Especially when Middle Eastern people are neither making it nor creating it, this materiality remains nothing but an aesthetic object. While the spiritual side of modernity- rights, reason, innovation and philosophy- which prepare the ground for human beings to participate in the world, become more active and depart from the world of tradition. In a Kantian sense (in his newspaper article; 'What is Enlightenment' 1748) (quoted from Foucault, 2007: 29) the spiritual side of modernity is assisting people to understand the world and its affairs without guidance from the other. It also encourages the individual to have the courage to know. This aspect of modernity, a secular, human love for knowledge, was blocked by the political elite and replaced by a revival of tradition, especially religion. This

obsession with tradition resulted in diverting from the exigency of modernity in a non material area.

Thus the religion and its institutions (mosques, mullah, traditional charisma, and others) end up becoming the Ideological Apparatus of the State. In contrast to Europe the emergence of the modern state project did not aim to marginalise pre-modern political cleavages and jurisdictions and replace them with the institutions of a centralised state. However, the emergent postcolonial rulers claimed supremacy of sovereignty, over the people, resources, and, ultimately, over all other authorities within the territory it controlled. In this way it fulfilled the Weberian definition of the State. This contradiction remains hitherto unresolved. Thus while the State was imposed from the outside, vertically, it was never able to engage in a horizontal dialogue with the people that it claimed to rule. If in the West, especially in the 19th century, the State attempted to solve this gap through the idea of nationalism, in the Middle East nationalism as such has never materialised. After the French Revolution the State, the secular state, after breaking with religion invented the idea of nation to fill the void left behind by the separation of the State and church. In this regard Nationalism aimed "to overcome local ethno-cultural diversity and to produce standardized citizens whose loyalties to the nation [and its state] would be unchallenged by extra-societal allegiances" (Robertson, 1990: 49).

The Arab form of nationalism was pan-nationalism. A nationalism that claimed to unite all the Arab land from the Ocean (Atlantic) to the Gulf (Persian) as the slogan of the Arab Ba'th Party called for. This grandiosity directly threatened the local elite and their wealth; therefore it was opposed vehemently by all the local leaders; especially in the Persian Gulf region. However, this call for pan-nationalism when it was put into practice, as in Iraqi and Syrian nationalisation, betrayed what it was advocating and soon ended up to be nothing more than a thin veneer to cover the reality of tribal control, as in the case of Saddam's Iraq, and the particular sect dominance in Asad's Syria.

This emerged State from the date of its inception to the present time is in a struggle with the population that inhabit its territory. In Europe, in the course of the struggle for democracy and ordinary people's rights, the subjects of the State constituted themselves as citizens on whose sovereignty as a collective the power and legitimacy of the State was claimed to rest. As a

result sovereignty was transferred from the monarchical ruler to the people, and the people were defined as the sum of legally equal citizens. In the States of the Arab Middle East every struggle toward emancipation and becoming a citizen, no matter how trivial is brutally aborted by the State and its apparatuses.

One of the main groups of activists (modernisers) in the regime are the intellectuals; those who are aware of the West and their own society, to a certain degree. Arab intellectuals are divided into two main strata: those with the State and those opposing it. Pro-State intellectuals run the media machine of the State. They are no more than propagandist. This group surrendered to the State and abandoned any acts of criticism. Whereas the intellectuals who are independents and view the State from a critical point of view, are marginalised or exiled by the State. Despite these differences both groups are caught in a phantasmagorical world. For both groups the main concern, at a rhetorical level, is how to make the Arab a global power again, as in the glorified past. As alJabri shows, in his book *Naqd al Khitab alArabi* (Critique of the Arab Discourse) (1994), the whole understanding of the renaissance *nahza* among most Arab thinkers is not based on reality. These intellectuals resembled the protagonist of Ivan Turgenev's novel, *Fathers and Sons.* T he novel was published in 1862 and in it Turgenev sketched the struggle in mid-nineteenth-century Russia between a feeble liberalism and a merciless Jacobin revolt. In Bazarov, the novel's central character, Turgenev created a sombre figure doomed to destruction because he still stands only in the gateway of the future. "The Arab Bazarovs could not win: they, too, were only in the gateway of the future" (Ajami, 1997: 138).

Most of the work of Arab intellectuals is text based, since their culture is dominated by a text, a holy text namely the Quran. Drawing on a text and ignoring reality is a sort of fashion. When they adapted this method to the Western modern texts they ended up being caught within the text. If the text reflects the dream and aspiration of modernity or it is modernity in its utopian form, then the Arab intellectuals are arrested inside that utopian dream. This is a hazardous game as Deleuze (1998) cautioned his student during a lecture, 'Beware of the dream of the other, because if you are caught in the dream of the other you are fucked' (quoted from Bucher, 2005: 138).

This situation of being caught in a dream of the other led most Arab intellectuals to have difficulty in relating to the reality. The deprivation of reality also distanced them from the reality of most people's lives. Hence, they could not engage with people and as a result have no link to them. This absence of any relation made those intellectuals who wished to stand against the authority to end up isolated. This being nowhere, made swinging attitudes and contradictory stands to be common practice. The Iraqi writer Khalid al-Maaly (2006) in a biographical anecdote elaborates that. In an article for the German newspaper '*Berliner Zeitung*' alMaaly wrote:

> During the 1980s, a friend of mine – a left-wing, secular-minded Syrian writer living in Paris at that time – surprised me by his open admiration for the newly organised Hizbullah. At first I thought his admiration was merely a passing fancy. But when Iraq occupied Kuwait in 1990, he and I finally collided. He could not disguise his delight at the "annexation" of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein's troops, which made me regard his secular, leftist views as a joke. Yet his career led him ever deeper into the arena of the struggle for human rights. With European financial support, he issued a periodic newsletter on human rights, which for years had not a word to say about Saddam's crimes, nor about women's rights. Meanwhile his relations with Arab Islamist groups, especially the Muslim Brotherhood, deepened steadily.
> His joy over the 9/11 attacks, as well as his admiration for Osama bin Laden and his "blow at the heart of America," fit the rest of his political development only too well. He constantly sought justifications for Islamist acts of violence, as if he were acting under the ancient Arab tribal principle that, no matter what internal differences we might have, we must stand together as one man against an aggressor.

alMaaly (2006) insists that this attitude is not an exception: "Unfortunately, this brief biographical sketch might all too easily be extended to a large proportion of Arab intellectuals. Many of them are characterised by a carefully masked double standard." This duplicity is not limited to the individual intellectuals per se. It is the common attitude among those who adapt the modern Western political theory and practice. A theological belief in Marxism was a common practice among the Arab Lefts throughout Cold War. These included belief such as West's demise is imminent, because of the dominance of capitalism and the latter digging grave for itself every day. Their inability to understand the canonical modern texts and consequently to relate them to reality resulted in sloganification: reducing it to a slogan. In other words the dominance of rhetoric over reality. This has been elegantly articulated in a detailed book entitled

'alArab Zahira Sawtya', العرب صاهره صوتيه 'Arabs a Phonetic Phenomena' (1977) (2002) by the Saudi thinker Abdullah al-Qasimi).

This can be extended to almost all political belief, Marxist, nationalist, existentialist, etc. Surprisingly, this practice is also affecting to a large degree, especially methodologically, modern political Islam. The prioritising of the text and insisting that reality and humans have to change and adapt to the text, which is a clear justification for violence, is a trend among the followers and the thinkers of the fundamental Islam. It is not Islam that is wrong it is the people, is one of their common slogans. Roxanne Euben (1999 :81) quoting from Olivier Roy (1994) in his book the Failure of Political Islam "it is Marxism that is the mirror and foil of the Islamist effort". For Euben herself Qutb's, the theoretical father of the Muslim Brotherhood, echoing of the Marxist theory is "striking" (1999: 78).

What invigorates this phenomenon of being trapped in the dream of the other- of being unable to realise the reality- is the role the State plays in relation to those who disagree and oppose the State. The State eliminates any sort of neutral or free public space. The public space is the sphere of public action and critique freed from the constraints of the mosque and the State, which is essential to democratic citizenship. It is the realm in which citizens engage in collective deliberation and in joint action on behalf of the public good. But the States and its apparatuses in the Arab Middle East are compacted in a manner to pull the citizens away from the public space to a private world. The controlled public spheres within the territory of the Arab Middle Eastern States produce silence or permit only talks that are unrelated to the political reality. In this case tradition and its various components are utilised, by the States, meticulously to enhance such an arrangement. For instance, women and youths make up the vast majority of the population of these states, but the State manages through utilisation of tradition to push them into the margin.

The trick is quite simple. In tradition of the region, especially in Islam, the family is essential. Every family is run like a small state. It is common that the family has the head, and the head is the father. This structure makes the father to be the natural and the normal representative of the rest of the family. The Arabic concept used for this is *rab ala'lla* رب العائله or *rab alausra*, رب الاسره، *rab* is god. Thus, women and youth end up being unrepresented and

silent. This is continually pushed by the mosque and the political Islam. The State is always willing to compromise to traditional forces on such issues.

Observing and analysing this reality resulted in coining the concept or the theory of the Failed Modern State (FMS). The phrase is composed of three concepts, namely: failure, modernity and state. It indicates that the State is in a perpetual process of halting, in other words, failing to reach modernity. The reason behind that is rather apparent. Allowing the society to develop into a modern stage, automatically results in the disappearance of the current form of the States. Therefore, in order for the current structure of the States in the region to survive it has to become an impediment to completion of modernity. This situation of failing modernity, simultaneously, maintains tradition to balance or to fill the void left as a result of the failed modern. In other words, traditions like modernity similarly hold the State in a permanent state of failure.

The FMS, to borrow the title phrase from Richard Rorty (1994) in his description of religion "is the conversation stopper". But the essence of religion, as Rorty later on articulated "is trying to put off invoking conversation-stoppers as long as possible" (Rorty, 2003: 148). In order for the conversation and discussion to take place there needs to be a free space. It is conditioned that this space has to be beyond the control of authority. Such a space is not permitted in the FMS. The FMS record is dark when it comes to such a place. It controls media, harasses journalists, does not permit freedom of information, freedom of expression or freedom of communication. There is not any room for democracy, development, human rights or a prosperous society in the FMS.

The FMS is a phrase cramped over each other and forced to carry a particular meaning. It qualifies to be a paradigm. Like a paradigm attempting to solve a puzzle, it raises new puzzles. While it combines three different notions namely, failure, modern and state, it hides within it an ellipse, which is tradition. Modernity in this context is seen as military, bureaucracy, technology and the international system. While the notion of the State itself, a state based on territory, sovereignty is a modern phenomenon. In this particular case the FMS is neither modern nor traditional. It is the outcome of the combination of the two. This is not suggesting a hybrid state,

modern and tradition, within the space of the State are neither merging nor producing any new synthesis. Tradition contains many different components, for instance: tribe, religion, family, and sect. These are all invariably used, in different areas to serve the State and its elite. The coming together of the two components, namely tradition and modernity, in the body of the State, does not result in dialectical relationships. This State, despite being in the middle of a journey, is not in a state of transition. Despite containing opposing components, these States are rather static. The State neutralises the opposing forces and eliminates any existing contradictions. Any change which does not empower the State, regardless of how trivial, is barred. The State as a body becomes a buffer zone and changes both the forces into a component, instrument or tool that ultimately only enhances the State's survival. The dialectical relationship between tradition and modernity within the space of the State is proscribed because of the potentiality of change. Moreover, both tradition and modernity are emptied out. They are no more independent forces. They a re utilised by the State to guarantee the survival of the State. Thus, modernity and tradition are two main pillars of the State. They are the State's means of communicating and linking to the population. The aim of making a tool of everything is Machiavellian in essence. To reduce something to a tool is to utilise it. To utilise is to use without being related to. A tool functions without demand. Modernity and tradition are both equally reduced to just instruments and these instruments are monopolised by the State to create conditions and circumstances that assures the continuation of the State itself. By becoming a tool both tradition and modernity their essence changes to a level that they are becoming means to different aims than they are supposed to bring.

The concept of failure crystallises this tool relationship. It is failure to reach the desired end. But the failure in this particular case is premeditated by the State. The State fails modernity, or rather more accurately, holds modernity in the state of failure. A similar process is done with tradition. This failure status of both modernity and tradition gives privilege to the ruling elite who have neither full modernity nor full traditional qualities but appear to have them both. This neither nor situation makes a void which, provides the rulers with an advantage to turn themselves and their s ystems a ccordingly as the winds and pressure, either internal or the external, demand, and meanwhile avoiding any actual transformation in the system of the State. This tool relationship changes the nature, role and function of every component of society and

the State. The mosque becomes an ideological state apparatus. The soldier in the army functions as a mercenary. The whole society metamorphoses into a Camp.

Modern is referring to modernity, the occidental modernity. However, it is not in the remit of this thesis to investigate the project of the Western modernity. Nevertheless, it is necessary to define what is meant by occidental modernity. Modernity is a complex multi-layered movement which has its own social, intellectual, scientific, philosophical and political dimensions. This project has its own distinctive commencements in every different location. It is associated with particular events in different regions.


> To be modern signified to be anti-medieval, in an antinomy in which the concept 'medieval' incarnated narrow-mindedness, dogmatism, and above all the constraints of authority. It was Voltaire shouting "*Ecrasez l'infime*." It was Milton in Paradise Lost virtually celebrating Lucifer. It was all the classical "Revolutions" - the English, the American, and the French to be sure, but also the Russian and the Chinese. In the United States, it was the doctrine of the separation of church and state, the first Ten Amendments to the Constitution, the Emancipation Proclamation, Clarence Darrow at the Scopes trial, Brown vs. the Board of Education, and Roe vs. Wade (Wallerstein, 1995: 473).

Modernity, the project of becoming modern, in the Arab Middle East, is synonymous with catching up, becoming different, overcoming the time lag, causing the rupture with tradition, etc. This polysemy crystallises the complexity surrounding the notion and the implementation of modernity.

To summarise, the occidental "modernity contained three elements: a concept of rational thought, a new system of states, and a formula for church/state relations (Alan, 2003: 58). The events that mark the beginning of modernity in the region are simultaneously events that mark the arrival of the modern, hence modernity commenced after arrival from the West. Thus it did not emerge from tradition of the region. This arrival is also entangled with other events like the arrival of Western military, defeat of local power, wakening up, realisation, and commencement of modernisation.

One of the most organised and robust institutions emerging after the arrival of modernity was the State. This state is a postcolonial-state. Thus the FMS is a form of a postcolonial state.

As a form this form of the State is one of the most stubborn impediments to development, democratisation and rule of law.



The above diagram is the structure of the FMS. As the diagram shows the State relates to the masses equally through tradition and modernity. The State is the sovereign. Through tradition, religion custom, history, *Assabiya* (group linkage), values, the State manages to penetrate feeling, imagination, and consciousness. Utilising these has practical effect in the way the State functions. Similarly through modernity the State counterbalances tradition and controls it, moreover modernity offers the State technology and the art of power.

In his *Of Grammatology* Jacques Derrida (1997: 158) stated that "There is nothing outside of the text, there is no outside-text." In the same text he says "I believe that a generalized writing is not just the idea of a system to be invented, a hypothetical characteristic or a future possibility" (1997:112). These statements paved the way for those who follow him, and employ his postmodern approach, to turn the text into an 'imperialistic' entity, "extending the realm of script and with it the rule of scribes, to all aspect of human existence, and perhaps on existence in general" (Weber, 2008: 228).

regimes versus democratic regimes. It analyses the art of governance as practised in the region. It shows how the state and the elite are in fusion, how the former metamorphosed into a complex machine that is able to survive all the challenges from inside and outside.

The thesis layout is as follows: the literature review chapter reviews and analyses the main concepts. In the background chapter selected events are chosen and explored. These events shed light on the genealogy of the Failed Modern State. They also put the emergence of the FMS in perspective. The following chapter is dedicated to the FMS concept. The chapter lays out the components of the concept and explains what each single word in the Failed Modern State phrase indicates. The chapter on the camp explains how the FMS functions. The camp signifies centrality and the omnipresence of the state. It shows how it is impossible for one to experience life individually. There two case studies which make up two separate chapters: the first one is the mosque. In this chapter the role of the mosque as an example from tradition, its relation to the state and the elite is analysed. The second case study concerns the military. The military in the Failed Modern State functions as mercenary. The soldiers are not foreigners' nevertheless they are perceived by the general public as foreigners. Their loyalty is only to their master, the state elite. These elites regard the people as their potential enemy. The final part is the thesis conclusion.

1.1 Literature Review

A lot has been written, from various different schools, about the Arab Middle Eastern States' experience of modernisation. Therefore, any attempt to review all the literature concerning this issue would be an impossible endeavour. In order to overcome this challenge in this thesis the key existing literature on this subject has been divided generally into two main streams namely, the external and internal literatures.

The external are those scholars who are approaching the issue from the outside with an outsider's eyes and interests. These could be classified as Orientalists both positively and negatively. The internal scholars reside in the region and write with passion and missionary zeal. Each group highlights and prioritises different aspects and sees the situation from a different point of view. This chapter reviews each of these approaches separately and attempts to unveil their holes and shortfalls.

1.2 External Commentators

This group i.e. the external commentators, after Edward Said's landmark book 'Orientalism,' lost their advantageous status. Said argues that "in studying the other's culture and politics one faces two choices, either to put intellect at the service of power or at the service of criticism, community, dialogue, and moral sense" (2003: 172). For him clearly most of the external scholars served power rather than otherwise. Said emphasises that "all knowledge is interpretation, and that interpretation must be self-conscious in its methods and its aims if it is to be vigilant and humane, if it is also to arrive at knowledge" (Said, 1997: 170). This fear is reiterated and expanded by another veteran Middle Eastern scholar Maxime Rodinson (1976: 84) for him:

> Books on the contemporary Arabian Peninsula tend to be rather impressionistic. Some are journalistic accounts or travelogues, others superficial narratives which use flowery language to conceal their author's lack of understanding; others still are the works of orientalists who naïvely believe that their knowledge of medieval Islam is adequate preparation for understanding the Arab world of today.

Accordingly, there are generally two groups of Western scholars, namely (a) those who are the servants of power and (b) those who lack sufficient knowledge about the region. Serving power and making up assumptions about the region signifies that the people and their culture, their habit and their history are misrepresented. To misrepresent is to represent according to one's own interests. This is done through creating false imagery, assumptions, and false statements in order to serve a particular purpose, which is usually different than the interest of the real interest of the people who have been misrepresented. In the other words, throughout time Orientalists have been falsifying the reality of these people. As a reaction to this, Hasan Hanafi (1991) called for the establishment of a science called *istighrab* (occidentalism), for the purpose of systematically studying and scientifically understanding the West, pretty much the way the West had studied the East through its science of *istishraq* (Orientalism).

What is rather conspicuous is the political mission of Said's project. Said was puzzled why America on the one hand has vital interests and oil investments in the Arab world and on the other hand its strategies and policies have always favoured Israel. Said's Orientalism was an attempt to answer that question.

> The system of ideological fictions I have been calling Orientalism has serious implications not only because it is intellectually discreditable. For the United States today is heavily invested in the Middle East, more heavily than anywhere else on earth: the Middle East experts who advise policymakers are imbued with Orientalism almost to a person. Most of this investment, appropriately enough, is built on foundations of sand, since the experts instruct policy on the basis of such marketable abstractions as political elites, modernization and stability, most of which are simply the old Orientalist stereotypes dressed up in policy jargon, and most of which have been completely inadequate to describe what took place (Said, 2003: 321).

Said and his work has been criticised widely, both by Western Orientalists and Arab scholars. For Hashim Salih (2009), Said was not a specialist in the area that he worked on, his area of specialisation was comparative literature. Therefore he missed a large number of works that were different to the picture he painted. For al-Azm (2010) Said was political in his approach. Therefore, according to what is stated above, what Said was criticising in the other he was doing it himself. His writing has a political mission, like any other Orientalist and he was cherry-picking in choosing his sources.

The Orientalist approach appears in two folds namely ignoring the reality on the ground and apologising for injustice when it is required. Said's conceptualisation signifies anti-Orientalism, while classical Orientalisim signifies the study of the East by the Western scholar. Post-Said the anti-Orientalists approach has renounced almost all sense of critical approach and they are apologetic for every form of violation and torture, including masses murder, under the banner of cultural relativism. This surreal situation is described by one Syrian political thinker as ethereal.

> [I]n an ethereal in-between so beloved of postmodern anthropologists and perplexed politicians and strategists in Non-Governmental Organizations, and increasingly by official instances of many states and international organizations, including the UN. This accounts to a large extent for the recent tendency towards a radical relativism regarding the study of matters Islamic, under the title of cultural specificity which, like other forms of exoticism, I take to be a grid of misrecognition (al-Azama, 2003: 25).

There is no doubt that many of those who addressed the Middle East and its situation, did so to serve a particular interest. Therefore they ignored the reality of the situation. Equally the anti-Orientalist approach ignores the reality on the ground and is more concerned about answering the Orientalists claims.

1.3 Culturalists

Failure of the non-Westerners, among them the Arabs and Muslims, to become modern, has been one of the subjects that numerous Western thinker, have commented on throughout the last two centuries. Among these non-Westerners the Muslims and the Middle Easterners particularly received a lion share of comments and theorisations. One of the most influential and dominant explanations in this area is culture. For an influential sociological thinker like Max Weber the project of modernity is a unique Western experience.

> Only the Occident knows the State in the modern sense, with a constitution, specialized officialdom, and the concept of citizenship. Beginnings of this institution in antiquity and in the Orient were never able to develop fully. Only the Occident knows rational law, made by jurists and rationally interpreted and applied, and in the Occident is found the concept of citizen (civis Romanus, citoyen, bourgeois) because only in the Occident does the city exist in the specific sense of the word. Furthermore, only the Occident possesses science in the present-day sense of the world. Theology, philosophy and reflection on the ultimate problems of life were known to the Chinese and the Hindu, perhaps even of a depth unmatched by the European; but a rational science and in connection with it a rational technology remained unknown to those civilizations (Weber, 1961: 232-33).

Weber, during his lectures in Munich University in the Winter Semester of 1919-1920, did not hesitating to specify modernity to the 'occident'. Elsewhere, Weber emphasises that a particular Western religion, Protestantism, Calvinism, played a significant role in making modernity in the West, particularly Europe. He asks question such as what made capitalism. What moved the entrepreneur to act as he did – to live simply, to work hard, to coin sayings like 'time is money' and to reinvest in production. For him these particular patterns of behaviour have a root in Luther's and Calvin's new interpretation of religion. For Weber many of the early entrepreneurs were influenced by the Calvinist strand of the Reformation. The Reformation, which was a Western type of reforming Christianity, among many things, accentuates the doctrine of 'predestination' – that those who would gain salvation were 'pre-designated'. Given that Luther had deemed to remove the medium between God and human, which indicates that man, is 'alone' before God. Combining the 'salvation status' and the exercise of 'private judgement', Weber argues that 'worldly success' was interpreted as a sign of salvation. Combining the Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism shows how the Protestant work ethic became the capitalist work ethic. This is a clear sign claiming that the project of modernity is a unique European experience. Its uniqueness implies its impossibility to replicate to copy or to migrate. Thus, based on these grand premises, there are a herd of Weberian followers who take a culturalist view of Islamic societies attempts at modernisation.

Holding culture the prime responsibility for the failure of modernity in the Arab Middle East, by scholars outside of the region is common. This issue is outlined vividly by Afshin Matin-asgari (2004: 293):

> Much intellectual effort, in academic circles as well as in the larger political and cultural arena, is devoted to probing many of the world's problems in terms of a clash between secular modernity and religious tradition. At the center of this controversy is a critique of Islam, treated as a more or less coherent culture, civilization, or historical tradition. Typically, Islamic 'fundamentalism' is seen as the prototype of religious extremism. And Islamic 'civilization,' according to scholars such as Bernard Lewis and Samuel P. Huntington, has remained 'backward' in comparison with 'the West,' because 'something went wrong' earlier in 'Islamic history.'

In his article Afshin Matin-asgari (2004) examines the works of "trend-setting scholars" including "Marshal G. Hodgson, Clifford Geertz, and Ernest Gellner". In summing up his article Matin-asgari draws a number of conclusions among them

> [T]his basic Weberian fallacy defines societies, or historical eras, primarily in terms of their cultural 'ethos,' often articulated in religion. This fallacy is deeply ethnocentric, positing a model of 'Occidental' culture endowed with superior rationality, science, law, and economy; these qualities are rooted in religious transformations that are unique to 'the West,' and either missing or impossible to develop elsewhere in the world, again due primarily to rigid and stagnant 'non-Western' cultural and religious norms (Afshin Matin-asgari, 2004: 300).

The consequence of this cultural understanding is that the Western scholars rarely hold the State of the ruling elite as responsible. The state is always seen as essential. This view sets a premise that no matter how undemocratic and abusive of human rights these states are; still they are more moderate and progressive than their mass. Talking about women's rights in the Arab countries Bernard Lewis (1996) (2002: 81) states:

> Westerners tend naturally to assume that the emancipation of women is part of liberalisation and that women will consequently fare better under liberal than under autocratic regimes. Such an assumption is dubious and often untrue. Among Arab countries, the legal emancipation of women went furthest in Iraq and South Yemen, both ruled by notoriously repressive regimes. It lagged behind in Egypt, in many ways the most tolerant and open of Arab societies. It is in such societies that public opinion, still mainly male and mainly conservative, resists change. Women's rights have suffered the most serious reverses in countries where fundamentalists have influence or where, as in Iran, they rule. The emancipation of women is one of the main grievances of the fundamentalists and its reversal is in the forefront of their program.

Here Lewis, because of his fixed ideological believe either fails or refuses to trace the genealogy and the causes of the emergence of fundamental Islam. Also through a misleading interpretation of now, the current, he attempts to establish a formula that modernity is only possible when it is forced. This view, of forcing modernity on the population, in other words modernity from above, is so hegemonic that it refuses to depart from the area of Middle Eastern study. Regarding the State as the only agent of modernisation consequently ends up making the State the legitimate father of modernity. In his interpretation of the failure of modernity the French philosopher Bernard Levy (2004: XVI) regard the issue as "the problem of Islam". Accordingly, it is Islam as

a culture and a religion, which is not compatible with modernity. Islam is seen as an "obscurantist vision of the world that could not mix with modernity".

The interpretation of the phenomenon of modernity was never far from politics and power. The majority of these thinkers in some way or other served a particular political system. This approach has been documented and commented on by Edward W. Said (2003) in his book *Orientalism*. Said's thesis is built upon the premise that there is no such thing as neutral knowledge. For him all knowledge, especially those with regard to the other, is contaminated with power. It follows that all Western knowledge of, say, the Middle East or south Asia must wittingly or unwittingly serve the purposes of imperialism.

> Under the general heading of the knowledge of the Orient and within the umbrella of Western hegemony over the Orient during the period from the end of the eighteenth century, there emerged a complex Orient suitable for study in the Academy, for the display in the museum, for reconstruction in the colonial office, for theoretical illustration in anthropological, biological, linguistic, racial, and historical theses about mankind and the universe, for instances of economic and sociological theories of development, revolution, cultural personality or religious character (Said, 2003).

The political interest demanded an essentialist approach toward the occident: essentialism means simplifying and solidifying. Thus this view is the dominant viewpoint among the external thinkers. For this purpose areas like religion, nature, culture and mind are regarded as responsible for this cataclysmic failure. These comments come from every political orientation.

> The absence of private property is indeed the key to the whole of the East ... But how does it come about the Orientals did not arrive at landed property, even in its landed form? I think it is mainly due to the climate, taken in connection with the nature of the soil, especially with the great stretches of desert, which extend from the Sahara straight across Arabia, Persia, India, Tartary up to the highest Asiatic plateau. Artificial irrigation is here the first condition of agriculture and this is a matter either for the communes, the provinces or the central government (Marx and Engels, 1959: 312).

For Marx and Engels the absence of private property indicates the absence of capitalism, which also means the absence of wealth, surplus, and dialectical movement of history: in a nutshell, the absence of modernity. In the same token Wittfogel (1957) argues, Asiatic and among them Egypt, Mesopotamia are "hydraulic civilizations". These civilisations were quite different from those of the West. He believed that wherever irrigation required substantial and

centralized control, government representatives monopolised political power and dominated the economy, resulting in an absolutist managerial state. In addition, there was a close identification of these officials with the dominant religion and an atrophy of other centres of power. The bureaucratic network directed the forced labour for irrigation projects. The power of the hydraulic state is greater than the power of government in free enterprise systems. It extends over society as a whole by limiting property rights, by taxation and confiscation a variety of managerial measures that "prevent the nongovernmental forces of society from crystallizing into independent bodies strong enough to counterbalance and control the political machine." Often benevolent in form, hydraulic despotism is oppressive in content, and its "total power spells total corruption, total terror, total submission and total loneliness" (Mattick, 1958:23)

Both Marx-Engels and Wittfogel, share the viewpoint that the centrality of the State is the prime cause of creating despotism. Both theses are at best outdated. Neither land nor irrigation plays a big role in the revenue of these states today. Both disregarded the human agent as an independent history maker. They also regard the Middle Eastern people as natural as opposed to cultural people. Wittfogel's approach is driven from Marx's thesis. "In the last few decades, Wittfogel's theories have been summarily dismissed by critics who claim that small-scale irrigation societies have evolved around the world without developing in to the hydraulic states purportedly predicted by Wittfogel" (Price, 1994: 187). Marx's view is a pre-technological view. Today with the help of technology a capitalist form of state can emerge and function in the desert. What can be appreciated from Marx's view is the absence of communication and ultimately, in contrast to the occidental capitalist society, the non-dialectical structure of power in the region. But in the contemporary world the structure of capitalism is far more complex. Capitalism in contrast to what Marx believed does not advocate infinite and out of control progress.

There is a striking similarity among the most dominant viewpoints from outsiders on the failure of modernity in the Middle East. Whether it is culture, religion or nature, it is an essentialist, simplistic approach. Moreover, they are one dimensional. They all indicate that human beings as an agent have no role to play they are passive, irrational and surrendered. All these approaches insist that the possibility of change in the region is nill.

Modernity necessitates an end to man's self or the externally imposed immaturity. These theories argue that a rupture with the imposed immaturity is an impossible endeavour in the region. If there is verification that the region went into a long sleep until the arrival of the Western power, this does not necessarily indicate that the region is doomed to remain the same eternally. If culture, nature and mind are capable of creating an un-modern condition, then these qualities to resist the wave of modernity require maintenance by an organised force or power. There is no doubt that culture and nature contributes both negatively and positively into the making of the current situation but ultimately it is the human being that activates those particular sources into a designed end. In the West the emergence of modernity prepared the space for people to rupture with the conditions that imposed immaturity. Modernity that arrived in the Arab Middle East, the State led modernity, failed or had no intention of creating such a space that supports the individuals to leave their immature condition.

Despite their focus on the State and the prime roll of the State these theories at best fail to interpret the current complex structure of the State in the region. These interpretations believe that society and politics is the natural product of cultural and natural factors. These invariables remain to produce similar politics and state structure infinitely. In a speech delivered at the Stanford University on February 25, 1992 and later on published in the Public Culture journal 1999, Charles Taylor distinguished between two kinds of theories of modernity, which he called "cultural" and "acultural". For him the "culture" theory of modernity is one that characterizes the transformations which have happened in the modern West mainly in terms of the rise of a new culture. By contrast, an "acultural" theory is one that describes these transformations in terms of some culture-neutral operation.

> By this I meant an operation which is not defined in terms of the specific cultures it carries us from and to, but is rather seen as of a type which any traditional culture could undergo. An example of an acultural type of theory indeed a paradigm case, would be one which conceives of modernity as the growth of reason, defined in various ways (e.g., as the growth of scientific consciousness, or the development of a secular outlook, or the rise of instrumental rationality, or an ever-clearer distinction between fact-finding and evaluation). The emergence of modernity is not bound by a particular culture. It is rather a cultural neutral phenomenon (Taylor, 1999: 154).

1.4 Modernisation Theory

Theoretically, modernisation is a path set by the West, the colonial power, and their local agents, to reach modernity. This path supposedly begins with a rupture with the past, tradition, locality, and superstition. Therefore, it is an evolutionary process: with both a clear departure and obvious arrival points. As Karl Marx in his *Preface to the First German Edition of Capital* Volume One in 1867 puts it "The country that is more developed industrially only shows, to the less developed, the image of its own future". Accordingly there is only one way toward the future and this unique way is universal. For Pappé (2007:8) modernisation "is more an ideology than a reality".

During the 1950s modernisation theories were prominent in the academic agenda and modernisation theorists optimistically and confidently wrote about the future of democracy in "belated modernities". The overall expectation was that the process of economic development and the pace of modernisation would ultimately create and consolidate democratic regimes. Modernisation theory claimed that establishing the structure automatically and imminently results in the desired object. In the other word the future can be engineered. It is a rather Marxian view which regards the human being as a product of its milieu. This view was influential among the colonial agents who made the Middle East.

> If we supply an aggregate of human beings, more or less homogeneous in language and religion, with a little assistance and a good deal of advice, if we protect them from the external aggression and discourage internal violence, they will speedily and spontaneously organize themselves into a democratic state on modern lines (Naiden, 2007: 59).

That was how the Sykes-Picot Agreement in 1916 planned the region. The nation states or the mimicry of the nation state that were established in the region have neither aim nor capacity to develop toward realising modernity. Instead of producing proletariat, labour, capitalism or market the arrival of modernity in a country like Iraq, Iraqi economist Muhammad Salman Hassan argues, that it generated pre-capitalist *iqta* system (Haj, 1997:9). The *iqta* is a modern agrarian system characterised by a patriarchal mechanism of labour control.

In the heart of the project of modernity there is a "Faustian drive to submit the entire world to the absolute control of man under the steady guide of knowledge" (Castro-Gómez, 2002: 270). This indicates the supremacy of reason, necessity of a free public space, use of language, and ultimately respect for human beings. The importance of the State in making and realising this process cannot be disputed. The State is a "central instance: from which the mechanisms of control over the natural and social world are distributed and coordinated" (Gomez, 2002: 270). The State is the "rational organization". Therefore

> The State is understood as the sphere in which all societal interests reach a point of "synthesis," that is, the locus which formulates collective goals valid for everyone. This requires the application of "rational criteria" that permit the State to channel the desires, interests, and emotions of citizens toward its own goals. The modern state thus not only acquires a monopoly on violence, but also uses it to rationally "direct" the activities of its citizens in accordance with previously established scientific criteria (Castro-Gómez, 2002: 270).

But obviously, the States that were established by the colonisers lacked these ingredients. Therefore instead of becoming a rational organisation for realising a rational project like modernity, the States in the region, became more as an obstacle. This state is neither exceptional nor transitional. It is there to stay. The parents of these States, "were unquestionably Western", the "midwife the local elites" (Pappé, 2007: 1). The forms of State that emerged resided on the surface, or rather were planted on the surface. In their structure resembled grass; they locate on the surface and grow very little roots. They never developed into a tree. These states were a rhizome (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987) and remained as a rhizome. In all of their functions of communication, supply, movement, war, renewal, building, and destruction they are rhizomatic, in the other word they remain on the surface, avoid having any root, like a nomad, like grass.

> Modernization as a method was disdainful of anything that stood in the way of progress as they defined it. The modernisation theorists hoped to short-circuit the give-and-take of politics and instead substitute fact, knowledge, and the indisputsable authority of science. Unruly traditional societies had to be reorganized to make individuals subject to the epistemological control of social science . . . The modernization theorist's attitude of scientific authority marginalized competing sources of knowledge and identity that provided grounds for political resistance . . . At its core lay the eidolon of rationalist modernism: total knowledge about [the means of creating] a society free from both want and dissent, with boredom as its most threatening feature. [Modernization theory] left little room for the emancipator democratic egalitarianism that Habermas has promoted as

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE Library CORK

a necessary ethical foil to the Enlightenment exaltation of instrumental reason (Engerman et al, 2003: 8-9).

1.5 Rentier State Theory

If the cultural variable falls short of explaining the political structure and most importantly the failure of modernity, another dominant theory, which attempts to answer the question, is the Rentier theory. The Rentier theory is a complex theory. However, it appears above all to be an economics based explanation, the Rentier theory has its deep roots in the nature, modernity and the culture of the region. The Rentier approach emphasises the role of the rent money, then the source of the rent is a natural resource and this natural resource is only valuable because of the advancement and arrival of modernity in the region and elsewhere in the world. Modern technologies (excavation and shipping) and the world market play a big role in making the rent. The Rentier theory was postulated by Hossein Mahdavy (Iranian economist) with respect to pre-revolutionary Pahlavi Iran in 1970; the idea has since been appropriated by a community of Middle East specialists (Yates, 1996: 11), mostly outsiders, in their discussion of the Arab world. Furthermore the origin of the theory is European based; the Rentier theory is also called the *Dutch Disease* (Yates, 1996: 28).

The Rentier is a concept based on the rent. Rent is defined as "the income derived from the gift of nature" (Beblawi, 1990:85). When the State is relying on rent, as the only source of income then it is a non-productive state. Giacomo Luciani (1990) introduced the formula "Allocation vs. Production States" categorises the Arab Middle Eastern states, especially those with substantial oil revenue, as the States that are non-productive and their main activity is the allocation of rent that they derive from their natural wealth. Expanding from the same perspective Hazem Beblawi (1990) in '*The Rentier State in the Arab World*' argued that those states that derived most or a substantial part of their revenues from the outside world and whose functioning of the political system depends to a large degree on accruing the external revenues that can be classified as rents, showed a remarkably different political dynamic than other (i.e. productive) states. However, Beblawi and Luciani argued that the Rentier effects are not confined to the oil-exporting states alone.

The question here is; does the concept of Rentier demystify the nature and the structure of the State in the Arab Middle East? If the main activity of the Rentier state is allocation, it indicates that there is no system of taxation. Taxation as a form of exchanges establishes a relationship between the taxpayer and the State, the relationship of duties and rights. Thus taxation has been regarded as a matter for development. When the State is not taxing it indicates that it has "autonomy from the citizens" as Moore (2004) puts it: "the State apparatus, and the people who control it, have a guaranteed source of income that makes them independent of their citizens" (Moore, 2004: 306). Moore continues to outline the main features of the Rentier State structure:

- The external intervention, oil being a strategic commodity, concern about the security of supply has motivated political and military intervention. This as result has increased the autonomy of these states in relation to their citizens.
- Coupism and countercoupism. It is very tempting for those not at the very centre of power to try to take over by force.
- Absence of incentive for civic politics. Dependency on oil revenues affects the general tenor of civilian politics, and reduces that through two very mechanisms, that citizen will not engage in politics in a civic fashion.
- Ineffective public bureaucracy, there is little incentive to establish inefficient public bureaucracy (Moore, 2004: 306).

The Rentier as economic model has an impact on other political and social areas. It eventually results in what Beblawi (1987: 52) called the "Rentier mentality" and "Rentier ethics". For individual in these states non-economic criteria such as closeness to the ruling elites, showing loyalty, remaining silent and being apolitical are the main ways of earning income. Rentierism, as a mode of behaviour, is an apolitical form of politics, results in reinforcement of traditional aspects of the State. Since the member of a particular tribe, sect or religion is more trusted and as a result the income of rent is distributed on them to the basis of their memberships of the group right and loyalty, the Rentier economy and politics enhance the State's traditional origins, as it regenerates the tribal hierarchy consisting of varying layers of beneficiaries with the ruling elite on top, in the effective position of buying loyalty through their distributive power. The theory assumes that as the State is not dependent on taxation, there is far less demand for political participation.

Brynen (1992) and Luciani (1988) focused on the authoritarian consequences of Rentierism. In their view, since the State revenues are dependent on the international market, rather than domestic production, the ruling elites are much less constrained by the interests of domestic groups and social classes. Rentier politics, as a result, is different from the situation where the State's appropriation of societal resources through taxation spurs the population to seek a greater voice in the allocation of state expenditures. The State-society relationship is of a different sort in a Rentier economy. It is premised on the State's providing welfare for its people and the people keeping aloof from political participation. "Indeed, if anything the slogan of the American Revolution--"no taxation without representation"- is reversed: in a Rentier state, state-society relations seem predicated on the principle of "no taxation, no representation", quoted from Moadde, M. (2002: 377).

Rentier theory indicates that both modernity and tradition are used and utilised by the State in areas of economy, politics and society. In the heart of the Rentier theory there is a clear indication for utilisation: in other words, it means manipulating both tradition and modernity for the survival of the State elite. Moreover the theory is unable to analyse in detail the structure of the system and it fails to address and answer many vital questions. The Rentier presumes "that the financial autonomy of oil states grants them immunity from social pressures" (Okruhlik, 1999: 295). This interpretation is not as uncomplicated as it seems. It argues that the State provides welfare for its people on a condition that the people keep aloof from political participation. This indicates that there is a contract. It is an unwritten and unspoken contract. A contract built on the basis that individuals trade their own political rights for economic gains. But this contract is only assumed, imagined by the authorities. This makes the act of allocation by the State a political act. The trade is goods for rights. Thus the act of distribution of goods is a political act par excellence. Therefore, the Rentier system, instead of providing stability to the regimes, often fosters its own civil opposition because of the way revenues are deployed (Okruhlik, 1999: 295).

Moreover, the theory suffers from many other serious shortfalls which make in at the end an interpretation far from reality on the ground. Historically, the rent is not a new phenomenon in the Arab Middle East. Ibn Khaldun in his famous book *al-muqaddimah* has pointed out that Arab

tradition does not look upon effort favourably. There are numerous concepts and events such as *ghazo* (booty), *karam* (generosity) which Arabs are known for. It is *muruoha*, manhood, to distribute. Based on that the ruling elite, by taking all the wealth and engaging in the act of allocation, are not only securing their own survival but also practicing an ultimate act of manhood. Culturally, historically and socially, when one gives, when one distributes, one is in a better and higher position. This also indicates that the effort taking, the hard working is not a guarantee of respect from the community. Therefore, as Hafez (2009) puts it, the Arab culture despises effort. This makes it closely if not directly associated with rent.

This historical and cultural evidence disputes the essence of Rentier theory. When people receive goods and economic supplements from the government they do not interpret it as having to renounce their political rights for it. It is rather a norm. This is more so in the case of oil. For what is received from the government by the people in the region, is demanded and expected since everyone regards what they receive as just a small part of their fair share of the oil income. The natural resources are seen and regarded by the public as a public property.

The New York Times journalist Michael Slackman travelled to the Khasaba region in Oman. His travelogue was published in the newspaper on May 14, 2009. "After the change in the regime, the life that was going for generations has changed". The report states:

> Sultan Qaboos provided water and electricity, and over the next 39 years transformed a country that had been hermetically sealed into a modern state. For the older generations, that is more than enough. But like the rest of the Middle East, Oman has a very young population, a generation that did not experience the deprivations of the not-too-distant past. They are generally educated and aware. They want political change, rule of law, freedom of speech, institutions, and a voice.

This crystallises that the policy of Rentierism is not fulfilling its aim. The new generation has new demands. This also indicates that updating gadgets, technological tools are not enough. The "authoritarian systems, no matter how benevolent and right minded, eventually rub up against the human desire for justice and self-determination" as the article prophesies. Quoting from the 32 old Said al-Hashmi the New York Times reporter quotes "for me, for my generation, there are a lot of ambitions, my father, my grandfather, grandmother, they really appreciate this

life. For me, I don't appreciate it like that. We need civil life; we need more democracy or real democracy."

Expressing the 'need for more democracy or real democracy' is a clear sign that the contract which the Rentier theory assumes between the State and the people is not functioning, or at least not any more. More or real democracy is only possible in a real modernity. But Oman is neither real modern nor truly tradition. The system is aware that it is difficult to open the doors to modernity. The Rentier theory assumes success. Moreover, it also assumes that the population is in agreement which trading the politic for economic gains. What Hashmi, the information and research manager of the State Council, says, puts the whole theory into jeopardy, he states, as the journalist quotes, "this is our life, we have to talk about freedom of speech and about public freedoms, and these are not accessories. These are necessities for Omanis in the 21st century."

The Oman situation clearly resembles the rest of the region. For instance in her writing on the Shi'a problem in Saudi Arabia Madawi al-Rasheed (1998: 123) states that "after the confrontations of 1979-1980, the Saudi state realized that a pragmatic approach to the Shi'a problem would be more beneficial. Officials visiting the region immediately after these events openly recognized the social and economic privation of the community and promised to improve the educational, health and economic infrastructure of Shi'a towns".

This shows the typical Rentier mentality approach to social and political unrest. But as she crystallises that "an assessment of the Shi'a opposition in the 1990s shows that economic development in the region did not immediately succeed in pacifying the Shi'a and winning their allegiance" (al-Rasheed, 1998: 123). Another similar point with Oman is the change in demand of the new generation. "Economic development did appeal to traditional Shi'a leaderships, who were satisfied with the promises of the State. However, they did not succeed in pacifying the young Shi'a activists, who were influenced by the rising tide of political Islam in the Middle East, and looked to Iran for inspiration".

1.6 Hybrid Sovereignty Interpretations

In 2008 the Turkish academic Gokhan Bacik published his PhD thesis under the title '*Hybrid Sovereignty in the Arab Middle East: The Cases of Kuwait, Jordan, and Iraq*'. As the title indicates the thesis suggests that the Arab states in the Middle East are hybrid sovereigns. In this circumstances hybrid is the "co-existence of modern and traditional practice" (2008:6), within the formula or the structure of the State. Thus "the intercourse between two completely different models has produced a hybrid strain of sovereignty that is neither completely Western nor traditional". This process of "hybridisation is the inevitable product of the colonial presence in the different culture" (2008: 6-7).

For Bacik the hybrid sovereign "is the result of clash between *de jure* and *de facto* practices." If de jure is colonial then de facto is tradition. This clash between the two is the result of "colonially imposed state structure" (2008: 7). According to Bacik European colonial powers engaged in an "extensive Westernisation" within the region. This process of making the other like the self created a bifurcated legacy in the Arab world. It inevitably led to various clashes.

The word or the concept of clash is not a neutral concept after the publication of Samuel Huntington's book the *Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of the World Order* (1993) (1997). Bacik argues that the clash of two cultural models has three possible consequences:

> (i) The total dominance of one side by the other, and thus the reconstruction of the other by the conquering model
>
> (ii) The models completely reject each other
>
> (iii) The two models gave a way to a hybrid model that is *significantly* different from both of them (2008: 30).

For Bacik the third model is the model on the ground in the Middle East. The first model is the model of the ideal modernity, the idea of the replacement, the rupture, a totally new beginning, different from traditional past. The second model is the model of total rejection and the impossibility of communication. The third model suggests that the partial agreement between two different cultures which hybridises and thus produce the third culture which is *significantly* different from both of them. This is suggesting that distinguishing tradition from modernity in the Arab Middle East is no longer possible.

For Bacik the struggle between modernity and tradition cannot be explained by the "simplistic" notion of failure. In a very apologetic form for all Arab dictators and the inhuman condition in the Arab lands Bacik states "actors cannot be blamed, since they are under the influence of their traditional and social structure" (2008:35). According to Bacik the Arab tradition is resisting modernity, thus modernity cannot become the dominant narrative. There is a part of tradition, despite the influence of modernity, which is resisting and therefore amalgamating with modernity and producing hybridity.

The emergence of the hybrid sovereignty requires both tradition and modernity to coexist together within the same space. There are several questions begging for answers here for instance: who is the agent behind this arrangement. Can both, tradition and modernity, coexist in one terrain? Is their coexistence a perpetual conflict or a true hybrid? Through answering these questions I argue against the belief that the Arab Middle Eastern States are hybrid states. It is true that both tradition and modernity have presence in the socio-political and the State structure in the Arab Middle East. Both lines (tradition and modernity) are struggling for emancipation and domination over the society. But if both tradition and modernity are two horizontal lines there is a vertical line that cuts both of them, that is the line of the State or the State elite.

The concept of hybridity suggests that there is a real mixture, to a degree that neither the modern elements nor traditional ones can be easily recognised. What if it is still possible, is the end, to identify the individual elements that comprise the hybrid? This suggests that in reality there is no hybrid. The situation that exists was born after the marriage of modernity and tradition. After a simple observation, one has no difficulty, to locate the elements of both modernity and tradition within the society and the State. When a hybrid can be disarticulated into its elements, it is a compound without mixture, in other words, it is not a hybrid.

The hybrid form is only occurring in a circumstance where there are perfect conditions for communication. This occurred in an atmosphere where the medium that contains both is neutral. This medium theoretically could be a State. Within this neutral medium there is a possibility of synthesis. But the States in the Middle East are not a neutral medium. When the State reshapes, changes and utilises both tradition and modernity, for its own survival, then both tradition and modernity are no longer an independent forces. Their relationship to each other decided upon by the State. As a result neither traditional groups nor modern groups have the

opportunity to establish a dialectical relationship, to commence a dialogue and to produce a synthesis. Within the sphere of these states the possibility of hybridity is nil.

1.7 Internal Interpretations

In the Middle East modernity-related issues are a daily concern, not only for the intellectual elites or avant-gardes, but for the vast majority of the ordinary people. The demand for democracy, better government, social justice, freedom of information and transparency is rampant among all levels of the society in the region, to a degree that, it is hard to find a daily newspaper without having a piece related to the topic, whether it is news, feature article or an opinion, directly or indirectly focusing on modernity and its related issues. This has been so since the arrival of Napoleon. For instance on the 19th of June 2009, as part of my daily routine I start with reading Kurdish, Arabic and English newspapers. Firstly I opened *alHayat* newspaper, (Arabic daily newspaper published in London and sponsored by the royal Saudi family) in its opinion page there is an article by a Lebanese writer *Karam alHlo* titled '*On the Meaning of Being Auroubi'* (Arab nationalist) in our time`. He wonders if there is any value in presenting Arab nationalism and Arab unity as a path to a promised renaissance and new Arab future, when the Arabs are more loyal to their territorial states, feuding sects and waking tribes. Isn't such a thesis, Arab nationalism, an act of romanticism, he wonders. The article is a review of a book by the Arab Jewish member of the Israeli Knesset, Azmi Bishara under the title '*To Be an Arab Nowadays'* (2009), which was published by *Markaz aldrasat alwahda alarabia* (Centre for the Arab Unity Studies). The article clearly addresses sombre issues like, nationalism, identity, unity, relationship with the other. All these matter and these issues are seen as different ingredients of the project of modernity.

In alQudis Alarabi, a newspaper, which represents the voice of the pan-Arab nationalist point of view, (published in London) Dr. Faisal alHusefi writes under the title, '*the Sovereign and Power (authority) in the Arab Political System'*. Accordingly in the Arab political systems the relationships between the sovereigns and power represent itself in two manifestations. Either everlasting unity between the two or forced rupture. The first one is the norm; even republican

systems are drawn toward the system of inheritance. The second, which include, coup and regime change by the external power, have so far been the only way of changing the systems.

The article addresses issues like dictatorships, the impossibility of change, the marginalisation of the whole population, the absence and the impossibility of democracy. Aside from the broadsheet and daily newspapers there are a large number of blogs, personal websites, journals, pamphlets and books addressing the similar issues. There is no doubt about the high level of obsession with the quest.

Questioning the Arab situation and searching for the cause or the causes of the failure dates back to the late 19th century. It was in 1870 that *Butrus al-Bustani*, wrote an editorial titled "*Why Are We Backward*?" He answers that the "Easterners," particularly those of the Syrian provinces, "lack unity and fraternal love" (Sheehi, 2005: 438). Consequently, his compatriots surrendered themselves to ignorance, sectarianism, materialism, tribal prejudice, and fanaticism, resulting in national division, internal strife, and vulnerability to foreign economic and political expansion. The realisation of ignorance in this case is more condemnation of the ignorant (the person) rather than the ignorance. Despite that early beginning, a more powerful phrasing of the issue dates back to the early decades of the twentieth century. This was expressed in the formulation of a question, a single dominant question. 'The question was: why the other [West] succeeded and we [Arab Muslims] failed'. For its significance the question requires a rather more rigorous analysis.

A reader of the *Al-manar* journal, (a journal that was published by Rashid Rada, who was not an Arab himself), provoked the question for the first time. This indicates that the realisation of the gap between others and the Arabs or Muslims was not realised and not articulated, by the Arabs themselves. The answer was given by Shikib Arsalan (1931) in a book or rather a pamphlet under the title '*limaza taa'khra almuslmoun wa taqadama alakhron'*, Why the Other [West] Succeeded and We [Arabs or Muslims] Failed'. It is not surprising that the answer for the question for Arsalan was in Islam. He holds Muslims responsible for abandoning their religion. He states, as long as the Quran is not regarded, as a manifesto, the renaissance of Muslims is impossible. He also agreed and called that Islam, as a religion, has to be supported by a worldly organisations for instance state. For him the abandonment of the Muslim *ulama* (clerics) of math

and natural science, sciences that established the basis for European progress, is the ignorance by the Ulama rather than by Islam.

What can be concluded from his pamphlet: (a) a separation between Islam as a religion and Muslims as believers, (b) Islam as a religion is pure, complete, a panacea and infinite, (c) therefore, the sources of the failure of the Muslims is their abandonment of Islam, (d) the answer to the question of why Muslims failed and other succeeded is to go back to Islam and its book. Despite that Arsalan is not rejecting the use or utilisation of Western science and technology. Does he suggest a hybrid society where Islam and modernity can coexist together? Is he ignorant of the impact of religion in shaping scientific and political minds? Is he suggesting a permanent dependency on Western technology? What is clear in the answer he offers, if it could be regarded as an answer, is the failed modern formula: to utilise Western modernity in order to succeed with Islam. Hashim Salih in a newspaper article (*alAlsharq alawsat* August 9th 2002) argues 'that his question hitherto remains unanswered'.

Among many other things the question also indicates that the West was the stimulator, the force that awakened Arabs, from their "long sleep". Through this contact the Arabs realised that their present condition is an undesirable situation. This realisation only became apparent after the comparison to the West. But the question is multilayered. On one hand, it asks about the secret of the success of the 'others' i.e. Europeans, which emphasises the importance of understanding the nature of the success of the other. But the question is not based on a scientific comparative a nalysis. It originates from anger and a frustration a fter the realisation of the backwardness. What is noticeable, in term of the chasm between the West and Islam, is a sad unwanted realisation. When the wording of the question indicates, why the other succeeds, there is a clear sense of envy and disbelief. Why the other, who were not in the first place, who were never, successful in the past, in comparison to us the Muslim, now, at this moment, are successful. On the other hand, we [the Arabs or Muslims], who were successful in the past and should have been successful now, have failed. Therefore, it was rather expected within this mind frame that the answer of the question draws from the past, from the heritage, from the glory days. Despite its rational phrasing, the question is based on feeling and desire, thus ultimately it fails to engage in a rigorous analysis and derive toward a rational conclusion.

In addition to all that, the formula of the question sets a premise for the coming scholars in the area. The dichotomy became a mindset of us versus them, failure versus success. The answer always fluctuated between idealisation and demonization, a panacea or the pure evil of Westerners.

The question, or rather the wonderment, established an understanding that the West is or could be a ready-made model which is possible to emulate. This logic was applied similarly to the past. The return to the dystopia of the golden era is also possible for consideration as a model to emulate. This viewpoint highlights that there is no need for an effort to create the whole effort should be on copying. Copying the West or copying the past was seen as the path to salvation.

Focusing on the West diverted the Arab moderniser's efforts from the reality of their own society. They focused mostly on the West and how to catch up, for them the West became a threshold, which consequently hampered the understanding of their own society and themselves. They believed in order to catch up with the West they were required to obtain tools and elements, and moreover they thought there could be borrowed readymade. Thus the prime area of interest was always limited to military technique and equipment, economic programmes, and political ideologies. The Arabs compared themselves to the West, so the modernisation for them ended up to be a process of how to be like the West. In this sense modernity was reduced to a mere act of aping, a process of the externality in technology, fashion, appearance and architecture.

In his book *'uss alatqadm a'nda mofakry alislam'*, the Basis of Progress among the Muslim Thinkers, Fahmy Djad'an (1988: 16) attempts to tackle the problem of progress and how it is being addressed by Muslim thinkers in the modern Arab world. For Djad'an the concept of Arab Muslim thinkers refers to those thinkers who, despite their different opinion and geographical background, regard Islam as a religion, culture and civilisation that should play an effective role in making the social life, culture and politics of the individual. Whereas non-Muslim Arab thinkers are those scholars for whom Islam as a religion, culture and civilisation, does not play any role in their intellectual works. These are also categorised as the Arab or the Muslim secular thinkers for instance: Mansur Fahmy (1886-1959), Taha Hussein (1889-1973), and Ismail Mazhar.

This crude categorisation relates to other dichotomies such as reform/revolution, continuation/rupture, traditional/modern, religious/secular and East/West. But besides this, the Djad'an, book is an example of a trend that sees the study of modernity as a phenomenon in its implication and its fate, among the Arab scholars. For Djad'an and others modernity and modernising society is an issue concerning only the intellectuals. This is the remnant of the heavy influence of modernisation theory. The definition of modernisation as Pappé states "takes for granted not only those local pre-modern pasts are irrelevant but also that, as long as they are not westernised, the locals themselves are not part of a modern history" (2007: 3). In general the intellectuals are divided in three groups: (a) those who are marginalised, (b) those who are exiled and (c) the majority; those who are part of the ideological state apparatus.

It is challenging to address the ineffective role of the intellectuals in the Arab Middle Eastern states. According to Abu-Rabi` (2004, xiii) these intellectuals "failed to produce a critical and constructive Islamic theory of knowledge" they also "failed to inform us as to how to become both 'Muslim' and 'modern'". For him these intellectuals are in state of ineffectiveness. For the intellectuals to be effective, first the State should realise the necessity of knowledge and create a space for freedom and expression. But these States have no public sphere. Thus, there is no neutral sphere where pure communication could be conducted.

In these States the intellectuals are products of the State; "if the present intellectuals are not ready or willing to walk with us, we will create a new generation of the intellectuals, a rather more sympathetic generation, one who has a better understanding to us" (Alkhateb, 2001). This is how the former Syrian minister of information Ahmmad Askander puts it. This leaves no doubt about (a) the identity of the intellectuals (b) the State attitude toward them and (c) the role of the intellectual in the society.

The elite in the Arab Middle East believe, "education is a weapon whose effect depends on who holds it in his hands and at whom it is aimed", as Stalin puts it (1949:281). Therefore, the reliance on the intellectuals to provide the miracle of modernity in a state and a society where the intellectuals have no effective role is a mistake. This originates from the view that every project of modernisation, regardless of the location, time, and culture, has a similar trajectory to the Western modernity process.

In his book, *naqd al khtab al arabi*, (1985) (Critique of the Arab Discourse) al-Jabri concentrates on the discourse of these intellectuals and their illusionary plan to modernise the society. For al-Jabri Arab thinkers despite their different background collectively failed to understand both their own society and the West. For him all the discourses are ideological and have no merit to changing the reality. What is rather intriguing, in the works of these intellectuals, is the almost total absence of the role of the emerged state in the process of modernity in the region.

Many prominent Arab thinkers have attempted to find the reason behind the failure of modernity in the region. Each thinker prioritises an aspect and argues that the improvement of that particular aspect is the key to the renaissance. This view is idealistic and abstract, as Hisham Sharabi (1984) states. Inability to separate the Western discourses from their reality on one hand and similarly being incapable of understanding the self, is the source of this abstract view.

There is more than one adjective, in Arabic language, to describe and consequently name the commencement of the project of modernity. These variations depend on the regional dialect and the influence of the certain foreign language over the local language. I highlight two from Egypt, which are also used in other places, namely *nahdha*, and *tanwer*. The former literally means 'rising up' and the latter indicates 'Enlightenment'. Rising up emphasises that there was once a civilisation, which throughout time faded or failed. Therefore the duty now is to rise up again. The concept invites certain nostalgia toward the past golden age. Based on this premise the scholars in the Arab world are divided between rupture and return. For Hsan Hanfi (1980) the rupture is not accurate, there should be a continuation of the past and its civilisation root, but with change in the form. This thinking has a root in the Arab past. For the Muslim and the Arab thinkers the Greek philosophy was merely a tool that could be utilised to renew the Muslim civilisation, and keep the content untouched. For Abulla Aurawi (1996:10) the return to the past is not an option, thus, there must be a total rupture with this past. This emphasis on the rupture is an attitude which regards the past, the heritage and tradition as obsolete. It is also calling for the total adaptation of the Western modernity project.

Whereas, there are other scholars who consider that the complete continuation of the root, Islam, is the path toward modernity. The supporters of this view primarily come from the Muslim Brotherhoods group. One of the main contemporary thinkers who theorise this view was the Egyptian Said Qutib (1906-1966). In his book *Ma'alm fi altariq*, '*Signposts on the Road*' or

'Milestone' (1980), which later on became the manifesto for every Islamic Political movement. Qutb (1980: 1) states:

> Mankind today is on the brink of a precipice, not because of the danger of complete annihilation which is hanging over its head--this being just a symptom and not the real disease--but because humanity is devoid of those vital values which are necessary not only for its healthy development but also for its real progress. Even the Western world realizes that Western civilization is unable to present any healthy values for the guidance of mankind. It knows that it does not possess anything, which will satisfy its own conscience and justify its existence.

Qutb, on the one hand, totally rejects Western value and on the other hand, he regards this as danger to the Islamic faith. He establishes a dialectical relation between the pure and the decadent: pure being the *salaf (fundament*, the early Islam) and decadent is represented by the Western secular value. The main purpose of this critique is to induce a return to the past. The essential point here is regarding the sovereign; for Qutb and his followers sovereignty is not for man but for Allah. Hence, every form of human sovereignty is *jahillya* (ignorance i.e. the pre-Islamic form of authority). Therefore, it is permitted to be destroyed violently. This is a clear recipe for calamity.

The machine of state plays a pivotal role in Qutb's theory. For him the era of convincing through preaching is over. Islam has to seek power by running the State and consequently implementing Islamic shari'a law. This project is also based on a vision that through unification of Islam under an Islamic state the *nahza* is possible.

There is a secular version of this vision, which is exemplified by pan-Arab nationalism. The Ba'th party, as the only pan-Arab political party, believe in, *umma Arabia wahada that resal khalida* امه عربيه واحده ذات رساله خالده One Arab Nation Bearing an Eternal Message. *Umma* hitherto referred to the Islamic community, not the Arabs, and *Risala* is the word used for God's message transmitted by Muhammad, the Rasool. For pan-Arab nationalist modernity and modernisation is only possible when all Arabs are united in one state. Both Islamism and pan-Arab nationalism invoke an essentialist form of identity. For the political Islam, being Muslim is the identity; while for the pan Arab nationalist an Arab is the one who speaks Arabic. However, in the case of the Baathists being Arab was not as clear as it appears; this was only an empty slogan.

> To Baathists, being an Arab is connected with the degree of loyalty that one has, not only to the idea of "Arabness," but also to the party that carries that idea, that party's central committee, and ultimately, to the party leader. In that sense, it is fascist. Baathist ideology in the pure original sense means you could have ancestors going back hundreds of years in an Arab country and your first language might be Arabic, but still you are not an Arab in the Baathist view. The quality of being an Arab is therefore a subjective and not an objective attribute of an individual (Makiya, 2005: 82).

Both ideologies, the Islamists and the Baathists, authorise the use of violence to achieve their goal. Islamists resemble in many ways the totalitarian system. Like totalitarians they desire to capture the whole, and establish a uniform way of living based on their codes and principles. They also resemble the totalitarian for having an idea or ideology and an aspiration to have a new beginning, whether going back to the past, or purifying the society. But this is hard to confirm for a number of reasons. One, none of the Islamic parties have ever been in power, the implementation of totalitarianism is impossible outside power. Two, the Islamic political parties have no clear view on economy, technology, science, and even the structure of the State, therefore they have no option but to borrow from the Westren modernity, which in the end is similar to the common style of the existing nowadays States they also establish the Islamic version of it i.e. the Islamic version of the FMS.

Contrary to these views there are thinkers who call for adopting the final product of the Western civilisation in both areas of technologies and ideas, since Western civilisation is the dominant and most advanced civilisation. For theses thinkers, mainly the Arab liberals, people like Fawad Zakaria, Ismaile Mazhar, and others, the Arab modernity is a project of catching up. They also confirm that the Western project of modernity is a global or human project. This implies that modernity is singular. Therefore, emulation and adopting is also the only way forward.

These views were condemned by Hisham Sharabi (1984) who contends that the lack of progress, particularly regarding democracy, national unity and human rights, is rooted in the Arabs' failure to break from their patriarchal tradition and internalise modernity. In this regard the main concept he uses to analyse the failure of modernisation, or becoming modern, is what he calls “neopatriarchy” (1988).

While criticising others for idealising the West, Sharabi himself repeats the same practice. In his book prefaces for studying Arab society, he takes an example of a boy in Damascus and compares him with a boy of similar age in Chicago, in his attempt to diagnose the patriarchal system in the society. Hisham Sharabi argues that the boom of oil exports created a new postcolonial political system of neopatriarchy. By this term, Sharabi means a system of political control through tribal-based patronage networks that preserve hierarchal relations of loyalty within an expanding market economy. Key to this hierarchy is a system of male domination that "assign[s] privilege and power to the male at the expense of the female, keeping the latter under crippling legal and social constraints" (1988: 33). Sharabi's concept can be criticised from many different aspects. For instance what were the main forces behind the maintenance of traditional patriarchal system? It is the state that maintains and distorts this process. Through the patriarchal system the State elite managed to marginalise and silence the majority of the population among them young, women, and children; this worked through sustaining traditional family system, which recognise the father as the only speaker and the only representer of the whole family. Beside that Western modern societies are still to a large degree a patriarchal system or modernity as some feminist theories claim is a masculine project. However, as John Willoughby (2008: 184) argues "that the increased educational attainment of women will instead lead to noticeable increases in female labour force participation" without much change in politics or the state structure.

In relation to *tanwer* تنوير the Arabic for enlightenment, the concept "has been used, appropriated, and recycled in multiple milieus ranging from state discourse and the secular intellectuals in the process of co-option by the state to the Islamists and the nationalists" as the Egyptian academic Mona Abaza (2010: 32) explains. Enlightenment is an essential stage in the trajectory of the Western modernity. The fact that the stages of the Arab developments are named by translating the western names into Arabic connotes that the Arabs are imagining themselves to walk in the similar path as Europeans. Today when one unearths contemporary Arab history one comes across every stage of Western modernity by name. But in reality the concept has a different function. Through sloganification of the concept like *tanwer,* enlightenment,

> the government has been trying to sell for the Western "democratic" and free world an image of a civilized, "enlightened" government, combating its "dark" opponents, it has

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE Library CORK

> itself reinvented practices from the Middle Ages, such as publicly stripping and raping female demonstrators, acts that were committed in May 2005 by thugs paid by the regime. The launching of the Campaigns of enlightenment in official and literati circles for more than a decade has run parallel with the regime's mounting of highly barbaric practices in its attempt at harshly disciplining the unruly (Abaza, 2010: 32).

For the state the *tanwer* is nothing but a camouflage to disguise the practice which is in contrast of the essence to every form of enlightenment.

The arrival of modernity instigated tradition. Tradition was the main source of the world view and the discourse of power in pre-modern times. However although it was the dominant and single discourse, it was not a uniform. Nevertheless despite its multiplicity, its main feature was dogma. Tradition, prior to the arrival of modernity was a mere practice which avoided any form of reflection. With the arrival of modernity and the attempt of internalise it led to the emergence of a group called *turathi* those who focused on inheritance. This school tries "to seek our modernity by rethinking our tradition *(turath)*" (al-Jabri, 1999:1).alJabri acknowledges that:

> Voices are clamouring here and there to question, in one way or another, the Arab researchers' concern over tradition: why all the interest in tradition? Is this not an intellectual regression? Some even go as far as referring to a pathological phenomenon, a "collective neurosis" that suddenly hit Arab intellectuals following the 1967 debacle, and caused them to turn backwards in the direction of "tradition." Those who hold such an opinion raise the objection that the interest in the topic of "tradition" diverts minds from the exigencies of modernity (al-Jabri, 1999: 1).

He regards these voices as "delusion". What al-Jabri misses is that the excavation of the heritage by *turath* in the age of Modern did not result in "modern understanding and a contemporary view of tradition" as he puts it, but rather resulted in glorifying the past and regarding it as an alternative to modernity. For al-Jabri modernity is not a process to "refute tradition or break with the past, but rather to upgrade the manner in which we assume our relationship to tradition at the level of what we call 'contemporaneity,' which, for us, means catching up with the great strides that are being made worldwide" (1999: 2). A close reading of the text indicates that modernity, in this regard, is nothing more than a tool to upgrade the past. This also shows that concepts or process such as; change, renewal, or rupture, are totally dismissed. Here tradition has the upper hand and modernity has to serve it in order to continue. If tradition is an inheritance then to inherit is not essentially to receive something it is an active affirmation. In order to be traditional

one must decide how and what to inherit, thus one has to be selective, 'filter' as Derrida (2002: 110) puts it.

Genuine fidelity to a tradition is not literalist traditionalism. Genuine fidelity consists in preserving not simply tradition but the continuity of tradition. As fidelity to a living and hence changing tradition, it requires that one distinguishes between the living and the dead, the flame and the ashes, the gold and the dross" as Strauss, (1965) puts it:

> Within a living tradition, the new is not the opposite of the old but its deepening: one does not understand the old in its depth unless one understands it in the light of such deepening; the new does not emerge through the rejection or annihilation of the old but through its metamorphosis or reshaping. ``And it is a question whether such reshaping is not the best form of annihilation." This is indeed the question: whether the loyal and loving reshaping or reinterpretation of the inherited, or the pitiless burning of the hitherto worshipped, is the best form of annihilation (Strauss, 1965: 24.25).

The Arab traditionalists vary in their relationship to traditional. Some view it as a complete system: "Islam as a total system, complete unto itself, and the final arbiter of life in all its categories" (Mitchell, 1993: 14) as the slogan of the Muslim Brotherhood affirms. This also purports perfection and infinity, (Islam is applicable to all times and all places, another Muslim Brotherhood slogan). On the other hand, the vernacular traditionalists are, at best, unrelated to reality and politics. Their utterances are merely a voice. If for Aristotle, the transition from voice to language was the founding condition of political community, then these people are not political and not establishing a political community either. This makes very few of traditionalists able to be considered compatible with the Straussian interpretation of tradition.

1.8 Modernity and the State

If the emergence of the State as an organisation and idea was the most powerful aspect of the project of Western modernity, then any understanding of a copy or replication of it should be based on an understanding of the origin. How this was original pictured, understood or imagined. A review of cultural and political history reveals that modernity was seen first as a single, compact, and undivided, project and in addition to that, it was also pictured as being a panacea.

The combination of simplification and universal-remedy has a root in the cultural background of the Arabs. Emerging from a strong monolithic religious background, Judaism, Christianity or Islam, it is understandable, that the Arabs, imagining and picturing, even a secular movement like modernity as a unified and uniform project.

Viewing it from philosophical point of view modernity and its arrival was never dealt with as an event. According to Deleuze (2004:172), "with every event, there is indeed the present moment of its actualization, the moment in which the event is embodied in a state of affairs, an individual, or a person, the moment we designate by saying 'here, the moment has come'." The arrival of modernity did not become a moment of realisation, a moment to create a gap or a break in the continuation of the past. The arrival caused a shock but did not produce a new mode of thinking, living or being. What emerged was a reaction: either for or against. This resulted in multiple failures (a) a failure of understanding the Western modernity, (b) of understanding one's self and (c) of delivering any tangible outcome.

For Hardt and Negri this, at best, is misunderstanding, for them (2000:74) "modernity is not a unitary concept but rather appears in at least two modes". The first mode is a radical revolutionary process. This modernity destroys its relations with the past and declares the imminence of the new paradigm of the world and life. This new emergence, however, created a reaction, a counter-revolution which eventually ended up in Thermidor: swinging back toward a pre-revolutionary state.

From that point of view both Hardt and Negri (2000: 76) criticise Samir Amin's genealogy of Euro-centralism theory, Amin outlines:

> If the period of the Renaissance marks a qualitative break in the history of humanity, it is precisely because, from that time on, Europeans become conscious of the idea that the conquest of the world by their civilization is henceforth a possible objective . . . From this moment on, and not before, Eurocentrism crystallizes(1989: 72-73).

For Hardt and Negri (2000: 77) it is the counterrevolutionary power, rather than the revolutionary power, which began to realize the possibility and necessity of subordinating other populations to the European domination. Here too, the second mode of modernity gained the upper hand.

Concluding from that European modernity as a project was far from being a panacea. From its very beginning it marks a "tragic conflict" between a horizontal force aiming at freedom for humanity and a vertical force utilising knowledge to impose the power over the other. The latter became the essence of modernity, which established a mechanism to guarantee the domination through this vertical structure, between colonised and coloniser. This also resulted in a counteraction in a Nietzschen (1989, 1886: 89) sense that fighting monsters raises the possibility of making one *a* monster. Accordingly the institutions established by the coloniser, resemble the essence of the coloniser themselves; therefore, they were not aiming to destroy the relations with the past and declare the immanence of the new paradigm of the world and life. From this perspective the process of modernisation could be criticised as a process that intended to change the non-West society in order to serve the Western society.

Holding the State, and its structure, as the responsible for the failure of modernisation and never reaching modernity in the Arab Middle East, is relatively new. The State itself was always regarded as one of the main products of the modernisation project. The State is the modern element; therefore the State per se was always seen as the *sine qua non* for modernity. But the State, in the West, is the product of a capitalist modernity. In the Middle East the State became the main driver for implementing modernity. This state led modernity is a limited modernity. In the Middle East it is used to enhance and empower the State vis a vis society. Thus modernity never aimed to change or revolutionise tradition. Understanding the relationship between the States, or rather the particular form of the State that emerged in the region and modernity requires first of all understanding of the nature of that state and its identity. To whom that state belonged, and to whom it intended to serve.

The State has the ambition to borrow from modernity and implement it, that drive is paralleled by an equally strong conservative drive, however as much as the States and its apparatuses are driven by necessity to introduce modernity, they are equally driven to limit, and frequently inhibit it in ways which are necessary for them to maintain their control over the power.

But in the last few decades the State as a structure became the focus of scholars, commentators, political scientists and others in the region as the main obstacle confronting the project of modernity. There are different approaches in holding the State responsible. Those like

Burhan Ghalioun (1994) regard the State as a remote entity from the society and the *Umma* the nation. According to him the Arab states are elite states. Others like George Tarabishi (1982) hold the territorial structure of the state as the main factor. Thus the possibility of modernity according to him can only be realised in the unity of Arabs from the Ocean to the Gulf. While other scholars like Khaldun Hassan alNaqib (1991) blame the authoritarian nature of the State. While for Nazih Ayubi as it is clear from the title of his approach, it is the particular structure of the state. He argues that the Arab states are as the title indicates 'Over-stating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle East'.

The notion of 'blackhole State' is the manifestation of the astronomical "black hole" phenomenon. This notion coined in the Arab Human Development Report (2004: 126)

> We can call this the model of the "blackhole State", likening it to the astronomical phenomenon of extinguished stars which gather into a ball and are converted into giant magnetic fields from which even light cannot escape. The modern Arab state, in the political sense, runs close to this model, the executive apparatus resembling a "black hole" which converts its surrounding social environment into a setting in which nothing moves and from which nothing escapes. Like the astronomical black hole, this apparatus in turn forms into a tight ball around which the space is so constricted as to paralyze all movement.

Being a black-hole is a totalitarian desire, totalitarian without being a totalitarian. It is like being God, divine. The report shows how the different elements of modernity are utilised for this aim. If the body of the central executive and the leaders hunger for unlimited power is something from tradition, it is guaranteed in the constitutional texts, which enshrine the right of the king, the president or the emir (or the Revolutionary Command Council) to legislate and vest wide powers in the head of state. According to the report the central executive

> becomes the supreme leader of the executive, the council of ministers, the armed forces, the judiciary and public services, for it is he who appoints and has the power to dismiss ministers, members of the judiciary, senior officials and officers, and it is he who convenes and has the authority to dissolve parliament (where one exists). The laws also prescribe the central control of local authorities, since the ruler appoints governors and prefects, who are responsible to him and not to citizens. The centralization of the executive also shows in bureaucratic expansion, greater state interference in the economy and higher government spending of national resources, particularly on security and military organs. This trend is evident, both in radical states with planned economies and

in conservative states which, from the outset, declared their adherence to the market economy (2004:127).

The black hole is a powerful metaphor. But it is rather more descriptive than analytical. It describes only what is on the surface. It is a metaphor which shows how brutal and totalitarian the State is. Despite its high level of accuracy the metaphor might be misleading. The State has a one way relation with the masseses. It shapes them, assemblages them, toys with traditional and modern values and creates actual and virtual civil wars. It is not only, as the blackhole metaphor indicates a mega machine of control.

1.9 Conclusion

The occidental modernity and its fate in the Arab Middle East has been discussed and analysed, by many scholars, from outside and inside the region and from many different angles. In this thesis these scholars are divided into two categories, the external and internal. This division is not simply geographical. It is also political, economical and cultural. There is no doubt that the strategic place of the area for global politics and its role in world economics influenced the academic and non academic analysis elsewhere in the world. These geostrategic interests are clearly marked on the aim and structure of the external literature. Whereas, the internal literature, which is mainly written by the local Arab intellectuals and thinkers, despite their locality in terms of language and information, as far as methodological and conceptual concerns they are a distortion of the main Western methodological schools, typically characterised either by mimicking or counter-reaction. Moreover every country in the region has a horde of state-owned intellectuals and academics who tend to write more ideological and pro-government works which are of little utility.

The independent Arab writers, scholars and intellectuals have an ambivalent relationship to the West. While they dream of being Western, to live like Westerners and to catch-up with the West, at the same time they celebrate the West's calamities. This attitude influences their view, thus one can claim that their analysis is at best, unconnected to the reality on the ground. The highly secrecy oriented nature of these governments is palpable and constraints abound when any study conducted in this area. This is largely attributed to the nature of power. In general

power is conducted better and more smoothly in a closed secret environment. In addition to that any information leaked or told about these systems is usually done for a different reason than they proclaim. However the nature of these systems, their impact on daily livelihood of the people and their performance of power reveal a great deal of knowledge about the nature of these states.

Moreover, most of the studies on the region, both internal and the external tend to stress on one aspect at the expense of the others. Thus most literature could be described as one dimensional and to some extent superficial. The State in the region has been neglected to some extent or treated as a positive force in implementing the project of modernity. The trajectory of this State, from the moment of its creation, has been marked by a particular and unique architecture. This State, however itself a product of modernity, from the very moment of its inception hijacked over modernity and utilised it for its sovereign elite.

In analysing the reason behind the failure of occidental modernity in the region culture has ascendancy. The culturalists are those who regard culture at an impasse. They either argue that there is no possibility of modernity in other non-Western culture, therefore other are destined to remain in pre modern condition indefinitely. Or the culture has to be reformed to make room for the modern, which is seen as an impossible endeavour. The FMS approach recognises that culture plays a big role in resisting modernity. This is not attributed to the essence of the culture. If the Middle Eastern culture dominated by a religion, Islam it is not unique in its hostility toward modernity, this position is equally shared by every other religions, Abrahamic and non-Abarhamic. The culture hostility toward modernity is more in its mode of utilisation. The incompatibility of Islam and democracy is more in its practice than in theory.

Since the State mainly utilises culture, and the State has no interest in the emergence of a modern society, it is therefore expected that the State would highlight the anti-modern aspect of culture and employs it for that particular purpose. The implementation of occidental Modernity within the sphere of other non-Western culture is evidence against the culturalist claim.

Another dominant concept in the literature concerning the FMS is the Rentier theory. This approach in many ways confirms the FMS theory. This signifies that the authorities in the FMSs are fully aware that curtailing the political rights has to be compensated for. The

compensation here is economic. The Rentier is both modern and tradition. The Rentierism is not possible without modernity. While Reintierism indicates that both modern and tradition has been utilised by the State for the sustenance of the elite power but the approach at the end fails to explain the complex structure of these States in the region. The Rentier theory regards the population of these states as having little interest and awareness of their political rights. Whereas, the empirical evidences on the ground for instance the presence of opposition groups, demonstrates otherwise. Unlike Rentier theory the FMS gives broader focus – in particular on combination of state repression (use of modernity) combined with state cooption (use of tradition). The Rentier is totalizing a part and exaggerating its effect. Moreover, the Rentier interpretation collides with traditional understanding for state subsidy and the role of dolling out as a form of practicing power in the region.

As far as modernisation theory is concerned the socio-economic indicators are inadequate representations of a country's political development or its capacity to democratise. Therefore where analyses of socio-economic indicators fail to unlock development's complex formula, modernisation scholars tend to blame culture as the source of the failure of modernity. Modernisation theory fails to provide an adequate explanation for the persistence and durability of these systems. This theory rather naively, presumes an almost mechanical relationship between levels of economic development and democracy. The Failed Modern State theory adequately explains the possibility of utilising modernity elements; whether it is through economy, technology or institution against modernity itself. Thus the elements which are regarded as basis signs of marching toward the realisation of modernity, within the zone of FMS, metamorphosed to anti-modern elements.

The FMS approach unveils how both modernity and tradition have been equally utilised by the State to serve the State interests. It suggests that the State is hindering every form of communications and acts as a barrier. Thus modern and tradition never have the opportunity to engage in a dialectical relation in a neutral sphere. Modernity is not borrowed by the state to reform or depart from tradition. The main role of modernity within the territory of the state is to counter-balance tradition and update the structure of the state and its power. Furthermore occidental modernity provides valuable services to these states in areas of economics and international relations.

As part of the process of modernisation there has been talk of transition and consequently democratisation. In the past decade academic interest focused almost exclusively on democratisation. Despite borrowing many aspects and elements of modernity the states in the Middle East are not in transition toward the realisation of a modern society. The FMS through its static status confirms this fact. Its only aim is to maintain power in the hand of a small group. Therefore, transition is against the principle of this state. Thus the state itself has no interest in transition and through establishing a cunning formula balances out any transitional demand from outside the realm of the state. As far as the concept of hybrid is concernd; there is no doubt that modernity and Islam are both present within the sphere of the State. However, the relationship is not a dialectical; is not producing a synthesis. The FMS, approach deciphers this unique exceptional status. The FMS requires both modernity and tradition to function and to survive. This State through its apparatuses terminates any engagement between the two parts; therefore it is rather unrealistic to speculate about any sort of exchange. The State throughout its history engaged in this utilisation practice. By reducing, tradition and modernity to a tool it enhances the State's power. Tradition and modernity provide two different domains for communication and meaning.

The literature that tried to address this form of State in most cases avoided the complexity of the structure. It has always assumed that both these two forces are competing and conflicting. The two forces have always been regarded as the makers of the State. Rarely has literature addressed how the State utilises both tradition and modernity. How it reduces them to mere tools. How the State as a medium metamorphoses all the forces within that medium to serve the very interest of the state.

In contrast to the reviewed concepts and theories, the FMS concept does not engage in picking up one aspect and totalising it. It is clear that culture plays a vital role, the economy also has an impact, but more important is the frame within which these factors are functioning. In other words the decisive point is the mode of functioning: how culture functions, how economy is utilised. This indicates that the culture is not responsible per se. T hose coming from a culturalist perspective argue that culture is the determining factor in shaping politics in the region. In contrast to that the FMS concept is neither homogenising nor essentialising. If the state acts as a barrier the emergence of modernity is possible. This makes the FMS concept an anti-

orientalist concept. Moreover contrary to rentier state theory the FMS concept shows that the population are neither apathetic nor apolitical nor willing to trade their political right for a wad of money. In relation to other approaches the FMS concept indicates that these states are not in transition and at best they are not hybrid. The FMS combines two forms of failure; which they act as counter-revolutionary modernities and create immobile static situation which ultimately as a result every aspect of life falls into stagnation.

2.1 Background

> The world, the whole world, in that quaking era, so full of anticipation and possibilities, looked around, as slow as a tortoise, as swift as a bolt of lightning, to question, to listen carefully for distant thunder, watching with dread for the approaching morrow. Then, everything was open to re-evaluation, to reapportionment: ideas, regions, countries, even kings, sultans and little princes. New states rose sud denly, and others vanished (Abdul-alrhaman al Munif in *Ikhtlaf Allul e wal Nahar, Variations on Day and Night*). (Halliday, 2007)

> Closer scrutiny, however, reveals an interesting affinity in the architecture and methods of Arab systems of governance and brings out features of an interwoven regional architecture comprising an Arab "integral whole" in which the systems are mutually reinforcing. It is therefore possible to speak of an "Arab model" of governance with specific traits common to most systems and in turn based on an Arab regional system that constitutes its political infrastructure (UN Development Programme, Arab Human Development Report, 2004: 129).

A coercive despotic system was never alien to the Middle East. In his book '*the Roots of Despotism: a Reading of the Mesopotamian Ancient Literature*', Makwi (1994) traces the phenomena of despotism back to the early Mesopotamian civilisation, especially the Babylonian civilisation. But the contemporary form of the system that dominates the region has a more modern date of birth. These systems, namely the territorial states or the nation-states, are "artificial creations" (AHDR, 2009: 22). The artificial opposes the natural and denotes that there is a maker and an interest behind what is made. To make an artificial entity in most circumstances is to engage in violence. To force what should not be there. This act was done through the reorganization of the political geography, loyalty, demography and culture. The borders of the Arab Middle Eastern states reflect this fact. This was accomplished through a series of treaties between the outside powers themselves on one the hand and on the other hand between the outsiders and the local elites. The artists, who were residing elsewhere, far away from the region mainly in places like London and Paris, fabricated the borders. As (Fromkin, 1989: 17) puts it:

> It was an era (1914-1922) in which Middle Eastern countries and frontiers were fabricated in Europe. Iraq and what we call now Jordan, for example, were British

> inventions; lines drawn on an empty map by British politicians after the First World War; while the boundaries of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iraq were established by a British civil servant in 1922 and the frontier between Moslems and Christians were drawn by French in Syria-Lebanon.

Drawing the borders was followed by the establishment of an "artificial state system" (Fromkin, 1989: 17) and as a result a new characteristic emerged, epitomised in the figure of state or 'statehood' (Bacik, 2008). With the Statehood came government, the territory, sovereignty and nation: notions, which were novel to the culture and politics of the region. While the Europeans were planning the remaking of the region they had to find suitable local representatives to link the newly established system to the locals.

> The new king would be an authentic (and docile) Arab. He might even mollify Arnold Wilson and the Indian army command, who did not like ordering Muslim soldiers to attack the troops of the Caliph. Now they would be ordering these soldiers to fight alongside an Arab king—say, a descendant of the Prophet. And the British found just such a king—Husein ibn Ali, a descendant of the Prophet who was the hereditary custodian of the shrines in Mecca and Medina. The negotiations between Husein and the British, and later between Husein's sons and the British, affected the future of Palestine, Jordan, and what later became Saudi Arabia, but they also affected Iraq (Naiden, 2007:60).

Drawing borders indicates the marking of territory and distinguishing that territory from its surroundings was a modern phenomenon alien to the culture of the region. This designed territory was usually named and then handed over to a sovereign. The sovereign is a modern creature, but the spirit and imagination remained traditional. According to traditional imagination these territories were given which also indicated that they were possessed by the sovereign. This was achieved in the *al a'qer* treaty (al Naqib, 1989: 112). "The significance of *alaqer* was that it linked the border to the sovereign. This was not known in the Arab *mashriq* (east)". The introduction of the border was a paradigm shift in the history and the culture of the region. Historically a marked territory was never a component of the community. The absence of border indicates that there was no such thing as a State. The State is a territorially demarcated institution. In the pre-border era belonging (identity) was tribal and the tribes were nomadic. The nomad is characterised by movement and change, and is unfettered by complex systems of organisation.

The drawing of borders changed the relationship between the inhabitants and their land; as a result the marked territory became a component of the new life. It resulted in limitation and the restriction of mobility and the end of the freedom to wander. This introduction could be interpreted in more than one way. Firstly, when the outside powers, mainly Britain and France, drew the borders they attempted to introduce a similar system of Westphalian State in to the region. These borders were the first step towards the formation of state in the region. Secondly, the borders were a tool to divide and conquer. This particular understanding is common among pan-Arab nationalists. And finally, borders changed the purpose of traditional movement of the nomad, from grazing into a political move. As a result, the border gave those who were residing within its boundary a different form of identity. These were all modern elements forced upon the life of the people. Thus with the emergence of the state as an entity many other organisations and institutions followed, for instance sedentary life style, restriction of movement, new identity, new form of governing and most importantly the emergence of organised force in the shape of army and military.

Whether the border drawing was done through the agreement between the colonial powers and the local elites or between the colonial powers themselves, for instance the Sykes-Picot Agreement (1916) that led to the formation of the States in the region, one thing was given: there was a total absence of the local people and their true representatives. At the Paris Peace Conference of World War I "decisions, by all accounts, including those of the participants, were made with little knowledge of, or concern for, the lands and peoples about which and whom the decisions were made" (Fromkin, 2004: 399). This is a clear sign that the power or the State in the region, from the moment of its formation, was distant, alien and ultimately disregarded the aspiration of its population. This became one of the most enduring legacies of these states: politics without people. At any occasion, when the people demanded participation the States response was a shift from a total neglect to violence.

The emergent States in the region were designed to fulfil interests, which were not necessarily the local people's interest. As Ayubi (1995: 86) observed, the colonial powers were aiming "in redirecting economic relations away from the Middle East and towards Europe."

The new borders were, therefore, the geographical manifestations of more profound changes in the basic premises of the political economy. The most notable of these changes as Samir Amin argues (1978: 25-30), resulted from the colonial policy of redirecting the economy, in particular the agriculture sector, to the needs of the international economic system. Most of the colonial powers, Amin asserted, sought to privatise the system of land ownership, and consequently, redistributed land among those who exhibited readiness to cooperate, mostly among tribal Sheikhs and urban notables. This is particularly correct in the early stage especially before the discovery of oil or in the countries with a significant agriculture sector. These economic ties and high interest were clear and documented by the Western side. A document, issued by the British Foreign Office stated "with the single exception of Egypt there is no foreign country in the Near and Middle East where British commercial interests are so well established and of such extensive scope as Iraq. It is difficult to estimate accurately the amount of British capital invested in the oil industry alone" (Tarbush, 1982: 35). According to the document the economic value of Iraq and Egypt was of great importance.

The lines, which initially were drawn on papers in faraway offices, later on became borders marking the territory of the States. They resulted in the creation of a space for the docile elites, who were chosen by the the external powers. These elites, who were alien to the majority of their populations, for the sake of their own survival traded their wealth for security. Without this the survival of the majority of them was questionable. Therefore, they had to redirect the goods and their economy toward the colonial power. Alien elites, the externally maintained security and redirection of economy became the essential characteristics of the States that emerged. These combinations put together created the possibility of the ruling elites being external from their population. This the externality became possible only because of the arrival of different modern tools and the impact and the need for Western modernity. The subject matter here is the newly emerged States. This State tried to function like every other state elsewhere. This functionary was realised through the capture of movement and the partition of space.

However, these States like every other form of the State have their own particularities. Since "a state-idea, projected, purveyed and variously believed in different societies at different times" (Abrams, 1988), by the same token, the emerged postcolonial state in the Arab Middle East, was seen and purveyed differently in line with local culture. As Abdulla alAurawi (1993:

129) puts it "the contemporary Arab States are a combination of two processes: the continuation of the sultan form and the modern forms of reform". These dualities are strongly present in the emerged postcolonial states. The postcolonial form of state was established to serve two sorts of elites namely internal and external. "The parent were unquestionably Western, the midwife the local elites" (Pappé, 2005: 1).

For Abrame (1988), the State is system and idea. The system is a "palpable nexus of practice and institutional structure centred in government and more or less extensive, unified and dominant in any given society". There is, too "a state-idea, projected, purveyed and variously believed in different societies at different times". Accordingly, the State as a system is universal whereas a state-idea is local. The dominant global form of the State and relatively to the same extent the nationalism is the product of Western modernity. This indicates that the system that is universal is the Western system. Thus the system of the failed postcolonial modern state is Western whereas the State idea is a mix of the local and the external i.e. Western. This shows clearly that neither modernity nor tradition alone can be sufficient enough to form a state.

If, both modernity and tradition are the *sine qua non* in making the postcolonial state, then the similarities in both modernity and tradition reinforce each other. While the differences are not engaging in a dialectical engagement but rather with the careful management of the State elite, through the State machine, they remain parallel to each other. When it comes to the authority and power system: the absolutism and despotism, in the form of kings, caliphs and princes, tainted tradition of the region, hence what followed is the total denial of the people's right. This dominant traditional line merges with one of the dominant narrative of State formation in modernity namely Thomas Hobbes's Leviathan, as J.M. Coetzee (2007) articulates:

> It is hardly in our power to change the form of the State and impossible to abolish it because, vis-à-vis the State, we are, precisely, powerless. In the myth of the founding of the State as set down by Thomas Hobbes, our descent into powerlessness was voluntary: in order to escape the violence of internecine warfare without end (reprisal upon reprisal, vengeance upon vengeance, the vendetta), we individually and severally yielded up to the State the right to use physical force (right is might, might is right), thereby entering the realm (the protection) of the law. Those who chose and choose to stay outside the compact become outlaw.

This amalgamation, of both modern and traditional in establishing sovereign states played a big role in making the failed postcolonial modern state, especially when the modern power purposely had no desire to form a Western style modern state, i.e. a nation state that seeks legitimacy from the member of the nation. The new state did not educate people to become citizen; it had no intention of building a city. It fed traditional imagination of the power. This imagination as described by *abdulrahman al Kawakibi* (1984: 126).

> We became accustomed to regarding abject submission as polite deference; obsequiousness as courtesy; sycophancy as oratory; bombast as substance; the surrender of basic rights as nobility; the acceptance of humiliation as modesty; the acceptance of injustice as obedience; and the pursuit of human entitlements as arrogance. Our inverted system portrayed the pursuit of simple knowledge as presumption; aspirations for the future as impossible dreams; courage as overreaching audacity; inspiration as folly; chivalry as aggression; free expression as impertinence; free thinking as heresy; and patriotism as madness.

The modern colonial power, to paraphrase John Stuart Mill's (1859) (1984: 118,119) argument, regarded it as a grave error to suppose that the same international customs and the same rules of international morality can obtain between civilized nations and barbarians. Accordingly the barbarians, non-civilised, non-Western, non-Europeans, cannot be depended upon for observing any rule. "Nations which are still barbarous, is likely to be for their benefit that they should be conquered and held in subjection by foreigners. Independence and nationality, so essential to the due growth and development of a people further advanced in improvement, are generally impediments to theirs". Furthermore Mill argues that the "barbarians have no rights as a nation." This attitude justifies the elite's total rule over the local (barbarous) population. Since the elites are those barbarians who are partially modernised, they should follow the manner of the modern civilised people in their treatments and relations to the local.

These characteristics show that the emergent postcolonial state, which later on became the FMS, was never fully established and never had the intention to run the population's affairs. This distance from the locals created a chasm between the emerged state and the population. This circumstance identified the sovereign with elite. The newly emerged (elite) State had no intention to transfer the sovereignty from the colonial to the people. The transfer was basically from the external elite to the local elite. If the barbarians are not a nation, (according to Mill's

argument), even after the emergence of the postcolonial state, in the Arab Middle East, they did not become a nation. When the State has no relation to the nation, it cannot tolerate notions such as: individuality, citizens, participation, freedom, etc. In the newly emerged state, the elites' main concerns were to conserve and hold power. This motivation translated into a politics of survival.

2.2 The Politics of Survival

The FMS has only one goal: to remain in power, hence to survive. If the state has a programme, to paraphrase Mussolini's phrase, it is to rule at any price. However, it is axiomatic that every form of politics and politicians are challenged; therefore, it also goes without saying, that every political leader is concerned about his or her survival. Thus "the politics behind survival in office is the essence of politics" (de Mesquita et al. 2002: 11).

However, every system differs, in its engagement in the game of survival. The FMS has its own technique with regard to survival. What does survival indicate? The dictionary meaning of the word might help to shed some light on the matter. The first meaning of the word is; "to continue, to remain alive or in existence". Furthermore the word also means: "to carry on despite hardships". This condition means for the FMS, to remain in power, to hold power and control, fighting all the real and potential threats that might disturb and disrupt the status quo. The above explanation indicates that there are many overlapping are as between survival and security. Security is an essential element of survival. It becomes the State's main concern. In FMS to quote from Giorgio Agamben (2001) "security becomes the basic principle of state activity". He continues "the thought of security bears within it an essential risk. A state which has security as its sole task and source of legitimacy is a fragile organism; it can always be provoked by terrorism to become itself terroristic".

The security in the FMS translates to the security of the sovereign. This is not necessarily in line with the security of the population. In most cases the reverse is true. For the security to be implemented it requires apparatuses. These apparatuses are sovereign tools to implement the sovereign security. When the FMS fears the freedom of its citizens it abandons them. "He who has been banned is not, in fact, simply set outside the law and made indifferent to it but rather

abandoned by it, that is, exposed and threatened on the threshold in which life and law, outside and inside, become indistinguishable" (Agamben, 1989: 29). Thus, instead of laying down rules that guarantee them the exercise of their essential freedoms, the State becomes a source of risk to life and the freedom of the population. Thus, "instead of guaranteeing human security, the State itself turns into a major threat to it". "This makes both national and local disproportionately powerful security apparatuses often combine to turn the State into a menace to human security, rather than its chief supporter" (UN Development Programme/Regional Bureau for Arab States, title is *Arab Human Development Report,* 2009: 53).

The elite whether they are backed by families, tribes, sects, ethnic groups or factions, have a clear desire to remain throughout time in the same place, holding the same power and influence. No change or renewal in their identity. The established elites have a recognised identity; whether it is family, clan, tribe, sect or an oligarch. This results in a clear boundary between the elite and the population. This is utilised as a mechanism for differentiation and boundary making. The society identifies the elite and the elite distinguish themselves from the rest. Except in the oligarch structure of Egypt, the other elites, who are running the FMSs, are established in a manner where it is impossible for any outsider to enter as well as for any insider to leave. Leaving is treason, in most cases punishable by death, especially when the one who left dared to leak any internal secret information.

This ossified structure of the elites hampers any change from within and from outside. The elites are seen by the population as cohesive and as a result identified as one, thus as a consequence the state divides into the people versus the elite. This makes the maintenance of the elite the ultimate task of every elite member. This goal is not achievable easily. To survive is to remain in the same situation. This requires fighting against changes, real and potential. Change could happen in the balance of power, social cohesion, economic situation, or the nature of the population's awareness. Therefore, to survive is to engage in a multidimensional struggle. To be haunted by the spectre of change. This makes the survival for the FMS a perpetual state of war. The politics of survival, in the FMS, has some clear features:

1- An elastic division between friend and enemy: the identification of friend and enemy, for the ruling elite, is elastic. It is not based on a constitution or law. Thus the State is a political actor refusing to be reduced to a legal system. This exception from the law makes the FMS a state of emergency or state of exception, perpetually.

2- The survival of the ruling elite requires strength vis-a-vis the population: "a strong state is able to penetrate societies, regulate social relationships, and extract resources and determine how they are used" (Migdal, 1988: 4-5). In the FMS this strength is merely based on violence and fear. Not only in Iraq during the Saddam was reign the state 'the Republic of Fear' (Makiya, 1989), every other FMS by necessity is practising the politics of fear.

3- The weakness or non existence of civil society: If the State is strong then the society is weak. The State is continuously balancing of power: promoting some groups and classes, at the same time repressing others.

4- When the survival and the security of the state and its elite is the goal, in a Machiavellian sense, then everything is permitted. This includes, as human rights organisations reports from the region show, killing, torture, forced masses movements, genocide and silencing.

5- The FMS uses different aspects of modernity as tools for the sake of survival. Foucault (1997: 71) has convincingly argued that rationality is not equivalent to reason as such. Rather, particular rationalities take shape as a specific normative schemas of reason that organise subjects, states, and cultures and so "govern us" through their terms. Thus the knowledge and technology that was borrowed from modernity was used in the FMS for the purpose of governing the society and the individuals in way that guarantees the survival of the system.

6- "Effective strategies of survival demand an elaborate set of institutions in order to administer rewards and sanctions meaningfully" (Migdal, 1988: 208). For instance, since 1989 Jordan focused its survival strategy on three main centres: political parties, the parliament, and the press (Lucas, 2005: 3).

7- The emergence of the State class. Beyond the narrow circle of the ruling elite, the State creates a machine to run the population. These hordes of people or bureaucrats are qualified to be a form of a class. Their interest lies in their obedience to the State elite. The ruling elite permit them to become corrupt, so that they lose their moral value and their tie to the population. This group of people make up the bulk of middle class people. In contrast to the role of the middle class in making Western modernity this group is enforcing the tyranny.

2.3 The Identity of the State Elite

The State elite are immersed in modern gadgets. Their premises and houses are made, decorated and filled with Western modern materials. Their being modern goes to a level that goes against the general ethos of their society. In the prologue of his book, *A World of Trouble: America in the Middle East*, Patrick Tyler (2009: 1) offers a stunning example. "Night had long since fallen over central Saudi Arabia in early 2004 when George Tenant came trudging out of his bedroom in Prince Bandar bin Sultan's palace and asked for Scottish whiskey". In parallel to this modern tool and gadgets, there is a substantial presence of tradition. This materialises mainly as structure and facade. As a structure every ruling elite group is made-up in the form of a tribe. This formulation provides unity, identity, and justification for their behaviour.

In his major work on the African state Bayart (2009: 42-43) outlines the features of the tribe and tribe mentality. Accordingly:

> Tribalists think more or less consciously, that the men and women of their tribe and clan are superior to others and that as a result the others should serve and obey them. The tribalist tries to impose the hegemony, the predominance of his tribe and his clan. In practice, tribalist ideas and feeling are used more often to create a clientele who can help them to satisfy their selfish interests and ambitions. Tribalism is expressed in different form of which the following are the main ones:
>
> 1- The tribalist constantly exaggerates and boasts the qualities, merits, and good deeds of the people of its tribe and its clan; on the other hand he refuses to recognise their faults, and even tries systematically to hide them. With respect of other tribe exactly the opposite attitudes prevails.
> 2- The tribalist indulges freely in liberalism and favouritism toward the people of his tribe and of his clan. By contrast he is in general very sectarian towards people of other tribes and other clans.
> 3- The tribalist tries to grant all the privileges and posts of responsibilities to the people of his tribe and clans.
> 4- Conversely the tribalists seek to exempt his own people from their duties and obligations, from any difficult work, or from most dangerous, difficult or humiliating missions.
> 5- The tribalists practice this favouritism in the division of the material benefits and the distribution of services.

With these attitudes in mind the elites treated holding the power as a natural right of their family, clan, tribe, and sect. This natural right had to be preserved and maintained. Therefore, the main concern for the power holders was survival. Immediately, these newly emerged states began to seek support from two very contradictory sources: namely tradition and modernity. Both tradition and modernity became essential forces that the ruling elites relied on to maintain their continuity. Thus, from a conceptual point of view it is accurate to say that, the postcolonial state in the Arab Middle East, from the moment of creation was heading towards becoming a FMS; that utilise both their own tradition and Western modernity for the sake of survival. By making both tradition and modernity a tool, a tool for a clear particular purpose, this post colonial state loses every form of authenticity, roots, relations, and most importantly identity.

Exploitation of both tradition and modernity were not possible without the presence of both modern and traditional power in the sphere of the State. In other words it was impossible for the FMS to emerge without the arrival of modernity. From modernity, the FMS obtained the idea of exploiting tradition. It is also traditional mind behind the utilisation of modernity. When modernity becomes a tool: it is eventually drained of its revolutionary impact. It is not any longer a power for change but rather it becomes a power for continuity. Therefore, it is not astounding that the genesis of the FMS traces back to the immediate post-Napoleonic expedition to the region, which also marks the arrival of modernity. This state was Muhammad Ali's state in Egypt.

2.4 The Ottoman Era

After the fall of the Abbasid Empire the Ottoman Empire took control over most of the Arab world and ruled it for about 400 years. While the Arabs before and after the Ottoman Empire continued in a similar despotic fashion but despite that they did not hesitate to call the Ottoman era *a'sr al-inhitat* عصر الانحطاط the age of decline. Throughout most of the Ottoman era, there was little change or progress. They had little or nothing to offer for the Muslim people. They ruled under the name of caliph when in reality they were nothing but despotic kings. Their lack of any form of governing made them vulnerable in the face of the emerging modern model

in Europe. Their entire system of Empire was established to serve the caliph. The Statesmen, especially in the Asiatic part of the empire, were only seen during tax collection. Thus, the State was only communicating with the population when it demanded tax. People were taxed without being either represented or protected or served. Thus, the Empire was seen by the population as a force that only takes, and has nothing to offer.

This distant relationship between the State and the society is the genesis of the negative attitude of people in the region, toward any form of establishment. The Iraqi social scientist Ali Alwardi has covered the situation in great detail in his lengthy eight parts, *lamahat fi altarix aleraq alhadith*, (Social Glimpses in Modern Iraqi History), لمحات من تاريخ العراق الحديث. As other also confirmed, "the central government, concerned primarily in obtaining the annual tax, turned the governors of the provinces practically into chief tax farmers" (Abu-Manneh, 1994: 176). Moreover, the Ottomans had lacked any communication method, any education apparatus, and any discourse. For most of the people the empire was a heavy burden.

When European modernity emerged, the Ottoman era began to decline. The Europeans began to put the idea of renaissance and modernity into practice. This had an immediate impact on the Middle East as the closest neighbour to the Europe. According to Lewis (1961:40) "the French Revolution was the first great movement of ideas in Western Christendom that had any real effect on the world of Islam". The ideas that the French Revolution spread were challenging the legitimacy and the narrative of the Ottoman Empire. While the Ottoman inherited from the Muslim the idea that might is just and caliph has a divine right, the French revolution established the *Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen*. Furthermore, the Ottomans began to be defeated on the battleground.

European triumphs and the Ottoman defeats sparked the idea and the necessity of modernisation. This evolved in four main stratums. According to Demirag (2005: 142) they were: "Pan-Ottomanism, Pan-Islamism, Pan-Turkism and Westernism". All four had a common goal, which was saving the empire from imminent collapse. This indicates that all these groups were agreed on the main premises but disagreed mainly on the methods. The manifestation of this novel identity is known as the *Gülhane Decree* of 1839. It is often considered one of the

most important documents in modern Middle Eastern history, marking the beginning of the era of reforms in the Ottoman Empire. The period, which begins with the announcement of this decree and ends with the promulgation of a Western-style constitution, is collectively known in Ottoman history as the *Tanzimat*, an Arabic word that means reordering. The text includes three main principles:

1. The guarantees promising our subjects perfect security for life, honour, and property.
2. A regular system of assessing taxes
3. An equally regular system for the conscription of requisite troops and the duration of their service (Inalcik, 1975).

While the Tanzimat created a central bureaucratic elite keenly aware of its interests as a group and increasingly more independent of royal power, the provinces felt the impact of the reorganization only gradually. Many regions of the empire, including wide areas inhabited by the Arabs, were not touched by Istanbul's reform measures until the second half of the nineteenth century (Kayali, 1997). Yet, it was not solely via Istanbul that the provinces opened up to Western influences and ideas of reform. European merchants had penetrated some of the Arab lands, especially cities which, had harbours on the Mediterranean, long before the *Tanzimat* reformers. Cities like Aleppo in Syria had already experienced a period of reform. The region's early contacts with the West later affected the cultural and political life of the province. Trade, missionary activity, and emigration had exposed Mediterranean Arab towns to European culture and modern political ideals and brought about a climate of opinion sympathetic to what the *Tanzimat* stood for.

The Ottoman system was unable to resist modernity. The Young Turks were hastily attempting to save the Empire, "without a coherent plan" (Fromkin, 2000:46). Through their acts they hoped that they could coin a new form of identity that all peoples of the empire could identify themselves with it, and consequently save the Empire. The Turks wanted to solidify their control of Arab lands and Turkify them while the Arabs sought to protect their culture and institutions within the empire's framework. Thus, despite their common interests, there were also centrifugal forces pulling Turks and Arabs apart.

Before the realisation of the modernisation, the Ottoman Empire was in a state of dogmatic certainty. This reality influenced directly the structure of the empire and the nature of governance. Throughout its time, like any other empire, the Ottoman Empire was in a continuous attempt to expand the border of the empire in order to collect more taxes. This hunger for taxing shaped the structure of the empire. For instance the empire was in direct control of the provinces like Aleppo, Damascus and Tripoli which had high a tax-revenue in the Middle East (Hourani: 1991: 226). Other places were just controlled for seasonal or a short period of time in a year. For instance, place like Hijaz including Mecca and Medina were only controlled during the pilgrimage time. This policy resulted in the poverty and stagnation of these regions. If the Ottomans had Islam as an ideology of the Empire against the Europeans, it lacked any form of identity with its Muslim subjects. The Empire had neither an official language nor a distinctive nationality. Walking, nowadays, through a city like Istanbul one sees Farsi, Arabic and Turkish calligraphy written in different places, which symbolise the absent of any form of uniformity in the empire. Having said that, this does suggest that any form of tolerance or multiculturalism, it was mere unawareness. With the commencement of the modernisation project these were all seen as challenges by the Young Turks.

What the Young Turk desired to build, on the ruin of the Ottoman Em pire, was a European style nation-state with one identity, one language, and one centre. A trademark copy of the emerging nation-state in the Europe. To attain their goal they did not hesitate to use every card they had, including force. The Ottomans during their reign over the Middle East were not the Other for the Arabs. The Empire was loose in term of culture, language and nationality. In reality the Ottomans preferred to trace back their genealogical origin to Arabs. The combination of The Ottoman Turkification and the arrival of the colonial power created the Arab revolt against the Turks. With the defeat of The Ottoman Empire and their withdrawal from the area the French and British arrived. The era of direct contact between European imperialism and Arabs had commenced.

Modernity that arrived through the Ottomans into the Arab area was a particular sort of modernity. It was not an epistemological project. It did not introduce any paradigm shift in social, economy and political areas. What did it introduce were notions like nation, religion,

origin and the Other, this emerged within the frame of Arab-Turk relationships. The Arabs built their understanding on the Ottoman interpretation of these concepts, and developed it as a reaction to the Ottomans. Modernity diffused to Arabs through the Ottomans was a mere technique to rearrange the army and a distorted imagination about how to rebuild themselves and combat others.

However, the Ottoman's attempt to accommodate the Arab past in order to prevent the emergence of a new Arab identity. But Arab intellectuals grew increasingly more conscious of their ancestors' role in the origin of Islam and in early Islamic civilization. Especially after the revival of the classical literature, the close association between the Arabic language and Islam became more public and apparent which is the end provided a basis for Arab selfhood, which later on was strengthened further by the hand of the *salafi* movement.

In summary the Ottoman era in the Middle East is significant in understanding the later events in the region. The Ottoman occupation of the region resulted in the isolation of the region from the rest of the world for many centuries. In the eighteen century when the Ottomans attempted to go through modernisation, Arabs in the Middle East reacted to the process. This had an impact on the political situation in the region in many ways.

1-The Ottomans were a barrier between Arabs and Europe. Liberal Arabs considered this as a negative and by traditionalists as a positive.
2- During the modernisation period, the Ottoman pushed to impose Turkish as the official language of the empire and as a response the Arabs awakened up the position of their language and consequently their language became the basis for their identity making. This was the reason behind the closeness to the German style of identity making.
3- Through modernisation process the Ottoman wanted to strengthen their position and build more link to the Arab Middle East, for instance they built a railway to Hijaz and consequently hold the Middle East as their colony.
4-Modernity which reached the Middle East, initially, and for a long time, was not the European modernity. It was modernity that went through the Ottomans.

5- The Arabs were introduced to modernity as a process of colonisation. The significant point here is the presence of the coloniser, which heavily impacted the way Arabs received modernity, this ultimately forced, distorted and shaped the nature of the project.

2. 5 Napoleon's Expedition and the Arrival of Modernity

Napoleon Bonaparte's short occupation of Egypt between 1798 and 1801 can be taken as a departure point in a new relationship between the Middle East and Europe. According to Atiyah (1958: 73) "if any one date to be chosen as a marking the end of the long Arab sleep, it will be the day on which Napoleon set foot on Egyptian soil. Until that day the Arabs were still living in the Middle Age". The invasion was not only a break; it was according to Said (2003: 80) a 'reinvention'. The mission was not limited to Egypt "Napoleon was inventing what we now call the modern Middle East" (Owen, 2007). If invention, reinvention and wakening are all concepts which indicate rupture and discontinuity with the past, they also indicate the emergence of a new, different view, and all this happened under the direct influence of modernity. There was another characteristic which made the expedition fully modern. "Napoleon's Egypt may have been the first non-European country to have been conquered in the name of liberty because the French and American Revolutions had invented this rhetoric" (Cole: 2008).

The rhetoric points to a particular circumstance where an outsider force comes to liberate, an outsider penetrating into the inside to liberate the inside from inside itself. An outsider put itself to a higher moral ground, establishes a hierarchy, and declares itself to be better, to carry a noble mission. These all without any ambiguities are modern and from modernity. Their slogan of liberating signifies that there is slavery and they are adamant to puts a halt on it. They bring the ethos of the French Revolution, to puts an end to the ancient regime. They crave to modernise and their vision of modernity is "characterized in terms of consciousness of the discontinuity of time: a break with tradition, a feeling of novelty, of vertigo in the face of the passing moment" (Foucault, 1984: 35). This rhetoric of liberation also marks the beginning of the arrival of liberalism to the region, as it is clear in the title of Albert Hourani's (1962) book "*Arab Thought in the Liberal Age, 1789-1939*".

"Before the arrival of Napoleon the country was divided into around two dozen regions, each ruled by its own Mameluke bey, assisted with what was virtually his own private Mameluke army, whose duties remained purely military" (Strathern, 2008: 12). The Mamelukes who were originally slave soldiers, claimed power and became despots in the country. The Arab Christian Lebanese writer, Jergy Zedan, who wrote about Islamic history in a literary fashion, devoted a novel to the Mameluke under the title, *estebdad almamake,* the despot or tyranny of the Mameluke. The plot is about a businessman in Cairo, during the reign of Ali Beg Alkaber, whose name is Abdulrahman, Zedan is complaining of the harsh treatment that he endures in the hand of Mamluk. At best the Mamluk were as Ezzat Abdel-Karim (2004) describes "a people that remained foreign to the country, reluctant to mix with Egyptians, until they vanished from the historical stage". This indicates that pre-napoleon Egypt was not a sovereign independent state.

For Napoleon the mission's sole aim was to 'destroy England'. It aimed also to fill the vacuum that resulted from the decline of the Ottoman Empire and build an empire. He wrote on 16 August 1797, "in order truly to destroy England, we must take Egypt. The vast Ottoman Empire, which dies every day, lays an obligation on us to exercise some forethought about the means whereby we can protect our commerce with the Levant" (Cole, 2007: 29).

The impact of the expedition on Egyptian society is a matter of debate to nowadays. At the arrival of Napoleon the country was in a terrible situation. Its economy was bad. The climate was harsh and droughts were prolonged. The Nile flood was low. In addition there was an outbreak of plague and other diseases. Politically, the country was in a state of constant civil war. The Mameluk groups fought fierce and constant battles with each other; consequently they raised urban taxes to levels that produced misery. The country was in a state of total isolation and ignorance from what was going on outside its border. When Abd al-Rahman al-Jabarti wrote his book *Ajaeb Alathar*, *The Wonder of the Heritage*, which was a chronicle for what, happened in Egypt and the world he did not mention the French Revolution. However, others argue differently, for instance Cole (2007) argues that Egypt had intense economic and diplomatic interaction with Europe and the Greater Mediterranean in the eighteenth century and was hardly a virgin wilderness to be "discovered" or introduced to modernity by Bonaparte. He argues that, moreover, most of the specific innovations imported by the Army to the Orient did not survive

the French departure in 1801, and that on the ground there was little long-term impact, save perhaps for the killing of tens of thousands and the disruption of Ottoman Egyptian society.

Cole's view is rather rare; it matches only with Said's and people like Saat alHussari. While on the other hand there is a growing amount of literature dedicated to the topic, which holds quite a contrary view. If the French authors painted the expedition positively, for the sake of propaganda, there are many Egyptians and Arab writers who do not hesitate to see the positive side of the expedition.

The Expedition did change the nature of society and power in the country. While most Arab thinkers acknowledge its imperialistic dimension they also stress its modernising effects. However, some went so far as to deny its imperialistic side and regard it as a holy Campaign. While alJabri (2005) regards it as a moment when the Arabs were woken up by the outsider to realise, not only their present weakness, but also their past glory. For alJabri (2005) Napoleon's invasion resulted in a revival or rediscovery of classical Arab or Muslim philosophers among them *Ibn Rushd* and others. The combination of imperialism and modernity of the Expedition "divided the consciences of the Arabs ever since" (alJabri, 2005). This view is confirmed by Bernard Lewis's (2005: 36) view who also regards the expedition as the moment of introducing "Freedom and Justice in the Modern Middle East" and "changing perception".

On the practical and pragmatic level through the summer and early fall of 1798 Napoleon tried to establish a pro-French representative government and to modernise Cairo. His ships had famously ferried over not just soldiers but a small group of French mathematicians, inventors, scientists, artists and writers. These savants explored the pyramids, discovered the Rosetta stone and assembled material for the "*Description de l'Égypte*," the 24-volume masterpiece that was published years later. They also did things like map Cairo, illuminate its streets, construct hospitals, supervise elections and even helped feed the population by building modern bakeries (Reiss, 2008) wrote in New York Times.

> Egyptians saw the public dance halls they built, they remarked on the unusual ways they treated their women, they found themselves obliged to obey unfamiliar rules such as burying their dead outside the city, watering down the streets and hanging out lanterns at

night, and they watched as they undertook perplexing and disturbing public works such as tearing down the old alley gateways and the like (Abdul-alkarem, 1934).

It is almost impossible to deny the significant impact of the expedition, the rupture it caused in the mindset and the change it made in every aspect of political and social levels. These are rather more apparent through the post Expedition event and movements. The immediate ruler of the country was Muhammad Ali, the Ottoman officer who admired Napoleon and tried to emulate him, he took power after Napoleon's sudden departure. The Expedition generated the chaos and agitation of the old system as it caused elsewhere.

There is a parallel of events and similar results between Napoleon's Egyptian Expeditions and his later on the German invasion. When Napoleon invaded Germany the political structure of the German states disintegrated. Under the influence of overwhelming Napoleonic power, the delicate states, which the Holy Roman Empire had maintained among the many political constitutions of central Europe, dissolved (Celia, 1990: 8). The Holy Roman Empire structure had a similarity with the Ottoman Empire both structures could not hold in front of the, post revolutionary modern Napoleon's army. If the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire resulted in the emergence of new concepts like: "*Heimat, Nation, Staat and Volk*" (home-land, nation, state and people) (Celia, 1990: 8). The dissolution of the old structure of the Ottoman Empire resulted in the birth of colonialism, nationalism, reform, Islamism and modernisation.

Napoleon's invasion or expedition was military, scientific and cultural. The army and the intellectuals marched together. Power and knowledge were combined. However, the military part failed but the scientific and cultural side left impacts on both sides. The expedition changed the region in many ways:

1-The French Expedition ushered in the age of Westernisation and modernisation into Egypt. Along with the army, Napoleon recruited scholars and engineers who systematically collected, classified, and represented all available material on the history, geography, and culture of the country. It was the combination of knowledge and power.

2- The expedition resulted in rupture with the old system in many ways and highlighted the necessity of modernisation. This rupture m ainly occurred on t wo different plateaus, one is military and the other scientific.

3- T he defeat unleashed a new phenomenon, the realisation of the necessity of change or modernising. In the other words, it is a defeat that becomes the premise of modernisation. This had a severe impact on the identity and the nature of modernisation. It emphasised on the weakness of the colonised and the necessity to catch up, to mimic, became the goal of the process.

4- The expedition amalgamated modernity and imperialism, knowledge and power, to a degree that even nowadays the majority of the Arab thinkers find it hard to distinguish between the two. This might be expressed in many different ways and conceptualised through various words, like, cultural invasion, Orientalism, modern *jahlya*, but the content still remains mainly the same.

5- As a reaction to the imposed modernity, Islam was revived. Ironically Napoleon attempt to control the Egyptian society, while attempting to understand how the previous, Mameluk reigned for such long time, concluded, that it can only be possible through the religion.

6- While the French were using Islam as an ideology to implement their plan, in contrast the Mameluk were using the idea of enlightenment to encourage the ordinary Egyptian to fight the French. This was the commencement of utilisation of both modernity and tradition by power. In a *firman*, an imperial decree, issued by Sultan Salim III calling for a holy war *Jihad* against the French stated that, "the French think that men, born equal, must be equally free; that all distinction between men is unjust, and that each ought to be the master of his own opinion and his manner of living" (Strathern, 2008: 234). This clearly indicates the low awareness among people and the place of women in their eyes. Another crucial point is the problem of association: for Mameluks and many Egyptians, anything that came from the French, regardless of its value, was regarded as evil.

7- This was possible because the society, throughout its history, was traditional. Traditional as the etymology of the word indicates, from Latin *tradita,* handed down i.e. trying faithfully to preserve the inherited idea and change as little as possible. Therefore, while the French were surveying the country, the ordinary Egyptian paid little heed to them. Even among the educated elites while they raised their eyebrows and tried to explain, the background knowledge, which they had acquired within the walls of Al-Azhar, was of no avail in producing sensible answers.

2.6 Genesis of the FMS

To suggest that the Egypt of today was founded by Mohammed Ali, or he is the founder of modern Egypt as Henry Dodwell (1931) puts it, is merely a cliché. He arrived in Egypt, as an Ottoman officer, after the departure of Napoleon's army. The country was in the midst of chaos and shock. During these circumstances the whole society, as a result of the occupation, defeat, and supremacy of the French army, went numb. There was a vacuum in governance; the whole country was ready to be taken and even to be exploited. At this very moment came Muhammad Ali. His origin is disputed. One thing is certain that he was neither Arab nor Egyptian. He was an outsider. It is not a rarity in Arab history, for an outsider to become the change maker.

He admired Napoleon to the degree that he tried to emulate him, "I was born the same day as Napoleon" he liked to boast (Karsh & Karsh, 2001: 28). Similarly he dreamt of an empire. "I am well aware that the [Ottoman] Empire is heading by the day toward destruction, and that it will be difficult for me to save her. And why should I seek the impossible. On her ruin I will build a vast kingdom… up to the Euphrates and the Tiger" (Karsh & Karsh, 2001: 28). His mimicry of Napoleon or the West was in line with the Levantine character. To be a Levantine

> [I]s to live in two worlds or more at once without belonging to either; to be able to go through the the external forms which indicate the possession of a certain nationality, religion or culture without actually possessing it. It is no longer to have a standard of one's own, not to be able to create but only able to imitate. It is to belong to no community and to possess nothing of one's own. It reveals itself in lostness, pretentiousness, cynicism and despair (Hourani, 1946: 70-71).

If Muhammad Ali was seen by the Western commentator as a sort of Levantine, in contrast, Arab commentators, regarded him differently, Alsharef (2000: 1) Nagm (1967: 23), Raouf Abbas (2005). He realised that the weakness of the Islamic state stemmed from its military underdevelopment and that it would only be able to withstand the encroaching threat from the West if it acquired the means and capacities of deterrence with their might. He further understood that a thorough overhaul of the military arm of the State required closing the civilisational gap between the countries of the Ottoman Empire and the West.

He began to tear down traditional structures that had been part of Egyptian life from time immemorial such as; l and, and tax, industrial, religious, and educational. Ref orms seemed nothing short of a revolution to his Egyptian subjects. He established a state apparatus to be erected upon a primitive agricultural community. He submitted them to the power of the despotic emperor, the sole and transcendent property owner, the master of the surplus, or the stock, the organiser of a large scale works. These changes made him a despotic ruler. However, there was nothing new with a despot ruler for the Egyptian society. Wittfogel (1957: 153) claimed that a particular form of social organisation, "Oriental despotism characterized in its most intense form by the State being among other things the sole control of massesive irrigation projects", as was common in Egypt since the Pharaohs. The ground was ready for the emergence of a despot in terms of history, culture, and the structure of power.

> True to his class, he despised the Egyptians and continued to base his government and army on the 'foreign' Muslim, mainly Turko- Albanian-Circassian' aristocracy'. But the lesson to Muhammad Ali of the events of 1815 was invaluable. He was determined to get rid of traditional troops and in the interim to keep them as far as possible from the vital parts of his government. He became even more determined to safeguard his autonomy and to limit The Ottoman influence and patronage, as far as possible, in areas under his control (Abir, 1977: 295).

In a first step toward despotism, from 1803 to 1811 he established his personal power and destroyed all potential opposition within the country. The end of this process was marked by the infamous massacre of the remnants of the former rulers, the Mameluks, in the Cairo Citadel. He killed them, while they were dining in his castle. This event and method became the favourite method for the other despots who followed him, in dealing with their oppositions. From 1812 to

1827 he continued to build up his land and sea forces. The typical despot moves towards making the military the sole strong power in the country *vis a vis* the society. To nowadays this particular structure of governing is rampant in the region. From 1811 to 1818 he suppressed the *Wahhabis* in the Arabian Peninsula and recaptured the holy cities of Mecca and Medina; a move to seek a religious background to the power through which he can claim holiness.

Indeed Muhammad Ali is the founder and the father of the modern form of governing and State, not only in Egypt but the entire Middle East. He had grandiose and unrealistic ambitions. He spent the money that he collected through taxation, on building a grand mosque, which "majestically stands at a north Western bend of the Citadel and is visible from almost every location in Cairo. It has become the symbol of the Citadel" (Rabbat, 2005). His fascination with, rather unnecessary, citadel at a time when the society was in dire need for every development, was an emblematic despotic move. However, he believed "it is possible that Egypt will regain its place and again become a centre of civilisation" (Abu Nur, 2005). This illusion that history can be repeated is the source of a chronic misunderstanding called the fixation with the past, which signifies the impotence of creating or establishing anything new. If Muhammad Ali like Hegel believed "that all great world-historic facts and personages appear, so to speak, twice, he forgot to add: the first time as tragedy, the second time as farce" as Marx sarcastically indicates, (Marx, 1852: 1).

Muhammad Ali's reform unlike the Ottoman re form, did not introduce the idea of "citizenship, or changes in the moral basis of government" (Hourani, 1991: 273). Throughout his changes and reforms he set a pattern of a model of a state; neither modern nor traditional. Therefore, he could be regarded as the legitimate father of the FMS. He puts the whole society and its resources in the service of his state. He hated the population and never related to them. The State was a mega-central-machine, functioning to strengthen itself. Like all the others, who came after him, to lead the FMS, he established dynasty. He regarded his people as backward, though he attempts "through these three methods, schools, academic missions and translation, to transfer knowledge from the West to Egypt to further his aim of building a modern state". Yet "he did not attempt to transfer Egypt itself to the West, but rather preserved its heritage and

Eastern customs" (El-Gemeiy, 2005). It was more significant for him to be accepted by the West. He did not attempt to become what is possible, but rather to become what is desired.

2.7 The Nahza

The movement that was initiated during the reign of Muhammad Ali's era is known in Arabic as nahza or nahda. The concept is used to denote "enlightenment", "albeit with reference to our own enlightenment, as distinct from but related to the European Enlightenment of the 18th century" (Mursi Saad El-Din, 2005). The nahza is a reference to an event that never occurred. Thus it is not a historical event. It is merely a desire. Therefore, in this context the concept refers to a dream, to an event to come, not to a tangible or actual event. Nahza in Arabic means standing up, to waken up. It is antonym to fall. According to alJabri, (1982: 22) the word nahza refers to the Renaissance rather than the Enlightenment, however both are absent in the region's history. For alJabri Nahza is a discourse looking for reality. It is not "an age of questioning, and of the celebration of reason", (Mursi Saad El-Din, 2005), as Arabs would like to imagine it in line with the occidental enlightenments. It is an event and a concept with its own characteristics. The nahza is a moment of realisation of how backward Arab society was in comparison to European society. Thus, it was just natural for Europe to end up being mimicked and imitated, and also the place to borrow modernity from.

For Muhammad Ali modernity meant, the collection of skills and techniques to serve his ambition to realise a strong centralist state. For him modernity was rather pragmatic practical steps not a societal, cultural or political movement, to establish a strong despotic power. All the radical changes he introduced were centred on this particular aim. All the schools, he established (Abdel-Moneim, 2005), were under the authority of the department of the military and their main focus was on the military training and militaristic issues.

The other education schools which he developed were designed as apparatuses to support the machine of military. Among these were the School of Medicine, the School of Agriculture, the School of Engineering and the Language Academy. For the sake of well being, the soldiers had to be taken care of; therefore, it is to be expected that the School of Medicine should be the

oldest advanced institute in Egypt. It was established at Abu Zaabal, north of Cairo in 1827, with the aim of producing Egyptian doctors for the army. The army and the military to fulfill their aim, in the age of pre-technology, needed animals, consequently, the school of veterinary medicine, was the next to follow. The speed and the amount of graduates signify the importance of the institute, "within a decade, the school had graduated 420 doctors and pharmacists for the army" (Abdel-Moneim, 2005). To further perfecting his army, Muhammad Ali, opened, a number of military academies including the Infantry Academy in 1820, the General Staff Academy in 1825, the Cavalry Academy in 1830, and the Artillery Academy in 1831. These were to be followed by "a naval academy on a battleship to graduate naval officers" (Abdel-Moneim, 2005). According to Nwehz (1992: 203) Muhammad Ali's reign was a time when the contemporary form of the Middle Eastern Arab states emerged and divorced from the society.

Imitating the West was not fulfilled only through a strong army, the new form of state realised the need of knowledge. This realisation was the moment of emergence of a different form of elite. If the concept of elite was signifying the political elite, coming in contact with the West and modernity another form of elite was born. The new forms of elite were the intellectuals: people who had knowledge rather than other forms of power. The emergence of this group and their relationships with the States is one of the crucial elements in emergence of the particular form of state that came out. The intellectuals play various roles: think tankers, advisers, but more importantly they contribute to what Louis Althusser (1970) called "the Ideological State Apparatuses".

With changes in the form of governing the use of power also changed. The power during the era of pre-Western-influence was a machine based in a limited space, a castle, and had no, or limited, intention to extend its influence beyond that limitation. During the era of the Ottoman Empire people's only obligation was paying tax to the authority. In that regard the State relation to the land, territory and people was different to the modern style of the state. Land concerns state only when it becomes a territory. Territory is a space that power of the central state is functioning at it. Here, it is worth dwelling a bit more. When taxation ends up being the only line of interaction between the people and the State then the nature of this link has an impact on the

nature of the relation between the State and the people. This process of taxation is not the same as the process of taxation in the modern capitalist state.

> In the modern model of state the taxation monitories the economy, creates money. It necessarily creates it in motion, in circulation, with turnover, and also with correspondence with services and goods in the current of that circulation. The State finds in taxation the means for foreign trade. Through taxation the goods and services become commodities and commodities measured and equalised by money (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004: 489).


As it becomes apparent, through taxation, the modern capitalist state becomes a machine to turn over goods and service into commodities, which at the end are measured and equalised by money. This process was missing in the Ottoman style of governing in the region. One crucial point is the location of the central power. The centre of the Empire was in Istanbul, the region of Arab Middle East, apart from Damascus and Cairo, were mere margin or frontiers. Therefore, the region was merely used as a source of revenue to the faraway centre. This was operated through local representatives. Local representatives were apparatuses to serve the centre; since the centre had no means to monitor their activity, closely, they were more inclined to engage in corrupt practices.

The State was only intended to serve the ruling elite, through imposing heavy tax on people. Therefore, the State acquired an image of the oppressor. Consequently paying tax was seen as a duty to avoid harm by an evil power. Here lies the genesis of the negative image of the State as an entity of pure evil, in the mind and the psyche of the people. Therefore, it is expected that the population will remain aloof from the State and its apparatuses. This attitude toward the State has resulted in an unbridgeable gap between the State and society. The State has been seen throughout history, as an apparatus of capture on top of organic (human) apparatuses of capture, a meta-vampire (Deleuze and Guattari 2004). In other words the State did not take a part in cultivation of land, in husbandry of animals, neither in advancement of the society, nor in growth of market or industry. It only built an army to collect tax, to defened the territory and to serve itself. As a consequence, there was a vacuum in managing the society and its daily issues. The tribe as an old form of governing ended up filling the vacuum. The tribe is a machine of repetition, guarding the continuity and punishing severely anyone who de sires to break or

discontinue with tradition. This particular character became more significant later on, when the European colonial power colonised the region and attempted to intervene in different spaces such as social, natural, traditional and economical. The collision between the two was imminent.

However, with the emergence of a new form of State and governance, still the sovereign body was not just a metaphor, but a political reality and its physical presence was necessary for the functioning of the State. On the other hand it was a moment of realisation, in contrast to the pre-modern form, that society as a whole needs to run the modern style of the state. With this comes the realisation of the role of knowledge and of people like technicians, bureaucrats and intellectuals. People who played the role of linking power to people, through their labour and discourse create a new image of the state and in the end attempt to legitimise it.

2.8 The Colonial Making



The image is taken from the BBC website

It is accordingly understood between the French and British governments are prepared to recognise and protect an independent Arab state or a confederation of Arab states (a) and (b) marked on the annexed map, under the suzerainty of an Arab chief. That in area (a) France, and in area (b) Great Britain, shall have priority of right of enterprise and local loans. That in area (a) France, and in area (b) Great Britain, shall alone supply advisers or foreign functionaries at the request of the Arab state or confederation of Arab states. That

> in the blue area France, and in the red area Great Britain, shall be allowed to establish such direct or indirect administration or control as they desire and as they may think fit to arrange with the Arab state or confederation of Arab states (Sykes-Picot Agreement, 1916, as quoted in McArthur McArthur, 1992: 88).

The colonials formed the States according to their "strategic calculations" (Anderson & Stansfield, 2004:13). The States that emerged had a missions namely to serve the interest of the colonial power. For this particular goal to be achieved a form of localisation was required. The State has to have a local face and some sort of roots. Thus as Rosemarie Said Zahlan (1989: 19) puts it:

> The one important and constant element in the political evolution of the Gulf state was the position of the rulers. He signed the treaties, and he was personally responsible for the application for all their clauses. The British authority - whether the Political Resident, the Political Agent or the Senior Naval Officer of the Persian Gulf Division- dealt with him only.

The local ruler was appointed, made and protected, by the external power. When he was ready to sign a treaty his personal position was strengthened and his influence continued and was guaranteed. The rulers, who were mostly the local sheiks, were never accountable to the ordinary people. In the new system, the colonial, enhanced and continued the old one. In the past, the sheiks regarded themselves as accountable to Allah. This was translated into: being accountable to no one. But another crucial feature of this system of accountability was that: Allah is beyond the community. Thus, the sheiks had no reason to seek legitimacy from the locals. They were inferior people to them. This system appropriated the colonials. In a similar fashion, the colonials were beyond the community. They regarded themselves as superior to the people. The old shecks found it absolutely normal to seek the protection and support from them and ignore the locals. Affiliation with the white-superior-strong-civilised-man was the source of prestige for the shecks in the eyes of the local. "Moreover, since the second half of the nineteenth century the local elites and the sultans were recipients of the regular payment from the British Empire" (alNaqib, 1989: 105). This military, economic, and symbolic support from the British Empire isolated the elite from the people and consequently resulted in a circumstance that the emerged local elites and their states were in total isolation from their societies. This was not in contrast but rather was

a natural and expected continuation of the historical structure of power and authority in the region.

The British not only managed everything, since the local elites were not familiar with modern notions like state, society, economy, sovereignty. They also ranked the local elites according to their own criteria. "In 1929, for example, the rulers of Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar were the recipients of seven-gun salutes; the ruler of Abu Dhabi received a five gun salute, and the ruler of Dudai only a humble three" (Said Zahlan, 1989: 20). The number of gun salutes was based on the behaviour of the elites. The more modern they behaved the more gun salute they received. This trivial ranking shows clearly how the elites were everything but statesmen. It also demonstrates that the colonial administrators were fully aware how much the fake prestige and pride was an essential component of the psyche of the elites. "European rule during the twentieth century was, as Lewis puts it, an imperialism of interference without responsibility, which would neither create nor permit stable and orderly government" (Anderson, 1987: 5).

The elites had the sources and all the tools they needed to rule their community from outside. This established non-relational- relationships with the local community. The local were non-existed unless they posed a danger to the elites. Locals were subalterns. Subaltern, according to Spivak cannot speak. If the "speaking is a transaction between the speaker and listener" (1996: 289), this did not happen in the case of the local population, locals were not listened to. They were not permitted to use their language to express their concerns, engage in a dialogue, or to even think. Through these policies they were reduced to apolitical being. All they could have was their religion as it was during Islamic caliphs; philosophy was discussed in the palaces and religion was for the people. If administration and implementation of that was less demanding in the small Gulf States, in others with a substantial population other additional tools were employed. As Aziz Al-Azmeh (2005) puts it, in case of Saudi Arabia

> Wahhabism, it was a manner of domesticating Arabian tribesmen under the authority of a trading and patrimonial clan, the house of Saud, by re-socialising them in the context of a new polity formed out of a system of tribal hierarchies, at the apex of which stood the Sauds and their priestly partners, the Al Al-Shaykh, the descendants of Muhammad Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab. The emphasis was on so managing the tribes that they acquiesced to

> payment of *zakat*, the religious translation of a tax to the State strictly personified in the person of the Imam, later the King (an interview with Iran Bulletin23, Jan. 2005).

Once accountability has been set aside, and once the society, with all its institutions, have been reduced to serve a single goal namely the survival of the elites, as a result a circumstance prevails that leads to the triumph of evil. The evil prevails when accountability is subdued.

This situation might vary from one state to another but despite that the similarities are rather stronger. One of the main noticeable differences between the Gulf States and the other is that "the Gulf States did not go through the nationalism period that the Levant and Egypt and Iraq went through" (alNaqib, 1989: 104). But the Arab nationalism is not an ideology to establish a nation state. It is a doctrine which postulates the existence of "a single [Arab] nation bound by the common ties of language, religion and history... behind the facade of a multiplicity of sovereign states" (Sati al-Husri, 1955: 11-13). Similar to other grand theories, socialism, fascism, Nazism, Arab nationalism had a grand vision and a goal set in the future. This is why the movement has been criticised as "a misnomer. It does not represent a genuine national movement or ideal but is rather a euphemism for raw imperialism" (Karsh, 2006). In the case of Nasser the pan Arab nationalism was a euphemism for an Egyptian leadership of the Arabs. As Pachachy (1991: 69-70) puts it:

> While Abdul Nasser was a fervent Arab Nationalist, most of his close associates and Egyptian people in general were not. He dragged a reluctant Egypt into playing a central role in Arab affairs. In so doing he was not only serving his Arian nationalist ideals but also promoting the interest of Egypt itself. He realized that Egypt by herself was no more than an over populated impoverished underdeveloped third world country, but as leader of united Arab world she could play a decisive role in international affairs. For Nasser Arab solidarity was only a step toward eventual unity but also an instrument of great potency in Egypt's the external relation. For this reason he would not tolerate any Arab government breaking rank and defying Egypt's claim to leadership of the Arab world.

The situation was similar for the Ba'th party in Iraq and Syria. The Ba'th Party in both Syria and Iraq were involved in occupation and annexation of other neighboured countries: the Syrian occupation of Lebanon in 1970s and the Iraqi case for the annexation of Kuwait in August 1990. These examples crystallise how the Arab nationalism was nothing more than an expansionist plan.

Arab nationalism, whether theoretical or practical, did not result in establishment of a nation state. The State "Placed in historical context, the regime of Saddam Hussein appears less as an aberration, and more as a logical culmination of the pathologies embedded in the State of Iraq since its creation in 1921" (Anderson & Stansfield, 2004:13).

2.9 The Debacle of 1967

The Current form of the States in the Arab Middle East was shaken by the 1967 defeat to Israel. Thus 1967 is a critical juncture in the contemporary history of the region. In that year a short war: a war that lasted only six day, changed everything everlastingly. The war started on Monday June 5.

> At 7: 45 A.M. Private Yehoshua Bar-Dayan wrote on his diary: 'I believe the war has started. Two Mystere squadrons flew by law'. By the time he made his next entry, forty five minute later, the war had been all but won: the planes flying overhead destroyed hundreds of Egyptian aircraft, most still grounded on their base" (Segev, 2007: 405).

As a result, "all facets of Arab life were subject to ruthless assaults: Islam, the Arabic language, the capacity of an Arab as an individual, the record of radical Arab states (Ajami, 1981: 26). He continues "the secular pan-Arabists lost their self-confidence and traditionalists recovered theirs. The latter no longer seemed as anachronistic as the former had said they were" (pp. 67-8). Henceforth, modernity became an evil. A defeat became the name of the project: a defeat that in Arabic has been described endlessly. Arab literature, ever since, tainted with sorrow, mourning, and a paradigm shift to the past. Modernity was blamed for the defeat. Thus, Islamic fundamentalism triumphed, and hence, the West became an evil. June 1967 was an event had shown the Arab states and their leaders and their fundamental weaknesses. So far it is an unrecoverable defeat. The event of defeat might encourage a beginning of a new historiography, as an Arab nationalist theorist Constantine K. Zurayk, articulated in post 1948 (1956: 34) quoted from Hasso, (2000: 492):

> The victory which the Zionists have achieved... lies not in the superiority of one people over another, but rather in the superiority of one system over another. The reason for this

> victory is that the roots of Zionism are grounded in modern Western life while we for the most part are still distant from this life and hostile to it. They live in the present and for the future while we continue to dream the dreams of the past and to stupefy ourselves with its fading glory.

Such historiography might result in an "inexhaustible wellspring of intellectual progress" as Koselleck articulated it (Schivelbusch, 2003: 4). But this was not the case. The event of 1967 ended the dream of Arab nationalism or rather pan-nationalism. Similar to Napoleon's invasion of Egypt, the defeat of the 1967 resulted in shock.

> In the 1970s and the 1980s, the political and economic edifice of the Arab world began to give way. Explosive demographic trends overwhelmed what had been built in the postindependence era, and then a furious Islamism blew in like a deadly wind. It offered solace, seduced the young, and provided the means and the language of re sentiment and refusal (Ajami, 2003: 3).

For Egypt and her leader the war or 'the liberation of Palestine' was a road to become the grand Arab leader and establish a united Arab state under the rule of Nasser. As a result of the defeat the territorial state became the norm. After the decline of European empires and the emergence of America as a global power America moved to the region to fulfil its need and fantasy. "A half-century of regional involvement in every conceivable way-through diplomacy, aid, culture, education, espionage, subversion, and (not least) the projection of military power-has secured the 'holy trinity' of American interests: Israel, oil, and anti-communism" (Hudson, 1996: 329). Throughout the cold war America had to fight to contain the threat of communism in the region. This policy had resulted in the support of the ruling elites. This the Campaign did not attempt only to eradicate the "communists and socialists, but any element calling for democracy and land reform, including liberal, left-of-centre and other reformist groups and movements" (Halperin, 2005: 1135). In January 5 1957 President Eisenhower in a message to the congress announced his Doctrine on the Middle East. In it he proposed.

> It would, first of all, authorize the United States to cooperate with and assist any nation or group of nations in the general area of the Middle East in the development of economic strength dedicated to the maintenance of national independence. It would, in the second place, authorize the Executive to undertake in the same region programs of military assistance and cooperation with any nation or group of nations which desires such aid. It

> would, in the third place, authorize such assistance and cooperation to include the employment of the armed forces of the United States to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of such nations, requesting such aid, against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by International Communism.

The era of American presence in the region did not result in any change in the form of the State in the region.

2.10 Conclusion

The idea and the presence of the state in the Middle East are millennia old, the current forms of the States, which are the brainchild of the Western modernity, are relatively new. The contemporary form of the States, elite led machine, which has authority over a marked territory, supported and recognised by the international community and the external to the society, is imported and planted in the region by the outsider. This alien figure, the State, was a modern form of power that was handed over to docile local elite. The local elite had their own vision and understanding of power, for them: to rule is to possess. Leadership is ownership. This has a root in the concept of *gazza*. The Arabic word indicates what has been captured is owned. Thus the State that was handed over to the local elite was seen and dealt with as personal property. This personal property required care, and survival. While this mindset emerged from tradition, the idea and the structure of the State, as a modern form of organisation, brought with it the idea of citizen, law, civil society and democracy. This made modernity stand in contrast to tradition. While tradition justified the ownership of the State by the elites, the concept of modernity disputed that and stood contrary to it. This awkward fact caused the ruling elite to be jealous of their being sovereign, suspicious of every member and always vigilant for their own survival. But modernity also brought technique of governing, law, bureaucracy, army and arms. This occurred virtually everywhere in the Middle East. This common background allows us to talk about a particular form of the Arab states.

> There is near consensus in the Arab world today concerning the serious flaws in the State of Arab affairs; it is a rare consensus among rulers and ruled in which class distinctions disappear and regional, sectarian and even ethnic differences fade. There is also consensus, as demonstrated by the agreement at the May 2004 Arab summit meeting in Tunis which focused on political reform that the heart of the failing lies in the political

> sphere, specifically the architecture of the Arab State, and that reform must begin there (AHDR, 2004: 128).

The current states in the region are deformed modern national territorial states. This form of the State is neither modern nor traditional. It is a particular form of state, opposes the true essence of both modernity and tradition. Both forces; modern and tradition (mainly religion), are threatening the peculiar structure of this state, but none is able to change it. The historical presence of the other, an outsider shows clearly the strategic position of the region. This presence of the other impacted the region both negatively and positively. The failed modern state as a form of total state controls every form of communication with the outside world. Therefore, after the emergence of these state the outside power had only to go through the apparatuses of these state to communicate with the inside. The FMS which locates in the gray area between the outside and inside found it more beneficial for its survival to appease the outsiders, to fulfil the outsiders' wish as long as they are not affecting the future of the system.

The outsider is driven to the region by their interest: when their interest is met at best through the state i.e. failed modern state, as they wish, whether it is peace or no hostility with Israel, or the flow of oil, or the opening up markets, then the outside power does not bother this state. This makes the state China wall between the outsiders and the populations. This leads the population within the failed modern state to view the outside power as their enemy and the backer of their regimes. This enmity is interpreted by culturalist and rentier state approaches as an essential part of the culture of the region.

No doubt the outsider play a vital role in shaping and surviving of this particular form of state but ultimately it is the failed modern state structure shapes that role, and sometimes pushes the outsiders toward their current position. Thus it can convincingly be argued that these states have a dynamic of their own and that their existence is determined by the outside power alone.

3.1 Concept: Failed Modern State

This chapter outlines the concept of the Failed Modern State (FMS). It explains what each single word in the phrase indicates and how in combination they form a concept to understand and analyse the complex phenomenon of the State in the Arab Middle East. After explaining what is meant by the concept generally, the first word of the phrase (Failed) will be discussed. While elucidating the meaning of failure it is critical to ask the question, is there a failure on the ground. Providing the answer to such a question is a process of linking the coined concept to the reality on the ground. It also requires explaining the meaning of modern in that context and what sort of state as a result emerged.

3.2 The Concept

The FMS is a phrase compound of three words and one ellipsis. The three visible words are *failure, modern* and the *state*, while the ellipsis word, which is included within the meaning of the word failure, is tradition. These words, which makeup the phrase, individually, carry a different function and meaning. While together, like a chemical substance, they stand for a very different meaning and function. Through this combination the phrase becomes a tool to demystify, criticize, argue and analyse the problem which the concept is directly connected to. Since a word in itself fails in its neutral meaning to function as a concept "we have to impose a [particular] meaning up on it" (Heywood, 2007: 18). This is the process of concept construction.

In light of what is being said, the FMS is a system of singularity that attempts to understand the problem of a particular sort of political event. It also attempts to understand the nature and the essence of these systems, which so far stubbornly remain as puzzle in the general area of the State and regional study. As we explained in literature review chapter in more detail, there have been many previous attempts to name the nature of States that exist in the Arab Middle East such as military regimes, single-party regimes, traditional/patrimonial, sultanistic, pseudo-democracies, electoral authoritarianism, and predator states, Rentier state, weak state, dependent state, despotic state, and totalitarian state. This thesis argues that n one of these concepts or descriptions is able to elaborate the particularity and exceptionality of the nature of the States in the Arab Middle East. These concepts basically fail to penetrate the complex

structure of the art of governing. In order to crystallise the imposed meaning of the concept an etymological exercise for each word is needed.

While the Arab Middle East exists as a phrase and as a geopolitical region what it signifies is not fully apparent. It is clear that not all Arabs live in Middle East nor all Middle East is Arab. When Burton I. Kaufman (1996) employed it for the title of his book, The Arab Middle East *and the* United States*: Inter-Arab Rivalry and Superpower Diplomacy*, he included the Levant, the Persian Gulf States and Egypt, Libya and Sudan in North Africa. But when William L. Cleveland (1994) wrote his '*A History of the Modern Middle East*,' he did not include Libya and Sudan. To regard the Levant, the Persian Gulf Arabs and Egypt as one cluster is a common pattern. When Gershoni and Jankowski (1997) edited their seminal work *Rethinking Nationalism in the Arab Middle East*, they did not include any country from the North Africa apart from Egypt. This was so for a clear reason that the sense of Arab unity among the rest of North African Arab states is nonexistent. Egypt in North Africa is the only country, which shared and in many cases leads the aspiration of Arab unity. Moreover Egypt, especially post 1952 Egypt, gravitated more toward the Asian part of the Middle East than Africa. The wars with Israel (1967, 1973), the short unity with Syria and the establishment of an ill-fated solidarity group with Iraq, Jordan and Yemen are among many other attempts to link to the Asian part of the Arab Middle east.


What are known as Maghreb in French political dictionary are countries in which

> French is still the predominant language among the educated. It is overwhelmingly the medium of instruction, especially at the secondary and higher levels of education. The spread of this language and the preponderance of French culture in North Africa are the most salient and longest-lasting features of the colonial legacy. The mission civilisatrice that France, as the colonial power, felt it was carrying out in these countries resulted in the creation of francophonic and, to a great extent, francophile elites (Allouche, 1989: 411).

This particular feature distinguishes the Maghreb countries from the rest of the Arabs. Libya unlike Egypt has no shared experience with the rest of the Arab Middle East such as Arab nationalist aspiration, war, or regional unity.

When the work on the thesis commenced I had the whole Middle East in mind. After some research I came to realise that despite the similarities, not all Middle Eastern countries share similar political, social, cultural and historical experience. Some countries were stood out from

the early stage such as Turkey and Iran, for their different history, trajectory, relation to the west and culture. The states that I have chosen to develop my concept share, despite their difference in political structures, similar languages, experiences and aspirations unlike the rest of the Middle East.



3.3 The Failure

The first word in the 'FMS' phrase is failure. Failure as a word and as an event indicates that there is an undesirable condition on the ground which the efforts to changing it have failed. The undesirable condition was traditional initially, which is encapsulated within the failure as an ellipsis. Failure indicates the failure of modernity, the failure to cause a rupture with tradition, the failure of the hybridisation of tradition and modernity. In the failure there is a sign of an attempt. This elucidates (a) that there is an awareness of the condition of the reality on the

ground; (b) there is a desire and certain will to change that undesirable reality; (c) the change is possible; (d) but this possibility never materialised. This attempt is an attempt to become modern. The word failure is a noun. The English word has a French origin *faillire*, which dates back to the seventeenth century, which also meant *to fail*. The word could mean omission of occurrence, like a failure to perform a duty. It also indicates the state of inability to perform a normal function, like the failure of an organ of the body. It might also mean an abrupt cessation of a normal function and also a lack of success. Despite all these meanings what is rather germane to the conceptualisation is the meaning where failure is the state or condition of not meeting a desired or intended objective after having attempted it. While in the general meaning of the word it is not clear whether the failure to meet the objective is predetermined or otherwise remains unclear, but in the FMS phrase failure is clearly, predetermined.

The failure to meet a desired or intended objective refers firstly to a situation, which is the dire condition situation and necessitating change. This situation, from which one desires to be departed, is tradition. Here the ellipses word becomes rather apparent. When tradition is the situation from which one wanted to depart, then, the failure, in the phrase, indicates that that particular effort did not succeed in reaching its desired objective. But despite that, an attempt occurred, so, tradition has been departed from but the failure indicates that the arrival, the final step of the journey (modernity) has failed to materialise. Both, the desire for change, which entails realisation and the rejection of tradition, and the effort, means that tradition, did not remain as it was. It ended up in the situation of it being impossible to return-back-to. In the pre-modern era tradition was a sleeping force. It was awakened by the forces of modernisation. Therefore, one can say, as a result, tradition was remade and to some extent, to borrow from Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (1992), 'reinvented'. Hence the commencement of modernisation is simultaneously the recommencement of tradition. "Tradition was born in opposition to something: to ideas accompanying foreign merchandise, or to universally proclaimed liberalism", as Abdullah alLroui claims (Sheehi, 1997: 43).

To summarise, the failure in the concept of the FMS indicates: the failure to leave tradition behind and to cause a rupture, or an epistemological rupture, with it. When the evolution of tradition began, and was maintained by forces like states and thier elites, then there was no space for the full implementation of modernity, hence the failure to become modern. A

double failure: a failure to cause rupture and a failure to become modern. This crystallises the position of the FMS, which is neither tradition nor modernity. It inhabits the middle between the two contested poles: tradition and modern, and has no desire to move. It desires to remain, to resist, and to be static. As a result a tradition and modernity, as two parallel lines, are making up the FMS, despite their very contradictory nature. These contradictory elements in the composition of the state are not unique. According to Deleuze and Guattari (2004: 388) "political sovereignty or domination has two heads: the magician king and the jurist-priest.... Undoubtedly, these two poles stand in opposition in term by term". But their opposition inside the body of the FMS "is only relative, they function as a pair" or more correctly the FMS makes them function as a pair. Consequently they are the principal elements of the State apparatus.

Hence failure is multifaceted. It is a failure to rupture with tradition, or to obtain a different view on tradition. It is also a failure to achieve modernity and to become modern. This atmosphere of introducing part of modernity, by the elite, into traditional sphere, while at the same time maintaining tradition and withholding or not encouraging modernity to be realised, is the permanent failure. For the failure as a concept to have an analytical merit, failure must be an event and phenomena on the ground. Failure of modernity signifies the absence of modern standards of the human rights, economic development, democracy, freedom, health, education and many others. The absences of these features are bluntly and tragically everywhere throughout the region.

How to judge failure? Why is it assumed that there is failure? It would be rather apparent that the adequate answer to this question would be fact based. In recent years several studies have covered the economic and social performance of the region, focusing on such aspects as growth, employment, trade, knowledge, women, and poverty among others. These are areas, which are directly linked to the role of the State and the function of the State.

In Egypt, the country which regards itself as the leader of the Arab states "about one in every four Egyptians lives in a shantytown; more than a third of Cairo's 19 million residents live in areas known as *ashwaiyyat*, without clean drinking water or proper sewage systems" (Shatz, 2010). On the other hand the state spies on its people and controls its people through apparatuses like the ministry of the interior which has "an army of about two million informers: one Egyptian in every 40" (Shatz, 2010). This is not unique to Egypt. The first regional United Nations Human

Development Report for the Arab States (2002) covered 22 countries from the Maghreb to the Gulf. The Report concluded that Arab countries needed to embark on rebuilding their societies on the basis of:

- Full respect for human rights and human freedoms as the cornerstones of good governance, leading to human development.
- The complete empowerment of Arab women, taking advantage of all opportunities to build their capabilities and to enable them to exercise those capabilities to the full.
- The consolidation of knowledge acquisition and its effective utilisation. As a key driver of progress, knowledge must be brought to bear efficiently and productively in all aspects of society, with the goal of enhancing human well being across the region (AHDR: 2002: 9).

The areas that were highlighted indicate that ordinary people have no rights in front of authority. Disempowerment of women shows that the vast majority of the population is marginalised and silenced. While calling for the utilisation of knowledge for development demonstrates that modernity is being curtailed. The knowledge that was borrowed is not utilised to serve the population.

The subsequent Arab Human Development Report (2003) a year later focused on the issue of the Knowledge deficit, an area that was highlighted more than a century ago by a Kurdish activist and scholar alKawakby. In his book *Characteristics of the Tyrant* طبائع الاستبداد he states "the tyrant would shiver in fear of worldly knowledge such as theoretical wisdom, intellectual philosophy, the rights of nations, civil policy, history, literary rhetoric and other knowledge that pierces the veil of ignorance and enlightens people" (1984: 50).

In its closing conclusion the report puts forward a strategic vision for creating knowledge societies in the Arab world built on five pillars:

- Guaranteeing the key freedoms of opinion, speech and assembly through good governance bounded by the law.
- Disseminating high quality education for all.
- Embedding and ingraining science, and building and broadening the capacity for research and development across society.

- Shifting rapidly towards knowledge-based production in Arab socioeconomic structures.
- Developing an authentic, broadminded and enlightened Arab knowledge model (AHDR, 2003).

All the recommended areas are directly related to modernity. Their shortage signifies how modernity is being implemented. It shows how the region is lagging behind the rest of the world. The AHDR 2004 report with its focus on freedom stated:

> Despite variations from country to country, rights and freedoms enjoyed in the Arab world remain poor. Even disregarding foreign intervention, freedoms in Arab countries are threatened by two kinds of power: that of undemocratic regimes, and that of tradition and tribalism, sometimes under the cover of religion. These twin forces have combined to curtail freedoms and fundamental rights and have weakened the good citizen's strength and ability to advance (AHDR, 2004: 8).

The findings illustrate that freedom is threatened by two forces modernity (undemocratic regime) and tradition (tribalism and religion). Both modernity and tradition are aiming at the same objective. They both serve the state and its elite and threaten freedom, and work in parallel to serve the State. The 2009 report branded the Arab States as:

> A state which departed from the legitimate rules and subsequently becomes a source of risk to life and freedom. Instead of guaranteeing human security, the state itself turns into a major threat to it. It is fair to say that, across key dimensions of performance, the record of Arab states has been mixed, with negative impacts on human security. While most Arab states have embraced international treaties and adorned their constitutions with clauses that enjoin respect for life, human rights, justice, equality before the law and the right to a fair trial, their performance shows a wide gap between theory and practice (AHDR, 2009: 54).

It is worthwhile mentioning the UNDP which after a decade of producing human-development reports and indexes (HDIs) to determine quality of life, after 2000 decided to focus on a specific region for the first time. The reports were not welcomed by the states of the region. "In some countries, officials were highly uncooperative" (Fergany, 2002). The response was as expected, denial and even attempts to terminate the report. Because the reports aimed at a "new social contract" they actually benefit the bulk of the population. This, means empowering people in the face of the state. FMS inhabits a foggy zone; that is not easy for people to look through. Therefore, knowledge is crucial; it helps citizens, to see, to realise, while secrecy helps the states and the machine of bureaucrats. Therefore, the FMS is inherently a secret state and abhors, in every shape and form, any information about it. Knowledge is the antitheses to the FMS.

Among Arab intellectuals, complaining about the failure of the State is universal. The concept used to describe the situation is *azma* i.e. crisis. The use of the notion of crisis indicates the crucial and decisive characteristic of the situation. If the notion of crisis usually indicates a turning point, the Arab crisis as Fahmi Gad'an (1996: 95) puts it "is a crisis with a closed horizon". The parties that hold responsibility for the crisis are, according to most Arab thinkers (Gad'an, 1996) (Algabri, 1996) (Zreq, 1998) (Gahlion, 1994), a combination of the state, society and the culture.

"The failure of these systems—whether in their patriarchal, monarchist version as in Saudi Arabia or their fascist, republican version as in the Ba'athist states—is the result of the stagnation of power, meaning the lack of any turnover or renewal of elites" (Ghalion, 2004:127). In an interview with Farrukh Iqbal, lead economist and author of the World Bank (2006) report "Sustaining Gains in Poverty Reduction and Human Development in the Middle East and North Africa" Iqbal states:

> Some may not think that poverty is a serious issue in the Middle East and North African region, given its association in the public mind with oil wealth. But this is a misleading image. Although the region has a low poverty rate compared with other developing regions, the fact is that one of every five persons there may be considered poor (at the $2 PPP line) and that little progress has been made in reducing this ratio since the mid-1980s.

Thus one of the main observations of the report is "slow growth has a social cost". The failure is the failure of state to play its role as the main player in achieving a better life. The State is not a mobilising force in the society. It is more the controller. "They [the state elites] serve only the interests of the clans who hold power, they communicate in no way whatsoever with their citizenries, and they depend for their survival solely upon coercion and multiple security services" (Ghalion, 2004: 127).

The state's desire is that the population should remain poor, so that they can be easily controlled; this poverty is not merely in the area of income. "A person who is not free is poor. A woman who is not empowered is poor. And a person who has no access to knowledge is poor" (Fergan, 2002). The main responsiblity for the poverty of fr eedom, poverty of power, and poverty of knowledge is the state. As Bayart (2009: 60) puts it "the state is a major manufacturer of inequality".

There is a substantial lag between Arab countries and other regions in terms of participatory governance. The wave of democracy that transformed governance in most parts of Latin America and East Asia in the 1980s and Eastern Europe and a big part of Central Asia in the late 1980s and early 1990s barely reached the Arab states.

> During democratization's "third wave," democracy ceased being a mostly Western phenomenon and "went global." When the third wave began in 1974, the world had only about 40 democracies, and only a few of them lay outside the West. By the time the *Journal of Democracy* began publishing in 1990, there were 76 electoral democracies (accounting for slightly less than half the world's independent states). By 1995, that number had shot up to 117—three in every five states. By then, a critical masses of democracies existed in every major world region save one the Middle East. Moreover, every one of the world's major cultural realms had become host to a significant democratic presence, albeit again with a single exception—the Arab world. Fifteen years later, this exception still stands (Diamond, 2010: 91).

This freedom deficit undermines human development and is one of the most painful manifestations of lagging political development. While *de jure* acceptance of democracy and

human rights is enshrined in constitutions, legal codes, and government pronouncements, de facto implementation is often neglected and, in some cases, deliberately disregarded (Middle East Quarterly, 2002: 65).

The root of this failure in almost every area of life is, as Marina Ottaway (2004) puts it "fairly simple". According to her the central dilemma of democratic reform is that: "The Presidents and kings remain too powerful, untrammelled by the limits imposed by effective parliaments and independent judiciaries. Countervailing institutions remain weak, if they exist at all" in other words, total power is in the hands of president or the king.

This absolute form of power is the very frame of power that continues from tradition. This tradition of absolute power has deep roots in history. The idea and organisation of the shepherd and flock relationship can first be found throughout the Mediterranean East, in Egypt, Assyria, and Mesopotamia and with the Hebrews, as Foucault (2007) calls it "pastoral power". In the Middle East the existence and the presence of this form of power, ossified and continued as it used to be. Prophet Muhammad used the exact word of shepherd and flock for describing the relationships among members of society, in a saying "Each of you is a shepherd, and all of you are responsible for your flocks." (*Saheeh Al-Bukhari, Saheeh Muslim).*

The notion of shepherd and flock application within tradition first and then within the FMS differs substantively from what Foucault attempts to conceptualise. The shepherd flock relation is not the relation of care and "sacrifice of one for all, and the sacrifice of all for one" (Foucault, 2007: 129). In traditional and FMS, the shepherd is the one who is political. Whereas the flock has no right to be political: thus any attempt by a member of the flock to be political is regarded as law breaking. This makes the FMS an exceptional and an external state. It is external to the population. External means the state machine is outside the realm of the community. Throughout the reign of the Ottomans for the Iraqis the state meant collecting tax and remained distant. This resulted in a pattern of thinking among the ordinary people that the right place of the state is external to the society.

Thinking historically the Ottoman Empire when it was the sole power holder in the region for more than four centuries followed the same method. The externality of the state to the society, as Iraqi sociologist Ali Al-wardi remarks, was the main reason behind the survival of the

Ottoman Empire for such a long time. In his book لمحات من تاريخ العراق الحديث *Social Aspects of Iraqi Modern Society,* about the modern Iraqi sociological history, Alwardi (1977: 22) asks: why the Ottoman Empire lasted for many centuries, whereas the British Empire struggled to sustain the power for few decades only. For him the main reason for the durability of the Ottoman and the difficulties of the British lay in the British's relation with the people. The British colonial administrators intervened into social and political areas which resulted in a backlash and revolt. Especially the British attempt to change the way people continued to do their centuries old daily life rituals. They behaved moderns and forced the people to become modern. Modern signified better and that justified using force. The British forced people to walk on curbs, cross the road in designated places, use toilet rather than urinate in backyards. This indicates that the British introduced into daily life organisation, rules, hygiene and ultimately a different way of living. But this was all conducted in an atmosphere where there was no proper communication. Thus, misunderstanding between the two was the norm. Nowadays in an atmosphere contaminated with conspiracy theory and paranoia misunderstanding about most aspect of politics and life is rife.

The failure of the FMS countries are apparent through their records of human rights abuses, their fortress against democracy and democratisation, their lag behind the world, their underdevelopment, their high illiteracy rates, etc. Deterioration is the pattern. It is also apparent through the draconian laws that restrict basic freedom of expression, association and assembly, restrictive press laws, defining law in vague and loose terms to increase the scope of the death penalty. Introducing provisions like "anyone who commits an act which undermines the political regime or incites others to do so, and anyone who acts individually or collectively to change the economic, social or fundamental situation of the society" (Jordanian antiterrorism law October 8, 2001) can be sentenced to hard labour.

3.4 The Ellipsis (tradition)

Ellipsis is a noun. According to, Oxford University Dictionary, its origin is Greek: from *elleipein*, which means *to leave out.* In its current use it means omission of words either from speech or writing. The word failure includes within its meaning the word tradition. Tradition in

the phrase FMS has been omitted. Even in reality this tradition is in the state of omission. Because of the rhetoric of modernity, tradition is in a state of unspoken, of ellipse. As Mona Abaza puts it "the government has been trying to sell for the Western 'democratic' and free world an image of a civilized, 'enlightened' government, combating its 'dark' opponents" (Abaza, 2010: 32). The government does that to hide its Middle Ages practices.

Tradition in itself is rather complex. It indicates both religious and non religious acts, both Islam and the local culture. There are lines, which overlap and also run in parallel with each other. When it comes to ruling the society the non religious part of tradition has been dominant throughout the history. Islam always played the role of ideology, justification, or the maker of a secondary reality. This situation resulted from the lack of a coherent approach towards sovereignty, state and state-making, on the one hand and on the other hand from the ambiguity towards the political in Islamic canonical texts. Therefore, the main pre-Islamic cleavage survived even after the birth of Islam, slipped through the Islamic resistance to it.

One of the main concepts in this regard is Assabiya. According to the Oxford Dictionary of Islam "*Assabiya* is a social solidarity with an emphasis on group consciousness, cohesiveness, and unity. In the modern period, the term is analogous to solidarity". According to Al-Jabri (2008), Assabiya is different from the tribe, since the tribe has a blood connection among its members, either real or illusionary. Assabiya is based on interest, feeling, survival, and locality. In the desert the basic element of society is Assabiya, because man as an individual cannot survive. Therefore, the conflict for survival is the conflict between the Assabiyyat (Arabic plural for *Assabiya*).

Assabiya is regarded by Islam as a malady, "O people, we created you from the same male and female, and rendered you distinct peoples and tribes, that you may recognize one another" (Qur'an, 49:13). As the verses stress the aim of differentiation is not to result in enmity. The only purpose is recognition, as equal, not inferior. This is especially the case in Meccian Koran: the verses, which were revealed to Muhammad in Mecca, before the *hijra* (migration) to Medinah and establishment of his authority (State). The problem also concerned Muhammad, Imam Ja'far al-Sadiq, reported from the Prophet who said: "Whosoever possesses in his heart Assabiya even to the extent of a mustard seed, God will raise him on the Day of Resurrection with the *Jahiliyyah (age of ignorance i.e. pre-Islam)*."

Despite all that the *Assabiya* survived, Islam itself internalised it and took advantage from it through its reign. The genealogy of this phenomena traces back to the era of the second caliphate Omar. Assabiya as a form of grouping emerges as a result of social and psychological linkages among a distinctive group of people, for the purpose of assaulting the other or defending against assaults. If the cruelty of the desert necessitates that the individual has to gather together and establish the *Assabiya*, this social prototype underwent very little change throughout the history of the region.

This reality of *Assabiya,* as a basic element of society, hinders the birth of the individual as a n i ndependent political actor. The birth of an independent individual was the basis of Western modernity. For instance in Hobbes's Leviathan (2002: 93) the component of the community is "man" as he states that

> nature hath made men so equal in the faculties of body and mind as that, though there be found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body or of quicker mind than another, yet when all is reckoned together the difference between man and man is not so considerable as that one man can thereupon claim to himself any benefit to which another may not pretend as well as he.

It is apparent that Hobbes' concern is 'men' as individuals in relation to society. While for a prominent Arab sociological thinker Ibn Khuldun it is the *Assabiya* not the individual that is the basic component of the society.

The *Assabiya* is a form of identity. In society, which is based on *Assabiya*, there is no room for the modern style of identity like individual or nation. Nation in that sense denotes a larger group of people who are capable through imagination to imagine their-being as being a member of one community. Whereas, the member of *Assabiya* are known to each other and in most case they share a relationship. The *Assabiya* survives on invasion, attacking, and the spoil of war. Therefore, the connection between *Assabiya* and the other people resembles the colonial experience. With the arrival of modernity, the *Assabiya*, which secured power, with the help of technologies of transport and surveillance, of domination and repression, secured its survival against other *Assabiya*. For their own endurance the modern rulers were quick in implementing the methods of the modern style of power. When in Egypt Muhammad Ali Pashas became the ruler of the country, he hired an advisor into Cairo, who according to Mitchell:

> [he] was the friend and assistant of the English reformer Jeremy Bentham, who in turn was the inventor of the Panopticon, the institution in which the use of coercion and commands to control a population was replaced by the partitioning of space, the isolation of individuals, and their systematic yet unseen surveillance (Mitchell, 1991: X).

Modernity also changed radically the form of the army. However, the change was in limited form not to loyalty. The new army, as it was explained in an official Ottoman pamphlet:

> [the new force] should not, like the rest of our forces, be composed of sellers of pastry, boatmen, fishermen, coffee-house keepers, *baccals* (greengrocer), and others who are engaged in the thirty-two trades, but of well disciplined men (Effendi, 1820: 234).

The other fold of the ellipse, tradition, is Islam. Islam in regard to the FMS is an ideology on the one hand and a counter discourse on the other hand. Islam is the official religion of every single FMS countries. Every state has a special ministry for religious affairs. The wide network of mosques within the countries functions as an ideological state apparatus. Tradition is a main part in daily life practices. It shapes families, personal relationships, ethos, and morality. This tradition in most cases prepares the ground for the FMS to function. Tradition resists human rights, democracy, women rights, secularism, individualism, freedom of expression, liberty etc. Therefore, tradition and its agents- clerics and tribal leaders are the closest supporters of the State- fight on behalf of the state against modern forces. As Bassma Kodmani puts it the "conservative Islamic authorities that claim to be non political are more problematic and dangerous for social progress than legally recognized Islamic parties participating in the democratic process" (2005: 3).

3.5 The Modern

The concept of modernity and its diffusion to Middle East is the concern of the thesis. The concept of diffusion indicates that modernity migrated from a place to another one. What is modernity, in its birth place, how modernity travelled, and what it resulted in, are questions which require answers. As Hardt and Negri (2000: 74) put it:

Modernity is not a unitary concept but rather appears in at least two modes. The first mode is a radical revolutionary process. This modernity destroys its relations with the past and declares the immanence of the new paradigm of the world and life.

This new emergence, according to Hardt and Negri, determined a counterrevolution: a cultural, philosophical, social, and political initiative that, since it could neither return to the past nor destroy the new forces, therefore, sought to dominate and expropriate the force of the emerging movements and dynamics. This is the second mode of modernity, constructed to wage war against the new forces and establish an overarching power to dominate them (2000: 74).

The two forms of modernity remained in parallel throughout the modern history of the west. The first modernity is the modernity of the revolution; the second modernity is the capitalist modernity. This dualist nature of modernity has been visible and felt outside Europe also. If colonialism belongs to the counter-revolutionary modernity, anti-colonialism belongs to the revolutionary modernity. Thus what is branded as occidental modernity is a twofold modernity. When this modernity diffused to the Arab Middle East, initially it resulted in an awakening. The awakening had two directions, one toward past and the other toward future. One was directed toward tradition and the other one toward modernity. Therefore, the tradition that emerged in the region was the counter-product of modernity. Since the dominant modernity was the counter-revolutionary modernity it "also began to realize the possibility and necessity of subordinating other populations to European domination" (Hardt & Negri, 2000: 77). The two counter-revolutionary modernities, one occidental and the other Middle Eastern monopolized the scene. This made it possible for European modernity to ally with tribal and religious elite with little or no difficulties. It was a meeting of two elites to manage the situation. The state, as the complex body of domination and management of society and people, that emerged had no difficulty to take from occidental modernity elements to enhance its power and secure its survival. Similarly, since it was ruled by traditional elite, it never had intention to abandon tradition.

What does modern denote in the FMS phrase? Modern, for the modernist, and the activists who are inspired by the Western version of modernity, is an aspiration to-come. However this has been, aimed at, planned for and desired in the last two centuries, despite that it is an event still to take place. It is set in the future. Modern is the status hoped to be reached in future. It also indicates that the future has to be modern. The crucial thing about modernity is that

it never reaches maturity. Or it is in reality never allowed to reach maturity. While modernity is the future for the Arab modernists, it is not so for Europeans. For the Europeans, the West-modernity is history. It is already achieved. An event has already taken place. Despite the claim by some (Habermas, 1992) that the project of modernity can be redeemed, the post-modern or the departure from modern has already occurred. This emphasises the irredeemable chasm between the Arabs and the West and their being [Arabs] in a process of never being able to catch up. One can claim that modernity is for the Arabs at the same time actual and virtual: actual in the sense of technology and virtual in the sense of thinking and consciousness. Modernity is in a condition of multiplicities, each of which is composed of actual and virtual elements. Pure actual modernity does not exist.

Since this part is concerned with the modern in the phrase of FMS, it has no ambition to trace the genealogy of modernity in the West. It only focuses on modernity in the FMS.

In his book, *What Went Wrong: Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response*, Bernard Lewis, (2002) dwells specifically on the concept of modernity and the historical circumstances that made the Middle Easterners, who at that time were ruled by the Ottoman empire, realise the necessity of borrowing modernity from the West: both its actual (material) and its virtual (cultural) aspects.

> In the first half of the eighteenth century, the struggle was indecisive, and even brought some gains for the Ottomans. In 1710 and 1711 they won a significant victory over the Russians who, by the Treaty of the Pruth (1711), were obliged to return the peninsula of Azov. But another war against Venice and then against Austria ended with another defeat and further territorial losses, specified in the Treaty of Passarowitz of 1718 (Lewis, 2002: 20).

According to Lewis the defeat of the Ottomans in the war against the Europeans, was an event the Ottomans were not used to. This was the main reason behind their realisation of modernity and subsequently made it an urgent process. It was a defensive modernity. The Ottomans from the beginning had drawn their legitimacy from holy war – *gaza* – on the frontiers of Christendom. The subjugated regions of Europe formed the richest, most populous and politically prised zones of the empire, and the theatre of the overwhelming majority of its military campaigns, as successive sultans set out for the House of War to enlarge the House of Islam. The Ottoman state was founded, as its most recent historian writes, on 'the ideal of

continuous warfare' (Anderson, 2008). The idea of *gaza*, which leads to *fat'h,* which means opening, has its root in Islamic religion. It is regarded as *jihad,* duty, over Muslims to spread their religion over the earth, by every mean. This idea of perpetual warfare, which was legitimised by the religion, and those who died, in their path, were *shahid* martyrs, and rewarded by Allah in *gana* heaven, was utilised by the Ottomans as their source of income. Since expansion meant legitimacy and wealth the empire was always eager for expansion.

Having said that, this does not indicate that the Empire had no, or did not recognises frontiers. In recent years in some conferences and meetings scholars have begun to discuss the existence of borders and frontiers. Documents recently discovered give evidence that a real border already existed at the end of the fifteenth century, at least in some regions of the Empire (Pia Pedan, 2002). There are concepts and words used by the Ottomans to describe the border in their documents. Words like *snur, hdud,* which is also used in other Middle Eastern languages, *snur* in Kurdish means border and *hudud* in Arabic means border, also a word like *add* which is driven from the Arabic word *hadd* which means limit, did exist. The existence of the concept of border might indicate that the Ottomans recognised the Other. The people who were beyond their realm of power, people who differed from them, but they did not regard them as equal. For them the people beyond their frontier were people, who should either be converted or subjected. This superiority feeling continued until the emergence of European modernity. Henceforth, the Ottoman defeats in war after war commenced. Defeat a fter defeat brought home a painful realisation, to a level that "it was no longer sufficient, as in the past, to adopt Western weapons. It was also necessary to adopt Western training, structures, and tactics for their effective use" (Lewis, 2002: 20).

The issue was not technological per se. While "the Ottoman state and armed forces were as effective as they had ever been, in traditional terms" (Lewis, 200:20), they realised that being Muslim is not the source of victory as it was in the past; being Muslim in the similar way, after the advance of modernity in Europe, was instead a liability. This marked the commencement of the phenomena of borrowing modernity. Here lies the genesis of catching up, being like the other, the feeling of inferiority, despising oneself, renouncing one's own culture. are phenomena which hamper the emergence of modernity event at the present.

For the Arabs modernity marked "the end of a long sleep" (Atiyah, 1958: 73). Sleep differs from death. Being end itself; death has no end. Unlike the sleep, which no matter how long it lasts has an end, death is infinite. The end of sleep is waking up but the end of metaphorical sleep is awakening, an abruption, a realisation of a new world and ultimately a different realisation of the self. The metaphor of 'sleep' indicates that Arabs were not dead. They were present in the world, but without any communication, reflection and influence. Their sleep was long. They departed from the world's events for a long time. They were so in deep asleep, required a strong the external force, like Napoleon's army in 1789, to wake them up. This departure from the world signified among many other things; unawareness of progress, changes, innovation, therefore, the wakening up was rather an experience of shock and surprises. Since they were woken up by the Other, consequently they faced the Other. The Other was a force from modernity empowered by the superior knowledge and technology. The French who played the role of the Other, the one who were waking and disturbing, occupied Egypt between 1798-1801. They were the first colonial conqueror who endeavoured to bring the Enlightenment to the Orient. The invasion was justified exclusively by the assumed superiority of the Western value system, "liberating" the Orient from the yoke of barbaric despots. Before this expedition, colonisation was rationalised by religious arguments; now reason, rationality, and scientific thought justified the conquest of an extra-European country. Thus when the Arabs woke up they did not only face an occupier, they faced a new system, a new rhetoric and a new paradigm. Consequent to this shocking realisation numerous questions emerged: questions evaluating the identity, who are we, which merely directed toward the past. Who are these people, and why are they so a dvanced in comparison to 'us'. For them Europeans and their culture, is the future that they were ambivalent how to reach it.

3.6 The Modern in the FMS

The word 'modern' in the FMS phrase signifies the ultimate achievement, the goal, the moment when the Arab Middle East and their states are on a par with the Europeans and the European states. But this modernity for the state and the state elites has arrived. It is there. What is not there is the reality of modernity. Reality is the social reality and real is the "inexorable abstract" (Zizek, 2009: 11). Modernity from the early days became part of the State.

> Jeremy Bentham corresponded with local rulers in all these places, including the governor in Cairo, Muhammad Ali Pasha, advocating the introduction of the panoptic principle and other new techniques. For many Europeans—military officers, Saint-Simonist engineers, educationalists, physicians, and others—a place like nineteenth-century Cairo provided the opportunity to help establish a modern state based on the new methods of disciplinary power (Mitchill, 19991: X).

Modernity arrived fast for the State and the State elite. They soon realised the principle of holding power. The ruling elites became familiar through their Western advisers; they made themselves familiar with how to use modern tools. The most notorious of these advisers were Gertrude Bell and Lawrence of Arabia. When the French dethroned the King Faisal, Bell persuaded the British to make him king of Iraq. With all his family in Mecca, the lonely Faisal, knowing virtually nothing about his new kingdom, took Bell as his most intimate adviser, and some hailed her as the uncrowned Queen of Iraq. Bell in her diary, available online, expresses that in a quite clear way:

Baghdad Aug 28, 1921

> My letters seem to behave in just the same curious way. Well, we've had a terrific week, but we've got our king crowned and Sir Percy and I agree that we are now half seas over. The remaining half is the Congress and the Organic Law.

As she confesses to her parents, she and her colleagues had a 'terrific week'; as they crowned their 'our king'. The possessive pronoun 'our' indicates that the King belonged to them (the British). The King was crowned by them (the colonial) to be the King of the Iraqi people(s). The other thing that catches attention is the shortness of the time it took to crown the king. In a matter of week, a foreign person made the king of another country, whom the majority of the people did not welcome it. At the core of modernity is technology. Technology by definition "include both physical tool and organisational artifices such as bureaucracies" (Frankenfeld, 1992: 461). Thus technology and modernity are without essence. Human beings as agents give the essence of modernity and technology. When both modernity and technology become part of the State-formation in its modern form, they are in danger of making people an obsolete figure within the state.

Here the boundary between, whether the state is modernity or modernity is the state, is blurred. Technology provides mastery to man, mastery over nature, and also consequently over

fellow men. Consequently the state, as an organisation, as technology, slips from the human control. If this is correct for the European modern states and it is the essence of the Middle Eastern States. In his article; 'the Question Concerning Technology', Martin Heidegger explains how technology changes drastically the relationship of man to the nature:

> A tract of land is challenged into the putting out of coal and ore. The earth now reveals itself as a coalmining district, the soil as a mineral deposit. The field the peasant formerly cultivated and set in order [*bestellte*] appears differently than it did when to set in order still meant to take care of and to maintain. The work of the peasant does not challenge the soil of the field. In the sowing of grain it places the seed in the keeping of the forces of growth and watches over its increase. But meanwhile even the cultivation of the field has come under the grip of another kind of setting-in-order, which sets upon [*stellt*] nature. It sets upon it in the sense of challenging it. Agriculture is now the mechanized food industry. Air is now set upon to yield nitrogen, the earth to yield ore, ore to yield uranium, for example uranium is set upon to yield atomic energy (1993: 320).

If nature is challenged through technology and as a result "comes under another kind of setting in order" so too was the human field, the society.

> A government ordinance of January 1830 confined them to their native districts, and required them to seek a permit and papers of identification if they wished to travel outside. 'It was scarcely possible', we are told, 'for a fellah to pass from one village to another without a written passport.' The village was to be run like a barracks, its inhabitants placed under the surveillance of guards night and day and under the supervision of inspectors as they cultivated the land - and surrendered to the government warehouse its produce.
>
> No one before had thought to organise Egypt as one would barrack and discipline an army. The acts of confinement, regulation, and supervision of the population dawned suddenly. Wherever people looked, they were to be inspected, supervised, or instructed. If they left the village, it was generally under guard, forcibly drafted into the still harsher discipline of the corvée or the military the Camp - unless they were 'absconders' who abandoned their homes and fled, as tens of thousands began to do. If they were guards rather than those who were guarded, they still did not escape surveillance. Spies were placed at every point, and the hierarchy of supervision and inspection was to ascend from the field and the shop, through the levels of village, district, regional and provincial supervision, to the central Bureaux of Inspection (*dawawin al-taftish*) under the direct supervision of the Governor (Mitchell, 1991: 34).

From this early stage the divorce between the state and the nation occurred. The state and also the nation are historical phenomena, historical in the sense that they are not natural. The concept of the state predates the concept of nation.

> The concept of nation in Europe developed on the terrain of the patrimonial and absolutist state. The patrimonial state was defined as the property of the monarch. In a variety of analogous forms in different countries throughout Europe, the patrimonial and absolutist state was the political form required to rule feudal social relations and relations of production (Negri & Hardt, 2000: 93).

The nation was an ideological necessity for the modern secular state that emerged after the French revolution lacked a cement to unite the inhabitants within the territory.

> The concept of nation in these early years of the French Revolution was the first hypothesis of the construction of popular hegemony and the first conscious manifesto of a social class, but it was also the final declaration of a fully accomplished secular transformation, a coronation, a final seal. Never was the concept of nation so reactionary as when it presented itself as revolutionary (Hardt & Negri, 2000: 104).

But the history of the event of the emergence of state and nation did not continued in a natural manner of diffusion of knowledge to the Middle East. Initially it was brought to the region by the Europeans and later on it was borrowed and mimicked by the locals themselves. Borrowing requires flexibility and pragmatism from the start. This is followed by willingness and an ability to adapt, to utilise talent and accept allegiance from many sources, and to make multiple appeals for support. In the nature of the relationships between East and West; between the owner of technology on the one hand and on the other hand the one who needs technology, as a precondition it demands openness to technological innovation, and being ready and willing to change. Above all borrowing indicates pragmatism and the non-ideological nature of the state. For the Ottomans the aim of the borrowing of institutions and technology was apparent, to continue to rule the empire. "Thus Ottoman society and Ottoman bureaucracy brought about institutional change in selective areas—for example, military technology and organization and public and private finance" (Pamuk, 2004: 226).

Whereas, imposing modernity differs from borrowing modernity in many aspects. Imposing include the imposer and the imposed: the civilised and the savage. The civilised who realises his being civil in interacting, imposing, leading, teaching, the savage; who in return, comes face to face with his savageness through encountering the civil. The savage is not fully human, he is merely an object; an object to be avoided, to be tamed, to be overcome, to be civilised. As Balfour puts it clearly "we are in Egypt not merely for the sake of the Egyptians,

though we are there for their sake; we are there also for the sake of Europe at large" (Said, 2003: 34).

In the case of imposing, the imposed up on has no right to speak for himself, to represent himself, to remain himself. (There is no need to mention herself). He will be reduced to a machine. In the space where modernity is imposed by a foreign power, Human beings are reduced to a machine. Like a machine they are treated as having no subjectivity or organising centre. They are nothing more than the connections and producers. They are under a constant process of deterritorialisation, or becoming other than themselves.

Deleuze and Guattari "insist that the machine is not a metaphor and that life is literally a machine. An organism is a bounded whole with an identity and end. A mechanism is a closed machine with a specific function. "A machine, however, it is nothing more than its connections; it is not made by anything, is not for anything and has no closed identity" (Colebrook, 2002: 56). Accordingly, the inhabitants of the colonial space became the machine, their existence and their being only valued in relation to Western culture and Western modernity. As Pappe (2007: 3) explains in his comment on the theory of modernisation, "this definition [modernisation] takes for granted not only that local pre-modern past are irrelevant but also that, as long as they are not Westernised, the local themselves are not part of modern history". As Pappe explains further, the local "appear only as receptacles, passive human beings whose live are changed through the intervention of the external and dynamic powers saving them from stagnation" (2007: 3).

This vision did not only lead to degrading and dehumanising the people, their past, their way of life, their history; it also reduced them to an obstacle which during the time of difficulties the power should not hesitate to remove them. For instance, when the British army's faced rebellion and resistance in Iraq in 1920 from the Kurds and the Arabs, Winston Churchill did not hesitate to sanction the use of chemical weapons against them. Churchill as a colonial secretary was sensitive to the cost of policing the Empire and was in consequence keen to exploit the potential of modern technology (Geoeff, 2004: 214) in reducing cost. This sensitivity toward economic cost led him to disregard the indigenous population as equal human beings. Accordingly, he did not hesitate to quell the resistance in an economical way. Churchill was particularly keen on chemical weapons, suggesting they be used "against recalcitrant Arabs as an experiment". He dismissed objections as "unreasonable". He justified the act by saying "I am

strongly in favour of using poisoned gas against uncivilised tribes - [to] spread a lively terror" (Jonathan Glance, (2003). This policy "beginning with the British idea of order the use of violence to suppress dissent, much of which took violent form itself, has been reproduced and elaborated on by central government in Baghdad since the foundation of the state" (Tripp, 2000: 6). Commenting on that both Anderson and Stansfield (2004: 24) state "repressing the 'uncivilised' Kurds through the liberal use of violence was to become something of national sport in Iraq over the next 80 years, but the Kurds have not been the only victims". This very policy of imposing modernity was seen from the eye of the imposer very differently

> If it is our business to govern, with or without gratitude, with or without the real and genuine memory of all the loss of which we have relieved the population and no vivid imagination of all the benefits which we have given to them; if that is our duty, how is it to be performed?" England exports "our very best to these countries." These selfless administrators do their work "amidst tens of thousands of persons belonging to a different creed, a different race, a different discipline, different conditions of life (Said, 2003: 33).

These are the premises which show how the process of modernity contributed in making the FMS. What can be concluded is that Modernity in its colonial form brought policies, techniques, systems, and concepts through which a new organisation was born. This new organisation was the State.

3.7 The State

The states or the territorial states which exist in the Arab Middle East today are a result of the colonial planning by the French and British. The Sykes-Picot Agreement on 16 May 1916 declares

> That France and Great Britain are prepared to recognize and protect an independent Arab State or a Confederation of Arab States in the areas (A) and (B) marked on the annexed map, under the suzerainty of an Arab chief. That in area (A) France, and in area (B) Great Britain, shall have priority of right of enterprise and local loans. That in area (A) France, and in area (B) Great Britain, shall alone supply advisers or foreign functionaries at the request of the Arab State or Confederation of Arab States. That in the blue area France, and in the red area Great Britain, shall be allowed to establish such direct or indirect

administration or control as they desire and as they may think fit to arrange with the Arab State or Confederation of Arab States (from BBC website).

As Ayubi (1995: 86) rightly observed, the colonial powers were "the most instrumental in drawing up boundaries in roughly their present form, in redirecting economic relations away from the Middle East and towards Europe...in defining - often very artificially - the units that were to be singled out as distinct states". One could deduce from this the following premises: (a) the states are not a result of changes and progress within society; (b) The states are imposed from outside; (c) The states are not established for administering towards local requirements; (d) The main purpose behind the newly established states was economics (imperialism). These consequently marked the form of administration as Samir Amin explains "most of the colonial powers, sought to privatise the system of land ownership, and consequently, redistributed land among those who exhibited readiness to cooperate, mostly among tribal Sheikhs and urban notables" (Amin, 1978: 30).

In order to fulfil this, a dvancement in two areas was need namely: technology and bureaucracy. These two sides indicate the material and management (organisation) side of modernity. From the technological side all related sectors necessary for promoting agricultural commercialisation were developed: railways and roads were built, irrigation networks were established or improved, and credit institutions emerged. On the bureaucratic side, some forms of parliamentary democracy were advanced, but the access to political life remained confined to a special stratum within society, tribal sheikhs, urban notables (in the Arab East mainly), and the aristocratic class (mainly in Egypt).

While in addition to all these, the background, the history and the culture, of the state enterprise originated from two very different sources which shared considerable similarities. One is the Ottoman Empire the other is European colonialism. Both were alien to the native people. Neither was concerned with seeking legitimacy from the people. For the Ottomans people were an uncapped source of tax money without any services. For the Europeans the people were not considered as human beings with human rights. For the Europeans what was valuable were raw materials and latter on the market. For both the Ottomans and the Europeans, tradition and modernity establish the premise of the postcolonial State. This external genesis of the States in

the region makes externality one its main characteristics. The state was established by the external, for the external purpose, and remained aloof from the local.

From this background the contemporary states elites in the region inherited externality from the population and an attitude that the state as combination of range of complex institutions is their property. Thus the first task of these new elite was to ensure their remaining in power. Therefore, they arranged the state machines in a particular structure that shapes the population and the wealth in a manner that serve their continuation in power. This particular arrangement required element from modernity, without implementation of modernity, simultaneously needed tradition with return to the traditional structure.

> The contrasts between the state agendas of Arab republics and monarchies are profound. The monarchs generally claim divine right to rule (some add tribal rights and descent from Muhammad's line as well). The presidents generally adopt Arab nationalism and socialism and propagate an image of modernity. However, the presidents are also keen to project an image of Islamic piety in order to take advantage of the Islamic injunction to obey the Muslim ruler (Elhadj, 2009: 61).

Thus the state elite utilises the state apparatuses to perpetuate their position. Consequently the state structures shapes in a form that only designed to serve the elite. In other word the state is not neutral. This also indicates that this particular state structure cannot be run by other than the current ruling elite.

3. 8 On the Tool

The essence of the tool is interference between two or more domains in order to facilitate more effective action. The resulting action is always of one domain upon the other. Consequently tool, through its function, creates hierarchy, establishes domination, and gives all the power, force, violence, to one party (domain) over the other. Through mediation the tool establishes an unequal relationship between two entities tool is a medium; it simultaneously links and separates two different entities. Therefore, when two entities relate to each other through tool they are at same time unrelated.

The use of tool is *techne*. In the Greek myths *Techne* is the gift of Prometheus. It is making something into something it is not. The action is accompanied by "conscious, wilful, violent, and productive" mind (Meagher, 1988: 159). Based on Aristotle's division of knowledge in the

'Nicomachean Ethics' the techne is unethical. According to him knowledge is divided into three categories: theoretical (episteme), productive (*techne*), and practical (phronesis). Works of art result from techne but ethics falls under the domain of phronesis, which is "a state of grasping the truth, involving reason, concerned with action about what is good or bad for a human being" quoted from (Haney, 1999: 32). In the FMS the state establishes a *techne*, in the other words productive unethical relation to the modern and traditional values. Consequently, the values tradition, costumes, laws, rights and principle become tools.

The significance of linking State elites and the concept of tool lies in the ethos of their relationships. For Foucault (1982: 208) power is structured "in a way in which certain actions may structure the field of other possible actions". Accordingly, the tool relation establishes a field where practicing power over the whole society is possible. To relate in a tool manner is to relate in a non relational relation. This indicates when the FMS is in the tool relation with the people; consequently they are in non-relational relation. This is a form of abandonment by the state. Abandonment is a form of a relation. It is possible according to Agamben (1998: 28) in the 'state of exception' "the relation of exception is a relation of ban." To be banned by the state is to be in relation with the state.

> He who has been banned is not, in fact, simply set outside the law and made indifferent to it but rather abandoned by it, that is, exposed and threatened on the threshold in which life and law, outside and inside, become indistinguishable. It is literally not possible to say whether the one who has been banned is outside or inside the juridical order (Agamben, 1998: 28).

The state of exception or emergency is official in Syria and Egypt. The rest of the countries qualify to be categorised as in states of emergency, especially when it comes to their relationship with the law or the constitution. The state of exception is "suspension of the entire existing juridical order" (Agamben, 2005) a state where the law is a tool in the hand of the sovereign. While the State applies the law to the population but the population does not enjoy comparable rights. The State has been exempted from the law. The result is a production of "refugeeness, and statelessness".

Drawing on that, one cannot apprehend the Arab politics by referring to the legal system in the Arab countries highlighting the type of political regime, but by examining the

practices of the apparatuses of rule and bureaucracy on using governmentality tools in order to divide their populations into categories that can be manage (Hanfi, 2008).

One can trace the modern origin of the model of the tool relationship back to Machiavelli. In chapter XVIII of his book the *Prince* (1979: 59) he says "it is unnecessary for a prince to have all the good qualities I have enumerated, but it is very necessary to appear to have them". Thus, one of the dominant views of Machiavelli was "to see him [the prince] as treating religion, and other values, functionally, as an instrument promoting desirable political behaviour" (Colish, 1999: 598). To make something a tool is to relate to it without possessing it. In this way the user of the tool eliminates the effect of the tool on him. The sole purpose of the tool is to have an effect on the others. In the course of talking about Ferdinand of Aragon, Machiavelli regarded him as "the man who accomplished great things under the cloak of religion, but who in reality had no mercy, faith, humanity, or integrity; and who, had he allowed himself to be influenced by such motives, would have been ruined" (1979: 73). To treat values as a tool is essential for survival. As Machiavelli affirms:

> And you have to understand this that a prince, especially a new one, cannot observe all those things for which men are esteemed, being often forced, in order to maintain the state, to act contrary to fidelity, friendship, humanity, and religion. Therefore it is necessary for him to have a mind ready to turn itself accordingly as the winds and variations of fortune force it (1979: 60).

When one uses a certain value as a tool one manages to detach from it and use it in a rational, calculating way. This makes the value, of which a tool was made, have no value. This loss of value, frees the value from its restriction. The devalued value gains or has potential to gain a different value, endless use, ultimately serving whatever purpose, through its use. The human, Western relation to tools, equipment, is a relation of use according to Heidegger. For him understanding is not a cognitive activity, instead, his emphasis is on know-how. Therefore the available "equipment" appears to a person primarily in terms of the possibilities that it can serve: "the available is discovered as such in its serviceability, its usability" (Kaufer, 2003: 84).

The understanding and usability of the elites who have all the power and the possibility of using the tool and change the values of tools is self serving understanding. This is fully justified by the modern liberal understanding of rationality. This self serving, making a tool out of values, which ultimately results in a divorce between ethics and reason, is critiqued by Levinas. For him the

separation of ethics from politics results in a development of "The State of Caesar" which in the end

> separates humanity from its deliverance by developing without hindrance and reaching the plenitude (or hypertrophy – natural, as it were) of the form it received from the Graeco-Roman world, the pagan State, jealous of its sovereignty, the State in search of hegemony, the conquering, imperialist, totalitarian, oppressive State, attached to realist egoism (Levinas, 1994: 184).

The FMS is in a relationship with both tradition and its components and modernity and its components in a tool or techne manner. This status of both tradition and modernity provides the State with all the opportunities it desires to control the population and guard its jealous sovereign. The tool relationship provides the regime in these States with no clear identity or no identity as such. This absence of identity makes the State a void that can claim different identities, without difficulty, under different circumstances. It offers the ruling elites freedom to use and manoeuvre among various different policies. The rationale behind the tool relationship is the politics of survival. Such politics are inherently paradoxical. In his attempt to explain the politics of modern Italy the Sicilian, Giuseppe Tomasi di Lampedusa, coined a memorable phrase: ("Se vogliamo che tutto rimanga come è, bisogna che tutto cambi!") "If we want everything to stay as it is, everything has to change" (Rowland, 2009).

In order for the system, the regime, the state, to remain as it is everything has to change. Through this the state resembles Allah, the divine that changes without being changed. This change is managed, watched, observed and directed in a particular direction. The state in its attempt to manage the survival is engaged in permanent movement in response to pressure, events, demands, needs, projects, policies, plans, and programmes. Therefore every process might be derailed for a different reason. In describing Jordan's commencement of the liberalisation process in late eighties Tahir al-Masri then Prime Minister ensured that the process was going to be very controlled: in his words reported by New York Times of October 26 1989 "we will take it in small doses from the king" (Amawi, 1992: 28). The fact that the ultimate political power rests with the throne, and that it is willing and able to exert this power, has led many to perceive no real change in the political institutions and the balance of powers. As Layth Shubaylat, a popular independent Islamist member of parliament, notes, "this is a decorative and

superficial democracy which has not changed the reality of our situation; the power centres that administer and run the country are still there" (Amawi, 1992: 28).

This engagement in manoeuvring is the nature of the very game of survival. The game also confirms the tool relation idea. Projects, process and policies are commenced by the State at a certain time for a limited purpose and after achieving their short term goal, abruptly abandoned. In addition to capacity and power, the State has perfect know-how in the use of tools. This combination of know-how and unrestricted access or power and resources within the territory of the State, creates a situation where the State can, in most circumstances, in a trouble-free way attach to and detach from the tools. In this game: times, momentum, the duration, are immensely important.

The FMS is a State for itself. It has no political end apart from its continuation. This unique state purpose creates an atmosphere where modern tools and traditional tools have different roles and functions. As long as it remains this way the FMS can tolerate neither modernity nor tradition as independent forces in society. Thus, only after change in its purpose of can the FMS tolerate aspects of both tradition and modernity. This occurs only when modern and traditional tools lose their independence and become a supportive part of the system. This is done through the machine of the state. One could ask, what is the ultimate implication of the tool relationship? Through the tool relationship the State reduces both modernity and tradition into tools. As a result of this process, a situation emerges that hollows both modernity and tradition. The state would be the balance and the buffer between the two. In their current state of affairs both modernity and tradition are broken, unable to answer and deal with the problems on the ground. This makes the State the only viable force that has the power to change but changes in the State take place only if they enhance the status quo. The hollow modernity and hollow tradition play a vital role in making the FMS. Hence, neither of them can ever be set in motion, since that would mean moving away from being under state control, this makes any step toward modernity or tradition, seen by the State, as an attempt to destabilise the whole system. For this reason, any change or reenergising modernity in any sort or shape, whether it is through; democratisation, secularisation or liberalisation the State resists it vehemently.

3.9 The Prohibition of Society

The form of society in the FMS, which clears the way through which the FMS can relate through both modern and traditional tools, is not society in the modern sense of the word. The concept of society indicates civil society. In Western political thinking this has a genesis in the Greek City State. The society is an imagined *polis*. In Western political thinking longing for a lost 'original community' is a common tradition (Kellogg, 2005: 340). The *polis* signifies a certain power structure which has implications for society, culture and the modes of order. It is an arrangement, where there is the possibility for one to be a citizen. "The society is a structure of unlike elements; where the total equality cannot come into consideration" (Simmel, 1911: 388). These 'unlike elements' are sources of mobility, change and the basis for democracy. For Deleuze (1986: 2) society is "something that never stops slipping away". This indicates that society is made up of different groups wit h different interests. Therefore, its main characteristics a re multiple and constantly evolving. Each group for its self-interest establishes relationships with other groups, through this power emerges. For this to happen there must be freedom, respect and security.

The FMS cannot tolerate such a structure. Any form of fluidity or mobility, outside the control of the FMS, if it is not managed by the State, is seen by the state as a source of potential danger to the existing power structures. Therefore, the population in the FMS has been derailed from becoming a society. Through utilisation of both modern and traditional tools the FMS transforms the population into the masses. These masses are run in a Camp style of administration: as it is explained in the following chapter in detail.

In the FMS, there is no gap between the state and the population the State fully intervenes and shapes the population in a manner that serves its power structure. This makes the state the only holder or the cement as Durkheim puts it (DiCristina, & Gottschalk, 2008: 25) of the current shape of the population. For Durkheim, the cement is the collectively held belief and sentiment that resides at the core of social life. It is the beliefs that bind individuals into a society. Therefore when there is no accentuated society individuals are forced into being a mass, and this mass has to live the life of the Camp, this makes the current structure fragile and always at risk

of falling. The immediate consequence of the Saddam Hussain regime collapse in 2003 was the fall of so-called Iraqi society. This is similar to or possibly happens with the commencement of a democratisation process in these states. This imminent fall is postponed by the State and its apparatuses. Therefore, when the state collapses the current shape of the masses collapses immediately. This collapse or disseverment of the non-societal structure results in re-emergence of the pre-modern structure of togetherness namely tribe, sect, etc.

Prior to the emergence of the FMS people in this area were not living in societal forms. After its emergence the FMS did not aspire to create a society. Like forced marriage, FMS created a form of forced living together. Furthermore the population never enjoyed the status of citizens. For instance when Iraq was created, the people of the country were not in a relationship with the state, the state viewed them as people with no allegiance, no sense of nationality or patriotic pride. As King Faisal I in 1933 observed "there is still no Iraqi people, but unimaginable mass of human beings, devoid of any patriotic ideal … connected by no common tie, giving ear to evil, prone to anarchy, and perpetually ready to rise against any government whatsoever" (Batatu,1978: 28). This clearly indicates that in the pre-FMS era there was no society and after the emergence of the FMS that reality remained the same.

3.10 The FMS as a Void

The FMS is neither modern nor traditional. It hollows both tradition and modernity. Being neither modern nor traditional and utilising both is only possible by being a void. When the state is described as a void it is a state which has a frame but nothing to hold it as permanent within that frame. Only through becoming a frame can the state claim both modern and traditional identities without being either. A void is where there are no clear rules and norms according to which politics is to be conducted. When tradition and modernity become tools, the state brings them together, amalgamates them, but does not establish from them a hybrid. The amalgamation of modern and tradition is not to produce a third space. However, both tradition and modernity might mix, within a space that is watched and limited by the State, but this mixture is for production of the void. In this situation both tradition and modernity are counterbalancing each other.

The void is permanent because the state resists the occurrence of any event. Nothing has to happen, because every occurrence might destabilise the situation. It might destabilise security and the meaning of the authority. For the State, the status quo has to be preserved. By avoiding any association, any meaning, and any identification the FMS gains a free hand in utilising tradition and modernity. When the State is a frame and that frame is filled according to the game of the balancing of power then the State becomes the ultimate barrier in front of any form of communication. Eliminating communication is the precondition for survival.

In order to survive the state has to end every sign of communication. Communication might result in an event. The event and truth are related. According to Alan Badiou (2002), "a truth appears in its newness because an eventful supplement interrupts repetition". it is a moment of revelation of truth. When something occurs, an event happens, in other words, a disruption in the flow of the status quo, resulting in a break; through this break the truth is revealed. Thus, the ultimate aim of the void is to eliminate t he possibility of a break and ultimately stop the disclosure of truth. The revelation of truth is unbearable for the FMS regimes.

The void is not natural. It needs to be made. The FMS is constantly organising occurrences that are not events and cannot become an event. In other words activities that do not reveal any truth. These occurrences happen through endless rituals.

> On an occasion Fahd [former King of Saud] telephoned the people building his Al Salem Palace in Jeddah to tell them of his wish to visit the site. In accordance with Islamic custom, sheep are butchered on these occasions, and 1000 sheep were slaughtered in anticipation of his arrival. Fahd did not show up, but telephoned to say that he would come the following day. The sheep-slaughtering exercise was repeated and again there was no Fahd. He made a promise to appear a third time, with the same result. Three thousand sheep had been slaughtered for nothing (Aburish, 2005: 59).

The void implies total control over every activity, every internal movements. In terms of the State's relationships with the world, being void has an immense advantage. For the State, being a void and becoming a void through, shifting between modernity and tradition, resists being identified with either, is the key for holding power and being able to defuse and resist internal and the external pressures. The void provides the state with the capacity to resist or accommodate the external pressures. When there is for instance, a pressure for democratisation

from outside, the State has no difficulty in adopting democratic rhetoric and allows or loosens restriction on some civil society actors internally. The State is assured that these minor activities do not affect its nature. The void is permanent, any other forms are temporary and it is adopted for the sake of remaining void. The void refuses to be filled. This is maintained through a virtual civil war between modernity and tradition. The state has no difficulty in emphasising its modern or traditional side in order to build a defence mechanism. The FMS cannot be democratised. Democracy is a modern phenomenon whose full realisation will be a death certificate for the FMS. Democracy among other things emphasises legitimacy, transparency, and the transfer of power, the FMS is structured in a way to resist the implementation of these concepts.

The void nature of the State can explain the easiness with which shifts in loyalty take place, especially in the area of international relations, from one pole to another. For instance when the Soviet Union collapsed in the early 1990s, the leaders of the FMS, who had once looked to Moscow for help and sponsorship, without any difficulty, in terms of ideology or belief, began seeking ways to put themselves in the good graces of the United States and the West (Ibrahim, 2007: 9). The clear evidence of the utilisation of tradition to counterbalance the pressure from modernity is when the leader of the FMS utilise the imminent danger of Islamic extremism. The slogan is "it is either us or Bin Laden (Ibrahim, 2007: 9)." The "us" is the elite leaders of the FMS. This scenario is expressed vividly by Zakaria, when he describes the meeting between an American diplomat and Egyptian president, in his palace.

> Then the American gently raises the issue of human rights and suggests the Egypt's government might ease up on political dissent, allow more press freedoms, and stop jailing intellectuals. Mubarak tenses up and snaps. 'If I were to do what you ask, Islamic fundamentalist will take over Egypt. Is that what you want?' The conversation moves back to the latest twist in the peace process (Zakaria, 2003: 119).

For Ibrahim (2007), this is nothing but a 'cynical trade-off'. It is an attempt to narrow down people's choice to theocrats versus autocrats: theocrat being the extern and a failed part of tradition and autocrat being failed modern system of the FMS. While the state scaremongers the West with talk of Islamic radicalism, simultaneously it opposes political modernity. Ibrahim puts it:

> In Egypt, for example, the Mubarak regime tries to decimate all liberal alternatives. At the beginning of this decade, I was imprisoned. In 2005, the Tomorrow Party's Ayman

> Nour (who had finished second in the presidential election that year) was sent to jail, where as of this writing in early 2007 he still languishes. And Talal Sadat, the late President Sadat's nephew, has just received a one-year prison sentence. The younger Sadat had twice been elected to a parliamentary seat from which he criticized the Mubarak regime and the autocratic predicament in which Egypt finds itself, and worked for a more genuine democracy. His real offense was publicly challenging Mubarak's scheme to groom his son as successor to the presidency. Talal Sadat was tried by a military court from which there is no appeal, and taken immediately to prison (2007: 9).

Despite being void, the FMS desires to become normal. Normal means apolitical. The policy to establish this is nothing but a repetition through time.

> Once leadership is firmly vested in the members of the family qualified to exercise royal authority in the dynasty, and once (royal authority) has been passed on by inheritance over many generations and through successive dynasties, the beginnings are forgotten, and the members of that family are clearly marked as leaders. It has become a firmly established article of faith that one must be subservient and submissive to them. People will fight with them on their behalf, as they would fight for the articles of faith (Ibn Khaldun, 1967: 318).

3.11 Conclusion

This chapter explained what FMS as a concept indicates. It outlined what each word in the phrase means and explains it in the framework of the political, social and historical spheres. In contrast to all the other theories and methodological approaches to denote the Arab Middle Eastern states, the FMS approach is complex. This complexity is shown through the presence of both modern and traditional in the same sphere and the control of the masses by the State through these tools. The State makes tools out of both forces and through this toolification process and tool relation it manages to change both tradition and modernity into forces in contrast to their own nature. It reduces them, limits them, and finally exploits them. Thus the realisation of traditional or modern political form is beyond possibility within the FMS. In the matrix of the FMS both tradition and modernity, while they might appear to be opposing each other, are separated by the state which acts as a buffer zone of to eliminate the possibility of establishing a dialectical relationship. In the absence of modern form of society as a modern

form of togetherness, there is a perpetual potential for a civil war. In fact there is an ongoing virtual civil war between the two forces, which fuelled by the state; directly and indirectly. The enmity between the two forces modernity and tradition, the state manages to divide society and play the balance of power game to ensure its survival. This division with the population hampers every kind of progress, any form of improvements, and any possibility for modernity. The State is unwilling to form a nation. FMS is a state against the birth of nation, as a collective form of identity within its border. Through its complex structure the theory offers an answer to the key questions regarding the area. If the idea of modernity rests upon rupture, the structure of the FMS theory shows why the state elites are reluctant to abandon tradition and embrace modernity. Through the formula of the FMS, these states have managed an elastic strategy of liberalisation (promoting modernity) on the one hand and on the other hand, (reiterating on tradition) to control their population and remain robust in their will and capacity to repress.

4. The Camp: How the FMS Functions

I enter restrooms with identity papers in my hands,
I leave the coffee-bar looking right and left
even the little bud looks right and left
before it blooms
Syrian poet Muhammad al-Maghut

The puzzle that dominates the political study of the Middle East is why States, or authorities, despite their lack of legitimacy, unpopularity and their authoritarian structure, from traditional (Jordan) and conservative monarchies (the GCC countries) to secularist (Egypt, Iraq, and Syria), last so long. Why, despite the enormous pressure from inside and outside these sates are able to continue the status quo? The FMS theory approaches this issue from a different angle. This chapter attempts to answer the question of how the FMS functions. Dictators are long lasting in the Arab Middle East. Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak has been in power for 28 years. The regime that he leads has ruled the country uninterrupted since 1952. "There is no evidence of an internal threat to that stability at present and, in particular, on all available evidence, no indication of a resurgence of violent Islamist extremism," according to the International Crisis Group (ICG, 2003:3). Today the main debate in Egypt is whether Mubarak's son Jamal will succeed him in the Syrian fashion. When Hafez Assad died after three decades as president of the Republic of Syria, the constitution was amended swiftly to ensure the smooth passing of power to his son Bashar. When the leader of Iraq's largest Shite Muslim political party, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), died in Tehran at the end of August 2009, the leadership of the party passed smoothly to his inexperienced young son Ammar al-Hakim. This is a common practice among the other countries in the region too.

For Khouri (2009) this situation evokes "a major question that hangs over the Arab world like a ton of bricks". He raises the question: "why do its top-heavy, non-democratic political control and governance systems persist without any significant popular opposition or public

challenge", in other words why do dictators in the region endure so long? In the first instance, one cannot blame the dictators for being dictators; similarly one cannot blame the dictators for holding power for so long. The question is how can they [the dictators] manage to hold on to power while being so unpopular. Why the Arab people who are suffering, in Khouri's word (2009), the abuse of power by:

> a self-contained ruling elite, the absence of meaningful political accountability, dominance of the power structure by security-military organs, prevalent corruption and financial abuse, mediocre economic management, enforced leadership-worshipping and personality cults, and strict social controls, especially on the young and women, are not rebelling?

Is there a bargaining relationship between the regime and the people? Khuori's (2009) answer is:

> [The] angry or frustrated Arab men and women do not relate to their central government in the same way that Iranians do (or Turks). Indignant Iranians or Turks fed up with their government's' abuse of power demand a change in government behaviour, and use available means to bring about that change. Arabs in a similar situation seem to largely ignore their governments, and instead set up parallel structures in society that satisfy the same practical services and needs that governments in more coherent countries normally provide. Discontented citizens throughout the Arab world have channelled their energy into several arenas that coexist in parallel with the State. These include Islamist and other religious movements, tribal structures, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector to a lesser extent.

(It is possible that the momentum of the events in the region infuriated Khouri. He wrote the piece during the last post-election-demonstration by the *Green movement*, in Iran. The comparative sense is noticeable).

While there is some truth in the answer that he provided to the question, it fails to provide a sufficient analysis, therefore the answer is incomplete. Why do Arab men and women not relate to their central government? It is apparent for every single resident of the Arab States that the State and its elites are the main holder of power and are responsible for all the shortcomings. The elites are the ultimate decision-makers. What is the reason behind the deliberate apathy toward their government?

In reality the Arab people do not discounting their governments. They are rather avoiding them. Seeking a parallel entity with the State is a clear sign that the people want to divert their

anger and misery away from the State as a pragmatic solution, for a short-term gain, because the FMS does not tolerate people's frustration.

Another rather striking example of this phenomenon of staying away from the State is the condition of the situation itself. By not addressing the government and not holding it accountable, every other solution either fails from the beginning or it is nothing more than a short-term gain. While it is immensely difficult to answer the question as to why people do not rebel, it is rather more fruitful to ask the question: what are the techniques that are employed by the States, regimes or governments that eventually make individuals in the FMSs submit to illegitimate and repressive government?

A corpus of Western literature is based on the formula that was established by Karl Marx namely "the absolutely desperate current State of affairs fills me with hope" (Deladurantaye 2000:8). Accordingly the desperation of the situation is a preparing ground for a change or a revolution. This formula has been applied in various ways. For instance, the idea of an international embargo clearly epitomises this formula: when people are under harsh circumstances, they react and rebel against it. But history, especially the history of the region, proves otherwise. The desperation of the situation results rather than breaking down regimes, in people surrendering to the regime, in the emergence of a new sort of life. In a country like Egypt people are dying while queuing for bread, as reported by the Arabic newspaper in London *alquds alarabi,* (01/09/2009). But there is no sign of any hope in this desperation. One of the most sophisticated scholars in addressing this issue was Kanan Makiya. In *Republic of Fear* (1989) and later on *Cruelty and Silence* (1993) Makyia detailed the work of the system by telling the personal narratives of witnesses.

> Salim was about to sit down to dinner when the knock came. The two men did not come in or identify themselves. They confirmed Salim's identity and politely told him to accompany them for a few questions. His wife asked too loudly whether anything was wrong, what was the problem; they hadn't done anything, and so on. Salim reassured her as though he knew all about it; he stepped outside with the men, and gently pushed the door shut in her face. Salim remembered his hands turning clammy in the car, although it was not hot, and feeling his stomach had caved in on itself although he was no longer hungry. The car stopped at the local *Amn* headquarters (Makyia, 1989: 3).

In his second book Makiya focused on the silence of the intellectuals. To play around with both Makiya's concepts Cruelty and Silence, a question can be drafted. Can a regime silence the population through cruelty? Makiya did not address this question. The Arab intellectuals' silence toward the cruelty of their regimes was his subject matter. There is no doubt that cruelty plays a big role in silencing the population. But the cruelty or the fear alone is not sufficient. The Arab Middle Eastern regimes are engaged in a complex game to assure their survival.

The model implied here is a Camp. The concept was coined by Giorgio Agamben in his book *State of Exception* (2005). The State, namely the FMS, transforms the masses or the population into Camp dwellers. In the Camp everyone is subject to the sovereign authority and has been reduced to being an inmate. The inmate is someone who is devoid of personal dignity and rights. In this reduced status, people are not legally or morally protected against mistreatment at the hands of the State. Since the Camp is only possible in the State of exception, the State, to prepare the ground for changing the masses into a Camp has to become exceptional. The exceptionality of the State is a precondition for the establishment of a Camp. The Camp is a relationship tool *par excellence* that is practiced by the FMS. It is a process whereby the whole masses of the population are transformed into an instrument, inmates.

The making of the Camp, the transformation of the population from societal organisation into the Camp organisation, requires certain policies. The Camp is contrary to the idea of society. Since their inception Middle Eastern States have been engaged in making the Camp. The building of society, based on the idea of Greek polis, or building a city to accommodate citizens, was never an option.

4.2 The external Factors

The corps of literature that regards the external power as the ultimate grantor of the regimes in the region is vast. Holding the West, especially America, responsible for all calamities is common. "A common complaint is that the U.S. government has supported autocratic regimes" (Rubin, 2006: 55).

This section attempts to integrate two different but related issues. First is the issue of the external factor in creating and sustaining the FMS. The second is how the FMS builds its relationships

with the outside world. There is no doubt that external factors play a big role in maintaining the stability of the Middle Eastern regimes domestically. Yom et al argue that "international factors remain extremely relevant to autocratic regime stability in the post-Cold War Arab world. Whereas Western powers prioritized the promotion of democratic change in other regions at least rhetorically, in the Middle East they not only tolerated but actively buttressed authoritarian rule in numerous ways" (2008: 55). Yom et al based their conclusion on Eva Bellin's (2004) article. In it Bellin concludes:

> Some conditions responsible for the robustness of this authoritarianism are exceptional to the Middle East and North Africa; others are not. Access to abundant rent distinguishes the region and subsidizes much of the cost of these overdeveloped coercive apparatuses. Multiple Western security concerns in the region guarantee continuous international support to authoritarian regimes in the Middle East and North Africa even after the cold war. But the prevalence of patrimonialism in State structures and the low level of popular mobilization are not unique to the region. Together, these factors reinforce the coercive apparatus' capacity and prevent democratic reform (Bellin, 2004: 152).

Yom returned in (2008) to the subject with an attempt to fill the theoretical gap "by furnishing a new theory of 'cliency' to delineate the causal linkages between international patronage and client regime durability". She found that:

> Long-term patronage from the external powers generates a perverse effect. On the one hand, it expands the client regime's autonomy from masses opposition within society by bolstering its political, fiscal, and military resources without exhausting its domestic productive base. Yet it ironically constricts the autocrat's autonomy from key support groups, such as business elites and political minorities, because their own fortunes become tied even more intricately with authoritarian continuity (Yom, 2008).

There is no doubt that the external factor has significant impact on the maintenance and survival of the regimes. Yet the nature of the relationship between the States in the region and outside powers is constructed solely by the State sovereign. In other words it is the State and its structure that shape the type of relationship with the outside world. This is primarily based on the structure of the FMS. The FMS withholding both tradition and modernity in a failed status and utilises them as tools to maintain authority. This ethos of resisting the emergence of full modernity and full tradition plays a central role and shapes the relationships of these States with

the outside world. For instance when modernity structured by the State to be a mere tool and then when an external factor, whether a state or non-state factor pushes for more freedom, civil society and democracy, it is the State that resists the materialisation of these efforts. For instance Fareed Zakaria (2003) in his description of a meeting between the Egyptian president and an American diplomat, epitomise this fact. The setting is inside the Heliopolis, the neighbourhood of Cairo from which President Hosni Mubarak rules over Egypt. The palace is all a bad imitation of the imperial French style. And then the infamous dialogue about the choice between human rights and terror and the rhetorical question "Is that what you want?" (2003: 119).

A close reading of the event reveals how the FMS functions. Firstly, the place, as described 'bad imitation of French imperial style', discloses how the desire to live in a modern space, to feel the dwelling of a Western style modern place, without being modern in practice, is an integrated part of the system. Secondly, the bad imitation is not only in the style of decoration it is an essential part of the making of the whole system. Mubarak likes to feel French in Egypt, to borrow modern art, technique, tools and ban modern freedom, democracy and rights. The conversation shows how the Egyptian president utilises tradition, to sustain his own personal power. The untold part of the story is, as Mubarak stops the Muslim Brotherhood from reaching power and establishing a clerical state, at the same time persecuting the liberals, the advocates of modern style of governing. This is the FMS in action.

Moreover the case for the external factor has been exaggerated. It is clear that the external factor alone is not sufficient to hold, protect and save these regimes. Furthermore, it could be argued that, if the local elites in the Arab Middle East were to democratise and liberalise their States, their effort would not face any considerable challenge from the West, especially in the post Cold War era. In post 11 September world there is a realisation, among the world super powers that the policy of supporting unpopular regimes is not as a fruitful policy as it was. In her speech at the American University in Cairo, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, in June 2005 stated:

> For 60 years, my country, the United States, pursued stability at the expense of democracy in this region, here in the Middle East, and we achieved neither. Now we are taking a different course, we are supporting the democratic aspirations of all people. (Quoted from BBC News)

No matter how ironic the speech was it shows that America especially, and the West in general, will not oppose a democratic liberal State in the Middle East in principle. This is not disputing the wretched history of the region as a result of the external intervention and unflagging support of the authoritarian dictators. But the argument does not hold when the question is asked; why does the West support dictators? The West is pursuing its own interests. It is up to the sovereign States to negotiate with that egoistic interest. This suggests that there are local elites, with a particular local arrangement and power structure. These local elites to ensure the continuation of the present structures establish their relationships with the outside, in order to support their own particular form of governing. Therefore, the local ruling class establishes relationship in order to receive greater autonomy from the population and receive military and political support. In this situation outside factors are more advantageous. The ruling elites are unloved and undesired by the population; therefore their reliance on force and outside support becomes a matter of life and death. This State is on a life-support machine. The local ruling elites, who never had any sort of relationship with the population, and in most cases consider the people of their own country as the enemy and treat them on that basis, needs outsiders to protect them. Nevertheless the end of outside support does not indicate that these States are becoming modern, democratic or protectors of human rights. It could be argued that it is not the outside world that sustains these authorities. Saddam's regime was under total embargo for more than a decade but this did not result in the collapse of the regime.

The concept of the Camp combines both the inside and outside factors. When the State is in the form of the FMS, it only survives when it organises the masses of the population into the form of the Camp. The Camp structure is not only related to the area of security but also to the economic, social and military. One of the main characteristics of the Camp is the reduction of the inmate to an absolute powerless being, and this is only possible when the regime or the FMS can rely on the support of outsiders. The Camp concept crystallizes that the external support without a robust internal mechanism cannot continue to survive. The reverse is also true: the internal structure without the external support cannot live. When the FMS is composed of both modernity and tradition, modernity can be regarded as the outsider and tradition as the insider. Modernity is army, arms, technology, governing, international relations, market, modes of transport, finance, global political structures; while tradition is family, tribe, sect, religion, loyalty, booty forms of economic, cultural ethos, and customs.

The FMS is structured in such a way that neither pressure nor cooperation from outside can change its structure; the recent history of the region is testament to that.

4.3 Why the Camp?

Why does the FMS make a Camp rather than a society? The society is a space where differences remain, negotiation occurs, exchange is the norm. What can the Camp provide to the structure and the maintenance of the State? The FMS functions on the utilisation of both modernity and tradition. It utilises them to survive and changing society into a Camp can contribute to this particular end. The Camp is both a structure and a method: the structure concerns the relationship between the State and the population, while the method concerns how both realms are run. As a structure and a method of governing the Camp is borrowed from modernity. It is, as Agamben claims, the '*nomos*' (1998:108) of modernity. FMS model of the Camp is not necessarily similar but overlap in many ways with the modern the Camp. What happens when the entire mass of the population is run as a Camp? The Camp is a form of a structure that holds everything in a static and constant status. It is run by a power based at the centre and nothing changes without the approval of the central sovereign. It is the total control of the population.

If the Camp is the space that is only open when the State of exception begins to become the rule, as Agamben (1998: 108) puts it, then accordingly the State that desires to be exceptional, beyond the law, by necessity has to run the population in the Camp format. The formula which emerges here is as follows: the population, which is structured in a form of the Camp, prepares the ground for the exceptional State and the exceptional State survives as long as the population is run as a Camp. The Camp is a place outside the juridical order. This does not indicate that no law applies to the realm. It is otherwise. As the AHDR (2004:127) puts it; "the absolute central powers in the hands of the executive which are not subject to normal legal restraints, which are supported by additional mechanisms that increase the centralization of power in the executive", are making the exceptionality possible. Here it is fair to ask, on what premises does the concept of the Camp rely? This particular inquiry is dealt with through more

than one line. First, the Arab States in general, apart from 'authoritarian State' are also described as the "black-hole State" (AHDR, 2004: 126).

> We can call this model [the Arab States] the "black-hole State", likening it to the astronomical phenomenon of extinguished stars which gather into a ball and are converted into giant magnetic fields from which even light cannot escape. The modern Arab State, in the political sense, runs close to this model, the executive apparatus resembling a "black hole" which converts its surrounding social environment into a setting in which nothing moves and from which nothing escapes. Like the astronomical black hole, this apparatus in turn forms into a tight ball around which the space is so constricted as to paralyze all movement.

The 'black-hole model' clearly resembles the Camp, but suffers from a severe lack of political imagination. Unlike the Camp, the black-hole model cannot explain adequately, the structure of the State, the State-masses relationship, the machine of the State, and the economy. However, the concept of black hole, through the apocalyptic picture of the State masses relationships contributes positively to the illumination of the concept of the Camp.

Another line which enhances the concept of the Camp is the attitude of the population toward their 'own' State. In a question regarding the best forms of government (during a survey conducted by the Centre of Strategic Studies University of Jordan) Jordanian public opinion was consistent with earlier responses which favoured democracy. The results showed that 81.0% of Jordanians believe that democracy is the best form of government with only 5.8% opposing this position. Meanwhile, an authoritarian system of government received large disapproval, with only 21.2% in support and 63.0% saying that this form of government would be "bad or very bad" for the government of the country (Braizat, 2007).

The result of the survey can be applied to the other Arab States based on their similarities, as Burhan Ghalioun, (AHDR, 2004: 127) states that it is "possible to speak about a single unified, integrated Arab system for tyranny and control". The people favouring democracy over authoritarian system implies that the majority of the population are disenchanted with the current system. The concept of democracy also reveals that the people have a clear desire to be part of the governing machine and to have power over who is ruling them and ultimately become the final source of decision making and be sovereign.

Moreover, favouring democracy and abhorring authoritarianism indicates that the majority of people dislike the current style of governing. From this it can be argued that the people are living within a geographical boundary and under a system which they do not approve of. This makes people live an unwanted life, in an unwanted manner under an unwanted system. These are all characteristics of Camp living. This feeling enhanced the attitude of the population toward the cause of the underdevelopment of their countries. In a survey conducted by the Centre of Strategic Studies University of Jordan) one of the questions asked was:

> Some people believe that the lack of development in the Arab World compared to other areas is the result of internal or the external factors, what do you think is more important
>
> Internal factors 27.1
>
> The external factors 22.8
>
> They are both of the same importance 40.0
>
> Don't know 10.1

Similar surveys with similar questions resulted in similar answers in other countries such as Syria, Lebanon, and Kuwait. As becomes clear from the survey result, the sums of those who regard the internal factors as the cause of their underdevelopment exceed those who regard the external factors. This shows that people hold their own States as a primarily responsible for their political and economic situation.

Combining this result with the previous results on the democracy survey, it becomes clear that both politically and economically people are in disagreement with their own government. These are all signs of the presence of a wide gulf between government and their population. In this very circumstance the State has to rely solely on force and violence rather than consent to sustain its power. This makes the State become the external entity and distant from the population. Then the State of exception is realised as normal and the Camp becomes the necessary feature. In this condition the sovereign no longer limits himself

> to deciding on the exception on the basis of recognizing a given factual situation (danger to public safety) he now de facto produces the situation as a consequence of his decision on the exception. This is why in the the Camp the *quaestio iuris* is, if we look carefully, no longer strictly distinguishable from the *quaestio facti*, and in this sense every question

> concerning the legality or illegality of what happened there simply makes no sense. The the Camp is a hybrid of law and fact in which the two terms have become indistinguishable (Agamben, 1998: 128)

The Camp is an exceptional place. It emerges only in the State of exception. The Camp as a place and a phenomenon has its own distinctive history. According to Giorgio Agamben

> the historian debates whether the first appearance of the Camps ought to be identified with the *the Campos de concentracion* that were created in 1896 by the Spaniards in Cuba in order to repress the insurrection of that colony's population, or rather with the *concentration the Camps* into which the English herded the Boers at the beginning of the twentieth century" (2000: 37).

The Arabic words for the Camp are *mukhaim*, and *ma'askar*. The *mukhaim* is a place where a *khaima* is in place. *Khaima* is the Arabic word for *tent*. Thus the the Camp indicates the place where the tents are being assembled. This has nomadic, militaristic and refugee connotations. This implies that, when one is living in the Camp, one is displaced. A person who is displaced is forced to leave his own original abode. This shows that the inhabitant of a Camp is one who is forced to abandon his place to relocate to another temporary place. Moreover this relocation occurred against one's will. Thus the Camp is a place where the inhabitants are there against their own will, and have no freedom to leave. As Makiya puts it "in the early 1970s, Baghdad was divided into security zones, the planning of which required citizens to sell their properties in certain areas at a price set by the government" (1989: 3). Accordingly, the State was forcing people, to leave, to live elsewhere, according to the State's desired policy. To maintain this situation force has to be present and be used continuously. The name *Ma'skar* originated from *askar,* which indicates soldier. Thus *ma'askar* is a military the Camp. Both names are new in the Arabic language. They are basically made up in response to Camp and the emergence of the military, which is essentially a modern phenomenon. Adding the Arabic meaning to the English word the Camp, the concept, indicates living unwillingly somewhere and having neither power nor choice to relocate. The militaristic connotation as a concept of the Camp highlights its structure: order, centrality, strict rule of law, uniformity, lack of freedom and absolute docility toward authority.

The Camp h as some distinctive features. Firstly, it is only possible in the State o f exception. Secondly, the Camp is always ruled by a dictator. Thirdly, the dwellers of the the Camp are not citizens but inmates. It is apparent that both the State of exception and dictatorship are inextricably linked. Thus the foundation of the Camp society is based on a dictator who hijacks the State and suspends the law to establish a totalitarian authority. So, there is a figure, in the centre. Around the figure there is a State, which functions as an apparatus to serve and protect the figure. Below the State there is a population (society), which has been changed into the Camp. The dwellers of the Camp have to love the leader, remember him perpetually, and never dream of opposing him or replacing him. The Camp has a constitution. It is written to regulate and assemble the Camp. For instance article eight in the Syrian constitution indicates that the "leading party in the society and the State is the Socialist Arab Baath Party. It leads a patriotic and progressive front seeking to unify the resources of the masses and place them at the service of the Arab nation's goals". When the society is the Camp, it is a landscape where the central figure and the State members, the sovereign can act with impunity. The State or the "political administration" as Mustafa Hijazi argues:

> [h]angs together on the basis of each level in the hierarchy of authority demeaning the one directly below with the object of keeping it in place. This results in a circumstances that the "whole apparatus of State is united in regarding the citizen as an outsider placed at the very bottom of the heap. All personnel, from the lowliest clerk to the most exalted minister, treat every transaction performed as gratuitous generosity on their part. The notion of a public service, a merit system of promotions, or a citizen's inviolable right to something has always been absent. Instead, relations of conflict, diminution, and overlordship permeate all levels of the bureaucracy in its dealings with the public. Hence arises the tendency to grovel before authority, or to seek a personal solution to problems—*wasta* [a mediator] as it is called in Iraq (Makiya, 1989: 36).

The figure at the centre of the FMS is not a figure or a single individual. Despite having a single individual at the hub, it is always elite, rather a homogenous elite. The membership of this elite are generally related to each other in a traditional manner; family, tribe, sect. This traditional formation has been amalgamated with modernity and the result is a static form of identity. Among its main characteristics are: one is either a member or not, one has no freedom to leave the membership. The act of leaving is regarded as treason and generally punishable by

death; for instance in the case of Hussain Kamel, Saddam's son-in-law, membership is not open to any outsider.

When it comes to the individual in the society of the Camp he or she, as Carl Schmitt puts it, "is merely a means to the essence, the State is what is most important" (Wolin (1990: 396). For Schmitt as Richard Wolin (1990: 396) put it:

> Law itself has no validity prior to the State. Instead, it must pass through "the State as a medium" in which it undergoes "a specific modification."' The State, in its extra-legal capacity as pure "executive authority," is deemed the ultimate arbiter over questions of "concrete indifference": it is the State that must in the last analysis decide. By subordinating the autonomy of the legal sphere to "reasons of State," Schmitt strips civil society of any independent, oppositional potential.

In this situation politics assume primacy over legality. And the politics is the politics of survival. When elite forms a State, it is by necessity an exceptional State, i.e. a State of exception. When the State is a State of exception then the emergence of the Camp is imminent. According to Agamben (2000: 38) "the Camp opens up when the State of exception becomes the rule". The State of exception is where the law has been suspended. As Agamben emphasises "one cannot overestimate the importance of this constitutive nexus between the State of exception and concentration Camps". The State of exception is a form of State, which "appears as a legal form of what cannot have a legal form" (Agamben, 2005: 2). The only legality of the State of exception is that it has been legally permitted to be above the law. The State of exception does not signify the total absence of law. Here the law is suspended when it come to the State. Whereas, when it come to the public the law has been reinforced. This signifies, on the one hand, that the State has a total right to implement a harsh law on the people with impunity, whereas, on the other hand, the people have no legal rights to protect themselves from the State.

The State of exception is not exclusive to Egypt and Syria (which are formally in a State of emergency); it can be argued that it is endemic in the region. This very situation resulted legally in "what Arab constitution grants, Arab law frequently curtails. And law renders legal, actual practice often violates, people are thus besieged in their own country (AHDR, 2005, III). For Agamben the Camp is a paradigm, though asking particular questions, helps him to deduce

the definition of Camp from the events that took place during the Second World War. For him the concept is rather 'juridicopolitical' (Agamben, 1998: 107) therefore Agamben asks questions like: "What is a Camp, what is its juridicopolitical structure, that such events could take place there? This will lead him "to regard the the Camp not as a historical fact and an anomaly belonging to the past (even if still verifiable) but in some way as the hidden matrix and nomos of the political space in which we are still living". For Agamben the Camp is a paradigm. As he himself puts it, in an interview, 'I work with paradigms' for him a paradigm is something like an example, an exemplar, and a historically singular phenomenon.

> As it was with the panopticon for Foucault, so is the *Homo Sacer* or the *Muselmann* or the State of exception for me. And then I use this paradigm to construct a large group of phenomena and in order to understand an historical structure, again analogous with Foucault, who developed his 'panopticism' from the panopticon (Ek, 2006: 372).

Here the Camp is used as a concept and phenomena. The concept serves two main purposes: it names the structure and it serves as a key to decode it. The concept of the Camp is able to explain the structure of economy, governing, and general State society relationships in the FMS.

4.4 The State of Exception and the FMS

Syria, since 1963, and Egypt, since 1981, are formally in states of emergency. This exceptional situation granted presidents limitless power. The State of exception is a law, an emergency law to suspend all laws. Under this continuous State of emergency, this has been successively approved by successive parliaments:

> the authority's gains far-reaching powers to arbitrarily and systematically curb human rights and fundamental freedoms in the name of national security. Arbitrary arrests on the grounds of upholding "national security" or "public order", prolonged detentions, far-reaching media censorship, prohibition of strikes, demonstrations and electoral the Campaigns, the use of violence against people who are peacefully exercising their constitutional rights, and the referral of civilian cases to military courts, are just a few of the far-reaching powers the authorities can exercise with impunity. According to Human Rights groups, the State [Egypt] holds at least 10,000 people detained without charge on the basis of the emergency law (Kausch, 2009: 13).

The Camp is where every human action has a different meaning. In such circumstances, for instance, a professional occupation is not a normal activity where one works, produces, and participates. It is a form of belonging and being accepted by the State. Occupation and employment are being enlisted by the State and offered to those who show their loyalty to the system and work, especially in government and the public sector area, to accept fully the State action. Work, in the FMS, is a way of silencing the individual. Thus the work, labour, is emptied from every form of human productivity. Through this the FMS dehumanises the human. It makes him or her feel powerless, unproductive, dependent, and above all, hollowed. Every worker is a virtual worker. The worker realises, and painfully feels that he or she is not necessary, does not contribute, and ultimately is not needed. This feeling of worthlessness translates to powerlessness. The message of the FMS is clear and tells every worker: show your presence to the State, make sure you are not involved in any other things, remain busy, don't produce anything, don't get bored, and (because boredom might lead to creativity and that is not permitted), do not engage in politics and earn your bread.

> In *Survival in Auschwitz*, Primo Levi narrates this vignette: "Driven by thirst, I eyed a fine icicle outside the window, within hand's reach. I opened the window and broke off the icicle, but at once a large, heavy guard prowling outside brutally snatched it away from me. '*Warum*?' I asked in my poor German. '*Hier ist kein warum*' [Here there is no why], he replied, pushing me inside with a shove" (Schweber, 2008: 156).

In the FMS one is constantly watched by official police and plainclothes informers. In a country like Egypt there are "two million informers: one Egyptian in every 40" (Shatz, 2010). In FMS's the Camp one is watched, one is eavesdropped and one is not allowed to say *warum*, why?

4.5 The Camp and the Opposition

The Camp as a model of organisation and management ensures, above all, the State's centrality. This also indicates that political opposition to the state is banned, restricted or allowed but without power. The outright ban on the opposition is the most common case. But with the pressure and the change in the global landscape of politics (end of the Cold War, democratic waves, war on terror, new Middle East), there are would-be signs of reforms. "Arab regimes

have been very good at providing the impression that reforms were being enacted" (Mathews, 2009: 4). The absurdity is that they also have mastered the art of introducing reforms that have no effect. Why do the non-reforming reforms take place? The FMS paradigm denotes such an uncanny phenomenon. The reform is judged by its outcome. When the outcome of a reform is not a change then the reform is just a game, a security game, to ensure and enhance State power. In contrast, when the outcome of a reform is a change in the situation then the reform is real. An ineffective reform is common and necessary for the continuation of the FMS. Through the creation of the Camp the dominant mode in the FMS is stagnation. Such an atmosphere is hard to maintain. For the State to maintain and renew its dominance there have to be 'events'. Through these events the State wears new masks, utters new discourse, and creates an impression that something is happening, it re-engages people, and refreshes memories. But above all through these events the State renews itself and enhances its power. For instance now Bahrain has an elected parliament. This is a new establishment. But this parliament is only partially elected. This is done to bring in the Shia representatives of the country through their political party *Al Wefaq* National Islamic Society. Through this the Bahraini State elite, who marginalised the majority of the Shia population throughout their history, now gives face, voice and representation to this population, but without much effect. The parliament, or as it is called *nuab,* is designed in a manner that even if the opposition won every electable seat they would still not have a dominant position in the parliament.

Through the Camp structure the State has no difficulty in embracing international treaties and adorning their constitutions with clauses that enjoin respect for life, human rights, justice, equality before the law, and the right to a fair trial. It is only a gesture to mask the true face of the State. Because of utilising both modernity and tradition the FMS has no difficulty to curb the opposition. If the Camp signifies (among many other things) a total controlled sphere then managing the opposition within this sphere, to the degree of total ineffectiveness, is the custom. To achieve this goal the ruling elites either crush the organisation or execute their members. The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, an off-shoot of its larger Egyptian counterpart, has been banned in Syria since 1958, and according to a 1980 law [Emergency Law 49], known membership in the group is punishable by execution (Telhami, 2001:120). Another method of crippling the opposition is through direct interference by the ruling elite in the structure of opposition groups. Through this the authority determines who is allowed and not allowed to participate in the formal

political arena. This is done through official law or unwritten legislation. This system affects, not only the relationships between opponents and the State, but also the relationships between various opposition groups.

This wide gap between appearance and reality is a hallmark of the FMS. It is crystallised in the Arab Human Development Report (2009: 53):

> ...weak institutional curbs on State power; a fragile and fragmented civil society; dysfunctional elected assemblies, both national and local; and disproportionately powerful security apparatuses often combine to turn the State into a menace to human security, rather than its chief supporter.

This shows how the State ruling elite, in order to enhance and maintain their reign, are utilising the different aspects of modernity.

Both modernity and tradition are effectively employed in creating an atmosphere of the impossibility of opposing. The question around the change in the leadership in the FMS is not focused on any form of power transformation. The question concerns succession. This is equally so in republican Egypt and the Saudi Kingdom. Stressing succession signifies that the current power holder has no intention of leaving the crown. This indicates that neither people nor the oppositions ever have an opportunity to accede to power. Traditional aspect that is utilised to sustain this situation is around the role of the leader. This differs from a kingdom to a republic. But the difference is rather trivial. In the republic the identity of the successor is unknown or it is known but never definite. Whereas, in the royal systems the issue of succession less ambiguous.

When the successor is not known and the system does not allow any person to claim such a position then the population remains without gaudiness or leadership beyond the candidate of the State elite. The FMS knows very well that the population can only be mobilised from a head with a clear leadership. The culture that never permits any form of autonomy or individuality finds it difficult, if not impossible, to organise itself. Even in the case of the emergence of a particular personality the Failed Modern Sate, through its powerful media, creates a fearful image of him.

Both Drysdale (1985) and Lisa Anderson (2001) reflected on the succession in Syria. Anderson (1987: 219) observes "that al-Asad carefully prevented the development of

independent powerful competitors" she concludes wrongly, "and in doing so cleared the field for the mediocre and the ruthless". The picture she paints that there are engineered elections which president stands and competes with mediocre and the ruthless. Clearly that is not the case in Syria. Despite being a republic the leadership remains in the (right member) family. When a wrong family candidates (wrong person or at a wrong time) emerges, the state media, with the permission of the leader, eclipse their chance. This was the case of alAsad brother Rifaat in Syria. When the system, through the Eighth Regional Congress of the Baath party, confirmed Rifaat's eclipse, then the criticism commenced.

> Initially, the delegates were reluctant to criticize him, fearing it would be unsafe to do so, but as they gained confidence, criticism of Rifaat became very vocal and charged. Hafiz would not allow his brother to defend himself and interceded only to calm some of the critics. Reportedly, television cameras studiously avoided showing Rifaat, who according to one source was completely isolated. Significantly, although Rifaat was re-elected to the Regional Command, three of his supporters were not: Ahmad Diab, a Sunni who was in charge of the crucial National Security Office, Nasir al-Nasir, the Sunni Minister of Interior, and Ilyas al-Lati, a Christian. The places of the late Iskandar Iskandar, former Minister of Information, and Mahmud al-Ayyubi, who is suffering from a terminal illness, were also filled. Nevertheless, the Congress did not resolve the succession question once and for all. In all likelihood, President Hafiz al-Asad will not explicitly single out anyone as his heir apparent. Now that he is apparently well, he has no reason to (and many reasons not to). Rather, he will leave himself as much flexibility as possible (Drysdale, 1985: 257).

The whole scenario of moving the presidency of a republic smoothly from the father to the son in a Kim II Sung style is portrayed and conceptualised by the Egyptian activist Saaddin Ibrahim during an interview with Alan Johnson (the interview was conducted in 2006 and published in 2007 in the journal Democratiya):

> On the day of my arrest [by Egyptian authority] I had published an article in Al-Majalla, a London-based magazine distributed across the Arab world. Let me tell you how that article came about. An Arab satellite station, Orbit, asked me to be an expert commentator during the funeral of the Syrian President, Hafez al-Assad, on June 13 2000. The funeral was a protracted affair lasting several hours and I was live on air taking questions from callers. Two or three questions concerned the political future of Syria and who would succeed Assad. I began to develop an ad hoc theory about political succession

> in non-democratic regimes. I pointed out that it was easy to predict the future as we could see on our screens that Bashar al-Assad, the oldest surviving son of the deceased President, was meeting all the dignitaries quite as if he was already Head of State. A caller asked how the son could succeed the father without holding a formal position. I said 'Oh, I am sure the Ba'ath party will get together and fix that.' Another caller pointed out that his age, 34, would debar him. I said 'Well, even the constitution too can be fixed. They will lower the age-limit from 40 to 30' (as it turned out they lowered it by constitutional amendment from 40 to 34 – they were not even subtle!) One caller wondered if we were seeing a precedent being set in the Arab world, and asked where else this kind of familial succession might take place. I mentioned Iraq, Yemen and Libya (Johnson, 2007: 156).

The event exemplifies how modernity and tradition are utilised by the FMS to fix a suitable form of power arrangement. The utilisation of modernity and tradition was also done during the death of Jordanian King Hussain, when he was kept alive artificially using modern life support machines, in order to arrange for his son Abdulla, not his brother Hassan, to succeed the crown (Heakel, 1999: 114). Since having a successor signifies ones limits, not appointing a successor is an act by the sovereign to portray his limitless and timeless reign. This act of divine imitation of autocracy is more common in the republic States.

Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, as reported by APS Diplomatic Recorder July 11 2006 states "there is no need to appoint a vice-president". Therefore it is not surprising that

> ...if any form of "freedom" has been expanded in Egypt, meanwhile, it has been the freedom of the presidency from the informal constraints that earlier limited its authority. Over the past two decades, Mubarak has acquired substantial liberty to have his opponents convicted in military trials, for example, or to shut down newspapers and professional syndicates, or to jail human rights activists (Brownlee, 2002: 6).

This divine form of autocracy is haunted by the image of Allah. The leaders in the region are obsessed with imitating ultimate power divine. The source of this imagination is the structure of the Islamic ruler and the Islamic theological understanding of Allah. As Hourani, (1981:3) put it the Islamic ideas of a ruler is a person who has absolute power, "standing apart from the society he rules, responsible only to God or to his own highest self". While Islamic theology distinguishes and, at the same time, it joins together, redemption and creation, 'imperative' (*amr*) and 'creation' (*khalq*).

The Middle Eastern leaders, whether monarchs or presidents, understand the practice of power as being in a position to have divine power; for instance, to create through utterance. It is common practice that people visit the *majlis* (the place of sitting) and recite poetry before the king and the king fulfils their wishes. This autocracy imagines its power, like divine, to be neither divided nor limited. This divine absolutism is only possible for the sovereign through the utilisation of the rest of population. Therefore, only through the externality of the State and the Camp formation is the realisation of such a kind of authority possible. The outcome of these combinations gives rise to the following type of situation

> In Egypt the ruler is regarded as a God until he falls. He is above criticism, until he departs. He is the history and geography [of Egypt] until he is replaced by someone else. He always fancies Egypt as his private property, his hamlet or his larger village. He is the State and the fatherland. Loyalty to the fatherland is synonymous with loyalty to his regime, and to him personally . . . He regards any criticism of Egypt as criticism of him personally and, hence, an unforgivable treason (Najjar, 2008: 117).

This being god is only possible through the utilisation of modernity and tradition. Another faction that the FMS produces and utilises are the intellectuals. If the intellectuals are the opinion makers, or the brain of the nation, then the State, according to David Hume cannot do without them.

> Nothing appears more surprising to those, who consider human affairs with a philosophical eye, than the easiness with which the many are governed by the few; and the implicit submission, with which men resign their own sentiments and passions to those of their rulers. When we enquire by what means this wonder is effected, we shall find, that, as FORCE is always on the side of the governed, the governors have nothing to support them but opinion. It is therefore, on opinion only that government is founded; and this maxim extends to the most despotic and military governments, as well as to the most free and most popular (Hume, 1987: 32).

The State in general, including the FMS, is founded on opinion. The intellectuals play a considerable role in this regard. This function spells out the relationship of the State to the intelligentsia. If the sociology of the intellectuals debates whether this group are a new class, or a class-in-themselves or primarily class-bounded (Charles Kurzman and Lynn Owens, 2002: 63), in the FMS the debate is focused around the State. Thus intellectuals are strictly divided into two categories, those who servie the State and those who oppose and criticise it.

In this regard the FMS is similar to a communist system in the manner it deals with intellectuals. For both Marx and Engels philosophy was something to be left aside. For them

> one has to leap out of it and devote oneself like an ordinary man to the study of actuality, for which there exists also an enormous amount of literary material, unknown, of course, to the philosophers. Philosophy and the study of the actual world have the same relation to one another as onanism and sexual love (1970: 103).

Enhancing that in 1922, Lenin stated that "the intellectuals, the lackeys of capital, who think they're the brains of the nation. In fact, they're not its brains, they're its shit" (quoted in Slavoj Zizek, 2003). There is a striking similarity between the two comments. By employing the language of sex and dirt both Marx and Lenin show their abhorrence of free thinking. What is being abhorred here is the freedom. To think freely is to not belong religiously to any form of institution. This State of not belonging, not devoting, not serving is unacceptable to them. In a similar fashion the FMS does not allow any form of free thinking. In the FMS the intellectuals are mostly manufactured by the State. They are apologetic to the State, their main duty is praising, exaggerating the character of the leader, hiding the reality, and inventing Orwellian forms of 'new speaks'. This was the theme of Kanan Makiya's *Cruelty and Silence: War, Tyranny, Uprising, and the Arab World* (1996). For him, cruelty in Iraq, and elsewhere in the Arab world, thrives on a flawed culture and is perpetuated by the collective silence of Arab and 'pro-Arab' intellectuals.

Arab intellectuals in the FMS are a State apparatus for domination. This apparatus is embodied in bodies such as the ministries of culture, education, heritage, and media. The forms that are used to justify these acts are Arab nationalism, Islamism, and *turath,* tradition. By using the notion of pan-Arab nationalism, Arab intellectuals engaged directly and indirectly in covering up and justifying the acts of the FMSs' leaders. Kanan Makya gives the example of Hisham Djaiet. In answer to a question about how he could justify the annexation of Kuwait, Djaiet replied:

> I need not remind you, Europeans that your nations were born out of wars. In annexing Kuwait, Saddam Hussein has entered into the dynamics of history. . . . He was undertaking the beginning of the unification of the Arab world. Sometimes legitimacy is more important than legality. . . . War has the merit of clarifying things. With respect to

> your contradictions and with respect to ours. We have everything to gain from this clarification. We have nothing to lose from this war, even if it ended in defeat. Because thanks to Saddam Hussein, it is taking place on the level of realities--oil, military force, etc.--and no longer on the level of symbols (Makiya, 1995: 90).

Only such language, such flimsy arguments, is permitted in the FMS. For the State the intellectual has to manufacture opinions, justify crime, and give language to the most silent form of the State. Therefore, the Arab State intellectual is a talking machine talks according to the need and the mood of the sovereign. They are a human form of robot. "The Camp is an unthinkable realm shrouded in silence" (Robert-Jan van Pelt, 1994; 80), there is no argument, no free space, no exchange, therefore no intellectuals. It is not necessarily that the intellectual has to be independent. There is no doubt about his or her critical faculties. The Camp has no space for critics. The Camp is a silent, eventless place. What is happening is the ritual, regular and repetitive events that function, in a religious manner, as a permanent remembrance. One is not allowed to forget, to depart, to have free time and space from the State. The real event is hidden. If the event is a moment of becoming, of a rupture with continuity, then it has the hazard of provoking thinking. Therefore, nothing is an event apart from a State event. This silence provides the road to the externality of the state.

The link or the relationship between the State and the society is axiomatic. Thus labelling a State as external is rather anomalous. Almost all the definitions of the State stress this link between the government and the people. The modern State has more complex and comprehensive relationships with the people. As a result of modernity, "a large group of individuals within a defined territory: [became] subject to one supreme authority: this group became the people (Sorensen: 2004:11). When the State became the supreme authority, and obtained the "monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory" in the Weberian sense, then the State overcome all the other layers of power over individuals and became the only centralised power within a territory, managing the society's affair.

The relationship between the State and its people is established in more than one way: economic, rational, symbolic, or out of necessity. But what organises the relationship more than anything else is citizenship. The concept of citizenship frames the link on legal, political, and

identity levels. The legal aspect of citizenship requires a working constitution as a prerequisite. The political aspect requires freedom as a basis, without which there won't be any room for becoming a political agent. The people's identification with the institution is crucial for the legitimacy of the State.

The constitution as a document provides the frame for the relationship between the State and the citizens. Thus if the State is not constitutionally based citizenship is non-existent. But citizenship can be otherwise. In his study of Soviet citizenship Golfo Alexopoulos explains:

> In the first decades of Bolshevik power.... fears of anti-Soviet elements and other dangerous enemies produced various waves of political repression in which all citizens became vulnerable to severe restrictions on their citizenship rights and even exclusion from the Soviet polity. At different times and for different reasons, certain groups were targeted more than others, but all Soviet citizens could be subject to accusations of political disloyalty or deviance. The sanctions corresponding to such charges would bear directly on their citizenship status. .... Soviet citizenship policy was not principally guided by economic considerations or concerns about population size, labor shortages, or immigration. Rather, political factors proved central. Citizens were to be molded into active and enthusiastic supporters of State goals while deviant individuals and groups became targets of denaturalization or were stripped of their citizenship rights on various charges, real and imagined (2006: 489).

In a similar fashion in the FMS, citizenship, as an aspect of modernity, instead of becoming a formula to organise the polity becomes a tool in the hands of the government. Thus, the State has two strict categories of citizenship; first for those who are "active and enthusiastic supporters of State"; second are those "deviant individuals and groups". The former is considered as a citizen while the latter in most cases are stripped of rights and become targets of denaturalisation.

The question is: how does the State become the external through the process of denaturalisation? In order to answer the question one has to dwell on questions like; why is the externality one of the distinctive characters of the FMS? In this regard what is meant by the concept of the external is crucial. The external is not abandoning the sphere of the society by the State and residing beyond. The externality means the lack of any channel of communication between citizens and the State. This indicates that the State is unapproachable. There is an absolute lack of communication between people and the State In other words, the State is rather a

regime. As Burhan Ghalioun (2004: 127) puts it "they [the Arab elites] communicate in no way whatsoever with their citizenries". This means the State has a presence, or rather a high presence, within the public sphere but, despite this presence; these apparatuses are the external to the population. They are the external because they do not engage in communication. They do not build relationships. Walls, arms, wire, and security apparatus separate the State from society. The metaphor of the black hole that is used to describe the State in the Arab world can be interpreted as the State having the capacity to 'disappear' the individual forever. The externality of the State is one of the characteristic of the exceptional State. An exceptional State is a State that is in a State of emergency.

> This condition grants the government the power to suspend the operation of some constitutional and legal provisions pertaining to human rights, and this is in conformity with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. However, a number of these rights-such as the freedom of belief, the prohibition of torture, and non-retrospective application of the law must continue to be respected. A State of emergency is also assumed to be temporary and imposed only in the face of a danger that threatens the independence of the State, its territorial integrity, or the regular functioning of constitutional institutions. Nevertheless, a number of Arab governments have resorted to declaring long States of emergency without clear reasons (AHDR, 2009: 61).

This separation and isolation of the State from the people offers the State a position of superiority: to hold back and be servile, to distinguish between friend and enemy. According to a Human Rights Watch report (2007: 9) Egypt "uses a policy of preventive investigation and detention whereby they aggressively carry out surveillance of independent mosques, maintain extensive lists of persons who regularly attend them, and record their activities and associations with each other". When the State is external to the population it means that the State has a freehand in penetrating society, without acknowledging any restrictions. This intervention, penetration, and harassments happens to a degree, for instance in a country like Syria, as described by Human Rights Watch (2007) leaving "no room to breathe". The State within its fortress, coldly and crudely, observes society. When the population has no access to the State, when there is no transparency, then society tends to distrust, to distance, and to live in a State of fear. For them the State is an unknown entity. It is covered with fog. This absolute lack of knowledge by society about the State translates itself into absolute lack of power and influence

over the State. Only through knowledge can one understand an entity. The lack of knowledge means the lack of understanding, thus the lack of influence.

"When the consequences of an action affect the stability of the homeland", says the Syrian president Bashar al Asad (2001)

> ...there are two possibilities: either the perpetrator is a foreign agent acting on behalf of an outside power, or else he is a simple person acting unintentionally. But in both cases a service is being done to the country's enemies, and consequently both are dealt with in a similar fashion, irrespective of their intentions or motives.

According to Deleuze and Guattari (1987: 360) "the State is sovereignty". In the FMS, the sovereign is the State and the State is the sovereign. The two are intertwined to the degree of hybridity. The State is reflecting the mood, the desire, the dream of the sovereign. It is correct to say that the State, the whole State, becomes a part, an organ of the body of the sovereign. In this case, as Estienne de La Boetie puts it, "it is hard to believe there is any such thing as politics when everything is in the hands of one man" (1988: 37). Since the mode and the structure of the State has been imagined and established by the master, there is no room for the emergence of polis or society. Therefore the homeland and the sovereign are intimate; the territory becomes part of the sovereign body. This could be called the politics of the body. Therefore, in FMS talking about the health of the president is a matter of national security and it is a punishable act. Nothing can function without the permission of the sovereign. Thus it becomes apparent that any action that affects the stability of the homeland directly affects the stability of the sovereign and vice versa. Therefore, anyone who is engaged in such act is "the perpetrator", he must be either a mercenary for an outside force, in another word engaging in act of treason, or a fool; carrying out an "unintentional act". In both cases the perpetrator is not regarded as a person with a genuine political agenda but his attempt has been depoliticised, which immediately translates to politics of anti-politics. Al Asad reassures the multitudes of his country that they should not engage in any act that upsets the State. They should not show any dissatisfaction toward the State. They should not attempt in any fashion, whatsoever, to collect knowledge about the State, to engage in any act of criticism. According to him, those who dare to do so are crossing the red line. They

are either being pushed by outside forces or a fool. To live, to survive, one has to remain silent, distant, and docile.

The externality of the State is a policy to make the State distant and mysterious. When the State is the external then the society has no mean to be informed about it. Knowledge is at the heart of the matter. While the State has every means and grants itself, in the name of security, the right to collect detailed information about society, on the other hand society has to live in total darkness about the State and its apparatuses, apart from the official State propaganda. If the State is the sovereignty and the 'sovereignty only reigns over what it is capable of internalising' (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 360) then, in the FMS, the society is internalised but the State, as internaliser, remains the external. This happens through redefining the space, military zone and prohibited zone, security belt etc. The reorganisation of space, whether is it urban space, rural space or wild place, is a modern act of managing the space for the sake of control. The State as the external plans the space and remains external to it. The zoning internalises communities and gives the opportunity for the State to remain the external. This is done through headquarters, military barracks, secret agents, etc.

It is not only the space that is managed by the State. Time is also managed in a similar fashion. Curfews are common in the FMS. Such an act is boldly and harshly visible in areas where people of different ethnic and minority backgrounds are living. Minorities and differences are present in every single county in the Middle East. In Iraq: Kurds, Shi'a and Christians, in Egypt: Cupts (Christians), and radical Islamic groups, in Syria: Kurds, Allawi, Christians, and Druz, in Jordan: Palestinians, in Saudi Arabia: Shi'a, and others, in Bahrain: Shi'a, in Kuwait *Bdon* and Shi'a. The minority in the hierarchy of the Camp are at the bottom. They are stripped of all the basic rights. They are naked in front of the authority.

To question the rationale behind the externality is to question the power relations. Why does the State want to be the external? Is there a power relation between the State and society in the FMS? For Foucault, power relationships

> ...can only be articulated on the basis of two elements which are each indispensable if it is really to be a power relationship: that 'the other' be thoroughly recognized and maintained to the very end as a person who acts; and that, faced with a relationship of power, a whole field of responses, reactions, results, and possible inventions may open up (1982: 220).

When there is no communication, there is no power relationship. In this regard, how can a relationship be described or understood when the two parts, namely the State and the society (people) are related but not communicating with each other? Deducing from Arendt (1969) the FMS is the least powerful form of government. Therefore, the FMS for its survival depends "solely upon coercion and multiple security services" (Ghalioun (2004: 127). As a result the State and society are in a kind of war with each other "the State is against the nation" (Ghalioun (2004: 127).

The externality of the State indicates that the State has a monopoly without being apart. Thus it is not permitted for any other groups or organisations in society to be external. In other words, neutrality within the space of the FMS is prohibited. Thus bodies like intellectuals, civil society and independent media are basically either dysfunctional or banned. In the absence of such associations, the State dominates socio-economic and private affairs, intensifying the State's authoritarian tendencies.

The externality is leaving no gap between the State and the society. The State is directly linked to the people but this linking does not allow people to relate to the State. It is a one-way relationship. According to Simmel (1996: 66) "the human being is the connecting creature who must always separate and cannot connect without separating". Thus, when there is no gap, there is no connection. Like the panopticon the external State desires to be a passive observer and to have power to see every aspect of society without being seen, until the moment of action.

The external is residing in a space without communicating and not willing to listen to the inhabitants of the space, refusing to build any bridge, no relationship of care. This separation between the State and the population is a process of drawing borders, dividing the space, and consequently distinguishing the State and its apparatuses from non-State. This clear partition makes the State visible and appears powerful in the eyes of the population. The externality means presence without communication. This privilege grants the State a clear idea on who is a friend and who is an enemy.

How is externality possible for the State? The FMS has barriers with its subjects: actual and virtual, such as walls, wire nets and also fear. The FMS re lies on both tradition and modernity to make the externality possible. When in Syria the top State leaders are from the

Allawite sect it gives the State an identity and purity in a traditional manner. It distinguishes between who is entitled to have a natural (divine) right to lead the country and who is not. This traditional cleavage makes it clear for the non-Allawaite what their limit are and to not look at the top positions in the State. That was the case during the reign of Saddam in Iraq. It is the same in the rest of the countries in the region.

How is modernity contributing to this the externality? It is clear that a minority cannot hold power over the majority without extensive access to modern techniques. Technology, ideas, notions, and concepts have been borrowed from modern Europe to enhance the dominance of the elites. In Syria, the government, by withdrawing citizenship rights from the Kurds, citizenship being a modern concept, automatically remove any entitlements and any right of participation. In Kuwait the *Bdon* (without) people are banned from citizenship rights and have no entitlement to work, education, and residence. It is the same for the Shi'a and Ismailis in Najran region in Saudi Arabia. Modernity contributes in the form of identity-making, media, technology, surveillance, international relation etc.

4.6 The Camp Economy

The Camp is structured to limit the activity of its inhabitants. Since it is a "nomos of the modern" (Agamben 1998: 171) it borrows many structures from modernity. It is highly hierarchical, centralised and controlled. It also runs according to a plan, it is monitored and under constant surveillance. It curtails freedom in every way. As part of its nature the Camp has a centre and does not allow any other force to emerge within the Camp to compete with the central force. Thus, the central power is omnipotent, and totalitarian, but without ideology. It controls every sector of the life and utilises it for the survival and continuity of the regime. One sector that plays a significant role in this regard is the economy. When a form of economy is described as the Camp economy it is neither a state socialist economy nor a market economy. If the main

> ...features of the State socialist economies are absence of autonomous economic units. The government is the major coordinator of the economy, having extensive public ownership of resources and complete control over the issue of money and the distribution

> of investment and the formation of prices. Government direction largely determined levels of employment, wages and the division between personal and collective spending (Lane, 2008).

Thus there is no doubt that the Camp economy shares many general features with the State socialist economy model. In a similar fashion in the FMS which organizes its economy on the model of the Camp, 'the government is the major coordinator of the economy'. The State also has an extensive or practically full ownership of (natural) resources. But the Arab States do not control the small bourgeoisie sector in their economy. As Mehran Kamrava (2002: 43) puts it:

> These States [Middle Eastern States] face diminished capacities in their efforts to regulate the economic activities of the petite bourgeoisie and some medium-sized enterprises (SME). At best, the State can only partially enforce its regulative agendas on the activities of these economic actors, resulting in the emergence of the economic phenomenon of "semi-formality": those economic activities that are only partially or episodically regulated by the State.

The exemption of 'the petite bourgeoisie and some medium-sized enterprises' from the control of the State is the main diverging point of the Camp economy from the State socialist economy. This economic independence is tolerated by the State according to the logic of the Camp. Their economic activity is limited and their "relative economic autonomy from the State does not necessarily translate into overt political activism". As Kamrava (2002: 43) indicates "semi-formal economic actors are among the groups least likely to engage in open political activities directed against the State".

While it is crystal clear that the economy in the FMS is not in any form or shape a capitalist economy, the State has a monopoly and the market is a sphere for political activity.

> Many governments have allowed speculation to take place as a means of redistributing rent accrued to government to their client base of 'loyal' followers. In the Arabian Peninsula, various governments have allowed the development of speculation in real estate as a means of buying loyalties. Land would be granted to loyal followers either freely or at real low nominal prices and the latter would resell the land at above market prices either to governments who would need the land for various infrastructural projects

> or to other members of the private sector for their own developmental purposes. The same would apply to manipulations in Arab stock markets leading more often than not to major financial disasters. The laxity of government controls over financial transactions and the lack of prudential guidelines have allowed speculators, usually close to centres of power, to amass vast fortunes without effort. Rent or 'booty' is pretty much ingrained in the local culture (Hafez, 2009: 467).

The Camp economy is controlled and run by a limited number of people. It is an arena for buying loyalty and exemplifying that the only way to accumulate wealth is by being loyal to the regime. This is not only in the Gulf Arab States but also in other regions such as the Levant.

> The Syrian economy is controlled by a few powerful families. These clans have access to major orders, monopolies, lucrative licenses and are not, therefore, interested in reforms. Moreover, State patronage has proved a reliable way of safeguarding power. As long as the upper class retains its privileges, it will support the regime (Keller, 2006).

In the FMS the economy is the strongest tool in the hands of the political elites to ensure their lasting in power. This is achievable because economic resources are natural resources or handouts from abroad. This premise indicates that the economy is structured according to the requirements of political survival. Thus, the formula that emerged in regard to the economy is like this: how to use the economy to empower the elites and control the population. Therefore, in the FMS "legitimacy has not been based on taxation and representation" (Fundy, 1994: 44). In most of the States in the region people are not taxed. The absence of taxation is the absence of a relationship between State and people. It signifies the independence of the State from the population. This is possible "either because they have oil resources (the Gulf States) or because they depend exclusively on a foreign patron (the former Soviet Union and later the United States, in the case of Egypt)" (Fundy, 1994: 45). This economic system sidelines the people and reduces them to an unproductive population.

This method of an illiberal-controlled economy is widespread among Muslim countries and as a result, they "generate only six per cent of the world's wealth, while accounting for nearly 22 per cent of its population" (Allawi, 2009:207). If a process like "democratization is inextricably linked to the sources of funds for the State" (Fundy, 1994), then the population has not any particular methods to pressure the State into making concessions to the people.

When the people are not a source of income for the State, this indicates that the State is independent, but for the State to survive it relies on the whole population to be dependent on the State. This asymmetrical relationship effects negatively the position of the population in the eyes of the State, i.e. the State elites. This dependency has been interpreted by the followers of the 'Rentier State' hypothesis as the major impediment in democratisation. Accordingly, the "governments use their oil revenues to relieve social pressures that might otherwise lead to demands for greater accountability (Ross, 2001: 332).

This is what might be called a

> ...taxation effect, when governments derive sufficient revenues from the sale of oil, they are likely to tax their populations less heavily or not at all, and the public in turn will be less likely to demand accountability from--and representation in--their government (Ross, 2001: 332).

This conclusion is based on a rationale, that there is an agreement between the State and the society. This agreement called "authoritarian bargain" which is a contract "between ruling elites and citizens whereby citizens relinquish political freedom in exchange for economic security" (Desai et al, 2006: 2).

This interpretation is wholly based on the Western view or logic. It is a rational choice theory. It implies that individuals in those communities are rationally calculating and they choose what maximises their interest. In this case for individuals to be silent in the face of the regime and adhere to the system is more beneficial than resisting to it, whereas, a close examination of the situation disputes such an approach totally. The Rentier is not a social contract. There is not any form of written or unwritten agreement, between the people and the State. These conclusions are based on a different path, different people and different logic. It is the result of work of some Middle East scholars who have looked for similar correlations between variations in tax levels and variations in the demand for political accountability in European history. As Waterbury argues that

> ...neither historically nor in the twentieth century is there much evidence [in the Middle East] that taxation has evoked demands that governments account for their use of tax monies. Predatory taxation has produced revolts, especially in the countryside, but there has been no translation of tax burden into pressures for democratization (Waterbury 1994: 29).

The economic situation in the FMS, the economics of the Camp, might have some overlaps with the public finance school of economics.

> Pure public finance proceeds in an institutional vacuum. The government is a benevolent dictator and will implement best policy. Citizens are depicted as passive and this follows naturally from the assumption of a benevolent dictator. The dictator will not be influenced by interest groups or the opportunity of personal gain, so citizens presumably see no case for becoming politically active. The policy expert is triumphant as they inform the benevolent dictator of the best means to provide for efficiency, redistribution and macroeconomic stability (McLean et al 2008: 62).

The Camp economy also overlaps in areas like 'regarding the government' as a 'dictator' but differs in the nature of the dictator, which in the case of the public policy school is 'benevolent' whereas in the case of the FMS is brutal. Another asymmetrical area is the belief that the dictator 'will not be influenced by interest groups or the opportunity of personal gain' and 'will implement best policy'; the difference in this circumstance is that while the government is the 'sole policy implementer', it applies the 'best policy,' not in the interest of the people, but rather in the interest of the regime and the ruling elites.

In the public policy school and the Camp economy, the 'citizens [inmates] are depicted as passive'. The public policy school concludes that the 'citizens presumably see no case for becoming politically active', but in the Camp economy the citizens see no opportunity for becoming politically active. The last parallel and contrast, in the public policy school 'the policy expert is triumphant as they inform the benevolent dictator of the best means to provide for efficiency, redistribution and macroeconomic stability'. In the case of the Camp economy 'the policy experts' are advising the ruling elite not of the 'best means to provide for efficiency, redistribution and macroeconomic stability', but rather for the best means for survival. The experts in FMSs are concerned, in a pure Machiavellian manner, with the way t he prince maintains his reign. Because the FMS is an established structure it can manoeuvre in times of crisis and pressure and lean toward modern or traditional, depending on the nature of the pressure, without risking the whole system.

4.7 Conclusion

The Camp as a modern structure organises people, names them, identifies them, arranges them hierarchically, strips them of their rights and above all silences them. The Camp is the model of an extreme centralist State. This central is the external. The externality provides access for the FMS to utilise both modernity and tradition simultaneously, to use them separately, in combination, and sometimes against each other, and above all without being either. The FMS is in a failure relationship with both tradition and modernity. This indicates that the FMS is holding both tradition and modernity in a static position. It won't allow any progress, any moving forward, any changes.

More importantly it obstructs any attempt by both modernity and tradition to get closer to each other, to establish a link, to engage in a dialogue. Through this the FMS makes sure that both tradition and modernity remains no more than apparatuses. Therefore, holding both tradition and modernity in a state of failure the FMS guarantees its security and its survival.

The full emergence of tradition, thus establishing a State according to Islamic codes, would mean the removal of the current State. Similarly, the emergence of a State in line with modernity would mean that the State has to return sovereignty to people, respect human rights, and implement democracy. Thus full modernity, as full tradition, translates into a toppling of the current State. Therefore, both traditional forces and pro-modern forces are engaged in the same enterprise, namely regime change.

This particular characteristic is crucial for establishing the security of the State and the sovereign. The sovereign, the body of the State, is mobile between the two polls without ever residing or identifying with either. This flow, between the two opposite polls, depends on the events. The events (crisis, internal challenges, and external war) that face the State determine which of the two polls is dominant. But the State can never dispose of either of the two polls entirely. It is security that swings the pendulum. Security, according to Foucault (2007) is neither law nor discipline. Security for the FMS is merely managing the events in order to enhance the capturing of the power of the State.

In both *Anti-Oedipus* and *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari, argue that the State functions as an apparatus of capture. Externality puts the State in the right position to manage

events and direct it toward the security of the sovereign. The Camp is the only space that allows this happen and is the only method that makes this possible.

5. The Mosque and the State: the Mosque as an Example of Tradition in making the FMS

I don't see in religion the embodiment of the Holy Spirit, but rather the embodiment of the Social Order. Religion ascribes to Heaven an idea of equality which prevents the rich from being massacred by the poor.

—Napoleon *Conseil d'Etat*, 1806

5.1 Tradition

As the FMS shows tradition is one of the two pillars in making and sustaining the FMS. Tradition is what was there before the arrival of occidental modernity. This includes religions (both official and popular), sects, tribes, customs, the Ottoman style of politics and many other things. Each single aspect of tradition plays a vital role in defining politics. They contribute to making people's attitude toward the other, no matter how different that other is. In this regard the concept of *ahl al-dhimma* is essential. "The dhimma designated an indefinitely renewed contract through which Jews and Christians (People of the Book), and, according to the Hanafi the Maliki schools of law, other non-Muslims, were accorded protection 'on condition of their acknowledging the domination of Islam'" (Scott, 2007: 2,3).

Today, "some Muslim jurists, in interpreting the concept of *ahl al-dhimma,* continue to uphold the view that, because an Islamic community is based on religion, members who are Muslim, or profess Islam, have certain extra rights and responsibilities conferred on them (Saeed, 199:307). This concept not only concerns religious differences, it also establishes the yardstick for dealing with every other difference and ultimately it becomes the frame for dealing with every minority.

Tradition contains the tribe, one of the most basic cornerstones of community. "Middle Eastern societies are not 'modern,'..... the tribal spirit holds sway. Its influence upon Islam permeates even the most cosmopolitan Arab states" (Salzman, 2008: 32). The tribe is a pure, close form of togetherness. It shapes politics and society in many ways. The tribe forms the tribalists: as Bayrat (2009: 42) puts it.

> Tribalists think more or less consciously, that the men and women of their tribe and clan are superior to others and that as a result the others should serve and obey them. The tribalist tries to impose the hegemony, the predominance of his tribe and his clan. In practice, tribalist ideas and feeling are used more often to create a clientele who can help them to satisfy their selfish interests and ambitions.

The tribe is the State maker. Thus the identity of the State is clear. It is crystallised for everyone who has a natural right to rule and who does not. Here, loyalty is not for the State or nation or territory or a belief. If one is a member of the right tribe one is loyal by birth and by nature will have every right. Tradition establishes a definitive, untouchable, obvious and immobile reality which shapes the power relationship between people and the authority. These characteristics kill the sense of resistance. Tradition by offering immobility, the untouchable and the sacred, establishes values like real, truth, right or wrong, which ultimately result in the surrender of human will.

5.2 The Mosque

The mosque is a space unlike other social or political spaces. It has its own logic, a different logic, from other spaces. Above all, the mosque is a sacred space. In addition to its long history, it has a special position in the geography of the city and the establishment of power. The combination of its long history, sacredness, the stories and myths it carries, its particular architecture make it a rich source of imagination for individuals in the society.

In this chapter the mosque is chosen as an element from tradition, an element among many others. Tradition is one of the two main makers of the FMS. The mosque is chosen as a case study for the significant role that it plays in making and taming the population. Furthermore, the mosque is the most organised institution within traditions and has a long and close historical relationship with the State (elites) and the exercise of power.

The mosque is an institution that represents and speaks for Islam. It outlines the motivations, interests, strategies, and agendas of traditional religious authorities. The interaction between the mosque and the State, the FMS, is a relationship as outlined by Kodmani in her case

study on Egypt, "at times, the State leans on the Islamic establishment to support its policies, and the religious establishment likewise seeks—and receives—the support of the government to reassert its full control on religious affairs when needed" (Kodmani 2005: 2). The mosque signifies Islam. Through it the religion is practiced and preached. Historically, the first mosque in Islam became the arena of the first state of Islam. This historical fact impacts directly (negatively) on the process of secularisation as a significant structure of the modern state.

This chapter deals with issues such as, what is the mosque? What is its essence, its role, its structure and its place? It also concerns the functions of the mosque; how it becomes a machine of anti-politics, a bridge between state and society, a source of legitimacy, an ideological state apparatus, and home in a homeless society, and finally anti-modernity mechanism. This institution can play all these different functions because of its particular relationship with the State and its elites. In the FMS frame, the relationship between the two is a tool relation. The State (elite) in a Machiavellian manner uses the mosque and its role as a tool to maintain the State.

Before dwelling further on the mosque and its characteristics, a distinction between official and popular religion can be made. The mosque is the "centre for the activity of the official religion, popular religion, however, features the shrine as the central institution for religious activity" (Barakat, 1993:126). When it comes to their relationship with the State both institutions share many features. However, having said that, a distinction can be made between official and popular religion in relation to the State. According to the Moroccan thinker al Jabri (1987:49) official religion supports the State in terms of the judiciary, while the popular religion contributes to the spiritual area. Moreover, the mosque is chosen, in contrast to popular religion, for its universality and uniformity, in every FMS.

To ask about the nature and the essence of an entity such as the mosque is to question the space, and its relation to other institutions, its functions and its symbolic significance. The mosque is not an ordinary building (place) by any standard, architectural or otherwise. If Bachelard's work had "taught us that we do not live in a homogeneous and empty space, but on the contrary in a space thoroughly imbued with quantities and perhaps thoroughly fantasmatic as well" (Foucault 1986: 23), then a place like the mosque is heavily imbued with imagination and qualifies to be regarded as a Heterotopia.

Like any religious temple, the mosque is an extraordinary place. There are many different layers that in combination make the mosque the most unique and powerful space in a Muslim society. These layers are: sacredness, presence or omnipresence, history, imagination and the special association with the power or the State. Therefore, its importance and influence over the individual, society, and consequently politics cannot be disputed. To evaluate this complex, untold and silent, relationship, many different lines have to be taken into consideration. The mosque, as an institution, is unique to Islam. Islam is presented through the Arabic language, therefore, if the language tells us about the nature or the essence of a thing (Heidegger, 1993: 383), then to demonstrate clearly the true meaning of such an institution one has to return to the original language, classical Arabic in this instance. This chapter focuses on the roles of the mosque and is focussed on the Arab Middle East.

Mosques are categorised in their function into two types: one is called *masjid* in Arabic, which is a place used for praying and worship alone; the other is called *Jam'a*, which is a place for gathering, sermon and preaching, of the doctrine of Islam. The word *Jam'a* in Arabic indicates a place where gathering happens. Gathering for religious purposes, is usually Friday prayer. *Masjad* is a location where the act of *sjod* occurs. *Sjod* is bowing in front of a holy figure. Such an act, in Islam, is only permitted to Allah. Therefore, the mosque is a place for submission to Allah. It is also called *bet Allah al haram* i.e. Allah's holy abode or place. However, this does not mean that Allah is dwelling there. But it is a place or a space that belongs to Allah, among his *abd* slaves or worshippers. The notion of *abd* or slave in this context plays a central role. The orthodox interpretation states that when everyone has the status of *abd,* this establishes the premise for equality among the human. This interpretation is only valid when the state does not exist. In reality, that is what Islam calls for. There is no mention of the word or the concept of the State i.e. *al-dawla* in the Koran. Beside the omission of the State there is no mention of the sovereign either. Thus there is no any religious context for an Islamic political theory. This was a serious crisis after the death of Muhammad and remained to be so. This vacuum, non-existence of any political view, made Islam an easy prey for established political authorities, initially the tribe; as in the return of the pre-Islamic tribal structure, and later on the State elites, throughout its history.

The justification for the State is based on reason and rationalisation. Among the recognised scholars in this area is Imam Khomaeni. During his stay in Najaf (Iraq) from January 21 to February 8, 1970 he delivered lectures concerning *Velayat-e-Faqeeh*, the governance of the jurist. For him the Islamic state is necessary, because:

> A body of laws alone is not sufficient for a society to be reformed. In order for law to ensure the reform and happiness of man, there must be an executive power and an executor. For this reason, God Almighty, in addition to revealing a body of law (i.e., the ordinances of the *sharī'ah*), has laid down a particular form of government together with executive and administrative institution (2002: 19).

This absence of a clear reference to the state and any form of organised politics is justified by others on different ground.

> The absence of explicit and clear texts, in the Koran and Sunna, which regulate political power and state do not mean that Islam is globally not concerned by the question of power. In fact, the historical practice of the community (*umma*) runs against [such a conclusion]: the predication of the Prophet evolved during his lifetime into the creation of a state; Muslims maintained that state, in a way or another, [since they considered it] as a necessary means to maintain religion and defend the domain occupied by the community. On the other hand, the Koran and the *Sunna* offer what may be taken as foundations for an ethics of political power in Islam, such as the apology of consultation (*shura*), the call for the implementation of justice, the care for the poor, for the deprived and all those in their situation (Al-Jabri, 1997: 34).

Based on this utilitarian and rational interpretation the State is a necessity. Thus, the State is required for the implementation of Allah's will. This position is taken up literary by modern political Islam. Muslim Brotherhood has mantras such as Islam is religion and state, which they attempt to merge shar'a and state through establishment of a theocratic state. This reality is not without difficulty. In addition to this there is another problem with regard to communication. Since (God) Allah cannot be known or communicated with directly, such communication has to go through a channel. Eventually the channel plays the role of the divine. For this very reason submission to Allah ends up being submission to the representative of Allah. Since the latter is human, whether it is in the figure of a caliph or a king, then the *abd* or the slave of Allah has no choice but to be the slave of a person or a system. In this case, as in most of Islamic history, Islam will end up being an ideology for justifying power. This is the hypocrisy of authority when one is representing the divine and behaving as human.

The concept of caliph as a political authority has no Islamic base as Ali Abdel Raziq (1888-1966) strongly demonstrated almost a century ago, in his ill fated book (*Al-Islam Wa Usul Al-Hukm*) Islam and the Foundations of Governance.

> Islam is innocent of this institution of the caliphate as Muslims commonly understand it. Religion has nothing to do with one form of government rather than another and there is nothing in Islam which forbids Muslims to destroy their old political system and build a new one on the basis of the newest conceptions of the human spirit and the experience of nations (Hourani, 1962: 188).

It is noticeable that the rulers in the Arab Middle East elites are haunted by the grand image of Allah during their reign. They desire to be in power infinitely, they crave total power, omnipresence through the media and portraits in every corner of their country and in every office and in every single house, granting reward for the servants and punishment for the dissidents.

The mosque is a sacred space, where the heavenly and the earthly meet, providing meaning to the faithful by metaphorically reflecting the underlying order of the world. However, the space itself cannot be sacred, as Paul in Act 17:24 puts it "the God who made the world and everything in it, being the Lord of heaven and earth, does not dwell in shrines made by man" this applies equally to Islam, but the importance lies in the feeling that one gets when entering such a space. This complex action cannot proceed unless it occurs in the realm of imagination. The mosque is a sophisticated machine; armed with a powerful holy language and a central figure to deliver and fulfil this duty confidently. The mosque building is distinguishable and unique to its surrounding. Architecturally, in terms of verticality and size it is dominant and visible. This architectural technique establishes a link to the most holy place in Islam and t hrough this subsequently to the whole history of Islam. Because of its power and the awe it inspires the mosque has always been the site where the elites showed their care and will.

The mosque is a place, in the middle of the community, on the earth, that belongs to Allah. This image preoccupies Muslims, consequently imagining heaven and imagining hell on a daily base. T his translates to right deed being rewarded whil e the wrong one is punished. Moreover this demands Muslims to resist the power of the worldly life and not forget the other world. Muhammad articulated that in a *hadeath* (saying), "work for this world as you never die, and work for your other world as you die tomorrow". Maintaining these two counter forces is the duty of the mosque. Inside the mosque must be silent and spacious "so that the heart may feel at

ease" and the ceiling must be "high so that prayers may breathe there. There must be ample light so as to have no shadows; the whole should be perfectly simple; and a kind of immensity must be encompassed by the forms. . . . Nothing should be hidden from view" (Le Corbusier, 1987: 100). From its tall and high minaret one can see everywhere in the surrounding area. With the emergence and the arrival of technology the power of the mosque became greater. Through the loudspeaker no one can ignore the five times a day call to prayer. Through these calls one is reminded repeatedly, of the greatness of Allah, and Muhammad as His prophet.

In the Friday prayer, the most important gathering of the week, a speech follows. In the FMS due to the absence of the right of freedom of expression, these speeches are either in total support of the regimes or otherwise concern issues like heaven and hell and anecdotes from Islamic history. Through these speeches the mosque plays a significant role in fuelling the imagination: an imagination purely based on nostalgia either toward past or elsewhere. Nostalgia as former Iraqi minister Ali Allawi argued "can be a powerful force, and in time, can even turn to quite dangerous ends" (Allawi, 2009: 8).

The mosque is a space, which is part of the community, but it has another rather significant dimension. That is epitomised in its metaphysical, divine, dimension. It exists between two worlds. The mosque, as a result, is a bridge, a bridge between two separate worlds. If "the human being", according to Simmel (1996: 66) "is the connecting creature who must always separate and cannot connect without separating", then the mosque is the ideal space that offers the opportunity to separate and cross. Through this the mosque can draw people out of themselves.

These characteristics make the mosque an exceptional space which belongs to the community without being fully part of it. Muslims are obliged to go five times a day for prostration. They engage in a particular act and practice. This practice is called *salat,* i.e. prayer, but the Arabic word also indicates connection. This indicates that the mosque is the location that offers the connection to the divine.

Prayer is an essential ritual for Muslims. It is one of the main five pillars of Islam. However, as the Prophet Muhammad puts it "the earth has been made to me a mosque", praying can be conducted anywhere, but it is more rewarding if it is practiced in the mosque. Since the

mosque is the point where man can communicate with Allah, entering the mosque is not permitted without conducting certain gestures and rituals. One has to go through a particular cleaning ritual, commencing with *ttaharat*, i.e. cleaning, (the act of going to toilet and cleaning by water), and then the act of ablution *wodhu'*, which is the act of cleaning the hands, face and feet. This cleaning has to take place in the vicinity of the mosque i.e. before entering the actual space of worship. Prior to entering the mosque the shoes or sandals have to be taken off.

These rituals taken together indicate that there is a clear line and a border between the two spaces: inside and outside, sacred and profane. One is not allowed to take the dirt of man's world into the sacred house of Allah. Entering the mosque one has to leave the human world behind, depart from it, and enter the realm of the divine. There, inside the mosque, one as a believer has to engage in certain bodily activity. This also emphasises that praying is not merely a spiritual exercise, but is also a bodily ritual. It would be difficult to overstate the importance of prayer to religion. Praying to religion is what thinking is to philosophy. The importance of the practice, in regard to belief, was clearly demonstrated by Pascal "kneel down, move your lips in prayer, and you will believe" (Althusser, 2001: 114). Acting without questioning, believing without thinking, submitting without rationalising, are all qualities the FMS wishes to establish in society.

Therefore, the State and the mosque are connected in many ways. The mosque contributes by establishing dogma, the definitive, and the immobile. The mosque by taking the individual away from his/her real world contributes to making him or her an apolitical being. The mosque trivialises this world. It pictures it as a temporary medium. In this regard a mosque could be compared to a church in the modern world. As Hardt informs us, Michel Foucault's work has made clear

> the institutions and _*enfermements*_ or enclosures of civil society - the church, the school, the prison, the family, the union, the party, etcetera - constitute the paradigmatic terrain for the disciplinary deployments of power in modern society, producing normalized subjects and thus exerting hegemony through consent in a way that is perhaps more subtle but no less authoritarian than the exertion of dictatorship through coercion (Hardt, 2000: 163).

For the FMS the mosque is a normalising machine. To normalise means to confirm according to the custom, what the religious authority in the mosque establishes is the normal. The mosque is the guardian of such normality. It regards as its duty to detect the abnormal and prevent from happening it. The line between the normal and abnormal is not clear. For instance when the State seeks a *fatwa* from the mosque in relation to a particular act, it is a clear attempt by the State to normalise that act. Meanwhile, when a mosque issues a fatwa against a particular act signifies that the act is abnormal and subsequently prohibited by both the State a nd the population (believers). The vice versa is also possible. The State and the mosque in most cases are in tune in categorising the normal and abnormal status of an event. For instance:

> Imams at the el Fath and el Nour mosques, and others across Cairo, have accused Negad el Borai, chairman of the Group for Democratic Development (GDD), and Dr Saad el din Ibrahim, chairman of Ibn Khaldoun Center for Development Studies of being 'traitors' for their work for rights reform in Egypt. One of the imams described their calls for amendments to the constitution to limit the powers of the country's president, among other reforms, as an American 'infidel' idea; he asked the congregation to fight such traitors and ideas, reported the independent liberal daily *al-Masry al-Youm*. The 18 March sermons were condemned by the GDD as direct incitement to murder the government's political opponents, and a new form of harassment. The secular writer Farag Fawda was assassinated in June 1992 after a similar the Campaign in the mosques falsely accused him of apostasy and treason (Index on Censorship, 2005: 84)

Moreover, the State appoints the clergy, pays their salaries and governs them through a special ministry. This ministry is a part of government in every single FMS. They are for instance, in Egypt and Qatar called The Ministry of Awqaf, in Kuwait the Ministry of Religious Endowments and Islamic Affairs (Awqaf). For the authority the definition of normal is vital. The normal in the FMS is the state elite's normal. What is normal for the élite is the norm. When the mosque, as a medium, becomes a machine for the State's normalisation then consequently the State elites normal becomes the social normal. This is crucial for the power relationship between the State and the people. Normal kills questioning, curiosity and doubt. Anything in line with the norm does not require questioning, thinking or criticising. It is accepted and embraced.

If one of the ways to be modern "is to find yourself in an environment that promises adventure, power, joy, growth, transformation of the self and the world—and, at the same time,

that threatens to destroy everything you have, everything you know, everything you are" (Berman, 1988: 151). Or when "modernity is often characterized in terms of consciousness of the discontinuity of time: a break with tradition, a feeling of novelty, of vertigo in the face of the passing moment" (Foucault, 2007: 106), then the mosque, its authority, its moral judgement, its power to penetrate and control human consciousness, resists that very event and subsequently becomes an obstacle in front of modernity.

The mosque has the ear of the people. The voice that comes from it is the trustworthy voice. It is a voice that is worth hearing and listing to it. In contrast the State does not have that privilege. Therefore, the mosque has to speak on behalf of the State. Because of its holiness people are simultaneously hearing and listening willingly to the mosque. In hearing there is understanding and in listening there is a joy and therapy (music). The mosque has engaged in such practices since the Ottoman Empire.

The mosque as a religious machine produces rituals. Ritual is a set of repetitive acts that occur through time. The significance of this act is in relation to the future. Through the repetitive acts the future is not anymore wholly unknown. To repeat is to resist the difference. Through repetitions an act normalises, to critique becomes a sin and obedience a virtue. Eventually "life must sink to a biological, vegetable level" (Vladislav, 1986: 98), as Vaclav Havel puts it in his 1975 letter to Dr. Husak.

During the prayer in the mosque one has to be close to others, one is not allowed to be apart. This close togetherness is part of complicated social and traditional phenomena: that one has no right to separate or to be different. This custom affects the notion and the vision of freedom in the Arab and Islamic world. Accordingly, freedom is exemplified in worship. Through worship man can abandon the irrational of feeling and desire to rise up to the realm of the rational. Thus rationality is synonymous with belief which also indicates abandoning self and its worldly surrounding (aLArawi, 1993). Therefore, it can be concluded that believing and the practice of belief, which the mosque plays a central role in it, can be apolitical; especially when there is an interest, the interest of the State, behind this. Despite changes in modern times, much of the religious life of Egyptian Muslims is still centred on the mosque, and religion as an institution of social control is still centred in governmental agencies. Mosque and government, then, are still connected (Berger, 1970: 3).

Every form of social formation requires an ideology. Islam, though not exclusively, forms a big part of the ideological apparatus of the FMS. The other parts include concepts and narratives that belong to modernity like nationalism, revolution, etc.

> Through the years, the imam's sermons have become the heartbeat of the city; daily prayers mark the rhythm of life. Mosques are much more than places for worship; they are the core of Zarqa's [a city in Jordan] socio-political identity, where people meet to discuss their bleak destiny and allow themselves to dream of a better future (Napoleoni, 2005: 27).

Over time the rhetoric, which originated from Western modernity, rusts and wears out. Islam fills the void. There is little doubt about the powerful place of the mosque in the geography of society. There is no community without a mosque. The institution has a significant role and impact on the consciousness of the people. It has power and unlimited desire to implement it. If the modern state in its Weberian definition would be "the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory", then there is no doubt that the FMS, as a power-hungry fragile machine, desires to hold its monopoly and use the mosque for that purpose. Through the mosque, a space, the FMS relates to tradition. This passage is highly significant. This is one of the reasons why the FMS does not attempt to separate the mosque and the State, in line with the separation of the church and the State in the West.

5.3 The Machine of Anti-Politics

Not letting modernity emerge, especially its political dimensions such as citizenship, society and freedom, is a central mission for the FMS. This goal is achieved through the politics of anti-politics. To put it in the Machiavellian style, the State and its elite's first and last preoccupation is to remain in power. When remaining in power perpetually is the sole aim, then, every means is justified for the fulfilment of that goal. De-politicisation of the population, consequently producing apathy, is one of the most effective ways to achieve that aspiration. The FMS is a machine par excellence of de-politicisation. Through de-politicisation, the FMS moves to establish the ground for normalising the abnormal. The FMS utilises both modern and traditional tools in this regard.

Through its discourse the mosque institutes a fixation on the past. The past, in this circumstance, refers to events that never occurred or their actual occurrence is rather different. This past prepared so as to be a part of current memory. Memory, as Walter Benjamin says; (2007: i) "is not an instrument for exploring the past. It is the medium that which is experienced, just as the earth is the medium in which ancient cities lie buried. He who seeks to approach his own buried past must conduct himself like a man digging". The picture of the past that has that function as a parallel reality and consequently prevents ordinary people from feeling and understanding their actual reality is the manufactured past. The real is camouflaged by a fictional reality.

The fixation to the past pre-modern era signifies many criterions, which are vital for the survival of the FMS. The past mean the absence of democracy, total submission to power even when its injustice and cruelty are normal. It also indicates that politics is not the concern of ordinary people. Therefore, it is highly significant for the FMS to be associated with the mosque and utilise it.

> Saudi royalty sanctions official Wahhabi discourse for obvious political reasons. This religious discourse is responsible for closing channels of political debate and delaying the emergence of calls for political reform and participation in the country. Together with state repression, this discourse enforces interpretations of religious texts that call upon pious Muslims to consent to political authority and show ultimate obedience to rulers. This discourse also prohibits any public criticism of rulers and criminalises (in a religious and political sense) discussion of their policies. Dominant Saudi religious interpretations create "consenting subjects" rather than free citizens who engage in public affairs (Al-Rasheed, 2007).

To separate politics from the concerns of ordinary people was a well-established practice by the totalitarian states in the former Eastern Bloc. As Havel (1975) put it: "indifference has become an active social force". During the totalitarian system the general atmosphere was of despair. "Despair leads to apathy, apathy to conformity, conformity to routine performance". The result is the complete abandonment of any hope for g eneral reform, any interest in supra-personal goals and values, or any chance of exercising influence in an 'outward' direction (Havel, 1975). The abandonment of 'outward' world leads to a situation where the person diverts his energy "in the direction of least resistance, i.e. 'inward'.

The mosque exiles its attendants from their real atmosphere, to heaven, to hell, or the past. It exiles them through fear, through language, through sonance (sound). When faced with reality, the exiled from the reality has no experience of it, consequently feels an estrangement and impatience toward it. This inability to experience reality has always been one of the main forces behind the failure to achieve any change in the region. For instance a process like democratization unfolds slowly because it requires a complex, multifaceted evolution in the political, social, and economic realms. The slowness and chaos that accompanies the evolution of democracy is beyond the tolerance of the individual and society. Through religion and state the individual is accustomed to one of the two possibilities; either it never happens or happens immediately, there is no third option. In addition to this, an exile is a person who wishes to evade duty and responsibility and this makes the politics of citizenship, which is based on the trade of rights and duties, an impossible endeavour. The politics of anti-politics is to take the rights of participation, expression, and decision-making from the ordinary people and limit it to a small circle of elites. This also touches the issue of sovereignty, especially individual sovereignty. People, who take authority from the mosque, view themselves as the repository of the highest values of the nation acting to impose order.

To summarise, the mosque as a location, discourse and practice has an exceptional power in shaping the spirit, psyche and fear of its attendees. These leverages enable the mosque to participate actively in making politics. The mosque's moral authority plus its sacredness eliminate any doubt or questioning; consequently have inputs over the structure of power and general direction of the progress in society.

These different forms of power are used, abused and utilised by the authorities directly and indirectly. This makes the relationship between the two-entities; the mosque and the FMS intimate and continuously engaged in a power struggle. But there is an important fact to be acknowledged. Islam, as Ali Abd al-Raziq put it in 1925,

> did not determine a specific [political] regime, nor did it impose on Muslims a particular system according to the requirements of which they must be governed; rather it has allowed us absolute freedom to organise the State in accordance with the intellectual, social and economic conditions in which we are found, taking into consideration our social development and the requirements of the times. Quoted from `Imara, (1972: 92).

This vacuum, of not determining a specific political regime, did not allow Muslims to have absolute freedom to organise the State in accordance with the intellectual, social and economic conditions in which they are found. Rather it resulted in a vacuum which allowed Islam, throughout history, to fall into the hand of the State élite and be reduced to a mere ideology. This makes the relationship between the mosque and the State a mutual relationship. By having a link to the mosque, the FMS succeeds in having a link with the past, the sacred. Through utilising the mosque, the FMS manages to oppose opposition groups and reduce the individual to a detached, powerless person who lives in continuous internal exile.

5.4 The Mosque as a Source of Legitimacy

Legitimacy can be defined as the approval of others of one's act. The approval of others, of one's act, is only obtained, when one demonstrates that his or her act is not purely out of self interest. In this particular circumstances the State need the mosque, first to relate to as a source of legitimacy and secondly to utilise it for the same purpose. The FMS, aware of this need hence relates to the religion and the mosque as a form of 'symbolic capital'. Symbolic capital to paraphrase Bourdieu is an act of denial from the real interest which presents itself in a set of practices. One of the most influential manners of [this] denial is through symbolic practices, which manages to deflect attention from the interested character of practices and thereby contribute to their enactment as disinterested pursuits" (Bourdieu, 1977: 183).

> Activities and resources gain in symbolic power, or legitimacy, to the extent that they become separated from underlying material interests and hence go misrecognised as representing disinterested forms of activities and resources. Individuals and groups who are able to benefit from the transformation of self-interest into disinterest obtain what Bourdieu calls a "symbolic capital" (Swartz, 1996: 77).

Through the mosque the FMS disguises its own naked interest. It attempts to establish a form of power that is not perceived as power but as a legitimate demand for recognition, obedience, or the service of others. The mosque is the location where religion materialises; therefore, building a connection with the mosque is sharing the symbolic power of the mosque. For instance when in 1952 Gamal Abdel Nasser through a coup came to power, despite being

nationalist and pro-Soviet, was quick to realise the importance of gaining control over al-Azhar (the most important religious institution in Egypt), and through it all the mosques within the country.

> In order to ensure domestic control and promote his foreign-policy objectives, within Egypt, Nasser wanted al-Azhar to lend legitimacy to his regime and its program of transforming Egyptian society. Subordinating al-Azhar to the State also would allow Nasser to balance the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood, as the most organised and influential opposition group in the country, which threatened to mobilize Egyptians against the government. Moreover, Nasser understood that al-Azhar's influence extended well beyond the borders of Egypt and that government control over the most respected and influential institution of Islamic scholarship would be an important tool in furthering Egypt's leadership of Arab and Islamic nations (Moustafa, 2000: 5,6).

Nasser also used *fatwas* to advance his foreign policy objectives in the Arab and Islamic world. In the rivalry between Nasser and King Faisal of Saudi Arabia throughout the 1960s, Nasser used al-Azhar's *fatwas* to legitimise his policies and appeal to the sensibilities of Saudi Arabia's citizens to rise up against their government. Anwar Sadat Egyptian president (1970-81) and Hosni Mubarak (1981) also took advantage of their leverage over al-Azhar to secure various *fatwas* supporting their own policies. Sadat was able to secure fatwas that justified overturning Nasser's land-reform program, his policy of *Infitdh* (economic liberalization), and, most important, his peace treaty with Israel 1979. Mubarak relied on similar *fatwas* from al-Azhar to legitimise Egypt's participation in the second Gulf War (Haddad, 1996: 297, 309) and to condemn Muslim extremists. This is not limited to Egypt; in every FMS, the authority guides the religious institutions according to their politics. The FMS is consciously aware of the risks that attach in utilising the mosque. The mosque, in comparison to the State, has more legitimacy and root in the eyes of the population. Thus the mosque is not an easily docile entity. This creates the relationship of use and control. But the FMS has also to ensure that this utilisation does not result in the empowerment of the mosque. Therefore, the mosque has to perform in a limited space. Thus the relationship between the FMS and mosque is twofold. On the one hand, the FMS utilises the mosque and on the other hand it is fully aware of the power struggle between the two. This schizophrenic relation has become more evident since the emergence of modern political Islam.

With the emergence of political Islam, the mosque became the battleground between the State and Islamic groups. The emergence of political Islam made the space of the mosque a risky space for the State. Political Islam is a modern use of tradition. In the other words, political Islam, like the FMS, uses modern techniques to utilise Islam. This is done through the classification of tradition. This means the organisation of tradition under different names. Thereafter, purifying these classified names through a process of distinguishing between licit and illicit (*halal and haram).* Classification and organisation is a form of use and control. Therefore political Islam is similar to the FMS, in its use of tradition and modernity. The FMS desires to depart from the mosque and its influence. But this remains a mere desire.

> On April 25, 1967 a junior Ba'thist officer of 'Alawi origin named Ibrahim al-Khallas published an article in the Syrian army organ *Jaysh al-Sha'b* entitled "The Means of Creating a New Arab Socialist Person," in which he stated that "the way to fashion Arab culture and Arab society is by creating an Arab socialist who believes that God, imperialism and all other values that had controlled society in the past are no more than mummies in the Museum of History (Eyal, 2005: 44).

There is no doubt that the young 'Alawi officer expressed the views of the Syrian state as a FMS. Minimising the role of religion among the multitude and within the apparatuses of the State and replacing it with Arab nationalist and secular ideology, was an attempt to depart from an institute that would not yield to full control by the State. This attempt was not without risk. In reality, deploying a junior officer to write the article was a planned step to test the water. Therefore, when the article aroused angry protest among the urban Sunni population and strikes and anti-Ba'th demonstrations broke out in Syria's large cities, the regime denounced the article and imprisoned its author and the editor.

> These two, the Syrian public was told, were agents of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Damascus Radio even stated "the article has been planted in the army organ as part of reactionary Israeli-American plot, in collusion with anti-revolutionary elements and merchants of religion to drive a wedge between the masses and their leadership"(Jaysh al-Sah'b, 9 May 1967).

The chasm between the State and the mosque was never filled. Therefore with the emergence of political Islam, a war commenced between the state and the latter over who has the right to utilise the mosque. Political Islam in many cases succeeded in exploiting this cynical relationship

between the mosque and the FMS. For the newly emerged group the mosque was a space that had to be recaptured. This puts the mosque at the centre of the struggle between the State and political Islam. Since then, for the State the mosque is the location that has to be managed, monitored and guided in order to keep it away from the newly emerged group.

The FMS's relationship with the internal entity is based on the logic: if you do not enhance my power, you are doomed. Political Islam as a vigorous opposition power, and as a real threat to the State, adds another task to the mosque. Through manipulating the mosque, the FMS, tries to de-legitimise political Islam. When Syria came under the threat of the Muslim brotherhood, the State appointed clerics to preach messages such as "Under the leadership of President Asad, Syria became the focal point of support for the entire Muslim world. The mosques of Damascus are flourishing; the number of worshippers present in them is on the increase" (Kedar, 2001). This, as a result, made the mosque the battleground where both political Islam and the FMS are fighting a war against each other. The discourse of political Islam is *salaf:* going back to the early stage of formation of Islam, fundament. Then the establishment of fundamentalism means the tantalisation of tradition. This is the total absence of modernity. Then the FMS has to hold tradition in the status of failure; so, it vehemently opposes the full return to the fundament *salaf.*

5.5 The Mosque as the Home in the Homeless Society

Home is essential for being; being human, citizen and political. Therefore, creating home and feeling home among the population is of great importance for the FMS rulers. "In authentic experience of 'home,' whether a house, a village, a region, or a nation, is a central point of existence and individual identity from which you look out on the rest of the world" says Edward Relph *in Place and Placelessness* (Price, 2002: 39). For one to succeed in the world, to be actively part of the world, one has to have a dwelling. Does the FMS allow one to be in a worthy of home? Home is a place, which pr ovides protection, welcoming and a space for others. Therefore man has to be the owner of his home, master of his home. The home should be a place that separates one from the outside, in order to be able to participate in the world. According to Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: "No one shall be subjected to arbitrary

interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks". While the FMSs state in their constitutions the need to maintain the sanctity of the home the reality shows the contrary. For instance, i n Syria, according to the United State department of State Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, Labour (2008) report:

> On the night of July 16, according to a human rights organization, Mu'awiyah Ali al-Dablan, a police officer from the village Al-Taaminah in Hama, and his friend Bashar Aziz were arrested in al-Dablan's home. The reason for the arrest and the whereabouts of the two men were unknown at year's end.

Similarly, according to the United States Department of State, 2008 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Egypt,

> On April 30, police officer Ahmed Antar Ibrahim assaulted Al Nadim Center director and anti-torture activist Dr. Magda Adly and her colleague Dr. Mona Hamed inside a courthouse in Kafr Al Dawwar. During the assault, the police officer fractured Adly's shoulder and inflicted a head wound that caused her to lose consciousness for 30 minutes. The two doctors were at the courthouse to attend and testify in a case concerning the Hussein family, who alleged torture by local police. Sobhi Mohamed Hussein and his sons, Ahmed and Mohomed, reported that police detained, burned, and beat them in Kafr Al Dawwar police station on April 22 after they complained about a police raid at their home.

While in Jordan (2008) according to the United States Department of State country report of Human Rights:

> The law prohibits arbitrary interference in private matters; however, in practice the government did not respect this prohibition. Citizens widely believed that security officers monitored telephone conversations and Internet communication and read private correspondence, and that the government engaged in limited surveillance without a court order of persons deemed a threat to national security. The law requires that security forces obtain a warrant from the prosecutor general or a judge before conducting searches or otherwise interfering with these rights. In an April 2007 report, the AOHR alleged that the government conducted late night raids on homes and made arbitrary arrests between the hours of 7 p.m. and 7 a.m.

Meanwhile in Oman (2008) the United State department of State Human Rights Report: Oman)

> The law provides for broad governmental discretion, which the government used in practice. The law does not require police to obtain search warrants before entering homes, although the police often obtained warrants from the public prosecutor's office.

> The government monitored private communications, including mobile phones, e-mail, and Internet chat room exchanges. The Ministry of Interior (MOI) required citizens to obtain permission to marry foreigners except nationals of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries; permission was not granted automatically. Citizen marriage to a foreigner abroad without MOI approval may cause the foreign spouse to be denied entry into the country and prevent a legitimate child from claiming citizenship rights.

These examples clearly show that the notions of the home, privacy and a separate space from authority are all but nonexistent in the FMS. What is the implication of not being at home in one's own home? It clearly indicates that inhabitants of the FMS are living in the State of permanent homelessness.

According to Heidegger (1993: 383) "man do not dwell because they built", i.e. not every building can be a place for dwelling and not everything that man builds is for dwelling. So "in what does the nature of dwelling consist" (Heidegger, 1993: 384). After posing the question, Heidegger excavates the old meaning of the related words and pays attention to what t he language says. He states that dwelling is: "to remain, to stay in a place" (1993: 384). But the question is: how this is remaining in a place is experienced. In other word what are the conditions that qualifies a place to be a home. The first proviso, for Heidegger, is to be "at peace, to be brought to peace, to remain in peace".

> The word for peace, *Friede*, means the free, *das Frye*, and *fry* means: preserved from harm and danger, preserved from something, safeguarded. To free really means to spare. The sparing itself consists not only in the fact that we do not harm the one whom we spare. Real sparing is something positive and takes place when we leave something beforehand in its own nature, when we return it specifically to its being, when we "free" it in the real sense of the word into a preserve of peace. To dwell, to be set at peace, means to remain at peace within the free sphere that safeguards each thing in its nature. The fundamental character of dwelling is this sparing and preserving. It pervades dwelling in its whole range. That range reveals itself to us as soon as we reflect that human being consists in dwelling and, indeed, dwelling in the sense of the stay of mortals on the earth (Heidegger, 1993: 352).

Accordingly home denotes peace. For peace to be achieved there must be freedom. So home is a peaceful place that offers freedom, protection from danger, lack of disruption, intrusion and it offers immortality. The FMS does not allow for a space to have all these criteria.

The home has two layers, one is the private dwelling, household, and the other is the homeland. With the emergence of the territorial state, the State, the organisation that

monopolises violence, has the ultimate responsibility to offer this home atmosphere. The dwelling is emphasised and it allows an atmosphere in which one can become an independent individual, while the homeland establishes the premise for becoming a citizen. In the FMS on the both levels the home and home-feeling are absent. This clearly has a colossal impact on modernising society. When one is unable to be oneself, when one is neither feeling a citizen nor, more importantly, regarded as a citizen by the State, one does not feel at peace.

The concluding remark of the Arab Human Development Report (2009: 207) crystallises the issue of home and home-feeling in the FMS. The report's concept is "human security" and it is defined as "the liberation of human beings from those intense, extensive, prolonged, and comprehensive threats to which their lives and freedom are vulnerable", i.e. feeling at home. Therefore, the essence of human security is for one to feel at home in his or her private dwelling and within the border of the State.

The definition, and the concept from which it flows, have particular relevance to Arab countries at this juncture, the report states. In the FMS when there is absence of human security there is an absence of home.

> Executive branches and security and armed forces that are not subject to public oversight present grave potential threats to human security. All Arab heads of state wield absolute authority, answering to none. They maintain their hold on power by leaving the State's security apparatus an extremely wide margin for manoeuvre, at the expense of citizens' freedoms and fundamental rights (AHDR, 2009: 24).

In an article published in *Alqudis Alarabi*, (daily Arabic newspaper published in London) on 6/7/2009, the Saudi writer Dr. Madawi Al-Rasheed asks "do the citizens in the Saudi Arabia need training?" The article comes after the finding of the Ministry of Islamic Affair, "that the feeling of being citizen, among the Saudis is absent". To deal with this grave problem the department organised a workshop, which was attended by 300 mosque clerics. The workshop was called the law of belonging (*fiqh alentima'a*). What Al-Rasheed stresses is that the problem of lack of belonging in Saudi Arabia is not solved through lectures, workshops and giving advice. The core of the problem is that there is no room for patriotism.

In Saudi Arabia and the rest of the FMS, it is not possible to belong to the country. The only form of belonging permitted is the belonging to the ruling elite through blind loyalty to the family, the sect, the tribe and the president. If belonging denotes some sort of freedom or choice, then forced belonging cannot be regarded as actual belonging. This indicates that there is no belonging in the FMS, apart from belonging to the State elites. When there is only one belonging; the other form of belongings is banned. One can only become part of the homeland through the body of the king, the president or the prince.

Absolute homelessness in the FMS is a fact. Such a condition is unbearable. It is a condition of being naked and vulnerable, in front of the authorities. This makes the homeless to be in a perpetual search, to overcome this condition, to find a home. In the FMS, this might be a futile effort. The immediate response would be to seek a home, a shelter for safety, mortality elsewhere, beyond the boundary of the FMS. Here with this immediate burning demand the mosque prevails as an alternative.

In addition to providing a feeling of home, the mosque is also a place for prayer and purification, which can also play a role in reducing the stress and burden of living on the believer. *Salat*, prayer can be an act of escape. This very act of departure, this possibility, enables man to find a space beyond the world: a space to disconnect, to detach the self from the distress of reality. Connecting to Allah through *salat* and complaining to him, at the end of the prayer, is an act of protest against the real distresses of the world.

This act is significant as it provides a channel to diffuse the pain and oppression to somewhere beyond. Especially when the outside of the mosque is a place where there is an increase in repression of reformists, human rights defenders and activists, the independent press and electronic media, leaders of protest movements, and of other forms of political action (Human Rights in the Arab region annual Report, 2008: 30).

In this regard the mosque becomes the alternative space to the unbearable reality. It offers a "sigh to the oppressed creature, a heart to the heartless world, a spirit to the spiritless situation" (Marx & Engels, 1972: 38). Through prayer the mosque provides a coping mechanism. Research, in American society, shows that members of traditionally underprivileged or marginalized groups--women, African-Americans, and older Americans--are more likely to pray

(Baker, 2008). This suggests that individuals from social groups that experience more suffering and deprivation may turn to prayer as a coping mechanism. Coping is an effort to manage (that is master, tolerate, reduce, minimise) environmental and internal demands (Lazarus and Launier 1978: 288). Joseph Baker finds that

> Individuals look to God to help maintain a feeling of control and justice in difficult situations, and that African-American, those with low income levels, and women are all more likely to use religion as a coping mechanism. Social position can change individuals' perceptions of what they are able to do within the world, and correspondingly what God can or needs to do--if anything--to help them. Thus, among its many purposes, prayer can be seen as an attempt to communicate with the divine in the hope of receiving assistance in coping with one's circumstances (Baker, 2008: 171).

Based on that finding, the inhabitants of the FMS are more likely to pray and use praying as a coping mechanism. When there is a mechanism to cope with intolerable conditions, the result is the clear death of politics.

Therefore, the mosque and its outside are engaged in the dialectic of an inside-outside relationship: inside Allah and outside the State. Thus the feeling of diversion, of support by almighty Allah, in the face of the cruelty of the world, provides a false remedy. Once the believer is inside he has to surrender to the rule of the place. Like every other societal "segment" (Deleuze, 2006:93) it marks its boundary clearly. When one is inside the mosque one is clearly in the mosque, thus one has to obey the rule of the place. The mosque regularly and repetitively trains the incomers to listen to only one speaker, to be silent, not to question, not to argue, to be thankful and eventually to be docile.

The mosque and the act of praying is not essentially a docile act. It becomes so as a result of a particular social condition. That which is responsible for the deterioration of the social condition is the FMS. Therefore, with the emergence of political Islam the praying changes from a coping mechanism into a political activity. However, the main purpose of the politicisation of religion and religious places by modern political Islam is the establishment of an Islamic State. An Islamic state does not tolerate the practice of politics. It would be a society where everything has reached the end among them: history, politics, thinking, aesthetics, and science.

Islamic praying has a ready ground to be a rebellious political act. When Muslims are uttering through their pray phrases like, *la illah ella Allah*, no god but Allah, they are coming under an obligation to not recognise and not obey to any worldly force but Allah. Historically Islam established an institution like the State, but never conceptualised it. This emphasises that Islam, as a religion sees an institution like the state as not necessary, especially, when the community including the individuals and the family, are following strict Islamic rules.

The FMS through establishing a 'republic of fear', state of security, permanent rule of exception, never ending martial law, widespread use of torture and abuses of basic human rights, creates a situation where one feels homeless at home. Therefore, it is presumed that the mosque will end up being a home for the body, spirit and feelings. A place where one can belong; leave behind the harsh continual fear, and danger of violent death. A place where the life of man is Hobbesian: solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.

The ruling elites desire this Leviathan condition. In this circumstance the mosque is reduced to the role of a tool to enhance and serve a clear purpose, which is a contribution to the survival of the FMS. In this case the mosque, as an element from tradition, is kept in a state of failure. It is no secret that the mosque has other potential outcomes therefore, the FMS rulers through their complex security apparatuses has to continuously monitor, control and manage the mosque to maintain it in a state of failure, i.e. implementing shari'a Islam. This makes the interaction between the mosque and the State a mix of complicity and rivalry that has profound effects on society.

5.6 The Mosque as an Ideological State Apparatus (ISA)

To demystify the role of the mosque as an ideological state apparatus, a question about the nature of the latter has to be answered. What is an ideological state apparatus? It is a concept coined by the French neo-Marxist Althusser, First published in *La Pensée*, 1970 and later on, in collection of essays under the title *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays*. After distinguishing it from the 'repressive state apparatuses' like (government, administration, army, police, courts, prisons) Althusser (1971: 143) defines Ideological State Apparatuses "as a certain number of realities

which present themselves to the immediate observer in the form of distinct and specialized institutions". These are like

> religious ideological state apparatus ISA (the system of the different Churches), The educational ISA (the system of the different public and private 'Schools'), The family ISA, The legal ISA, The political ISA (the political system, including the different Parties), The trade union ISA, the communications ISA (press, radio and television, etc.), The cultural ISA (Literature, the Arts, sports, etc.) (1971: 144).

All Ideological State Apparatuses, independent of their particularities, contribute to the same result, which is according to Althusser, quoting from Marx in *Das Kapital* Vol. I. "the reproduction of the relations of production"(1971: 144). In other words: contributing to making and preserving the condition of production in order for the reproduction to flow and the status quo preserved.

How does this apply to an institution like the mosque? Obviously, the mosque as a religious institute shares a lot of characteristics with the church. If the church for Althusser is an ideological state apparatus, the same could apply to the mosque. In the FMS, the mosque, among many other apparatuses, stands as the most dominant and the powerful apparatus that indirectly but effectively, contributing to the survival of the FMS. Through the creeping of modernity the FMS had a semi civilizational shift (from Islam to the secular) in which as consequence Islam was partially removed from the public domain, to make room for the emerging (secular, Westernised) state. In the newly emerged state the mosque was incorporated (re-inscribed) under the control of the *wazart alawqaf* (Directorate of Religious Affairs). Here Islam is re-politicised to support the State's nation-building project. Islam, in this sense, truly becomes an official state religion.

Article two in the Egyptian constitution states "Islam is the religion of the State…Principles of Islamic law (Shari'a) is the principal source of legislation". Article three in the Syrian constitution states: "The religion of the President of the Republic has to be Islam. Islamic jurisprudence is a main source of legislation". This sine-qua-non-relationship between the FMS and religion is more apparent in Iraq's post-Saddam constitution. Article three states that "Islam is the official religion of the State and it is a fundamental source of legislation: no

law that contradicts the established provisions of Islam may be established". These are the samples from the most secular and modernised states among the FMSs. In other countries, like for instance Saudi Arabia, the *Wahabi* (puritan interpretation of Islam) and the al Saud family, throughout the history of the Kingdom, were closely allied.

Islam is the official religion of the FMS. Its apparatuses are funded and supervised by the State. The State supervises institutions (mosques) around the country through appointing mullahs to the mosques and paying their salaries. These institutions oversee various social and communal activities and enhance the role of the State in insulating its insulate over personal and private areas. For instance, according to its official website the Ministry of the Religious Affairs *Awqaf* وزاره الاوقافin the Kingdom of Jordan has the following objectives:

1- Maintenance, development, preservation, and management of mosques and Awqaf funds.

2- Development of mosques to deliver the message of Islamic education.

3-Nourish the spirit of sacrifice, strife and stability in the nation and strengthen morals through the teachings of Islam and guidance of the faith.

4- Nurture and solidify Islamic mannerisms in the private and public lives of all Muslims.

5- Support public Islamic functions and the scriptures; call for the establishment of religious institutes and schools to teach recital of the Holy Koran.

6- Spread Islamic culture and preserve Islamic heritage; reveal the role of Islam in the elevation of mankind and bring Muslims closer to their faith.

(Quoted from Article 5, of the legislation of Awqaf and sacred Islamic places 2001)

What becomes apparent from this list of objectives is the complex function of religion in the FMS. For instance the idea of "nourishing the spirit of sacrifice, strife and stability in the nation and strengthening morals through the teachings of Islam and guidance of the faith" is a clear sign of the role that religion, through this machine, plays as a mechanism to create identity. So Islam is a discourse, through which the notion of 'sacrifice', which in itself is an act of offering something to a deity in propitiation or homage, is being mediated. Such a notion for instance indicates that the person, the citizen, the member of community has to abandon his

individual being and become part of the 'we', the nation, for the sake of the State. In other words, from the inhabitant within the territory of the State it is demanded that he/she give up everything, even their basic needs, for the State. If all the State Apparatuses, according to Althusser, function both by "repression and by ideology", the mosque through the State power and its religious ideology possesses both elements.

The mosque has many direct and indirect links to the State for which through it they provide the service to the State. If the main function of the ideological state apparatus is to create and maintain the condition that favours the State survival, then the mosque as a medium is actively participates toward that particular end. The mosque belongs to so called non-political Islam. Thus it is tolerated by the State and utilised to curb political Islamists and others. The State and the mosque are in agreement on who should be attacked. In Egypt for instance, as it was observed by Farag Foda, in his book *Qabl el soqoot* [Before Falling], the State:

> has given in to the clerics' demand not to allow Marxists on television because they question the absoluteness of Islam. It has become reluctant to publish the thoughts of anti-Islamist or secular scholars, and it is overly sensitive to the emergence of an enlightened discussion of religion. Forbidden areas have multiplied, including debates on history, political thought, philosophy, social practices and their foundations, even science and knowledge in general. Intellectuals and experts from a wide range of fields are systematically slandered, and as a consequence they increasingly withdraw from broad areas of debate and refrain from expressing their opinions on matters of concern to society (Kodmani, 2005: 14).

The mosque is in an agreement with the authorities to maintain stability, even through coercive methods. The mosque does not oppose the despotism of the State; a despotic ruler is seen as just through the eyes of the mosque, in order to avoid *fitna* civil war. The more important fact is that the mosque remains aloof to the topics regards as sensitive to the State authority. However, there is a false impression that the mosque is independent and impartial from the State. But this is nothing more than an illusion or a scenario to establish the credibility.

This silence, leaving sensitive matters unspoken spreads an air of normality. It is palpable that the mosque does not advocate for democracy. The very idea of power in the hand of ordinary people is alien to the highly taxonomical hierarchy of religion. The FMS in its structural components resembles the religious institute in various ways. Like the mosque, the FMS

demands total submission from the population; similarly, it divides the community between loyal and disloyal. Those loyal to the ruling elites, as with the religious believers, are rewarded with a heavenly life. The disloyal, like *murtad* or *kafir*, atheist will end up in hell. The FMS does not negotiate disloyalty, akin to Islam; abandoning religion is punishable by death.

The only time the mosque opposes the authority is when there is a doctrinal difference between the two. This is mainly epitomised in Shi'a mosques and shrines against the Sunni based authorities, for instance in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Lebanon. When the mosque is funded by the State it indicates that the mosque and the *ulamma,* the clergies are relying on the State for their economic survival. However among the Shi'a Muslims the clergy rely on people's donations. (This is the reason behind their alliance with people against authority, prior to their coming to power themselves.) This economic tie makes the mosque more pro-State than pro-people. Apart from the economic ties, the mosque plays the role of filling the void of the State ideology. The FMS does not have a particular value system. Its main concern is survival.

5.7 The Impossibility of Secularism

The FMS has a religion. It is clearly announced in their constitutions. FMS has a special ministry under the banner of religious affairs. There is no mentioning of any separation between the State and the mosque. The mosque is not independent of the State; similarly, the State is not independent of the mosque.

Secularism is an exclusively modern doctrine. It was founded historically to overcome the problem of Christianity. Thus it originated from and is related to the Christian religion. This historical fact is used as an argument by the opponents of secularism in the Islamic world. The genealogy of secularism has two different layers of history. One is related to the nature and the trajectory of Christianity as a religion in relation to power (Roman Empire). Christianity unlike Islam and Judaism was not associated with power and did not reach a position of power in its early stages. Therefore, it is expected to call for the separation of the two domains i.e. worldly and divine. Since Islam and Judaism were associated with power and State formation from an

early stage, they had to conquer the right to use violence, as a Sine qua non to form their state. This makes the call for secularism in Islam rather difficult compare to Christianity.

The other layer in the history of secularism stands in relation to the emergence of the modern form of the State in the West. The Westphalian Treaty (1648) was signed after one of the most destructive conflicts in European history which is known as the Thirty Years (religious) War. The treaty confirmed that peace was the outcome of sending religion into exile. Consequently the rise of rationality was only possible after the retreat of religion from the public domain. As Friedrich Schiller (2006) put it "to every secular state was conceded the right of establishing the religion it acknowledged as supreme and exclusive within its own territories, and of forbidding the open profession of its rival. Subjects were to be free to quit a country where their own religion was not tolerated". This clearly indicates the supremacy of the State over religion. The State as a territorial entity had the right to establish the religion it acknowledged as supreme and exclusive within its own territory. Later on during the French Revolution, secularism became a value statement as well "on November 2, 1789, Talleyrand announced to the French National Assembly that all ecclesiastical goods were at the disposal of the nation, as indeed they should have been" (Madan, 1987: 748).

Secularism from a theoretical perspective frees power from the divine connection and limits it to the realm of the human (man), thus establishing t he ground for democracy. If democracy for every member of society is "to partake in ruling and being ruled" (Ranciere, 2001: 7), then in its essence it is against the imagined style of governing by the State elite in the FMS. Therefore, a genuine secular system was never canvassed by the FMS. Since the FMS lacks any sort of identification, it cannot afford to abandon or draw a line between itself and a strong source of identity like the mosque or religion in general. Every entity, in order to present itself into the world, requires a narrative. Islam, if not becoming the narrative of the State directly, fills the gap of the missing narrative in the FMS indirectly.

Among many other things religion is a doctrine. According to William Graham Sumner the doctrine is "the most fearful tyrant to which men ever are subject, because doctrines get inside a man's own reason and betray him against himself" (Douglas Little, 2002: 117). A doctrine that makes humans betray their reason is what the FMS longs for. Islam can be used as such a doctrine. Therefore, if secularism draws the line between the State and the mosque, in

other words separating the two domains, the FMS is unwilling and unable to carry out that. The FMS has a fear and impotency about establishing any institution apart from the army and other security apparatuses. Thus, there is no room for the new institution that can challenge the old institutions. Limiting religion and mosque to the realm of the private sphere, in the FMS, the public sphere ends up being a void. This void might invite other doctrines and ideologies which might call for resisting and challenging the State more vehemently than religion.

However, the mosque does not have total hegemony over the public sphere. Nevertheless there is no doubt that it is one of the main actors in this sphere. The mosque acts as a guardian of the moral, cultural and traditional. These codes are employed against any change and newcomers. Through this guardianship the mosque plays the role of resisting modernity. The hegemony over morality and the urge for guardianship gives the mosque the role of protector against any intruder. This means the mosque is perpetually on alert, vigilant. When the intruder is modernity and by this the ground is prepared for a continuous civil war within society. The civil war is designed and monitored between the FMS and the mosque. The mosque helps the government maintain a monopoly over the political sphere; in return, the mosque would be rewarded by being granted a monopoly over the religious sphere.

In addition to all that the FMS is fully aware that religion cannot be suppressed fully in society. Even if this is attempted religion reasserts itself where it was formerly stifled or thrives where it was never held back. Fighting only enhances religion. While the identity of the FMS is merely a void, religion through its institutions speaks to profound questions to which many millions of people seek answers, especially the transcendental questions in social and spiritual areas. Then the equation would be a totally imbalanced. Thus it is not surprising that religion creeps toward the void created by the State.

5.8 Can the Mosque Play the Role of Civil Society?

Civil society refers to "the arena of uncoerced collective action around shared interests, purposes and values, its institutional forms are distinct from those of the State, family and market" (LSE, 2004). Accordingly, the mosque can and has potential to play the role of civil society, in other

words; to mediate between the State and society. But this potential remains only as potential, since it has no opportunity to become reality. The potential of the mosque to be a civil societal institution is rather apparent, especially if one believes that the mosque can be an independent institutional infrastructure for political mediation and public exchange. But as Hardt (2000: 158) cautiously highlights, it is "also important to be aware of the functions of discipline and exploitation that are inherent in and inseparable from these same structures". However even in modern societies as Michel Foucault's work has made clear the institutions of civil society "constitute the paradigmatic terrain for the disciplinary deployments of power, producing normalised subjects and thus exerting hegemony through consent in a way that is perhaps more subtle but no less authoritarian than the exertion of dictatorship through coercion" (Foucault, 2000: 158).

In the FMS the mosque participates in making normalised subjects, normalised conditions or produce situations that directly or indirectly service the State and its apparatuses. When the mosque fails to link the text with the reality and reduce religion to the recitation of stories, and regularly warning the believers of *halal* (licit) or *haram* (illicit) permissible or forbidden the result is the gap between the political and the religious. The dominant structure of the mosque speech is divided into two time slots; one is utopian or dystopian past, which is *halal* and the other is the present which mostly *haram*.

This de-functionalised function makes the mosque and the orthodox Islam in the eyes of modern political Islam being regarded as a non-Muslim, people who live in the age *jahiliya* or ignorance. Said Qutb (the theoretical father of the Muslim Brotherhood, the mother of all factions of modern political Islam), reinterpreted the concept of *jahiliya*, applying it to the expansionist non-Muslim world. To Qutb, *jahiliya* meant the modern forces of "ignorance," of secularism. It was also clear that declarations of faith were not enough from the near secular "tyrants" who ruled the Islamic world. Thus according to the modern political Islam, which is an antitheses of modernity, the FMS and at the same time religion has to be recomposed and reformed. This is done through purifying now, the current, in other word to return to the origin of Islam, the fundament, *salaf*. This consequently makes the mosque the battleground between the forces that call of the return of the past, traditional, and the FMS which sustains the mosque in the status of failure in order to manipulate it as an instrument for survival. If "civil society is

conceived as the realm of organized social life that is voluntary, self-generating, (largely) self-supporting, autonomous from the State, and bound by a legal order or set of shared rules" (Diamond, 1994: 5), then the mosque in the FMS does not qualify. While mild political Islam might view the mosque as a form of civil society, certainly independent of (and superior to) the state – and but some of the authoritarian/intolerant features of political Islam arguably make it too fundamentally incompatible with the idea of civil society.

5.9 Conclusion

Tradition has many different components. Religion is one of the most dominant and shared components. The FMS has a tool relationship with tradition. This is a form of utilitarian relationship. Utilitarian indicates that the State ut ilises different components of tradition i n different circumstances in order to survive. The openness indicates that the FMS has no ideology and no fixed method in dealing with tradition. It is the event and the circumstances that dictate what is picked by the State and what is suppressed. Therefore, the State has no difficulties to embrace certain elements of tradition at the time and opposing it at others.

The FMS cannot do without the mosque. As a postcolonial creature, the FMS has always a sense of strangeness: it is strange to the role that it plays, to the people that it governs, to the system that it implements. This very sense of rift forces the FMS seek support, acknowledgment, and connection from t he outside rather than inside. But total alienation from the inside is impossible. Thus, the FMS is haunted by the feeling of normality and integration. To be normal part of the community and integrated, does not indicate that the FMS desires to be an active part of the community; it is rather a quest to be accepted as normal by the community, more than being aloof. To be normally accepted, to be seen as normal, is only achievable by establishing a close link to the sacred. The mosque offers this sacred connection to the FMS. When the FMS and the mosque are in alliance, the latter takes from the mosque, history, presence, normality, transcendences, roots, things that the State, the FMS, on its own lacks. The Mosque is the most present and dominant institutes in Muslim society. It is the institution that holds the truth (in the eyes of the community) and more importantly is seen and regarded as the truth holder. It has a

long and sacred narrative which is used to set up hegemony. It is a machine of repetition especially in the moral sphere, which aims to establish a law, shar'a. Since it has hegemony over the speech and hegemony over the loudest voice, it can be used as a machine for silencing.

The case study of the mosque shows how vital and necessary tradition is for the continuation and survival of the FMS. While it is a product of modernity, of the colonial maker, the FMS from its early days was structured to be part of tradition and utilise tradition for its own sake.

The colonial powers did not support people who were democratic, secular and modern; they rather backed those who had a strong links (symbolically and historically) with Islam (the religion) and its sacred power structure. The prime example is the *Hashemite Family*, Jordan and Iraq in the early days, believing that their religious background will offer them legitimacy through their charisma. The relationship between the State and the mosque is in a state of failure, it is ambiguous and fragile. Therefore the mosque has to be observed and monitored continually. This failure status makes the mosque to become the battleground between the State and the emerging political Islam. The mosque and other religious institutes consolidate a specific religious discourse, either pro state or against state, but in both cases they ensure the emergence of an acquiescent society.

6.1 The Military and the State: the Military as an example of modernity in making the FMS.

'*The good military [man] is the good Baathist*', a famous Baathist slogan

Modernity is a complex phenomenon. It includes many different and contradictory components. The FMS is itself a product of modernity. It is a form of the Westphalian state. This form of state was manufactured by the European colonial power a nd was later on given the mission of modernising society. The essential point here is that the State borrowed modernity, initiated it and attempted to implement it. This point is significant. The State is not a neutral entity in the Middle East. The State is possessed by the State elite. When modernity is the State modernity, it is utilised to enhance and ensure the State elite's position.

In most cases the FMS is not an ethnically neutral state. Usually it belongs to a particular ethnic, sect or religious group generally the State elite cleavage, are minorities in number. In order to rule the State has to actively to peruse the policy of silencing and marginalising the differences. This puts the state in a permanent state of virtual civil war. Therefore, it is rather obvious that the borrowed modernity would not end up being a general social change. Consequently the borrowed modernity ends up being a tool in the hands of the FMS. To fulfil this endeavour the FMS borrows the technical modernity and resists the intellectual part of it.

As the FMS diagram shows modernity is one of the two legs of the FMS. The FMS fails to be modern but nevertheless is a state. This state is on the edge of failing. In order to prevent this it has to rely on violence and force. The military is the most organised form of violence in the hands of the State.

This chapter argues that, in the Middle East, the nature of the State shapes the nature of modernity. The military, its structure, its relationship with the State, and its aim are all elements of modernity. the Military is an important aspect of modernity and the FMS utilises this aspect of modernity, makes the military in the FMS, resembles a modern military in many ways, but

different in functions and relationships with the State. In the FMS the military is utilised as a mercenary force.

6.2 The State-Military Relationship

The Arab state-military relationship remains to be an un-thought area, "despite the wealth of studies on Arab regimes and the many assessments of their military capabilities, there is a dearth of analysis of political-military relations in the Middle East' (Brooks, 1998: 10). The civil-military relationship in the FMS is not conventional. It evades many existing frameworks of state-military relationships and conceptual understanding. This relationship is difficult to put in any of the conventional typologies. For Mehran Kamrava (2000: 68) in general, State control over the armed forces in the Middle East can be divided into:

> those found in inclusionary states, in which the regular military's political aspirations are kept in check and are neutralized by a highly ideological, largely volunteer militia (Iran, Iraq, and Libya); those in exclusionary states, in which once-ideological officers are still in power but have now civilianized themselves and much of the machinery of the State, having in the process become largely nonideological, civilian autocrats (Algeria, Egypt, Syria, Sudan, Tunisia, and Yemen); and finally, those in monarchies, either whose small geographic and demographic size compels them to rely on foreign mercenaries (Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates [UAE]), or which rely on one or more loyal tribal contingents to counterbalance the influence and potential autonomy of the regular military (Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia).

This categorisation might partially inform us about the nature of the military with regard to the idea of professionalization but ultimately it fails to decode the complex state-military relationships. A founding problem of the FMS is that neither the State nor the military has fully matured. Therefore, it is hard, if not impossible, to talk about state-military relationships in a conventional way. In the FMS the full formation of both the military and the State is impossible. The military in the Arab Middle East resides in a rather unusual location. It is both alienated from society and mistrusted by the State.

The military is ideally seen as an organised force to protect the territory of the country from foreign aggressors. The Arab militaries were, at best, ineffective, in this regard, in almost all the wars they engaged in, for instance; the 1967 Arab Israeli war and in both Gulf Wars

showed quite dismal performances. For Reiter and Stam (2002) this is primarily due to the lack of democracy fo r Kenneth M. Pollack, (2002) it is a mixture of tactical and state-military relationships.

Noticeably, what is missing in the literature is the question of the purpose and the rationale of the Arab military in the eyes of the State. Moreover, the question touches the State society relationship, and how the military is deployed in this regard. There is no doubt that the State-military relationship in the Arab Middle East is complex. The nature of this complexity mirrors the nature of the State or the sovereign.

The military epitomizes modernity. Based on the formula of the FMS, modernity in the region is in a state of failure. In other words, the State is actively interfering in halting the progress of the military from becoming a fully-fledged modern institution. Through this process the State succeeds in making the military a tool to be utilised for the regime's survival. This was the situation from the early days of the formation the State in the region. When the new military was established in Iraq on January 6, 1921 it had only three tasks:

- Protect the new monarchy and provide it with a force more powerful than the well-armed tribes:
- Deal with the ever-present threat of rebellion from discontented tribes or ethnic groups;
- Contribute to nation-building via the implementation of conscription which would bring young men from disparate regions together and inculcate in them a sense of nationalism. Faysal regarded the new military as a 'spinal column for nation-forming' (Hashim, 2003: 12).

6.3 The State and Violence

The military is a large body of people organised and trained by the State. Since "every state is founded on force," (Weber, 1946: 1) the State and violence are closely combined. Weber, elaborating on that statement, concluded that "if no social institutions existed which knew the use of violence then the concept of 'state' would be eliminated" (1946: 1). If violence is not managed or organised and concentrated in one hand, then "a condition would emerge that could be designated as anarchy". This view which has a clear parallel with Hobbes's notion and justification of sovereignty provides the premise for the relationship between violence and the

state in its modern form. Weber continues his analysis until he arrives at one of the most famous definition of the State namely "state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory" (Weber, 1946: 1). This emphasises the centrality of coercive power in understanding the State, including military power. This leaves no doubt that the State is the State when it has the monopoly on force or violence. This monopoly of violence's only achievable, among other things, when the State has a well organised military, to combat any other, non-state, sources of violence. So the State needs the military to be worthy of the state and the State is the only party that has the legal right to use violence. This makes the military the essence of the State.

However, there is a clear sign of an interdependent relationship between the military and the State, thus, the relationship is delicate. In fact, balancing this relationship has been the focus of the analysts for a long time. For Huntington (1985: 70), "the military man has the right to expect political guidance from the Statesman. Civilian control exists when there is the proper subordination of an autonomous profession to the ends of policy". The Statesman has to acknowledge the integrity of [the military] profession", the military has to remain "neutral politically". It is clear that for Huntington the civil-military relationship is a dichotomy. This inherently conflictual relationship can only be solved when one side, preferably the civilian, is in control. "In countries with fully institutionalized and consolidated democratic control, such as the United States, military officers not only obey civilian authority but also internalize democratic norms and accept civilian control as legitimate" (Fitch, 1998: 41). The more legitimate the State the more obedient the military. If the legitimate state is a civilian state and legitimacy is essential for establishment of professional relationship, then a non-civilian state such as FMS state has difficulty in having a professional army.

In an essay published in the 1920s, Walter Benjamin questions this relationship. Accordingly, the State has the right to use violence when it is justified. "Violence is justified insofar as it is a means for the control of those violent acts that are not themselves means for the control of immediate threats of violence" (Fenves, 1998: 43). Taking this perspective further, violence that is justified is violence towards violence. So, this use of violence is permitted only when there is an act of violence. Therefore, it is "clear.... that violence can first be sought only in the realm of means, not of ends" (Benjamin, 1999: 277). This means for Benjamin the

preservation of law, a universal law, which regulates all the interest of society. Therefore, it is crucial for any state, in order to have the right to use violence, to be a legitimate state.

This premise provides ground for the question of monopoly. If "monopoly is a sufficient control over a particular product or service to determine significantly the terms on which other individuals shall have access to it" (Friedman, 2002: 208), then such an act requires justification to establish legitimacy. If the State has a monopoly over the use of violence, this does not grant the State a free hand to make use of this right. The significant point in this regard is the 'sufficient control', of violence, 'to determine the terms on which other shall have access to it'. Therefore, the monopoly is more for the sake of diminishing, or desirably a total ban, on the use of violence, as Carr and Wilson put it "the service which soldiers are trained to render is one which it is hoped they will never be called up on to perform" (Huntington, 1985: 469). So the total monopoly of violence by the State is to end all other forms of violence, as a result violence shifts to potential violence. But for the State to justify its monopoly over violence it has to be legitimate. This legitimacy is obtainable through the process of democracy, thus in countries with fully institutionalised and consolidated democratic control military officers have no choice but to obey to the civilian authority.

The key concept here is legitimacy versus force: legitimacy belongs to the State, while force belongs to the military. Even in the fragile democratic states, for instance Pakistan and Turkey, when the military organised a coup, they immediately came under pressure, internally and the externally, to restore democracy and organise elections. But in the absence of legitimacy, as in every single Arab Middle Eastern states, the relationship between the State and the military is a relationship of power. When one is strong and powerful, the other will, or is forced, to obey. Therefore, in the States where the military is not fully institutionalised and is not controlled by democratic means, it might develop an appetite for intervention, commonly through organising a coup. This makes the relationship between the military and the State a relationship of mistrust. Thus when it comes to the military, in the Arab Middle East, there is the ever present spectre of a coup.

For John Locke, in the *Second Treatise of Government*, the legitimacy of government is often justified on the grounds that it is based on the consent of the governed. Accordingly, the government derives their just power from the people. Based on the Lockein assumption, Said

Aburish (1997: 1) argues "there are no legitimate regimes in the Arab Middle East". Therefore for Michael Hudson (1977: 2) "the central problem of government today in the Arab world is political legitimacy". The sovereign, in every single country, regardless of the structure of the government, is not based on the consent of the governed, thus opposes the true desire of the population and fails to represent them. Unlike any democratic system, when an illegitimate government is toppled, especially if it is through an internal coup, no one laments for its removal. However, in the case of a coup, the coming government is illegitimate, but an illegitimate one is replacing another illegitimate one. In a similar case Alex Thomson comments on the military coup in African states:

> African military coups were relatively peaceful affairs. Causalities were usually confined to the small participating factions while many were entirely bloodless. This was simply because few in society were prepared to defend the outgoing usually illegitimate administration (2000: 123).

6.4 Modernity and the Military

Analysing the military and its relationship with the State in the FMS is significant in many ways. The military was the very first sector of the State that had to undergo the process of modernisation. Through modernising the military elites in the Middle East hoped that they could protect their states from colonialism or defeat at the hands of France and Great Britain.

> These decades saw a mania in the Middle East for the import of European methods of military organization and techniques of warfare. Everywhere, in the Ottoman Empire, North Africa, Egypt, and Iran, *nizam-i jadid* (new order) regiments sprang up, sometimes on the ruins of older military formations, sometimes alongside them, unleashing a process of military-led modernization that was to characterize state-building projects throughout the region until well into the twentieth century (Cronin, 2008: 197).

Thus, the military was the first institution to experience change and reform in order to become modern. This fact highlights an important character of Middle Eastern modernity. The regional elites realised, that, in order to protect themselves from the colonisers they had to borrow their method, their technique and their knowledge. To be able to defend and resist, they realised that they had to become like their enemy. Consequently, Modernity was a defensive project. To become the very one who you are against, to be, simultaneously with and against modernity.

This dualism, this paradox, became the main feature of modernity in the region. This process was hasty, organised under a feeling of shock and the awareness of an imminent defeat. However, this historic fact means the military made the most use of and was the most affected by modernity. This furthermore illustrates that from the very beginning the process of modernity was seen only in fragment. Modernity was not seen as a departure, or as a rupture with tradition, all that was frozen and solid melt into air as Marx and Engels (1848) put it in the *Communist Manifesto*. Modernising the military signifies that traditional power had no intention of undergoing reform; rather it intended to solidify its position, through using modernity as a tool to reform, reorganise, and retrain the military.

Another feature of the military in its relation to modernity lies in its structure. If modernity requires organisation, bureaucracy and hierarchy, the military provided all these through training. The military broke down the former local relationships, introduced education, and required travel, consequently the ordinary people as a soldier introduced to urban life which helped in constructing a new national identity. If modernity demanded a new man, this new man was a soldier and it was possible to make him. It was possible in Europe as Foucault explains:

> By the late eighteenth century the soldier has become something that can be made; out of a formless clay, an inapt body, the machine required can be constructed; posture is gradually corrected; a calculated constraint runs slowly through each part of the body, mastering it, making it pliable, ready at all times, turning slightly into the automatism of habit; in short, one has 'got rid of the peasant' and given him 'the air of the soldier (Foucault, 1991: 135).

Modernity and the military share many other characteristics. Modernity is impersonal in term of its relationships; it establishes bureaucracy rather than paternalism as the model of authority. The soldier has to have a high awareness of self-control, discipline and willingness to accept authority. Thus with the arrival of modernity the military became the ideal vehicle to take society to modernity. Therefore, the theorist of pan-Arab-Nationalism al-Husari believed "military barracks are like social schools. They free the individual from selfishness and make him feel the presence of other-the country and nation. It teaches him true sacrifice in all its forms" (quoted in Makya, 1989: 165). The military became the method to introduce and impose modernity the method that was acceptable and encouraged. It did not care of values like freedom or granting rights. Rather it aimed to make a docile body in a matter of a short time. The military

was composed of home-grown, middle–class, personally pious and fiercely ideological officers who rose on the rhetoric of nationalism. This self–importance, gave the military a sense of mission as the builder and the protector of the State. Thus the military in the Middle East normally considers itself unaccountable to any civilian institution.

6.5 The FMS and the Military

No existing civil-military relationship typology can explain fully the nature of state-military relationship in the FMS. There might be overlap with other third world types but nevertheless the state-military relationships in the FMS remains an anomaly, especially to the many western typologies. The civil-military relation in a democratic country is characterised by

> 1)a high level of military professionalism and recognition by military officers of the limits of their professional competence; 2) the effective subordination of the military to the civilian political leaders who make the basic decisions on foreign and military policy; 3) the recognition and acceptance by that leadership of an area of professional competence and autonomy for the military; and 4) as a result, the minimization of military intervention in politics and of political intervention in the military (Huntington,1995: 9).

The part of Huntington's description might be helpful in explaining the state-military relationship in the FMS, is his description of the state-military relationships under personal dictator and one-party system states. Accordingly:

> In the personal dictatorships, the ruler did everything he could to ensure that the military was permeated by and controlled by his cronies and agents, that it was divided against itself, and that it served his purpose of keeping a tight grip on power. In the one-party states, civil-military relations were not in quite the same disarray, but the military was viewed as the instrument of the party, military officers had to be party members, political commissars and party cells paralleled the normal military chain of command, and ultimate loyalty was to the party rather than the State (Huntington, 1995: 10).

But this description explains the state-military relationship in the FMS only partially. Understanding the typology of the FMS civil-military relationships is best done through knowing what it is not. In contrast to other civil or state-military relationships for instance the European,

the former Soviet, the Latin Americans, the American and the Turkish, the FMS state-military relationships stands as an anomaly.

According to Born et al (2006) the European paradigm of civil-military relationships is based on the complete separation, unquestioned subordination, and almost radical isolation of the armed forces from civilian politics. The civil-military relationship in the FMS clearly does not adhere to this paradigm. The former Soviet paradigm, in which the military constituted the muscles of a single party system, might overlap in some areas. In this system "the military, like all political structures, was constitutionally subordinate to the party" (Perlmutter and LeoGrande, 1982: 781). The party in the FMS, in case of its existence, is not the owner but another tool in the hands of the State elite.

In what is called the Latin American paradigm, there is also some similarity with the FMS model. In this Paradigm the crux of the relationship is a mistrust of the armed forces themselves. The military is basically viewed as a predatory institution, capable of intervening in civilian politics at any time, and once having intervened, is likely to try to remain in power. There is therefore an understanding that armies should be kept completely away from politics, and that their loyalty to the civilian government has to be kept under guarantee at all costs (Sigmund, 1993: 115). In the FMS there is widespread mistrust by both the State and society toward the military. But this mistrust did not result in keeping the military at bay. The FMS widens this gap between the population and the military.

The Turkish military and the Turkish pattern of civil-military relations do not neatly fit into any of these paradigms (Aydinli, 2009: 583). Turks have more confident in their military than in any other of the country's institutions. According to a Gallup poll conducted in May 2007 81% of the population have confidence in the military, while only 56% of the population have confidence in their national government (Europe's World:2007: 55). This trust in the military and regarding them as the guardian of the system and the country, as in Turkey, is non-existent in the FMS. The military in the FMS neither trusted by the people nor by the State. This significant feature makes it resemble mercenaries. Moreover, the military is just one layer of the complex security system in the FMS. Its main function is to protect the State from its people.

6.6 The Spectre of the Coup

A spectre haunts the FMS, the spectre of the coup. The State-military relationship is established under the shadow of this ever-present spectre. The spectre, from its nature, is a present-absent. It is un-dead. It does not appear visible but its presence is always felt. The metaphor of a spectre embodies something that is always there and always waiting to come (or come back). The spectre is thus both past and future; it is from the past, but waiting to come back. This spectre is the spectre of coup. There have been coups in the past, there have been coups in the region, and there might be coups in the future, at any moment, when the time is ready, the spectre of a coup waiting vigilantly for the right moment to appear. This fear of a coup that might happen any moment when the situation is right results in the permanency of the spectre of the coup. A coup is imminent. A coup is in the situation to-come. Coup is here, if it is not, now, tomorrow, in the near future. This spectre shapes the relationship and gives it a particular structure, makes it agitated. Therefore, the relationship between the military and the State is a fluid relationship. There are several reasons why the spectre of coup in the region is every present. Firstly, from a historical perspective "the Middle East has provided fertile ground for coups. Between March 1949 (the first coup after World War II) and the end of 1980, fifty-five coups were attempted in Arab states-half of them successful" (Quinlivan, 1999: 133). This might mentally and empirically prepare the ground for others to try, i.e. path dependency.

Secondly is the lack of legitimacy. An illegitimate state, since the population are not linked to it, is easy to grasp. However throughout time this has changed. Illegitimated state became less vulnerable to a coup. This happened mainly through "learn[ing] to take preventative measures to forestall their recurrence" (Be'eri, 1982: 70). This learning throughout time resulted in the development of a particular structure, which could be called a 'coup-proof' structure. Such a structure is a mix of both modern and traditional elements as Quinlivan (1999) explains:

> (1)the effective exploitation of family, ethnic, and religious loyalties for coup-critical positions balanced with wider participation and less restrictive loyalty standards for the regime as a whole; (2) the creation of an armed force parallel to the regular military; (3) the development of multiple internal security agencies with overlapping jurisdiction that constantly monitor the loyalty of the military and one another with independent paths of communication to critical leaders; (4) the fostering of expertness in the regular military; and (5) the financing of such measures (Quinlivan, 1999: 133).

As Quinlivan shows measurements were implemented in countries like Iraq, Syria, and Saudi Arabia. The measurements show how modernity and tradition are skilfully amalgamated by the sovereign to proof any possibility of organising a coup. But the implementation of these measures also signifies that the whole system is built on the basis of preventing the spectre from becoming reality. These systems might succeed in preventing coup but the fear of a coup has never gone away fully. The spectre of a coup results in the emergence of relationships of distrust between the State and the military. Thus, the military becomes a necessary evil. This results in the emergence of a complex state-military relationship.

Although some might argue "military coups, have become less frequent and successful or there have been almost non-existent military coups in the MENA region since the late 1970's" (Brooks 1998: 11) this by no mean eliminates the fear of a coup within the regimes. The FMS is fully aware that any signs of weakness in the system immediately raise the appetite for a coup.

6.7 To Name (conceptualise) the State-Military Relationship in the FMS

The FMS is a closed state. This indicates that one, as an individual, has no responsibilities only obligations. He or she cannot and should not leave the group but simply observe tradition. In the FMS the sovereign belongs to a distinctive group of people. Society only has to yield to it. Therefore the military's core duty is to sustain this structure and defend it. In this regard the FMS is in line with the Western radical far left and far right systems. Similarly, it believes in the internal subordination of all other social institution of the state, which translates into submission to the sovereign.

To achieve this purpose the FMS develops a specific system of control which overlaps with what Lucham (1961) called an "Apparat Control", in which a ruling party, balances the power of the military with the assistance of such tools as ideology, purges, and secret police surveillance. The structure of the Iraqi military during the reign of Saddam is an example of this

> In the military, as opposed to the Republican Guard (RG), support for the president is far less staunch. Thus, the RG is placed between all military units and the capital city, and

> the Special Republican Guard (SRG) is stationed inside of Baghdad, and thus between the RG and the inner rings guarding the president. As long as the regime looks stable, the RG, the SRG, Special Security (SS), and the Palace Guard (or Presidential Guard, Himayat al-Ra'is) will remain essentially loyal to [President] Saddam Husayn. If he is removed they have too much to lose: power and prestige, higher salaries than those of their military counterparts, and other privileges that increase in relation to a soldier's proximity to the president (Baram, 2000: 12).

The military structure through these multiple coils where one feels higher that another is to assure that the military is neither cohesive nor even that there is proper communication between its different coils. These boundaries within the military are the classic divide and rule game. Obviously this is not enough, if the military is a modern organisation; the FMS has to halt its progress toward becoming fully modern. Like any other sectors of the State, it has to remain in a state of failure.

Sustaining failure is accomplished through putting hurdles in front of the progress of the military. The most common way to establish that is through injecting or introducing traditional structures like the tribe or the sect into the military. For instance recruiting young men from his hometown, Tikrit, as his bodyguards became the policy of Saddam Hussein. This was organised on the basis of kinship.

> Within the Tikriti population, the innermost circle from which recruits were picked was Al Bu Nasir, the tribe to which both Saddam Husayn and President Bakr belonged. The next phase was to introduce some of these young men into key positions in most of Iraq's internal security bodies. The most important amongst them was Jihaz Hanin (the Apparatus of Yearnings), later to become al-Mukhabarat al-'Amma (General Intelligence), the Ba'th party's intelligence organ that terrorized all of its opponents, as well as most party members (Baram, 2000: 11).

The process of tribalising the military is clear evidence of the ruling elite's distrust toward the military. Moreover, (a) the effective exploitation of tribal loyalties by the state elite was a form of coup prevention; (b) an intervention by the State elite to halt the progress of the military; (c) to break up the military into units and spread fear and frustration among its high ranks, in the words of an Iraqi artillery battalion major captured in March 1991:

> We are very afraid of this man. Even now that I am talking to you, an American, you will notice that by habit, I will lower my voice when I want to say his name. He has spies everywhere. If he knows that I say bad things about him to you he will kill my wife, my children, and my parents in Iraq. If my division commander every (sic) ordered me to turn my guns against Saddam Hussein, I will do it. But who will be the officer to give this order? I will never give this order. But I will follow the man who does (Vern, 1991: 33).

This all happens in order to prevent a coup. If in Iraq the process of causing failure was done through introducing the tribe into the military, in Syria a similar process took place, with a minor difference, which was the replacement of tribe by a sect.

> [In Syria] a small group of men controls the military and the security forces in Syria. Like Asad himself, most of them are `Alawis, members of a small and long-persecuted religious community living in northWest Syria. They serve as the regime's nucleus, the guarantor of order in the country, and the sponsor of those coalitions (military, party, bureaucratic, rural, and minority) on which the regime relies (Eyal Zisser, 1995).

6.8 The Making of the Mercenary

To paraphrase Foucault (1995) the soldier is a figure belonging to modernity, his body made docile through training, disciplined and controlled by the State. The soldiers were merely drawn from citizens. The emergence of soldier marked the end of the phenomenon of the mercenary. "Mercenaries went out of style in the nineteenth century. States altered the conduct of war by raising citizen armies and eschewing the use of mercenaries in practice or in law" (Avant, 2000: 41).

With the advance of modernity and the expansion of European colonial power, the idea of the soldier reached the Middle East also. "From the year 1822, Egyptians had found themselves being taken in tens of thousands and turned, for the first time in memory into soldiers" (Tahtawi, 1977: 177). The idea and the concept of soldier was novel. It replaced the unorganised old military.

> The new military, it was explained in an official The Ottoman pamphlet, 'should not, like the rest of our forces, be composed of sellers of pastry, boatmen, fishermen, coffee-house keepers, *baccals*, and others who are engaged in the thirty-two trades, but of well disciplined men'. A military was no longer to be thought of as an occasional body,

> brought together for seasonal the Campaigns. It was to be an organised force, created out of men compelled to live (Mitchell, 1988: 36).

The new military introduced many new rules and disciplines; its number increased, the duration of service prolonged and it enlisted the natives. These changes might look impressive but they were limited only to techniques. The essence of the State or regime military relationship and also military society relationship did not change significantly.

The mercenary had a long tradition in the region. One of the most organised military, in pre-modern times, was the Ottoman Janissary. Janissary is deduced from the Turkish *Yani-chiry*, yani which means new and *chiry* stands for troop. Thus Janissary literary indicts new-troop. They were:

> Christian, converts, they became Muslim *reaya* (flock) of the Sultans. This transformation had an immediate positive effect on their economic status-the new Muslims stopped paying *Cizye* tax. They gained other prerogatives in their relationship with the administration, avoiding the numerous everyday inconveniences that were the lot of Christian subjects. Apart from that, the Muslim person had one more important advantage-the opportunity for further social prosperity by entering the so-called "military class" (askeri). By this the converts acquired additional fiscal comfort and economic advantages. All these were not imaginary; they were real opportunities (Radushev, 2008: 447).

The recruitment of janissaries shows how the Ottoman elites planned and desired to have a military separate from society. The Janissaries were not directly linked to the society; even though they converted they still remained aloof. This was also true from society's point of view. The janissaries insulated the ruling elite from the rest of society. Their ultimate allegiance was to their master, their sovereign. They prioritised the sovereign in comparison to the rest of the native population. The origin of the Janissary was important:

> The sovereign also decreed that youths from the regions of Harputs, Diyarbakir and Malatya (territories in South-eastern Anatolia under strong Kurdish and Shiite influence) were not to be recruited. Recruitment in the lands from Karaman to Erzerum should be attempted with utmost care, because there the Christian population was also mixed with Turkmen and Kurds. "Whoever violates this order and brings foreigners among my pure blooded slaves," ends Suleyman I, "shall be damned by the Prophet 120 thousand times!" (Radushev, 2008: 450).

The Ottoman sovereign distrusted the local population. The sovereign was the external. Consequently, the power that protects and guards the sovereign should have no link to the population. The janissaries were converts, which indicated that they had departed and changed their own original belief. This very fact forced the janissary to acquire a very fluid identity. On the one hand they had to leave and break with with their own society; on the other hand, they were not fully embraced by the new society. The fact that they were called *Devsirme* (tribute in blood) not brother, shows that they were not seen as a full member of their new society. This fluid weak identity gave the power to the sultan to easily dismiss or mobilise them.

> In the early eighteenth century there was a large-scale the Campaign to recruit youths for urgent reinforcement of the corps' units in Istanbul. After his ascension to the throne in 1703 Sultan Ahmed III (1703–1730) removed 800 Janissaries of the *Bostanci* corps from the Capital and the Palace; they had instigated the big riots against the central government. Immediately after that, the new Sultan issued an order to recruit fresh Janissaries from the European provinces of the Empire (Radushev, 2008: 450).

The trend of hiring foreign soldiers and dismissing the local continued during the early years of Muhammad Ali Pasha in Egypt. He was in no sense an Egyptian nationalist. According to Peter Colvin:

> A very high percentage of the students and the new elite that evolved were what could only be characterized as The Ottomans. This means that they were ethnically Turks, Circassians, Armenians, or from other nationalities considered suitable for military or bureaucratic positions. Rather few were Egyptians, although the insatiable demands for manpower meant that more and more Egyptians did get recruited. Even the private soldiers of the military were originally Sudanese, until it became clear that they could not stand the climate and were replaced by Egyptian peasants (Colvin, 1998: 251).

With the emergence of the territorial states in the region after the end of the Second World War, this trend, of hiring and relying on foreign alien mercenaries, more or less continued, moreover, a new form of local mercenary was introduced.

6.9 Reconceptualising the Mercenary

The FMS recruits mercenaries in two ways. There are those states that employ mercenaries in the classical sense. The Gulf Arab monarchies, because of the shortage of manpower and the

reluctance of locals to serve in the military are "employing foreign mercenary soldiers to protect them" (al Hamad, 1997). These people are foreign and paid, thus they qualify for the two main criteria of the mercenary in its classical form.

The other form of mercenary is a local mercenary. These are rather functioning as mercenary. In other words, their mode of function qualifies them to be considered as mercenary. This type of mercenary has to be made. In a similar fashion to how a soldier was made, in eighteenth century Europe. Through its struggle for survival the FMS has to make a mercenary out of the local inhabitants. There is little doubt that nowadays the concept of mercenary, in its classical formula, is in crisis. The United Nation Commission of Human Rights report (1997) states:

> This report reiterates questions to which so far no definitive answers have been given and on which the relevant United Nations bodies must take a stand: what is the status of a foreigner who enters a country and acquires its nationality to conceal the fact that he is a mercenary in the service of a third State or the other side in an armed conflict? What is the status of a non-resident national who is paid by a third State to carry out criminal activities against his own country of origin? And what about a dual national, one of whose nationalities is that of the State against which he is acting, while he is being paid by the State of his other nationality or by a third party? What are the limits of *jus sanguinis* in an armed conflict when it is invoked by persons who are paid and sent to fight in a domestic or international armed conflict-taking place in the country of their forebears?

As it becomes apparent, from the paragraph above, there are numerous difficulties facing the concept of mercenary nowadays. The belonging, loyalties, and allegiance of the mercenary in contrast to the soldier are ambiguous. Soldiers are drawn from citizens who are members of a nation and who have established a state to run their affairs.

Mercenaries, stereotypically, are "paid" and "foreign", but as current scholars are noticing, "these dual characteristics are flawed by anachronistic preconceptions and the modern constructs of contemporary language" (Fissel, 2009: 260). Highlighting the foreignness of the mercenary indicates two things: one the nature of their relation to the State and society and two their identity. The foreign is identity of the mercenary in relationships with the State, and also the identity of the State in relation to the mercenary. The foreign is the one who is not a member of a

nation, the one who is not a citizen. In the FMS both notions of nation and citizen are far from established.

In the FMS, a person does not become a member of the nation, by virtue of birth, residency or naturalisation. Only the sovereign has a right to grant and withdraw citizenship depending on the political circumstances. Thus, all members could be subject to accusations, by the State, of political disloyalty or deviance. The sanctions corresponding to such charges would bear directly on their citizenship status, especially if political factors proved central.

The form of citizenship in the FMS does not refer to any meaningful practice. One can easily argue that citizenship has never been a firm category in the FMS. Citizens are to be moulded into active and enthusiastic supporters of state (elite) goals, while deviant individuals and groups became targets of denaturalisation or are stripped of their citizenship rights on various charges, real or imagined.

The case of the Kurds in Syria, Bdon (Arabic for without) in Kuwait, Shi'a in Bahrain and Saudi, political activist and oppositions virtually everywhere, shows how local inhabitants are made foreign on the basis of their relationship with the State. Alienating the opponents from their rights and faith is an old Islamic practice. Islam combined faith and life to that degree that any disagreement over the faith could result in the ending of life. The sovereign also follows the same method. In Foucault's (1978:135) sense, the sovereign has the total right over life and death of the subjects in his domain.

The case of Dr Nasr Hamed Abu Zeid (1943-2010) is a prime example for this very phenomenon. He was a Cairo University professor of Arabic literature. For works in which he "criticised the religious discourse and its social, political and economic manifestations" and "this threatened the interests of some institutions" (El-Magd, 2000), he was denounced as apostate, heretic, and infidel. He had to divorce his wife and either leave the country or be killed.

Another infamous case was the novelist Abdul-rahaman alMunif (1933-2004). Munif was the most important author in the Arab world during the late 20th century. He was from a trading family of Saudi Arabian origin in 1963; he was stripped of his Saudi nationality after having criticised the regime. The two cases undoubtedly can be criticised as extreme or exceptional but what does their being extreme or exception unravel. For Schmitt:

> The exception can be more important to the rule..... because the seriousness of an insight goes deeper than the clear generalizations inferred from what ordinarily repeats itself. The exception is more interesting than the rule. The rule proves nothing; the exception proves everything: it confirms not only the rule but also its existence, which derives only from the exception (1985: 15).

When the State has exceptional rights, rights beyond any legal obligation, in determining who is foreign and who is citizen, subsequently, both notions become fluid and ultimatly hollow. For this reason there is very little substance in considering notions like foreigner and citizen, in the political sense, to judge the relationship of the military with the State and society. In the FMS when any person who engages in acts, whether it is criticism, opposition, or any act no matter how peaceful it is, the regime will immediately regard the person as a foreign agent. The adjective of 'the foreign agent' *'amel* is used commonly by the authority as a synonym for the opposition *moaraza*. No one better than the Syrian president Bashar alAsad crystallises this [in an interview with the *alsharq alawsat* Arabic newspaper on 8 February, 2001]:

> When the consequences of any action affect stability at the level of a country there are two possibilities: one that the actor is an agent who is working against the interests of the State and he is either ignorant or doing it without intending to do so. The result is that in both cases the person will be serving the enemies of his country (2001).

If the regime, because of its severe lack of legitimacy, views the majority of the population with suspicion, as potential enemies, and any member who dares to challenge or raise his/her voice will be stripped of his or her nationality. After such an action the victim ultimately would be categorised as an enemy [usually of the state and the population, as the official rhetoric puts it]. Taking such an event as a paradigm or model, one can conclude that the regime regards the population as potential foreigners or enemies and utilises the military for that purpose. If the regime views the population as foreign then, based on the logic that only the foreign treats the foreign as foreign, then subsequently the regime and its apparatus is foreign to the population. Consequently, the people are foreign to the State and its elite, and the state and its elites are foreign or see as foreign by the majority of the population. When the sole function of the soldier or the military force is to protect and prevent the regime from the people, then the military regards the people as foreign and the source of potential danger. It is known since Aristotle that potentiality precedes actuality and conditions it. Therefore, the military is not hesitating to use

force indiscriminately against the population. The military is treating the population as foreign, as the enemy; therefore, the military is foreign to the people.

If the military is foreign to the people, and the military is the sector that drains the national budget, "in many Arab states, military careers are still relatively lucrative" (Rubin, 2001). According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI, 2010), the Middle Eastern countries military expenditure as a share of GDP is all among "high" and "upper middle" levels. If the military is foreign to the population and highly paid then the combination of both qualifies the military, in the FMS to be categorised as a mercenary.

Making a mercenary out of a soldier implies that the military is nothing but a tool. This tool is utilised in the hand of the regime against society. Consequently the military is alien to the people. This alienation has numerous consequences, among them: the military feels superior to the population. It does not hesitate to abuse human rights. And it becomes a sphere to fulfil economic and pathological desire. Therefore, joining the regime becomes the passage of salvation those who are failing to pursue an ordinary life. The protagonist of *Omar El-Keddi's,* (2009) short story *the World's Longest-held Prisoner*, is an example par excellence:

> After failing his middle school exams, Saleh al-Shaybi decided to join the military. He saw his fellow villagers and men from the neighbouring villages return with new clothes, pockets filled with cash, wrists weighed down by watches, smoking cigarettes from full packs and lighting them with gold lighters. He decided to follow in their footsteps, and wrote down "please take me" on his application. After basic training he was stationed at the Tajura barracks, and two years after that was able to buy a second-hand green Datsun 120, which he drove along Tripoli's streets harassing girls and women.

The soldier in the FMS is a figure outside society. Becoming a soldier's is a moment when one leaves society to stand against it. The military in FMS is a shield that protects the state from the population:

> The Jordanian Arab Military (JAA) was first created as a police force on the East Bank in 1921. Its main task at that time, as it is today, was to protect the Hashemite rule over that territory. In spite of its involvement in the 1948 and 1967 wars-obviously the external threats-the military has continued throughout this period to serve mainly as the regime's defender and it is mostly structured to be able to respond rapidly to domestic challenges (Bligh, 2001).

The military as a tool, not only protects the regime, it establishes the foundation for the despotic system. It does so through hampering communication with the society. The despotism emerges from the lack of communication. This means that people have no access to the state, have no stake in decision-making, have no say and ultimately have no power. With no free flow of information in society it is hard to organise any group. When Marx (1975) compares occidental and oriental societies he suggests that the differences between the two are in the different structure of the societies. The occidental societies are subject to dialectical transformation whereas Oriental societies are non-dialectical. A non-dialectical society is a society where the differences are not engaging in dialogue or struggle, ultimately is a non-societal-society. There is no possibility for the birth of any synthesis. The military actively participates in making such a condition possible. This include the separation of the regime from the population, regarding the people as a potential source of danger, thus surveillance, reporting of individuals and threatening of people are among the daily regular duties of the military in the FMS:

> In the early 1970s, Baghdad was divided into security zones, the planning of which required citizens to sell their properties in certain areas at a price set by the government. The headquarters of such zones were surveillance centres, routinely checking on movements within and between zones. Many a casual visitor to Baghdad has confirmed their surprising efficiency upon being questioned for taking snapshots of the Tigris at sunset, or some other such offence (cameras are sold in Iraq, but photography is suspect without the written authorization of the Ministry of Interior). Some of these centres are hooked to video cameras concealed on rooftops or built into statues and public monuments. The cameras cover the major roads, intersections, and roundabouts forming a comprehensive network for each zone and enabling the centre to monitor its area visually (Makeya, 1989: 20).

In such an environment, engagement, communication and eventually politics is impossible:

> Performing or playing, in the theatrical sense of the word, the gap between a place where the *demos* exists and a place where it does not … Politics consists in playing or acting out this relationship, which means first setting it up as a theatre, inventing the argument, in the double logical and dramatic sense of the term, connecting the unconnected (Ranciere, 1999: 88).

Through institutions and organisations like the military the FMS hampers any effort to connect 'the unconnected', to play a game, to invent an argument, to engage in real politics. The

permanency of martial law or emergency rule, officially in some FMS and unofficially in the other is to suspend the basic rights and exempt rulers from any constitutional limitations, however weak. To sustain this infinite emergency the military has to be permanently vigilant towards the people.

To exemplify this relationship the case of Saudi Arabia is chosen. The reason behind selecting the case of Saudi Arabia is that it demonstrates the mercenary relation more clearly which help us to clarify the nuances of the concept more accurately.

6.10 The Case of Saudi Arabia

The State in Saudi Arabia is a family business. Thus the family's [civilian] control over the military, like any other aspect of the state, is "absolute" (2004: 18). According to article 5 of Basic Law or the constitution; the system of government is a monarchy. Accordingly:

> the rule passes to the sons of the founding King, Abd al-Aziz Bin Abd al-Rahman al-Faysal Al Sa'ud, and to their children's children. The most upright among them is to receive allegiance in accordance with the principles of the Holy Koran and tradition of the Venerable Prophet.

To accomplish this "the King chooses the Heir Apparent and relieves him of his duties by Royal order". In Saudi Arabia, as in many other Middle Eastern states, power is exercised in extreme secrecy. This secrecy requires distance, barrier and insulation. Many layers of armed forces and security apparatuses provide this. This results in a "difficulty to monitor the country" (Halliday, 2009). Foreign diplomats are largely confined to their embassies, and access to Saudis is extremely difficult. Therefore, according to Halliday (2009) "until the past decade or so, there was almost no reliable academic or journalistic writing on the country".

Secrecy is one of the characteristics of the external state; the state that is beyond the influence of the population. To sustain this externality, the military has to play a different role than the conventional r ole of the military in regard to the state and society. The military in this particular form of the state has to play the role of insulator: to insulate the state and its elite from the population. As Otto Hintze (1975) argues, how states organise their militaries has a profound

effect on how states and societies themselves are organised. Therefore, the nature of state's relationship with the military is a barometer to read how the state relates to its people.

In Saudi Arabia the military is divided into two main branches. One is the Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG) with its sub-branches. The other is the regular military. The National Guard in Arabic is called *Alharas Almalaki*, which actually means the royal guard. Historically it was forged out of those tribal elements that were loyal to the Saud Family. The SANG's or the royal guard's mission is to protect the royal family from internal rebellion and the other Saudi Military, should the need arise. *Jane's Defence Weekly* described the royal guard as "a kind of Praetorian Guard for the House of Saud, the royal family's defence of last resort against internal opposition" (Hartung, 2003).

Colonel Abdulla bn Muhammad AL alsheik (2008) is the officer who wrote about the role, duty and connection of the Royal Guard. According to him the role of the Royal Guard is to do everything to provide protection for the servant of the two holy places, within and outside the Kingdom, by using every resort to fulfil that. The Royal Guard is directly connected to the servant of the two holy places i.e. the King.

The Royal Guards' duties are:

- Providing security and equipment, for the servant of the two holy places, in all his trips; inside and outside the country.
- Providing guard the security for all the servant of the holy tow places guests
- Providing security and safety for all the location that the king and his entourage visit.
- Providing safety and security for the royal family during all the celebration in coordination with other security sectors
- Providing safety and security for all *dawawen* (a place for receiving the locals) and palaces.
- Putsting surveillance all the places of the visit of the royal family, checking all those who are working there and providing them with special entrance card. (AL alsheik, 2008) [quoted from the official website of the Royal Guard].

These are some of the duties of the royal guard in Saudi Arabia. It is clear that the main duty of the royal guard is providing protection to the royal family. The structure and the duties of the royal guard show clearly that they function as a protection barrier between society and the sovereign. The sovereign, who is the State, has to be protected from the people. So, this well

organised and well trained military in addition to providing safety and security to the body of the sovereign also has a duty to maintain the status quo.

If most studies in the past regarded, the role of the military as a progressive force of modernisation or even democratisation, that was so because of the domination of the modernisation theory as Huntington puts it "most seem to agree that in the Middle East the military were typically proponents of change" (1968: 219). Since a branch of the military like a royal guard has no connection to society, it fails to be a force for modernisation. It is rather a force for halting and resisting change.

But what does this emphasis on the notion of "providing protection", as the main duty of the royal guard, reveal. Why does the monarchy or the King or the president need the best, the most equipped special force to protect him. Why is the sole aim of the organised force within the territory of the country so devoted to doing this? What does this need signify? In the FMS the sovereign requires protection to a level that the whole system is structured around this single aim. In answering these questions two lines need to be considered. One is mythology, the other is fact. The myth wraps the fact. The myth is the infusion of the physical body of king, president or prince with the body of the people. The body of the sovereign is the body of the state and the nation. Thus protecting the body of the sovereign indicates protecting the body of the nation. Whereas, the invisible fact is that the body of the sovereign: king, prince or president, is not the body of the people but lives on them parasitically. This is not specific to Saudi Arabia alone. It is endemic in every single state in the region. As Makiya (1989:21) puts it "for six decades the Iraqi military acted as an agent for internal repression". The Arab Middle Eastern states regard the population within their territory, as their primary enemy. As Chomsky puts it (2002:70) "if politics begins to break out inside your own country and the population starts getting active, those with power cannot hold on to power, since the latter is very fragile". The fear of this potential moment, the moment of realisation and breaking out is the prime reason behind building such a mighty military.

Accordingly, this fragile power shapes the relationship between the State and its society. Thus, the military as a tool is deployed to manage this particular relationship. There is not any sort of social contract, no consent, and no rational basis for the sovereign. All that is there is naked power. Therefore, the sovereign finds himself in the state of perpetual doubt. "When it is,

after all, hardly a law of nature that a few should command while the multitude obey, that the economy should be geared to ensuring luxuries for some instead of necessities for all", (Chomsky, 1992: 192). In the absence of a coherent ideology to justify this, the sovereign has to rely on naked power, in most cases, to sustain the situation.

For the very same reason the demand by the State in Saudi Arabia upon the population for wider military service is avoided. "Such demand could bring forth pressure for citizens to have a say in state policy" (Gause III, 2003: 358). The State or the sovereign view the population with suspicion, and employ different policies to distance or docile them. In such circumstances it only makes sense, to have an organised military for achieving such an end. The source of and the reason for the misgivings be tween the State and society, in the case of Saudi Arabia, are intrinsically based on the nature of society and the formation of the State. Historically, the country was never united. Eventually when it was united, it was done by force, while, in reality, it had little to bind it together. Like any other FMS the country is still missing an identity to cement the different cleavages together. It is instead held forcefully together. The merchants of the Red Sea coast saw themselves as sophisticated and cosmopolitan. The nomads and oasis-dwellers of the centre saw themselves as strong physically and spiritually. Both groups looked down on those in the east, many of them Shia's. If the population is held forcefully together to serve the sovereign, it results in a permanent fear of the break down this fragile togetherness. In the past when that occurred in other places in the region the outcome were less than desirable.

> [in case of Suadi Arabia] the ruling family is well aware of what the future would hold were it to be overthrown. If the history of postmonarchical Iran and Iraq are anything to go by, the royal family would have to flee or be slaughtered. Even the less extreme cases of Egypt and Yemen suggest that the royal family would lose its wealth and all its social privileges. The Saudi royal family will not give up power easily. It will be prepared to use force to hold on, including physical suppression of its opponents. Underestimating its willingness to use force—or, for that matter, the willingness of any of the Arab ruling cliques to do likewise—would be a serious error (Clawson, 2002: 201).

This clearly indicates that the sovereign is aware that it is trapped in an either/or scenario. In this case the choice is either holding power or dying. This affects the relationship between the state sovereign and the population which could be smeared with violence. On the one hand, the sovereign knows that in the case of any weakness the population will behead them. On the other

hand the people are aware that the sovereign does not hesitate to use violence against them. However, the State-society relationship, especially in the Gulf States, does not operate through the deployment of mere violence, as is the case in the republican states in the region. The Gulf State also have a Rentier policy. It is separation between economy and politics. "We do not ask much of you economically and we do not give much to you politically" (Zakaria, 2003: 76). It is a trade the State authority imposes on its people. But the State authorities are aware that this policy does not guarantee the security of their state. In these countries the armies are structured in a way to be ineffective. There is no cohesion among the different units. The military units are, in case of Saudi Arabia lead by the royal family members. The family members are not in unity. It is reported that briefly before his death Ibn Saud said, "Verily, my children and my possessions are my enemies" (Hertog, 2007:541). Thus every unit has a loyalty to the leading prince before anything else. Information management or the capacity to communicate information vertically is at best poor. It is obvious that if the military is divided and has personal rather that national loyalty and is as result reluctant to share the information.

6.11 Conclusion

If the State is a "container" (Taylor, 1994: 151), the military's ultimate duty is to protect the inhabitant of that container from external threats. Thus, the military's main duty is to defend the territory of the State from external threats. Therefore, the military is not for internal deployment. In the FMS however the military's main task is internal. This internal mission is namely the protection of the sovereign. This results in the emergence of a new relationship between the military and the State, on the one hand and the military and society, on the other hand.

Therefore, to theorise the status of the military in the FMS is challenging if not impossible. To take traditional civil–military relation, which regards the two spheres of civilian and military as clearly distinguishable it fails to capture the nature of the relationship. To summarise, there is no such relation between the military and the civilians in the FMS. The State uses the military against the civilian population to implement its coercive rule.

The traditional approach to civil military relations emphasises the formal institutions, functions, and policymaking, and the consequent relations between the two essentially separate

sub-systems-the civilian and the military. While in the FMS, on the one hand, the civilian does not make the State (thus the notion of 'civilian' in the 'civil-military relation' does not necessarily refer to the state), since the State, is separate from society, on the other hand, there is no separation between the military and the State in traditional fashion.

The major challenges in front of other theories would be the exceptional and unique nature of the FMS. In other theories the State is taken as a civilian. The FMS is not a civilian state. However the critical and new critical approaches are closer to the reality of the situation by regarding the boundary between the two spheres as not fixed, but shifting according to the interaction between the military and civil sub-systems (Barak & Sheffer 2007: 4). The FMS is not a fully formed state, either ideologically or institutionally.

Through following the trajectory of the State or the regime and the military relationship, it becomes apparent that the military was always regarded as a tool: a tool for modernisation, for preserving the status quo, a tool to realise the dream of pan-Arab unity, consequently a tool to protect the regime. The State, in general, is "an apparatus of capture" (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004: 468). This capture policy operates through seeking perpetual expansion, for Robert Gilpin (1981: 106) this "phenomena is universal". However the FMS has a desire to capture both internally and the externally, its core mission is survival. Survival indicates continuation without interruption, of the reign of the closed circle of rulers and of the elite. For the FMS to survive, it has to establish a highly complex of layers, walls, and be an internal the external. This is in itself a paradox. The military plays a designed role in defining this state. Since the State is engaged in the endless game of survival it needs force, brutality, fear, and will. The military and other security sectors provide these qualities. The military has only to provide. Any step beyond that is seen by the state as suspicious. In countries that might differ in certain ways still the outcome is the same. For instance in Egypt, when the Free Officers organised the coup, they shared the government positions among themselves. But later on this situation was changed. Anwar Sadat during his presidency struck out at all opposition in the military as he aggressively consolidated his leadership. From the early days of his presidency, he employed divide-and-rule tactics among the military elite in order to domesticate it. His use of such tactics created an elite loyal to his person or the office of the presidency, rather than to the institutional power bases that particular military leaders had accumulated under Nasser. During Mubarak's reign the role of the military

has vanished and been replaced by police, security officers and spies who are above the law and killing civilians regularly with impunity. The FMS either captured sovereignty through a coup or through appointment by outside forces. Both shape their policy to prevent an imminent coup. Thus the FMS lives in continuous fear of a potential coup. Therefore the head of the military has to be in the hand of the family, the clan or the loyal elite.

Plato gave the task of realisation of his republic to the philosophers, Bacon to scientists, Marx to the proletarians, and Arab nationalist thinkers regarded the soldiers as playing such a role. Husri and others dreamt of the military as the social mobiliser, an agency of social change. In the FMS the military is separate from population. The military is separate in their governing system, their loyalty, their duty, the location of their barracks, and through joining the army one does not become a modern civil orientated man with loyalty to the nation. By joining the army one will end up being killed or being a killer vis-a-vis the population. With the emergence of the FMS, citizenship was never materialised and the citizen army never established. The emerged army was taken through conscription and ultimately reduced to the status of a mercenary. Classically the mercenary is a person who is foreign and paid. In the FMS, in order to show their unshakable loyalty to the sovereign the military treats the population as foreign, consequently they become foreign, and draining the big part of the national budget. Making a mercenary out of the military is the ultimate utilisation of the military. The mercenary's loyalty is to money. Since money has a source, at the end, the mercenary's loyalty is to the source of the money. The source of the money is the regime, especially when there is no taxation. Then the ultimate loyalty of the military is for the regime.

Some regarded the military in the region as "the vanguard of nationalism and social reform" (Halpern, 1963: 75). The genesis of such an approach is in European history. In Europe the middle class is the maker of modernity. Because in the Middle East the officers are mostly drawn from the middle classes, by the same token the officers because of their middle class background are seen as modernisers. This qualifies the army to be a guardian and a leading group toward modernising society. Alas, the FMS approach shows that such view is contrary to the reality. The middle classes in a different space and different time are different in their mission and priorities. The FMS is merely a state without a nation "over the last eighty years or so the Saudi royal family created a unified and centralised state not a nation" (Al Rasheed,

2007). Not making a nation is an effort to withhold modernity. A nation is a form of organisation. Through it people imagine their large community. It is a form of identity and solidarity. In pre-national societies organising people around a general collective idea is difficult. The existence of a nation is viewed by the FMS as a threat. To resist this threat the State has to block the emergence of a nation and it has to be militaristic and distant from the population. It has to control the people and spread fear among them; this can only be achieved by a ruthless military whose loyalty to the population is nil.

By making a mercenary army out of the military, the FMS reduced the chance of a coup significantly. This by no means indicates that the fear of a coup has disappeared altogether. The military has power to a degree as Peter D. Feaver puts it "the very institution created to protect the polity is given sufficient power to become a threat to the polity" (Feaver 1999: 214). Therefore, the classical dilemma is who guards the guardians. But the FMS has managed to diminish this dilemma to a certain degree.

Conclusions

> The . . . [Arab] monarchies . . . are peculiarly vulnerable to the tensions of modernization. Their legitimizing values are essentially rooted in kinship, religion, and custom. But they are by no means wholly traditional; they do not conform precisely to the classical Middle Eastern patriarchy. In fact, we observe strong attributes of modernity in the legitimacy formulas of even the most traditional kingdoms, just as we shall discover persistent strands of traditional identifications in the systems that have crossed the revolutionary divide (Hudson, 1977: 165).

> A man spends his first year learning how to speak and the Arab regimes teach him silence for the rest of his life (Ahlam Musteghanemi in the Memory in the Flesh)

The theoretical terrain and methodology of this thesis provides the conceptual framework through which I proceeded to analyse modernity in the Arab Middle East. Modernity in the region as a phenomenon has had a tragic fate. This phenomenon failed to materialise, or rather more accurately the emerged state and its elite, prevented of realisation in the Arab Middle East. This failure was not due to the culture, economy or external factors alone. This failure was and is premeditated by the State elite through the state apparatuses. Modernity was and is premeditated because its full realisation is not in the interest of the survival of the ruling elite. After the end of colonialism, the inherited state [inherited from the former colonial rulers] became a medium controlled by the emerged local elite, within this medium; culture, economy and external factors functioned according to the state elite's interest. This State or this particular form of State is conceptualised as the FMS.

The background chapter shows how this form of state emerged and was established through different events and treaties. How Western powers, namely the United Kingdom and France, in the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 divided the region between themselves. In the tradition of the region there was no counterpart to the Western idea of the sovereignty (state) whether in its internal or the external fashions. Therefore, the state as an idea and structure is wholly new and manufactured. This occurred through imitation and the copying of the Western modern model of the nation-state: the Westphalian model.

From the day of its inception the emerged state had to borrow many elements of modernity in order to survive. The state borrowed from modernity, selected suitable parts of it and translated it. Translation indicates that the state manipulated modernity and altered it to maintain its own survival. Modernity became an essential element of the new state. This was depicted in the technology, bureaucracy, army, arms, infrastructure and the media. The state's manipulation of modernity had a negative impact on the nature of modernity from the ground up to the degree that the state had to limit and counter true modernity. For instance democracy, nationalism, human rights, separation of powers, freedoms and legitimacy are all essential parts of the modern state structure but implementation of these structures is against the state elite interest. They desire to be in power without challenge, without limit, without end and without any regard for the population. Therefore, modernity from the day of its arrival has to be kept in a state of failure, which indicates that the realisation of full, real or true modernity was never accepted by the state elite. The part of modernity that was encouraged, by the state elite, among the population was fake or superficial modernity. Modernity of fashion: handbags, shoes, cars, and other gadgets or imitations of life style whether it is sexuality or other social aspects. This was embraced enthusiastically by the fake middle classes in these states.

The FMS concept analyses a multifarious event. This event is the failure of the occidental modernity in the Arab Middle East. To describe an event as a failure is a statement. This statement is made by comparing the definition of modernity with the reality on the ground. Modernity is used as a shorthand term for modern state and modern society. A modern society is profoundly different, in many ways, from its previous society, namely traditional. These differences appear on individual, social and institutional levels. In modern society individuals are reasoning and autonomous, people organise themselves in the form of society, i.e. the recognition of different cleavages and interests which are competing in a peaceful tolerant space. Modernity has a different mode of production, a different set of organisations. A modern society is also expected to protect human rights and establish a citizenry relationship between people and state. Reference to these concepts and paradigms can be found in the work of philosophers of modernity, from Spinoza to Locke to Kant and even Hegel. However, t he experience of modernity in the non-West is different; but nevertheless, the Arab Middle Eastern countries had opportunity and potentiality to develop a modern society, if the ruling elite were not challenging

it. A glimpse into the past shows how society was willing to embrace the western values and overcome their tradition.

> The Iraq of the 1950s of which I was raised, as well as the broader Arab Islamic world of that time were a stage when the secular elements of society, the ruling political class, and cultural and intellectual elites had moved far from an overt identification with Islam. It then appeared to be only a matter of time before Islam would lose whatever hold it may have still had on the peoples and societies of the Muslim world..... Islam was not noticeable factor in daily life. Women, not only in my own family but throughout the middle classes, wore only western clothes. They had long ceased to wear the hijab (Allawi, 2009: VIII).

This clearly shows that the ground was ready for change, for new, for rupture if there was a suitable and committed guide. Today within the States of the Arab Middle East, these features are either totally absent or exist in very weak forms. This allows one to state that Middle Eastern modernity has failed to establish a truly modern society. The notion of failure also suggests that there is the presence of modernity on the ground but in fractured and failed forms because this failed modernity on the ground is borrowed from occidental modernity, it is not a modernity that emerged from the region's culture by the region's thinkers. This also suggests that tradition is a living part of the popular culture. The states in the region are the product of the arrival of occidental modernity. These state elites to quote from the Indian thinker Partha Chatterjee (1986: 21) "thinks with and also thinks against a Western modernity", therefore the emerged states through their functioning on one hand utilised modern tools and premeditated the failure of modernity.

The roles of this State, its mode of function, its politics are the subject matter of the thesis. If the main question of the thesis is, why modernity failed in the Arab Middle East, the answer is offered is that modernity failed because of the emergence of a particular form of a state that is conceptualised as a FMS. Failure of modernity does not signify its complete rejection by the state elite. Moreover, it is not a sign that modernity was rejected by the population. In fact, modernity was not resisted by the population. One can say, despite their distorted awareness of the concept in general they embraced modernity. As poll after poll shows, people desire democracy, rule of law, transparency and above all technology. This is equally true for the

religious people also. In fact, the early advocates of modernity were religious clergies. Therefore, it is convincing to argue that modernity has been purposely failed by the state elites.

Ensuring the failure of both modernity and tradition is a complex and continuous task that the state and its apparatuses are closely engaged in. This task involves ba lancing between modernity and tradition, responding to internal and the external pressure, through the utilisation of both modernity and tradition but never allowing either to become independent forces. However, this separation and boundary setting is neither unique nor novel historically, Arab and Muslim thinkers regarded the nature of men as different. This inferred that philosophy: thinking, individuality, argument and autonomy were for the elite and religion: uniformity, holiness and silence for the masses. But in modern times this task became more complex and requires more detailed knowledge and techniques. This has been mostly addressed by the presence of modernity and some of its techniques.

If the modern State is commonly regarded as an independent, legitimate and centralised socio-political organisation that aims at the regulation of social relationships in a complex and stratified society living in a specific territory, then the FMS is of a different calibre. It is neither independent nor legitimate, and its essential aim is the survival of its elite. The complexity of this state becomes apparent throughout the thesis.

This thesis suggests that picking a single invariable factor such as culture, religion, oil or the external factor, is no longer satisfactory to demystify the crisis of the region characterised by impossibility of reform, lack of democracy and survival of the states. To claim that there is a single dominant factor responsible for the structure or the failure of these states is not satisfactory. These states are equally modern and traditional. Both modernity and tradition are nothing but tools in the hands of the State elites, equally utilised with each other, against each other or separately, depending on the nature of the challenges that the State has to face.

The FMS conceptualisation shows that the rhetorical question like '*is Islam compatible with democracy'*, that dominates current Middle Eastern study, is nothing but misleading. Since no religion is democratic and Islam like any other religion is open to endless interpretations, it is the situation that determines which interpretation is dominant. Historically when Muslims were

confident and lived prosperously they interpreted the Koran in an open and liberal way. Whereas when they were defeated and frustrated they turned to a radical interpretation; the example of Taqi ad-Din Ahmad Ibn Taymiyya and the fall of Baghdad at the hand of the Mongol is a prominent example. Ibn Taymiyya lived in a time when the Islamic world was suffering from external wars and internal strife. The crusaders were in the region and the Mongols had all but destroyed the eastern Islamic empire when they captured Baghdad in 1258. In Egypt, the Mamluks had just come to power and were consolidating their hold over Syria. It was in this setting of turmoil and conflict that he formulated his views on the causes of the weakness of the Muslim nations and on the need to return to the Koran and *sunna* (practices) as the only means for revival. (The information is available on the special website devoted to him and his work http://www.ibntaimiah.com/ in Arabic) His literal and radical interpretation of Koran, directly reflected the political situation around him.

Based on the relationship between situation and interpretation, the strong presence of the political Islam in the FMS is clear. FMS marginalises the population and when it fights the radical Islam it utilises both the language and the technology of modernity, thus the state is seen as a modern in the eyes of the population. This false affiliation of the state with modernity makes modernity associated with all the states' pathologies such as corruption, despotism, waste of the wealth and tyranny.

The particular structure of the FMS elucidates a number of impossibilities. Among them: (a) it is impossible to reform within the system; (b) because of the FMS structure being neither modern nor tradition and utilising both the system survives any pressure from both outside and inside; (c) moreover, their longevity shaped the mind of generations of people to not know how to be citizens. This hopelessness is due to the established structure of the FMS. Reform indicates an absence within a system; whether it is an absence of institution or of a value. But in order to introduce this absent value or norms into the system, as a prerequisite, the creation of space is needed, which cannot be realised without making change. Furthermore, it is essential that the state the only true power holder, acknowledges the absence of values and norms. Therefore to reform, it is necessary to pinpoint what is missing in the system, where it can be located and more essentially whether there is room, or the possibility of making room, to accommodate it.

The FMS does not acknowledge any need for reform. The FMS views itself as a divine or perfect creature. More importantly, the FMS does not tolerate making a (free) space beyond its control (omnipotent), especially when there is the harsh realisation that any crack might lead to the collapse of the whole system. This very fact has been one of the main reasons behind ineffectiveness of external pressure for democratisation.

> Shortly after 9/11, President George W. Bush declared that the best hope for peace and security in the Middle East lay in the expansion of democracy and freedom there. But soon enough, democratization began to collide with core U.S. interests after all. U.S. pressure for political reform proved distracting (and potentially destabilizing) to regional allies whose assistance was crucial in the drive to stabilize Iraq and restart the Israeli-Palestinian peace process (Bellin, 2008: 112).

In addition the FMS responds to extra pressures only when they come from major powers. However, the response is often nothing more than a cosmetic change. Therefore the result of external pressure is

> no evidence of a genuine political paradigm shift occurring in the region. They (the people) see no substantive redistribution of power, no creation of effective checks and balances at the institutional level to limit executive power, no reforms sufficient to make political leadership truly accountable to the popular will. At most, they find cosmetic reform: some liberalization, some introduction of competitive elections. But such initiatives are hobbled in ways that are preventing a tangible shift in the balance of power. Reform in the Arab world has largely given rise to "façade democracy" rather than true democracy (Bellin, 2008: 115)

The structure of the FMS allows such manoeuvres and makes them, at best, ineffective. These reforms are sold by the government as meaningful but they are nothing more than a placebo. This is equally true for democratisation, secularisation, development and rule of law. None of these will be realised without a radical change in the structure of the FMS. Such a change might destabilise the balance between modernity and tradition. If the balance shifts towards modernity, then the result is more likely to be a democratic government under the rule of law. On the other hand, if the balance shifts towards tradition then the more likely result is a theocratic

government; especially at the current moment when the modern (radical) political Islam is the most organised traditional force. This by no mean indicates that tradition and religion are the same thing, but religious political groups are the most powerful and organised traditional groups. Therefore, any real change threatens the whole system. This makes words such as reform, which also means changing the form of the government, as a real threat to the survival of the FMS.

This equally applies to democracy. If the word democracy indicates the rule of the majority or the participation of the population, such an act contradicts with the basic principle of elite rule in the FMS. Democracy as a practice opposes the central ethos of the FMS, which is exemplified in the belief that the State is the property of a particular group of people. If concepts like reform, democracy and the rule of law demand progress towards modernity, there are other concepts which equally relate to both tradition and modernity, namely secularism. Secularism is the separation of religion from the public domain. The FMS stands on a modern and a traditional leg. Therefore, it is clear that tradition, including religion, is an essential part of the FMS - without it the state can neither operate nor survive. According to this arrangement secularism within the realm of the FMS simply is unfeasible.

If reform or change requires language, movement and organisation then these are not possible without the full agreement of the State. Therefore, inside the FMS for any events, whether modern or traditional to take place, there must be a full permission from the government. For the FMS, the undisputable rule is: any event that does not enhance the survival of the state is banned. Managing, monitoring and prohibiting these events, is the priority of the state. They are an essential part of state security. The FMS is wary of its security. State and state-security dates back to the birth of the modern state; the FMS has no difficulty in borrowing and implementing this particular aspect of modernity. Whether it is repression, which is fairly very common (imprisonment, torture and threats) to a degree that the FMS meet the definition of totalitarianism. Through amalgamation of both modernity and tradition classical control technique like divide-and-rule and co-option become possible. Usually through utilising modernity and tradition the State has no difficulty in preventing undesirable events, but in cases of their occurrence the State guides and secures their consequences in a fashion that only enhances the State-authority.

The failed modern concept relates to previous concepts in various ways. In relation to those who prioritise culture as the central obstacle to realisation of modernity, the FMS confirms that, the state, in the form of the FMS creates a zone within which nothing is independent. This implies that regarding culture as an independent force misunderstands the reality within the territory under the coercion of the state. Within the zone of the FMS culture is nothing but a mere tool that the state utilises in a similar way to any other instruments. It is axiomatic that the culture of the region, like any other traditional culture, is hostile to modernity. But the state maintains this hostility to counterbalance the occidental modernity. Meanwhile, this particular situation paralyses the local culture preventing it from modernising itself.

The Rentier-state theory is one of the dominant theoretical approaches used to analyse Arab Middle Eastern states. The FMS and Rentier-state theory diverge and converge in a number of ways. Rentier and rentierism is not possible without modernity. For instance; the technology to excavate natural resources, the ability to ship them to the international market and the international market itself, are all products of modernity. This is form technological and economic sides. But Rentierism is primarily a political method practiced by the state elite to ensure their survival. For instance instead of 'no taxation without representation' the Rentier State turns that famous American Revolution phrase to 'no representation without taxation'. Accordingly some argued since the primary role of the Rentier State is allocation then "democracy is not a problem for allocation states" (Luciani, 1990: 76). If Rentier policy is possible because of modernity that does not necessarily indicate that the Rentier is wholly modern. As I have argued in the literature review the Rentier mentality has strong roots in the tradition of the region. Therefore the Rentier is a traditional idea realised by modernity. This indicates that when people in the Rentier states receive subsidies from the state they do not regard it as salary for their obedience. Therefore, despite Rentier policy there is widespread dissatisfaction and more importantly the government cannot buy off opposition. In countries like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain and others opposition, has arisen and with it a discrepancy between the expectations derived from the Rentier framework and empirical reality. Moreover people in the region are fully aware that the oil wealth is their wealth. The Rentier state is not a modern state per se. It utilises modernity. At the same time, the ruler to be subsiding the population for their cooperation is a traditional Arab ritual. However, this approach fails to demystify the state-society relationship in the region. It also suffers from a crude generalisation.

Unlike the FMS, the Rentier theory, fails to answer the question of dissatisfaction and opposition to the regimes in the region. Rentierism is convincing when reality is absent.

The structure of the FMS m ight instigate the idea of transition; from traditional to modernity but in reality there is no transition. The FMS is not in transition toward modernity; (this argued in rather more detail in the literature review chapter) this also indicates that it has no desire to move away from traditional. This makes the FMS structure a permanent structure. In other words, this form of state does not qualify as a state in transition. The lack or absence of transition and the impossibility of it in the structure of the FMS also clarifies the relation of the concept to modernisation theory. The overall expectation of modernisation theory was that the process of economic development and the pace of modernisation would ultimately create and consolidate democratic regimes. The FMS approach does not argue that the state does not engage in any activities: in fact the state through its apparatuses active but only to enhance the FMS, not to transit to a new era.

Modernisation theory argues that the States in the Middle East are on a road toward modernity. However, the reality stands in contrast to this perspective. The non-transitional state of these States indicates that the status quo is preserved. The static non-developmental status of the State and ultimately of society indicates that modernisation theory is irrelevant. Modernisation theory, the belief that industrialisation and economic development leads directly to positive social and political change, is at best divorced from the reality on the ground. To paraphrase Seymour Martin Lipset's statement in his book *Political Man* (1960) wealth might be essential for sustaining democracy but economic development per se does not sets off a series of social changes that together tend to produce democracy. Many of the countries in the region are not poor and the current levels of education and urbanisation in the region are high enough to support democracy. The FMS theory shows that when there is a critical barrier, namely the State and the State elite, none of these variables has any effect. The FMS in order to survive requires tradition as much as modernity. Therefore, the level of modernity should not exceed to a level that would wither tradition. Moreover the FMS hollows modernity from its political influences to a level that modernity itself, in many cases, ends up being used is a tool to withhold modernity.

The FMS approach contributes in various ways to understanding the contemporary puzzle around Arab Middle Eastern States. One of the puzzles around the states in the region is their

centrality. This is a puzzle because no states in the region are uniform or have a uniform identity. They are all multi-ethnic, multi-sects, and multi-religion. Regardless of that apart from UAE and Iraq, no country in the region is federal or decentralised. FMS cannot share power, negotiate with the other. It has to hold power in as an absolute form. The other puzzle is why despite the presence of so much of tradition and modernity in these states no progress is happening. The FMS shows that the State elites require both modernity and tradition to utilise in order to survive. Therefore, both modernity and tradition contribute in making this form of State.

The FMS approach contributes in various ways to demystify the puzzling structure of Arab Middle Eastern States. The theory confirms that not only internal or external factors hold together the states in the region: it is a subtle complex combination of all these forces together. The external factor is exemplified primarily by the major Western powers. They can be considered generally as advocating for more modernisation and modernity. The FMS concept verifies that one factor alone, whether it is external or internal, on its own, cannot ensure the survival of these states and function with such stubbornness against all the pressures (internal and external). The FMS is structured in a form able to bring together all these contradictory factors and translate them into enforcement. The FMS shows that all political power is held by the State. Thus within the State there is no room for consultation, dialogue or exchange, first and foremost because there are no recognisable independent forces and in the case of their existence they are nothing but a rubberstamp for the authorities.

By having both modernity and tradition as tools, the FMS is equipped to confront challenges both internally and internationally. For instance, there has been much talk about the change in the role of the state and state power in the era of globalisation. No doubt this has affected the States in the Arab Middle East but it did not impact on the nature and structure of the state into any fundamental way. This equally applies to the democratic waves. According to Huntington

> The first "'long" wave of democratization began in the 1820s, with the widening of the suffrage to a large proportion of the male population in the United States, and continued for almost a century until 1926, bringing into being some 29 democracies. In 1922, however, the coming to power of Mussolini in Italy marked the beginning of a first "reverse wave" that by 1942 had reduced the number of democratic states in the world to 12. The triumph of the Allies in World War II initiated a second wave of democratization

> that reached its zenith in 1962 with 36 countries governed democratically, only to be followed by a second reverse wave (1960-1975) that brought the number of democracies back down to 30. At what stage are we within the third wave? (1991: 12).

The Middle Eastern countries did not become part of the third wave and the populations like Samuel Beckett's protagonists, in *Waiting for Godot*, have to wait forever for the fourth wave.

The FMS is located between modernity and tradition. It is a medium with a purpose. Therefore, it acts as a barrier between tradition a nd modernity. Through this separation it attempts to create the atmosphere of the Camp. The Camp atmosphere signifies [as explained in detail in chapter four] that nothing should take place. All the occurrences should originate from the state. The state has to organise, establish, arrange, and appoint, everything, everyone and every event. One of the reasons behind this FMS desire is tradition. One can argue the present of tradition makes politics in the FMS a political theology as Carl Schmitt understood it. According to him

> All significant concepts of the modern theory of state are secularized theological concepts not only because of their historical development—in which they were transformed from theology to the theory of state, whereby, for example, the omnipotent God became the omnipotent lawgiver—but also because of their systematic structure, the recognition of which is necessary for a sociological consideration of the concepts. The exception in jurisprudence is analogous to the miracle in theology (1985: 36).

In the FMS the image of ruler and its role and relationship with the population is springs from tradition (religion). In traditional Islamic theology, علم الكلام *ilm alkalam*, Allah is ordering (*amr*) and creating (*khalq*) simultaneously. As it is clearly mentioned in Koran "The Initiator of the heavens and the earth: to have anything done, He simply says to it, "Be, and it is" (2: 117). This "Be," and it is', which indicates thing operates at maximum speed. The picture of the powerful leader has an origin in this arrangement. According to the main principle of *ilmi kalam*: the good is good not because it conforms to a Law of Nature or of Reason, but because God decrees it to be good. The FMS leader only sees himself as in a position of a true leader when he has these particular qualities. Like god he is the ultimate judge of what is good and what is not. To have

such qualities indicates that one need not consult anyone else. There should be no restriction or hurdle in front of the leaders. Therefore, for instance, there is no room for an institution like parliament. The FMS leaders meet delegations of their population only if they praise them or beg for money.

This state is like a mirage; nothing appears as it is. There is the presence of Islam without being Islamic. The same thing applies to modernity. This makes studying and analysing these states through focusing on official documents just as constitutions or state publications or the media a misleading exercise. While FMSs struggle hard to be omnipresent and visible, simultaneously most activities of the state happen in the dark. This high visibility in combination with high secrecy is the nature of the system. These two contradictory activities blend with each other. The visibility is invisibility. What is visible is visible to cover what is meant to be invisible. This particular arrangement ensures the inhabitants of these countries live in bewilderment. People see the army, arms, *mukhabarat* (the secret service), police, but have no clue, for the instance, where the budget is going, how it is spent, how decisions are made and in whose interest.

The FMS can be highly visible and extremely secretive through the utilisation of modernity and tradition. To take the media as an example: state officials in the FMS are always visible in the media. They are shown in every different ways but in most cases silently. The purpose is to remind the population of them, their position and their importance. This mute appearance is highly symbolic. It verifies the position, the power and charisma of the rulers. This is only possible because of modernity. Tradition is in the form of praise. It is part of the history of power in the region that the leader has his own private poet or poets. The old poet was replaced by modern media people, but the function remained the same. In most cases the only difference is in the sheer amount. It can be said that the media machine services the ego of the ruler. This daily repetitive exercise poses a question about the nature of representation in the FMS. State officials desire to be seen, to be shown to the public, to pose their activity and remain mute. They do not engage in, dialogue or exchange of information. The sole purpose of their virtual persona is to occupy the mind, memory and time of the people. This occurs not only in the media. There are pictures of the leader everywhere, in every shape and fashion, the city named after them, universities, streets, sculpture in every park and corner, a never aging picture

in the front page of every state newspaper. Samir alKhalil (Kanan Makiya) in his book the '*Monument: Art, Vulgarity and responsibility in Iraq*', (1991) details this issue. One can never escape the presence and influence of political leaders in the FMS.

From its beginning in the Middle East modernity became the FMS the leviathan's the sovereign concern. This had some clear implications on the nature and purpose of modernity, among them modernity is not a social movement. It is not a revolution. It is not aiming to bring about a dynamic society. The notions of citizens and enlightened beings are not to be considered. It is rather otherwise. If occidental modernity called for 'man's emergence from his self-imposed immaturity', as Immanuel Kant 1784 stated in his brief article '*What is Enlightenment*', the Middle Eastern version of modernity utilised modern techniques to enhance the self-imposed immaturity. The FMS created a situation in which the human being should not dare to know and above all have no courage to lead his or her life.

This thesis demonstrates that the state, and the system that the state elite established among the population, lies at the heart of all the problems of the region. The state elite shape the economy in an unproductive way to utilise it for political gain. To become a bureaucrat one has to pacify all his or her political faculties. The FMS pact confronts the emergence of society, the particular arrangement where different voices can be recognised and engage in dialogue and exchange. This anti-society policy has ramification on those who have different identity from the dominant group. Therefore, the FMS is a state that discriminates against minorities and strips them of all their legal rights. The minority is a loose concept which can be any one and every one. One falls among a minority when one is beyond the boundary of the state favour.

If the FMS is a failure, the question is how to overcome this failure? The answer to the question does not lie in the nature of the failure. Therefore, the answer is not concerned about the reparation of the failure. The FMS is beyond amendment or redemption. The question here concerns modernity as a pure concept rather than as a model. This makes modernity a form of becoming. Becoming or "to become", as Deleuze & Parnet (2006:2) put it, "is never to imitate, nor to 'do like', nor to conform to a model". Thus, to become modern it is not to become like the West. It is not to imitate. It is not to construct the same model, as the West. To become modern in that sense, one can use the occidental model as a reference but not as the model. For this modernity to succeed, the state, unless it is a legitimate state, has to be distanced or is forced to

be distant from it. Modernity as a project has to be social and has to be for the society rather than the state. What is more imperative is the preparation of the ground for thinking. There can never be modernity without thinking, in other words individual thinkers, thinking not in order to serve power or authority, but the human, the community and the society, to paraphrase the famous Protagoras statement; making human the measure (Kattsoff, 1953). This is only achievable by the revival or the introduction of philosophy into the ambience of social and political spheres. Historically, Muslims philosophised but there has never been an Islamic philosophy. Philosophy requires, firstly, creating an environment for a human to think about his or her own condition. Secondly, it is crucial to respect that thinking and make it the source of politics. This is only attainable when there is education, freedom, a space for discussion, democracy, and a change or exchange in the system of ruling. Philosophy here is also an act, an act of permanent critique. This prepares the ground for a historical rupture with a history where man (h uman) a s an independent hum an being has never existed. This form of nonexistent existence is the central reason for the survival of the FMS and it is the mother of all tragedies. To end the failed modern state has to be reconstructed to allow the emergence of modernity by people for people.

Becoming modern, the emergence of modernity, is both potential and possible in the Arab Middle East. For people to become free, live in a free society, to obtain a home in order to be active in the world is not beyond possibility because of their culture. There is a desire for being able to speak; speaking is only possible when you have a listener. There is a clear demand among the population to relate to each other not as the big Other i.e. the state wishes but more in a civil manner. When the state is a door to connect to the outside, to infinity as Levinas likes to put it, a space will emerge where dialectic and dialogue is possible. This indicates the possibility of revision, improvement, negotiation and birth of synthesis i.e. new. People desire democracy, they express it in every possible opportunity. But, primarily because of the structure of Failed Modern Sate, this remains only as a desire.

Bibliography

Abaza, Mona, (2010) 'The Trafficking with Tanwir (Enlightenment)', *Comparative Studies of South Asia*, Africa and the Middle East, Volume 30, Number 1. pp. 32-46.

Abdel-Moneim El-Gemeiy, (2005) 'Educating Egypt' *Al-Ahram* Weekly, 27 Oct. No. 766.

Abdul karem, E. (1934) Egypt's Education', *Al-Ahram Weekly*, from the review by Yunan Labib Rizk on *Al-Ahram Weekly* 8 - 14 April 2004 Issue No. 685.

http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/685/chrncls.htm

Abir, M. (1977) 'Modernisation, Reaction and Muhammad Ali's 'Empire', *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Oct.), pp. 295-313.

Abrams P, (1988) 'Notes on the difficulty of studying the state,' *Journal of the Historical Sociology*, Vol. I. No. I. March.

Abu-Manneh, Butrus, (1994) 'The Islamic Roots of the Gulhane Rescript', *Die Welt des Islams*, New Series, Vol. 34, Issue 2 (Nov.), pp. 173-203.

Abu Nur, S. (2005) 'Muhammad Ali's Ideological Project', *Al-Ahram Weekly*, 4-10 August No. 754.

Abu-Rabi, I. (2004) *Contemporary Arab Thought: Studies in Post-1967 Arab Intellectual History*, Pluto Press, London.

Abou El-Magd, (2000) 'When the Professor Can't Teach', Al-*Ahram Weekly*, No. 486. http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2000/486/eg6.htm

Abrams P, (1988) 'Notes on the Difficulty of Studying the State ' *Journal of the Historical Sociology*, Vol. I. No. I. March.

Aburish, Said. (1997) *A Brutal Friendship*, New York, St. Martin's Press.

Aburish, S. (2005) *the House of Saud: the Rise, Corruption and Coming Fall Of*, Bloosbury, London.

Aflaq, M. (1959) *fi sabil al alb'th* (in the path of Ba'th), dar altali'a, Beirut.

Afshin Matin-asgari (2004) Islamic Studies and the Spirit of Max Weber: A Critique of Cultural Essentialism Critique, *Critical Middle Eastern Studies*, Fall, 13(3), pp 293-312.

Agamben, G. (1998) *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life,* Standard University Press.

Agamben, G. (2000) *Means Without Ends*, University of Minnesota Press Minneapolis.

Agamben, G. (2002) 'Security and Terror', *Theory and Event*, volume 5: issue 4.

Agamben, G. (2005) *State of Exception,* (tran) Kevin Attell, University of Chicago Press.

AHDR (2004) *Towards Freedom in the Arab World,* United Nations Development Programme, Regional Bureau for Arab States.

Ahmed S, (2003) 'Military Power and State Formation in Modern Iraq' *Middle East Policy*, Winter.

Ajami, F. (1981) *the Arab Predicament: Arab Political Thought and Practice since 1967*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ajami, F. (1997) 'The Arab Inheritance', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 76, No. 5 (Sep. - Oct), pp. 133-148.

Ajami, F. (2003) 'Iraq and the Arabs' Future', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 82, No. 1 (Jan. - Feb.), pp. 2-18.

Afaf Lutfi and al-Sayyid Marsot, (1985) *A Short History of Modern Egypt*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Al-Alarawi, A. (1993) *Mafhom aldawlla*, (the concept of State) almarkaz althaqafi alarabi, Beirut.

Al al-sheik, (2008) 'History of the Royal Guard', http://www.rg.gov.sa/publish/article_138.php

Alan, Ritchar. (2003) 'Modernity and economic development": the "new" American Messianism. *Middle East Policy*, Volume X, Fall, Number 3 September 22.

Al-Azama, Aziz. (2003) 'Postmodern Obscurantism and 'The Muslim Question', *Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies*, (JSRI) No5 Summer.

Al-Azm, Sadik J. (2010) 'Orientalism, Occidentalism, and Islamism Keynote Address to "Orientalism and Fundamentalism in Islamic and Judaic Critique: A Conference Honoring Sadik Al-Azm, *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East*, Volume 30, Number 1, 2010, pp. 6-13.

Al-Asad, Bashar. (2001) 'an interview with Al *sharq al-Awsat*, February 8

al-Hamad, T. (1997) 'Will Gulf Monarchies Work together', *Middle East Review of International Affairs* (MERIA) Journal, Vol. 1 No. 2. May.

al-Hamad, T. (1997) 'Will Gulf Monarchies Work together', *Middle East Review of International Affairs* (MERIA) Journal, Vol. 1 No. 2 http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/1997/issue2/jv1n2a3.html

al-Husiri, Sati. (1967) *Mudhakarati fi al Iraq* (My Iraq Diary): 1921-1941 Dar al Tali'ah: Beirut.

al-Husiri, Sati. (1955) '*al-Uruba Awalan*, (the Uruba Arab Nationalism First) Dar al-Ilm li-l-Malain, Beirut.

al-Jabri MA. (1997) *Al-Dimuqratiyah wa Huquq al-Insan* (Democracy and Human Rights), 'Democracy and Human Rights'. Centre of Arab Union Study, Beirut.

al-Jabri, Mohammed 'Abed (1999) *Arab-Islamic Philosophy: A Contemporary Critique*, the Centre for Middle Eastern Studies, the University of Texas at Austin.

al-Jabri, M. (1983) *Contemporary Arab Discourse: Critical Analysis*, Centre of the Arab Unity.

a l-Jabri, M. (1987) *alsyasi wal dini fi la magrib*, (the political and the religious in Morrocco) markz aldrasat alwahada alarabia (Centre of the Arab Unity Study) Beirut.

al-Jabri, M. (1996), *almashro'a alnhzawai alarabi: maoraga'a naqdya*, (Arab Renaissance Project: Critical Analysis) Arab Unity Centre, Beirut.

al-Jabri (2008) *Ibn-Khaldun: How State Emerges.....How a Politics Emerges*, available on: http://www.aljabriabed.net/realitearabe18.htm.

Al Kareem, A. (2001) 'The Totalitarian Society', available on http://www.mokarabat.com/dcen3.htm (cited on 21/07/09).

Al-Khateb, M. (2001) al-Hayat daily newspaper 20/Jan/01.

Allawi, Ali. (2009) *The Crisis of The Islamic Civilisation*, Yale University Press.

Allouche Adel (1989) Arabisation et politique linguistique au Maghreb a review, *Language in Society*, Vol. 18, No. 3 Sep. pp. 411-414

al-Maaly, K. (2006) *Two faces of Arab Intellectuals*, available on http://www.signandsight.com/features/993.html (cited on 30/10/09).

Al-Mustaqeem Mahmod Radhi (2005) The West in the Travel Journal of an Imam in Paris, *International Writing Program*, The University of Iowa http://iwp.uiowa.edu/91st/vol6_n1/radhi_essay1.pdf

Al-Naqib, Khaldun Hassan, (1989) *al mugtam'a wal Dawla fi el jazira alarabia*, (society and state in the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula) Markaz Drasat Wahda alarabia (Arab Centre of Unity Study), Beirut.

Al-Naqib, Khaldun. (1991) *the Authoritarian State in The Arab Mashriq: a comparative Study*, Arab Unity Centre, Beirut.

al-Rasheed, M. (1998) The Shia of Saudi Arabia: A Minority in Search of Cultural Authenticity, *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 25, No. 1 (May), pp. 121-138

al-Rasheed, Madawi. (2008) 'Islam and the Princes: Religion at the Service of Royal Power', Inaugural lecture King's College
http://www.madawialrasheed.org/index.php/site/more/143/

al-Rasheed, W. (2009) Alsaudi: hal yahtag almouatana ela dorat ta'hel? *Alqudis Alarabi*, 6/7/2009. Also available on (Arabic) http://www.madawialrasheed.org/index.php/arabic/more/195/

al Rasheed, Madawi. (2007) Reflection key to writing Arabia's diverse history, from http://www.madawialrasheed.org/index.php/site/more/97

Al-Rasheed, W. (2009) Alsaudi: hal yahtag almouatana ela dorat ta'hel? *Alqudis Alarabi*, 6/7/2009. also available on (Arabic) http://www.madawialrasheed.org/index.php/arabic/more/195/

alSharef, M (2000) qera'a fi khitab alasr alnahza (The Discourse of the Renaissance Era: a Reading), *alkarmel*, Issue 65.

alSharif, M. (1999) 'qeria fi alkhitab alArabi an alazmma' (Reading on the Arab Discourse on Crisis), *alKarmel*, Issue 60.

alTahtawi, R. (1993) '*Takhlis Al-Ibriz fi Talkhis Bariz*' (Egypt association for book, Egypt), Cairo.

Althusser, L. (1971) *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays*, Monthly Review Press, NY.

al-Wardi, Ali. (1977) lamahat mn tarekh alIarq almuasser, *Glimpses the Social Aspects of the Iraqi Modern History: on the 1920s Revolutio*', Vol.5, part I Baghdad. (in Arabic).

Amatzia Baram, (2000) Saddam Husayn Between His Power Base and the Community,' in *Middle East Review of International Affairs* (MERIA) Journal, Vol. 4, No. 4 December http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2000/issue4/jv4n4a2.html

Amawi, A. (1992) 'Democracy Dilemmas in Jordan', *Middle East Report*, No. 174, Democracy in the Arab World (Jan. - Feb.), pp. 26- 29.Arasaln, S. (1931), limaza takhara almuslom wa taqadam alakhron', dar maktabat alhayat

Amin, S. (1978) *The Arab Nation: Nationalism and Class Struggles*. London: Zed Press.

Amin, S. (1989) *Eurocentralism,* Monthly Review Press. New York.

Anderson, B. (1991) *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism.* Revised Edition ed. London and New York: Verso.

Anderson, Lisa. (1987) The State in the Middle East and North Africa, *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Oct.), pp. 1-18.

Anderson, Lisa. (1987) Lawless Government and Illegal Opposition: Reflections on the Middle East, *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 40, No. 2, Spring, pp. 219-32.

Anderson & Stansfield, (2004) *the Future of Iraq: Dictatorship, Democracy, or division*?, Palgrave Macmillan.

Antonius, George, (1938) *The Arab Awakening: The Story of the Arab National Movement.* H. Hamilton, London.

Applegate, Celia. (1990) *a Nation of Provincials: The German Idea of Heima'.* University of California Press, Berkeley.

Arab Human Development Report (AHDR) (2009) *The Arab State and human security performance and prospects*, United Nations Development Programme Regional Bureau for Arab States.

Arab Human Development Report (AHDR) (2005) *Towards the Rise of Women in the Arab World,* United Nations Development Programme Regional Bureau for Arab States. http://www.arab-hdr.org/publications/contents/2005/intro-e.pdf

Arab Human Development Report (AHDR) (2004) 'Towards Freedom in the Arab World', United Nations Development Programme Regional Bureau for Arab States http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/regionalreports/arabstates/name,3278,en.html

Arab Human Development Report (AHDR) (2002) *Creating Opportunities for Future Generations,* United Nations Development Programme, Regional Bureau for Arab States.

Arasaln, S. (1931) *limaza takhara almuslom wa taqadam alakhron*, (why the Muslims did not progress while other did' dar maktabat alhayat, Beirut.

A'rawi, A. (1993) *mafhum al hurtia*, 'The Concept of Freedom,' almarkaz althaqafi.

Ardeshir Mehrdad, (1997) *Conversation with Aziz Al-Azmeh: Political Islams: Modernities and Conservative-populist ideologies,* http://www.iran-bulletin.org/political_islam/azmeh_1.html

Arendt, H. (1969) Reflection on Violence, *New York Review of Books*, Vol. 12, No. 4. 27 Feb.

A.R. Lucham, (1961) *A Comparative Typology of Civil-Military Relations*, Government and Opposition, Vol.6.

Armstrong, K. (2001) *Muhammad: a biography of a prophet*, Phoenix, London.

Atiya, E. (1958) *the Arabs: the Origins, Present Conditions, and Prospect of the Arab World*, A Pelican Book UK.

Aurawi, A. (1996) *mafhom al-aql: maqallat fi almufaraqat*, (the Concept of Reason) Ar ab cultural centre, Beirut.

Ausfour, G. (2009) a lmaqmoua'..... yastamr fi alsakhrya, *Al-Arabi*, Issue 605 April http://www.alarabimag.com/arabi/Data/2009/4/1/Art_88148.XML.

Avant, Deborah, (2000) Mercenary to Citizen Armies: Explaining Change in the Practice of War, *International Organization*, winter, Vol. 54, Issue 1.

Aydinli, Ersel. (2009) A Paradigmatic Shift for the Turkish Generals and an End to the Coup Era in Turkey, *the Middle East Journal*, Volume 63, Number 4.

Ayubi. Nazih. (1995) *Over-Stating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle East*. London & New York: I.B. Tauris.

Badiou, Alan, (2002) *On the Truth-Process: An open lecture*, August, the European Graduate School. http://www.egs.edu/faculty/alain-badiou/articles/on-the-truth-process/

Berman, Marshall (1988) *All That Is Solid Melts into Air: The Experience of Modernity,* New York Viking Penguin.

Bacik, G. (2008) *Hybrid Sovereignty in the Arab Middle East: The Cases of Kuwait, Jordan, and Iraq*, Palgrave Macmillan.

Baker, J. (2008) An investigation of the sociological patterns of prayer frequency and content, *Sociology of Religion*, Summer.

Barak & Sheffer (2007) the Study of Civil–Military Relations in Israel: A New Perspective, *Israel Studies* Vol.12. No. 1.

Barakat, H. (1993) *the Arab World: Society, Culture, and State*, University of California Press.

Batatu, H. (1978) *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq: A Study of Iraq's Old Landed and Commercial Classes and of Its Communists, Ba'thists, and Free Officers*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Bayart, J. F. (2009) *The State in Africa: the Politics of the Belly*, Polity.

BBC, (2005), Rice calls for Mid-East democracy, available on http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4109902.stm (cited on 8/10/09)

Be'eri, Eliezer. (1982) 'The Waning of the Military Coup in Arab Politics,' *M iddle Ensterrn Studies,* Vol. 18, No. I (January), pp. 69-81.

Bell, Gertrude, Letters, 28/08/1921, available on Newcastle University website: http://www.gerty.ncl.ac.uk/letter_details.php?letter_id=501

Bellin, E. (2004) 'The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East,' *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 36: No. 2.

Bellin, E. (2008) Democratization and Its Discontents: Should America Push Political Reform in the Middle East?', *Foreign Affairs*, July / August Vol. 87 No. 4 112-19

Benjamin, W. (2007) *Walter Benjamin's Archive*, Verso, London, NY.

Benjamin, W. (1999), *Critic of Violence*, in Selected Writing, Vol.1, Harvard.

Berger, M. (1970) the Mosque: Aspects of Governmental Policy towards Religion in Egypt Today, *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 6, No. 1 Jan.

Elhadj Elie (2009) To Perpetuate Their Dictatorships, Arab Rulers Resort to the Islamic Creed, *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 13, No. 4 (December)

Bergson, H. (1935) *the two sources of morality and religion*, Macmillan.

Berlin, I. (2001) 'the Philosophy of Kral Marx' in '*the Power of Idea*', (ed.) Hardy, Pimlico.

Bligh, A. (2001) the Jordanian Army: Between Domistic and The external Challenges', *Middle East Review For International Affair*, Vol. 5. No. 2. http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2001/issue2/jv5n2a2.html

Bolter‹Jay and Grusin, Robert (2000) *Remediation: Understanding New Media*, Cambridge: M.I.T. Press.

Born Hans, Marina Caparini, Karl Haltiner, and Jurgen Kuhlmann, eds. (2006) *Civil-Military Relations in Europe: Learning from Crisis and Institutional Change,* New York: Rutledge.

Bourdieu, Pierre. (2008) *Sketch for a Self-Analysis,* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Bourdieu, P. (1977) *Outline of a Theory of Practice*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Braizat, F. (Arab Barometer Survey Project: Jordan Report', available on (cited 6/10/09) http://www.arabbarometer.org/reports/countryreports/Jordanreport.pdf.

Brownlee, Jason. (2002) Democratization in the Arab World? The Decline of Pluralism in Mubarak's Egypt', *Journal of Democracy*, 13.4. 6-14.

Braudel, F. (1978) *the Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II,* Vol. II tr. Sian Reynilds. Fontana/Collins.

Brooks, Risa. (1998) Political–Military Relations and the Stability of Arab Regimes, *Adelphi Paper* 324. Oxford University Press.

Brown, W. (2008) With Reason on Our Side..., *Theory and Event:* Vol. 11, Issue 4.

Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) *The Logic of Political Survival*, MIT Press.

Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (2008) *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices Jordan,* available at: http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/nea/119118.htm

Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (2008) *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices Oman*, available at: http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/nea/119124.htm

Butrus Abu Manneh, B. (1980) The Christians Between Ottomanism and Syrian Nationalism: The Ideas of Butrus al-Bustani,' *International Journal of Middle East Studies,* Vol. 11.

Carnegie Endowment for international Peace, (2009) *Getting to pluralism: Political Actors in the Arab World,* available on: http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/0916_transcript_pluralism3.pdf (Cited 6/Jan/2010).

Castro-Gomez (2002), the Social Sciences, Epistemic Violence, and the Problem of the "Invention of the Other" *Nepantla: Views from South* Vol. 3. Issue 2.

Chatterjee, Partha. (1986) *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Chomsky, N. (1992) *Deterring Democracy*, Verso, London.

Chomsky, N. (2002) *Understanding Power*, the New Press.

Clawson, P. (2002), 'A Dialogue: Saudi Arabia', SAIS Review of International Affairs Summer–fall.

Coetzee, J.M. (2007) Diary of a Bad Year, the *New York Review of Books*, Vol. 54. No 12. available on: http://www.nybooks.com/articles/20390 (cited on 31/07/09)

Cole, J. (2007) *Napoleon's Egypt: Invading the Middle East,* Palgrave Macmillan.

Colish, M. (1999) Republicanism, Religion, and Machiavelli's Savonarolan Moment, *Journal of the History of Ideas,* 60.4, pp 597-616

Colvin, P. (1998) Muhammad Ali Pasha, the Great Exhibition of 1851, and the School of Oriental and African Studies Library, *Libraries & Culture*, Vol. 33, No. 3, Summer.

Constantine K. Zurayk (1956) *The Meaning of the Disaster*, trans. R. Bayly Winder Khayat's College Book Cooperative. Beirut.

Counts, & Lodge (1949), *'the Country* of the *Blind: The Soviet System of Mind Control*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin com.

Crodesman and Obiad, (2004) *Security Apparatus in Saudi Arabia*, Full Report, Centre of Strategic and international study. http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/sns_military.pdf

Cronin, Stephanie, (2008) Importing Modernity: European Military Missions to Qajar Iran, *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 50, Issue 1, Cambridge University Press.

Cuno, Kenneth M. (2005) 'Constructing Muhammad Ali, *Al-Ahram Weekly*, 10-16 Nov. 2005. http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2005/768/sc1.htm

de La Boetie, Estienne. (1988) *Slave by Choice,* Runnymede Book, Surrey, England.

Deladurantaye, L. (2000) 'Agamben's Potential', *Diacritics* 30.2: pp 3-24.

Deleuze, (1980) 'Leibniz Course Vincennes' - 15/04/1980, available on: http://www.webdeleuze.com/php/texte.php?cle=50&groupe=Leibniz&langue=2

Deleuze, Gilles. (1986) 'The Intellectual and Politics: Foucault and the Prison'. History of the Present 2 (Spring).

Deleuze & Guattari, (1994) *What is Philosophy,* Verso.

Deleuze, G. (2004) *The Logic of Sense*, trans. Mark Lester with Charles Stivale, ed. by Constantin V. Boundas, London: Continuum.

Deleuze & Guattari (2004) *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, Cointinuum, London.

Deleuze, G. & Parnet, C. (2006) *Dialogue II*, Continuum: London.

Demirag, Y. (2008) Pan-ideologies in the Ottoman Empire against the West: from pan-Ottomanism to Pan-Turkism, *Turkish Year Book for International Study*. Vol. XXXVI.

de Mesquita, Bruce Bueno (2002) *The Logic of Political Survival*, available on: http://weber.ucsd.edu/~tkousser/Bueno%20de%20Mesquita%20et%20al%202003%20-%20logic.pdf

Desia et al (2006) *The Logic of Authoritarian Bargains*, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University.

Derrida, Jacques. (1974) *Of Grammatology.* Trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Derrida, J. (2002) The Deconstruction of Actuality, in *Negotiations: Interventions and Interviews 1971-2001,* Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Diamond, Larry. (2010) Why are There no Arab Democracies?, *Journal of Democracy* Vol. 21, No. 1 January.

DiCristina, B. & Gottschalk, M. (2008) The Violence of Persuasive Argument: Using Durkheim to Outline a Latent Barrier to a Nonviolent Criminology, *Critical Criminology*, 16:17–38.

Djad'an, F. (1988) '*uss alatqadm a'nda mofakry alislam fi alalam alArabi alahadith* (the basis for Progress among Muslim Thinkers in Modern Arab World), alshabaka alarabi llabhath walnashr, Beirut.

Dodwell Henry. (1931) *The Founder of Modern Egypt: A Study of Mohamed Ali*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Drysdale, Alasdair. (1985) The Succession Question in Syria, *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 39, No. 2 (spring), pp. 246-257.

Engerman, David C. Nils Gilman, Mark Haefele, and Michael E. Latham, eds., (2003) *Staging Growth: Modernization, Development, and the Global Cold War*, Amherst/Boston: University of Massesachusetts Press.

Ek, R. (2006) Giorgio Agamben and the spatialities of the Camp: an introduction', Geografiska Annaler: Series B, *Human Geography* Vol. 88 Issue 4, pp 363 – 386.

El-Gemeiy, Abdel-Moneim, (2005) Educating Egypt, *Al-Ahram Weekly*, 27 October - 2 November Issue No. 766.

Eric Hobsbawm, (1990) *Nations and Nationalism since 1780*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Esposito, J. (2009) *How to Improve Relations with the Muslim World - Challenges and Promises Ahead*, Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy (*CSID) 10th Annual Conference*, May 5.

Europe's World, (2007) the Army is Turkey's Most Supported Institution', Autumn, 7.

Fakhry, Majid. (1983) *A History of Islamic Philosophy*, Second Edition; Columbia University Press, New York available on http://www.muslimphilosophy.com/ip/hip.htm#pf1 (cited 8/2/2010).

Fanon, Frantz. (2001) *the Wrenched of the Earth*, Penguin London.

Feaver, Peter D. (1999) Civil-Military Relations, *Annual Review of Political Science*. 2:211-41.

Fenves, F. (1998) Out of the Order of Number', Benjamin and Irigaray Toward a Politics of Pure Means, *Diacritics* 28.1.

Fergany, Nader. (2002) A Person Who Is Not Free Is Poor, interview with, *Al-Ahram Weekly*, July 11-17. http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2002/594/ec2.htm

Feser, E. (2003) Hayek on Tradition, *Journal of Libertarian Studies*: Volume 17, No. 1 (Winter 2003). Ludwig von Mises Institute.

FJ. Samuel Fitch (1998) *Military Attitudes toward Democracy in Latin America,* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Formkin, D. (2004) *A Peace to End All Peaces: The Fall of The Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East*, Phoenix, London

Foucault, M. (1975) *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*. (trans) by Alan Sheridan. New York: Vintage Books.

Foucault, M. (1980) *History of Sexuality Vol. I*, (trans). Robert Hurley, Vintage Books, New York.

Foucault, M. (1982) *Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics,* University of Chicago Press.

Foucault, M. (1984) *What is Enlightenment?,* in Rabinow (P.), ed., The Foucault Reader, New York, Pantheon Books.

Foucault, Michel (1997) *Security, Territory, and Population, in: Michel Foucault, Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth*, ed. by Paul Rabinow, New York: The New Press.

Foucault, M. (1991) *Discipline and Punish*, (trans). Alan Sheridan, Penguin.

Foucault, M. (2007) *The Politics of Truth,* Semiotext(s) MIT press.

Foucault, M. (2007) *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France*, 1977-78 Edited by Michel Senellart. (trans) by Graham Burchell. Palgrave Macmillan. London.

Forster, M. (2002) *Herder's Philosophical Writings*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Cambridge

Friedman, M. (2002) *Capitalism and Freedom,* The University of Chicago Press.

Fundy, M. (1994) Tribe vs. Islam: The Post-colonial Arab State and the Democratic Imperative, *Middle East Policy*, Vol. III, No. 48.

Gad'an, F. (1996) altariq elalmustaqbal, afkar-qwa, llazmna alarabya almanzora, Arab Institution for Study and Publication, Beirut.

Gamar, A. (2006) Power, Action, Signs: Between Peirce and Foucault, *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society,* Vol. 42. Issue. 3.

Gause III, F. Gregory. (2003) *From "Over the Horizon", to "into the Backyard": the US Saudi Relationship and the Gulf War'*, in the Middle East and the United State: the Historical and Political Reassessment,' Ed. Lesch, D., Westview Press

Gauthier, D. (2004) *Martin Haeidgger, Emmanuel Levinas, and the Politics of Dwelling,* A Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Louisiana State University and Agriculture and Mechanical College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in The Department of Political Science. Available on (accessed on 6/7/09) http://etd.lsu.edu/docs/available/etd-11052004-163310/unrestricted/Gauthier_dis.pdf

Gershoni and Jankowski (1997) Rethinking Nationalism in the Arab Middle East', Colombia University Press, New York.

Ghalioun, B. (1994) almhna alarabya aldawlla zd alomma, (the Arab Crises the State Agenst the Nation), Arab Unity Centre, Beirut.

Ghalioun, B. (2004) The Persistence of Arab Authoritarianism, *Journal of Democracy* 15.4.

Giacomo Luciani (1990), Allocation vs. Production States: A Theoretical Framework, in: Giacomo Luciani (ed.), *The Arab State*, London: Routledge.

Gilley, Bruce, (2006) The Determinants of State Legitimacy: Results for 72 Countries, *International Political Science Review* / Revue Internationale de science politique, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Jan.), pp. 47-71

Giplin, R. (1981) *War and Change in the World Politics*, Cambridge University, New York.

Gran, P. (2002) Tahtawi in Paris, *Al-Ahram Weekly* Online10 - 16 January Issue No.568 http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2002/568/cu1.htm

Habermas, J. (1974) The Public Sphere: An Encyclopaedia Article, *New German Critique*, Vol. 3 Autumn. http://frank.mtsu.edu/~dryfe/SyllabusMaterials/Classreadings/habermas.pdf

Hafez, Z. (2009) The culture of rent, factionalism, and corruption: a political economy of rent in the Arab World, *Contemporary Arab Affairs,* Vol. 2 Issue 3 July. pp 458 - 480

Haitham Maleh, (2003) *Life as a Permanent State of Emergency*, available onhttp://www.qantara.de/webcom/show_article.php/_c-476/_nr-62/i.html

Haj, S. (1997) *the Making of Iraq, 1900-1963: Capital, Power, and Ideology* (New York: SUNY Press.

Halliday, F. (1973) Saudi Arabia: Bonanza and Repression, *New Left Review* 1/80, July-August.

Hashim Ahmed (2003) Saddam Husayn and Civil-Military Relations in Iraq: The Quest for Legitimacy and Power, *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 57, No. 1 (Winter), pp. 9-41.

Hopwood, D. (1993) *Egypt: Politics and Society 1945-90*, London: Routledge.

Halpern, M. (1963) *the Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Halliday, F. (2007) *Crises of the Middle East: 1914, 1967, 2003*, available on http://www.opendemocracy.net/crises_of_the_middle_east_1914_1967_2003

Halliday, F. (2009) One Big Unhappy Family, *New York Review of Books*, Volume 56, Number 4 ·March 12, HTTP://WWW.NYBOOKS.COM/ARTICLES/ARCHIVES/ 2009/MAR/12/ONE-BIG-UNHAPPY-FAMILY/

Halperin, Sandra. (2005) the Post-Cold War Political Topography of the Middle East: Prospects for Democracy, *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 26, No. 7, pp. 1135-1156

Halpern, M. (1963) *the Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Hanafi, H. (1980) *alturat wal tagded* (the inheritance and renewal), almarkaz al arabi llbahth wal nashr, Cairo.

Hanafi, H. (1983) *fi fikrna almoa'sr* (on Our Contemporary Thinking), dar altanwer llteba'a wal nashr, Beirut.

Hashim, Ahmad. (2003) Saddam Husayn and Civil-military Relations in Iraq: The quest for legitimacy and power, *the Middle East Journal* winter. Vol. 57, Issu. 1.

Haney, David P. (1999) Aesthetics and Ethics in Gadamer, Levinas, and Romanticism: Problems of Phronesis and Techne, *Publications of the Modern Language Association* PMLA, Vol. 114, No. 1, Special Topic: Ethics and Literary Study (Jan), 32-45

Hanfi, S. (2008) *Power, Governmentality, Resistance and State of Exception in the Arab World*, http://www.boellmeo.org/download_en/en_power_conference_summary.pdf

Hardt, M. (2000) *The Withering of Civil Society*, in Hill & Montag (ed) (2000), 'Masseses, Classes, and the Public Sphere', Verso. London.

Hartung, William D, (2003) Bombings Bring U.S. 'Executive Mercenaries' Into the Light, May 16, *Los Angeles Times*.

Hasso, F. (2000) Modernity and Gender in Arab Accounts of the 1948 and 1967 Defeats, *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 32, No. 4 Nov. Cambridge University Press.

Hazem Beblawi (1990) *The Rentier State in the Arab World*, In: Giacomo Luciani (ed.), The Arab State. London: Routledge.

Heakl, M. (2002) *Kalam fi al syasa: wogohat nazar ma'h bdayat alqarn alhadi wal ashren*, (on politics: point of view in the early twenty first century), alsharka amisri llnashre, Cairo.

Heidegger, M. (1993) *Basic Writing*, San Francisco: Harper San Francisco

Hertog, S. (2007) Shaping the Saudi State: Human Agency Shifting Role in Rentier-state Formation, *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 39, Issue. 4. pp539-563

Hintze, Otto (1975) *Military Organization and the Organization of the State*, in the Historical Essays of Otto Hintze, ed. Felix Gilbert (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1975), 178-215.

Hobbes, T. (2002) *Leviathan*, Broadview Literary Text, Canada.

Hobsbawm, Eric (1983) *Introduction: Inventing Tradition.* In: Hobsbawm and Ranger, (1983), 'the Invention of Tradition', Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hohnason, P. (2005) *Intellectuals*, Phoenix, Great Briton.

Hourani, A. (1946) *Syria and Lebanon: A Political Essay*, Oxford University Press. London.

Hourani, Albert. (1981) *the Emergence of the Modern Middle East*, Berkeley: University of California Press.

Hourani, A. (1983) *Arabic thought in the liberal age 1798-1939*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Hourani, A. (1991) *A History of the Arab People*, Faber and Faber, London.

Hourani, G. (1976) *Averroes: on the Harmony of Religion and Philosophy*, Messrs. Luzac & Co. London

Hroub, K. (2010) West doesn't Want a democratic Middle East, *the Japan Times*, Thursday, may 20.

Hudson, Michael C. (1977) *Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy*, New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

Hudson, Michael C. (1996) To Play the Hegemony: Fifty Years of US Policy toward the Middle East, *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 50, No. 3 (Summer), pp. 329-343.

Human Rights in the Arab Region: Annual report (2008) *From Exporting Terrorism to Exporting Repression,* Cairo; Institute for Human Right Studies.

Human Rights Watch. (1991) *Syria Unmasked: The Suppression of Human Rights by the Asad Regime*, New Haven, Connecticut,Yale University Press.

Human Rights Watch Report (1993) *Genocide in Iraq: the Anfal The Campaign Against the Kurds*, Human Rights Watch, Available on line: http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1993/iraqanfal/

Hume, David. (1987) *Of the First Principles of Government*, in Essays, Literary, Moral and Political. Indianapolis, Ind.: Liberty Fund.

Huntington, Samuel P. (1991) Democracy's Third Wave, *Journal of Democracy*, Volume 2, Number 2, Spring, pp. 12-34

Huntington, Samuel. P. (1968) *Political Order in the Changing Societies*, Yale University Press.

Huntington, Samuel P. (1995) Reforming Civil-Military Relations, *Journal of Democracy*, Volume 6, Number 4, October

Ibanez-Noe, Javier, (1999) The Dialectic of Emancipation and Power and the Nihilistic Character of Modernity, *Clio*, V28, No 2 Winter 1999 149-168

Ibn Khaldun, (1967) *The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History*, tr. Franz Rosenthal, Princeton University Press.

Ibn Asakir, (1928) *Tabyin alKadhib al-Muftari*, Damascus.

Ibrahim, S. (2007) Toward Muslim Democracies, *Journal of Democracy*, Volume 18, Number 2, April.

Ibrahim S. (2007) 'the King Faruk: nostalgia for a better time', *al sharq alawsat*, http://www.eicds.org/arabic/publicationsAR/saadarticles/07/october/kingfarouk.html

International Crisis Group; Middle East Briefing, (2003) '*The Challenge of Political Reform: Egypt after the Iraq War*', available on: (cited on 16/10/09) http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?l=1&id=2297

Imara, Muhammad (1972) *al-Islam wa-usul al-hukm li-`Ali `Abd al-Raziq* (Islam and the Foundation of Government of 'Ali Abd al-Raziq), Beirut: al-Mu'assasat al-`Arabiyya lil-Dirasat w-al-Nashr.

Inalcik, Halil, (1975) *the Middle East and North Africa in World Politics: A Documentary Record,* Yale University Press, New Haven.

Index on Censorship, (2005) 'the Minister and the Mosque', Vol. 34, Issue 2, May , pp. 84–85

I nstitute for War and Peace Reporting, (2009) *Calls for Inquiry Into Kurdish Soldiers Deaths* 12 May, available on: http://www.iwpr.net/report-news/calls-inquiry-kurdish-soldiers%E2%80%99-deaths

Iqbal, F. (2006) *Sustaining Gains in Poverty Reduction and Human Development in the Middle East and North Africa*, World Bank Report. http://siteresources.worldbank.org /INTMENA/Resources/Poverty_complete_06_web.pdf

Janice E. Thomson, (1994) *Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns: State Building and Extraterritorial Violence in Early Modern Europe*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press.

Jenkins, J. (2004) German Orientalism: Introduction, *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East*, 24(2):97-100

Johson, A. (2007) A Politics of Inclusion: An Interview with Saad Eddin Ibrahim', *Democratiya*, 8 Spring.

Middle East Initiative (2001) *Human Rights Defenders in Jordan: Government Undoing a Decade of Reform Jordanian antiterrorism law*, October 8, http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/middle_east/jordan/hrd_jordan.htm

Jouejati, M. (2005) *Syria: From Authoritarianism to Benevolence*, Middle East Institute September 06, http://www.mideasti.org/scholars/editorial/syria-authoritarianism-benevolencehttp://www.meforum.org/465/hafiz-al-asad-discovers-islam

Kadhim, A. (2006) Civil-Military Relations in Iraq (1921-2006): An Introductory Survey, *Strategic Insights*, Vol. V, Issue 5 (May)

Kamrava, Mehran. (2000) Military Professionalization and Civil-Military Relations in the Middle East, *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 115, No. 1, Spring, pp. 67-92.

Kant, I. (1748) '*An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment*?', Available on http://www-personal.ksu.edu/~lyman/english233/Kant-WIE-intro.htm

Karsh, E. (2006) *Arab Imperialism: The Tragedy of the Middle East*, The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel, Mideast Security.

Karsh, E & Karsh I. (2001) *Empire of the Sand: the Struggle for the Master in the Middle East*, 1789-1923. Harvard University Press.

Kattsoff, Louis O. (1953) Man is the Measure of all Things, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol. 13, No. 4 (Jun.), pp. 452-466

Kaufer, S. (2003) Schemata, Hammers, and Time: Heidegger's Two Derivations of Judgment, *Topoi* Vol. 22, pp. 79–91.

Kausch, K. (2009) *Defenders in Retreat: Freedom of Association and Civil Society in Egypt*, Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior (FRIDE).

Kawakbi, A. (1984) *The Character of Despotism and the Downfall of Slavery*, Dar un-Nafa-es, Beirut.

Kayali, Hasan. (1997) *Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire', 1908-1918*. University of California Press, Berkeley.

Kedourie, E. (1960) *Nationalism*, Hutchinson University Library, London.

Keller, G. (2006) *Economic Development in Syria: Crawling towards a Market Economy*, http://en.qantara.de/webcom/show_article.php/_c-476/_nr-696/i.html

Khomeini, I. (2002) *Islamic Government: Governance of the Jurist*, (trans). Prof. Hamid Algar, The Institute for Compilation and Publication of Imam Khomeini's Works (International Affairs Department).

Khouri, R. (2009) Why is it that the Arabs don't revolt?, *The Daily Star*, 27 June.

Kodmani, Bassma. (2005) *The Dangers of political Exclusion: Egypt's Islamist Problem*, Carnegie Papers, No 63.

Kurzman, Charles & Owens, Lynn. (2002) The Sociology of Intellectuals, *Annual Review of Sociology*, Vol. 28, pp. 63-90.

Kramer, Martin. (2001) *Ivory Towers on Sand: The Failure of Middle Eastern Studies in America,* Washington: The Brookings Institute.

Lane, D. (2008) 'From Chaotic to State-led Capitalism' *New Political Economy*, Vol. 13, No. 2, June.

Latour, B. (2007) *Welcome to an Idea*?, http://www.bruno-latour.fr/presse/presse_art/GB-07%20DOMUS%2007-04.html Available on (cited 13/10/09)

Latour, B. (2007) *It's development, stupid! or: How to Modernize Modernization*, available on http://www.brunolatour.fr/articles/article/107 NORDHAUS&SHELLENBERGER.pdf (cited 13/10/09)

Lazarus, Richard S., and Raymond Launier. (1978) *Stress Related Transactions Between Person and Environment.* in Perspectives in Interactional Psychology, edited by L.A. Pervin and M. Lewis. New York, NY: Plenum, Pp. 287-327

Le Corbusier (Charles-Edouard Jeanneret), (1987) *Journey to the East*, (trans). Ivan Zaknic and Nicole Pertuiset MIT Press Cambridge.

Levinas, E. (1994) *The State of Caesar and the State of David*, In Beyond the Verse: Talmudic Readings and Lectures. Translated by Gary D. Mole. The Athlone Press. London.

Levinas, Emmanuel. (1961) *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority*, (trans) Alphonso Lingis. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press.

Levy, Bernard- Henri. (2004) *War, Evil, and the End of History*, Melville House Publishing.

Lewis, B. (1961) *the Emergence of the Modern Turkey*, Oxford University Press.

Lewis, B. (1996) The Middle East, Westernized Despite Itself, *Middle East Quarterly* March Vol.III No. I.

Lewis, B. (2002) *What Went Wrong: Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response'* Phoenix.

Lewis, B (2003) *Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror,* (New York: Modern Library

Lewis, B. (2004) *From Babel to Dragomans: Interpreting the Middle East*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Lewis, B. (2005) Freedom and Justice in the Modern Middle East, *Foreign Affairs*, May/June.

Lipset, S.M. (1960) *Political Man: The Social Basis of Politics,* Garden City, NJ: Doubleday.

Little, D. (2002) *American Orientalism: the United State and the Middle East Since 1945 Chapel Hill*, University of North Carolina Press.

London School of Economics (LSE) (2004) *What is Civil Society*, http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/CCS/what_is_civil_society.htm

Lucas, R. (2005) *Institutions and the Politics of Survival in Jordan: Domestic Responses to The external Challenges*, 1988-2001', NY University Press.

Lucham A.R. (1961) A Comparative Typology of Civil-Military Relations, *Government and Opposition*, Vol.6.

Lyotard, Jean-François (1984) *The Postmodern Condition: A Report of Knowledge.* Trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Giacomo Luciani (1990) *Allocation vs. Production States: A Theoretical Framework*, in: Giacomo Luciani (ed.), *the Arab State*, London: Routledge.

Machiavelli, N. (1979) *the Prince,* Oxford University Press. Oxford.

MacKenzie, I. (2008) What is a political Event, *Theory and Event*, Vol. 11, issue 3.

McArthur, B. (1991) *Penguin Book of Twentieth Century Speeches*, London: Viking Penguin.

McLuhan, Marshall, (1964) *Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man*, New York: McGraw Hill.

Madan, T. N. (1987) Secularism in Its Place, *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 46, No. 4 (Nov.), pp. 747-759.

Madison, J. (1787) *the Federalist Paper No. 10*, available on: http://avalon.law.yale.edu /18thcentury/fed10.asp.

Mahdavy, H. (1970) *The Pattern and Problems of Economic Development in Rentier States: The Case of Iran*,' in Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East, ed. M.A. Cook Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Makiya, K. (1989) *Republic of Fear*, University of California Press

Makiya, Kanan. (1995) Toleration and the New Arab Politics, *Journal of Democracy,* Vol. 6. No. 1, pp. 90-103

Makiya, Kanan. (1996) *alqswa walsamt*, Crulity and silence', manshorat haeat irsal aliIraqia, Irbil.

Makiya, Kanan (2005) All Levels of the Iraqi Government Were Complicit, *Middle East Quarterly*, Spring, pp. 81-87

Makwi, A. (1994) *Jzor alistibd: qira'a fi aladab alqadim,* (the Roots of Despotism: Reading of the ancient literature), alam alfikr, Kuwait.

Mark Charles Fissel, (2009) The August Arsenal, *The Journal of Military History*, Volume 73, Number 1, January.

Martin, James (1998) *Gramsci's Political Analysis: A Critical Introduction*, Basingstoke: Macmillian Press.

Marx, K. (1843) *Contribution to Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Rights*, http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1843/critique-hpr/intro.htm

Marx, K and F. Engels. (1959) *On Colonialism*, Moscow: Progress Publishers

Marx, Karl, and Frederick Engels. (1970) *The German Ideology*. Ed. C. J. Author. New York: Inter-national Publishers.

Marx and Engels, (1972) *Introduction to 'Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right'*, On Religion, Moscow.

Marx, K. (1975) *Early Writings,* Harmondsworth: Penguin/ New Left Review.

Marx, K, (1897) *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*. http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/1/3/4/1346/1346.txt Accessed on 29-08-2008.

Mattick, P. (1958) Oriental Despotism, A Comparative Study of Total Power, *American Socialist*, vol. 5, April, No. 4, p. 23

Meagher, Robert, (1988) Techne, *Perspecta,* Vol. 24, pp. 159-164

Metz, Helen Chapin ed. (1988) 'Iraq: A Country Study'. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress. http://countrystudies.us/iraq/

Migdal, J. (1988) 'Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World' Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Mill, J.S. (1984) "A Few Words on Non-Intervention", in Collected Works of John Stuart Mill: Essays on Equality, Law, and Education, vol. XXI, ed. John M. Robson Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Mitchell, Timothy. (1991) 'Colonising Egypt', Berkeley, University of California Press.

Mitchell, Richard P (1993) the Society of the Muslim Brothers, Oxford University Press, New York

Moadde, M. (2002) 'the Study of Islamic Culture and Politics: An Overview and Assessment' Annul Review of Sociology. Vol.28. pp359–86

Moore, M. (2004) 'Revenues, State Formation, and the Quality of Governance in Developing Countries' International Political Science Review / Revue internationale de science politique, Vol. 25, No. 3.

Mordechai Kedar, (2001) 'The State Religion in Syria under Asad: The Islamic Thought of Dr. Muhammad Sa'id al-Buti (in Hebrew), Hamizrah Hehadash, Vol. XLII.

Moustafa, T. (2000) 'Conflict and Cooperation between the State and Religious Institutions in Contemporary Egypt', International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 32, No. 1 Cambridge University Press.

Mursi Saad El-Din (2005) 'Plain Talk' Al-Ahram Weekly: 25 - 31 August. Issue No. 757.

Mustafa Reshid Celebi Effendi, 'An explanation of the nizam-y-gedid', in William Wilkinson, An Account of the Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia Including Various Political Observations Relating to Them (London: Longman *et al*, 1820), appendix 5, p. 234. From Mitchell, T. (1991) 'Colonising Egypt', University of California Press. Berkeley

Naiden, F.S. (2007) 'Lines in the Sand', Wilson Quarterly, Winter. Available on (cited on 27/07/09) http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=wq.essay&essay_id=215626

Nagm, Muhammad Yusif, (1967) *Alawmel alfa'ala fi takwen fik alarabi alhadith* (the effective factors in making modern Arab thinking) from Arab thinking in a century Ed. Fauad Sarof American University Beirut, Beirut.

Najjar, Fauzi. (2008) The Future of Democracy in Egypt, *Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies* Vol. 17, No. 2, 117–133, Summer.

Napoleoni, L. (2005) *Insurgent Iraq: Al-Zarqawi and the New Generation*, Constable London.

Nevo, J. (2008) Introduction, *Civil Wars*, Volume 10, Issue 3 September, pages 213 - 216

Ní Aoláin, & F. The Campbell, C. (2005) The Paradox of Transition in Conflicted Democracies, *Human Rights Quarterly* 27.1. 172-213

Nietzsche, F. (1989) *Beyond Good and Evil*, Vintage Books.

Oakeshott, M. (1962) Rationalism in Politics, in *Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays:* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Nwaehz, W. (1992). Ishakalyat al dwal al arabya al mu'hsara: al infsal an al mojtamah' the problem of the Modern Arab states: separation from society. *Mujalat al ijtihad*, No 14, Beirut.

Okruhlik G. (1999) Rentier Wealth, Unruly Law, and the Rise of Opposition: The Political Economy of Oil States, *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 31, No. 3 Apr., pp. 295-315.

Oliver J. Thatcher, ed.(1907) *The Library of Original Sources, Milwaukee*, University Research Extension Co. Vol. III: The Roman World.

Omar El-Keddi, (2009) *The World's Longest-Held Prisoner*, translated by Ghenwa Hayek (available on) http://www.banipal.co.uk/selections/selection.php?workid=186

Ottaway, M. (2004) *Democracy and Constituencies in the Arab World*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Carnegie Paper No. 48, July 2004 http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=1575&prog=zot&proj=zdrl

Owen, R. (2007). Uninvited Guest', the Nation, *alHayat,* available at: http://www.thenation.com/doc/20070924/owen/print

Pachachy, A. (1991) *Iraq's Voice at the United Nation 1959-69: A personal Record*, Quratet Books, London.

Pappé, I. (2007) *The Modern Middle East*, Routledge, London and NY.

Pargament, Kenneth I. (1997) *The Psychology of Religion and Coping: Theory, Research, Practice*, New York, NY: The Guilford Press.

Perlmutter, Amos, (1981) *Praetorian Army and Praetorian State*, in Perlmutter, Political Roles and Military Rulers, London: Frank Cass.

Perlmutter, Amos & LeoGrande, William M. (1982) The Party in Uniform: Toward a Theory of Civil-Military Relations in Communist Political Systems, *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 76, No. 4 (Dec.), pp. 778-789

Pia Pedani, Maria (2002) *Dalla frontiera al confine*, (From the border to boundary), Roma, Herder.

Plato. *Phaedrus*, Translated by Benjamin Jowett available on http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/phaedrus.html

Pollack, Kenneth M. (2002) 'Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948–1991. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.

Popper, K. (1986) Utopia and Violence, *World Affairs*, Vol. 149, No.1.

Price, David. (1994) Wittfogel's Neglected Hydraulic/Hydroagricultural Distinction, *Journal of Anthropological Research*, Vol. 50, No. 2 (Summer), pp. 187-204

Price, J. (2002) The Apotheosis of Home and the Maintenance of Spaces of Violence, *Hypatia* 17.4.

Quinlivan, James T. (1999) Coup-Proofing: Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle East, *International Security*, Vol. 24, No. 2. (Autumn), pp. 131-165.

Rabbat, N. (2005) A Mosque and an Imperial Dream, *Al-Ahram Weekly* 18-24 August No. 756.

Ranciere, J. (2001) Ten Theses on Politics, *Theory and Event*, Vol. 5, No.3.

Ranciere, J. (1999) *Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy,* trans. J. Rose, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Razi, Hossein. (1990) Legitimacy, Religion, and Nationalism in the Middle East, *The American Political Science Review,* Vol. 84, No. 1 (Mar.).

Reiss, T. (2008) Freedom at Gunpoint, *New York Book Review*, Jan 6.

Reiter, Dan and Stam III, Allan C. (2002) *Democracies at War.* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,

MITCHELL, Richard P.: The Society of the Muslim Brothers. (New York

1993), 14

Robert-Jan van Pelt, (1994) Auschwitz: From Architect's Promise to Inmate's Perdition, *Modernism/Modernity* Vol.1. No.1

Rodinson, M. (1976) A Marxist View of Arabia, *New Left Review* I/95, January-February.

Ross, M. (2001) Does Oil Hinder Democracy?, *World Politics* 53.3 pp 325-361

Rowland, (2009) With Berlusconi in the Soup, *New York Review of Books*, Vol. 56, No 19 Dec 3.

Roxanne L. Euben, (2006) *Journeys to the Other Shore: Muslim and Western Travellers in Search of Knowledge,* Princeton; Princeton University Press.

Rubin, B. (2006) Arab Liberals Argue About America, *the Middle East Quarterly*, Winter, Vol. XIII, NO. I.

Rubin, B. (2001) The Military in Contemporary Middle East Politics, *Middle East Review of International Affair*, Volume 5, No. 1 – March.

Saeed, Abdullah. (1999) Rethinking Citizenship Rights of Non-Muslims in an Islamic State: Rashīd al-Ghannūshī's contribution to the evolving debate, *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations*, Vol. 10. No. 3.

Said, E. W. (1997) *Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World*, New York: Vintage Books.

Salzman, Philip Carl. (2008) The Middle East's Tribal DNA, *Middle East Quarterly*, Winter.

Salih, Hashim, (2002) *qiraaat fi al atnwer alalmany: lmaza tqadama Europe wa taaghra alakhron,* 'Reading German Enlightenment: Why did Europe Progressed while the other not', available on http://www.aawsat.com/leader.asp?section=3&article=117361&issueno=8655

Schedler, A. (1997) *The End of Politics: Exploration of Modern Anti-politics*, Macmillan Press LTD, Great Briton.

Schiller, F. (2006) *The Thirty Years War*, available on http://www.gutenberg.org/files/6775/6775-h/6775-h.htm (cited on 14/7/09)

Schivelbusch, W. (2003) the Culture of Defeat: On National Trauma, Mourning, and Recovery, *Granta*, London.

Schmitt, C. (1985) *Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty*, Cambridge: M.I.T. Press.

Schweber, Simone (2008) Here There Is No Why : Holocaust Education at a Lubavitch Girls' Yeshivah,' *Jewish Social Studies: History, Culture, Society* n.s. 14, No. 2 (Winter): 156–185.

Scott, Rachel M. (2007) Contextual Citizenship in Modern Islamic Thought, *Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations*, Vol. 18, No. 1, 1–18, January.

Seale, Patrick. (1988) *Asad: The Struggle for the Middle East*, Berkeley. University of California Press.

Sean L. Yom & Al-Momani, Mohammad H., (2008) the International Dimension of Authoritarian Regime Stability: Jordan in Post-Cold War, *Arab Studies Quarterly*, winter, Vol. 30, Issue 1.

Seeba, Hinrich C. (2003) Trostgründe: Cultural Nationalism and Historical Legitimation in Nineteenth-Century German Literary Histories, *Modern Language Quarterly* MLQ Vol.64. No. 2.

Segev, T. (2007) *1967: Israel, the War, and the Year that Transformed the Middle East'*, Abacus, London.

Serres, M. (1982) *The Parasite*, Lawrence Schehr, trans., Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.

Sharabi, H. (1988) *Neopatriarchy, a Theory of Distorted Change in Arab Society*, Oxford University Press, New York.

Sharabi, H. (1984) *Muqadimat ldirasat almugtama' al arabi', dar almutahida llnashr*, Beirut.

Shatz, Adam, (2010) Mubarak's Last Breath, *London Review of Books*, Vol. 32 No. 10. 27 May. Available on http://www.lrb.co.uk/v32/n10/adam-shatz/mubaraks-last-breath (cited, 21/5/10)

Sheehi, Stephen (1997) Failure, modernity, and the works of Hisham Sharabi: Towards a postcolonial critique of Arab subjectivity, *Middle East Critique*, Volume 6 Issue 10 Spring.

Sheehi, S. (2005) Arabic Literary-Scientific Journals: Precedence for Globalization and the Creation of Modernity, *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 25.2.

Sigmund, Paul (1993) Approaches to the Study of the Military in Latin America, *Comparative Politics*, No. 26, pp. 111-122.

Simmel, Georg. (1910-11) How is Society Possible? *American Journal of Sociology* 16, 372-391

Simmel, Georg. (1996) *Bridge and Door*, in Rethinking Architecture: A Reader in Cultural Theory (Ed.) N. Leach. Routledge: London.

Slackman, M. (2009) Khasaba Journal: With Murmurs of Change, Sultan Tightens Grip, *New York Times* 15/5/2009.

State Department Bureau of Democracy (2009) *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices*, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/nea/119124.htm

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), (2010) *Year Book*, Oxford University Press.

Strathern, P. (2008) *Napoleon in Egypt*, Vintage Books, London.

Strauss, L. (1965) *Preface to Spinoza's Critique of Religion,* trans. E. M. Sinclair, Schocken, New York.

Stockholm international Peace Research Institution (2003) 'Military expenditure as a share of GDP, 1998-2003', Available on

http://www.sipri.org/contents/milap/milex/mex_share_gdp.html (citied on June 2009)

Strinati, Dominic (1995) *An Introduction to Theories of Popular Culture*, Routledge, London.

Swartz, D. (1996), 'Bridging the study of culture and religion: Pierre Bourdieu's political economy of symbolic power', Sociology of Religion, Spring.

The Sykes-Picot Agreement available on: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_depth/middle_east/2001/israel_and_the_palestinians/key_documents/1681362.stm (cited on 19/01/2010

Tahtawi, R. (1977) *al-A`mal al-kamila Vol.2,* ed. Muhammad Ummara, almoasasa alarabia lldrasat oa alnashr, Beirut

Tarabishi, G. (1982) *The Territorial State and the Nationalist Theory*, Dar alTali'a, Beirut.

Tarabishi, G. (2006) *Harqatat: a'n demokatya, almanya, hadatha and momana'a alarabia*, Da alsaqi, Beirut.

Tarbush, M. (1982) *The Role of the Military in Politics: A Case Study of Iraq to 1941*, KPI, London.

Taylor, Peter, J. (1994) State as a Container: Territoriality in the Modern World System, *Progress in Human Geography*, Vol.18, No.2.

Taylor, C. (1999) Two Theories of Modernity, *Public Culture*, No. 11, V. 1, 153-156.

Thomson, A. (2000) *An Introduction to African Politics*, Routledge

Tilly, C. (1985) *War Making and State Making as Organised Crime*, in 'Bringing the State Back In' ed. Peter Evans, et al Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Turkone, M, (2003) *Islamciligın Dogusu*, Ankara: Lotus Yayınevi. Quoted in Demirag , Y. (2005) Pan Ideologies in the Ottoman Empire against the West: From Pan-Ottomanism to Pan-Turkism, The Turkish Year Book Vol. XXXVI.

Tyler, P. (2009) *A World of Trouble: American in the Middle East*, Portobello, London.

United States Department of State, (2008) *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – Syria,* 25 February 2009, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/49a8f14da7.html

United States Department of State, (2008) *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – Egypt*, 25 February 2009, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/49a8f191af.htm

United Nation Report: Commission on Human Rights (1997) Geneva available at: http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/TestFrame/71e8763786cca82a8025666b00

Vein Liebl, (1991) *The Other Side of the Jebel (Hill), Command Magazine*, Issue 13, November- December, p. 33.

Vladislav, J. (1986) *Václav Havel or Living in Truth*, London: Faber & Faber.

Waterbury, John (1994) *Democracy without Democrats? The Potential for Political Liberalization in the Middle East*, in Ghassan Salamé, ed., Democracy without Democrats? The Renewal of Politics in the Muslim World. New York: I. B. Tauris.

Waterbury, John. (1983) *The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: the Political Economy of the Two Regimes*, Princeton University Press.

Weber, M. (1961) *General Economic History*, Collier Books, New York.

Weber, M. (1992) *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, Harper Collins Academic

http://www.ne.jp/asahi/moriyuki/abukuma/weber/world/ethic/pro_eth_5.html

Willoughby, John. (2008) Segmented Feminization and the Decline of Neopatriarchy in GCC Countries of the Persian Gulf, *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* Vol. 28, No. 1.

Wittfogel, K. (1957) *Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power*, Yale University Press, New Heaven.

Wolin, R. (1990) Carl Schmitt, Political Existentialism, and the Total State, *Theory and Society*, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Aug), pp. 389-416.

Yael Navaro-Yashin, (2002) *Faces of the State: Secularism and Public Life in Turkey*, Princeton University Press. The first chapter available on line http://press.princeton.edu/chapters/i7285.html

Yates, D. (1996) 'the Renteir State in Africa: Oil Rent Dependency and Neocolonialism in Republic of Gabon' Trenton, NJ: African World Press.

Yazbeck Haddad, (1996) *Operation Desert Storm and the War of the Fatwas*, in Islamic Legal Interpretation: Muftis and Their Fatwas, Cambridge, Masses.: Harvard University Press.

Yom, S. (2008) *Towards a Theory of Cliency: The International Dimensions of Regime Survival in the Middle East*, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the ISA's 49th annual convention, Bridging Multiple Divide, http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p251292_index.html

Zakaria, F. (2001) Why Do They Hate Us?, *Newsweek*, 15 October, http://www.fareedzakaria.com/articles/archive.html.

Zakaria, F. (2003) *the Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad*, w.w Norton & Company.

Zisser, E. (1995) The Succession Struggle in Damascus, *Middle East Quarterly*, Sep. Vol. II No. 3.

Zisser, Eyal, (1999) Hafiz al-Asad Discovers Islam, *Middle East Quarterly*, March, Vol. VI. No. I.

Zisser. Eyal. (2005) Syria, the Ba'th Regime and the Islamic Movement: Stepping on a New Path?, *Muslim World*, 95 No 1. January

Zizek, S. (2003) *Organ Without Body: on Deleuze and Consequences*, Routledge, London, available on: http://www.lacan.com/zizsanctuary.html.

Zreq, Q. (1998) mal *'amal: hasith el alagyal altal'a*, (What Ought to be Done: to the Leading Generation) Arab Unity Centre, Beirut.

Zreq Qonstantine K. (1956), 'The Meaning of the Disaster, trans. R. Bayly Winder Khayat's College Book Cooperative. Beirut.