

Title	Defence planning in Ireland
Authors	Crummey, Declan
Publication date	2022-10-06
Original Citation	Crummey, D. 2022. Defence planning in Ireland. MRes Thesis, University College Cork.
Type of publication	Masters thesis (Research)
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Download date	2025-09-08 20:27:18
Item downloaded from	https://hdl.handle.net/10468/14512

Ollscoil na hÉireann, Corcaigh
National University of Ireland, Cork



Defence Planning in Ireland

Thesis presented by
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for the degree of
MRES Government and Public Policy

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2022

TABLE OF CONTENTS

STUDENT DECLARATION	iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	v
ABSTRACT	vi
LIST OF FIGURES	vii
LIST OF ACRONYMS	ix
CHAPTER ONE – INTRODUCTION	1
Introduction.....	1
Defence Planning in Ireland	2
Research Question	3
Structure of the Thesis	3
CHAPTER TWO – LITERATURE REVIEW	4
Introduction	4
Defence Planning and Uncertainty	4
<i>Origins of Defence Planning</i>	4
<i>What is Defence Planning?</i>	5
<i>Resourcing Uncertainty</i>	7
Defence Planning and Public Policy	8
<i>Theory of Decision-making</i>	8
<i>Policy-making</i>	10
<i>Defence Policy and Defence Organisations</i>	12
<i>Policy and Strategy</i>	15
Defence Planning and Civil-Military Relations	17
<i>Control and Effectiveness</i>	18
Defence Planning Models	20
<i>Defence Planning Framework</i>	20
<i>Generic Model of Defence Planning</i>	22
<i>NATO Defence Planning</i>	24
<i>EU Defence Planning</i>	25
<i>Congruence of the Defence Planning Models</i>	27
Chapter Summary	29

CHAPTER THREE – METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN	31
Introduction	31
Research Philosophy	31
Research Methodology	32
<i>A Mixed-Methods Study</i>	32
<i>The Phenomenological Approach</i>	33
<i>Data Collection</i>	34
<i>Sampling</i>	36
<i>Ethical Considerations</i>	38
<i>Data Analysis</i>	38
Strengths and Limitations	38
Chapter Summary	39
CHAPTER FOUR – IRISH DEFENCE CONTEXT	40
Introduction	40
Historical Defence Context	40
<i>Formative Defence Planning</i>	41
<i>Control Vs Effectiveness</i>	43
<i>The Modern Era</i>	46
Current Defence Management Structures	47
<i>The Civil Element</i>	48
<i>The Military Element</i>	50
<i>Relationship between the Civil Element and the Military Element ...</i>	51
<i>Current Finance and Procurement Structures</i>	53
Recent Developments	54
Chapter Summary	56
CHAPTER FIVE – RESEARCH FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS	57
Introduction	57
Defence Planning and Uncertainty	57
<i>What is Defence Planning in Ireland?</i>	57
<i>Resourcing Uncertainty or Uncertain Resourcing?</i>	60
Defence Planning and Public Policy	63

<i>Defence Policy in Ireland</i>	64
<i>Policy-making</i>	67
<i>Defence Organisation</i>	71
<i>Policy and Strategy</i>	74
Defence Planning and Civil-Military Relations	78
<i>Effective Control?</i>	78
Defence Planning Models	82
<i>(The lack of) Capability Based Planning</i>	85
<i>International Influence</i>	88
Ireland's Defence Planning Model	89
<i>Congruence of Ireland's Defence Planning Model with</i> <i>International Models</i>	92
<i>The Future of Defence Planning in Ireland</i>	96
Chapter Summary	97
CHAPTER SIX – CONCLUSION	98
Introduction	98
Key Findings	98
<i>Defence Planning in Ireland</i>	98
<i>Theory of Public Policy</i>	98
<i>Organisation and Relationships</i>	99
<i>Ireland's Defence Planning Model</i>	100
Strengths and Limitations of the Research	101
<i>Strengths</i>	101
<i>Limitations</i>	102
Areas for Further Research	102
Conclusion	102
APPENDIX A – Interview Information Sheet and Consent Form	104
APPENDIX B – Semi-Structured Interview Questions	107
APPENDIX C – Survey Information Sheet and Consent Form	111
APPENDIX D – Survey - Defence Planning in Ireland	114
BIBLIOGRAPHY	124

MRES
STUDENT DECLARATION

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DECLAN CRUMMEY

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to acknowledge the assistance, guidance and encouragement of Prof. Andrew Cottey, UCC. The constructive and valued feedback was always appreciated and required.

I wish to express my sincere appreciation to the participants of this research. They engaged fully and expressed personal views on sensitive areas in an open and frank manner. Without their level of engagement and contribution this study would not have been possible.

My thanks and appreciation to Mike for his advice throughout.

Finally, I would like to thank Elaine, Molly and Paddy for their support, understanding and patience during this process.

ABSTRACT

(Word Count 26,749)

This research explores defence planning in Ireland, establishing incrementalism as the theory of public policy that best reflects decision-making in Ireland's defence policy. The research also establishes the institutions and actors that are involved, how they are organised and what relationship exists between them, while identifying Ireland's defence planning model.

The challenge of how a society plans for and manages defence, and defence planning as a practice to meet this challenge, has existed throughout history. Most modern democratic states maintain the ability to organise a collective military force. The procedures and processes that determine what that military force consists of, and what it can do, is defence planning. Effective and efficient defence planning is more concerned with the form and function of the future military force than the deployment of the current one.

The research was conducted from a mixed-method, concurrent quantitative and qualitative design position utilising the phenomenological approach. Three (3) primary methods of data collection were identified by the researcher in this mixed-methods research design – document review, interviews, and a web-based survey.

The findings indicate that structured defence planning occurs in Ireland. Defence planning in Ireland recognises specific national challenges in relation to threat perception, a traditionally low defence spend and the lack of a national discourse on defence matters. There is a clearly defined structure for the management of defence planning in Ireland from the Government through the Minister for Defence to the civil and military elements of the Department of Defence. The primary tool utilised for defence policy is a White Paper process but there is uncertainty about how this policy will be expressed in the future. There have only been two (2) White Papers on Defence in the history of the State. From a historical reluctance to formulate defence policy, incrementalism has emerged as the prevailing theory of public policy underpinning defence in Ireland.

The civil-military relationship in Ireland is not clearly defined. As a result, there are different interpretations, understandings and perspectives between civil and military personnel. Threat-based planning is stated to be the planning framework for defence policy but the research indicates that a combination of resource constrained planning and incremental planning is more accurate. There is influence from, and engagement with, International Organisations evident in Ireland's defence planning but a NATO or EU approach is not adopted. A critical gap identified in the historical and current context, is the lack of clearly defined and stated threats and subsequent tasks for the military force. This should exist as a high-level policy parameter such as a National Security Strategy to which a subordinate defence policy can be nested and clear tasks and objectives can be determined for the military.

LIST OF FIGURES

	Page
Figure 2.1. The Policy Process (Cairney, 2020)	11
Figure 2.2. Defence Organisation Model Interaction Grid (Grant & Milenski, 2019)	14
Figure 2.3. Strategy and Defence Planning (Gray, 2014)	16
Figure 2.4. Strategic Defence Management Loop (De Spiegeleire et.al., 2009)	23
Figure 2.5. The NATO Defence Planning Process (NATO, 2022)	24
Figure 2.6. The Elements of the EU Defence Planning Process (EU, 2018)	26
Figure 2.7. Sequential Questions for Defence Planning (EU, 2018)	27
Figure 2.8. Congruence of Defence Planning Models for assessing Ireland's Defence Planning (Author, 2022)	28
 Figure 3.1. Concurrent Quan+Qual Mixed-Methods Design Logic (Plano Clark & Ivankova, 2016)	 33
Figure 3.2. Primary Source Documentation (Author, 2022)	35
 Figure 4.1. Structure of the Civil Element of DoD (Author, 2022)	 49
Figure 4.2. Structure of the Military Element of DoD (DF, 2017)	51
Figure 4.3. Consolidated Structure of DoD (Author, 2022)	53
Figure 4.4. Government Level of Ambition used to frame the Capability Requirements of the DF (HLAP, 2022)	55
 Figure 5.1. Decision on defence requirements in Ireland are based on the National Interest? (Author, 2022)	 59
Figure 5.2. Open and explicit analysis with transparent data and assumptions form the basis of major decisions on defence requirements in Ireland? (Author, 2022)	60
Figure 5.3. Ireland's Defence Spending indicating the Projected Increase for LOA 2 as identified by the CODF (Irish Fiscal Advisory Council, 2022)	62

Figure 5.4.	Defence planning in Ireland is robust enough to deal with adverse shocks? (Author, 2022)	63
Figure 5.5.	General Theory of Decision-making in Ireland's Defence Policy (Author, 2022)	64
Figure 5.6.	Ireland's Current White Paper on Defence Policy Cycle (Author, 2022)	66
Figure 5.7.	The formulated defence policy will be implemented? (Author, 2022) .	69
Figure 5.8.	The formulation of defence policy in Ireland is inclusive and includes a Whole of Government approach? (Author, 2022)	70
Figure 5.9.	The formulation of defence policy in Ireland is transparent? (Author, 2022)	72
Figure 5.10.	Irish Defence Organisation Model Interaction Grid (Author, 2022 adapted from Grant & Milenski, 2019)	73
Figure 5.11.	Ireland's Current Defence Policy and Strategy (Author, 2022)	75
Figure 5.12.	Ireland's Joint Defence Strategy Statement and Defence Forces Strategic Planning Framework (Author, 2022)	76
Figure 5.13.	The Joint Department of Defence & Defence Forces Strategy Statement provides an effective link between policy guidance and military action? (Author, 2022)	77
Figure 5.14.	The principle of civilian control of the military is fully accepted by the military? (Author, 2022)	79
Figure 5.15.	Civilian control of the military in Ireland is accountable, transparent, consultative and responsive? (Author, 2022)	80
Figure 5.16.	There are sufficient joint civil and military structures and processes to formulate and develop defence policy and plans? (Author, 2022)	81
Figure 5.17.	The HLPPG Process (Author, 2022)	83
Figure 5.18.	Ireland's Defence Planning Model (Author, 2022)	91
Figure 5.19.	Congruence of Defence Planning Models for assessing Ireland's Defence Planning (Author, 2022)	93
Figure 5.20.	Congruence between Ireland's Defence Planning Model with International Models (Author, 2022)	95

LIST OF ACRONYMS

Acronym	Meaning
CARD	Coordinated Annual Review of Defence (EU)
CMR	Civil-Military Relations
CODF	Commission on the Defence Forces
CSDP	Common Security Defence Policy (EU)
DF	Defence Forces
DFHQ	Defence Forces Headquarters
DoD	Department of Defence
EDA	European Defence Agency
EDP	Equipment Development Plan
EU	European Union
HLAP	High Level Action Plan
HLPPG	High Level Planning and Procurement Group
IDP	Infrastructure Development Plan
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
OCC	Operational Capabilities Concept (NATO)
OCR	Capability Review of the Department of Defence
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PARP	Planning and Review Process (NATO)
PESCO	Permanent Structured Cooperation (EU)
PfP	Partnership for Peace (NATO)
RTI	Research, Technology and Innovation
SMC	Strategic Management Committee
SPF	Strategic Planning Framework
UN	United Nations
WP	White Paper
WPU	White Paper Update

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Introduction

From early civilisation to the strategic studies of Clausewitz¹ and Jomini² the challenge of how a society plans for and manages defence has been ever present. Defence planning, as a practice to meet this challenge, has existed throughout history in order to “limit the condition of uncertainty to ensure the survival of the group, community, nation or state” (Breitenbauch & Jakobsson, 2018:255). Most modern democratic states maintain the ability to organise a collective military force. The procedures and processes that determine what that military force consists of, and what it can do, is defence planning. Considering the “importance of technological superiority in modern conflicts, the cost of armaments and how long it takes to produce them, defence planning has become a vital activity in the preparedness of armed forces and the effectiveness of defence” (EU, 2018:64). Effective and efficient defence planning is more concerned with the form and function of the future military force than the deployment of the current one.

Defence planning is a long-term process, the aim of which is to “align national security interests, political feasibility, societal desires and military requirements” (Hakenstad and Larsen, 2012:9). This positions defence planning as “a thoroughly political process” (Gray, 2014:42). Breitenbauch (2015) posits that defence planning is the central mechanism that a state can employ to justify the expenditure of national treasure on expensive defence equipment required to deter, and possibly to fight, wars. It is determined in an arena where the relationships between the internal political and administrative institutions, the civilian and military actors in the defence organisation, the different military services competing for

¹Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831), author of ‘On War’, considered “arguably the most influential work of strategic theory to date” (Lonsdale, 2008:41).

² Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini (1779-1869), a contemporary of von Clausewitz, “sought to discover the scientific principles underlying war” (Lonsdale, 2008:46).

resources, and the external factors of international organisations and alliances all interact. Considering this complexity, the research of defence planning must “acknowledge, engage and assess” the interface dynamics “of its analytical, military, political, administrative and organisational dimensions” (Breitenbauch & Jakobsson, 2018:255).

Defence Planning in Ireland

Defence planning is complex and “national context matters greatly” (De Spiegeleire, van Hooft, Culpepper & Willems, 2009:7). In the last thirty (30) years there have been numerous reforms of the Irish defence landscape, all of which have impacted on the structure, composition, and strategic processes of Ireland’s Defence Organisation.³ Historically ‘there was a marked reluctance to formulate a specific Defence policy’ (Green Paper, 2013:6). The current White Paper on Defence, updated in 2019, ‘provides the strategic and comprehensive defence policy framework for the period up to 2025’ (White Paper Update, 2019:7) and states that defence remains of paramount importance to the Irish state.

The White Paper on Defence (2015) introduced a process of fixed cycle defence reviews at three and six-year intervals, intended to assure foresight, flexibility and overall preparedness in Ireland’s defence planning and provision. A specific Commission on the Defence Forces (CODF) has also reported to the Irish government with recommendations on capabilities, structures and staffing for the period beyond 2030. The government response to the CODF recommendations, in the form of a high-level action plan (HLAP), includes a commitment of “the largest increase in defence spending in the history of the state” (HLAP, 2022:6). A Capability Review of the Department of Defence has also been completed to consider and make

³ The term Defence Organisation is interpreted as “all agencies that embody a country’s official defence effort – i.e. the Ministry of Defence (MoD), the Armed Forces, and other defence-relevant parts of government” (De Spiegeleire et al., 2009:3).

recommendations in respect of the Civil Service branches of the Department of Defence (DoD). This suggests that an examination of Irelands defence planning is both relevant and timely.

Research Question

The aim of this research is to explore the nature of defence planning in Ireland. The research question extends to establishing what theories of public policy underpin defence policy decision-making, what institutions and actors are involved, how they are organised and what relationship exists between them. Finally, the research will establish if a defence planning model can be identified.

Structure of the Thesis

Chapter Two will demonstrate key theories in relation to defence planning and uncertainty, defence planning and public policy, civil-military relations and defence planning frameworks. In further developing an understanding of defence planning, Chapter Three will detail the selection of a phenomenological approach in a mixed-methods study as the research philosophy and design. Chapter Four will consider defence planning in a national setting, initially examining the historical context and then outlining current defence structures. Chapter Five will outline the main research findings using the themes identified in Chapter Two, having analysed the raw data in accordance with the approach to data collection and analysis justified in Chapter Three. Finally, Chapter Six will outline the main conclusions from the research.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

The purpose of this study is to explore the concept of defence planning in order to understand how a society focuses on the form and function of the future military force rather than the deployment of the current one. This chapter will demonstrate the key theories and arguments of defence planning, highlight existing research areas that have been investigated and identify inconsistencies or gaps in the knowledge that are suitable for further investigation in exploring defence planning in Ireland.

Defence Planning and Uncertainty

Origins of Defence Planning

The concept of modern defence planning can be traced to the Kennedy administration⁴ in the United States of America and particularly the reforms introduced by Robert McNamara as Secretary of Defence in 1961. These reforms led to the emergence of a systems analysis office that sought to address pre-existing military conventions, inter-service rivalry and competing demands on the available resources. This led directly to the development of the Planning-Programming-Budgeting System (PPBS), a “decision making model based on systematic analysis of requirements and incorporating these into a five year, programme oriented defence budget” (Enthoven & Smith, 1971:33).

Rather than the pre-existing but uncoordinated competitive scramble to secure resources for military equipment, the civilian analysts favoured by McNamara focused on capability⁵ and sought to answer the starkly posed question of ‘How much is enough?’, the eponymous title of

⁴ The Kennedy administration refers to the Presidency of the United States of America of John F. Kennedy from January 1961 to November 1963.

⁵ The concept of ‘capability’ focuses more on the desired military effect to be achieved rather than the traditional view of the number and type of military units (EU, 2018).

Enthoven and Smith's seminal work on defence planning (1971). A number of "enduring tenets about analysis and planning" emerged from PPBS. These included that decisions should be based on the explicit criteria of national interest rather than compromise between forces, requirement and cost should be considered together and major decisions should be made by choice from explicit, balanced and feasible alternatives. (Enthoven & Smith, 1971:33; Davis, 2018:374). McNamara's approach was controversial, particularly the concept of open and explicit analysis being conducted by military and civilian stakeholders. Fundamentally, PPBS was about reasoned decision making based on agreed criteria and was rooted in rational-choice theory.⁶

What is Defence Planning?

In most established nation states, "vast amounts of resources, manpower and effort are expended in an attempt to create and sustain armed forces" capable of protecting the vital interests of society (Hakenstad & Larsen, 2012:9). Hintze (1975:181) writing in the 19th Century suggested that all of a state's organisation and apparatus were "originally military organisation, organisation for war". Regardless, there is no single method, system, or process of defence planning, leading Gray (2014) to suggest that Enthoven and Smith's seminal question required expansion – 'enough to do what'? Gray (2014:4) takes a broad view and describes defence planning as the "preparations for the defence of a polity in the future (near-, medium- and far term)" drawing a clear link between defence planning and both grand⁷ and military strategy. Emphasising a political perspective, Hakenstad and Larsen (2012:12) define defence planning as the "process by which a given state arrives at political decisions regarding the future development of the structure, organisation and capabilities of their armed forces".

⁶ Rational-choice theory examines "what an ideal rational agent should do in every decision context" (Zappia, 2018:1387).

⁷ Grand strategy is the coordination and direction of all the resources of a nation "towards the attainment of the political object of the war – the goal defined by fundamental policy" (Liddell Hart, 1967:335). It is comprised of many instruments of the state in categories such as Diplomatic, Intelligence, Military and Economic (DIME).

Fruhling (2014) considers defence planning to be the management of strategic risk. He states that uncertainty and threat are integral elements of risk and the primary reason a polity maintains a defence force is to address risk that “arises from, or can be reduced by, the use of military force” (Fruhling, 2014:1). He identifies four distinct approaches to managing this risk – ‘hedging’ which is suitable for narrowly defined or specific risk, ‘options’ for a number of potential solutions to a risk under consideration, ‘portfolio’ for managing a number of strategic risks at one time and ‘flexibility’ which is the ability to adapt quickly to threats that haven’t been considered in advance (Fruhling, 2014:35). Nelson (2002:103) states that defence planning is the “stage of national security thinking that matches means to ends, and that address the goals of effecting policy”. Davis (2018:375) defines defence planning as “the deliberate process of deciding on a nation’s future military forces, force postures, and force capabilities” but clearly differentiates it from operational planning and the operational deployment of forces. Breitenbauch and Jakobsson (2018:254) also identify the requirement to focus “upstream” and examine how the political and administrative authorities of a state “conceive of, plan for, and decide upon future defence capabilities rather than the immediate use of the current ones”.

Defence planning is a deliberate process that is “narrower than a government’s efforts to develop grand strategy... but broader than operational military planning” (Tama, 2018:282). While less than grand strategy, there are a number of “financial, political, bureaucratic, industrial, employment and regional” (De Spiegeleire, 2012:2) pressures that affect a state’s defence planning efforts. Accordingly, the state’s “strategic outlook, hard security requirements and resource base” (Hakenstad & Larsen, 2012:9) must be considered in developing an effective armed force capable of facing future challenges. Defence planning therefore concerns both domestic and foreign politics, and governments are required to conduct this planning “in ways responsive, at the least attentive, to the public mood regarding danger” (Gray, 2014:139).

Resourcing Uncertainty

Fruhling (2014:8) states that in defence planning the concept of risk has “largely become synonymous with ‘cost’, and divorced from its association with uncertainty”. Uncertainty is the lack of information about, and understanding of, a situation and its possible outcomes and consequences and there is no “commonly accepted approach to characterising uncertainty in a quantitative way” (Fruhling, 2014:19). Defence planning is a process of government, therefore a consumer of public resources and as such it is accountable to the public who “expects effective and efficient performance” (Grant & Milenski, 2019:83). Defence planning must therefore align the intent of those developing the future capabilities of the armed forces with those responsible for the realities of the budget (Webb, Richter & Bonsper, 2010:387). Indeed, the gap between capability and budgets was also identified as a “serious obstacle to rational defence planning” by Enthoven & Smith (1971:13).

Unlike other public-sector organisations or areas, defence is traditionally associated with “significant and indispensable confidentiality in actions and considerable uncertainty of tasks”, both of which make control over effectiveness and efficiency difficult (Grant & Milenski, 2019:83). According to Gray (2014:182) while economic considerations are critical to defence planning the core relationship is that between political willingness to allocate resources to the perception of danger facing a polity. However, “when peril is believed to be slight and distant defence will be regarded in effect as just another expensive draw on limited national resources”, particularly when the threats that may exist are not considered “existential or near term probable” (Gray, 2014:182).

The challenge of defence planning therefore is to identify now that which might prove to be important to national security in the future (Davis 2014; Angstrom 2018). The lack of perceived threat limits how convincingly a government can allocate resources to defence

planning as “insurance against the certainty of danger in a future that currently is uncertain” (Gray, 2014:23). Davis (2014:6) considers the ability to confront deep uncertainty so important he states that while remaining valid, Enthoven & Smith’s enduring tenets require the inclusion of three additional considerations; flexibility to take on new and changed missions or objectives, adaptiveness to cope with new or changed circumstances and robustness to deal with adverse shocks. Making decisions about how “public resources (including but not limited to money) will be allocated to generate public value” is the essence of public policy (De Spiegeleire, Jans, Sibbel, Holynska & Lassche, 2019:61).

Defence Planning and Public Policy

Public policy is the “sum total of government action, from signals of intent to the final outcomes” (Cairney, 2020:2). Policy making is a process that links a series of actions and events and focuses on how policy is made rather than what the outcome of the policy is (Heywood, 2019:365). According to Cairney (2020:17) defining and measuring public policy is challenging when we consider the “complex policymaking environment in which policy is made”. This leads him to identify key questions in relation to considering public policy including does the study of public policy include what policymakers say they will do in addition to what they actually do? (Cairney, 2020:2).

Theory of Decision-making

Decision-making⁸ is central to the policy process. Heywood (2019) identifies four general theories of decision making: rational actor, incrementalism, bureaucratic organisation and belief systems. Rational actor models have been derived primarily from the field of economics and assume that there are clear objectives that are pursued in a rational and consistent manner

⁸ Decision-making is “the selective act of thought related to the possibility of choice and action” and a complex process that balances reason and action (Maldonato, 2007:28).

(Heywood, 2019:366). Simon (1982) however suggests that decisions are often not rational, either because of complexity, incomplete information or other limitations. He proposed a theory of bounded rationality where the outcome may not be optimal but is satisfactory, or reflecting the origins of modern defence planning - enough. Cairney (2020:73) states that public policy theories build on bounded rationality as they highlight a non-linear decision-making process and political objectives that may be imprecise and incompatible.

Incremental models suggest that decision-making often relies on “inadequate information and low levels of understanding” (Heywood, 2019:366), which can lead decision-makers to maintain the status quo rather than seek innovative solutions. Incrementalism suggests that policy makers only see the benefit of change “that would be technically feasible, in relation to available resources, and politically feasible, in relation to current policy and the balance of power” (Cairney, 2020:232). Bureaucratic, or organisational models, study the impact of the process on the product. Organisational process models highlight the impact of culture, values and patterns of behaviour on large organisations. Bureaucratic politics models examine the influence of bargaining between agents and agencies, possibly pursuing competing interests. Finally, belief system models emphasise the roles of beliefs and ideology, and how “fundamental moral or philosophical principles” (Heywood, 2019:369), policy preferences or views about implementation and application can affect decision-making.

Political decision-making is the product of “extensive organisational and analytical efforts” that in the case of defence planning links the interface of civilian and military realms and political and administrative practices such as analysis and policy (Breitenbauch & Jakobsson, 2018:255). According to Cairney (2020:232) the typical lens through which to study public policy is incrementalism, which provides ways to gather information, engages in strategic analysis and favours political outcomes that do not depart radically from the status quo. However, Gray (2014:53) states that defence planning should be a rational project as it plans

to “acquire and sustain (military) means for the contingent purpose of employing them in ways that advance the political ends chosen as policy”. Angstrom (2018:322) also posits that planning and anticipation are anchored in rationalism, “underpinned by the idea that predictions are possible”.

Policy-making

One method of studying policy-making is to examine the policy cycle, a series of sequential actions from agenda setting through policy formulation, policy implementation, evaluation and ultimately a decision on whether the policy should be retained or changed (Hogwood & Gunn, 1984; Parsons, 1995). Cairney (2020:73) states that policymakers “‘satisfice’ and use informational and cognitive shortcuts to make their task more manageable”. This has led contemporary theories to focus on the complexity of the process and the “dispersal of power from a single central actor” to multiple sources of authority and influence with “different values, perceptions and preferences” (Sabatier, 2007:3-4).

Viewing the complex policy-making environment through the lens of bounded rationality, Cairney (2020:232) describes a model consisting of multiple actors, who can make or influence policy (Figure 2.1). There are institutions or rules that govern how actors interact, and these rules can be formal or informal. There are networks between actors, and the boundaries between accepted responsibility and informal influence are blurred. There are dominant ideas or beliefs about the policy challenges and the acceptable solutions. Routine and non-routine events affect the policy agenda and contextual factors and systems, often outside the control of the actors, also contribute to complexity (Cairney, 2020:232).




Figure 2.1. The Policy Process (Cairney, 2020:232)

The reasons and timing for developing public policy can vary, from a new government delivering on election promises, to being part of an agreed cyclical time schedule, to being in response to a specific crisis. Regardless of the reason or timing though, the expectation of policy is that it will be implemented, will have an impact and that the impact will be in line with its intended purpose, time span and budgetary allocation (De Spiegeleire et al., 2019:60). Policy implementation cannot however be assumed. Sabatier (1986) identifies two approaches to policy implementation, top-down which presumes a rational policy will not be subverted by irrational bureaucratic factors, and from the bottom up which emphasises the contribution of those that ultimately should implement the policy.

Heywood (2019:383) identifies the role of the bureaucracy in policy-making and states there are three key sources of bureaucratic power. These are the strategic position of bureaucrats in the policy process, the logistical relationship between bureaucrats and ministers and the status and expertise of bureaucrats. Cairney (2020:245) states that the modern policy process often seeks stable arrangements such as limiting the number of participants that may be involved over a long period of time. This can have the effect of excluding other actors, dominating

resources and creating policy monopolies: defining issues in particular ways and presenting solutions that “translate beliefs into policy action” (Cairney, 2020:246). Jensen (2018:303) identifies the role of “collective actors sharing ideas and competing for legitimate authority and influence over sectoral policy making” and further advocates for programmatic actors as “the positive counterpart to veto players, seeking to advance an agenda as opposed to stop an alternative”. In relation to defence planning Nelson (2002:107) states that “who decides and who has policy input varies greatly”.

Defence Policy and Defence Organisations

Defence policy “is the result of politics not logic, more an arena than a unity” (Huntington 1961:2). Defence Organisations are a tool that political leadership must manage in order to achieve a state’s political goals; however, “governments across the globe still experience many difficulties in linking goals to means in their defence sectors in a transparent and policy-driven way” (De Spiegeleire et al., 2009:21). Fruhling (2014:11) states that the nature of defence makes it more challenging to assess effectiveness and efficiency than other public policy. Tama (2018) advocates defence policy being inclusive and transparent, but states that trade-offs between both may be required to accommodate different perspectives. Nelson (2002:108) believes transparency is essential but that pluralism, which is the “contribution of ideas and opinions across a wide spectrum”, is more important as decision makers cannot rationally choose among alternatives without hearing debate and criticism in the process. This suggests that “clear arguments and evidence are particularly important for defence policy” (Fruhling, 2014:11).

Defence is often described as being unique in public service due its “role of being custodian of the nation’s monopoly of organised, unlimited violence” (Grant & Milenski, 2019:83). Norheim-Martinsen (2016:322) however posits that modern defence organisations are subject

to the “same expectations and dynamics as the rest of the public – and private – sector”, suggesting reform is as attributable to New Public Management⁹ (NPM) as it is to the Revolution in Military Affairs¹⁰ (RMA). Fruhling (2014:11) argues that “ultimately defence policy is no different from other public policy in that it can be done well or badly” and good defence policy should be “coherent, efficient and effective in identifying goals and allocating resources (2014:195).

De Spiegeleire et al. (2019:62) observe that “defence organisations produce at least as many ‘policy documents’ as other government departments” but the primary tool for defence policy guidance is a high-level policy document such as a White Paper or Strategic Review (De Spiegeleire et al., 2009; Hakenstad & Larsen, 2012; Fruhling, 2014; De Spiegeleire et al., 2019). Tama (2018) identifies a potential problem in the unclassified nature of these documents. The possibility exists that they gloss over important security risks and challenges rather than discuss them in a frank manner, or they focus more on how the document will be perceived than on the substance of the defence policy (Tama, 2018:292). This can lead to the document being “rather general and anodyne” which in turn can present challenges to implementation (Tama, 2018:292). This may present what Angstrom (2018:332) refers to as a “discourse trap”, where policy and decision makers “are locked into certain choices due to how one frames the strategic challenge at hand”.

Grant and Milenski (2019:84) offer an interesting argument that all defence organisations “fall broadly into one of four recognisable models: Rational, Emotional, Politics dominant, or Military dominant” (Figure 2.2). The rational model is favoured by countries that wish to employ military forces for external political gain and are serious about conflict. This requires

⁹ New Public Management (NPM) refers broadly to the introduction of private sector management techniques to Government and the transfer of government functions to private bodies (Heywood, 2019:380).

¹⁰ The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) emerged as a concept in the 1990s and generally refers to the impact of information-technology on the conduct of modern warfare (Jensen, 2018). It is widely accepted that there has been more than one RMA.

strong policy guidance and balanced budgets but is not easy to maintain. The emotional model is the opposite of rational and occurs when political leadership makes decisions based on emotion rather than facts, logic or finance. It is representative of weak policy and results in few modern capabilities for the military but is easier to maintain as funding is skewed towards manpower rather than equipment. The politics dominant model is where a country uses political justification to follow a defence model (not rational) seen as a good fit for their culture, geography or budget and is usually “linked to political ideas such as non-alignment, neutrality or independence” (Grant and Milenski, 2019:85). Policy and resources are usually skewed towards manpower, but sometimes towards high-profile equipment procurement. The military dominant model is where the military have gained political power accompanied by a complete loss of true civilian political control. Usually representing chaos and breakdown of democracy, there are also less political and more benign constructs where the military waste resources, over-promote and award excess financial allowances. In such instances it represents weak or disinterested political control and policy.




Figure 2.2. Defence Organisation Model Interaction Grid (Grant & Milenski, 2019:90).

Grant and Milenski (2019:91) identify that a defence organisation rarely stays in one model but may be in a balance created over time amongst two or even three forces pulling at different aspects of the institution and also at different organisational levels. What the model indicates is how a country thinks about defence. It reflects how it makes defence policy, how it approaches policy as a concept, how it frames defence policy and how decision-making shapes defence planning (Grant & Milenski, 2019:91). Clausewitz stated however that policy is nothing in itself and strategy is the link between the policy goal and the military instrument to achieve it (Lonsdale, 2008:25).

Policy and Strategy

Defence planning is an exploration of the “supply of strategic thought and method to the real world of politically driven strategic demand” (Gray, 2014:5). Gray further states that there is a clear distinction between policy and strategy, but it is important “to signal a highly desirable connectivity between them” (2014:153). Strategy is complex, multidimensional and consists of many levels.

Freedman (2013:72) suggests that if we consider strategy as “practical problem-solving, it has existed since the start of time”. Clausewitz (1976:177) defines strategy as “the use of engagements for the object of the war” while Gray (2010:29) describes military strategy as “the direction and use made of force and the threat of force for the purposes of policy as decided by politics”. Lonsdale (2008:22) states that “strategy is the relationship between military force and policy objective”. In the context of defence planning however, where policy ‘ends’ are expressive of political decision-making, and military ‘means’ are the operational and tactical employment of defence capabilities, strategy provides the ‘ways’ to bridge the concepts (Gray, 2010; Gray 2014) (Figure 2.3). Assumptions are made about how the ends, ways and means relate to each other and defence planning is “extraordinarily vulnerable to potential errors in

assumptions” (Gray, 2014:63). This reflects the aspects of uncertainty and the importance of analysis in defence planning in order to avoid “the paradoxical logic of strategy” in that “the greater the risk, the less likely it seems to be, and the less risky it actually becomes” (Handel, 2003:17).




Figure 2.3. Strategy and Defence Planning (Gray, 2014:61).

There is a difference between the concepts of defence planning and strategy, and public administration understanding of strategic management and strategic planning. Strategic management refers to the set of decisions and actions that leads to the formulation of strategies to achieve policy goals (Robinson & Pearse, 1988; Bryson, Edwards & Van Slyck, 2018). Strategic planning is the deliberate and disciplined effort to develop decisions and actions that shape and guide what an organisation is, what it does and why it does it (Bryson et al., 2018). Norheim-Martinsen (2016:322) states that modern management practices have penetrated the public sector and the conflation of policy and strategy is reflected in various forms of “integrated strategic leadership”. Rather than focusing on attempts to delineate or separate policy and strategy, defence planning “should be conducted on and across the ‘strategy bridge’” (Gray, 2014:50).

Ultimately, public policy is the process of a government “matching multiple policy goals with limited means” (De Spiegeleire et al. 2019:60). In relation to defence policy and defence

planning, “policy ends are rarely anything of the sort” (Gray, 2014:139) and policymakers are satisfied with military capability that is “judged good enough to meet the need of the moment” (2014:142). According to Lonsdale (2008:19) “strategy sits uncomfortably between two worlds occupied by politics and the military”. While Gray (2010) advocates the strategy bridge to facilitate this complex relationship, Cohen (2002:208) describes it as an “unequal dialogue” as policy has supremacy. This requires discussion between the military and political leadership “concerning what policy requires and, just as importantly, what the military instrument can deliver” (Lonsdale, 2008:23). This discussion takes place in the arena of civil-military relations.

Defence Planning and Civil-Military Relations

Civil-Military Relations (CMR) is a field of study and an arena of participation in the political life of the state, linking the political and military components of strategy (Ulrich, 2010). Feaver (1996:149) describes the fundamental challenge of CMR as *The Civil-Military Problematique* – how a polity reconciles “a military strong enough to do anything the civilians ask them with a military subordinate enough to do only what civilians authorise them to do”. Owens (2011) states that a fundamental requirement of CMR is the ability to relate military means and ways to political ends, which is to understand strategy, policy and politics.

Huntington (1957:84) advocated “objective civilian control” as a method of achieving civilian control, or the societal imperative, without sacrificing effectiveness of the military, described as the functional imperative. At the opposite end of the continuum for Huntington lies “subjective control” which erodes the autonomy he considered necessary for a professional military and ultimately is detrimental to military effectiveness (1957:80-83). Janowitz (1960) viewed CMR through a sociological lens and rejected Huntington’s concept of objective control of the military in favour of greater civilian oversight. Rather than rely on the sterile

and politically neutral professionalism of the military which Huntington proposes, Janowitz proposes a politically aware military with responsibilities that overlap and complement their civilian counterparts. Finer (1988) was an early critic of Huntington and observed that professionalism in a military was more likely to cause tension and stress between the civil authorities and the military than improve effectiveness.

Avant (1994) and Feaver (2003) examine CMR using principal-agent theory. Avant focuses on military autonomy versus political interests. Feaver examines the nature of the relationship between the civilian principles and the military agents, relating how intrusive the monitoring is to Huntington's concept of objective and subjective civilian control. Owens (2011:31) however states that agency theory is limited by its narrow scope. Schiff (1995, 2009) builds on the work of Janowitz and proposes concordance theory to achieve agreement between the civilians, the military and society. Herspring (2013:1) building on the work of Bland (1999, 2001) advocates shared responsibility and posits a compromise approach to "focus on the process and not assume a battle between two dichotomous, potentially hostile entities". Norheim-Martinsen (2016) argues that defence organisations have become more like regular public-sector organisations and the modern CMR construct more closely resembles the formative model of Janowitz than Huntington. He observes that what were previously considered defining characteristics such as traditionalism, hierarchy and authoritarianism are not unique to military organisations. In addition, Western society has become more egalitarian, eroding rank differences based on societal factors. Accordingly, defence organisations are now more integrated into wider society (Norheim-Martinsen, 2016:322).

Control and Effectiveness

A criticism of early CMR theory is that the focus is often on democratic or civilian control. The challenge of CMR is to balance the requirement to be as functionally competent as possible

without threatening the democratic processes of the state. According to Ulrich (2002) these imperatives are not necessarily in opposition and can in fact be mutually reinforcing. Bruneau (2018:356) argues that civilian control of the military is easy to achieve as it simply requires a legal basis and a civilian-led, robust ministry of defence. Good control however requires not just institutions and democratic governance of the defence sector that is “accountable, transparent, consultative, and responsive”, but also that “civilians are willing to care about defence policy, security issues and military affairs” (Bruneau & Croissant, 2019:11). Norheim-Martinsen (2016:322) posits that the modern complex political and security environment requires a properly integrated, politically attuned military capable of offering advice, developing mutual understanding and trust in the CMR interface.

Angstrom (2018:320) proposes a CMR that focuses “on how a state organises and institutionalises its long term defence planning procedures”. Bruneau (2018:356) identifies the requirement to reconceptualise the civil-military relationship to focus on the institutions that provide capacity or capabilities in order to measure effectiveness. Bruneau and Matei (2013) state that civilian control of the military is one side of Feaver’s *Civil-Military Problematique*, but military effectiveness must be the other. It can be difficult to measure military effectiveness however. Nielsen (2005) relates it to the ability of the military means to achieve the political ends identified. Brooks and Stanley (2007:9) state that military effectiveness is about the “capacity to create military power from a state’s basic resources in wealth, technology, population size and human capital”. Bruneau and Croissant (2019:3) define military effectiveness as the ability to transform political guidance into effective action. They further identify three attributes and indicators of military effectiveness. The first is defence planning – a long-term plan which defines goals, the means required to achieve the goals and a methodology to evaluate progress. The second is the presence of structures and processes to formulate and implement plans. The third is whether the state commits sufficient

financial, political and personnel resources to ensure the military is adequately and appropriately equipped and skilled to achieve the goals (Bruneau & Croissant, 2019:3).

The interaction of civilian and military actors in the overlap of politics, defence policy, strategy and planning remains challenging. Tension and friction are inherent (Ulrich, 2010; Herspring, 2013). It is difficult to “exaggerate the relative importance of policy for defence planning, or the contribution of politics to policy” (Gray, 2014:153). However, Angstrom (2018:331) describes a “defence planning paradox” – the military should not comment on policy less they challenge the principal of democratic civilian control, yet they are required to understand politics in order to advise political authorities on the employment of military means to achieve policy goals. Determining the military capability required in the future is the essence of defence planning and in the first instance this requires a planning framework.

Defence Planning Models

Defence Planning Framework

A defence planning framework is the method by which a country analyses what it requires in terms of military capability and it also refers to the overarching approach that can be adopted. The definition of what constitutes military capability is expanding. Rather than simply being a platform or an activity, it is “combinations of things that have to be brought together to get things done” (De Spiegeleire et al., 2009:13) and it is becoming joint service, functional and focused on outcome. Different frameworks can be applied to defence planning but generally the approach is “holistic and capable of underpinning the entirety of the process” (NATO, 2003:3). Breitenbach (2015:2) states that planning is often stretched “between organisational intent and actual practice” and the “actual processes may comprise more than the formal ones”. Defence planning can be more or less formalised, more or less recurrent, can involve the production of strategic vision or guidance and invariably leads to procurement of capability.

According to Gray (2014:3) defence planning is not strategic planning, military planning or planning for the execution of war. Breitenbach & Jakobsson (2018:256) also direct an ‘upstream’ focus that excludes operational and tactical level planning but includes threat-based and capability-based planning. Through the lens of managing strategic risk, Fruhling (2014) offers four planning frameworks – net assessment based planning, mobilisation planning, portfolio planning and task based planning.

Threat-based planning involves identifying potential adversaries and evaluating their capabilities in order to determine what is required to defeat them (NATO, 2003:4). Net assessment based planning (Fruhling, 2014:3) is similarly focused on “one known and understood adversary”. Resource constrained planning is designed to provide a viable capability within a provided budget and no effort is made to investigate more expensive options, while incremental planning is where existing capabilities form the foundation of new ones (NATO, 2003:4). Mobilisation planning is designed to meet the risk of conflict in the future from an unknown threat, and portfolio planning is utilised where a defence force must configure itself to meet multiple, equally important risks (Fruhling, 2014:3). Task-based planning can be utilised where uncertainty is so great that planning focuses on the achievement of basic military tasks (Fruhling, 2014:3).

Most planning frameworks have effectively been replaced by a concept known as capability-based planning (CBP), “the ‘gold standard’ of defence planning” (De Spiegeleire et al., 2009:6). Approaching required capabilities systematically, addressing uncertainty head on and integrating cost into planning are all aspects of CBP that represent a “major and salutary change in the way defence organisations plan for the future” (De Spiegeleire, 2011:26). NATO, EU organisations such as the EDA and EUMC,¹¹ and many Western countries¹² utilise CBP to link

¹¹ European Defence Agency (EDA) and European Union Military Council (EUMC).

¹² Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom, and many EU countries (Webb, Richter & Bonspur, 2010; De Spiegeleire et al., 2009; Hakenstad & Larsen, 2012; De Spiegeleire et al., 2019).

“alliance or national goals, strategic plans, military capabilities, and the allocation of defence resources” (Webb, Richter & Bonspur, 2010:388).

CBP focuses defence planning on what is required to be achieved rather than what needs to be replaced or sustained and “typically translates political guidance into capabilities by using a set of scenarios that are thought to be representative for the operations in which armed forces might get involved” (De Spiegeleire, 2012:8). According to Davis (2014) a critical requirement of CBP is to use analysis as an aid to decision-making, as it ensures that multiple options are considered and disagreement among policy makers is facilitated. De Spiegeleire (2012:8) states that in many smaller states, the process of using scenarios tends to be less formalised and focuses predominantly on changes to the operational environment or more frequently “by funding cuts or by the obsolescence of certain existing capabilities”. However, for CBP, or indeed any planning system, to be implemented budgeting that links threats to national interests, to policy and strategy, and to capabilities, forces and budgets is required (Webb, Richter & Bonspur, 2010:394).

Generic Model of Defence Planning

In order to establish where the intersection of policy and strategy lies, a generic defence planning process can be visualised with the Strategic Defence Management Loop (De Spiegeleire et al., 2009:3) (Figure 2.4). Defence planning requires the defence organisation to convert political guidance or policy into “meaningful parameters that can guide concrete choices” (De Spiegeleire et al., 2009:4). Defence planners then utilise an analytical framework, such as CBP, to “derive real capabilities... and assemble them into a coherent defence force” (De Spiegeleire et al., 2009:5) in order to achieve the policy choices within the budgetary constraints. When capability choices have materialised, the defence organisation develops methods to assess its own effectiveness and efficiency and utilises performance measurement

to report back to the high-level political authorities. The final step, “arguably the key link in the strategic management loop” (De Spiegeleire et al., 2009:5), is to facilitate strategic reflection and possible correction of the established course, thereby closing the loop.




Figure 2.4. Strategic Defence Management Loop (De Spiegeleire et al., 2009).

Hakenstad & Larsen (2012:10) state that “international cooperation, harmonisation and interoperability” are increasing in importance. Despite this, defence planning is not conducted in any one way and there is an “array of approaches to the development of defence” (Tama, 2018:283). Nelson (2002:106) observes that the increased humanitarian and peacekeeping roles modern militaries engage in require a change of approach in defence planning, which he argues are becoming “denationalised and far more plural”. In response to these trends, NATO and the European Union (EU) have both introduced “programmes to coordinate and optimise national defence priorities” (Breitenbauch, 2015:3) in an effort to get more output (defence capability) for input (national defence spending).

NATO Defence Planning

NATO defence planning has existed since 1971 as a ‘best practice’ template to align the defence planning of member states. The process has undergone eight iterations as threats, the security environment and national defence spending trends have changed. The most recent version, ‘The NATO Defence Planning Process’ (NDPP) was enhanced in 2016. The aim of the NDPP is to “provide a framework within which national and Alliance defence planning activities can be harmonised to enable Allies to meet agreed targets in the most effective way” (NATO, 2022). It is a results oriented process, follows a top down approach in that member states are given objectives and an agreed time scale, and is structured, transparent and cyclical in that each planning cycle is conducted over four years based on a ten-year horizon (NATO, 2022). The NDPP is based on a “threat/risk informed, capability-based approach” (NATO, 2022) and consists of five distinct steps (Figure 2.5).




Figure 2.5. The NATO Defence Planning Process (NATO, 2022).

EU Defence Planning

In the EU there are three types of defence planning: the planning of member states, the planning of member states that are also members of NATO employing the NDPP and finally the EU's planning process (EU, 2018). The term European Union Defence Planning Process will be applied (EUDPP), but technically the process "has no official name" (EU, 2018). The EUDPP is a more recent construct than the NDPP. It came into being at the Helsinki Summit in 1999 and since its inception it has at different times come under the responsibility of the European Union Military Committee (EUMC), then the European Defence Agency (EDA), the European Council, the European External Action Service (EEAS) and finally the European Commission (EU, 2018). The EUDPP is designed to supply both military and civilian capability within the framework of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).

The changes of responsibility also reflect the different stages of implementation that have taken place. The initial stage of EUMC responsibility focused on the Capability Defence Mechanism (CDM). The period of EDA responsibility saw the introduction of the Capability Development Plan (CDP). More recent developments include the launch of a new planning cycle, a capability review of member states referred to as the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), the EU Defence Industrial Development Programme (EDIDP) and what is effectively a capability process in the establishment of the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). These developments also represent a policy shift from managing crises on Europe's borders to a broader level of ambition which is "the protection of Europe and its citizens" (EU, 2018). The EUDPP (Figure 2.6) is neither linear nor cyclical and is difficult to understand as no single document describes it in its entirety. It is a 'bottom up' approach as each member state fulfils capability as it decides and ultimately "amounts to an empirical trial and error aggregate rather than a capability process" (EU, 2018:10). Fundamentally, clear high-level political guidance is missing and in its absence the efficacy of EUDPP will remain unlikely (EU, 2018).




Figure 2.6. *The Elements of the EU Defence Planning Process (EU, 2018).*

The EU have however distilled the process of defence planning to “a series of sequential questions” (EU, 2018:9) that provide a framework for establishing defence planning guidance and documents (Figure 2.7). The first two questions are designed to provide a long-term assessment of interlinking aspects of security and to determine the military implications. The next questions determine what security and defence strategy and objectives are required. The following steps determine what military level of ambition exists and what military capability is required to affect this. The next question determines how these capabilities can be acquired and what time frame is involved. The final questions determine who is responsible and how can progress be measured. Using this framework, it is possible to compare each of the constituent parts of EUDPP against the more established NDPP, including high-level policy and other guiding documents (EU, 2018:11).




Figure 2.7. Sequential Questions for Defence Planning (EU, 2018:9-11).

Congruence of the Defence Planning Models

There is a rational justification for Ireland as both an EU member state and a partner of NATO to consider either, or both, EUDPP and NDPP as a model for defence planning, indicating an interesting research area in the context of Ireland’s defence planning. Utilising the framework of sequential questions (Figure 8) to establish what documents formally exist in the defence planning process, it is possible to find congruence between the NDPP, EUDPP and the generic defence planning model of the Strategic Defence Management Loop (Figure 2.4). The documents prepared in response to the first four questions are the high-level policy parameters that represent the political guidance and policy ends of defence planning. In the NDPP and EUDPP these are strategic foresight documents which attempt to identify what threats and military, political, socio-economic environments will exist in the long-term (15-20 years). They are also the clear political frameworks that provide the context in which the defence

planning will take place. The next stage provides the defence guidance in the strategic management loop and establishes what military objectives must be achieved. The next questions are clearly the capability development stage of the Strategic Defence Management Loop and lead into the performance assessment phase of the loop. The final question of the framework – Have we made progress? – is the closing of the loop and is represented by a capability report in the NDPP and the Coordinated Review of Defence (CARD) in the EUDPP.

This suggests that the sequential questions that provide a framework for defence planning (EU, 2018) can also establish if the steps of the Strategic Management Defence Loop designed by De Spiegeleire et al. (2009) are being achieved (Figure 2.8). This is an important finding from the literature, as it provides a model to guide the research in attempting to map the model of defence planning in an Irish context and placing the processes, documents and guidance that may exist in a framework with comparative examples from both the NDPP and EUDPP.



Figure 2.8. Congruence of Defence Planning Models for assessing Ireland's Defence Planning (Author, 2022).

Despite attempts by NATO and the EU to establish best practice systems, Breitenbach (2015:2) states that the defence planning of individual states varies to such a degree that comparative studies struggle to identify common traits. Grant and Milenski (2019:83) identify that this presents significant challenges for comparing a state's defence organisations for "effectiveness, efficiency, affordability, and also for moral basis, public acceptability and political support". De Spiegeleire et al. (2019:74) state that defence policy is evolving towards a "more explicit focus on implementation" but that this requires meticulous follow up metrics and clearly allocated responsibilities that are often lacking in the policy documents examined. They observe that metrics are often developed for easy to measure objectives and that the real focus should be on policy formulation and implementation that achieves defence and security value (De Spiegeleire et al., 2019:75).

Perhaps the most important observation from comparative studies is that three common features represent a characteristic of western democratic thought. First, major guidelines are determined at the political level; second, what is decided by the politicians is implemented by civil servants and military professionals; third, parliaments oversee the process, particularly budget allocation (Hakenstad & Larsen, 2012:89). However, there is a contextual gap in that there is little academic examination of defence planning specifically relating to Ireland. There are interesting indicators from the review of literature to guide the future direction of the research. In order to address this contextual gap, this research will establish the national context of Ireland's defence planning processes and procedures.

Chapter Summary

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a substantive and thorough account of the literature exploring the key theories and arguments of defence planning, highlighting existing research areas that have been investigated and identifying inconsistencies or gaps in the knowledge

suitable for further exploration to develop understanding of defence planning in Ireland. This requires an appropriate and robust research philosophy and design, which will be examined in Chapter Three.

CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN

Introduction

Chapter Two examined the theories that underpin the concept of defence planning, highlighting existing research areas that have been investigated and identifying gaps in the knowledge that will be explored to further understand defence planning in Ireland. This chapter will outline the research philosophy that has informed the selection of the phenomenological approach to the collection and analysis of data.

Research Philosophy

A research philosophy is a plan that specifies how you intend to carry out your research and how the evidence gathered will answer the research question (Gschwend and Schimmelfennig, 2007:1). According to Jackson (2013:49) the researcher must “consider the conceptual background, including ontological and epistemological perspectives, in order for informed decisions to be made regarding the methodology to be chosen”. Epistemology is a study of how people know things (Antonescu, Fallon, Ryan, Ryan, Walsh, with Borys, 2006). The influences and experiences that have shaped my epistemological position ultimately derive from my membership and experience of the Defence Forces for over thirty (30) years.

Of the available ways to think about and make sense of the complexities of the real world (Patton, 2002), interpretivism is determined to be the most suitable orientation to inform this research on defence planning in Ireland. This facilitates a research strategy that respects different understandings and perceptions between people. It also differentiates between the positivist approach of attempting to explain, and the interpretivist approach of attempting to understand human behaviour (Bryman, 2016:26). The field of defence planning provides the theoretical lens through which to position the research, particularly the concepts of policy-

making, strategy and civil-military relations. The phenomenological approach has been selected to complement the interpretivist stance. This is suitable for the study of defence planning as a detailed understanding of the issue is required, the context or setting is important, and fundamentally there is an issue that needs to be explored rather than simply using the information gleaned from the literature (Creswell, 2007).

Ontological assumptions deal with the nature of reality. Jackson (2013) states that the perspective of the researcher will determine whether a quantitative approach, a qualitative approach or a mixed-methods approach is required.¹³ Lowhorn (2007:1) states that quantitative research “establishes statistically significant conclusions about a population” while qualitative inquiries focus on words and on “the why and how of human interactions” (Agee, 2009:432). Creswell (2007) states that the researcher makes explicit the values they bring to the research through axiological assumptions. The multi-faceted nature of defence planning validates the selection of a mixed- methods design.

Research Methodology

A Mixed-Methods Study

Mixed-methods research integrates quantitative and qualitative research within a single project (Bryman, 2016:635). This allows the research “gain access to participants’ perspectives” using qualitative semi-structured interviews and gain data on specific issues through “the more structured approach of quantitative research” (Bryman, 2016:655). A concurrent quantitative (Quan) and qualitative (Qual) design (Figure 3.1) can produce “well-validated and substantiated findings” (Plano Clark & Ivankova, 2016:12) as it develops understanding from different data on the same themes. A further advantage of this design is that the researcher can

¹³ A quantitative approach is necessary to fit an objective and measurable study whereas a qualitative approach can encompass a subjective and interpretative study (Jackson, 2013:52).

interpret the results and “develop inferences grounded in these conclusions” (Plano Clark & Ivankova, 2016:3).




Figure 3.1. Concurrent Quan+Qual Mixed-Methods Design Logic (Plano Clark & Ivankova, 2016).

The Phenomenological Approach

Phenomenology¹⁴ has been “one of the main intellectual traditions responsible for the anti-positivist position” (Bryman, 2016:26). Phenomenology examines taken for granted human situations as they are experienced but which often go unquestioned (Finlay, 2012). According to Gray (2009:22) phenomenology contends that “any attempt to understand social reality has to be grounded in people’s experience of that social reality”. Phenomenological research starts with the researcher who turns an interest or curiosity into a research question, with the challenge being to remain open to new understanding further than what is already know from experience or through research (Finlay, 2012). In relation to this specific study of defence planning, it is intended to adopt “a general phenomenological perspective to elucidate the importance of using methods that capture people’s experience of the world” (Patton,

¹⁴ The term phenomenology can refer to a philosophy, an inquiry paradigm or a social science analytical perspective and has traditions in sociology and psychology (Patton, 2002).

2002:107). Most interpretations of phenomenology are drawn either from the descriptive concept of Husserl or the interpretive approach of Heidegger (Gill, 2014).

For Husserl, essence is the foundation for all other knowledge and his method of reduction, or bracketing, underpins the analytical process of several phenomenological methodologies; this involves the researcher suspending his or her “assumptions and presuppositions about a phenomenon” (Gill, 2014:3). Heidegger inspired hermeneutic phenomenological methodologies where interpretation is an integral aspect and all researchers exist in a “culturally and historically conditioned environment from which they cannot step outside” (Gill, 2014:3). This queries the ability of a researcher to fully bracket or reflect as proposed by Husserl. Although the phenomenological approach requires the researcher to avoid personal theories and biases that influence the research, “there is disagreement over what exactly should be bracketed and how” (Finlay, 2012:176).

A descriptive phenomenological method was selected for this research. Although this method requires bracketing, it “assumes a participant’s psyche as a fact and does not attempt to bracket it away” (Gill, 2014:6). This effectively allows a military researcher to adopt a military attitude, rather than trying to bracket this fact out of the equation. This is significant for a study of defence planning by a serving member of the defence community.

Data Collection

Three (3) primary methods of data collection are identified by the researcher in this mixed-methods research design – document review, interviews, and a web-based survey. Scott (1990:6) suggests four criteria for assessing the quality of documents: authenticity, credibility, representativeness and meaning. As identified in the literature review, official state documents are an important element of the research into defence planning and they are considered reliable primary source material. Bryman (2016:552) states that “such materials can certainly be seen

as authentic and as having meaning” but may lack credibility if they are perceived to be biased and may require scrutiny if they are treated “as depictions of reality”. Triangulation is a research method that uses “more than one method or source of data” in the study of phenomena (Bryman, 2016:386). Originally a method used in quantitative research, triangulation can also take place within a mixed-methods research design (Bryman, 2016:386). It is also considered that the understanding of the data emerging from the official documents may be complemented by data collection with people who possess knowledge of the formal and informal processes employed and this may add qualitative and quantitative value to the open source material. In order to visualise the relevant primary source documents, a timeline (Figure 3.2) has been created.




Figure 3.2. Primary Source Documentation (Author, 2022).

The purpose of an interview is to facilitate the researcher enter the other person’s perspective (Patton, 2002) and according to Bevan (2014) is the most underemphasised element of phenomenological research. A key aspect of the interpretivist stance is the existence of multiple realities and a phenomenon can present itself in different ways to individuals; this is

known in phenomenology as “modes of appearing” (Bevan, 2014:137). Morgan (2011) believes that a guiding principle in phenomenological research is that the participant is the expert on his or her experience. Accordingly, the discussion proceeds on the understanding that the phenomenon is “whatever the participant perceives it to be” and there is no reason or attempt to determine the accuracy of what is perceived as no one knows the participant’s experience of a phenomenon better than he or she does (Morgan, 2011:17). The semi-structured interview was considered the most appropriate for an exploration of defence planning in Ireland. This facilitates the interview pursue lines of thought introduced by the participants rather than by a predetermined set of questions. The semi-structured interview also facilitated the asking of reflexive questions,¹⁵ assisting the researcher bracket their own opinions and attitudes on the subject (Bevan, 2014). Ultimately however, the quality of the data collected will be reliant on the engagement of the participants.

Completing the concurrent Quan + Qual mixed-methods research design a voluntary, anonymous web-based quantitative survey was conducted.¹⁶ The survey was distributed amongst civil and military personnel operating in, and with experience of, the Department of Defence (DoD) including Defence Force Headquarters (DFHQ). The method invited respondents to visit a website via a link, where the survey could be completed.

Sampling

Defence planning in Ireland is an area that has a limited number of participants at any time. For the review of primary source documentation, a modern period is defined from the White Paper on Defence in 2000 as an appropriate sample in accordance with the timeline illustrated above (Figure 3.2). This consisted of twelve (12) official documents issued or approved by the

¹⁵ Reflexive questions are “posed with self-consciousness of one’s own natural attitude” avoiding theory laden questions (Bevan, 2014:139).

¹⁶ The web-based survey was distributed between 01 Jan 22 and 01 April 22 and was conducted using QualtricsXM.com.

Government of Ireland, or agents of their behalf, the DoD and the Defence Forces (DF). All of the documents were readily available to the researcher. However, as the national context has relevance, a historical review of defence planning in Ireland is also conducted tracing its development from the foundation of the state to the current defence structures in place.

Creswell (2007:128) states that for interviews in a phenomenological approach there is a “much more narrow range of sampling strategies”, with criterion sampling being suitable where all individuals participating have experienced the phenomenon. The semi-structured interviews comprised individuals who can contribute valuable descriptions of their experience. The number of participants was not predetermined; scope, variation, and diversity of experience were desirable criterion. A total of four (4) semi-structured interviews were conducted with civil and military leadership of the DoD, including the Secretary General, Chief of Staff, a member of the Management Board and a member of the General Staff. Further interviews were conducted with three (3) senior military officers with experience of the defence planning processes and procedures currently in use in order to develop greater understanding.

The anonymous, web-based survey was distributed amongst civil and military personnel operating in, and with experience of, the DoD including DFHQ. The distributed population sample was Assistant Principal and Principal Officers in the DoD and officers between the rank of Captain and Colonel in DFHQ. It is considered that these grades/ ranks were most representative of personnel involved in defence planning themes identified from Chapter 2. The population sample comprises sixty-eight (68) responses, consisting of thirty-four (34) civil members of DoD and twenty-nine (29) members of DFHQ. Responses that were returned incomplete have not contributed to the data collected and analysed.

Ethical Considerations

The research required participants to express their experiences in areas they are actively working in. It also required the researcher and the participants to endeavour to be impartial, unbiased and non-judgemental in order to accept the presence of different realities and understanding. It was necessary to fully explain the nature of the research being conducted and provide awareness of the subject area; this was achieved by an extensive fact sheet delivered in advance to each potential participant. Considering the position of the civil and military interviewees, any data being directly attributed has been disclosed to them prior to publication. Due to the hierarchical nature of the Defence Forces and the sensitive nature of the subject matter, the three (3) senior military officers interviewed are not identified and comments attributable to them have been anonymised.

Data Analysis

Consistent with the approach of Giorgi (2010), thematic analysis may be a useful tool to unravel the experiences of the participants (Gill, 2014). In accordance with phenomenological research as outlined by Creswell (2007), the data was analysed for significant statements and structural descriptions in order to develop a model of defence planning in Ireland. All data collected was transcribed and studied extensively, identifying clusters of codes into themes across the data. The results were then integrated into a coherent and detailed description of defence planning in Ireland as evidenced by the participants of the research.

Strengths and Limitations

There is very limited research into defence planning in Ireland. An important strength will be an end result that is a balanced and considered observation of defence planning in the Irish context. The relatively small size of the defence community in Ireland and the field of personnel who operate in and understand the complex defence planning environment presents a limitation

that will have to be addressed. It is possible that in the absence of formal codification of certain areas, interpretation and perspective become personalised opinions and views. However, this research acting as a catalyst for further debate and discussion on defence planning as a topic would be a very positive outcome.

Chapter Summary

This chapter detailed the research philosophy and design selected to develop understanding of defence planning in Ireland. The limited number of personnel operating in defence planning explain the selection of purposive sampling in a mixed-methods research design and the ethical considerations of the researcher. Building on the themes identified in Chapter Two and facilitated by the research methodology developed here, Chapter Four explores the historical setting of defence planning in Ireland and outlines the current defence structures.

CHAPTER FOUR

IRISH DEFENCE CONTEXT

Introduction

Chapter Three identified the mixed-methods research design to examine defence planning in Ireland. This chapter explores the historical context of Ireland's defence planning, tracing its development from the foundation of the Irish Free State to the current defence structures in place.

Historical Defence Context

The Defence Forces traces its origins to the founding of the Irish Volunteers in 1913. The Irish Volunteers, or Óglaigh na hÉireann, provided the basis of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB), who were central to the uprising against British rule in 1916. The subsequent War of Independence from 1919 to 1921 was characterised by an irregular force practicing guerrilla tactics against a larger conventional British force and led to the Anglo-Irish Treaty being signed on 06 December 1921. The Treaty was not universally accepted leading to a bitter fratricidal Civil War effectively fought between an emerging pro-treaty National Army and anti-treaty irregular forces. The provisions of the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 were a critical factor in shaping the approach to defence taken by the Irish Free State government. It determined the size of Ireland's military relative to the standing strength of British Forces and restricted responsibility for coastal defence by retaining critical port infrastructure. The treaty also identified Ireland's strategic importance to Britain, describing it as not "a dominion when it came to defence" (O'Halpin, 1999:84). In the divisive treaty debates that followed, the defence provisions of the agreement were accepted.¹⁷

¹⁷ Including by the most ardent opponents of the Treaty; DeValera's 'Document Number Two' accepted Britain's strategic concerns but claimed that after an initial five-year period, "so far as her resources permit, Ireland shall provide for her own defence by sea, land and air" (O'Halpin, 1999:84).

Formative Defence Planning

On conclusion of the Civil War in 1923, the National Army¹⁸ was formally instituted in the Irish Constitution as Óglaigh na hÉireann, the Defence Forces, consisting of a standing army and an Air Service HQ directing a small fleet of thirteen (13) aircraft. Emerging from violent and armed beginnings, the politicians of the new Irish Free State recognised the requirement for a military force. According to O’Halpin (1999:82) the military represented a matter of national pride and “a symbol of virile independence” with the maintenance of a military “one of the litmus tests of sovereignty”. Perhaps more important however was the requirement for a viable counter to the threats that the new state faced, including the threat of violent republicanism. The initial issues of defence for the government however were primarily focused on demobilisation and “considerations of cost, of political stability, and of Anglo-Irish relations all dictated a rapid reduction in the army and the uses to which it would be put” (O’Halpin, 1999:85).

1924 was a seminal year for the structures and mechanisms managing defence in the Irish state. The enactment of the Ministers and Secretaries Act established Ministers as head of Departments of Government. For the management of defence, this Act created a command structure that remoted command and authority from General Officer Commanding rank directly to the Minister, rather than through a military Chief of Defence. In March 1924, in response to demobilisation, demotion and perceived bias towards younger and more professional officers, the Army mutiny occurred (Valiulis, 1983), described by Farrell (1997:114) as the “the most serious challenge to civilian control of the military in the history of the Irish State”. Finally, in tandem with increased control over public expenditure by the Department of Finance, a recommendation was accepted to appoint a civil servant as the Accounting Officer

¹⁸ In this Chapter, the term ‘army’ is used to refer to the military forces of the Irish Free State and early Irish Republic. The modern Air Corps can also trace its history to the foundation of the state in 1922, but was considered an arm or Corps of the Army. The Naval Service came into existence in 1946.

for the Army, in control of the financial business of the military. According to Farrell (1997:116), this gave “defence officials remarkably broad powers, considering that almost all army policy proposals could be said to have had financial implications”. Civilian control of the military was therefore firmly established by 1924. Consistent with the CMR thought of Bruneau (2018), this was achieved by adopting legislation and procedures weighted strongly towards civil officials, the government taking a robust response to an expression of military power in the army mutiny and firm control over financial outlay by the Department of Finance.

Civilian dominance was not resisted by the military, as the mutiny of 1924 did not attract widespread support. Farrell (1998) attributes this to a growing sense of professionalism in the military resulting from study of international practices, particularly the British Army which was itself learning from the technological, doctrinal and structural changes experienced in World War 1. Farrell (1998:79) contends that it was natural for the nascent Defence Forces to model itself on the British Army as “that was what the rest of the Irish government was doing”. There was a growing awareness in the military of the requirement for long-term planning. By 1925, a memorandum from the Council of Defence to the Executive Council of government requested “at least the outlines of the defence policy of the government” O’Halpin (1999:88). This led to the first iteration of defence policy in the Irish state on 28 October 1925.¹⁹

In this defence policy there are elements of modern defence planning. Reflecting Davis (2018) it is a deliberate decision on the military force and posture. Like Gray (2014) it identifies the challenge of securing financial resources when threats are not perceived to be existential or probable. It states that “in times of peace, there is a tendency to overlook the necessity for the

¹⁹ No. 333 NAI DT S4541, Department of the President to each member of the Executive Council enclosing schedule on Defence Policy (Secret) DUBLIN, 28 October 1925 Copyright © Royal Irish Academy 2021, accessed 13 July 22 1618hrs.

maintenance of a force trained in arms” (S4541, 1925). It identifies domestic and international influences and is clearly an attempt by the state to align the societal, military, political and national interests as identified by Hakenstad and Larsen (2012). However, the military was not permitted “to proceed on the basis indicated” as there was “no parliamentary pressure to increase defence spending” (O’Halpin, 1999:92). Throughout the remainder of the decade “the civilian administration exercised an unreasonable control” and “financial delays and restrictions persistently hindered the equipping and development of the army (Duggan, 1991:164) leading O’Halpin to describe the government objective as the “biggest army possible for the least money” (1999:102). Suggesting challenges in the civil-military relationship, by 1929 the Minister for Defence stated that “military and civil branches should collaborate” but there should not be “undue interference from the civil side in the domain of military efficiency” (Duggan, 1991:165). In what was clearly a formative decade for defence planning in Ireland, “by 1932 the army was cowed, emaciated, and resigned to further decline” (O’Halpin 1999:82).

Control Vs Effectiveness

Defence issues in Ireland in the 1920s were characterised by the establishment of civilian control; in the 1930s the issues were focused on military effectiveness. Despite the establishment of a reserve Volunteer Force in 1934 the “familiar problems of organisation, equipment and finance” persisted (O’Halpin 1999:134). Plans for a conventional defence of the state drafted in 1934 pointed to the lack of a capable force structure due to “severe underfunding” (Farrell, 1998:96). It is interesting that the perception of threat in the Irish state did not increase at a time that war was brewing in Europe.²⁰ Despite the return of the strategic sea ports and the developing crisis that lead to Munich Agreement in 1938, the vagaries of neutrality as enshrined in the defence policy of 1925 emerged. The threat of a German attack

²⁰ The production of a paper in 1936 entitled ‘Fundamental Factors affecting Irish defence policy’ was the “only considered overview of defence issues” (O’Halpin 1999:137) in the prelude to the outbreak of the Second World War.

was dismissed as Britain would intervene on Ireland's behalf and "if Britain became powerless, resistance to her conquerors would probably be futile" (Farrell, 1998:77). Accordingly, Ireland entered the Emergency "without a plan because there was no policy" (Duggan, 1991:177). Despite the Minister for Finance stating that the "consequential increase in taxation presented a greater danger to the state than the threat of invasion" (Farrell, 1997:123), the "re-equipment, reorganisation and expansion" of the army was agreed (O'Halpin 1999:143).

The Emergency highlighted that "defence was a long-term business, not one to be dealt with through a series of hasty and inadequate provisions" (O'Halpin 1997:421). There were clearly lessons to be learned in the aftermath of World War II regarding the states preparedness for future challenges (Hakenstad & Larsen, 2012) based on domestic and foreign concerns (Gray, 2014). However, rather than review defence policy the Irish government "simply reached for the financial axe" (O'Halpin 1999:258) reducing the military from 38,000 to 9,000. Securing the strategic sea ports did however lead to the formation of the Naval Service in 1946 with the purchase of three (3) Corvette class vessels.

Although the declaration of an Irish Republic in 1949 saw no change to defence policy, the decision by the government that same year not to join NATO identified a core issue of Irish foreign and defence policy that still exists today. The military identified that Ireland's defence policy was essentially a rational choice between two alternative models. The first was military security based on membership of a powerful alliance. The second was a sufficiently strong national military as a realistic deterrent. According to O'Halpin (1999:263) however, the post-war years simply "saw a wholesale reversion to defence policy and practice as seen since 1925".

In 1955, Ireland joined the United Nations (UN). The decision to deploy formed military units in support of the UN in 1960²¹ led to much needed investment in equipment as the Irish government realised the contribution the military could make to foreign policy. The IRA border campaign of 1956-1962 ensured that violent republicanism also remained a viable threat. There was investment in rotary wing assets for the Air Corps in response to the winter of 1963 and fishery protection became a primary task of the Naval Service. However, the Devlin Report of 1969 highlighted ongoing civil-military issues “which placed a pointless premium on checking and control at the expense of effectiveness” (O’Halpin 1999:265).

The early 1970s saw a rapidly declining internal security environment in and along the border with Northern Ireland develop in tandem with Ireland’s accession to the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1973.²² The 1970s and 1980s led to a determined effort by the government to review defence and develop the “most realistic and cost-effective defence arrangements” (O’Halpin 1999:340). A succession of independent reports commenced with the Gleeson Report²³ in 1990 which echoed the Devlin Report of 1969 by reporting an ineffective military, mainly engaged on non-military duties and strangled by bureaucratic red tape. The Gleeson Report pointed to the absence of extant defence policy. It quoted the most recent definition of the role of the Defence Forces as being a statement by the Minister for Defence in Dáil Éireann nine (9) years previously in 1981. In 1994, external consultants hired by the government recommended a reduction in size but an increase in investment for the army and in 1998 recommended further rationalisation of the Air Corps and Naval Service. These reports also pointed to an absence of defence policy, stating that a White Paper on Defence would be important to provide an explicit policy framework. Accordingly, the Defence Forces

²¹ In 1960 the Defence Forces deployed an infantry battalion to the Congo in support of the UN.

²² Although Ireland joined the EEC for economic reasons, membership inevitably converged economic, foreign policy and political obligations, including security.

²³ The Gleeson Report is the commonly used reference to the Report of the Commission on Remuneration and Conditions of Service in the Defence Forces, dated 31 July 1990.

engaged in reorganisation and restructuring in the late 1990s designed to develop a slimmer but more operationally effective force. In 2000, the government formally issued a White Paper on Defence, the first extant written defence policy since 1925.

The Modern Era

The White Paper on Defence (WP) 2000 identified the end of the century in which independence was achieved as “an opportune time to take stock and set a forward progressive course” for Ireland and the Defence Forces (WP, 2000:1). The WP established a policy framework for defence over a ten-year period, identified the roles of the Defence Forces (DF), outlined security threats and identified equipment requirements. The WP was explicit that “defence in Ireland is conducted within a modest level of resources” (2000:8) and that nothing had emerged in the process of developing the WP to suggest the requirement “for substantial change in the overall level of resource allocation” (2000:9). A review of implementation was conducted in 2007 but that did not extend the framework period of ten-years. In 2013, a Green Paper (GP) on Defence was produced initiating a debate on defence matters that resulted in the publication of the WP 2015, which reaffirmed the roles of the DF and set out a “long-term and forward looking approach to defence provision” (2015:iii). The White Paper process, current defence policy and the policy-making environment is covered in detail in Chapter 5.

The WP (2015) establishes the government requirements of a military force for Ireland. The DF retains a conventional all-arms military capability consisting of two (2) Infantry Brigades and a Training Centre. There is an Air Corps that operates a range of rotary and fixed wing aircraft and a Naval Service that maintains an operational fleet of eight (8) ships. The DF consists of permanent and reserve members, the latter’s role being to augment and support the permanent force in times of need. The management of Defence is the responsibility of the Minister for Defence, supported by civil and military elements of the DoD.

Current Defence Management Structures

Bunreacht na hÉireann²⁴ establishes the exclusive authority of the Oireachtas²⁵ to maintain a military force in Ireland. Supreme command of the military is vested in the President. Section 17 (1) of the Defence Acts 1954-2015 legislates that military command and all executive and administrative powers in relation to the military is exercised by the Government, through and by the Minister for Defence. Article 28.12 of the Constitution designates Ministers as being the person in charge of Departments of State, with the principal legislation being the Ministers and Secretaries Act 1924 and the Public Service Management Act 1997 (DoD, 2021: 21).

The Minister for Defence is responsible to Dáil Éireann for the DoD, with responsibilities ranging from political decision making on defence policy issues to more routine administration (DoD, 2021:21). The DoD is responsible for the “raising, training, organisation, maintenance, equipment, management, discipline, regulation and control according to law of the military defence forces” (DoD, 2021:9). Ministerial responsibility is underpinned by the concept of ‘Corporation Sole’, where the Minister embodies the Department in law and is the ultimate decision-maker of defence policy within the overall context of government policy (DoD, 2021: 21). Due to the scope of a Department’s responsibilities and the complexity of the Minister being required “to personally carry out the full range of functions assigned to his/her department”, an official in a Minister’s Department can “exercise powers that were vested in that Minister” (DoD, 2021:22) in accordance with the Carltona Principle.²⁶

²⁴ Bunreacht na hÉireann, the Irish Constitution 1937.

²⁵ The Oireachtas is the Legislature in Ireland. It is the only organ of state that has the power to make laws. The Oireachtas consists of and the President of Ireland and a bicameral chamber, composed of a Lower House referred to as Dáil Éireann and an Upper House, Seanad Éireann (<https://www.oireachtas.ie/>, accessed 07 June 22, 1842).

²⁶ The Carltona doctrine, also referred to as the Carltona principle, expresses the idea that the acts of government department officials are synonymous with the actions of the minister in charge of that department (du Gay, 2009).

The DoD consists of both civil²⁷ and military elements which have “distinct but complementary roles” (DF, 2017:9). The “business of defence is achieved through close engagement between the civil and military elements of the Department” while the Defence Organisation²⁸ “work together in order to achieve maximum effectiveness” (DoD, 2021:9). The constituent parts of the Department reflect “the global concept of civil control of the armed forces” (DoD, 2021:9). The DoD Joint Strategy Statement establishes a shared High-Level Goal which is “to provide for the military defence of the state, contribute to national and international peace and security and fulfil all other roles assigned by Government” (DoD/DF2021:2). The Secretary General is the ‘Principal Officer’ of the Department and is also the Accounting Officer²⁹ for all defence expenditure. The DF Chief of Staff is the head of the military element of the DoD and is the Minister for Defence’s principal military advisor (DoD/DF2021:2).

The Civil Element

The civil element of the DoD supports the Minister in the formulation of defence policy, providing oversight and management of the Defence Votes,³⁰ driving efficiency and the process of change. The civil element also represents Ireland at EU and International engagements, defends against litigation and provides a range of critical services and outputs to the DF including liaison with other Government Departments, public authorities, institutions and public representatives (DoD, 2021:10). The Secretary General has overall management responsibility for the quality of advice submitted to the Minister (DoD, 2021:24) and is assisted in this role by the Management Board, which “acts as a leadership and management team for the civil side of the Department” (DoD, 2021:30). There is also a Management Group, which

²⁷ Previous research on Irish CMR (Crummey, 2015:147) established the use of the word ‘civil’ in an Irish context rather than the more established usage in the literature of ‘civilian’ as being an interesting national perspective on Civil-Military Relations.

²⁸ The Department of Defence and the Defence Forces are referred to collectively by the term ‘Defence Organisation’ (White Paper, 2015:1).

²⁹ The Accounting Officer bears personal responsibility for the regularity and propriety of the transactions in the accounts for which he or she is answerable, the control of assets, economy and efficiency in the use of the Department’s resources and for the systems, practices and procedures used to evaluate the effectiveness of its operations (DoD, 2021:25).

³⁰ In the case of Defence there are two (2) separate votes of expenditure – Vote 35 which refers to Defence Pensions and Vote 36 which is Defence Funding (CODF, 2022:135)

consists of the Management Board and Principal Officers (POs) of the Department. This is chaired by the Secretary General and meets monthly.

The civil element of DoD has a structure that “is not fixed but changes and evolves according to needs and emerging priorities” (DoD, 2021:11). At the time of writing that structure reflects four divisions with associated Branches designated Defence Capability (People), Emergency Operations & Infrastructure Oversight, International Affairs and Legislation, and Strategic Planning, Capability Development and Corporate Support (See Figure 4.1). The Department state that it is committed to a culture of openness and transparency and an ethos aligned with the Civil Service Code of Standards. The values espoused by the civil side of the Department are “a deep rooted public service ethos of independence, integrity, impartiality, equality, fairness and respect”, a culture of “accountability, efficiency, and value for money”, and the “highest standards of professionalism, leadership and rigour” (DoD, 2021:14).




Figure 4.1. Structure of the Civil Element of DoD (Author, 2022).³¹

The Military Element

Defence Forces Headquarters (DFHQ) is the military element of the DoD (DF, 2017:11). The military element supports the Minister by “planning, managing, formulating military advice, development and major strategic issues affecting the Defence Forces, including ongoing modernisation and transformation” (DoD, 2021:10). The Chief of Staff is directly accountable to the Minister for the performance of any duties assigned to him under the Defence Acts 1954-2015 (DF, 2017(1):10). Under the same legislation, the Chief of Staff delegates responsibilities to the Deputy Chief of Staff (Operations) and the Deputy Chief of Staff (Support). The General Staff are the “senior leadership and management team of the Defence Forces” (DF, 2017(1):26). Chaired by the Chief of Staff and meeting weekly, it consists of both Deputy Chiefs of Staff and the Assistant Chief of Staff. It also meets monthly with senior leadership of the DF including Branch Directors of DFHQ.

The organisational structure of DFHQ consists of two (2) divisions, Operations and Support, with associated Branches and Directorates which are structured to report to an individual Deputy Chief of Staff (See Figure 4.2). The military element of the DoD and the DF espouse shared values of respect, loyalty, selflessness, physical courage, moral courage and integrity. They also adopt a culture of “loyalty and faithfulness to Ireland and its Constitution, a calling to serve the nation, a sense of duty and common values” (DF, 2017(1):9).

³¹ www.gov.ie/en/organisation/department-of-defence (Accessed 05 June 22 13:45)




Figure 4.2. Structure of the Military Element of DoD (DF, 2017(1):11).

Relationship between the Civil Element and Military Element

The effective management of defence requires “sustained close collaboration of civil and military management under the direction of the Minister for Defence” (WP, 2015:109). The close relationship between the Secretary General and the Chief of Staff “is a key ingredient in the successful management of defence (WP, 2015:110). They meet on a regular weekly basis and have access to the Minister individually and jointly (DoD, 2021).

There are governance arrangements that arise from the civil-military nature of the DoD. The Strategic Management Committee (SMC) is the “central forum for management and oversight of civil and military matters” (WP, 2015:109) and facilitates engagement on defence matters while respecting the separate lines of authority within the civil and military elements of the Department. The SMC is chaired by the Secretary General and has a membership of the Chief of Staff, the civil element Management Board and the military element General Staff, although

it is expanded to include General Officer Commanding the Air Corps and Flag Officer Commanding the Naval Service periodically.

Below the level of the SMC “there are numerous joint civil-military working groups” and less formal joint working arrangements where civil and military personnel collaborate (WPU, 2019:57). There are civil-military units that are civil-lead and joint civil-military staffed. Examples include the Office of Emergency Planning (OEP)³² and the Research, Technology and Innovation (RTI) unit. In addition, there are civil-military groups such as the Strategic Human Resource Group (SHRG), White Paper Implementation Group and the High Level Planning and Procurement Group (HLPPG).

The HLPPG is a joint civil and military entity with the role of developing and implementing “multi-annual rolling plans for the Defence Forces for equipment procurement and disposal and infrastructural development (including property acquisition) based on the policy priorities in the White Paper” (DoD, 2021:35). The chair of the HLPPG is rotated between the civil and military element at Assistant Secretary General and Deputy Chief of Staff level. In the context of defence planning, the HLPPG provides a forum for the oversight of delegated financial functions and responsibilities, including those made under delegation instruments from the Secretary General as the Accounting Officer to the Chief of Staff (DoD, 2021:35). The consolidated structure of the DoD, outlining the roles of the Secretary General and Chief of Staff, the distinct civil and military elements, and the civil-military structures that exist to facilitate the workings of the Department is illustrated below (Figure 4.3).

³² The OEP supports the Minister for Defence in his responsibilities as Chair of the Government Task Force on Emergency Planning, a cross Government and public authority body.




Figure 4.3. Consolidated Structure of DoD (Author, 2022).

Current Finance and Procurement Structures

On an annual basis, Dáil Éireann votes the amount of funding allocated for Government Departments to spend on the provision of public services (DoD, 2021:39). In the case of Defence there are two (2) separate votes of expenditure – Vote 35 which refers to Defence Pensions and Vote 36 which is Defence Funding (CODF, 2022:135). At the end of the fiscal year the Accounting Officer is responsible for the Appropriation Account,³³ and presents this

³³ The appropriation account is an account of the expenditure authorised.

for audit to the Comptroller and Auditor General (DoD, 2021:39). Vote 35 provides for the payment of pension benefits to retired military personnel and certain dependants.³⁴ Vote 36 provides for both capital and current expenditure.³⁵

The Accounting Officer “annually delegates to the Chief of Staff budgetary control and responsibility for expenditure in respect of a series of subheads or part thereof” (DF, 2017(1):32). The Chief of Staff further delegates this responsibility to the Deputy Chief of Staff (Support) who in turn delegates annually to military sub-head holders (DF, 2017(1):35). Procurement is conducted in accordance with Public Procurement Guidelines and designed to ensure the “highest standards of integrity, fairness, legality, confidentiality and disclosure of interest” (DoD, 2021:44). Defensive equipment is procured in accordance with EU Defence and Security Directive 2008/81/EU, which has been transposed into Irish Law. Overall procurement policy in the Defence Organisation is managed by Contracts Branch in the Strategic Planning, Capability Development and Corporate Support Division of the civil element of the Department. They are directly responsible for the “management of procurement activities for defensive equipment and materials”, contract management of major capital equipment projects and corporate governance of the delegation to expend funds in devolved subheads in conjunction with the HLPPG (DoD, 2021:44).

Recent Developments

The Commission on the Defence Forces (CODF) was appointed by the Government in 2020. It was mandated to “recommend appropriate capabilities, structures and staffing of the Permanent and Reserve Defence Forces, both for the immediate future and beyond 2030, in order to ensure that they remain agile, flexible and adaptive” (CODF, 2022:1). The CODF

³⁴ Superannuation accounts for most of the expenditure with the balance spent on “military disability pensions and other ancillary benefits” (DoD/DF, 2021:4). The gross 2022 estimate for Vote 35 is €270.7 million (CODF, 2022:135).

³⁵ This includes pay and allowances and non-pay costs such as the purchase and upgrade of military equipment, necessary building and maintenance works and ICT projects (DoD/DF, 2021:4). The gross 2022 estimate for Vote 36 is €836.2 million (CODF, 2022:135).

examined the security and threat environment and current defence policy as established by the WP 2015, Updated 2019 but its Terms of Reference did not extend beyond the DF to the DoD. The CODF reported to the Minister for Defence in February 2022 outlining three (3) Levels of Ambition for military capability (Figure 4.4).

LOA 1 current capability	Aiming to uphold sovereign rights and serving on peace support operations to the same extent as at present.
LOA 2 enhanced capability	Building on current capability to address specific priority gaps in our ability to deal with an assault on Irish sovereignty and to serve in higher intensity Peace Support Operations.
LOA 3 conventional capability	Developing full spectrum defence capabilities to protect Ireland and its people to an extent comparable to similar sized countries in Europe.

Figure 4.4. Government Level of Ambition used to frame the Capability Requirements of the DF (HLAP, 2022:5).

In July 2022, the government published its response to the CODF recommendations in the form of a High Level Action Plan (HLAP) entitled “Building for the Future – Change from Within”. In this document, the government “approved a decision to move to Level of Ambition 2 (LOA2) over a six year period to 2028” (HLAP, 2022:6). This entails a commitment that the defence budget will rise to €1.5 Billion by 2028 “the largest increase in defence spending in the history of the state” (HLAP, 2022:6). The HLAP indicates five core areas, which have been represented as five strategic objectives. Each recommendation made by the CODF has been considered by government and responded to under four categories – accepted, accepted in principle, requires further evaluation or require the Minister for Defence to revert to government (HLAP, 2022:11).

The Capability Review of the Department of Defence (OCR) was conducted by the Department of Public Expenditure and Reform (DPER) in accordance with the Civil Service Renewal Plan

(2014). The review was “concerned solely with the Department’s capability to deliver on its mission statement” (OCR, 2022:12) and was based on four key areas of leadership, policy-making, delivery and business support. The review was published in July 2022.

Chapter Summary

This chapter has explored the historical context of defence planning in Ireland, tracing its development from the foundation of the Irish Free State to the current defence structures. This exploration was based on the themes that emerged from the review of literature in Chapter Two and the research philosophy and design developed in Chapter Three. Chapter Five will outline the research findings and analysis of defence planning in Ireland.

CHAPTER FIVE

RESEARCH FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

Introduction

Chapter Four identified the historical context of defence planning in Ireland and its development from the foundation of the Irish Free State to the current defence structures. This chapter explores the realities, interpretations and understandings of defence planning in Ireland following the key themes and arguments which informed the discourse in Chapter Two. The themes are defence planning and uncertainty, defence planning and public policy, defence planning and civil-military relations and defence planning models. Although there is a logical structure to the themes identified, the complex reality of the defence environment that exists in Ireland permeates the findings.

Defence Planning and Uncertainty

What is Defence Planning in Ireland?

The research establishes that resources, manpower and effort are organised and employed as a military force in Ireland. Therefore, Ireland practices defence planning in line with the interpretation of Gray (2014), Hakenstad and Larsen (2012) and De Spiegeleire (2012). A stated priority for the Minister for Defence is ensuring that the necessary level of resources are available for the Defence Forces (DF) to “fulfil all the roles assigned to them by Government and to facilitate investment in essential equipment and infrastructure” (Signal, 2021(1):31). The defence planning process is understood to be “relatively long term”, linking the identification of capabilities based on policy requirements, their procurement, acceptance and full operationalisation (WP, 2015:114). The WP (2015:62) also states that the DF retain “a range of flexible conventional military capabilities... as a hedge to future uncertainty”. This suggests that if viewed as the management of strategic risk as identified by Fruhling (2014),

Ireland's defence planning reflects 'hedging' which is suitable for narrowly defined or specific risk.

The WP (2015:113) echoes the description provided by Breitenbach and Jakobsson (2018:256) of defence planning being "complex and multifaceted" and in the Irish context defence planning is closely linked to other foreign and security policy areas.³⁶ The government approach recognises that "prudent defence planning involves maintaining an appropriate level of capability that can be enhanced" (WP, 2015:25). A national challenge in Ireland's defence planning is "procuring items in relatively small quantities with specific tailored requirements" (WP, 2015:114) requiring the quality and timeliness of decision-making processes to be critical. Awareness of this challenge was reflected in interview with a senior officer³⁷ involved in defence planning in Ireland who reflected Gray's (2014) position that the requirements of a state's defence planning must be clear – "we're a small country, small budget, we're competing for scarce resources. What are our priorities"? The military interviewees reflected Hakenstad and Larsen's (2012) requirement for defence planning to consider the state's hard security requirements and resource base in developing an effective military. Lieutenant General (Lt Gen) Sean Clancy, Chief of Staff of the Defence Forces³⁸ identified defence planning as "looking at the security, the analysis, the threats" and "developing policy to respond to those threats". Assistant Chief of Staff, Brigadier General (Brig Gen) Rossa Mulcahy³⁹ clearly placed defence planning in the medium and far-term describing the requirement to identify "the threats we will face in the future... and what are the capabilities and policies we will need to put in place to address those".

³⁶ Such as The Global Island, Ireland's Foreign Policy for a Changing World, Department of Foreign Affairs, 2015.

³⁷ Senior Officer 1 was interviewed on 14 Jan 22.

³⁸ Lt Gen Sean Clancy, Chief of Staff was interviewed on 28 Jan 22.

³⁹ Brig Gen Rossa Mulcahy, Assistant Chief of Staff was interviewed on 14 Jan 22.

Enthoven and Smith's (1971:33) "enduring tenets about analysis and planning" do not appear to be the foundation for Ireland's defence planning. In the web-based survey conducted for this research,⁴⁰ there is a significant discrepancy between civil and military respondents to the question if defence requirements in Ireland are made based on the national interest? The responses indicate a different interpretation of the defence focus between the separate elements that constitute the Department of Defence (DoD) (See Figure 5.1).




Figure 5.1. Decisions on defence requirements in Ireland are based on the National interest? (Author, 2022).

The research suggests an overall lack of faith in decision-making criteria for defence planning as proposed by Enthoven and Smith. Decisions on requirements being made based on choice between explicit, balanced and feasible alternatives elicited very strong disagreement from the military respondents (77%), while there was also notable disagreement from the civil element (56%). The respondents also indicated disagreement that open and explicit analysis with transparent data and assumptions form the basis of major decisions on defence requirements in Ireland (Figure 5.2). The requirement for the Minister for Defence to have an analytical staff

⁴⁰ A voluntary, anonymous web-based quantitative survey was conducted between 01 Jan 22 and 01 April 22 amongst civil and military personnel operating in, and with experience of, the Department of Defence including Defence Force Headquarters.

capable of providing relevant data and unbiased perspectives was the only area of agreement for both civil (89%) and military (92%) respondents.




Figure 5.2. Open and explicit analysis with transparent data and assumptions form the basis of major decisions on defence requirements in Ireland? (Author, 2022).

Resourcing Uncertainty or Uncertain Resourcing?

Reflecting the views of Grant and Milenski (2019) and Fruhling (2014), the WP (2015:115) states that often “defence is seen purely as consumption expenditure and the connectivity between defence provision and the proper functioning of civil society is not well understood or immediately obvious”. Further reflecting Gray (2014), the WP identifies that threats and their probability “often do not appear as urgent matters in current terms” (2015:115). This is an important interpretation of the national mindset towards defence planning by defence policy.⁴¹ Clancy identifies the position of defence in society as an obstacle to “cohesiveness and a comprehensive defence approach in the state” and that despite threats that are now more overt, “we don’t have a defence discourse in this state”. The Secretary General of the Department of Defence, Ms Jacqui McCrum, has stated that Ireland’s geopolitical position on

⁴¹ The Commission on the Defence Forces (CODF) referred to there currently being “unaccustomed attention on our national defence policy” (CODF, 2022:i).

the periphery of Europe was likely to be less meaningful in the future and that public debate should help inform defence issues (Signal, 2021(1):35). The Capability Review of the Department of Defence (OCR) identified that there are “security and defence matters where Ireland is required to contribute to international deliberations” (OCR, 2022:29). It further elaborated that reshaping defence issues in the minds of the public and influencing Government to prioritise investment are challenges for the DoD. Mulcahy identified the inherent challenge of this by stating that “you can put anything you want in defence policy, but if it’s not going to be resourced it’s not going to be achieved”.

Recognising the lack of discourse on defence issues in Ireland, the Government developed a series of defence review arrangements in the WP (2015:115) designed to “elevate discussion and debate” in a way that despite competing demands for resources, “investment in defence is given the appropriate consideration”. This was reinforced in the White Paper on Defence Update (WPU) 2019 which referred to the requirement “for greater debate on security matters in the public domain” which would “contribute to better decision-making on policy direction and resource allocation” (WPU, 2019:73). Gray (2014) states that the perceived threat limits how convincingly a government can allocate resources to defence planning; it is interesting to note that traditionally “Ireland’s defence spending has been exceptionally low % GNI” (Irish Fiscal Advisory Council, 2022:118). It is also noted that the increase of the defence budget to €1.5 Billion by 2028 in accordance with LOA 2 indicated in the HLAP (2022:6) still represents a low spend relative to other neutral countries and the EU average (Figure 5.3).





Figure 5.3. Ireland's Defence Spending Indicating the Projected Increase for LOA 2 as identified by the CODF (Irish Fiscal Advisory Council 2022).

The traditional low defence spend reflects the challenge faced in securing sufficient resources for defence in Ireland. A consequence of this is Irish defence planning's ability to confront "deep uncertainty" as identified by Davis' (2014:6) FAR principles of flexibility, adaptiveness and robustness⁴² as indicated by the respondents to the web-based survey. There was overall disagreement (56%) that defence planning in Ireland is flexible to adapt to new missions or objectives and disagreement (66%) that it is adaptive to cope with new or changed circumstances. A large number of civil respondents (68%) and an overwhelming number of military respondents (92%) disagreed that Ireland's defence planning is robust enough to deal with adverse shocks (Figure 5.4). This research indicates therefore that a low defence spend may negate a state's defence planning ability to identify now that which might prove to be important in the future (Davis, 2012; Gray, 2014, Angstrom, 2018).

⁴² Davis (2014) identified flexibility, adaptiveness and robustness as additions to Enthoven and Smith's (1971) original enduring tenets.



*Figure 5.4. Defence Planning in Ireland is robust enough to deal with adverse shocks?
(Author, 2022).*

The CODF (2022:25) identified that the DF need “a much clearer mandate and sense of its role in Irish society than is evident at present”. This requirement speaks directly to Gray’s (2014) addition of ‘to do what?’ to Enthoven and Smith’s original question of ‘how much is enough?’ In interview Clancy stressed the importance of tasks being aligned with policy and being determined by a Government level of ambition. The HLAP (2022:6) indicates that a level of ambition of enhanced capability has been accepted by the government and the projected resources to achieve this have been agreed. The CODF (2022:143) also identified that consistency between policy, level of ambition and funding are critical and that the “link between these three elements is acknowledged and maintained in all future policy discussion”. As stated by De Spiegeleire et. al. (2019) this link is the essence of public policy.

Defence Planning and Public Policy

According to Ferris (2015:90) “the making of public policy in Ireland is no different from that of other countries”. Public policy originates from the Oireachtas, frequently through the publication of Green Papers, White Papers or other evidence-based documents and is

implemented primarily through legislation.⁴³ This research indicates that incrementalism as identified by Heywood (2019) most reflects the general theory of policy decision-making in Ireland’s defence planning (Figure 5.5). This suggests that defence policy is formulated that is technically feasible relative to available resources and is politically feasible relative to existing policy. According to Heywood (2019), incrementalism is a typical lens through which to view public policy, and indicates that defence policy making in Ireland is inclined to favour political outcomes that do not depart radically from the status quo.




Figure 5.5. General Theory of Decision-making in Ireland’s Defence Policy (Author, 2022).

Defence Policy in Ireland

Defence policy in Ireland “includes diplomacy and the supply of security; policy therefore encompasses more than the Defence Forces” and is a combination of long standing policy positions⁴⁴ and written documents such as the White Papers, Programmes for Government and

⁴³ Ferris (2015) identifies that there has been a recent focus on evidence-based decision-making in relation to public policy in Ireland.

⁴⁴ Long Standing policy positions are described in the OCR as participation in UN peacekeeping missions and military neutrality, described as core elements of overall defence and foreign policy (OCR, 2022:28).

strategy Statements (OCR, 2022:28). The WP (2015) is the current written expression of Ireland's defence policy, although the OCR (2022:28) states "that of itself falls short of a full articulation of policy". Its stated intent is to provide a framework to enable a flexible and adaptive response to changes in the security environment, establish the security tasks to be undertaken and set out government policy on the use of defence assets in non-security roles. Building on the White Paper on Defence (2000), the first such paper in the history of the Irish state, the policy-making process started with a Green Paper on Defence (GP) (2013) which was designed to update the vision for Defence, stimulate an open and mature consultative process and ensure that the stated roles of the military are consistent with requirements (GP, 2013:4). In developing the WP, civil-military working groups conducted meetings with a variety of stakeholders including other government departments and agencies, interest groups and international organisations. The Minister also established an External Advisory Group and hosted a public symposium prior to its finalisation. The planning horizon for defence policy in Ireland is clearly and repeatedly stated as being ten years. The WP (2000:1) was described as a "medium term strategy for defence covering the period up to 2010". There was a review of implementation in 2007 which did not extend the original period beyond 2010. The WP (2015) also clearly establishes a framework for defence policy for a ten-year period to 2025. There was however a period of fifteen years between the two White Papers on Defence.

The WP (2015:114) commits to a series of fixed cycle reviews to "give reassurance that policy remains up to date and relevant to changing future circumstances" (See Figure 5.6). The reviews were scheduled to commence in the first half of the third year of each cycle. An update was produced in 2019 which affirmed the fundamentals of the WP approach stating that it continued to provide "the strategic and comprehensive defence policy framework for the period up to 2025" (WPU, 2019:7). The Strategic Defence Review was scheduled to commence in

2021.⁴⁵ The fixed cycle of defence reviews are identified as a mechanism to update the security assessment and its implications for the “overall policy requirements, associated tasks, capability development and resourcing” in order to bring certainty and regularity to the defence planning process (WP, 2015:114).




Figure 5.6. Ireland Current White Paper on Defence Policy Cycle (Author, 2022).

There is different interpretation of what the reviews mean for the traditional White Paper process. Mulcahy stated that with each review “every three years we’ll take a fresh ten-year horizon”. He stated his understanding that the intent was to have a more “dynamic, rolling and iterative” process rather than the traditional fixed ten-year blocks. Clancy stated that the Strategic Defence Review, although delayed, “will now become de facto the new White Paper” and will reset the threat analysis, security analysis and become in effect a policy document. Clancy also stated his belief that “I don’t think there’s space to do another White Paper process”. One senior officer⁴⁶ interviewed however expected the more traditional Green Paper/ White Paper process to start in 2023, with a twelve-month duration thereby avoiding “the difficulty we had before this White Paper was published where we had a fifteen-year gap”. In interview, senior civil leadership did not indicate that the fixed cycle of reviews would replace

⁴⁵ This has not commenced as of July 2022, although it is indicated as an ‘early action’ in the HLAP (2022:15).

⁴⁶ Senior Officer 2 was interviewed on 13 Jan 22.

the White Paper process. McCrum⁴⁷ and Assistant Secretary General of the Department of Defence Mr. Robert Mooney⁴⁸ outlined in detail the process of policy formulation without suggesting that the traditional government paper process would undergo any significant change. On the topic of capability development being an iterative process Mooney stated that “it would make the next White Paper easier” – suggesting that there would be one at some point.

The iterative, rolling process of fixed cycle reviews would meet the stated intent in the WP (2015) of ensuring defence policy remains up to date and relevant. A move to a predictable cycle of policy formulation would also avoid the situation where gaps are permitted to arise between iterations of a ten-year policy cycle. However, there is also assurance in the traditional process of Government papers clearly directing defence policy. Due to the historic reluctance of the Irish Government to enshrine defence policy, there are only two (2) policy cycles for the researcher to compare. It is therefore difficult to assess whether the policy cycle will benefit from a more traditional approach that provides a very defined period framework or a more fluid and dynamic process. While the differing opinions expressed may be attributed to interpretation, understanding, exposure to current strategic thinking or simply unstated intent, it offers an interesting observation on the policy cycle and the policy making environment in Ireland.

Policy-Making

As the literature identified and the research confirms, the policy cycle can be challenging and there may be more utility in examining the policy-making environment. Examining Ireland’s defence policy-making environment through the model proposed by Cairney (2020), it is clear there are multiple actors. The policy-making process that led to the WP is described as a whole

⁴⁷ Secretary General of the Department of Defence, Ms Jacqui McCrum was interviewed on 27 Jan 22.

⁴⁸ Assistant Secretary General of the Department of Defence, Mr. Robert Mooney was interviewed on 27 Jan 22.

of Government approach by Mooney who also stressed that the resulting policy is a Government Paper, rather than just a DoD output. McCrum, Mooney, Clancy and Mulcahy all identified the Minister for Defence and the Minister for Foreign Affairs⁴⁹ as primary actors while secondary actors are the agencies and other Government Departments. Regarding the formulation of defence policy, all interviewees highlighted the role of the DoD, in support of the Minister. The institutions or rules that govern the interaction between actors, specifically in the defence environment, include the principle of civil control of the military, described by McCrum as a “fundamental to all democracies” (Signal, 2021(1):43).

The networks between actors were described by Mulcahy as “collaborative”, and Clancy acknowledged that while the policy-making environment technically sits at the political level “the boundaries are very difficult to define” primarily due to the lack of an overarching National Security Strategy. In the national context, ideas and beliefs are naturally dominated by the concepts of neutrality and military non-alignment even though the WP (2015:6) identifies the UN, EU, OSCE and NATO PfP as regional security organisations that Ireland acts with in pursuit of international peace and security as a key policy issue.⁵⁰ The recent global COVID-19 pandemic is an example of a non-routine event that clearly affected the policy agenda.

In Chapter Two, Cairney (2020) offered that policymakers suffice. Mooney however stated that the defence planning approach in Ireland was to “maximise, not suffice”. Mulcahy also stated that with the WP (2015) “the intent was to make better defence policy”. This research suggests however that defence policy being maximised is questionable. The WPU (2019:37) states that the implementation of the WP (2015) was designed to be completed on a phased basis to reflect the Programme for Government, the related nature of some of the projects and

⁴⁹ The Portfolios of Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, and Minister for Defence, are currently held by the same Minister. This is not always the case.

⁵⁰ The military interviewees all pointed to the EU Strategic Compass initiative as an emerging factor in this regard.

resourcing implications. The White Paper Implementation Programme (2021:1) identifies that a project management framework was adopted that facilitated “a focused and practical approach to implementation” of projects over the ten-year period of the WP. In terms of outcomes however, of the ninety-five projects, sixty-three (59%) have been initiated but only twenty-five (23%) have been formally completed and closed as of February 2021. The OCR states that the WP consists of infrastructure and investment projects combined with “quite complex policy initiatives” and that this has led to “delivery challenges” (2022:28). These delivery challenges perhaps explain why only a small number (28%) of overall respondents to the web-based survey agree that formulated defence policy will be implemented. There is significant disparity in the responses between civil and military elements, again indicating two very different perspectives in the DoD (Figure 5.7). This view is reflected in the interview of a senior officer involved in defence planning when it was stated that “there’s nothing wrong with the White Paper. Other than I don’t think it was the intent of Government that seven years after it was written that a lot of the projects in it aren’t over”.




Figure 5.7. The formulated defence policy will be implemented? (Author, 2022).

While the research indicates that implementation of defence policy in Ireland cannot be assumed, the civil and military respondents agreed that policy implementation is a top-down

process. This suggests that a rational policy will not be subverted by irrational bureaucracy (Sabatier, 1986). An interesting finding from the survey is overall disagreement (74%) that the formulation of defence policy is inclusive and includes a whole of Government approach. There was overwhelming disagreement from the military respondents, but it is interesting that a significant number of civil respondents also disagreed (Figure 5.8).




Figure 5.8. The formulation of defence policy in Ireland is inclusive and includes a Whole of Government approach? (Author, 2022).

This position is supported by the fact that there was overall agreement from civil and military respondents (79%) that the number of people involved in formulating defence policy in Ireland is limited. It is further supported by the OCR (2022:33), which found that a number of personnel in the DoD “point to the limited opportunities available to them to input into the development of policy and strategy”. This contradicts both the stated methodology of the WP and the confirmatory positions of the civil and military leadership of the DoD in interview (McCrum, Mooney, Clancy, Mulcahy). This offers an interesting finding regarding the different perspectives and understanding of the leadership of the Department and those who also work there. It may also reflect the policy process seeking stable arrangements as suggested

by Cairney (2020) rather than Jensen's (2018) understanding of collective actors which is also an interesting observation on the Defence Organisation in Ireland.

Defence Organisation

As established in Chapter Four, the term Defence Organisation in Ireland encapsulates the DoD and the DF collectively, and the DoD consists of a civil element and a military element. In keeping with the national defence context however, the question of identity is more complex. The civil element of the Department are civil servants. The military element also constitutes Defence Forces Headquarters (DFHQ) and while being described as members of the DoD they are also serving members of the DF. Over the course of their careers the military members will typically move between appointments that are in DFHQ and appointments that are in the DF. Accordingly, research into the Defence Organisation in Ireland will encounter situations where the term DoD only refers to the civil element and situations where DFHQ is referred to only in a military sense as an integral part of the DF. The tacit understanding adopted by this research reflects the formal position as established in Chapter Four.

Huntington (1961) described defence policy as resulting from an arena rather than unity, suggesting that different interpretations and understanding will inevitably arise. Tama (2018) and Nelson (2002) advocate that defence policy should be transparent but that compromise may be required to accommodate different perspectives. The primary source documents utilised for this research and identified in Chapter Three are unclassified and are freely available to researchers through Government and military outlets, suggesting transparency in defence policy as identified by Fruhling (2014). However, an interesting finding emerges from the civil and military respondents to the web-based survey (Figure 5.9). The military element was unequivocal in its disagreement that the formulation of defence policy in Ireland is transparent; significantly no single military respondent agreed. On the civil side, the majority

also disagree but it is interesting to observe there was also a high level of ambivalence evident with an equal amount expressing no opinion. Only 22% of civil respondents agree that defence policy formulation in Ireland is transparent.




Figure 5.9. The formulation of defence policy in Ireland is transparent? (Author, 2022).

When viewed together with the previous findings, this research indicates that the survey sample of civil and military personnel working in the defence policy-making process in Ireland believe that it is not transparent, has limited numbers of people involved and is not inclusive. This suggests that pluralism, or the contribution of a wide spectrum of ideas and opinions, as proposed by Nelson (2002) is not evident and there is perhaps a lack of debate and criticism in the process. The OCR (2022:34) describes awareness of the policy environment and the operating environment by the respective elements of the Department as a policymaking challenge. This could be addressed by joint education initiatives in the policy making and operational processes for both civil and military elements of the DoD, allowing for greater integration of both elements.

Grant and Milenski (2019) contend that all Defence Organisations fit broadly into one of four models. When this was posed to the civil and military respondents in the web-based survey,

interesting findings emerge that are defined more by levels of disagreement than by agreement (Figure 5.10). The civil respondents were united in their disagreement that the Defence Organisation did not fit the rational (61%), emotional (78%) or military dominant model (61%). The highest agreement level was for the politics dominant model, but with a low score (28%). The military respondents were united in disagreement about the rational model (88%), the politics dominant model (88%) and the military dominant model (96%). The highest level of agreement for the military element was the emotions dominant model, but again with a low score (25%).




Figure 5.10. Irish Defence Organisation Model Interaction Grid (Author, 2022 adapted from Grant & Milenski, 2019).

The research indicates that the civil respondents believe that the Defence Organisation is a good fit for Ireland's culture, geography and budget. This model suggests that policy is skewed towards manpower, with some high-profile equipment procurement. The military respondents believe that the Defence Organisation makes decisions based on emotion rather than facts, logic or finance. This represents weak policy and results in few modern capabilities, as funding is

skewed towards manpower. Grant and Milenski's model permits a Defence Organisation to move between models, indicating that neither the civil nor military element are necessarily incorrect in their views. However, it is another interesting indicator of very different understandings and interpretations between the civil and military elements of the DoD. The model is intended to indicate how a country thinks about defence policy, but in an Irish context it also indicates how the participants in defence planning in the Department responsible for defence policy can think very differently. When this reality is applied to how policy links to strategy, perhaps unsurprisingly further differences emerge.

Policy and Strategy

The WPU (2019:74) identifies the necessary connection “between planning, strategy, delivery of capability (current and contingent) and operations”. The Public Service Management Act, 1997, provides the statutory basis for government departments to produce a strategy statement within six months of the appointment of a new Minister, or alternatively once every three years.⁵¹ The strategy statement is described as “the formal expression of the strategic management process” which is “intended to set out the key strategies and objectives to be achieved over a three-year period” (DoD, 2021:11) and “draws together commitments in the White Paper on Defence and the Programme for Government” (OCR, 2022:29). The DoD, consisting as it does of civil and military elements, produces a joint strategy statement with the DF (See Figure 5.11).⁵² It articulates a shared high-level goal⁵³ and strategic dimensions, under each of which strategic goals are identified complemented by “identified priority objectives and actions which will be pursued over the period” in question” (DoD/DF, 2021:2). There is

⁵¹ There have been eight (8) Strategy Statements during the lifetime of the two (2) White Papers on Defence 2000 and 2015.

⁵² The Department of Defence and Defence Forces Strategy Statement has been joint since 2008. The current strategy statement period is 2021-2023.

⁵³ The high-level goal is “to provide for the military defence of the state, contribute to national and international peace and security and fulfil all other roles assigned by government” (DoD/DF, 2021:2).

a joint Annual Report⁵⁴ produced which reviews the performance of the DoD and the DF against each of the strategic goals identified in the Joint Strategy Statement.




Figure 5.11. Ireland's Current Defence Policy and Strategy (Author, 2022).

The joint defence Strategy Statement is clearly linked to defence policy. The WP (2015) specifically refers to the fixed cycle of defence reviews informing the strategy statement preparation. The strategy statement is also a mechanism for strategic management. This is the formulation of strategies to achieve policy goals as described by the literature.⁵⁵ However, the research indicates that for the civil and military respondents to the web-based survey there is less of a distinction between policy and strategy. There was an overall understanding (55%) that policy and strategy are closely connected and a clear understanding overall (71%) that policy and strategy, while inextricably linked, are not the same. This is perhaps attributable to the fact that the joint strategy statement produced by the civil and military elements of the DoD also incorporates the DF. However, the DF also have their own separate strategy mechanism (Figure 5.12). The Defence Forces Strategic Planning Framework (SPF) is “developed to

⁵⁴ The Department of Defence and Defence Forces Annual Report has been joint since 2008.

⁵⁵ Strategic planning is different and is a function of separate Branches of both the civil and military elements of the DoD.

provide a clear direction that the Defence Forces will follow over the next 10 years” and comprises three distinct phases of consolidate, enhance and evolve (DF, 2017(2):4). The SPF is also aligned with defence policy.



Figure 5.12. Ireland’s Joint Defence Strategy Statement and Defence Forces Strategic Planning Framework (Author, 2022).

Clancy stated that the joint strategy statement is government process and not unique to defence whereas the SPF, while associated with the strategy statement, is “more nested within the White Paper... as it is based on the 10-year policy”. The OCR (2022:36) identifies the benefit of having a separate strategy for the DF and suggests that the civil element should have a sectoral-based strategy “relating to those matters that are confined solely to its business”. The presence of two distinct strategy processes for the DF perhaps indicates why only 33% of civil and 17% of military respondents to the survey agree that the strategy statement provides an effective link between policy guidance, the ends and the ways, and military actions, the means of the strategy construct (Figure 5.13). The research suggests that there is a lack of clarity regarding which strategic process more effectively links policy to military output, with the civil element leaning towards the Joint Strategy Statement and the military element leaning towards SPF.




Figure 5.13. The Joint Department of Defence & Defence Forces Strategy Statement provides an effective link between policy guidance and military action? (Author, 2022).

The link between ends, ways and means is referred to by Gray (2014) as the strategy bridge, and rather than try to separate policy and strategy defence planning should be conducted in a collaborative way. It is interesting in an Irish defence planning context to establish if there is a collaborative effort across the strategy bridge, or if there is clear delineation of responsibility between policy, strategy and military operations. McCrum states that “the idea that the Defence Forces have no input to Defence policy is simply not true” and that collaborative working structures “will continue to be the best way to deliver the shared outcomes for the Defence Organisation” (Signal, 2021(1):43). The research finds that this understanding does not necessarily permeate to the civil and military personnel working in the DoD. When asked in the survey if the civil element are responsible for policy and the military element are responsible for operations, there is overall agreement (52%). It is interesting that while there are often opposite views expressed by the civil and military respondents, the levels of agreement to this particular question are quite close from civil respondents (44%) and military respondents (58%). This is an interesting reflection on the perception of responsibility between the civil and military participants in defence planning in Ireland, and between the stated

position of the civil-military leadership and their colleagues operating in the Department. This is the reality of the complex relationships and understandings that exist in the “unequal dialogue” (Cohen, 2002:208) that is civil-military relations and civil control of the military.

Defence Planning and Civil-Military Relations (CMR).

The WP (2015:109) indicates that “considerable attention has been given in recent years to the ongoing development of civil and military management matters” and identifies the Strategic Management Committee (SMC) as the central forum for management and oversight of civil-military matters. The CODF (2022:2) alluded to “the perception of dysfunction in the relationship” stating that regardless of its accuracy was of “very long-standing and will require determined and visionary leadership to overcome”. McCrum describes the civil-military relationship as “professional and engaged” and sees a lot of “collaborative civil-military interactions in all areas of work” (Signal, 2021(1):37). Similarly, Clancy finds the relationship to be “business-like and professional” and stresses the “benefits of having constructive engagement and debate, which leads to optimal outcomes” (Signal, 2021(2):31).

Effective Control?

The WP (2015:1) states that “defence policy is a manifestation of civil control of defence”. This research makes a very significant finding that an overwhelming majority (89%) of the civil respondents to the defence planning survey disagree that the principle of civilian control of the military is fully accepted by the military (Figure 5.14). There is little ambiguity in this response from the civil element, with no single respondent indicating agreement. This finding indicates an alarming lack of faith, or lack of understanding, of the principle of civilian control of the military as a theory and a concept of CMR, and as a fundamental of a liberal democracy. This contention is further supported when we consider that in the same question a significant number of military respondents (38%) also disagreed with the statement. Previous research on

Ireland's CMR (Crummey, 2015) found that the legitimate statutory control of the Minister for Defence⁵⁶ is clearly and absolutely accepted, but that institutionally there is less clarity regarding agreement of the position of the civil and military entities below that level.




Figure 5.14. The principle of civilian control of the military is fully accepted by the military? (Author, 2022).

The research also points to other significant differences between the civil and military elements of the DoD. The military respondents disagree (92%) that civilian control of the military in Ireland is accountable, transparent, consultative and responsive, the requirements of good control as identified by Bruneau and Croissant (2019) (Figure 5.15). Significantly, the research doesn't indicate widespread agreement from the civil respondents either (55%) with a large number who expressed no opinion (39%). By contrast, civil respondents (78%) believe that the civil element care about security issues and military affairs; there is less agreement from the military respondents (25%).

⁵⁶ The legislative basis for the relationship between the Minister for Defence, the DoD and the DF is covered in detail in Chapter Four.




Figure 5.15: Civilian control of the military in Ireland is accountable, transparent, consultative and responsive? (Author, 2022).

Previous research has indicated that the civil-military relationship in Ireland is not defined and that this leads to differences in terminology and precise understanding of roles, ultimately leading to tension in the relationship (Crummey, 2015). This is supported by the OCR (2022:19) which states that “tensions and disagreements can and do arise”. Clearly there are different interpretations of civil control of the military amongst the participants of defence planning in Ireland. This research suggests that the CMR in Ireland requires codification and education with a view to clearly defining all aspects of the relationship, particularly fundamental theories such as civilian control of the military. In the literature, civil control is only one side of Feather’s *Civil-Military Problematique* – military effectiveness is the other.

Brunea and Croissant (2019) identify three indicators of military effectiveness; a long-term plan that defines the means required and includes a methodology to evaluate progress, sufficient structures and processes to formulate defence policy and plans, and that the state commits sufficient resources to ensure an adequately equipped and trained military. The military respondents disagree (83%) that a long-term plan exists compared to the civil respondents who either agree there is one (35%) or neither agree nor disagree (35%). The military respondents also disagree (88%) that there are sufficient joint civil-military structures

and processes to formulate or develop one. On this issue there is more concordance from the civil respondents with (50%) also disagreeing (Figure 5.16).




Figure 5.16. There are sufficient joint civil and military structures and processes to formulate and develop defence policy and plans? (Author, 2022).

An interesting observation from the survey responses on military effectiveness is that many civil respondents indicate neither agreement nor disagreement, compared to the military respondents who were unequivocal in their disagreement. This perhaps suggests an ambivalence from the civil respondents towards military effectiveness as a consideration in Ireland's defence planning. What is clearly evident is that there is no agreement that the key requirements of military effectiveness are a primary consideration of the DoD in Ireland.

The personal and daily interaction in CMR in Ireland endeavours to be professional, collaborative and business-like as described by McCrum and Clancy. There are areas, such as the Office of Emergency Planning, specific implementation teams and joint committees where civil and military elements of the DoD operate successfully. The OCR also points to the Brussels staff of the DoD where a particularly successful relationship exists. The OCR (2022:19) suggests that relationships have in the past deteriorated “between the senior cohorts on both sides” while acknowledging recent and genuine efforts to address this. The challenge

of CMR and the overlap of complex areas such as politics, policy, strategy and planning, suggests that different interpretations and understandings are always likely. In an Irish context friction and tension are inherent in the relationship, the causes are many and are heavily influenced by perspective (Crummey, 2015). The reality is that the very different interpretations and understandings of CMR in Ireland impact on the planning framework and defence planning model in Ireland.

Defence Planning Models

A defence planning framework is the method or over-arching approach utilised by a state in developing military capability. The WP (2015:68) states that capability⁵⁷ is developed by “appropriate investment in doctrine, HR policies, regulatory reform, equipment, infrastructure, organisation, education and training”. A “joint civil-military approach” (DoD/DF, 2020(2):2) is taken to all equipment and infrastructure projects overseen by the HLPPG. The membership of the HLPPG develops plans for “equipment procurement and disposal and infrastructural development (including property acquisition) based on the policy priorities in the White Paper” (DoD 2021:35).

The primary planning tool for infrastructure development is the Defence Forces Built Infrastructure Programme 2020-2025, also known as the Infrastructure Development Plan (IDP), which is an iterative document and “subject to review throughout the life time of the White Paper on Defence” (DoD, 2020(1):2). The primary planning tool for equipping the DF is the Equipment Development Plan (EDP) which is designed to comprehend the “total process associated with achieving outcomes which supply the equipment component of military capability” (DoD, 2020(2):2). While equipment and infrastructure are understood in the WP

⁵⁷ In an international context and in Irish military doctrine, capability is understood to consist of doctrine, organisation, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities and interoperability and is internationally recognised by the acronym DOTMLPFI (2022:30)

(2015) to be linked in the development of military capability, the WPU (2019) indicates clearly that the IDP and EDP are separate plans (See Figure 5.17).




Figure 5.17. The HLPPG Process (Author, 2022).

The HLPPG is described by one of the senior officers working in the defence planning environment as “an excellent forum for governance”. Mulcahy agrees stating that it provides the “oversight that the Secretary General needs as the Accounting Officer for the procurement and investment that gets allocated under Vote 36”. The primary focus of the HLPPG is to provide a structured process that facilitates a degree of prioritisation and debate on the military capability identified and proposed by the individual services⁵⁸ of the DF, or Contracts Branch of the DoD in the case of what is termed ‘defensive equipment’. All military capability procurement is based on inputs from the military into what capability is required which is then either approved or not approved by the HLPPG process.

⁵⁸ The Army, Air Corps and Naval Service.

The level of prioritisation afforded the capability is reflected by where it appears in the EDP. A senior officer⁵⁹ stated in interview that the EDP is disparagingly referred to as a “shopping list”. However, he gave an interesting insight into the different perspectives of the mechanism stating that for the civil element it is a budgetary tool while for the military it is part of the capability process. Mulcahy states that what the process is not looking at are future budget estimates for defence or what priorities exist within that time frame – “it tends to be we have this amount of money for this year, how can we best spend that?” It appears from the research that while the HLPPG achieves the procurement aspect of its title, the planning function is more accurately financial planning rather than defence planning.

The WP (2015:25) identifies that military capabilities are kept under review “having regard to the level of threat” but also avoiding being overly prescriptive “in order to allow for prudential capability planning” (WP, 2015:61). Mooney referred to “threat based planning” when describing the process of drafting the WP (2015). The important consideration of threat in Ireland’s defence planning also emerged clearly from interviews with senior military leadership. This would suggest an upstream focus on defence planning frameworks as posited by Breitenbauch and Jakobsson (2018). The civil and military respondents to the web-based survey indicate that resource constrained planning and incremental planning are more accurately the focus. This suggests that rather than focusing on potential threats or adversaries, Ireland’s defence planning framework is focused on providing viable capability within a provided budget and existing capabilities form the foundation of new ones. There was also strong support from the civil and military respondents to taking a systematic approach to developing capabilities and integrating cost into planning. This is known as capability-based planning.

⁵⁹ Senior Officer 3 was interviewed on 11 January 22.

(The lack of) Capability Based Planning

The senior officers interviewed were unequivocal in their opinion that there is no capability development process in Ireland's defence planning. "Absolutely none", "I don't see a capability development document that's fed by a capability development process" and "if you were to ask me what is the capability development process, I would quite honestly say we don't have one" are responses received. Indeed, the research indicates that there is, what could be considered rare, civil and military consensus that there is a requirement for capability based planning in Ireland. The WP (2015) identified the requirement for a Capability Development Plan as a key initiative. The WPU (2019) acknowledged that while work had commenced more time was needed. Clancy stated that "we need a capability development piece to pull all of this together" identifying that it should be the overarching governance of the EDP and IDP. He continued that it is "a tool which is not in our toolbox currently, but that is articulated in the White Paper". Mulcahy stated that we need a capability development planning process that will codify the "long-term capabilities required for the Defence Forces matched to the emerging threats". Mooney acknowledged that it was a more credible process. The CODF (2022:29) identified the "urgent requirement to put in place a codified top-down Capability Development Planning Process" describing it as "a significant gap hindering the effectiveness of the Defence Forces". The HLAP (2022:28) indicates that the government accept this recommendation and the "immediate establishment of a codified top-down Capability Development Planning process" is recommended as an early action. The consensus on capability based planning is interesting as it raises a number of questions for the research – not least why it hasn't been adopted up to now, what happens in its absence and if elements of it exist?

Despite being identified as a priority in the WP (2015), Mulcahy states that there isn't agreement on how the processes and structures will look. Mooney stated that the DoD has spent twelve years considering capability development planning but questioned if it was

compatible with the processes in Ireland, even though it would provide clarity and structures. There was acceptance that capability development would be joint civil-military. Mooney indicated that it would be a Civil Branch, jointly staffed, the same model as the Office of Emergency Planning. Reflecting different approaches in the DoD, Mooney stated his belief that the military would like to set it up and get it operating quickly whereas his focus was on the process being in place first which would identify the requirements of the Unit. He stated that form should follow function. Acknowledging difference between the civil and military elements, Mulcahy stated that as is the nature of the Defence Organisation it would have “reporting chains that are probably going to separate channels”. This reality was reflected by one of the senior military officer working in defence planning who stated in interview that “it will work provided a civil servant is in charge. I’m not sure if they would accept civil servants working for military officers”.

In the absence of capability based planning processes and a capability development plan, the Irish defence planning framework is described variously by the senior officers with experience of the process as “ad-hoc”, “siloe”, “amateur” and “isolated”. One senior officer described the process as being “personality driven” and “bottom-up”, a description that was echoed by Mooney who described the civil perception being of a bottom-up process in the DF. Mulcahy, while acknowledging shortfalls, stated that there was a structured process in place in the form of the HLPPG but that “the fundamental weakness in the process is that it isn’t realistic enough”, citing the lack of “future estimates for funding for the Defence Forces”. Stressing the importance of clear tasks to the process, Clancy reinforces this point stating that “you should be looking for the resources you need to meet that capability. Instead we have a budget, and then we think about what we buy, to make it fit to deliver some capabilities”. The senior officers with experience of the HLPPG also referenced the reliance of the process on the extant defence policy. One stated that “you will find it very difficult to advance the capability or a

project if it isn't referenced in some way, either implicitly or explicitly, in the White Paper" while another stated that "we rely on a line, a nugget, in the White Paper" for procurement. This indicates that Angstrom's (2018:332) "discourse trap" exists in Irish defence planning, as a senior officer stated "once the White Paper is mentioned, it seems to be universally accepted. Anything else gets questioned really".

This research finds that there are aspects of capability development in the Irish defence planning process. One of the senior officers interviewed described the HLPPG as a filter that provides an important forum for civil and military leadership to procure essential items for the DF. The introduction since 2015 of the IDP and EDP are also positive developments in providing a framework for investment and procurement respectively. The recent impetus to form a Research, Technology and Innovation (RTI) capability is also a very positive step. Developed to "facilitate, enable and fund technology and innovation that supports Defence Forces missions and capabilities" (Signal, 2021(1):45), RTI is an important facilitator of capability development planning. It will "require the creation of a joint civil-military unit that provides data and insight for evidence based decision-making in the Defence Organisation" (Signal, 2021(1):45). The CODF (2022:30) identified that while the HLPPG, the IDP and the EDP, in conjunction with other initiative such as a strategic HR Group (SHRUG) and embryonic RTI are all important aspects of capability development "there is a notable absence of overarching, and permanent structures" to guide current and future capability development. It is clearly established in Chapter Two that such overarching and permanent structures exist in NATO, the EU and other international organisations in which Ireland is either a fully participating member or active observer.

International Influence

The WPU (2019:74) states that defence policy is evolving in a broad security setting and “our very active engagement in the UN, the EU, NATO PfP and the OSCE, remain central components”. Involvement in Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) affirms “Ireland’s position as a fully committed EU Member State” and will enhance military capabilities for participation in UN mandated mission, enhancing interoperability with EU partners (WPU, 2019:65). Ireland also participates and observes in a number of CSDP initiatives, including the emerging Strategic Compass, described as an “ambitious plan of action for strengthening the EU’s security and defence policy by 2030” (EU, 2022). In the NATO PfP context, Ireland’s engagement through the Planning and Review Process (PARP) is “an essential element in giving greater definition to what needs to be done” (WPU, 2019:75) and existing capabilities are evaluated using the NATO Operational Capabilities Concept (OCC).

Mulcahy stated that while there was a political risk in “allowing us to engage at that level, certainly in PfP”, it has been hugely beneficial to Ireland “and has allowed Ireland as a state, and the Defence Forces in particular to be effective operators” on the international stage. The research indicates that the benefits of membership are not necessarily being ‘maximised’, referring to the description of defence policy used by Mooney. Of forty-seven (47) PESCO projects that are being developed Ireland is only a participant in five (5)⁶⁰ and an observer in a further five (5). Mulcahy referred to the CARD process and that to be an active and participant member the EU requires that Ireland can state what its level of ambition is for defence commitment. The HLAP (2022) now meets this requirement. A senior officer interviewed, referring to the EU and NATO PfP, stated that “we’re constantly getting documentation from

⁶⁰ As of 07 July 2022, Ireland is a participant in projects relating to cyber threats, disaster relief capability, Special Operations Forces medical training, systems for mine countermeasures and maritime surveillance.

them” and that rather than “reinvent the wheel we just need to adopt them for ourselves. But at the moment we choose not to”.

The CODF (2022:52) identified that there are international opportunities for capability development that are not being pursued.⁶¹ The potential of the EU Strategic Compass was emphasised by interviewees and is clearly an example of an opportunity presented by membership of the EU. In particular it may contribute to the EU CSDP policy and goals including capability development and long-term horizon scanning. Clancy states that Ireland’s engagement can be reactive and referring to precursors to the Strategic Compass such as the European Security Strategy and the UN Global Strategy “when you look at the threats and analysis that were outlined in all of that, we never reacted to any of those”. The CODF (2022:30), in identifying the urgent requirement for a top-down capability development planning process, identify that it “must support proper engagement with capability development processes at EU and NATO PfP level”. While there is some engagement, Ireland’s defence planning model does not reflect either conclusively.

Ireland’s Defence Planning Model

From the research conducted it is possible to map Ireland’s defence planning model (Figure 5.18). The government practice defence planning by allocating resources, manpower and effort to raising, organising and maintaining a military force. There is a lack of debate on defence issues in Irish society and a traditional low defence spend suggesting that the perception of threat by the public is low. This in turn presents a challenge to the Government in allocating national resources. Defence policy is formulated by the Government and implemented through and by the Minister for Defence and the DoD. The research suggests that the formulation of defence policy takes an incremental approach, that is technically feasible relative to available

⁶¹ Examples include the priorities identified in the EDA’s Capability Development Plan and leveraging “the experience and influence of European partners” (CODF, 2022:52)

resources and politically feasible relative to existing policy. The defence planning horizon in Ireland is ten (10) years as established by defence policy.

The primary tool that has been utilised for defence policy is a White Paper process. There is uncertainty about how policy will be expressed in the future and whether the traditional government paper process will apply or if the process will move to a more dynamic fixed cycle of strategic reviews. As there have only been two (2) White Papers on Defence in the history of the State and the current cycle of reviews established by the White Paper in 2015 have not concluded, it is difficult to assess which will better serve Ireland's defence policy. The policy-making environment contains primary and secondary actors, formal and informal rules governing the interaction between actors, networks, ideas and beliefs and it is affected by routine and non-routine events. Strategy is understood to be strategic management and is clearly linked to defence policy. There is a perceived lack of distinction between policy and strategy. This is particularly the case in the military where there is an additional strategic planning framework, linked to the Joint Strategy Statement but nested in defence policy. A joint Annual Report identifies to Government progress made in relation to the High-Level Goals and the performance of the DoD and the DF against each of the strategic goals identified in the Joint Strategy Statement.




Figure 5.18. Ireland's Defence Planning Model (Author, 2022).

The relationship between the civil and military elements is a key factor in Ireland's defence planning. Arguably this relationship lacks definition and codification which results in different understandings and interpretations between the civil and military elements of the DoD. This includes on fundamentals of the civil-military construct such as civilian control of the military. The primary tool for procuring military capability is the HLPPG. There are two (2) primary products; an IDP that plans and prioritises investment in infrastructure and an EDP that plans and prioritises equipment procurement. A threat based planning approach was adopted for the WP (2015) process. However, the research indicates that resource constrained planning and incremental planning are more accurately the focus. There is an accepted lack of a capability development planning process which prevents a Capability Based Planning approach, although the HLAP (2022:19) indicates that this is now a priority early action for the government.

Congruence of Ireland's Defence Planning with International Models

There is influence from International Organisations such as the UN, EU, NATO and OSCE in Irish defence policy but there is no evidence of either a NATO or EU defence planning approach. There is engagement with EU initiatives (PESCO and CARD) and NATO PfP processes (OCC) but no decision to favour or adopt one approach. Utilising the model identified from Chapter Two (Figure 5.19) it is possible to map Ireland's defence planning model comparatively with the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP), the EU Defence Planning Process (EUDPP) and the generic defence planning model of the Strategic Defence Management Loop.




Figure 5.19. Congruence of Defence Planning Models for assessing Ireland's Defence Planning (Author, 2022).

The research indicates that Ireland's Defence Planning Model (Figure 5.20) consists of high-level policy parameters such as formally stated Government policy on Defence in the form of a WP and WPU. These policy parameters establish what Ireland's role in the world is and what objectives, or roles, the Government assigns to the military. There is no evidence of documentation or processes that look at the global trends or the military consequences, such as Strategic Foresight Analysis (NATO) or Long-Term Capability Assessment (EU). A critical gap identified by all interviewees is the lack of a National Security Strategy. Described as a "failing" by Mulcahy and a "deficit" by Clancy, Mooney acknowledged that the lack of such a strategy may have policy implications.

The Joint Department of Defence and Defence Forces Strategy Statement establishes the bridge between policy and strategy. It could be considered a High-Level Policy Parameter as it establishes defence objectives, particularly if drafted after a new Programme for Government. However, there is no record of it substantially altering defence policy as established in the

WP. It is more appropriately considered strategic management as it is the primary tool for strategy in Ireland's defence planning. It is also considered defence guidance as it clearly states a shared high-level goal for both the DoD and the DF, similar to political guidance in NATO or Headline Goals in the EU. The SPF and military inputs into defence policy, strategy and the HLPPG procurement process also constitute defence guidance. These documents and processes address the question of what Ireland wants to do militarily. The SPF clearly outlines the military mission and vision which are formally stated and linked with defence policy. The Annual Report is a key element of strategic management in Ireland's defence planning as it is the primary document on an annual basis where the Defence Organisation reports to Government on progress made towards objectives.

The acknowledged gap in Ireland's defence planning model is capability development and the lack of a formal Capability Based Planning model. While the HLPPG process acquires military capability through procurement, the current systems and processes do not project, or plan, what Ireland needs to do in order to meet the tasks assigned by Government. There are no overarching documents such as NATO's Minimum Capability Requirements or Defence Planning Capability Survey Reports. There is also no evidence of full engagement with the EU CARD process. As there is no Capability Development as understood in the literature and the model, there are no Performance Indicators that explain how Ireland acquires the capability that it has identified. The RTI Unit is provisionally included in the model, as this is a positive step towards a capability development tool. However, until it is feeding into an established capability development process it will not realise its maximum potential. Similarly, Performance Measurement, or how Ireland ensures capability development, is an area that requires development and would constitute part of any capability development process developed in the future.




Figure 5.20. Congruence between Ireland's Defence Planning Model with International Models (Author, 2022).

The most important aspect of the defence planning model is what the literature refers to as ‘closing the loop’ – ensuring that provision exists for strategic reflection and possible correction to Defence Guidance and if necessary to High-Level Policy parameters. This suggests an iterative process whereby the Annual Report to Government can initiate change to defence policy if required. The Annual Report in Ireland’s model does not currently meet this requirement as it is effectively an account of what has occurred in the previous twelve months and does not contain recommendations for future action.

The Future of Defence Planning in Ireland

The CODF and the subsequent HLAP presents an interesting example for this research. How the recommendations accepted by government are implemented will be a good indicator of how, and what, policy may be formulated in the future. The government has made a decision “to move to Level of Ambition 2 (LOA2) over a six year period to 2028” (HLAP, 2022:6). The HLAP indicates five core areas, which have been represented as five strategic objectives under which each of the recommendations considered by government⁶² have been grouped thematically. This reflects a programme management approach similar to the implementation of the WP (2015). Implementation and oversight structures have been developed ranging from civil and military members of the DoD in an Implementation Management Office through an oversight group with an independent chair up to a High-Level Steering Board reflecting a whole of government approach.

However, while Mooney stated that the recommendations of the CODF may “have policy implications”, Mulcahy observed that they “will not be the new defence policy. And this is the political reality”. One of the senior officers interviewed questioned where recommendations

⁶² Each recommendation made by the CODF has been considered by government and responded to under four categories – accepted, accepted in principle, requires further evaluation or require the Minister for Defence to revert to government (HLAP, 2022:11).

of the CODF “fit in with policy? Does that go into a new White Paper or is it like another isolated planning?” Another senior officer identified that the White Paper may have to be renewed immediately “rather than become an outdated document for the next three years”. This is relevant when we consider the importance of the WP to the procurement process, as established by this research. One of the early actions to be completed within six months of the HLAP (2022:15) is the “commencement of the Strategic Defence Review” being progressed.⁶³ This may address the uncertainty on the future defence policy cycle identified by this research, depending on the planning horizon it frames or if it becomes a de-facto White Paper. It may also constitute the “comprehensive review of Ireland’s defence policy” that the HLAP (2022:6) identifies as a requirement prior to any consideration of LOA 3 as proposed by the CODF. These present excellent opportunities for further research in Ireland’s defence planning, as do the measured success or otherwise of the HLAP implementation. As identified in Chapter Two, there is no single method, system or process of defence planning. Reflecting Gray (2014) therefore, Ireland’s defence planning model is suitable if it achieves what Ireland and the government want it to achieve.

Chapter Summary

This chapter has explored the realities and understandings of defence planning in Ireland based on the themes that emerged from the review of literature in Chapter Two and the research philosophy and design developed in Chapter Three. It also builds on the historical and current context outlined in Chapter Four. Chapter Six will detail the main conclusions arising from this study of defence planning in Ireland, while also acknowledging the strengths and weaknesses of the research.

⁶³ The WP (2015) stated that the Strategic Defence Review should have commenced in 2021.

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION

Introduction

This research explores the nature of defence planning in Ireland, establishing incrementalism as the theory of public policy that underpins defence policy decision making, the institutions and actors that are involved, how they are organised and what relationship exists between them. The research also identifies Ireland's defence planning model. A review of the literature in Chapter Two identified themes that were further developed in the research and analysis of Chapter Four and Five, using the research design developed in Chapter Three. This chapter will summarise the key findings, acknowledge strengths and weaknesses and highlight areas for further research.

Key Findings

Defence Planning in Ireland

Resources, manpower and effort are organised and employed as a military force in Ireland. This indicates that structured defence planning occurs and Ireland manages and plans for the security of its society, values and natural resources. As existing research and understanding indicates, defence planning in Ireland is complex and multi-faceted. It consists of a whole of government approach and recognises specific national challenges in relation to threat perception, a traditionally low defence spend and the lack of a national discourse on defence matters.

Theory of Public Policy

The general theory of public policy decision-making in Ireland's defence planning is incrementalism. Defence policy is formulated that is technically feasible relative to available resources and is politically feasible relative to existing policy. While a typical lens through which to view public policy, the historical reluctance to formulate defence policy supports the

identification of a policy making system inclined to favour political outcomes that do not depart radically from the status quo.

The primary tool utilised for defence policy is a White Paper process. There is uncertainty about how this policy will be expressed in the future and whether the traditional government paper process will apply or if the process will move to a more dynamic fixed cycle of strategic reviews. The existence of a White Paper document is found to have particular influence on the procurement of capability. Where the White Paper is explicit it is perceived as an enabler but where it is silent it can be perceived to be an obstacle. The policy-making environment contains primary and secondary actors, formal and informal rules governing the interaction between actors, networks, ideas and beliefs and it is affected by routine and non-routine events. There have only been two (2) White Papers on Defence in the history of the State and the current cycle of defence reviews established by the White Paper in 2015 have not commenced. It is unsurprising that from this historical reluctance to formulate defence policy, incrementalism has emerged as the prevailing theory underpinning defence policy decision-making in Ireland. The implementation of the High Level Action Plan on the recommendations of the CODF will be an interesting case study in the formulation and implementation of future defence policy. If the recommendations of the CODF are not translated into defence policy, or a White Paper, will it impact on how effectively they are implemented?

Organisation and Relationships

There is a clearly defined structure for the management of defence planning in Ireland from the Government through the Minister for Defence to the civil and military elements of the Department of Defence. There are contrasting views on the transparency and inclusiveness of the policy-making environment and that there is a perceived lack of debate and criticism in the process. While there are differing views among the civil and military elements of the

Department of Defence regarding the Defence Organisation, the research indicates that there is an emphasis on manpower over capability. There is a joint approach to defence strategy, which is a mechanism for strategic management, and is clearly linked to defence policy. There is a perceived lack of distinction between defence policy and defence strategy.

The civil-military relationship in Ireland is not clearly defined. As a result, there are different interpretations, understandings and perspectives between civil and military personnel. This extends to fundamental theories of civil-military relations (CMR) such as civilian control of the military. A clearer codification and a shared understanding would contribute to a more joint Department of Defence, which would contribute to achieving greater effectiveness.

Ireland's Defence Planning Model

Threat-based planning is formally identified as the planning framework but the research indicates that a combination of resource constrained planning and incremental planning is more accurate. Ireland's defence planning is focused on providing viable capability within a defined budget and existing capabilities form the foundation of new ones. The Defence Organisation develops capability using a joint civil-military approach with the primary tool being the High Level Planning and Procurement Group (HLPPG). The HLPPG achieves the procurement aspect of its title; the planning function is more accurately financial planning rather than defence planning. While the HLPPG process acquires military capability through procurement, the current systems and processes do not project, or plan, what Ireland needs to do in order to meet the tasks assigned by Government. There is recognition that a capability development process is required in Ireland's defence planning. There is evidence of nascent developments in this regard but a coordinated, joint Capability Based Planning approach is recommended.

There is influence from, and engagement with, International Organisations evident in Ireland's defence policy but a NATO or EU defence planning approach is not adopted. There is also

congruence with international models of defence planning in that high level policy parameters, strategic management and defence guidance are present. The acknowledged gap is the lack of a capability development process and associated performance indicators and performance measurement. The defence planning model would also benefit from a more iterative process providing for strategic reflection and possible correction to Defence Guidance and High-Level Policy parameters.

A critical gap identified in the historical and current context, is the lack of clearly defined and stated threats and subsequent tasks for the military force. This should exist as a high-level policy parameter such as a National Security Strategy to which a subordinate defence policy can be nested and clear tasks and objectives can be determined for the military. This should also be an iterative process. It is assessed that this would contribute greatly to the formulation and implementation of defence policy, capability development and decisions on structure, capability and staffing.

Strengths and Limitations of the Research

Strengths

The researcher has sought to be impartial, adopting an approach that avoids arbitrating between the different views and opinions expressed by the military and civil participants of the research. Accordingly, the research findings are balanced and measured observations of defence planning in Ireland. The research also sought to avoid sensationalist or provocative interpretations or assumptions. The key strength of this study however is the manner in which the participants engaged fully with the research and expressed personal views on potentially sensitive areas in an open and frank manner.

Limitations

The defence community in Ireland is small and the number of personnel who operate in and understand the complex defence planning environment presents a limitation to any researcher. Further, in the absence of formal doctrine, interpretation and perspective become personalised opinions and views. It is possible that personnel who are operating or have operated in defence planning, from both the military and civil perspectives, have views and opinions that contradict or disagree with the views expressed in this research. This research acting as a catalyst for further debate and discussion on defence planning as a topic would be a very positive outcome.

Areas for Further Research

The management of defence at the political and strategic level in Ireland offers great opportunity for further research. This is particularly relevant in the complex and changing European security environment which includes the emergence of initiatives such as the EU's Strategic Compass. This research may be a suitable starting point for a comparative study of Ireland with other, similar European states. The relationship between the recommendations of the CODF, the government HLAP and future defence policy will indicate if any change occurs in the general theory of public policy or if an incremental approach continues to dominate. Any changes to the future defence policy cycle also present the opportunity for study and comparison relative to military effectiveness. The lack of formal codification of the civil-military relationship suggests an area that emerges from this research not solely as an avenue for further study, but as an imperative for further understanding.

Conclusion

There is little discourse on defence in Ireland. For much of the history of the state Ireland's defence planning has been vague, ill-defined and un-institutionalised. The production of the first White Paper in 2000 has heralded a seismic shift in the development of a more transparent

and defined process. The changes that have occurred in the last twenty years are very welcome and have enabled this research. There remains a requirement for more informed and realistic debate that reflects the modern liberal democracy in a multi-lateral Europe that Ireland has become.

Ireland's defence planning is a combination of political, administrative, military and organisational aspects. The study of Ireland's defence planning suggests a consistently incremental approach to decision making, that is still evident today. During this research, a major review of the Defence Forces has been conducted in the absence of an overarching National Security Strategy and a Capability Review of the Department of Defence has been conducted that identifies that the White Paper process falls short of a full expression of policy. The fundamental requirement for defence has been accepted, but a clear and long-term policy planning basis for decisions on defence has never been adopted.

Interview Information Sheet – Defence Planning in Ireland

Thank you for considering participating in this research project. The purpose of this document is to explain to you what the work is about and what your participation would involve, to enable you to make an informed choice.

The purpose of this study is to critically examine Ireland's approach to defence planning. The aim of this research is to establish what institutions and actors are involved, what relationship exists between them and how defence planning in Ireland is carried out. Should you choose to participate, you will be asked to take part in a one-to-one interview with the researcher. This interview will be audio recorded, and is expected to take 40-50 minutes to complete.

Participation in this study is completely voluntary. There is no obligation to participate, and should you choose to do so, you can refuse to answer specific questions, or decide to withdraw from the interview. Once the interview has been concluded, you can choose to withdraw at any time in the subsequent two (2) weeks.

All of the information you provide will be available only to the researcher. The only exception is where information is disclosed which indicates that there is a serious risk to you or to others. Once the interview is completed, the recording will immediately be transferred to a safe UCC data storage platform and wiped from the recording device. The interview will then be transcribed by the researcher. Once this is done, the recording will also be deleted and only the transcript will remain. This will be stored on a University College Cork supported cloud storage platform, Google Drive. The data will be stored for a minimum of ten years.

The information you provide will contribute to a Research Master's Thesis and may contribute to research publications and/or conference presentations.

I do not anticipate any negative outcomes from participating in this study. At the end of the interview, I will discuss with you how you found the experience and how you are feeling.

This study has obtained ethical approval from the UCC Social Research Ethics Committee.

If you have any queries about this research, you can contact me at 120227900@uemail.ucc.ie. Alternatively, you can contact my research supervisor Prof. Andrew Cottey, Department of Government and Politics, University College Cork at a.cottey@ucc.ie.

If you agree to take part in this study, please sign the consent form overleaf.

Research Consent Form – Defence Planning in Ireland

I.....agree to participate in Declan Crummey's research study.

The purpose and nature of the study has been explained to me in writing.

I am participating voluntarily.

I give permission for my interview with Declan Crummey to be audio recorded.

I understand that I can withdraw from the study, without repercussions, at any time, whether before it starts or while I am participating.

I understand that I can withdraw permission to use the data within two weeks of the interview, in which case the material will be deleted.

I understand that extracts from my interview may be quoted in presentations and publications if I give permission below (please tick one box):

I agree to participate in this study ☐

I do not agree to participate in this study ☐

Signed:

Date:

PRINT NAME:

Semi-Structured Interview Questions – Defence Planning in Ireland

Q1. In considering the defence policy making environment, is it possible to identify the primary and/or secondary actors involved in policy formulation in Ireland? (Figure 1 is provided to facilitate the discussion).

Q1a. Are there institutions, or rules (formal or informal), that govern how the actors involved in formulating defence policy interact?


Q1b. Are there clear boundaries of responsibility for the actors involved?

Q1c. Are there any dominant ideas or beliefs in relation to defence policy challenges or solutions?

Q1d. Are there social or economic factors that limit the ability to address and solve policy challenges?

Q1d. Do routine and/or non-routine events affect the policy agenda (for example, a terrorist attack, media influence, NATO operation)?

FIGURE 1.



Q2. Is it possible to map the defence planning process in Ireland? (Figure 2a and 2b are provided to facilitate the discussion).

Q2a. Who initiates the defence planning process in Ireland, and how is it initiated?

Q2b. How far into the future is defence planning conducted in Ireland – what is the time horizon?

Q2c. What are the products of the defence planning process in Ireland?


Q2d. Where is the available budget considered in the process? (Figure 2b)


Q2e. Where does capability development take place in the process? (Figure 2b)

Q2f. Where does capability planning inform defence policy in the process? (Figure 2b)

Q2g. What role, if any, do the following mechanism and structures play in the defence planning process?

- High Level Planning and Procurement Group (HLPPG);
- Equipment Development Plan;
- Infrastructure Development Plan;
- White Paper Implementation Group;
- National Security Committee;
- Government Task Force on Emergency Planning;
- National Maritime Security Committee;
- National Development Plan.





Q3. The diagram (Figure 3a) is a defence planning model that represents congruence between NATO, EU and academic best practice defence planning models. Is it possible to identify congruence with the defence planning process in Ireland? (Figure 3a and 3b are provided to facilitate the discussion).

Q3a. Are there high level policy parameters where global trends and their military consequences, Ireland's role in the world, Ireland's defence objectives are clearly identified?

Q3b. Is there Defence guidance, or what Ireland wants to do militarily, that is clearly defined?

Q3c. Is capability development, or what Ireland needs to do militarily, clearly defined?

Q3d. Are there clear performance indicators for how capability is acquired?

Q3e. Are there are clear measures of performance for developing capability?


Q3f. Is there a clear strategic management process ensuring progress towards achieving capability objectives?

Q3g. Do capability objectives inform high level policy parameters?

FIGURE 3a.



FIGURE 3b.



Survey Information Sheet – Defence Planning in Ireland

Thank you for considering participating in this research project. The purpose of this document is to explain to you what the work is about and what your participation would involve, to enable you to make an informed choice.

The purpose of this study is to critically examine Ireland's approach to defence planning. The aim of this research is to establish what institutions and actors are involved, what relationship exists between them and how defence planning in Ireland is carried out. Should you choose to participate, you will be asked to complete a survey, which will include items on defence planning, defence policy and civil-military relations.

Participation in this study is completely voluntary. There is no obligation to participate, and should you choose to do so you can refuse to answer specific questions, or decide to withdraw from the study prior to completing the survey. All information you provide will be confidential and your anonymity will be protected throughout the study. IP addresses will not be collected at any point, meaning the data you provide cannot be traced back to you.

You maintain the right to withdraw from the study at any stage up to the point of data submission. At this point, your data will be collated with that of other participants and can no longer be retracted.

The anonymous data will be stored on a University College Cork supported cloud storage platform, Google Drive. The data will be stored for minimum of ten years.

The information you provide will contribute to a Research Master's Thesis and may contribute to research publications and/or conference presentations.

I do not anticipate any negative outcomes from participating in this study.

This study has obtained ethical approval from the UCC Social Research Ethics Committee.

If you have any queries about this research, you can contact me at 120227900@umail.ucc.ie. Alternatively, you can contact my research supervisor Prof. Andrew Cottey, Department of Government and Politics, University College Cork at a.cottey@ucc.ie.

If you agree to take part in this study, please complete the consent form overleaf.

Survey Consent Form – Defence Planning in Ireland

Do you consent to participate in this study?

Yes ☐

No ☐

Survey – Defence Planning in Ireland

Please select one of the following:

I am a civil servant in the Department of Defence. ☐

I am a military member of Defence Force Headquarters. ☐

Q1 Defence Planning

Please indicate how you believe the following statements apply to defence planning in Ireland:

	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree
a. Decisions on defence requirements in Ireland are based on the National Interest.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
b. The requirement and cost of decisions on defence planning are considered together.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
c. Major decisions on defence requirements are made by choice based on explicit, balanced and feasible alternatives.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
d. The Minister for Defence requires an analytical staff capable of providing relevant data and unbiased perspectives.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
e. A multi-year force requirement and financial plan project	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

the consequences of current decisions into the future.

f. Open and explicit analysis with transparent data and assumptions form the basis of major decisions on defence requirements in Ireland.

g. Defence planning in Ireland is flexible in order to adopt to new missions or objectives.

h. Defence planning in Ireland is adaptive to cope with new or changed circumstances.

i. Defence planning in Ireland is robust enough to deal with adverse shocks.



Q2 **Defence Planning**

Please indicate how important the following considerations are as the focus of Ireland's defence planning:

	Not at all important	Slightly important	Moderately important	Very important	Extremely Important
a. Potential adversaries and evaluating their capabilities in order to defeat them.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

b. Identifying one (1) known adversary and understanding them.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
c. Providing a viable capability within a provided budget.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
d. Building future capabilities from the foundations of existing ones.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
e. Planning to meet the risk of conflict in the future from an unknown threat.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
f. Configuring a military to meet multiple, equally important threats.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
g. Placing focus on the achievement of basic military tasks.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
h. A systematic approach to developing capabilities & integrating cost into planning.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
i. What is required to be achieved rather than what needs to be replaced or sustained.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q3 Defence Planning & Defence Policy

Indicate which statement you believe most accurately describes the formulation of defence policy in Ireland (Please select just one):

	Select One
a. Defence policy is formulated in order to produce an outcome that may not be optimal but is satisfactory.	<input type="radio"/>
b. Defence policy is formulated based on bargaining between agents and agencies, possibly pursuing competing interests	<input type="radio"/>
c. Defence policy is formulated that is technically feasible relative to available resources, and politically feasible relative to existing policy.	<input type="radio"/>
d. Defence policy is formulated based on fundamental moral or philosophical principles, policy preferences or views about implementation and application.	<input type="radio"/>

Q4 **Defence Policy**

Consider the following statements and indicate how you believe they apply to defence policy in Ireland.

	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree
a. The formulated defence policy will be implemented.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
b. Defence policy is implemented from the top down.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
c. Defence policy is implemented from the bottom up.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
d. The number of people involved in	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

formulating defence policy in Ireland is limited.

e. The formulation of defence policy in Ireland is inclusive and includes a whole of Government approach.

f. The formulation of defence policy in Ireland is transparent

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Q5 **Defence Organisation**

Consider the following statements and indicate how you believe they apply to the Defence Organisation in Ireland.

	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree
a. The Defence Organisation employs military forces for external political gain and are serious about conflict.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
b. The Defence Organisation make decisions based on emotion rather than facts, logic or finance.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
c. The Defence Organisation is a good fit for Ireland's culture, geography and budget.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

d. The Defence Organisation is dominated by the military and there is a lack of civilian and political control.

☐
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Q6 **Policy & Strategy**

Consider the following statements and indicate how you believe they apply to defence policy and defence strategy in Ireland.

	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree
a. There is a clear distinction between policy and strategy.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
b. Policy and strategy are closely connected.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
c. Policy and strategy are the same thing.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
d. The civil side of the Department of Defence are responsible for policy and the military are responsible for operations.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
e. The Department of Defence/ Defence Forces Strategy Statement provides an effective link between policy guidance and military action.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

f. The greater the risk to National Security, the less likely it is to occur.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
g. Defence planning and strategic management are the same thing	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q7 Civil-Military Relations

Consider the following statements and indicate how you believe they apply to the civil-military relationship in Ireland.

	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree
a. The principle of civilian control of the military is fully accepted by the military.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
b. Civilian control of the military in Ireland is accountable and transparent, consultative and responsive.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
c. Civilian control of the military in Ireland is consultative and responsive.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
d. The civil side of the Department of Defence care about security issues and military affairs.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
e. The military side of the Department of	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Defence are capable of offering advice and developing mutual understanding in defence planning.

f. Military effectiveness is an important consideration in Irish defence planning.



g. A long term plan that defines goals, identifies the means required and includes a methodology to evaluate progress exists in Irelands defence planning.



h. There are sufficient structures and processes in the civil side of the Department of Defence to formulate and implement defence policy and plans



i. There are sufficient structures and processes in the military side of the Department of Defence to formulate and implement defence policy and plans



j. There are sufficient joint civil and military structures and processes to formulate and develop defence policy and plans.



k. The military should not comment on defence policy.

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l. The military should advise political authorities on the employment of military means to achieve policy goals.

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☐

Q8 Civil-Military Structures & Processes

Indicate how important you consider the following civil military structures and/or processes to Ireland's defence planning:

	Not at all important	Slightly important	Moderately important	Very important	Extremely Important
a.Council of Defence.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
b.Strategic Management Committee (SMC).	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
c. High Level Planning and Procurement Group (HLPPG).	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
d.Equipment Development Plan.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
e. Infrastructure Development Plan.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
f. White Paper Implementation Group.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
g.National Security Committee.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

h. Government Task Force on Emergency Planning.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
i. National Maritime Security Committee.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
j. National Development Plan.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

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