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Item Marxism in EU legal scholarship(Edward Elgar Publishing, 2024-06-13) Lonardo, Luigi; Deplano , Rossana; Gentile , Giulia; Lonardo, Luigi; Nowak , TobiasAfter providing an introductory overview of selected aspects of the thought of Karl Marx and of the main interpretative currents on Western Marxism, this chapter argues that Marx’s legacy in contemporary scholarship on European Union (EU) law is found in methodology. This is because the use of holistic, teleological and/or historical materialist explanations, which are now widespread in EU legal scholarship, could be considered a Marxist legacy, even though the authors may not explicitly reference Marx or Marxism. Marxist insights contributed to the move of EU law scholarship in English away from a purely doctrinal method to a contextual approach, and scholars borrowing from Marxism may still ask interesting normative questions. However, this chapter, which provides a perspective on ‘analytical Marxism’, contends that there is currently little remaining of Marxist contribution which is to be learnt for EU legal scholars. Where Marx is still enlightening is in the identification of ‘big picture’ normative questions.Item Ireland's distinct constitutional vision: The 'administration of justice' in quasi-judicial bodies(Bloomsbury Publishing, 2024-10-03) Donson, Fiona; O'Donovan, Darren; Ryan, Aisling; Thomson , Stephen; Groves, Matthew; Weeks, GregItem The right to freedom of thought under the European Convention on Human Rights(Cambridge University Press, 2024) Benziger, Felicitas; O'Callaghan, Patrick; Shiner, BethanyThe right to freedom of thought (FOT) is considered a fundamental right enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) as well as a wide range of national, international and European texts as this Handbook demonstrates. Contrary to the fundamental importance of the right to FOT, scholarly engagement has only started to gather pace more recently, in particular with regards to the right’s role and function in the face of unprecedented socio-technological developments. However, even in the limited context of the ECHR, research and practice concerning the right to FOT are embryonic. This is partially due to uncertainty concerning its content, considering that there is no definition of ‘thought’, which in turn relates to doubts concerning its particular context of application. Especially from a practitioner's perspective cases do not yet appear to have emerged within the ambit of the ECtHR where a claim was based on the right to FOT as such, rather than its ‘sister rights’ freedom of conscience and freedom of religion. Another reason for the hesitant engagement with the right to FOT is the perception that thoughts only appertain to the inner realm of a person’s identity (forum internum) and are thus beyond the reach of legal regulation.Item Law as part of a wider conversation: Experiences with STS (Science and Technology Studies)(Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, 2024) Deibel, TalyaLaw is sometimes seen as ‘lagging behind’ technology and innovation.When technological progress is quick, and bureaucracy is slow, legislative practices might fall behind the social and scientific realities. On the one hand, law is criticised for being an ‘unwanted constraint’ on innovation and for disincentivising technological progress. On the other hand, some argue that law responds well to digital technology and hence becomes essential in fostering a responsible and fertile technoscientific development. This culture clash of law and technology revolves around the balance between forward looking characteristics of science and the need to provide social justice and equity in contemporary societies. This paper emphasizes the inevitability of inter and intra-disciplinary approaches in legal research on technology today and will suggest a possible approach to this culture clash.Item Reenchanting practice : Stanley Fish and the challenge of virtue ethics(Hart Publishing, 2023) Cahill , Maria; O'Callaghan, Patrick; Bustamante, Thomas; Martin, MargaretIn this chapter, we critique Stanley Fish’s essay Dennis Martinez and the Uses of Theory, a key contribution to the ‘Fish-Dworkin debate’. Our core argument is that Fish’s central distinction between engaging in a practice and discoursing on that practice is too sharp, and that the two corollary claims that he makes – that practice is not generated by theory and that theory does not offer a genuine account of how practice unfolds – fail to convince. Behind Fish’s distinction is an attempt to reframe practice: to uncouple it from the sort of abstract theorising that takes place in a vacuum and to throw light on how practitioners actually carry out their activities. In what follows, we also seek to reframe practice, perhaps even to reenchant it, by drawing on the depth and richness of conceptions of practice available in the fields of virtue ethics and virtue jurisprudence. In Part 1, we outline the central distinction, while in Part II we examine how Fish applies that distinction to the practice of judging. In Part III, we examine how well the distinction stands up against understandings of practice that emerge from the field of virtue ethics. In Parts IV and V, we critique Fish’s two corollary claims by reference to insights from virtue ethics and virtue jurisprudence.