Paying the guard: An entry-guard-based payment system for Tor

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dc.contributor.author Palmieri, Paolo
dc.contributor.author Pouwelse, Johan A.
dc.date.accessioned 2017-09-21T14:12:24Z
dc.date.available 2017-09-21T14:12:24Z
dc.date.issued 2015-01
dc.identifier.citation Palmieri, P. and Pouwelse, J. (2015) 'Paying the Guard: An Entry-Guard-Based Payment System for Tor', in Böhme, R. & Okamoto, T. (eds.) Financial Cryptography and Data Security: 19th International Conference, FC 2015, San Juan, Puerto Rico, January 26-30, Revised Selected Papers. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, pp. 437-444. doi:10.1007/978-3-662-47854-7_26 en
dc.identifier.startpage 437 en
dc.identifier.endpage 444 en
dc.identifier.isbn 978-3-662-47854-7
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10468/4760
dc.identifier.doi 10.1007/978-3-662-47854-7_26
dc.description.abstract When choosing the three relays that compose a circuit, Tor selects the first hop among a restricted number of relays called entry guards, pre-selected by the user himself. The reduced number of entry guards, that until recently was fixed to three, helps in mitigating the effects of several traffic analysis attacks. However, recent literature indicates that the number should be further reduced, and the time during which the user keeps the relays as guards increased. Therefore, developers of Tor recently proposed selecting only one entry guard, which is to be used by the user for all circuits and for a prolonged period of time (nine months). While this design choice was made to increase the security of the protocol, it also opens an unprecedented opportunity for a market mechanism where relays get paid for traffic by the users. In this paper, we propose to use the entry guard as the point-of-sale: users subscribe to their entry guard of choice, and deposit an amount that will be used for paying for the circuits. From the entry guard, income is then distributed to the other relays included in circuits through an inter-relay accounting system. While the user may pay the entry guard using BitCoins, or any other anonymous payment system, the relays exchange I Owe You (IOU) certificates during communication, and settle their balances only at synchronized, later points in time. This novel deferred payment approach overcomes the weaknesses of the previously proposed Tor payment mechanisms: we separate the user’s payment from the inter-relay payments, and we effectively unlink both from the chosen path, thus preserving the secrecy of the circuit. en
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf en
dc.language.iso en en
dc.publisher Springer Berlin Heidelberg en
dc.relation.ispartof Financial Cryptography and Data Security - 19th International Conference, FC 2015, San Juan, Puerto Rico, January 26-30, 2015, Revised Selected Papers
dc.relation.uri https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-3-662-47854-7_26
dc.rights © International Financial Cryptography Association 2015. The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-47854-7_26 en
dc.subject Tor en
dc.subject Anonymous payments en
dc.subject Economy of privacy enhancing technologies en
dc.title Paying the guard: An entry-guard-based payment system for Tor en
dc.type Conference item en
dc.internal.authorcontactother Paolo Palmieri, Computer Science, University College Cork, Cork, Ireland. +353-21-490-3000 Email: paolo.palmieri@ucc.ie en
dc.internal.availability Full text available en
dc.date.updated 2017-09-20T15:26:52Z
dc.description.version Accepted Version en
dc.internal.rssid 411793272
dc.description.status Peer reviewed en
dc.identifier.journaltitle Financial Cryptography and Data Security: 19th International Conference, FC 2015, San Juan, Puerto Rico, January 26-30, 2015, Revised Selected Papers en
dc.internal.copyrightchecked Yes en
dc.internal.licenseacceptance Yes en
dc.internal.conferencelocation San Juan, Puerto Rico en
dc.internal.IRISemailaddress paolo.palmieri@ucc.ie en


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