Secure two-party computation over a Z-Channel

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dc.contributor.author Palmieri, Paolo
dc.contributor.author Pereira, Olivier
dc.contributor.editor Boyen, Xavier
dc.contributor.editor Chen, Xiaofeng
dc.date.accessioned 2017-09-22T11:00:02Z
dc.date.available 2017-09-22T11:00:02Z
dc.date.issued 2011-10
dc.identifier.citation Palmieri, P. and Pereira, O. (2011) 'Secure Two-Party Computation over a Z-Channel', in Boyen, X. & Chen, X. (eds.) Provable Security: 5th International Conference, ProvSec 2011, Xi’an, China, October 16-18, 2011. Proceedings. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, pp. 3-15. doi: 10.1007/978-3-642-24316-5_3 en
dc.identifier.startpage 3 en
dc.identifier.endpage 15 en
dc.identifier.isbn 978-3-642-24316-5
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10468/4775
dc.identifier.doi 10.1007/978-3-642-24316-5_3
dc.description.abstract In secure two-party computation, two mutually distrusting parties are interested in jointly computing a function, while preserving the privacy of their respective inputs. However, when communicating over a clear channel, security against computationally unbounded adversaries is impossible. Thus is the importance of noisy channels, over which we can build Oblivious Transfer (OT), a fundamental primitive in cryptography and the basic building block for any secure multi-party computation. The noisy channels commonly used in current constructions are mostly derived from the Binary Symmetric Channel (BSC), which is modified to extend the capabilities of an attacker. Still, these constructions are based on very strong assumptions, in particular on the error probability, which makes them hard to implement. In this paper, we provide a protocol achieving oblivious transfer over a Z-channel, a natural channel model in various contexts, ranging from optical to covert communication. The protocol proves to be particularly efficient for a large range of error probabilities p (e.g., for 0.17 ≤ p ≤ 0.29 when a security parameter ε = 10− 9 is chosen), where it requires a limited amount of data to be sent through the channel. Our construction also proves to offer security against unfair adversaries, who are able to select the channel probability within a fixed range. We provide coding schemes that can further increase the efficiency of the protocol for probabilities distant from the range mentioned above, and also allow the use of a Z-channel with an error probability greater than 0.5. The flexibility and the efficiency of the construction make an actual implementation of oblivious transfer a more realistic prospect. en
dc.description.sponsorship Fonds De La Recherche Scientifique - FNRS (F.R.S.-FNRS); Université Catholique de Louvain (SCOOP Action de Recherche Concertées) en
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf en
dc.language.iso en en
dc.publisher Springer Berlin Heidelberg en
dc.relation.ispartof Provable Security - 5th International Conference, ProvSec 2011, Xi'an, China, October 16-18, 2011. Proceedings
dc.relation.uri https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-642-24316-5_3
dc.rights © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2011. The final publication is available at Springer via https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-24316-5_3 en
dc.subject Oblivious transfer secure en
dc.subject Multi-party computation en
dc.subject Information theoretic security en
dc.subject Cryptography on noisy channels en
dc.title Secure two-party computation over a Z-Channel en
dc.type Conference item en
dc.internal.authorcontactother Paolo Palmieri, Computer Science, University College Cork, Cork, Ireland. +353-21-490-3000 Email: paolo.palmieri@ucc.ie en
dc.internal.availability Full text available en
dc.date.updated 2017-09-20T16:11:59Z
dc.description.version Accepted Version en
dc.internal.rssid 411793283
dc.contributor.funder Fonds De La Recherche Scientifique - FNRS en
dc.contributor.funder Université Catholique de Louvain en
dc.description.status Peer reviewed en
dc.identifier.journaltitle Provable Security: 5th International Conference, ProvSec 2011, Xi’an, China, October 16-18, 2011. Proceedings en
dc.internal.copyrightchecked Yes en
dc.internal.licenseacceptance Yes en
dc.internal.conferencelocation Xi’an, China en
dc.internal.IRISemailaddress paolo.palmieri@ucc.ie en


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