Evaluation of an informal rule for the allocation of sports capital funding

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dc.contributor.author Considine, John
dc.contributor.author Doran, Justin
dc.date.accessioned 2018-04-19T11:46:17Z
dc.date.available 2018-04-19T11:46:17Z
dc.date.issued 2016-07-23
dc.identifier.citation Considine, J. and J. Doran (2016) 'Evaluation of an informal rule for allocation of sports capital funding', Public Choice, 168 (1):43-54. doi: 10.1007/s11127-016-0348-1 en
dc.identifier.volume 168 en
dc.identifier.issued 1 en
dc.identifier.startpage 43 en
dc.identifier.endpage 54 en
dc.identifier.issn 1573-7101
dc.identifier.issn 0048-5829
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10468/5829
dc.identifier.doi 10.1007/s11127-016-0348-1
dc.description.abstract Significant empirical research has highlighted the existence of pork barrel politics. This is where public expenditure is targeted at particular regions based on the logic of collective action: political entrepreneurs maximize their chances of re-election by searching for and implementing programs or projects characterized by ‘concentrated benefits’ for key constituents and broadly dispersed costs. Using data on capital grants to Irish sports teams for 1998–2015, this paper analyzes the extent to which an informal rule can correct this bias. The case of allocating sports capital grants is particularly interesting since academic research, media commentary, and ministerial statements all seem to confirm the existence of political bias with such allocations in Ireland. Specifically, the geographical distribution of the grants are clearly linked to the Minister for Sport: that minister’s constituent county receives significantly higher per capita grant allocation than any other county. The grants were suspended in 2009 because of a fiscal crisis arising from the recession. When the grants were restored in 2012, a new informal rule for allocations was introduced. That informal rule was introduced to reduce the extent of pork barrel politics by ensuring that no county received less than 75 % or more than 150 % of the national average of the per capita grant allocations. The present study evaluated the effectiveness of that informal rule in reducing pork barrel politics in Irish sports capital grant allocations. en
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf en
dc.language.iso en en
dc.publisher Springer Verlag en
dc.relation.uri https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11127-016-0348-1
dc.rights © Springer Science+Business Media New York 2016. This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Public Choice. The final authenticated version is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-016-0348-1 en
dc.subject Pork barrel en
dc.subject Sport expenditure en
dc.subject Fiscal rules en
dc.subject Congressional dominance model en
dc.title Evaluation of an informal rule for the allocation of sports capital funding en
dc.type Article (peer-reviewed) en
dc.internal.authorcontactother Justin Doran, Economics, University College Cork, Cork, Ireland. +353-21-490-3000 Email: justin.doran@ucc.ie en
dc.internal.availability Full text available en
dc.date.updated 2018-04-17T15:16:01Z
dc.description.version Accepted Version en
dc.internal.rssid 352227268
dc.description.status Peer reviewed en
dc.identifier.journaltitle Public Choice en
dc.internal.copyrightchecked Yes en
dc.internal.licenseacceptance Yes en
dc.internal.IRISemailaddress justin.doran@ucc.ie en

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