On the origin of the left-Hegelian concept of immanent transcendence: reflections on the background of classical sociology

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dc.contributor.author Strydom, Piet
dc.date.accessioned 2019-02-06T09:55:57Z
dc.date.available 2019-02-06T09:55:57Z
dc.date.issued 2018-10-05
dc.identifier.citation Strydom, P. (2018) 'On the origin of the left-Hegelian concept of immanent transcendence: reflections on the background of classical sociology', Journal of Classical Sociology, pp. 1-19. doi:10.1177/1468795x18803642 en
dc.identifier.startpage 1 en
dc.identifier.endpage 19 en
dc.identifier.issn 1468-795X
dc.identifier.issn 1741-2897
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10468/7443
dc.identifier.doi 10.1177/1468795x18803642
dc.description.abstract This article pursues the question of the origin of the left-Hegelian concept of immanent transcendence that emerged in the nineteenth century. Whereas some contemporary critical theorists apparently understand the concept as deriving from a religious origin, evolutionary and historical considerations would seem to indicate that more might be involved. Evolutionarily, the origin of the concept can be traced to the civilisation-founding cognitive achievement that marks the emergence of the current version of the human species and the concomitant cultural explosion during the Palaeolithic period. In this context, the cultural consolidation of the newly acquired metarepresentational capacity by language and visual symbolisation or art preceded religion by a considerable elapse of time. As one among a number of sociocultural practices, it could only have made a partial contribution to the conditions for the emergence of the concept. Historically, the thought of the key nineteenth-century left-Hegelians Marx and Peirce was fundamentally shaped, not by religion, but rather by the core modern innovation of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries – the new mathematical-scientific-philosophical understanding of infinity as real – which gained primacy by significantly impacting on relevant late eighteenth- and nineteenth-century intellectual developments, including laying down the parameters of classical social thought in general and left-Hegelianism in particular. Since the competing religious understanding of infinity, despite having left traces on modern validity concepts such as truth, justice and truthfulness, remained shrouded in indefinite incomprehensibility, it could at best continue to play only the role of an identity-securing, identity-cultivating and motivational source for some, not all. As such, it did not contribute to the nineteenth-century left-Hegelian concept. en
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf en
dc.language.iso en en
dc.publisher SAGE Publications en
dc.relation.uri https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1468795X18803642
dc.rights © 2018, the Author. Reprinted by permission of SAGE Publications. en
dc.subject Habermas en
dc.subject Honneth en
dc.subject Infinity en
dc.subject Kant en
dc.subject Left-Hegelianism en
dc.subject Marx en
dc.subject Modernity en
dc.subject Peirce en
dc.subject Religion en
dc.title On the origin of the left-Hegelian concept of immanent transcendence: reflections on the background of classical sociology en
dc.type Article (peer-reviewed) en
dc.internal.authorcontactother Piet Strydom, Sociology and Philosophy (Emeritus), University College Cork, Cork, Ireland. T: +353-21-490-3000 en
dc.internal.availability Full text available en
dc.date.updated 2019-02-06T09:47:07Z
dc.description.version Accepted Version en
dc.internal.rssid 472578392
dc.description.status Peer reviewed en
dc.identifier.journaltitle Journal of Classical Sociology en
dc.internal.copyrightchecked Yes en
dc.internal.licenseacceptance Yes en
dc.internal.bibliocheck Check vol / issue / page range. Amend citation as necessary.

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