Moral hazard, path dependency, and failing franchisors: mitigating franchisee risk through participation

Show simple item record

dc.contributor.author Gant, Jennifer L. L.
dc.contributor.author Buchan, Jenny
dc.date.accessioned 2019-05-14T09:27:45Z
dc.date.available 2019-05-14T09:27:45Z
dc.date.issued 2019-04-01
dc.identifier.citation Gant, J. L. L. and Buchan, J. 'Moral Hazard, Path Dependency and Failing Franchisors: Mitigating Franchisee Risk Through Participation', (2019) Federal Law Review, In Press, doi: 10.1177/0067205X19831841 en
dc.identifier.volume 47 en
dc.identifier.issued 2 en
dc.identifier.startpage 1 en
dc.identifier.endpage 33 en
dc.identifier.issn 0067205X
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10468/7898
dc.identifier.doi 10.1177/0067205X19831841 en
dc.description.abstract Employment relations are well understood. Business format franchising is a newer and rapidly evolving business expansion formula, also providing employment. This article compares the fates of employees and franchisees in their employer/franchisor insolvency. Whereas employees enjoy protection, franchisees continue to operate in conditions that have been described as Feudal. We identify the inherence of moral hazard, path dependency and optimism bias as reasons for the failure of policies and corporations laws, globally, to adapt to the franchise relationship. This failure comes into sharp focus during a franchisor’s insolvency. We demonstrate that the models of participation available to employees in the United States, Australia and the United Kingdom could be used to inform a re-balancing of the franchisees’ relationship with administrators and liquidators during the insolvency of their franchisor, providing franchisees with rights and restoring their dignity. en
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf en
dc.language.iso en en
dc.publisher Sage Publications en
dc.relation.uri https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0067205X19831841
dc.rights © The Author(s) 2019. Published by Sage in Association with The Australian National University. Reprinted by permission of SAGE Publications. en
dc.subject Franchising en
dc.subject Franchise en
dc.subject Agency theory en
dc.subject Insolvency en
dc.title Moral hazard, path dependency, and failing franchisors: mitigating franchisee risk through participation en
dc.type Article (peer-reviewed) en
dc.internal.authorcontactother Jennifer L.L. Gant, School Of Law, University College Cork, Cork, Ireland. +353-21-490-3000 Email: jennifer.gant@ucc.ie en
dc.internal.availability Full text available en
dc.date.updated 2019-05-14T09:14:27Z
dc.description.version Accepted Version en
dc.internal.rssid 470731605
dc.description.status Peer reviewed en
dc.identifier.journaltitle Federal Law Review en
dc.internal.copyrightchecked No !!CORA!!
dc.internal.licenseacceptance Yes en
dc.internal.IRISemailaddress jennifer.gant@ucc.ie en
dc.internal.bibliocheck In Press. Update citation, add vol. issue, update page nos. en
dc.identifier.eissn 14446928


Files in this item

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record

This website uses cookies. By using this website, you consent to the use of cookies in accordance with the UCC Privacy and Cookies Statement. For more information about cookies and how you can disable them, visit our Privacy and Cookies statement