The contemporary Habermas: towards triple contingency?

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dc.contributor.author Strydom, Piet
dc.date.accessioned 2019-05-14T10:45:27Z
dc.date.available 2019-05-14T10:45:27Z
dc.date.issued 1999-05-01
dc.identifier.citation Strydom, P. (1999) 'The contemporary Habermas: towards triple contingency?', European Journal of Social Theory, 2(2), pp. 253-263. doi: 10.1177/136843199002002008 en
dc.identifier.volume 2 en
dc.identifier.issued 2 en
dc.identifier.startpage 253 en
dc.identifier.endpage 263 en
dc.identifier.issn 1368-4310
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10468/7900
dc.identifier.doi 10.1177/136843199002002008 en
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf en
dc.language.iso en en
dc.publisher SAGE Publications en
dc.relation.uri https://doi.org/10.1177/136843199002002008
dc.rights © 1999, SAGE Publications. All rights reserved. en
dc.subject Between Facts and Norms en
dc.subject Habermas en
dc.subject Double contingency en
dc.subject Triple contingency en
dc.subject A Berlin Republic: Writings on Germany en
dc.subject Die Einbeziehung des Anderen: Studien zur politischen Theorie en
dc.subject Vom sinnlichen Eindruck zum symbolischen Ausdruck: Philosophische Essays en
dc.title The contemporary Habermas: towards triple contingency? en
dc.type Article (peer-reviewed) en
dc.internal.authorcontactother Piet Strydom, Sociology and Philosophy (Emeritus), University College Cork, Cork, Ireland. T: +353-21-490-3000 en
dc.internal.availability Full text available en
dc.date.updated 2019-05-14T10:40:30Z
dc.description.version Accepted Version en
dc.internal.rssid 485189670
dc.description.status Peer reviewed en
dc.identifier.journaltitle European Journal of Social Theory en
dc.internal.copyrightchecked Yes
dc.internal.licenseacceptance Yes en
dc.identifier.eissn 1461-7137


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