Nonassertive moral abolitionism

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dc.contributor.author Dockstader, Jason
dc.date.accessioned 2019-07-18T10:50:23Z
dc.date.available 2019-07-18T10:50:23Z
dc.date.issued 2019-07-04
dc.identifier.citation Dockstader, J. (2019) 'Nonassertive moral abolitionism', Metaphilosophy, 50(4), pp. 481-502. doi: 10.1111/meta.12368 en
dc.identifier.volume 50 en
dc.identifier.issued 4 en
dc.identifier.startpage 481 en
dc.identifier.endpage 502 en
dc.identifier.issn 0026-1068
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10468/8196
dc.identifier.doi 10.1111/meta.12368 en
dc.description.abstract Proponents of moral abolitionism, like Richard Garner, qualify their view as an â assertiveâ version of the position. They counsel moral realists and anti-realists alike to accept moral error theory, abolish morality, and encourage others to abolish morality. In response, this paper argues that moral error theorists should abolish morality, but become quiet about such abolition. It offers a quietist or nonassertive version of moral abolitionism. It does so by first clarifying and addressing the arguments for and against assertive moral abolitionism. Second, it develops novel criticisms of assertive moral abolitionism and offers nonassertive moral abolitionism in response. Third, it discusses how various metaethical views might respond to nonassertive moral abolitionism. Its basic claim is that nonassertive moral abolitionism provides superior therapeutic benefits over assertive moral abolitionism and other conserving and reforming approaches to moral discourse. en
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf en
dc.language.iso en en
dc.publisher John Wiley & Sons, Inc. en
dc.relation.uri https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/meta.12368
dc.rights © 2019, Metaphilosophy LLC and John Wiley & Sons Ltd. This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Dockstader, J. (2019) 'Nonassertive moral abolitionism', Metaphilosophy, 50(4), pp. 481-502. doi: 10.1111/meta.12368, which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1111/meta.12368. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Use of Self-Archived Versions. en
dc.subject Metaethics en
dc.subject Moral abolitionism en
dc.subject Moral antirealism en
dc.subject Moral error theory en
dc.subject Moral nihilism en
dc.title Nonassertive moral abolitionism en
dc.type Article (peer-reviewed) en
dc.internal.authorcontactother Jason Dockstader, Philosophy, University College Cork, Cork, Ireland. +353-21-490-3000 Email: j.dockstader@ucc.ie en
dc.internal.availability Full text available en
dc.check.info Access to this article is restricted until 24 months after publication by request of the publisher. en
dc.check.date 2021-07-04
dc.date.updated 2019-07-18T09:21:10Z
dc.description.version Accepted Version en
dc.internal.rssid 493288112
dc.description.status Peer reviewed en
dc.identifier.journaltitle Metaphilosophy en
dc.internal.copyrightchecked Yes
dc.internal.licenseacceptance Yes en
dc.internal.IRISemailaddress j.dockstader@ucc.ie en
dc.identifier.eissn 1467-9973


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