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Restriction lift date:2021-09-05
Citation:Goyal, A., Jategaonkar, S. P. and Muckley, C. B. (2020) 'Why do privatized firms pay higher dividends?', Journal of Corporate Finance, 60, 101493 (19 pp). doi: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2019.101493
We examine state income and reputation incentives to account for the high dividends of privatized firms. Consistent with these agency-cost based incentives, we show strong and robust evidence that the extent of state ownership is positively related to corporate dividends. We distinguish between the empirical importance of these incentives using variation in the rule of law to protect minority shareholders, the fiscal deficit and the political orientation of the state. Our findings show that an incentive to enhance the state's reputation with minority shareholders can account for the high dividends of privatized firms.
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