Why do privatized firms pay higher dividends?

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dc.contributor.author Goyal, Abhinav
dc.contributor.author Jategaonkar, Shrikant
dc.contributor.author Muckley, Cal B.
dc.date.accessioned 2020-01-21T12:56:17Z
dc.date.available 2020-01-21T12:56:17Z
dc.date.issued 2019-09-05
dc.identifier.citation Goyal, A., Jategaonkar, S. P. and Muckley, C. B. (2020) 'Why do privatized firms pay higher dividends?', Journal of Corporate Finance, 60, 101493 (19 pp). doi: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2019.101493 en
dc.identifier.volume 60 en
dc.identifier.startpage 1 en
dc.identifier.endpage 19 en
dc.identifier.issn 0929-1199
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10468/9545
dc.identifier.doi 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2019.101493 en
dc.description.abstract We examine state income and reputation incentives to account for the high dividends of privatized firms. Consistent with these agency-cost based incentives, we show strong and robust evidence that the extent of state ownership is positively related to corporate dividends. We distinguish between the empirical importance of these incentives using variation in the rule of law to protect minority shareholders, the fiscal deficit and the political orientation of the state. Our findings show that an incentive to enhance the state's reputation with minority shareholders can account for the high dividends of privatized firms. en
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf en
dc.language.iso en en
dc.publisher Elsevier en
dc.relation.uri https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0929119918303900#ec0005
dc.rights Crown Copyright © 2019, Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. This manuscript version is made available under the CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 licence. en
dc.rights.uri https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ en
dc.subject Dividends en
dc.subject Minority shareholders en
dc.subject Payout policy en
dc.subject Privatization en
dc.subject State income en
dc.subject State ownership en
dc.subject State reputation en
dc.title Why do privatized firms pay higher dividends? en
dc.type Article (peer-reviewed) en
dc.internal.authorcontactother Abhinav Goyal, Cork University Business School, University College Cork, Cork, Ireland. +353-21-490-3000 Email: abhinav.goyal@ucc.ie en
dc.internal.availability Full text available en
dc.check.info Access to this article is restricted until 24 months after publication by request of the publisher. en
dc.check.date 2021-09-05
dc.date.updated 2020-01-21T12:50:20Z
dc.description.version Accepted Version en
dc.internal.rssid 500175717
dc.description.status Peer reviewed en
dc.identifier.journaltitle Journal of Corporate Finance en
dc.internal.copyrightchecked Yes
dc.internal.licenseacceptance Yes en
dc.internal.IRISemailaddress abhinav.goyal@ucc.ie en
dc.identifier.articleid 101493 en


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Crown Copyright © 2019, Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. This manuscript version is made available under the CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 licence. Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as Crown Copyright © 2019, Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. This manuscript version is made available under the CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 licence.
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