Block-ownership structure, bank nominee director and crash-risk

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dc.contributor.author Chauhan, Yogesh
dc.contributor.author Wadhwa, Kavita
dc.contributor.author Syamala, Sudhakar Reddy
dc.contributor.author Goyal, Abhinav
dc.date.accessioned 2020-01-22T15:07:25Z
dc.date.available 2020-01-22T15:07:25Z
dc.date.issued 2015-07-13
dc.identifier.citation Chauhan, Y., Wadhwa, K., Syamala, S. R. and Goyal, A. (2015) 'Block-ownership structure, bank nominee director and crash-risk', Finance Research Letters, 14, pp. 20-28. doi: 10.1016/j.frl.2015.07.002 en
dc.identifier.volume 14 en
dc.identifier.startpage 20 en
dc.identifier.endpage 28 en
dc.identifier.issn 1544-6123
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10468/9558
dc.identifier.doi 10.1016/j.frl.2015.07.002 en
dc.description.abstract We study the effect of outside block-ownership on the future firm-specific crash-risk of Indian firms. Major and dedicated block-owners play a significant role in aggravating the firm’s susceptibility towards crash-risk. Within a novel regulatory setup in India, where borrowing firms are entitled to a bank nominated board-member, we find an ancillary influence of bank nominee’s presence in dissipating block-owners influence on firm-level crash-risk. These results support the monitoring hypothesis in alleviating future firm-level crash-risk. Our results are robust to alternate model specifications, different crash-risk and block-ownership measures, clustering, and an array of control variables. en
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf en
dc.language.iso en en
dc.publisher Elsevier en
dc.relation.uri http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1544612315000641
dc.rights © 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. This manuscript version is made available under the CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 licence. en
dc.rights.uri https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ en
dc.subject Agency problem en
dc.subject Bank nominee en
dc.subject Block-ownership en
dc.subject Crash-risk en
dc.title Block-ownership structure, bank nominee director and crash-risk en
dc.type Article (peer-reviewed) en
dc.internal.authorcontactother Abhinav Goyal, Cork University Business School, University College Cork, Cork, Ireland. +353-21-490-3000 Email: abhinav.goyal@ucc.ie en
dc.internal.availability Full text available en
dc.date.updated 2020-01-22T15:03:45Z
dc.description.version Accepted Version en
dc.internal.rssid 500175798
dc.description.status Peer reviewed en
dc.identifier.journaltitle Finance Research Letters en
dc.internal.copyrightchecked Yes
dc.internal.licenseacceptance Yes en
dc.internal.IRISemailaddress abhinav.goyal@ucc.ie en


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© 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. This manuscript version is made available under the CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 licence. Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as © 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. This manuscript version is made available under the CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 licence.
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