

Title	Envy, racial hatred, and self-deception
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Publication date	2023-04-13
Original Citation	Salice, A. and Montes Sánchez, A. (2023) 'Envy, racial hatred, and self-deception', in Montes Sánchez, A. and Salice, A. (eds.) Emotional Self-Knowledge. New York: Routledge. doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003310945-12">https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003310945-12</a>
Type of publication	Book chapter
Link to publisher's version	<a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003310945-12">https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003310945-12</a>
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Download date	2024-11-10 02:56:22
Item downloaded from	<a href="https://hdl.handle.net/10468/15495">https://hdl.handle.net/10468/15495</a>

## 09. Envy, Racial Hatred, and Self-Deception

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### Abstract

Envy is an unpleasant, culturally vilified and self-threatening emotion that, in many circumstances, tends to mask itself. In other words, due to various factors, envy often exerts some psychological pressure towards self-deception. A domain where this pressure plays an important and underappreciated role is the political and, more concretely, the realm of racism and identity-based discrimination. Despite historical, empirical, and anecdotal evidence indicating that envy can lead to racial hatred, the link between these two emotions, and the role that self-deception plays in this link, remains under-investigated and poorly understood. This chapter aims at remedying this situation by offering an account of the link between envy and racial hatred. After reviewing the evidence available in support of this emotional link, we elaborate on our account of envy (as presented in Salice and Montes Sánchez 2019). We then explain how, why, and under which circumstances envy can transmute into racial hatred by claiming that this transformation process qualifies as an “emotional mechanism” (Salice and Salmela 2022). We conclude by arguing that the envy-racial hatred emotional mechanism is based on self-deception and, as such, is an immature coping mechanism set in motion by the subject to avoid a negative sense of self.

**Keywords:** Emotional Mechanism; Envy; Racial Hatred, Racism, Self-Deception

### 1. Introduction

Envy is an unpleasant and heavily stigmatized emotion. Numerous authors have remarked on the general reluctance people have to acknowledge feeling it and on this emotion’s tendency to “mask” as resentment. One of the greatest obstacles to knowing envy seems therefore to be envy itself. But how does this self-deceptive masking take place and which consequences does it have, beyond obstructing self-knowledge? These are the main questions that we address in this chapter. To do so, we have chosen to focus on an important but underexplored domain: the socio-political domain and, more concretely, the link between envy and racial—or, more broadly, xenophobic—hatred. Protasi (2021) has recently highlighted some evidence in support of this link, but she also notes that very few theorists have devoted any attention to it, and its nature remains opaque and under-investigated. Part of the reason for this might precisely be that self-deception plays a crucial role in masking this link, as we will argue. But what exactly is the role of self-deception here?

By way of an answer to these questions, in what follows we will defend three claims. First, in our view, the link between envy and racial hatred can be accounted for in terms of an emotional mechanism, as described by Salice and Salmela (2022). The way we understand them, emotional mechanisms are processes whereby an emotion that is threatening to the subject (in a sense to be specified below) is transmuted into another. Secondly, typical of all emotional mechanisms and, in particular, of the one linking envy with hatred, is self-deception of the emoting subject. Third, this element of self-deception has hindered a full appreciation of the role of envy as a political emotion in generating racial hatred.

Admittedly, the domain where we focus our investigation is extremely complex and involves many sensitive issues. Before we set out to defend the above claims, we therefore want to establish a few caveats. First and foremost, we do not want to reduce racism (or other forms of identity-based discrimination) to hatred—we understand racism as a complex social phenomenon, including structural racism, implicit biases, and so on. Many of the most insidious elements of racism have little to do with hatred and are not necessarily instigated by hatred. Our claims, therefore, are limited to some of the emotional components of some racist attitudes exhibited by individuals and groups. However, within this framework, we do contend that, in certain cases, racism *is* fuelled by hatred. Secondly, in linking envy with hatred, we are *not* claiming that envy is the sole contributing factor to (racial) hatred. Envy and hatred are two different affective attitudes that involve different evaluations of their intentional objects, and it is perfectly possible for individuals and groups to come to hate others without envy or other emotions intervening as mediating factors. But we do maintain that, in the cases that we analyze here, envy is a contributing factor (among others) that ignites racial hatred and sometimes fosters acts of racism. Thirdly, we operate with a broad understanding of racial hatred by characterizing an episode of hatred as “racial” when the target of hatred is evaluated as evil primarily based on their *social* or group’s identity—regardless of whether this identity is further specified as ethnic, cultural, religious, biological (“racial” in a narrower sense), etc. To put this differently, it suffices for an instance of hatred to qualify as racial, in the sense at stake in this chapter, that the other is hated primarily because of their social identity.<sup>1</sup>

The arguments in this chapter proceed as follows. In section 2, we start with reviewing some evidence about the link between envy and racial or xenophobic hatred. In sections 3 and 4, we dwell upon the premises of our arguments by summarizing the account of envy we developed in Salice and Montes Sánchez (2019) and the theory of emotional mechanisms developed in Salice and Salmela (2022). These two accounts are brought to bear on the issue at stake in section 5, which cashes out the envy-racial hatred link in terms of two possible emotional mechanisms. Section 6 elaborates on the psychologically vicious form of self-deception that is typically involved in these two emotional mechanisms.

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<sup>1</sup> Note that not all instances of hatred target the other *qua* member of a group (i.e., the other *qua* bearer of a social identity): individual hatred (hating the other *qua* individual person) certainly has a place in human psychology, or so has claimed one of us (Salice 2021). We are grateful to Mikko Salmela for his remarks on our understanding of racial hatred.

## 2. Evidence about the link between envy and racial hatred

On a first approach, it might seem counterintuitive to claim that there is an important link between envy and racist attitudes, or that envy might be a significant ingredient of such attitudes. After all, racism implies considering oneself superior to another racial group, while envy implies feeling disadvantaged or inferior to someone else (a rival), who has something you lack and covet. This apparent contradiction might be part of the reason why the role of envy is relatively underexplored in the context of racism (see Protasi 2021, ch. 5 for an overview). However, the contradiction is only apparent: the two attitudes are not incompatible and the examples that follow evidence that envy for a despised group is not uncommon. A plausible explanation for the compatibility of the two emotions is that the feeling of inferiority in envy is highly localized and relative to a specific good, quality or advantage that is envied: it doesn't involve a generalized sense of inferiority, and it can be made compatible with seeing the envied as inferior in other domains, as the following examples of envy linked to racist attitudes or identity-based discrimination show.

The first example, and perhaps the most familiar one to most readers, might be the case of anti-semitism. It has been pointed out that envy was an undercurrent of a lot of the anti-Jewish propaganda in Germany in the 1930s and that it fuelled the Jewish genocide (Glick 2002, Staub 1989). Our second example doesn't concern racism, but another form of identity-based hatred, which however shows a degree of similarity with racism: misogyny. Martha Nussbaum (2018) has defended the idea that one of the factors at play in the recent backlashes against feminism is precisely envy: the envy of those who consider themselves entitled to their privilege and see affirmative action initiatives as offering undue advantages to women. Finally, Sara Protasi (2021) offers two examples of envy in the context of racism. Both examples are particularly relevant to our chapter, which is why we dwell a bit longer on them. First, she analyzes a scene in Spike Lee's film *Do the Right Thing*, where two characters, Pino and Mookie, are having a heated conversation. They are both around the same age and they work as delivery boys at a pizzeria, but while Pino is the Italian-American son of the owner, Mookie is their African-American employee. Pino is openly racist against African-Americans, but despite this, Mookie succeeds in making Pino admit that his favourite basketball player, his favourite actor and his favourite rock star are all African-American. "You know—Mookie tells Pino—, I think deep down inside you wish you were Black". In Protasi's interpretation of the scene, this is an example where a group believed inferior is still envied for their talents for sports and art. Envy is therefore shown to be compatible with racist attitudes that depict the other as inferior in almost all respects. Interestingly, Protasi's attention and analytic efforts go to a different case though: racism against Asians and Asian-Americans in the US. This case is different in that envy is not just presented as an emotion that can occasionally be compatible with racist attitudes of contempt or hatred, but as something much more central. While Protasi doesn't claim this explicitly, her analysis can be interpreted as presenting envy as the underlying emotion that fuels and drives racist attitudes towards this minority. This can be seen

in the sort of stereotypes and dehumanizing metaphors that are applied to Asians: they are presented as hard-working, smart (in a specific and limited sense) and academically and financially successful, all of them positive and enviable qualities. However, those qualities are invested with a negative spin through dehumanizing technical metaphors that present Asians as robots, cogs in a huge machine, and so on. All of them are vilifying explanations of success that evidence one of the typical characteristics of envy: hostility towards the rival(s).

According to the evidence presented, envy is often a part of racist attitudes and can fuel them. However, envy is rarely associated with the racist emotional repertoire, which stereotypically includes hatred, anger, pride or contempt, but not envy. One of the main reasons for this, in our view, is that the context of racism intensifies the social pressure to mask envy, thus heightening the psychological pressure to transform it via emotional mechanisms (i.e. via self-deception). But before we can move on to explaining how this happens, we owe the reader an account of envy.

### **3. What is envy?<sup>2</sup>**

Most philosophical accounts of envy start by comparing it with and distinguishing it from a similar emotion: jealousy. According to the most widespread view, both emotions are unpleasant and they involve a relation between an emoting subject and another person (a rival) mediated by a good that the emoter values. The difference between them is that, while jealousy is about protecting the good you enjoy from a rival that threatens it, envy is about coveting the good possessed by the rival. This distinction doesn't mirror language use in English, where speakers often use both terms interchangeably or, rather, tend to say they are "jealous" when they mean "envious," partly due to the moral condemnation that envy has been the object of for so many centuries. The distinction, however, is phenomenologically sound and analytically useful, and therefore we conform to it.

Going deeper into the intentional structure of envy (how it presents and evaluates the objects it targets), let us start by remarking that it belongs to the class of the self-conscious emotions, i.e. emotions that are intentionally directed at (they are of or about) the self of the emoter. In other words, in envy, just like in other self-conscious emotions such as shame or pride, one evaluates oneself. However, the intentional structure of envy is more complex than the structure of individual shame, for example, since envy necessarily involves a comparison with another person: the rival. Shame doesn't necessarily involve a comparison, simply a sense of one's own insufficiency or degradation. But in envy the feeling of inferiority is always explicitly comparative, it is relative to a rival in relation to a specific good (which can be an object, but also an ability, a talent, a character trait, a state of affairs, etc.). How does this feeling of inferiority come about?

To begin with, envy involves a feeling of impotence or powerlessness caused by a frustrated desire for the good. This feeling can be more or less intense: one can feel absolutely powerless to obtain

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<sup>2</sup> This section draws on the views presented in Salice and Montes Sánchez (2019).

the good now or in the future, or one can feel that there is a temporary and more or less easily removable obstacle blocking one's access to the good. This feeling can also be more or less justified: sometimes, the subject is right that they will never be able to achieve the good (the fact that your colleague just took over the Einstein Chair of Physics in Princeton means that that possibility is now precluded to you), sometimes they are not (the right effort and dedication might, in principle, allow access to the good). Be this as it may, envy is characterized by a feeling of (more or less temporary) powerlessness and frustration.

However, more is needed for envy, since all we have said so far could also apply to any unfulfilled desire, and envy is more than unfulfilled desire. Crucially, envy also involves social comparison. Envious people compare themselves to a rival that they perceive as similar to themselves. Indeed, there is plenty of empirical evidence showing that envy thrives in the short distances (Ben-Ze'ev 1992, Miceli and Castelfranchi 2007, Boyce et al. 2010): people envy their colleagues who earn a slightly higher salary, but they tend not to envy the company's CEO, who earns ten or even one hundred times more than them. This is because envy requires seeing yourself as comparable to the rival in a way that allows for "in-your-shoes" perspective-taking: envious people typically can imagine themselves in the shoes of the rival and feel that if only the world were a little bit different, it could have been them who enjoyed the good (Ben-Ze'ev 1992, Protasi 2021). This, in turn, generates a self-assessment as wrongly disadvantaged or inferior: "if someone so similar to me deserved the good, I should have deserved it too, there is no good reason why the rival should be more than me". Therefore envy involves a sense of relative unfairness. To be clear, we don't think that envy involves a concern for justice in general. The background concern in envy is relative to the individual and highly localized, it is a concern for *one's own* (perceived) inequality vis-à-vis the rival, for one's own inferior position, not for equality and social justice in general. This feeling of unwarranted disadvantage vis-à-vis another is what grounds the hostility towards the rival that we take to be characteristic of envy.

Now, whether envy always involves hostility towards the rival is a debated point in the literature, and a number of authors have defended that not all envy does (most recently Protasi 2021). We, however, believe that so-called "benign" envy is a combination of desire for a good plus admiration towards the good's owner. Our main reason for this is that we see the self-conscious character of envy, the feeling of inferiority it entails, as leading to a more or less intense hostility towards the rival. We have argued in detail for this view elsewhere (Salice and Montes Sánchez 2019) and rehearsing our arguments here would take us too far from our current topic. For the purposes of this chapter, we think it is enough to assume that "benign" envy (if it is indeed envy) is very unlikely to play any role in fueling racial hatred. We therefore will proceed on the assumption that envy in the cases at hand is always hostile.

Stressing the self-conscious nature of envy in this context is important for at least two reasons. First, it explains why people resist acknowledging envy, since this emotion constitutes an implicit

acknowledgement of an inferiority vis-à-vis the rival. Such an acknowledgement is not merely unpleasant, like the frustration of an unfulfilled desire, it is also self-threatening—an aspect that plays a large role later on in our argument. Secondly, as stated above, the label “self-conscious” highlights the fact that, while envy touches on our sense of self in being an emotion of self-evaluation, it also does so in a peculiar way: envy is what in past work we have called a “hetero-induced” self-conscious emotion, i.e., an emotion characterized by a self-evaluation induced by relevant others. To put this differently, envy presupposes a specific relation with others; it presupposes a “sense of us:” the others are perceived as members of a group to which one also belongs and, therefore, as a part of what psychologists call our “social self” (Brewer and Gardner 1996). As such, envy is enabled by the subject’s identification with a group, which is the psychological process that leads one to understand oneself as group member (i.e., to acquire a social self, see Turner 1982).

In our view, there are two ways in which group-identification generally figures in envy. First, group identification can provide a basis for comparison by making certain similarities salient. Recall that envy entails seeing oneself as comparable to the rival in a certain respect; but what different people interpret as a legitimate basis for comparison can vary wildly, depending on how individuals perceive themselves and the situation. This is why envy requires perceived—not objective—similarity. Here, we contend that one of the factors that can foster a sense of being similar or comparable to someone else is group identification. For example, a mediocre actress in a local theatre company, who however regards acting as an important part of her identity, is very unlikely to be envious of someone like Meryl Streep, who nowadays is widely considered to be the greatest living actress and one of the best in history. Therefore, objective similarity (being an actress) does not necessarily trigger envy. But now imagine that the most successful living actress was the amateur’s sister. In this case, envy is much more likely to arise, precisely because of group identification. If the amateur group-identifies with her sister as a member of the same family, this can serve as the basis for a strong perceived similarity that allows for social comparison and “in-your-shoes” perspective taking, therefore leading to envy.<sup>3</sup>

While this first role of group identification for envy might be dispensable (the subject could follow other routes to assign salience to similarities), we contend that there is a second way in which group identification figures in envy, which is not only structurally more important, but also more relevant to our present purposes. In our view, group identification fixes the background good that most (and perhaps all) enviers aspire to: recognition by an in-group. The idea here is that, over and above the ostensible or superficial good that enviers focus on, what they aspire to is recognition. How do we reach this conclusion, when envy seems to be able to attach to so many different

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<sup>3</sup> Of course, in such a scenario, group identification might lead the amateur actress to feel group-based pride of her sister instead. We believe both responses are possible and can be fitting. Whether the amateur feels one or the other emotion will depend on factors such as how competitive the relation between the two sisters is, among others. Our point here is simply to illustrate how group identification can provide grounds for comparison even when the distance between two individuals is large and, sometimes, abysmal.

objects? Of course, on a superficial level, envy can be about variable goods that catch the subject's attention (material objects, character's traits, etc.). However, not all objects attract everyone's attention to the same extent: one individual will envy her sister's talent for acting, another, their colleagues' promotion, a third one, his neighbor's Ferrari, and so on. This raises the question of what, then, explains the subject's preoccupation with one particular good. And one plausible explanation is that the good exemplifies particular values that the subject cares about and that make the good appealing. In the case of envy, we contend that these are values that secure social status, i.e. social recognition by an in-group (in the sense of "esteem recognition"<sup>4</sup>).

Now, importantly, the rival may well be perceived as an out-group member, but the goods this rival possesses are valued by the envier's reference group and they confer esteem and status within this in-group. Think again about our initial examples of envy in the context of racism, especially the conversation between Pino and Mookie. While Pino explicitly conceives of African-Americans as members of a racial out-group, the athletic prowess and musical talent he envies them for are esteemed by Pino's reference in-group (both by Italian Americans and by American society at large). Thus, these qualities make their possessors deserving of esteem by the in-group that Pino cares about. This is why Pino can envy African-Americans for them. In sum, on a deeper level, the ultimate good at stake in envy is *esteem*: the esteem of one's in-group (the group that recognizes those values and their possessors as worthy of esteem). As we will see in section 4, this is precisely the situation at stake in the envy-racism link: the envier frames the rival as an out-group member, but they both struggle for the recognition of a common, overarching, referential in-group.<sup>5</sup>

Let us take stock. In our view, envy is the unpleasant feeling of inferiority vis-à-vis a rival that the envier perceives as comparable to themselves, in relation to a good that secures social esteem by the envier's in-group. Together with the moral condemnation traditionally attached to envy, the feeling of inferiority it entails makes it into a difficult emotion to acknowledge and generates a certain psychological pressure to mask or repress it. It follows that, in the context of racism, when envy is felt towards the racialized group or any of its members, acknowledging this emotion must become even more difficult, since this would amount to recognising that one perceives oneself as inferior in some sense, as less deserving of esteem than those one explicitly classifies as lesser than one. Therefore, we contend, racist enviers are under great psychological pressure to mask their

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<sup>4</sup> Axel Honneth (2005) distinguishes between three kinds of recognition: love, respect and esteem. Love is bestowed intimately and doesn't seem to require reasons. Respect is due to all persons by virtue of their being persons. Esteem depends on the qualities one has and how well one instantiates them; it admits of degrees and it is comparative. Therefore, we contend, esteem is the kind of recognition at stake in envy.

<sup>5</sup> The idea of the rival being member of an out-group and at the same time member of a (referential) in-group might sound inconsistent only if one assumes that there is one (one single) form of group-identification, but this is not the case: one can identify with a group in various ways. These identifications have various strengths and different functional profiles and it is possible for subject to understand another as an implicit in-group and as an explicit out-group member, when the identification at stake is different, see Salice and Montes Sánchez 2019 for further elaborations on this point.



envy. But how does this masking happen? In order to explain this, it is now time to turn our attention to emotional mechanisms.

#### 4. Emotional Mechanisms<sup>6</sup>

Let us start with a general characterization of emotional mechanisms (henceforth: “EMs”). At a first approximation, EMs are coping strategies that the subject sets in motion to overcome painful emotions.<sup>7</sup> More precisely, EMs have been qualified in a previous paper as “*personal (but often unconscious), distinctively patterned, mental processes* whereby an emotion of kind K is *transmuted into* an emotion of a different kind E” (Salice and Salmela 2022). To illustrate this characterization, we will now review two EMs in some detail. While there are a multitude of EMs, the reason why we specifically dwell on these two particular EMs is that they are the most significant ones for the envy-hatred link. In the first step, we introduce the two EMs and, in a second step, we explain the shared features that allow subsumption of these processes under the psychological category of EM.

**EM1:** in *t* person P *envies* rival R, meaning that P desires a good G possessed by R. P’s emotion of envy is subsequently (in *t*’) transmuted into *resentment* at R with an appraisal of R’s disvalue.<sup>8</sup>

For instance, in desiring your neighbor’s brand-new Ferrari, you also envy your neighbor in *t*. To cope with the sense of impotence and inferiority the emotion of envy confronts you with, and which we have described in the previous section, you set in motion an EM the outcome of which is the transformation of envy into resentment in *t*’: the neighbor is an unjust person that deserves blame.<sup>9</sup>

**EM2** person P reacts in *t* with *resentment* at a wrongdoing performed by person R against P. P’s emotion of resentment towards R is subsequently (in *t*’) transmuted into *hatred* towards R (or group G of which R is a member).

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<sup>6</sup> This section draws from Salice and Salmela (2022).

<sup>7</sup> For other strategies to overcome painful emotions, see the chapter by Vendrell Ferran in this volume.

<sup>8</sup> A few comments about terminology are in order. First, in the literature, EM1 is sometimes known under the label of “*Ressentiment*” (see Nietzsche 1961, Scheler 1961, Aeschbach 2017). It goes without saying that *Ressentiment* and resentment are different phenomena (although both phenomena are of an affective nature): *Ressentiment* is a mechanism, resentment an emotion. Second, we adopt a roughly Strawsonian view of resentment, whereby resentment is a moral emotion that presents its target as a responsible agent exhibiting ill-will towards you, and simultaneously you as a moral subject who legitimately can make moral demands on other moral subjects: both you and the target of your resentment are fellow members of the moral community. Third, we consider resentment as a specific form of anger, i.e., as moral anger (however, note the relevant term used in Salice and Salmela 2022 for this mechanism was “anger” *tout court*).

<sup>9</sup> The EM could also unfold differently: envy could lead to commiseration for the rival based on the re-evaluation of the good: the fox that envies the crow for feeding on grapes re-evaluates the grapes as sour and transforms the emotion of envy into commiseration for the crow who has to feed on sour grapes.

Imagine that, in  $t$ , you respond with resentment towards a wrongdoing your neighbor is inflicting on you (say: they keep you awake because of the loud noise of their party). Imagine also that, despite repeated expressions of resentment towards your neighbour, they still enjoy their parties ignoring your complaint. To cope with the sense of impotence that the emotion of inefficacious resentment confronts you with, you set in motion an EM the outcome of which is the transformation of resentment into hatred in  $t'$ : now, the neighbor is not merely an unjust person that deserves blame, but an evil individual that deserves hatred.

What makes these two different processes members of the same psychological category? There are four features that they have in common and that justify their subsumption under the same category.

The first is “emotional dissonance”. Here, emotional dissonance points to the distress that a hedonically negative emotion (like envy or anger) causes in a subject either when the expressions of the emotion and/or the actions performed according to the relevant action tendencies remain inefficacious, or when the emotion can neither be expressed nor acted upon (accordingly, “emotional dissonance” is used here with a different meaning than the one it is usually associated with in the sociological literature on emotional labour, see Hochschild 1983). This psychological distress is grounded in the threat that the emotion represents to the self of the emoter, i.e., in the negative sense of self that they elicit. EM1 and EM2 display emotional dissonance: not only is envy a socially stigmatized emotion, which ought not be felt and, by extension, expressed. Also, envy, according to our account, is constitutively infused by a sense of impotence and powerlessness, which blocks the subject from acting in the pursuit of the good. This impotence is a self-threat: it contributes to a negative sense of self causing psychological distress. Similarly, the resentment felt by the subject in EM2 is acted upon (contrary to envy in EM1), but it is inefficacious through and through: your neighbor does not revise their behavior in light of your expression of anger or in light of the punishment you have performed based on anger. The emotion of resentment bestows upon you the entitlement to be recognised by the other, but the other is precisely frustrating that entitlement, which makes you feel impotent.

A second condition that all EMs fulfill is revision in evaluation. Following a view that, in its general form and despite the many differences in the details, can be considered as orthodoxy in the theory of emotions, we consider emotions to be evaluative attitudes: they present the world and, in particular, their intentional objects as imbued with values. Emotional dissonance motivates the subject to revise the evaluation under which their (initial) emotions have put the relevant intentional objects. As EM1 unfolds, the rival is no longer perceived as someone who enjoys an advantage over you for no good reason, for they are evaluated in  $t'$  as outright unjust by invoking an impersonal or objective understanding of justice. Note that how exactly the subject comes to this evaluation is, to a large extent, irrelevant for the purposes of this chapter: you could for

instance confabulate that your neighbor didn't pay their taxes in order to be able to afford their Ferrari or that they run a fishy business, etc. What is important, though, is the fact that some level of confabulation must be involved for the evaluation to be revised. This points to two important elements of any EM. First, re-evaluation is not based on acquisition of new (previously ignored) relevant information by the subject.<sup>10</sup> The subject, to a certain extent is deluding themselves (and this is a point we will come back to in the last section). Second, re-evaluation, to have any prospect of succeeding in liberating the subject from the negative emotion, must be at least partly unconscious: for if the process of re-evaluation was fully transparent to the subject, the subject would know that they are exploiting a delusional cognitive process to escape the original emotion and they would thereby thwart that very escape (note: we write "unconscious", but not "subpersonal"—by activating their cognitive capacities the subject should be able to become conscious of what is going on in the EM; the point being that, more often than not, the subject is not motivated to activate those capacities—or perhaps better: they are motivated *not* to activate them). Something similar also occurs in EM2: the unjust individual is holistically re-evaluated as evil. It is re-evaluated in such a way under the condition that repeated expression of resentment or repeated punishing actions (motivated by resentment) did not correct the offensive behavior of the rival.

Based on this re-evaluation, and this is the third feature shared by all EMs, the subject emotes differently. To put it another way, we have a change in emotional response: the new evaluation elicits an emotion, which does not pose a self-threat to the subject any longer. This should be relatively obvious in the case of EM1 given that resentment is accompanied by a sense of entitlement that puts the subject in a superior position vis-à-vis the rival. But why does the same hold for EM2? In which sense does hating someone instead of being angry at them release the subject from the self-threat posed by inefficacious resentment? In previous work, one of us has advanced two possible answers to this question. First, hatred boosts and consolidates the subject's sense of moral superiority vis-à-vis its target (the target has not simply done something wrong against the subject, as it is signalled by resentment—the target is evil): hating, here, gives meaning to the self. Second, hatred does not have to be satisfied by actions performed by the hater; any harm occurring to the target (regardless who has inflicted it, how this has been inflicted, and so on) has the power to satisfy the hater (see Salice 2021). Finally, and relatedly, resentment treats the other as a responsible moral subject and demands the other's response to the offence they committed against you. By repeatedly ignoring your demand for a response (i.e., your resentment), the other refuses to recognize you as a subject with legitimate demands that require a response, which places you in a position of inferiority. Hatred, which treats the other as evil and incapable

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<sup>10</sup> It exceeds the purpose of this paper to elaborate on this point more extensively. However, we want to note that this idea, which has been argued for in Salice and Salmela (2022), might be too strong. Perhaps, subjects that undergo EMs do not entirely lack new information for their emotional re-evaluation. Rather, they selectively ignore or emphasise the importance of newly acquired information so as to make it conducive to their emotional re-evaluation, thereby falling prey to a confirmation bias in an epistemically vicious way. (We are thankful to Charlie Kurth for pushing us on this point.)

of a moral response, does not demand uptake, restoring the hater to a position of superiority. Admittedly, hatred is a socially stigmatized emotion that might generate distress and bad conscience in the emoter, but we contend that, when compared to the self-threat of ineffectual resentment and when collectivized as we explain below, it still leaves the emoter better off in terms of self-image.<sup>11</sup>

Concluding, all EMs have in common that the outcome emotion entails a disposition to be collectivized. But what grounds this disposition? Remember that EMs' reappraisal is not based on any new information about the emotions' intentional objects. Reappraisal in an EM therefore is a form of delusive evaluation. It then follows that the reappraisal is fragile because constantly controverted by the evidence that the subject has available (the very same evidence that prompted the initial emotion, that is). One way to stabilize the reappraisal and, by extension, the emotional reaction that is based on it therefore is to share the emotion with others. In so doing, the subject gains the sense that their reappraisal is intersubjectively validated, which in turn solidifies the outcome emotion. For instance, the subject might aggregate with other neighbors who, say, resent the owner of the Ferrari (perhaps because of envy that they, too, feel; but perhaps also for other legitimate reasons!) or who hate the party-organizer.

Armed with this clarification of the notion of EM, it is now time to turn to the link between envy and racial hatred. This is the topic of the next section.

#### **4. How Envy is Transmuted into Racial Hatred: An Emotional Mechanism Account**

We submit that envy can lead to racial hatred in *at least* two ways: this is by triggering either a *single-step* or a *multi-step* EM. As the multi-step process basically is a combination of EM1 and EM2 as described above, it is perhaps more germane to proceed by addressing that process first. By contrast, the single-step describes an altogether different EM.

The first segment of the multi-step process consists in the transformation of envy into resentment along the lines described above in relation to EM1. The subject envies their rival and the (many) superficial goods that the rival purportedly possesses (according to the envier) reveal to the subject that the rival enjoys a high level of recognition from the reference group. However, we submit that two elements play a particularly relevant role in the situation that generates racial hatred. First, whereas in discussing EM1 above we mainly focused on the superficial good of envy, this high level of recognition is what is predominantly at stake in the mechanisms that lead envy to racial hatred. For it is this high level of recognition (over and beyond the possession of superficial goods) that, we maintain, the subject also covets. Second, and crucially, the form of envy at stake here is such that the other, the rival, is already conceived of as an out-group member. The envier not only covets recognition by the in-group, but also frames explicitly the rival as an outsider (in relation

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<sup>11</sup> Thanks to Thomas Brudholm for pressing us on this issue.

to the envier's narrower affiliation) while implicitly conceiving of them as a member of a larger reference in-group (see footnote 5).

For the purpose of illustration, imagine that two candidates apply for social housing in State X, which notoriously suffers from a persistent housing crisis. One of the two applicants is an indigent citizen of State X and the other is, say, a refugee from a war zone. Both have lived in the same temporary accommodation and know (of) each other. The refugee, but not the citizen, is granted social housing. This prompts envy in the citizen. This form of envy, we contend, is as much about the superficial good (housing) as it is about the comparably higher recognition that the refugee has been accorded. In addition, the situation in which this form of envy emerges is clearly marked by an in-group/out-group differentiation: the refugee is understood as a member of an out-group (and, as we will see, this will play a crucial role in the transformation of envy into racial hatred).

If the subject cannot bear the level of emotional dissonance generated by their envy, they come under great pressure to discard the emotion. To do so, they unconsciously engage in revising the original appraisal of the emotion's intentional object. One of envy's intentional objects is the rival and this EM focuses on re-evaluating the rival of envy.<sup>12</sup> Remember that, in envy, the rival is perceived as culpable of contravening the subject's personal sense of fairness—this evaluation is now revised as a consequence of emotional dissonance: the other is now evaluated as offensive or unjust straight ahead. More precisely, they are now perceived to have acquired the superficial goods (and, by extension, the deep good: esteem recognition) in an unjust or unlawful manner.<sup>13</sup> Based on this new evaluation of the other as offensive, the subject now experiences resentment, which rapidly becomes unbearable. Now, of course, depending on the circumstances, the process could stop here without degenerating into racial hatred. For instance, the subject might overcome their emotional predicament, rest satisfied with blaming the unjust nature of the process and of the persons involved, and forget about the entire affair.

However, the process could also take a more troubling turn whereby resentment is transformed into hatred. There are at least three elements here that, we think, can exacerbate resentment and lead to racial hatred.

*First*, the rival is interpreted by the subject as attracting high level of recognition from the reference group, not only once, but in a constant, persistent, and publicly visible manner: e.g., not only the refugee has received social housing, they have also received health insurance and other forms of

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<sup>12</sup> However, the subject could also engage in re-evaluating envy's other intentional object: the good, which might lead to the sour-grapes scenario, as we have seen.

<sup>13</sup> Why blaming the rival and not, say, the City Council that assigned accommodation to the rival? The answer to this question is that this alternative way of discharging the negativity of envy is, of course, possible. Taking this route might block envy to debouch in racial hatred, but it goes with its own epistemic and moral vices. Furthermore, we presume that, if institutions are perceived by the subject to represent their social identity in some salient sense (e.g., if the subject politically supports the City's Mayor), then the subject's inclination will be to scapegoat the rival, rather than criticising their institutions.

social assistance. (But note that there is no need for the rival to be actually receiving these goods: the media—both digital and analogue—are infested by fake news about refugees and immigrants receiving social subsidies that don't exist; the stories are false, but some will believe them and *perceive* refugees as more fortunate than themselves, which is all envy requires). The diachronic dimension of this process is crucial, for the subject's resentment is reignited time and again, which adds to their general sense of frustration.

*Second*, this resentment remains inefficacious all the way through. To understand such inefficacy, let us start with the idea that, while the transformation of envy into resentment is frictionless when it relies on the idea that the rival has acquired superficial goods in an unjust manner (as this happens in EM1 described in the previous section), it is not equally frictionless to blame the subject for something that they, strictly speaking, are not first-personally responsible for. Esteem recognition is something that is accorded to the rival by a reference group—but it is not something that the rival generated directly by means of their actions. Thus, blaming the rival for having acquired superficial goods (their car, house, etc.) in an unjust manner leaves out of the equation what is most important to the subject: the esteem recognition that the rival enjoys and that the envier primarily covets. So, the subject's resentment will motivate actions and expressions that have the purpose of reprimanding the rival for the recognition they are perceived to unduly receive. However, this resentment is unwarranted or irrational: the rival cannot be blamed for something they quite obviously have not—and more importantly: *could not have*—done themselves. The point, we think, is important not so much because of the charge of irrationality itself (irrationality, we assume, plays little to no role in the psychology of the envious subject, see Sartre 1954), but because it shows that the demand bestowed by the subject's resentment on to the rival to rectify their conduct simply *cannot be met*. To go back to the example: any punishing strategy of the indigent citizen targeting actions of the refugee would be immediately self-defeating because it misses the target: *somebody else* (say, the City Council) has assigned accommodation to the refugee and, thereby, accorded higher esteem recognition to them. *Somebody else* has enacted the sort of administrative processes, which made possible attribution of higher esteem to that applicant. The refugee is not responsible for any of that and, therefore, cannot respond to the subject according to what it is demanded of them (after all, everything proceeded according to the law). This makes resentment intrinsically inefficacious because intrinsically irrational.<sup>14</sup>

The subject, therefore, now finds themselves in a new predicament. For inefficacious resentment is causing a new tide of emotional dissonance. The same coping strategy is then enacted and a new reappraisal occurs: the frustration generated by the lack of response to one's resentment is then

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<sup>14</sup> Of course, it merely is a peculiarity of our example that the reference group is providing the rival not only with the superficial good (housing), but also with the deep good (esteem recognition). Nothing in our account hinges on that, though. To elaborate on one of Protasi's examples, the Asian-American citizen, who has acquired wealth thanks to his or her hard working, is blamed by the racist for the esteem recognition that they, in the racist's eyes, unjustly receive by the reference group (perhaps in addition of being blamed for having acquired wealth, too, in a fraudulent manner).

dispensed with by attributing an evil nature to the rival and by tracing back that evil nature to ethnic traits. Sure, the refugee was not responsible for the decision of the City Council about social housing, because this was an action that they literally did not execute. However, the refugee did act in that instance, *as well as in all other instances reaffirming recognition*: what the rival did (from the perspective of the subject) was to maliciously deceive the system and it is precisely in virtue of this deception that the reference group has been *misled* into attributing a higher level of recognition to them (as documented by the many goods the refugee has acquired, in the eyes of the envier). It should be clear that this new evaluation goes over and beyond a simple attribution of an unfair or unjust action to the rival. The hypothesis that a new evaluation has occurred here (which amounts to an attribution of a malicious and evil *nature* and not merely of an unjust deed) is highlighted by three additional elements: (1) the temporal extension under which the rival's conduct is considered, (2) the narrative of deceit and fraudulence adopted in explaining that conduct, and (3) the perceived resistance of the rival to rectifying their conduct. The rival acted maliciously because they are malicious: it is their very nature to act this way.

Let us now come to the *third* feature of the process leading from envy to racial hatred. When the mechanism that changes resentment into hatred operates between two individuals at an individual level (as we have tacitly assumed in describing EM2 in the previous section), the hatred is directed at the individual's nature (Salice 2021). For example, if your noisy neighbor consistently ignores you and things become unbearable, you might come to hate this person (Salice and Salmela 2022). But things are different for racial hatred: the transformation of resentment into racial (rather than individual) hatred requires the presence of a third, additional element: in-group/out-group demarcation. As we have seen, this distinction is present all the way through the process insofar as envy already occurs against the background of that demarcation: the rival is already perceived as member of a group and, therefore, as carrying social, racial or ethnic traits. For hatred to qualify here as racial hatred, the perception of these traits must be exacerbated: in fact, they must be taken by the subject as the very reasons for hating the rival (see Szanto 2020). The element that assigns salience to such traits, we maintain, is that, from the perspective of the subject, the rival's recognition (perceived by the subject as undue recognition) must be something that they share (or again: are perceived to share) with other individuals, which are members of the same group. So, it is not only *this one* individual who supposedly enjoys a higher level of recognition (relatively to the subject), a plurality (majority or entirety) of the members of the group to which the rival belongs do also enjoy similar higher level of recognition. When this condition is fulfilled, then the evil nature that is attributed to the rival acquires ethnic or racial contours. The rival has acted maliciously because this is what "these people" do: it's *their* nature.<sup>15</sup> They all (and the rival as a

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<sup>15</sup> Holocaust Studies provide ample evidence for this claim. In his discussion of antisemitic propaganda in Nazism, Steizinger reports that, despite the differences in their accounts, various ideologues concurred in attributing an evil nature to the Jews: they "could only 'exploit and graze' what nature gave or what others achieved, making them literally 'parasites,' destroying their environment and robbing other people, leaving behind dead deserts" (Steizinger 2021: 102), they "were always driven by selfish, material, superficial, and libidinous interests" (Steizinger 2021:104), just like the "sack crab" who "bores through the posterior of the pocket crab, gradually growing into the

member of them) have acted maliciously and deceived the reference group. In fact, there need be nothing specific about this very individual that flags them as evil—as an individual taken per se, there is nothing that appears malicious or evil in them. But this, from the perspective of the subject, is unveiled as a travesty, for this individual bears an evil nature in virtue of being member of that ethnic group. Their true nature, i.e., their ethnic nature is evil and therefore deserves to be hated.

Hatred's replacement of resentment in the second segment of the process thus liberates the subject from emotional dissonance.

We now move our attention to the single-step process. Here, envy directly transmutes into hatred without passing through resentment, or so we claim. We encounter the same initial conditions that we found in the previous process: a concern for recognition and an out-group/in-group demarcation. The subject envies their rival, who is classified as an outsider, and the (many) superficial goods are testimony to the rival's higher level of recognition from the reference group. Envy, again, causes emotional dissonance: the emotion cannot be acted upon because (among other reasons) doing so would reveal the subject's feeling of inferiority. The subject therefore is under pressure to get rid of the emotion by reappraising the intentional object, but the subject reappraises the rival not indirectly or mediately as evil (by passing through the charge of being unjust, as in the previous scenario). Instead they do so directly or immediately. But how can that happen?

The higher recognition purportedly enjoyed by the rival is perceived as a direct *diminution* of the recognition enjoyed by the subject. The other, that is, is perceived to be stealing from the subject the attention of the reference group. Now, why does the rival do that? The reappraisal is captured by the answer to that question: the rival is not any longer somebody who infringes my personal sense of fairness (and they are also not an unjust individual, as the previous process provisionally described them), rather the rival is somebody who *is a selfish-evil individual who precludes my access to the deep good* (recognition from the reference group) and the envier is an innocent victim of their wickedness (Salmela and Capelos 2021). Here, too, the mechanism could stop at individual hatred, but the same condition we have identified while discussing the previous process could turn individual hatred to racial hatred in this case as well. The other is perceived with ethnic/racial traits from the onset of envy, but the selfish-evil nature of the rival is traced back to those traits when other members belonging to the same group of the rival are seen to enjoy a comparably higher level of recognition. If this condition is fulfilled, we contend, individual hatred turns into racial hatred: “all these individuals are stealing recognition from me and they commit that evil action because this is what they are—evil people”. As a consequence, the other is hated in virtue of their ethnic traits. (Even though, from the perspective of the subject, this individual might behave in

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latter, sucking out of its last life strength [...], the Jew penetrates into society through the open wounds in the body of the people, feeding off their racial and creative strength until their decline” (Rosenberg quoted in Steizinger 2021: 104). These quotes also aligns with the idea according to which the rival acts *in disguise*: they infiltrate (almost as a parasite) the reference group of the envious subject and, by acting maliciously, are able to secure goods and resources of that group (including the esteem-recognition grounded in those goods) for themselves.



ways that do not attract reprimand, they have inherited all the malicious traits of the group insofar as they are members of that group and it is in light of this ethnic evil nature that they deserve to be hated).

Just as for the multi-step process, so here too the rival is not evaluated as superior anymore and the subject is not evaluated as inferior anymore (despite the fact that their sense of inferiority remains there, lurking in the background). Also, in the two processes we have described, racial hatred tends to be collectivized, which explains why racial hatred generally is a social, collective and political affair, rather than the attitude of a single individual (Salmela & von Scheve 2017). The disposition to collectivization is partly explained by the fact that the evaluations supporting racial hatred are delusional and at constant risk to be controverted by evidence: sharing this emotion with others reinforce the delusional evaluation by giving the impression to the subject that their evaluations are intersubjectively validated.<sup>16</sup> This form of hatred is highly contagious: it has the power of aggregating individuals by generating a sense of belonging that overcomes the personal idiosyncrasies of the members, bypasses rational considerations about the true *raison d'être* of the racist community, and shields the community from acquiring any kind of information that contradicts its blind, dumb, and raw hostility.

## 5. Self-deception in the Envy-Racism EM

Our emotions indicate the values we attach importance to. It is because we attach importance to certain values (and not to others) that some events, facts, entities, persons, etc. in the world (but not others) instigate an emotional response in us. Another way of putting this is that emotions reveal our concerns or order of preferences, i.e., how we rank value-properties, which is what Max Scheler calls the “order of love [*ordo amoris*].” One could even go further by arguing that the order of love is what makes an individual person the individual person she is (in a thick, moral, sense). As Scheler puts it: “*Whoever has the ordo amoris of a man, has the man himself*. He has him as a moral subject—just as what crystal form is to crystal itself. He sees into this man as far as one can see into a man. Behind the empirical multifold and complexity, he sees the ever simply proceeding basic contours of the man in front of himself, and this, rather than knowledge or will, deserves to be called the core of man as a spiritual being.” (Scheler 1986: 348, our transl.; more recently, similar ideas have been developed by Bennett Helm, see his 2010 and his contribution to this volume).<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> Of course, this is only part of the reason. Another element that might support the disposition to collectivization is loneliness and, especially, that loneliness felt by people in a position of societal inferiority (as some research in psychology and criminology shows, see e.g. Kruglanski et al. 2014; Doosje et al. 2016; Lösel et al. 2018): this loneliness could instigate the desire of sharing experiences, which is acted upon by affiliating themselves with groups that, with their ideologies, facilitate the emotional mechanisms described in this section.

<sup>17</sup> We do not think that either personal identity or one’s own sense of self are exclusively a matter of what one values; other dimensions are essential too. But, like many others including Scheler, we do believe that the values that one holds and is guided by are a very important part of who one is (a claim we cannot defend at length here).

It then appears to follow that emotions offer important insights to the subject for understanding who they are in a thick sense. Reflecting upon one's emotions opens up a pathway to what has also been called "substantial" (in contrast to "trivial") self-knowledge (Cassam 2015). However, it is possible to emote in a way which does not respond to the fundamental values we attach importance to. EMs, in fact, show us that sometimes emotions rely on *delusional evaluations* that the subject indulges in not to emotionally respond to what truly matters to them, but precisely to avoid the negative emotions that respond to what matters to them.

One can infer from this view that EMs create a barrier in the path towards self-knowledge. They do so because they lead the subject to self-deception. Based on the outcome emotion, the subject appears to have certain concerns that they actually don't have: e.g., the subject *thinks* to be moved by a concern for justice in EM1, but that (as a matter of fact) is not the case. And, if it is true that our concerns or preferences identify who we are in a thick sense, then the subject undergoing an EM thinks to be somebody who they actually are not. What the subject cares about in EMs is their own inferiority, and this remains hidden and unacknowledged. Also, the subject *thinks* to be in a position of moral superiority towards the rival, whereas (as a matter of fact) they are not. Now, not all forms of self-deception are psychologically vicious—a large segment of contemporary psychology highlights the importance and, sometimes, the necessity for human well-being of certain self-delusions (Bortolotti 2018). However, we do want to claim that the self-delusions involved in EMS in general, but most importantly, in the envy-hatred EM are psychologically vicious.

This claim is supported by the idea that EMS are *immature coping strategies*: the subject creates the conditions for deceiving themselves that do not otherwise afford maturation or psychological development. For instance, a certain level of over-confidence might be psychologically justified: you need that overconfidence to accept challenges in life that you would not have otherwise accepted and that might result in important achievements (the risk might be worth taking). And if overconfidence leads to important mistakes in life, it is possible to learn from them and recalibrate one's level of self-confidence (see Bortolan's chapter in this book for cognate considerations). However, EMs do not afford the subject with opportunities for psychological growth: the subject's attachments to and concerns for values, that is, their order of preferences that steers their negative emotions to begin with remains *untouched* in the EM and, also, the false sense of superiority instated by the outcome emotion only covers up the original sense of inferiority, which remains present, even if only in the background. The subject, therefore, opts for ignoring important aspects of their identity that are responsible for the negative emotions in the first place and, in so doing, precludes the possibility for ameliorating their situation.

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This is all we need for the purposes of our argument: if concerns for values are one among other important parts of who one is, deceiving oneself about one's concerns counts as self-deception and obstructs self-knowledge.

In sum, the kind of hatred we have described in this chapter is precisely that: a petty and immature attitude the subject adopts to escape a sense of inferiority that is often triggered by misplaced attachments and concerns and, therefore, by a confused, if not perverted, “order of love”.

## 6. Conclusion

Time to recap. Envy is an unpleasant and hostile emotion involving feeling of inferiority vis-à-vis a rival, who possesses a coveted good. Envy can be moved by a multitude of different goods: these are superficial goods—goods that often presuppose a deeper or background good, which is recognition by a reference group. Some interracial conflicts involve a fight for recognition and feeling envy is an acknowledgement of inferiority in this respect. This fact cannot be tolerated by the racist, who is under great psychological pressure to trigger EMs that transform envy into non-self-threatening emotions and, especially, into hatred. Under certain given conditions, this hatred acquires the contour of racial hatred. However, EMs in general, and the emotional itinerary from envy to racial hatred in particular, are self-deceptive strategies: in ignoring their preferences and concerns, i.e., in ignoring fundamental aspects of their identity, subjects foreclose to themselves the possibility to mature and, therefore, to face their negative self-focused emotions and the implications they have on their selves.

## 7. Acknowledgments

We are thankful to Antonio Gomez Ramos, Mikko Salmela, and Charlie Kurth for reading and commenting upon a previous draft of this paper, as well as to Thomas Brudholm for insightful discussions on this topic. We have presented this paper at workshops in Linköping, Cork, Graz, and Sendai: we are grateful to the participants for their important feedback.

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