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Chapter 2

Pride

- Feeling good about myself because of you, because of us

Alba Montes Sánchez and Alessandro Salice

Introduction

For many of us, pride is a part of our everyday experiences. We see it in others and we feel it in ourselves. For example, we finally succeed in playing with some grace that difficult piece we have been struggling with on the piano and we beam with satisfaction. We see how an athlete smiles and puffs up her chest when she wins the local marathon. We are overcome by an expansive feeling when our little child runs to us waving a piece of paper where she has scribbled her name for the first time. We witness our national team conquer the World Championship and hang a flag from our balcony in celebration. We will come back to the differences between these various forms of pride, but for now it is important to highlight that all of these are examples of a pleasant and expansive emotion that we typically feel as a response to an achievement or a situation where one of our good traits comes to the fore. In a somewhat different sense, pride of stigmatized identities has been invoked as a banner by liberation movements seeking to fight that stigma (for example, Black Pride, Gay Pride or Disability Pride). Pride, however, is not always seen as a good thing, and how to assess it morally is a vexed question. For instance, the Christian tradition has condemned pride as a vice (Augustine is a famous example, see e.g. his *Confessions*; for an overview of pride in Christian thought, see Timpe and Tognazzini 2019). And even in our modern secularized and more pluralistic societies, when we describe someone as proud we typically mean this as a criticism, implying that this is an arrogant individual who looks down on others and expects deference and special treatment.

As this short compendium of examples shows, the word ‘pride’ can be used to refer to various phenomena and a thorough exploration of them all would likely require an entire monograph. To narrow down the scope of this chapter, let us start with a distinction: pride can refer to an emotion, in the sense of an isolated emotional episode in response to a specific situation, or to a more enduring character trait, a disposition to respond and act in certain ‘proud’ ways in various circumstances (the pride of liberation movements does not clearly come under any of these categories; we briefly come back to it in the conclusion).

Taken as a character trait (when we say of someone that they are a proud person), it is a synonym of arrogance, as we saw above, which to a large extent explains pride’s bad reputation (see, e.g., Neu 1998:229-230; Timpe and Tognazzini 2019:216-217). But note that often we may feel an *episodic emotion* of pride about our character traits without being proud people, i.e. *without having pride as a character trait*. For instance, imagine that the marathon winner had to train and struggle for a long time, overcoming many obstacles and disregarding the opinions of certain friends and family members who didn’t believe she would succeed. She might generally be a humble person, not prone to feeling pride often or to treat others arrogantly, yet on this occasion her achievement might prompt her to feel proud of her perseverance. She might attribute her victory (at least partly) to this trait and feel proud of it. If this happened, then she would be feeling proud of one of her character traits (perseverance) without having pride as a character trait. This book, however, is about emotions in everyday life and culture, and therefore in this chapter we leave aside the study of pride as a character trait and rather focus on pride as an emotion, that is, on pride as an affective response to a situation where an achievement or a good trait of ours comes to the fore.¹ In what follows, bearing this distinction in mind might help prevent misunderstandings.

In emotion research, pride is often portrayed as an emotion of self-appraisal or a self-conscious emotion (see, e.g., Tangney 2005; Taylor 1985). In other words, when feeling pride, one evaluates (and therefore is ‘intentionally’ directed towards, meaning that the emotion is of or about) oneself as commendable in light either of one’s achievements (agential pride) or one’s identity or character traits (non-agential pride) (Kauppinen 2019). The first section of this chapter briefly explains the characterization of pride as a self-conscious emotion and explores the distinction between agential and non-agential pride. But there is more to pride: some researchers argue that the self-appraisal implied in this emotion is essentially social. According to these views, pride is linked to the management of social expectations, of our social personas, it implies an evaluation of oneself

in the eyes of others and it reflects the good state of our social bonds (Scheff 2014). We devote the second section of this chapter to examining and discussing this idea. The third section of this chapter then turns to a different social aspect of pride: namely, our capacity to feel proud of others or ‘hetero-induced pride’ (Salice and Montes Sánchez 2016). In our view, the fact that we are able to feel this form of pride shows that some dimensions of who we are extend beyond the individual, that how significant *others* fare in the world can have a deep impact on *our own* self-appraisals. Our aim in the third section is to offer a sketch of the experiential and evaluative structures of pride that allow us to understand the impact that others have in shaping who we are.

Pride as a self-conscious emotion

As mentioned above, pride is often classified as a self-conscious emotion or an emotion of self-assessment. This means that, in pride, the emoter focuses on and evaluates herself in a positive light (see, e.g., Taylor 1985; Tracy and Robins 2007a). This positive self-evaluation is triggered by a situation or object (the cause of pride), which, as David Hume (1739/1978:291) put it, is ‘closely related’ to oneself and which one recognizes as excellent and reflecting positively on oneself. As for the meaning of ‘closely related’, Gabriele Taylor (1985:28-32) specifies that there has to be a relationship of belonging between self and cause: I can be proud of my achievements, my traits, my house, my family ... The crucial factor is that I can call the cause ‘mine’, such that it can reflect positively on myself. Now, this characterization implies that all sorts of objects that I regard as belonging to me in some sense could be fitting causes of pride, but not everyone agrees.

Some authors argue that pride properly-so-called can only focus on achievements, on things we do (Kristjánsson 2001; Solomon 1976; see Brady 2019 for a discussion). It seems, however, that we often feel proud of our traits (our perseverance or our grace) or other features not connected to agency, such as our heritage. Should we then conclude that there is something wrong with these experiences of pride? That they are inappropriate? It has been argued that the notion of pride should be broadened to encompass cases where pride is attached to identity or character traits, for example, and still be warranted. In fact, research in empirical psychology distinguishes between two kinds of pride: ‘authentic’ and ‘hubristic’ (Tracy and Robins 2007b). These labels entail a strong moral evaluation (it might be important to recall that ‘hubris’ in Ancient Greece was the kind of pride – or arrogance – that led humans to think themselves better than the gods and defy them, thus incurring the divine wrath that is the subject of so many tragedies). However, the implication that one kind of pride is morally better than the other, which is suggested by this terminology, seems dubious (see Miceli et al. 2017). This is why we

here follow Antti Kauppinen (2019) in adopting a different terminology: ‘agential’ versus ‘non-agential’ pride. Kauppinen’s terms have at least two advantages: they do not presuppose moral pre-judgments and they are clearly descriptive. But what do they mean?

Agential pride, refers to pride of one’s achievements. It is the pride we feel about having accomplished a difficult task thanks to our efforts. It is the kind of pride a marathon winner (or a child who has successfully written her own name for the first time) might feel about their success.² The thing you have accomplished does not have to be very grand in absolute terms, but it has to count as an achievement *for you*: a valuable outcome that requires your dedication and effort (Kauppinen 2019:176-178). This kind of pride targets what Kauppinen calls the ‘thin self’, i.e., the self understood exclusively as an agent, who can make choices and take responsibility for them. On this view, agential pride is the positive counterpart of guilt, an emotion of negative self-assessment that focuses on our actions or omissions, on ‘what I did’ (Tangney and Dearing 2004; Teroni and Deonna 2008). In other words, in feeling guilty, we focus on an action of ours, we evaluate it as wrong and feel bad about it. Just like in agential pride, we relate to ourselves as responsible agents who can choose how to act. When we feel we have acted badly, we experience guilt; when we feel we have acted excellently, we experience (agential) pride.

Non-agential pride, by contrast, is pride that targets one’s relatively stable qualities, character traits or abilities: things that are not under our direct control and that we need not be fully responsible for. Note, however, that the same situation might give rise to both agential or non-agential pride, or to both at the same time, depending on how the emoter frames the situation. In our example of the marathon winner above, the athlete saw her achievement as reflecting her perseverance, and felt proud of this character trait. Her achievement made her perseverance particularly salient to her and thus became an occasion for her non-agential pride. But she might instead (or simultaneously) feel agential pride of her victory. Perhaps a clearer example of non-agential pride might be that of someone feeling proud of their beauty or physical strength. This kind of pride can be said to target the ‘thick’ (not the ‘thin’) self, which is the self as a bearer of traits or identities, a self with a personality or a character (Kauppinen 2019). In the psychological literature, this pride is taken to be the positive counterpart of shame, the emotion of negative self-assessment that focuses on identity, on ‘who I am’ (Tangney and Dearing 2004; Teroni and Deonna 2008). In shame, we feel that a certain situation reveals a negative aspect of ourselves. To put this into words (although this feelings are often inchoate), in shame we do not tell ourselves ‘it was wrong to lie’ (as in guilt), but ‘I am a liar’. Like non-agential pride, shame too focuses often on bodily features and things we have little control of, like

being ugly (whatever that means) or lacking a natural talent for sports, for example. It is in this sense that non-agential pride of being beautiful or talented can be seen as the positive counterpart of shame. Both emotions attach to the same kinds of object, the ‘thick self’, but in pride we evaluate it positively, while in shame we evaluate it negatively.

So far, this distinction allows for pride to attach both to one’s actions and to one’s traits. While this analysis captures a large number of cases, it says very little about the social forms that pride can assume. It is to these dimensions we now turn to.

Pride and social evaluations

The discussion up to this point has left aside what some authors regard as the core of pride: status. According to these views, pride is an essentially social emotion, which responds to one’s monitoring how one fares within a social group. The characteristic evaluation in pride would therefore not simply be ‘I feel good about myself’, but rather ‘I feel good about my standing within this group’.

In sociology, Thomas J. Scheff has theorized pride along these lines. Scheff (1990a:4) starts from the assumption that humans are social and the ‘the most crucial human motive’ is the maintenance of social bonds. Relying on this idea, he has formulated and developed what he calls ‘the Goffman/Cooley conjecture’, which amounts to the idea that ‘a pride/shame system functions in most social interaction’ (Scheff 2014:115). The role of this system is to track the state of our relationships with other people. Drawing on the ideas of Erving Goffman and Charles Horton Cooley, who studied how our everyday exchanges with others are dominated by efforts to control the image we project to them, Scheff argues that we are constantly monitoring how we fare in our social interactions: we imagine what we look like to other people and what they feel about it, and we respond emotionally with pride or shame. According to Scheff, ‘these emotions are signals of *the state of a relationship* ... (W)hatever the substantive basis for shame, the actual violation or occasion, a universal, mammalian, cross-cultural component is the state of the bond: *true pride signals a secure bond (connectedness), shame a threatened one (disconnect)*’ (Scheff 2014:116, original italics).³ In other words, when we feel that our relations with others go well and our bond to them is strengthened, we respond with pride. On the contrary, when we feel that those interactions go poorly and put our connection at risk, we respond with shame. The pride/shame system would therefore always be at play whenever we interact with others, and very often also when we are alone and we imagine, remember or plan our social interactions (Scheff 1990b:283). This implies that most of the time we are in a state of either pride or shame, but these emotions have ‘low visibility’ and we often fail to notice them (Scheff 1990b:284). They could be called background affects. In fact, Scheff likens these

states of pride and shame with ups and downs in our self-esteem. Despite their low visibility, pride and shame are operative and exert a strong motivational pull that manifests itself in behaviour (Scheff 1990b:284-291). Now, shame, which is fundamentally linked to vulnerability and dependence, is often difficult to acknowledge, especially in our modern Western societies that idealize individualism. Shame is therefore often unacknowledged to self and others and tries to mask as other emotions, such as anger and what Scheff calls 'false pride': aggressive haughtiness and arrogance that is an attempt to hide one's vulnerability (Scheff 1990c:60-62). 'True pride', on the other hand, signals a secure bond and gives rise to interactions characterized by interest and respect, while false pride is characterized by hostility towards others.

Functionalist social psychology, in turn, does not go as far as conceiving pride and shame as pervasive in all our social interactions, but still considers them essentially social emotions in a more specific sense: they track status. Social psychologists take as a point of departure the analysis of the typical expressions and action tendencies associated with pride, which seem aimed at increasing visibility: puffing up the chest, throwing up the fists, and so on (see Tracy et al. 2010:167-168). Even when we do not try to maximize the size of our bodies, we often feel a tendency (which can be curbed or modulated by cultural conventions, display or feeling rules, see Hochschild 1983) to show off or draw attention to the achievement or virtue that is the object of pride. These tendencies might be particularly visible in children – before they fully internalize cultural norms and display rules – but are manifest in adults too. There are some contexts, such as sporting competitions, where the display rules seem not only to allow, but almost to demand, visible expressions of pride. Not all is a matter of display rules, however: Jessica L. Tracy and David Matsumoto (2008) found that even congenitally blind athletes, who have never seen others behave proudly and cannot imitate them, make the same type of bodily gestures when they celebrate a victory. Tracy and Matsumoto regard this as evidence that pride is a biologically innate emotion and thus ask what function it evolved to serve. In their view, this is a social function: enhancing social status or, more precisely, helping 'individuals transform culturally valued achievements into higher social status' (Tracy et al. 2010:168). Those who witness the pride display also benefit, since this allows them to 'more effectively navigate the status hierarchy by showing appropriate deference, knowing whom to emulate, forming productive alliances, and facilitating their own status jockeying' (Tracy et al. 2010:169-170).

All of the above suggests that pride requires an audience: how would my status be at play if nobody knows about my achievement or excellence? Pride, however, does often

arise in solitude. If you have been practicing that difficult piano piece on your own and you just nailed it, you may still feel proud and celebrate in proud ways, even though nobody is watching. Well, of course, these authors might retort, but that is because you imagine or you have an audience in mind. Is this really necessary, though? Recall the movie *Cast Away* (a modern rendition of *Robinson Crusoe*). Tom Hanks plays a FedEx employee who gets stranded on a desert island after a plane crash. A stereotypical city guy, he has never been in the situation to have to light a fire without matches or a lighter. After trying relentlessly for days, he finally succeeds in lighting a fire and his celebration has all the characteristics of exuberant pride. But what is his audience? Who of his former acquaintances or friends would consider this is an excellent skill?

Looking at the phenomenological tradition in philosophy might give us a clue as to how to interpret the social dimension of pride in a way that makes sense of its links to status and why audiences intensify it (Webster et al. 2003), without requiring a specific, real or imagined, audience for every episode of pride. Jean-Paul Sartre (1943/1969, part 3, chapter 1) famously claimed that emotions like shame and pride reveal in different ways a specific dimension of self-consciousness. As Dan Zahavi (2005) explains, experiences are perspectival – they imply an experiencer for whom they are given. This dimension of experience, its *for-me-ness*, is what Zahavi calls ‘minimal selfhood’. Shame and pride, however, exemplify social (not minimal) self-consciousness (Montes Sánchez 2015; Zahavi 2014). Sartre (1943/1969:259-260) illustrated the difference with a famous example: a man is crouching at a keyhole to spy on someone, completely focused on what he sees and hears. In that moment his experience of self is minimal, it simply amounts to the subjective quality of his perceptions: they are given *for* him. Then he hears a noise in the corridor, indicating perhaps that another person is approaching, and he is then overcome by shame. In that instant, the man’s experience of himself changes: he focuses on himself and experiences himself as an object, the object of someone else’s perception. This is what Sartre calls ‘being-for-others’: a fundamentally different form of self-consciousness that arises from recognizing that there are other subjects in the world who can perceive one (Sartre 1943/1969:268). This sense of being exposable to others is what, according to Sartre, defines not only shame, but also pride (as we will soon see, Sartre’s view of pride has a peculiar twist). And according to Vasudevi Reddy (2008:129-140), it is present in a very basic form from the first weeks of life, when infants are aware and respond to others’ attention to them. This does not necessarily entail that shame (or pride, for that matter) can only be elicited when other people are present, it simply means that in those phenomena, the dimension of selfhood one focuses on is the same that arises out of and is at stake in one’s engagements with others.

For Sartre, however, pride is very different from shame. This comes from his views about subjectivity and authenticity. For Sartre, the essence of subjectivity is possibility and freedom, and the other is the one who objectifies me and shows me my limits. In shame, I encounter my limit in my 'being-for-others', my objective side, and react to this with discomfort and anxiety (Sartre 1943/1969:288-290). This is very disagreeable, but at least it is honest, Sartre thinks. In pride, however, I encounter my limit and react with 'bad faith': I identify with my objective side and find pleasure in it. Sometimes, in vanity, I even try to control how the other sees me to increase that pleasure. Pride, for Sartre, is therefore always inauthentic: authentic subjectivity is possibility and freedom; pride is always a product of bad faith (Sartre 1943/1969:290-291).

Now, Sartre's views on our relations to others have been amply criticized and we will not repeat all those arguments. Let us just echo Lisa Guenther's (2011:27) remark that they reflect a failure to recognize the extent to which our freedom is nurtured and made possible by others. Human interdependence has undoubtedly a negative side, but it also makes us stronger, both individually and collectively. The double-sided effects of this interdependence are evident in the consequences pride has at an individual level. On the one hand, feeling pride of an achievement motivates the individual towards further achievements, increases their confidence in their potential, fosters persistence and improves future performance. Feeling proud of one's identity or values might lead one to advertise and promote them or fight for them (Miceli et al. 2017). In Scheff's (1990c:60-61) terminology, 'true pride' signals a secure social bond and generates open and respectful interactions. On the other hand, when pride turns into arrogance (or 'false pride', as Scheff refers to it), it involves a self-aggrandizing attitude and motivates behaviours that seek to obtain or signal one's superiority over others, including contempt and aggression.

Aside from Scheff's illuminating theory, which we presented above, we want to highlight two further ways of explaining the difference between these two sets of consequences. Some authors (e.g. Tracy et al. 2010; Clark 2013) suggest that individual pride can respond to two logics: a prestige logic and a dominance logic. Prestige is democratic, one can work to earn it, but it has to be accorded by peers, it can't be obtained by force, and therefore it promotes prosocial behaviour. By contrast, dominance is hierarchic and connected to power, which can be obtained in antisocial ways. Maria Miceli and colleagues (2017), however, propose a different explanation. According to them, when pride (be it agential or non-agential) aligns with one's own self-defining values, it has mainly positive consequences. Conversely, when the only concern in pride is being superior to others, it turns into arrogance and has mainly antisocial consequences.

Hetero-induced pride

The previous section has highlighted that the proud subject is, in an important sense, a socialized subject: this is the idea that pride does not (and perhaps cannot) occur in a social vacuum and that the subject, quite literally, needs others to experience pride of him- or herself. As we have seen, there might be various reasons for that and these reasons are not mutually exclusive: pride needs an audience in the sense of somebody perceiving the proud subject and their achievements; pride needs an audience in the sense of somebody acting as addressee of pride's communicative intention; pride is about social status, etc.

There is, however, a yet different sense in which sociality intersects with pride that has not been mentioned yet. We are referring here to cases of pride that are reported by the subject using expressions such as 'I am proud of you [singular or plural]'⁴ and 'I am proud of us'. A father might feel proud of his little daughter who just took her first steps (proud of you [singular]), a coach might feel proud of the football team she trains that just completed an impressive season (proud of you [plural]), a junior researcher might feel proud of the research group she's a part of, which just had an article published in *Nature* (proud of us). None of these examples seem to refer to the emoter's actions or character traits and thus to qualify as either agential or non-agential pride. These putative cases of pride therefore appear to be different from the ones we have discussed so far: while they are social for the many reasons we discuss above, they seem to be social in a yet different sense. In fact, they confront us with various challenges. First, do these expressions really pick out genuine forms of pride that require a specific category within the larger family of experiences of pride? Or can these alleged forms of pride be traced back to other affective phenomena? Secondly, and relatedly: if they are genuine forms of pride, then what exactly makes these cases genuine? Is it really the case, as these expressions suggest, that pride can be of or about the subject just as much as it can be of others, be them individuals or groups? And finally how to cash out the difference between 'I am proud of you [singular or plural]' and 'I am proud of us'? (This section draws on Salice and Montes Sánchez 2016).

Let us start with the first question and, for the sake of argument, let us focus on one single example: your daughter takes her first steps and you report that you feel very proud of her. What is the emotion you are reporting? We will now argue that you are indeed reporting a genuine form of pride by rejecting various attempts to trace it back to other experiences. The first of such attempts is to claim that the reported emotion just is a 'standard' instance of pride. Just as you are proud to have won the local marathon, so you are proud of, say, your parenting skills. But this account does not seem right: it does not because it does not do justice to your daughter, to her achievement, and to how these two elements figure in your emotion. There is

an important sense in which your emotion concerns your daughter and her achievement that goes entirely lost on this first attempt (which is why it has to be dismissed).

Alternatively, one could suggest that you are not reporting an episode of pride, but rather one of admiration. Yet it is possible to admire somebody without feeling proud of this person and, conversely, to feel proud of somebody without admiring them. In fact, it seems a little odd to say you admire your daughter for taking her first steps (something all normally developing children do), but it is a perfectly familiar and intelligible experience to feel proud of *your own* children for doing just that. The difference seems to be this: when you feel proud of somebody, there is a form of self-involvement at stake that is not present in admiration. Suppose it turns out that the achievement that made you proud of someone else is fake (suppose you were proud of your adult daughter for winning a prestigious prize, and then it turns out that she bribed the jury); it is likely that *you* yourself will feel exposed and open to criticisms in ways that you would not be subject to, had you only felt admiration towards this person. For instance, if the bribing winner is your daughter, a likely reaction could be to feel ashamed of her; but if the bribing winner was a stranger, you are more likely to react with anger or indignation.

Another way of going about the reported case of pride is to postulate that you still feel ‘standard’ pride, but one which has entered certain peculiar relations with the emotion of the other. Two candidates for these relations come to mind: either your daughter’s emotion of pride has *infected* you or you have *adopted* her perspective and felt so-called ‘fictional’ pride.⁵ Both relations are well known in emotion research. First, emotions have been acknowledged to be contagious: they can spill over from the emoter and contaminate other individuals or even large crowds. For instance, your depressed mood is lifted when you meet the happy group of your long-time friends. Second, ‘fictional’ emotions seem to be at the basis of our enjoyment of works of fiction: we sense the desperation of Anna Karenina when she throws herself under the train by adopting her perspective. Can pride of your daughter be accounted for in terms of an emotion that either has passed to you from her or that you have picked up by adopting her perspective? Again, the answer seems to be negative. Both relations necessarily presuppose that the targeted person feels a certain emotion: your friends must be happy for their jolliness to infect you and Anna Karenina must be desperate (or portrayed as such) for you to adopt her desperation. But this is not required in the case in which you feel proud of somebody else: your daughter needs not feel pride for you to feel proud of her. She might be too small to be capable of full-blown pride or, in the case of the adult marathon winner, she might be a very humble person and not feel pride on this occasion, and yet in both these cases it remains possible

and intelligible for you as her parent to feel proud of her. Of course, insisting on this point does not mean that, in order to be proud of another, the other must *not* feel proud – the point just is that, for this form of pride, it is ultimately irrelevant whether the other experiences pride or not. Furthermore, as for fictional pride, there is no need for you to simulate the situation from your daughter’s perspective: you feel proud of her from your own perspective.

If these considerations are on the right track, then we have established that there is something genuine about you feeling proud of others, which cannot be reduced to standard instances of pride (or of another kind of emotion) even when they enter specific cognitive relations. But then what is it? One might be tempted to argue (in line with the way in which we report these cases of pride) that what makes them genuine is precisely the fact that the emotion is *of* or *about* the other, meaning that the intentional object of these episodes of pride is not the subject, but the other. However, this hypothesis stands in strident contrast with the view of pride as a self-conscious emotion we have sketched at the beginning of our chapter. If it is grounded in the very nature of pride to be an emotion that has the self as its intentional object, then arguably there can be no episode of pride that is not about the self (not everybody in the literature agrees, though, see, e.g., Helm 2010:153-158). Taking this point seriously reignites our question: what is it that makes pride of your daughter original and not reducible to other forms of pride?

The answer, we claim, must pass through the idea that a dimension of a person’s self is social, where by ‘social self’ we mean a person’s self-experience as member of a certain group (in our examples: a family, a football team, a research group). Social psychologists have long ascertained that humans are often moved by reasons they acquire only insofar as they see themselves as group members (Bacharach 2006). For instance, in-group favouritism can be explained if individuals (often pre-reflectively) have group identified and thereby formed a social self. The social self (the subject’s self-experience as group member) not only motivates certain actions of ours (see Salice and Miyazono 2020), but it also has an impact on our affective life. For instance, it has been claimed that the social self is a necessary condition for collective emotions (León et al. 2019; Salice 2020b) In addition, it also enables us to feel pride of others: in hetero-induced pride, pride is about the self, but the self at stake is the social self, and the other is encountered as an in-group member.

These considerations license the view that the specificity of hetero-induced pride, in contrast to what we have labelled (for lack of a better term) ‘standard pride’, is the fact that it necessarily presupposes a process of group identification (and, therefore, a social self). Standard pride is social, but the dimension of the self that it impacts is the individual one. Hetero-induced pride, by contrast, is characterised by a further social layer given that the dimension of the self at stake in this emotion is the individual insofar as this individual is a group member.

This idea helps us also to shed light on a couple of remarks we made at the start of this section. First, just like in ‘standard’ pride, it is the self that is disclosed in hetero-induced pride, too. The dimension of the self disclosed in this form of pride, however, is its *social, relational* or *affiliative* dimension. Not only is it revealed to the subject that their identity is linked to a group (the family, the team and so on), but also – and this is our second remark – that the other (my daughter, the team players, my colleagues) figures in the emotion as somebody who, *qua* member of my group, is constitutive of my social identity.

This leads us to the last challenge we mentioned at the beginning of this section. How to cash out the distinction between various forms of hetero-induced pride? Our discussion has mainly focused on pride of you [singular], but we are all familiar with the plural declension of that case: I (the researcher) am proud of us when the research group where I work makes an important discovery that deserves international recognition, I (the coach) feel proud of you, the team, when you complete an excellent season. So, how to understand cases of pride of you [plural] and of us? An answer to this question calls for a fully spelled out theory of group identification, which we can offer here only in broad strokes. Start from the aforementioned idea that to group identify is to conceive of oneself as a group member or, to put it differently, to acquire a social self. The crucial point of group identification therefore consists in forming a social self, but a natural consequence of this process is to lead the subject to activate groupish notions: there is a small cognitive step from thinking of oneself as a group member to thinking – at least *in nuce* – of the group one is a member of. When this step is taken, the group is conceived as an entity partly identical to its members, but partly also independent from them (a phenomenon that goes in the literature under the label of ‘group entitativity’, see, e.g., Lickel et al. 2000).

We hypothesize that *this* thought (that is, the thought of the group as an entity partly identical to and partly independent from its members) is what enables the subject not only to experience pride of you [plural], but also pride of the group. In this variant, the social identity of the subject is more predominantly defined by their affiliation to the group as such (and not by their affiliation or attachment to the other *qua* member of one’s group). Not you [singular] stands in the foreground of the proud subject, but the entire group does. We also further hypothesize that the difference between pride of you [plural] and pride of us might be cashed out in terms of the subject’s claim of co-authorships of the achievement. While you [plural] excludes any claim of the subject vis-à-vis the group’s achievement (e.g. the coach, in feeling proud of you [plural] rather than of us, waives any claim on the merit in the achievement), ‘us’ includes at least an implicit claim in relation to the

achievement (be this a claim sustained by direct or merely indirect responsibility in the achievement).

Now, as for the consequences of group-based pride, it has been found to contribute to in-group cohesion, commitment to the group, willingness to work on its favour and a tendency to speak highly of the group (see Brosi et al. 2018, who also highlight differences depending on the particular kind of pride at stake). On the negative side, however, group-based pride has been linked to increased hostility and aggressivity towards out-groups, especially in the context of nationalism (see, e.g., de Figueiredo Jr. and Elkins 2003). This is in line with more general research on the effects of group identification and in-group/out-group differentiation (Tajfel 1970; Tajfel et al. 1971) and with Scheff's (1990c) illuminating work on conflict and war, which in his view is fuelled by unacknowledged shame that manifests itself in 'superpatriotism' and false pride.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we have presented pride as a self-conscious emotion that connects us to others in various ways: at the most basic, it reveals us as social beings with an exposable side and a concern for our relations with others (as in Jean-Paul Sartre and Thomas J. Scheff), but moreover, hetero-induced pride attests that our very identities are often impacted by our affiliations, our bonds with other individuals and groups. These aspects of pride are also manifest in the political uses of this emotion, which hinge on pride's susceptibility to attach to group identities and mark them as excellent, thus constituting an effective emotional device to rehabilitate stigmatized identities (as in Black Lives Matter, LGBTQ+ and Disability Pride) or push for the superiority of others (as in White Pride).

Now, these socio-political movements have crucial dimensions that go far beyond their member's emotions. The legitimacy of the pride strategies for emancipatory or privilege-bolstering goals should also be assessed very differently, based on a host of socio-political and moral reasons that we cannot analyse here (but see Vice 2019 for an account we favour). In any case, our foregoing analysis of pride the emotion is a starting point to examine the intelligibility and legitimacy of some of the rhetoric and strategies at play. As a self-conscious emotion with a high susceptibility to be hetero-induced, pride reveals the importance of others in making us who we are, both in our everyday lives and beyond them.⁶

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Notes

¹ We also leave aside the question of pride’s moral profile, of whether it is morally good or bad to feel. As with most emotions, we assume it will sometimes be appropriate and sometimes not, but examining its appropriateness conditions is out of the scope of this chapter (on this topic, see Brady 2019).

² The marathon winner in our example above felt a different kind of pride, though: more on this below.

³ Salice (2020a) offers a different conceptualisation of how the evaluations of others impact pride. According to this view, a distinction should be drawn between pride and what is called ‘episodic’ self-esteem (to distinguish it from self-esteem as a long-standing affective state of the mind): while pride is only partly permeable and responsive to how the others evaluate the self and its intrinsic trait is the subject’s claim of a direct responsibility in securing the achievement, others’ evaluations of the self are essential to and generative of episodic self-esteem.

⁴ We are thankful to Lucy Osler for pointing us to the possibility of being proud of you [plural].

⁵ By using the word ‘fictional’, we do not mean to imply that these emotions are make-believe. We simply mean that such emotions are elicited by our engagement with works of fiction or imagined scenarios, and not by real-life events. Neither do we wish to take a position in the debate on the status of such emotions. We simply wish to highlight that, whatever the elicitation mechanism and status of ‘fictional’ emotions, this is not what is at play in the cases we discuss here.

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