The phenomenality and intentional structure of we-experiences

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dc.contributor.author Salice, Alessandro
dc.date.accessioned 2020-12-16T15:50:51Z
dc.date.available 2020-12-16T15:50:51Z
dc.date.issued 2020-11-03
dc.identifier.citation Salice, A. (2020) 'The Phenomenality and Intentional Structure of We-Experiences', Topoi, (11 pp). doi: 10.1007/s11245-020-09727-w en
dc.identifier.startpage 1 en
dc.identifier.endpage 11 en
dc.identifier.issn 1572-8749
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10468/10838
dc.identifier.doi 10.1007/s11245-020-09727-w en
dc.description.abstract When you and I share an experience, each of us lives through a we-experience. The paper claims that we-experiences have unique phenomenality and structure. First, we-experiences’ phenomenality is characterised by the fact that they feel like ours to their subject. This specific phenomenality is contended to derive from the way these experiences self-represent: a we-experience exemplifies us-ness or togetherness because it self-represents as mine qua ours. Second, living through a we-experience together with somebody else is not to have this experience in parallel with the experience of the other. Rather, the paper argues that a we-experience is partly co-constituted by the experience of the other. After offering an account of the phenomenality and constitution of we-experiences, which traces these two elements back to the subject’s self-understanding as a group member, the paper argues for the claim that an experience’s for-us-ness is committal to this experience being co-constituted by another we-experience. en
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf en
dc.language.iso en en
dc.publisher Springer en
dc.relation.uri https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11245-020-09727
dc.rights © Springer Nature B.V. 2020. This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Topoi. The final authenticated version is available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11245-020-09727-w en
dc.subject We-experience en
dc.subject Self-representation en
dc.subject Subjective character en
dc.subject Phenomenal consciousness en
dc.subject Constitution en
dc.title The phenomenality and intentional structure of we-experiences en
dc.type Article (peer-reviewed) en
dc.internal.authorcontactother Alessandro Salice, Philosophy, University College Cork, Cork, Ireland. +353-21-490-3000 Email: alessandro.salice@ucc.ie en
dc.internal.availability Full text available en
dc.check.info Access to this article is restricted until 12 months after publication by request of the publisher. en
dc.check.date 2021-11-03
dc.date.updated 2020-12-16T15:41:26Z
dc.description.version Accepted Version en
dc.internal.rssid 547794235
dc.contributor.funder Suntory Foundation en
dc.description.status Peer reviewed en
dc.identifier.journaltitle Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy en
dc.internal.copyrightchecked Yes
dc.internal.licenseacceptance Yes en
dc.internal.IRISemailaddress alessandro.salice@ucc.ie en


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