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The phenomenality and intentional structure of we-experiences
When you and I share an experience, each of us lives through a we-experience. The paper claims that we-experiences have unique phenomenality and structure. First, we-experiences’ phenomenality is characterised by the fact that they feel like ours to their subject. This specific phenomenality is contended to derive from the way these experiences self-represent: a we-experience exemplifies us-ness or togetherness because it self-represents as mine qua ours. Second, living through a we-experience together with somebody else is not to have this experience in parallel with the experience of the other. Rather, the paper argues that a we-experience is partly co-constituted by the experience of the other. After offering an account of the phenomenality and constitution of we-experiences, which traces these two elements back to the subject’s self-understanding as a group member, the paper argues for the claim that an experience’s for-us-ness is committal to this experience being co-constituted by another we-experience.
We-experience , Self-representation , Subjective character , Phenomenal consciousness , Constitution
Salice, A. (2020) 'The Phenomenality and Intentional Structure of We-Experiences', Topoi, (11 pp). doi: 10.1007/s11245-020-09727-w
© Springer Nature B.V. 2020. This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Topoi. The final authenticated version is available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11245-020-09727-w