Philosophy - Journal Articles
Permanent URI for this collection
Browse
Recent Submissions
Item The work of art for Nishida Kitarō and Alva Noë(Project MUSE, 2025) Walsh, DavidWhat characterises art? Is it an object, a practice, an activity, an expression, an experience—or something entirely different? One way to answer is by looking at what art does rather than what it is—at the work art itself achieves. This paper places Nishida Kitarō in dialogue with Alva Noë, showing how both view art as something that actively works in and with the world. For Nishida, art exemplifies kōiteki chokkan , enacted by the interplay of action, intuition, and world. For Noë, art is an activity that offers new ways to organise life. Building on John C. Maraldo’s enactivist reading of kōiteki chokkan , this paper argues that Nishida and Noë share an implicitly enactivist view of art, where artistic actions and intuitions both shape and get shaped by the world. While they differ on the artist’s role, their perspectives together offer a more robust enactivist theory of art.Item The intentional stance and revealed preference(Springer Science and Business Media LLC, 2025-11-28) Ross, DonIn various contributions over many years, I have argued that the core methodology of mainstream microeconomics can best be defended by reference to Dennett’s intentional stance. This elucidating relationship is mutual: we can also learn about the logic of the intentional stance as a basis for behavioural science by examining it in action in economics. This examination directs attention to a specific broad theme in the history of the behavioural sciences, the subtle relationship between behaviourism and realism about intentional concepts.Item The right to freedom of thought: an interdisciplinary analysis of the UN special rapporteur’s report on freedom of thought(Taylor and Francis Ltd., 2023-06-23) O'Callaghan, Patrick; Cronin, Olga; Kelly, Brendan D.; Shiner, Bethany; Walmsley, Joel; McCarthy-Jones, Simon; Irish Research CouncilIn 2021, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief presented his ‘Report on Freedom of Thought’ to the United Nations General Assembly. This was the first substantive consideration of the right to freedom of thought at the United Nations level since the right was recognised in 1948. This paper provides interdisciplinary reflections on this report to support ongoing discussions on the appropriate content and scope of this fundamental human right. We begin by addressing reasons for the historical neglect of this right, namely the right being viewed as more symbolic than practical and relevant interests being perceived as already protected by other rights. Next, given there is no consensus on what the right protects, or how it protects, we consider its potential attributes. We then consider potential violations of this right, turning to its application to mental health. Finally, we consider the Special Rapporteur’s recommendations, discussing how some may be realised through human rights-centered regulation in the form of the European Union’s new Digital Services Act. In this context, we also briefly consider relevant aspects of the EU Commission’s proposal for an AI Act. We conclude by outlining pressing challenges facing the development of this rightItem Guo Xiang’s metaethics(Taylor & Francis, 2025-08-11) Dockstader, JasonThis paper contributes to the emerging field of comparative metaethics by placing the thought of the Neo-Daoist, Guo Xiang 郭象, within the taxonomy of contemporary metaethics in order to offer two novel views: nonassertive moral abolitionism and reactionary moral fictionalism. These views help answer the ‘now what?’ question that arises for moral error theorists after they come to believe that all moral judgments are false. The views also assist in the understanding of Guo’s attempt to combine Daoism and Confucianism through his synthesis of ziran 自然 and mingjiao 名教, spontaneity and morality. The paper defends the claims that Guo was a proto-error theorist and used a distinct criterion to answer the ‘now what?’ question. With this criterion, Guo recommends morality’s quiet abolition along with the reservation of occasionally implementing a passive and reactive pretense performance of moral speech-acts when socially required.Item Modelling conditionally respected social norms: a critique from the intentional stance(Taylor & Francis, 2025-07-21) Ross, Don; Wang, Cuizhu; University of Capetown; Narodowym Centrum NaukiThere is a broad consensus in the leading general literature on norms and norm-change that norms are conditional, and based on descriptive and normative expectations. Expectations are a sub-set of beliefs. Hence some primary barriers to norm-change arise from dynamics among beliefs, and between beliefs and preferences. However, the literature has under-examined the distinction between two such barriers, preference falsification and pluralistic ignorance. We clarify the implications of the distinction for two leading conceptual frameworks (due to Kuran and Bicchieri, respectively), and ultimately for explicit models, of norms and norm change. We furthermore explain how, once this clarification is in place, the two models are naturally reconciled by interpreting the concepts of belief – and also preference – that they incorporate as based on attribution from Dennett’s intentional stance.