Cognition and recognition: on the problem of the cognitive in Honneth
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Date
2012-05-08
Authors
Strydom, Piet
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SAGE Publications
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Abstract
While concurring with Honneth’s reconstruction of reification as a form of forgetfulness, this article questions the way in which he arrives at that conclusion as well as the conceptual status he ascribes to recognition – the instance with reference to which reification is exhibited as distortion or deformation. It argues, first, that Honneth’s dualistic mode of argumentation falls behind the left-Hegelian tradition which he himself seeks to revitalize, thus causing a serious architectonic problem; and, second, that while polemicizing strongly against the cognitive approach, he at crucial points actually reverts to the very resources made available by that mode of thinking. Being the central concern of the article, this latter aspect is treated as the cognitive problem in his work, especially in his Tanner Lectures.
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Keywords
Cognitive science , Critical theory , John Dewey , Charles Peirce , Reification , Jürgen Habermas , Georg Lukács
Citation
Strydom, P. (2012) 'Cognition and recognition: on the problem of the cognitive in Honneth', Philosophy and Social Criticism, 38(6), pp. 591-607. doi:10.1177/0191453712442141
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© 2012, the Author. Reprinted by permission of SAGE Publications.