Reactionary moral fictionalism

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Date
2019-07-18
Authors
Dockstader, Jason
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Springer Nature Switzerland AG
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Abstract
There is a debate among moral error theorists. It concerns what is to be done with moral discourse once it is believed to be systematically false or untrue. It has been called the ‘now what’ problem. Should error theorists abolish morality or insulate themselves in some way from this nihilistic consequence of belief in error theory? Assertive moral abolitionism aims to have error theorists avoid any insulation and abolish morality altogether. Revolutionary moral fictionalism aims for insulation by having error theorists start treating morality as a useful fiction. There are certain problems with assertive moral abolitionism and revolutionary moral fictionalism, however. This paper argues for a hybrid view that combines the best parts of both views. I call this position ‘reactionary moral fictionalism.’ It says it might be wise for certain individual error theorists to abolish morality in most cases, but remain quiet about their abolition. It also says that these error theorists should use morality as a fiction in those situations where it would be practically detrimental not to use moral discourse. In such situations, the error theorist should employ moral fictionalism. A fictionalist approach should thus be used only as a passive reaction to contexts where it cannot be avoided. The advice offered to certain individual error theorists by reactionary moral fictionalism is thus ‘abolish morality when one can, but use morality as a fiction when one has to.’ It is argued that this solution to the ‘now what’ problem offers superior therapeutic benefits for these individuals and could possibly serve as a compromise between assertive moral abolitionism and revolutionary moral fictionalism.
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Metaethics , Moral error theory , Assertive moral abolitionism , Revolutionary moral fictionalism
Citation
Dockstader, J. (2019) 'Reactionary moral fictionalism', Philosophia. doi: 10.1007/s11406-019-00106-3
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© 2019, Springer Nature B.V. This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of a paper published in Philosophia on 18 July 2019. The final authenticated version is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-019-00106-3