Nonassertive moral abolitionism

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dc.check.date2021-07-04
dc.check.infoAccess to this article is restricted until 24 months after publication by request of the publisher.en
dc.contributor.authorDockstader, Jason
dc.date.accessioned2019-07-18T10:50:23Z
dc.date.available2019-07-18T10:50:23Z
dc.date.issued2019-07-04
dc.date.updated2019-07-18T09:21:10Z
dc.description.abstractProponents of moral abolitionism, like Richard Garner, qualify their view as an Ć¢ assertiveĆ¢ version of the position. They counsel moral realists and anti-realists alike to accept moral error theory, abolish morality, and encourage others to abolish morality. In response, this paper argues that moral error theorists should abolish morality, but become quiet about such abolition. It offers a quietist or nonassertive version of moral abolitionism. It does so by first clarifying and addressing the arguments for and against assertive moral abolitionism. Second, it develops novel criticisms of assertive moral abolitionism and offers nonassertive moral abolitionism in response. Third, it discusses how various metaethical views might respond to nonassertive moral abolitionism. Its basic claim is that nonassertive moral abolitionism provides superior therapeutic benefits over assertive moral abolitionism and other conserving and reforming approaches to moral discourse.en
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden
dc.description.versionAccepted Versionen
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen
dc.identifier.citationDockstader, J. (2019) 'Nonassertive moral abolitionism', Metaphilosophy, 50(4), pp. 481-502. doi: 10.1111/meta.12368en
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/meta.12368en
dc.identifier.eissn1467-9973
dc.identifier.endpage502en
dc.identifier.issn0026-1068
dc.identifier.issued4en
dc.identifier.journaltitleMetaphilosophyen
dc.identifier.startpage481en
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10468/8196
dc.identifier.volume50en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherJohn Wiley & Sons, Inc.en
dc.relation.urihttps://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/meta.12368
dc.rightsĀ© 2019, Metaphilosophy LLC and John Wiley & Sons Ltd. This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Dockstader, J. (2019) 'Nonassertive moral abolitionism', Metaphilosophy, 50(4), pp. 481-502. doi: 10.1111/meta.12368, which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1111/meta.12368. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Use of Self-Archived Versions.en
dc.subjectMetaethicsen
dc.subjectMoral abolitionismen
dc.subjectMoral antirealismen
dc.subjectMoral error theoryen
dc.subjectMoral nihilismen
dc.titleNonassertive moral abolitionismen
dc.typeArticle (peer-reviewed)en
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