On Parfit’s ontology
Taylor & Francis
Parfit denies that the introduction of reasons into our ontology is costly for his theory. He puts forth two positions to help establish the claim: the Plural Senses View and the Argument from Empty Ontology. I argue that, first, the Plural Senses View for ‘exists’ can be expanded to allow for senses which undermine his ontological claims; second, the Argument from Empty Ontology can be debunked by Platonists. Furthermore, it is difficult to make statements about reasons true unless these statements include reference to objects in reality. These arguments show the instability of Parfit’s claimed metaethical advantages over naturalism.
Abstracta , Derek Parfit , On What Matters , Platonism , Meta ethics , Ontology , Reasons , Truth
Mintz-Woo, K. (2018) 'On Parfit's Ontology', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 48 (5), pp. 707-725. doi: 10.1080/00455091.2017.1381935
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