Sara Protasi: The Philosophy of Envy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021. Hardback (ISBN 978-1-316-51917-2), £75. 260 pp
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Date
2022-05-19
Authors
Montes Sánchez, Alba
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Springer
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Abstract
Envy is a complex and intriguing emotion that has received too little philosophical attention in recent years. Sara Protasi has come to remedy that gap with an original, thorough and carefully researched monograph that defends the view that envy is not all vicious, that one of its varieties can be fully virtuous, and that it plays an important role in our moral psychology.
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Sara Protasi , Envy , Moral psychology
Citation
Montes Sánchez, A. (2022) ‘Sara Protasi: The Philosophy of Envy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021. Hardback (ISBN 978-1-316-51917-2), £75. 260 pp’, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 25 (3), pp. 517–519, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-022-10294-9
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© The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V. 2022. This version of the article has been accepted for publication, after peer review and is subject to Springer Nature’s AM terms of use, but is not the Version of Record and does not reflect post-acceptance improvements, or any corrections. The Version of Record is available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10677-022-10294-9