On Habermas's differentiation of rightness from truth: can an achievement concept do without a validity concept?

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dc.contributor.authorStrydom, Piet
dc.date.accessioned2019-02-06T10:11:06Z
dc.date.available2019-02-06T10:11:06Z
dc.date.issued2018-12-03
dc.date.updated2019-02-06T10:06:00Z
dc.description.abstractThe metaproblematic of this article is the cognitive structure of morality. In the context of an investigation into Habermas’s theory of validity which respects his strong cognitivism and emphasis on moral knowledge, the focus is on his proposal to treat rightness as ‘justification-immanent’ rather than as ‘justification-transcendent’, as in the case of truth. The imputation of asymmetrical validity bases to rightness and truth is probed in terms of the distinction between achievement and validity concepts which is informed by the mathematical–philosophical conceptual pair of finite and infinite ideal limit concepts. The thrust of the argument is spearheaded by the question whether the process of the discursive construction and justification of rightness is not of necessity required, as in the case of truth, to have recourse to a transcendent – albeit immanently rooted – cognitive property beyond formal-pragmatically backed procedural presuppositions to secure its validity. A final brief coda collates suggestions made in the course of the argumentation towards a cognitive–sociological approach that links up with Habermas’s central concepts and could complement his inspiring vision of the ‘cultural embodiment of reason’.en
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden
dc.description.versionAccepted Versionen
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen
dc.identifier.citationStrydom, P. (2018) 'On Habermas's differentiation of rightness from truth: can an achievement concept do without a validity concept?', Philosophy and Social Criticism, pp. 1-20. doi:10.1177/0191453718816346en
dc.identifier.doi10.1177/0191453718816346
dc.identifier.endpage20en
dc.identifier.issn0191-4537
dc.identifier.issn1461-734X
dc.identifier.journaltitlePhilosophy and Social Criticismen
dc.identifier.startpage1en
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10468/7446
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherSAGE Publicationsen
dc.relation.urihttps://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0191453718816346
dc.rights© 2018, the Author. Reprinted by permission of SAGE Publications.en
dc.subjectFormal pragmaticsen
dc.subjectHabermasen
dc.subjectJusticeen
dc.subjectLimit concepten
dc.subjectMoralityen
dc.subjectProceduralismen
dc.subjectTruthen
dc.subjectValidityen
dc.titleOn Habermas's differentiation of rightness from truth: can an achievement concept do without a validity concept?en
dc.typeArticle (peer-reviewed)en
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