Breaking the regravelling trap: A fiscal-federalism contract for upgrading South Africa’s unpaved roads
Loading...
Date
2026-06-08
Authors
Ross, Don
Townshend, Matthew
van der Westhuizen, Vincent
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Economic Research Southern Africa (ERSA)
Economic Research Southern Africa (ERSA)
Economic Research Southern Africa (ERSA)
Published Version
Abstract
South Africa’s provincial and municipal road networks are dominated by low-volume gravel roads that are essential for service delivery and market access but are chronically under-upgraded. This paper argues that the persistence of repeated regravelling, reactive repairs, and post-disaster reinstatement is not primarily an engineering failure; it is an intergovernmental public investment problem. Responsibilities are decentralised across multiple principals and agents, benefits from upgrading are partly non-excludable and spill across jurisdictions, and budget holders face short-horizon fiscal constraints. The resulting wedge between national welfare and sub-national private incentives generates an underinvestment equilibrium in which economically justified upgrades are deferred and recurrent maintenance liabilities compound.
Description
Keywords
[SocietyPoliticsEthics] , Public investment management , Intergovernmental fiscal relations , Conditional grants , Performance-based financing , Low-volume sealed roads
Citation
Ross, D, Townshend, M & van der Westhuizen, V 2026 'Breaking the regravelling trap: A fiscal-federalism contract for upgrading South Africa’s unpaved roads' Policy Papers, vol. 2026, Economic Research Southern Africa (ERSA) , pp. 1-35. https://doi.org/10.71587/zwa9am73