Endogenous choice of institutional punishment mechanisms to promote social cooperation

Simple item page
dc.contributor.authorBotelho, Anabela
dc.contributor.authorHarrison, Glenn W.
dc.contributor.authorPinto, LĂ­gia M. Costa
dc.contributor.authorRoss, Don
dc.contributor.authorRutstrom, Elisabet E.
dc.contributor.funderNational Science Foundationen
dc.contributor.funderFundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologiaen
dc.date.accessioned2021-01-22T11:38:49Z
dc.date.available2021-01-22T11:38:49Z
dc.date.issued2021-01-03
dc.date.updated2021-01-22T11:27:39Z
dc.description.abstractDoes the desirability of social institutions for public goods provision depend on the extent to which they include mechanisms for endogenous enforcement of cooperative behavior? We consider alternative institutions that vary the use of direct punishments to promote social cooperation. In one institution, subjects participate in a public goods experiment in which an initial stage of voluntary contribution is followed by a second stage of voluntary, costly sanctioning. Another institution consists of the voluntary contribution stage only, with no subsequent opportunity to sanction. In a third stage subjects vote for which institution they prefer for future interactions: do they prefer one that does allow sanctions or one that does not allow sanctions? Our results show that even though sanctions are frequently used when available, the clear majority of individuals vote for the institution that does not allow sanctions. Thus, a distinction is required between the principles that guide the choice of institutions and the principles that apply to actions guided by institutions. Our results indicate that it is the wealth generated by the institution that determines its desirability.en
dc.description.sponsorshipU.S. National Science Foundation (Grants NSF/IIS 9817518, NSF/HSD 0527675 and NSF/SES 0616746); Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia (sabbatical scholarships SFRH/BSAB/489/2005 and SFRH/BSAB/491/2005), (Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology (project UID/ECO/03182/2019))en
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden
dc.description.versionAccepted Versionen
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen
dc.identifier.citationBotelho, A., Harrison, G. W., Pinto, L/ M. C., Ross, D. and Rutstrom, E. E. (2021) 'Endogenous choice of institutional punishment mechanisms to promote social cooperation', Public Choice, 191, pp. 309-335. doi: 10.1007/s11127-020-00868-5en
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s11127-020-00868-5en
dc.identifier.endpage27en
dc.identifier.endpage335
dc.identifier.issn0048-5829
dc.identifier.journaltitlePublic Choiceen
dc.identifier.startpage1en
dc.identifier.startpage309
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10468/10950
dc.identifier.volume191
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherSpringeren
dc.relation.urihttps://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11127-020-00868-5
dc.rights© The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Science+Business Media, LLC part of Springer Nature 2021. This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Public Choice. The final authenticated version is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-020-00868-5en
dc.subjectPublic goodsen
dc.subjectAltruistic punishmenten
dc.subjectReputationen
dc.subjectProvisionen
dc.subjectSanctionsen
dc.subjectBehavioren
dc.subjectSocial institutionsen
dc.subjectVotingen
dc.subjectLaboratory experimentsen
dc.titleEndogenous choice of institutional punishment mechanisms to promote social cooperationen
dc.typeArticle (peer-reviewed)en
Files
Original bundle
Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
Thumbnail Image
Name:
EndogenousChoice_AV.pdf
Size:
1.97 MB
Format:
Adobe Portable Document Format
Description:
Accepted version
Download
License bundle
Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
Thumbnail Image
Name:
license.txt
Size:
2.71 KB
Format:
Item-specific license agreed upon to submission
Description:
Download
Collections
Philosophy - Journal Articles