A flexible, sloppy blob? Ontology, AI, and the role of metaphysics
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Date
2023-01-01
Authors
Ross, Don
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Publisher
University of Illinois Press
Published Version
Abstract
Ladyman and Ross argue that analytic metaphysics is a misguided enterprise that should give way to a naturalized metaphysics that aims to reconcile everyday and special-scientific ontologies with fundamental physics as the authoritative source of knowledge on the general structure of the universe. Le Bihan and Barton (argue, as against this, that analytic metaphysics remains useful as a basis for the body of work in AI known as “applied ontology.” They stop short of claiming, however, that analytic metaphysics is useful as metaphysics. I consider a basis for making the stronger claim: Smith's project for building what he claims to be metaphysical foundations for applied ontology (and for AI generally). Ultimately, the stronger claim is rejected; but in the course of this dialectic new aspects of the naturalistic metaphysical project come to light, including relationships between it and the traditional metaphysical project of providing foundations for philosophical semantics of truth and reference.
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Keywords
Naturalized metaphysics , Applied ontology , Objects in AI , Flex and slop , Austere realism
Citation
Ross, D. (2023) 'A flexible, sloppy blob? Ontology, AI, and the role of metaphysics', American Philosophical Quarterly, 60(1), pp. 5-19. doi: 10.5406/21521123.60.1.02
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© 2023, Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois. This is the peer reviewed version of the following item: Ross, D. (2023) 'A flexible, sloppy blob? Ontology, AI, and the role of metaphysics', American Philosophical Quarterly, 60(1), pp. 5-19, doi: 10.5406/21521123.60.1.02, which has been published in final form at: https://doi.org/10.5406/21521123.60.1.02