Endogenous choice of institutional punishment mechanisms to promote social cooperation
Loading...
Files
Accepted version
Date
2021-01-03
Authors
Botelho, Anabela
Harrison, Glenn W.
Pinto, LĂgia M. Costa
Ross, Don
Rutstrom, Elisabet E.
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Springer
Published Version
Abstract
Does the desirability of social institutions for public goods provision depend on the extent to which they include mechanisms for endogenous enforcement of cooperative behavior? We consider alternative institutions that vary the use of direct punishments to promote social cooperation. In one institution, subjects participate in a public goods experiment in which an initial stage of voluntary contribution is followed by a second stage of voluntary, costly sanctioning. Another institution consists of the voluntary contribution stage only, with no subsequent opportunity to sanction. In a third stage subjects vote for which institution they prefer for future interactions: do they prefer one that does allow sanctions or one that does not allow sanctions? Our results show that even though sanctions are frequently used when available, the clear majority of individuals vote for the institution that does not allow sanctions. Thus, a distinction is required between the principles that guide the choice of institutions and the principles that apply to actions guided by institutions. Our results indicate that it is the wealth generated by the institution that determines its desirability.
Description
Keywords
Public goods , Altruistic punishment , Reputation , Provision , Sanctions , Behavior , Social institutions , Voting , Laboratory experiments
Citation
Botelho, A., Harrison, G. W., Pinto, L/ M. C., Ross, D. and Rutstrom, E. E. (2021) 'Endogenous choice of institutional punishment mechanisms to promote social cooperation', Public Choice, 191, pp. 309-335. doi: 10.1007/s11127-020-00868-5
Link to publisher’s version
Collections
Copyright
© The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Science+Business Media, LLC part of Springer Nature 2021. This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Public Choice. The final authenticated version is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-020-00868-5