Practical intentionality: from Brentano to the phenomenology of the Munich and Göttingen Circles

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dc.contributor.author Salice, Alessandro
dc.date.accessioned 2019-02-05T12:27:19Z
dc.date.available 2019-02-05T12:27:19Z
dc.date.issued 2018-06-14
dc.identifier.citation Salice, A. (2018) 'Practical intentionality: from Brentano to the phenomenology of the Munich and Göttingen Circles', in Zahavi, D. (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of the History of Phenomenology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 604-622. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198755340.013.7 en
dc.identifier.startpage 604 en
dc.identifier.endpage 622 en
dc.identifier.isbn 9780198755340
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10468/7437
dc.identifier.doi 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198755340.013.7
dc.description.abstract The aim of this chapter is to mine, reconstruct, and evaluate the phenomenological notion of practical intentionality. It is claimed that the phenomenologists of the Munich and Göttingen Circles substantially modify the idea of practical intentionality originally developed by Franz Brentano. This development, it is further contended, anticipates the switch that occurred within contemporary theory of action from a belief-desire (BD) to a belief-desire-intention (BDI) model of deliberation. While Brentanoâ s position can be interpreted as a variant of the BD model, early phenomenologists propose a general theory of deliberation that, in line with the BDI account, puts the notion of intention at the very core of practical intentionality. On their understanding, the concept of intention points to a primitive kind of mental state that cannot be reduced to a combination of beliefs and desires. en
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf en
dc.language.iso en en
dc.publisher Oxford University Press en
dc.relation.ispartof The Oxford Handbook of the History of Phenomenology
dc.relation.uri http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198755340.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780198755340-e-7
dc.rights © 2018, Alessandro Salice. This manuscript version is reproduced by permission of Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. en
dc.subject Belief en
dc.subject Desire en
dc.subject Intention en
dc.subject Practical intentionality en
dc.subject Franz Brentano en
dc.subject Early phenomenology en
dc.title Practical intentionality: from Brentano to the phenomenology of the Munich and Göttingen Circles en
dc.type Book chapter en
dc.internal.authorcontactother Alessandro Salice, Philosophy, University College Cork, Cork, Ireland. +353-21-490-3000 Email: alessandro.salice@ucc.ie en
dc.internal.availability Full text available en
dc.check.info Access to this chapter is restricted until 24 months after publication by request of the publisher. en
dc.check.date 2020-06-14
dc.date.updated 2019-02-05T11:39:04Z
dc.description.version Accepted Version en
dc.internal.rssid 472455752
dc.description.status Peer reviewed en
dc.internal.copyrightchecked Yes en
dc.internal.licenseacceptance Yes en
dc.internal.placepublication Oxford en
dc.internal.IRISemailaddress alessandro.salice@ucc.ie en


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