Does tenure matter: role of the corporate secretary in Chinese-listed firms

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dc.contributor.author Wang, Chen
dc.contributor.author Ye, Qing
dc.contributor.author Goyal, Abhinav
dc.date.accessioned 2020-01-21T16:14:01Z
dc.date.available 2020-01-21T16:14:01Z
dc.date.issued 2018-07
dc.identifier.citation Wang, C., Ye, Q. and Goyal, A. (2019) 'Does Tenure Matter: Role of the Corporate Secretary in Chinese-Listed Firms', Accounting Horizons, 33(1), pp. 181-205. doi: 10.2308/acch-52225 en
dc.identifier.volume 33 en
dc.identifier.issued 1 en
dc.identifier.startpage 181 en
dc.identifier.endpage 205 en
dc.identifier.issn 0888-7993
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10468/9549
dc.identifier.doi 10.2308/acch-52225 en
dc.description.abstract We study the impact of corporate secretary tenure on the governance quality of Chinese A-share listed firms. Results show that corporate secretary tenure is negatively associated with board meeting frequency, outside director in-meeting dissent, and incidence of fraud and lawsuit. Key findings are robust to an array of additional tests including propensity score matching, instrument variable analysis, as well as alternate governance measures such as analyst coverage, modified auditor opinion, number of institutional shareholders, and outside director board meeting absence. Overall, our study confirms the importance of corporate secretary in favor of modern corporate governance outcomes and board processes. en
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf en
dc.language.iso en en
dc.publisher American Accounting Association en
dc.rights © 2019 American Accounting Association. This is the Accepted Manuscript of an article published by American Accounting Association in Accounting Horizon. The published version is available at https://doi.org/10.2308/acch-52225 en
dc.subject Corporate governance en
dc.subject Corporate secretary en
dc.subject Fraud en
dc.subject Lawsuit en
dc.subject Outside directors en
dc.subject Tenure en
dc.title Does tenure matter: role of the corporate secretary in Chinese-listed firms en
dc.type Article (peer-reviewed) en
dc.internal.authorcontactother Abhinav Goyal, Cork University Business School, University College Cork, Cork, Ireland. +353-21-490-3000 Email: abhinav.goyal@ucc.ie en
dc.internal.availability Full text available en
dc.date.updated 2020-01-21T16:05:47Z
dc.description.version Accepted Version en
dc.internal.rssid 500175745
dc.description.status Peer reviewed en
dc.identifier.journaltitle Accounting Horizons en
dc.internal.copyrightchecked Yes
dc.internal.licenseacceptance Yes en
dc.internal.IRISemailaddress abhinav.goyal@ucc.ie en


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