Bonus incentives and team effort levels: Evidence from the “Field”

dc.check.date2022-05-22
dc.check.infoAccess to this article is restricted until 24 months after publication by request of the publisher.en
dc.contributor.authorButler, Robert
dc.contributor.authorLenten, Liam J. A.
dc.contributor.authorMassey, Patrick
dc.date.accessioned2020-07-30T10:34:39Z
dc.date.available2020-07-30T10:34:39Z
dc.date.issued2020-05-22
dc.date.updated2020-07-30T10:23:39Z
dc.description.abstractThis study explores the effect of bonus incentive mechanisms with a focus on how such a scheme influences aggregate production levels of teams of workers, specifically. We identify this using data from a highly competitive setting in professional sport, which involves a unique tournament design rule in an elite European rugby competition. The modelling results demonstrate qualified evidence that introducing bonuses to encourage teams to score via the most‐difficult, highest‐reward mode, incentivizes teams to increase effort to earn the bonus, and without reducing production after the bonus is achieved.en
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden
dc.description.versionAccepted Versionen
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen
dc.identifier.citationButler, R., Lenten, L. J. A. and Massey, P. (2020) 'Bonus incentives and team effort levels: Evidence from the “Field”', Scottish Journal of Political Economy. doi: 10.1111/sjpe.12249en
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/sjpe.12249en
dc.identifier.eissn1467-9485
dc.identifier.issn0036-9292
dc.identifier.journaltitleScottish Journal of Political Economyen
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10468/10336
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherJohn Wiley & Sons, Inc.en
dc.rights© 2020, Scottish Economic Society. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Inc. This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Butler, R., Lenten, L. J. A. and Massey, P. (2020) 'Bonus incentives and team effort levels: Evidence from the “Field”', Scottish Journal of Political Economy, doi: 10.1111/sjpe.12249, which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1111/sjpe.12249. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Use of Self-Archived Versions.en
dc.subjectBonusesen
dc.subjectEfforten
dc.subjectIncentivesen
dc.subjectSporten
dc.subjectTeamsen
dc.titleBonus incentives and team effort levels: Evidence from the “Field”en
dc.typeArticle (peer-reviewed)en
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