Practical intentionality: from Brentano to the phenomenology of the Munich and Göttingen Circles

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Salice, Alessandro
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Oxford University Press
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The aim of this chapter is to mine, reconstruct, and evaluate the phenomenological notion of practical intentionality. It is claimed that the phenomenologists of the Munich and Göttingen Circles substantially modify the idea of practical intentionality originally developed by Franz Brentano. This development, it is further contended, anticipates the switch that occurred within contemporary theory of action from a belief-desire (BD) to a belief-desire-intention (BDI) model of deliberation. While Brentanoâ s position can be interpreted as a variant of the BD model, early phenomenologists propose a general theory of deliberation that, in line with the BDI account, puts the notion of intention at the very core of practical intentionality. On their understanding, the concept of intention points to a primitive kind of mental state that cannot be reduced to a combination of beliefs and desires.
Belief , Desire , Intention , Practical intentionality , Franz Brentano , Early phenomenology
Salice, A. (2018) 'Practical intentionality: from Brentano to the phenomenology of the Munich and Göttingen Circles', in Zahavi, D. (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of the History of Phenomenology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 604-622. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198755340.013.7
© 2018, Alessandro Salice. This manuscript version is reproduced by permission of Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.