Shared intentionality and the cooperative evolutionary hypothesis

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dc.contributor.authorSatne, Glenda
dc.contributor.authorSalice, Alessandro
dc.date.accessioned2022-03-29T13:33:52Z
dc.date.available2022-03-29T13:33:52Z
dc.date.issued2020-06-24
dc.date.updated2022-03-29T13:23:27Z
dc.description.abstractOne important application of theories of collective intentionality concerns the evolution of social understanding and even of human thinking (Tomasello M, A natural history of human thinking, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2014). A promising idea behind this approach is the Cooperative Evolutionary Hypothesis (CEH), namely, the idea that humans’ capacity for social cooperation is at the heart of their ability to understand others’ mental states and behavior, leading to an explanation of how humans came to share thoughts and language. However, some of the most popular defenses of CEH face important problems. In this paper, we take Tomasello’s account (J Soc Ontol 2(1):117–123, 2016); A natural history of human thinking. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2014; Origins of human communication. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2008) as a leading example of the CEH which faces such insurmountable problems. In particular, we argue that Tomasello’s analysis of cooperation and spontaneous help is problematic. We locate a source of such issues in the assumption that the right account of joint action and simple forms of shared intentionality is that which is offered by Bratman’s theory of shared intentions. The second part of the article proposes and defends an alternative framework for understanding shared intentionality that can help substantiate CEH.en
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden
dc.description.versionAccepted Versionen
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen
dc.identifier.citationSatne, G. and Salice, A. (2020) 'Shared intentionality and the cooperative evolutionary hypothesis', in Fiebich, A. (ed.) Minimal Cooperation and Shared Agency. Studies in the Philosophy of Sociality, 11, pp. 71-92. Springer, Cham. doi: 10.1007/978-3-030-29783-1_5en
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/978-3-030-29783-1_5en
dc.identifier.endpage92en
dc.identifier.isbn978-3-030-29783-1
dc.identifier.journaltitleSudies in the Philosophy of Socialityen
dc.identifier.startpage71en
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10468/13020
dc.identifier.volume11en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherSpringeren
dc.relation.ispartofMinimal Cooperation and Shared Agency
dc.relation.urihttps://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-29783-1_5
dc.rights© 2020, Springer Nature Switzerland AG. This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of a chapter published in Fiebich, A. (ed.) Minimal Cooperation and Shared Agency. Studies in the Philosophy of Sociality, 11. The final authenticated version is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29783-1_5en
dc.subjectCooperationen
dc.subjectCollective intentionalityen
dc.subjectEvolutionen
dc.titleShared intentionality and the cooperative evolutionary hypothesisen
dc.typeBook chapteren
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