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Bonus incentives and team effort levels: Evidence from the “Field”
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Lenten, Liam J. A.
John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
This study explores the effect of bonus incentive mechanisms with a focus on how such a scheme influences aggregate production levels of teams of workers, specifically. We identify this using data from a highly competitive setting in professional sport, which involves a unique tournament design rule in an elite European rugby competition. The modelling results demonstrate qualified evidence that introducing bonuses to encourage teams to score via the most‐difficult, highest‐reward mode, incentivizes teams to increase effort to earn the bonus, and without reducing production after the bonus is achieved.
Bonuses , Effort , Incentives , Sport , Teams
Butler, R., Lenten, L. J. A. and Massey, P. (2020) 'Bonus incentives and team effort levels: Evidence from the “Field”', Scottish Journal of Political Economy. doi: 10.1111/sjpe.12249
© 2020, Scottish Economic Society. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Inc. This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Butler, R., Lenten, L. J. A. and Massey, P. (2020) 'Bonus incentives and team effort levels: Evidence from the “Field”', Scottish Journal of Political Economy, doi: 10.1111/sjpe.12249, which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1111/sjpe.12249. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Use of Self-Archived Versions.