Contracts, pay and performance in the sport of kings: Evidence from horse racing

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Date
2021-04-06
Authors
Butler, David
Butler, Robert
Simmons, Robert
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John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
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Abstract
A considerable body of evidence shows that performance‐related pay schemes can raise worker productivity with much of this increase due to worker sorting. However, variations in the power of performance‐related pay contracts are rarely observed. The thoroughbred horse racing industry offers such an opportunity. Contrary to earlier research, we find no evidence of worker shirking when the power of incentive contracts is reduced through jockeys switching from complete performance‐related pay schemes into a salaried (retainer) contract. Moreover, salary contracts result in legacy effects with superior performance continuing for elite jockeys even after their salary agreements have expired. We argue this is due to a reduction in monitoring costs.
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Keywords
Horse racing , Performance-related pay , Contracts , Incentives
Citation
Butler, D., Butler, R. and Simmons, R. (2021) 'Contracts, pay and performance in the sport of kings: Evidence from horse racing', British Journal of Industrial Relations. doi: 10.1111/bjir.12600
Copyright
© 2021, John Wiley & Sons Ltd. This is the peer reviewed version of the following item: Butler, D., Butler, R. and Simmons, R. (2021) 'Contracts, pay and performance in the sport of kings: Evidence from horse racing', British Journal of Industrial Relations, doi: 10.1111/bjir.12600, which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1111/bjir.12600. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Use of Self-Archived Versions.