Contracts, pay and performance in the sport of kings: Evidence from horse racing
dc.contributor.author | Butler, David | |
dc.contributor.author | Butler, Robert | |
dc.contributor.author | Simmons, Robert | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-05-12T09:08:54Z | |
dc.date.available | 2021-05-12T09:08:54Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2021-04-06 | |
dc.date.updated | 2021-05-12T08:54:17Z | |
dc.description.abstract | A considerable body of evidence shows that performance‐related pay schemes can raise worker productivity with much of this increase due to worker sorting. However, variations in the power of performance‐related pay contracts are rarely observed. The thoroughbred horse racing industry offers such an opportunity. Contrary to earlier research, we find no evidence of worker shirking when the power of incentive contracts is reduced through jockeys switching from complete performance‐related pay schemes into a salaried (retainer) contract. Moreover, salary contracts result in legacy effects with superior performance continuing for elite jockeys even after their salary agreements have expired. We argue this is due to a reduction in monitoring costs. | en |
dc.description.status | Peer reviewed | en |
dc.description.version | Accepted Version | en |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | en |
dc.identifier.citation | Butler, D., Butler, R. and Simmons, R. (2021) 'Contracts, pay and performance in the sport of kings: Evidence from horse racing', British Journal of Industrial Relations. doi: 10.1111/bjir.12600 | en |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1111/bjir.12600 | en |
dc.identifier.eissn | 1467-8543 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 0007-1080 | |
dc.identifier.journaltitle | British Journal of Industrial Relations | en |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10468/11292 | |
dc.language.iso | en | en |
dc.publisher | John Wiley & Sons, Inc. | en |
dc.rights | © 2021, John Wiley & Sons Ltd. This is the peer reviewed version of the following item: Butler, D., Butler, R. and Simmons, R. (2021) 'Contracts, pay and performance in the sport of kings: Evidence from horse racing', British Journal of Industrial Relations, doi: 10.1111/bjir.12600, which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1111/bjir.12600. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Use of Self-Archived Versions. | en |
dc.subject | Horse racing | en |
dc.subject | Performance-related pay | en |
dc.subject | Contracts | en |
dc.subject | Incentives | en |
dc.title | Contracts, pay and performance in the sport of kings: Evidence from horse racing | en |
dc.type | Article (peer-reviewed) | en |
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