Funding lotteries for research grant allocation: An extended taxonomy and evaluation of their fairness

dc.contributor.authorFeliciani, Thomasen
dc.contributor.authorLuo, Junwenen
dc.contributor.authorShankar, Kalpanaen
dc.contributor.funderScience Foundation Irelanden
dc.date.accessioned2024-09-06T15:45:34Z
dc.date.available2024-09-06T15:45:34Z
dc.date.issued2024-08-17en
dc.description.abstractSome research funding organizations (funders) are experimenting with random allocation of funding (funding lotteries), whereby funding is awarded to a random subset of eligible applicants evaluated positively by review panels. There is no consensus on which allocation rule is fairer—traditional peer review or funding lotteries—partly because there exist different ways of implementing funding lotteries, and partly because different selection procedures satisfy different ideas of fairness (desiderata). Here we focus on two desiderata: that funding be allocated by ‘merit’ (epistemic correctness) versus following ethical considerations, for example without perpetuating biases (unbiased fairness) and without concentrating resources in the hands of a few (distributive fairness). We contribute to the debate first by differentiating among different existing lottery types in an extended taxonomy of selection procedures; and second, by evaluating (via Monte Carlo simulations) how these different selection procedures meet the different desiderata under different conditions. The extended taxonomy distinguishes “Types” of selection procedures by the role of randomness in guiding funding decisions, from null (traditional peer review), to minimal and extensive (various types of funding lotteries). Simulations show that low-randomness Types (e.g. ‘tie-breaking’ lotteries) do not differ meaningfully from traditional peer review in the way they prioritize epistemic correctness at the cost of lower unbiased and distributive fairness. Probably unbeknownst to funders, another common lottery Type (lotteries where some favorably-evaluated proposals bypass the lottery) displays marked variation in epistemic correctness and fairness depending on the specific bypass implementation. We discuss implications for funders who run funding lotteries or are considering doing so.en
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden
dc.description.versionPublished Versionen
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen
dc.identifier.articleidrvae025en
dc.identifier.citationFeliciani, T., Luo, J. and Shankar, K. (2024) ‘Funding lotteries for research grant allocation: An extended taxonomy and evaluation of their fairness’, Research Evaluation, 33(1), p. rvae025. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1093/reseval/rvae025en
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1093/reseval/rvae025en
dc.identifier.endpage13en
dc.identifier.issn0958-2029en
dc.identifier.issn1471-5449en
dc.identifier.journaltitleResearch Evaluationen
dc.identifier.startpage1en
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10468/16305
dc.identifier.volume33en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherOxford University Pressen
dc.relation.ispartofResearch Evaluationen
dc.relation.projectinfo:eu-repo/grantAgreement/SFI/SFI Science Policy Research Programme/17/SPR/5319/IE/A Mixed-Methods Examination of Reviewer Recruitment, Assessment Criteria, and Workflow in the Peer Review Process/en
dc.rights© The Author(s) 2024. Published by Oxford University Press. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. For commercial re-use, please contact journals.permissions@oup.comen
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/en
dc.subjectFunding lotteryen
dc.subjectRandomizationen
dc.subjectResearch evaluationen
dc.subjectScience fundingen
dc.subjectSocial simulationen
dc.titleFunding lotteries for research grant allocation: An extended taxonomy and evaluation of their fairnessen
dc.typeArticle (peer-reviewed)en
oaire.citation.issue1en
oaire.citation.volume33en
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