A foundation for Pareto optimality

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A foundation for Pareto optimality

Duddy, Conal; Piggins, Ashley
Date: 2020-03-04
Copyright: © 2020 Elsevier B. V. All rights reserved. This manuscript version is made available under the CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license.
Copyright information: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Related: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304406820300306
Full text restriction information: Access to this article is restricted until 24 months after publication by request of the publisher.
Restriction lift date: 2022-03-04
Citation: Duddy, C. and Piggins, A. (2020) 'A foundation for Pareto optimality', Journal of Mathematical Economics, 88, pp. 25-30. doi: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.02.005
Published Version: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.02.005

Abstract:

Can an axiomatic justification be given for the requirement that society picks all and only Pareto optimal alternatives at each profile of individual preferences? Using the framework of fixed-agenda social choice theory, we present a characterization of the Pareto optimal social choice correspondence. We introduce a new independence condition, P-independence. When combined with three natural assumptions, P-independence leads to the conclusion that the social choice set and the Pareto optimal set are the same.

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© 2020 Elsevier B. V. All rights reserved. This manuscript version is made available under the CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license. Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as © 2020 Elsevier B. V. All rights reserved. This manuscript version is made available under the CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license.
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