Access to this article is restricted until 24 months after publication by request of the publisher.. Restriction lift date: 2022-03-04
A foundation for Pareto optimality
| dc.check.date | 2022-03-04 | |
| dc.check.info | Access to this article is restricted until 24 months after publication by request of the publisher. | en |
| dc.contributor.author | Duddy, Conal | |
| dc.contributor.author | Piggins, Ashley | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2020-03-31T09:34:13Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2020-03-31T09:34:13Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2020-03-04 | |
| dc.date.updated | 2020-03-31T09:28:26Z | |
| dc.description.abstract | Can an axiomatic justification be given for the requirement that society picks all and only Pareto optimal alternatives at each profile of individual preferences? Using the framework of fixed-agenda social choice theory, we present a characterization of the Pareto optimal social choice correspondence. We introduce a new independence condition, P-independence. When combined with three natural assumptions, P-independence leads to the conclusion that the social choice set and the Pareto optimal set are the same. | en |
| dc.description.status | Peer reviewed | en |
| dc.description.version | Accepted Version | en |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | en |
| dc.identifier.citation | Duddy, C. and Piggins, A. (2020) 'A foundation for Pareto optimality', Journal of Mathematical Economics, 88, pp. 25-30. doi: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.02.005 | en |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.02.005 | en |
| dc.identifier.endpage | 30 | en |
| dc.identifier.issn | 0304-4068 | |
| dc.identifier.journaltitle | Journal of Mathematical Economics | en |
| dc.identifier.startpage | 25 | en |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10468/9792 | |
| dc.identifier.volume | 88 | en |
| dc.language.iso | en | en |
| dc.publisher | Elsevier | en |
| dc.relation.uri | https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304406820300306 | |
| dc.rights | © 2020 Elsevier B. V. All rights reserved. This manuscript version is made available under the CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license. | en |
| dc.rights.uri | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ | en |
| dc.subject | Fixed agenda | en |
| dc.subject | Oligarchy | en |
| dc.subject | P-independence | en |
| dc.subject | P-oligarchy | en |
| dc.subject | Pareto optimal social choice correspondence | en |
| dc.title | A foundation for Pareto optimality | en |
| dc.type | Article (peer-reviewed) | en |
