A foundation for Pareto optimality

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dc.contributor.authorDuddy, Conal
dc.contributor.authorPiggins, Ashley
dc.date.accessioned2020-03-31T09:34:13Z
dc.date.available2020-03-31T09:34:13Z
dc.date.issued2020-03-04
dc.date.updated2020-03-31T09:28:26Z
dc.description.abstractCan an axiomatic justification be given for the requirement that society picks all and only Pareto optimal alternatives at each profile of individual preferences? Using the framework of fixed-agenda social choice theory, we present a characterization of the Pareto optimal social choice correspondence. We introduce a new independence condition, P-independence. When combined with three natural assumptions, P-independence leads to the conclusion that the social choice set and the Pareto optimal set are the same.en
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden
dc.description.versionAccepted Versionen
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen
dc.identifier.citationDuddy, C. and Piggins, A. (2020) 'A foundation for Pareto optimality', Journal of Mathematical Economics, 88, pp. 25-30. doi: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.02.005en
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.02.005en
dc.identifier.endpage30en
dc.identifier.issn0304-4068
dc.identifier.journaltitleJournal of Mathematical Economicsen
dc.identifier.startpage25en
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10468/9792
dc.identifier.volume88en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherElsevieren
dc.relation.urihttps://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304406820300306
dc.rights© 2020 Elsevier B. V. All rights reserved. This manuscript version is made available under the CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license.en
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/en
dc.subjectFixed agendaen
dc.subjectOligarchyen
dc.subjectP-independenceen
dc.subjectP-oligarchyen
dc.subjectPareto optimal social choice correspondenceen
dc.titleA foundation for Pareto optimalityen
dc.typeArticle (peer-reviewed)en
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